Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

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Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

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Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

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Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

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Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

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Theology of the Family

Where Faith and Family Intersect

Biographies

Notable Works & Great Quotes from Key Figures

Contemporary Voices

1960 AD – present

William Rowe of Detroit 1931 – 2015 AD

(●) The former Bible-school student who gave the problem of evil its most influential modern form, and who insisted that believers can still be reasonable. + If you have ever stood at a graveside and wondered why God allowed this, you have already asked William Rowe’s question. He spent his working life as a philosopher at Purdue University in Indiana, and he asked it more carefully than almost anyone in the twentieth century. His answer was that a world with so much suffering that seems to serve no purpose is evidence, not proof but real evidence, that there is no God. He belongs on a Christian apologetics site for two reasons. The first is that his argument is the one Christian philosophers still have to answer. When believers today talk about the "evidential" problem of evil (the claim that evil makes God unlikely, rather than impossible), the version they have in front of them is usually Rowe’s. The second is the way he argued. He had been a fundamentalist Christian (one of the conservative Protestants who held fast to a short list of "fundamentals" of the faith, the Bible’s complete truthfulness first among them) headed for the ministry. He never sneered at the faith he left, and he coined a name for the atheist who grants that a thoughtful believer can be fully rational: the "friendly atheist." The signature fact is a small one. The paper that made his name, published in 1979, is seven pages long, and the picture at its center is a single fawn caught in a forest fire.

(●) 1931 AD: Born in Detroit and sent, with his brother, to whichever Sunday school was nearest. + William Leonard Rowe was born in Detroit, Michigan, on July 26, 1931, to Ted and Olive Rowe. The Detroit of his boyhood was the city of the auto plants, of the Depression and then of the war factories, and so far as his own account shows, the Rowes kept to no single denomination. Religion came to the boys by geography. As he remembered it, he and his brother were required to attend Sunday school at the nearest Methodist, Baptist, or Presbyterian church, whichever that happened to be. Nothing in those years marked him out as a future philosopher, and nothing yet marked him out as a believer either.

(●) c. 1947 AD: At sixteen he was converted at a Baptist revival, and a year later he gave his life to Christian service. + At sixteen, in an evangelistic service at a Baptist church he attended now and then, Rowe was converted. An evangelistic service is the kind of meeting built around a sermon and an invitation: the preacher calls listeners to come forward and commit their lives to Christ, and he went. The next year, at another such service, he resolved to give his life to some form of Christian service. He meant it. When he finished high school he enrolled in a five-year program at the Detroit Bible Institute, a school that trained young people for the ministry and the mission field. His faith in those years rested, as he later put it, on two things: the experience of his conversion, and a simple acceptance of the Bible as the revealed word of God.

(●) c. 1950 AD: When the Bible school dismissed his favorite teacher, he left for Wayne State and found philosophy. + In his second year at the Institute, his favorite teacher was accused of "ultra-dispensationalism." Dispensationalism is a way of reading the Bible as a series of distinct eras, or dispensations, in God’s dealings with humanity; the "ultra" form pushes the divisions so far that parts of the New Testament are treated as belonging to a different era from the church’s. The trustees held a trial. Rowe, newly elected president of the student body, organized support among the teacher’s students and spoke for him at the hearing, and was deeply disappointed when the man was summarily dismissed. His faith was not shaken, but he could no longer stay. He transferred to Wayne State University in Detroit, happened into a philosophy course, saw that philosophy dealt with questions that bore on theology, and majored in it to prepare himself for seminary. The teacher who impressed him most was George Nakhnikian, a Harvard doctor of philosophy whose father was an Armenian priest, and who was himself an atheist. "In retrospect," Rowe said, "it seems odd that my favourite teacher was an atheist and his favourite student was a fundamentalist Christian." They stayed close for the rest of their lives. He took his bachelor’s degree in philosophy in 1954.

(●) 1954 AD: Seminary in Chicago and a doctorate at Michigan made him a philosopher of religion, and in 1962 Purdue hired him. + Rowe wanted to go to Fuller Theological Seminary in California, a conservative school whose theologians he admired, but Fuller could offer him no money. Chicago Theological Seminary, one of the seminaries affiliated with the University of Chicago, offered a three-year scholarship, and he set his reservations aside and went. A seminary is a graduate school for ministers, and this one opened a new world to him. There he met theologians who were not fundamentalists and learned to read the Bible more critically, which in a seminary means historically: asking who wrote each book, when, and from what earlier sources, the way a historian would question any ancient document. Looking back, he judged that beginning seminary was the first step on a long road, though it was many years before he saw where the road led. He came out with a divinity degree and went on to graduate work in philosophy at the University of Michigan, where he studied under William Alston, a philosopher who would later write about his own return to Christian faith. Rowe’s doctoral work was on Paul Tillich, the German-American theologian who called God "the ground of being" rather than a being among others, and it became his first book, Religious Symbols and God (1968). He finished the doctorate in 1962, and that same year Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana, took him on as an assistant professor of philosophy. He stayed until he retired in 2005.

(●) 1969 AD: After years of prayer without any sense of God’s presence, he realized he had come to believe that God does not exist. + No single argument took his faith away, and he was honest enough to say so. What wore it down, he said, was "the lack of experiences and evidence sufficient to sustain my religious life and my religious convictions." He knew it was wrong to demand a sign from God, but he longed for some sense of God’s presence, spent hours in prayer, tried to live the life of service he found in the Bible, and never had the experience he was looking for. The second strand was the Bible itself. The canon is the list of books the church accepts as Scripture, and what he learned in his theological studies about when those books were written and how the list came to be drawn up gave him reasons, as he saw it, to doubt that it was the revealed word of God. For a long time this left him not an atheist but somewhere in between. An agnostic neither believes that God exists nor believes that God does not exist, and Rowe thought that a real, if rather indefinite, position. Only in 1969, he said, did he realize that he had come to hold the definite belief that the God of theism, the all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good creator, does not exist. The positive arguments for that belief, by his own account, came afterward.

(●) 1979 AD: A seven-page paper about a fawn in a forest fire set the terms of the debate about evil for a generation. + By the late 1970s Rowe was already known for a careful book on the cosmological argument (T1) and for Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction (1978), a textbook that taught the subject to generations of undergraduates. Then, in October 1979, the American Philosophical Quarterly printed "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism." It was short, plainly written, and impossible to ignore (T2, T3, T4). The next quarter century was largely an argument with Christian philosophers about that paper, carried on in journals and collected volumes, and almost always in good temper. The honors of the profession came along the way. He was a fellow of the National Humanities Center in 1984 and 1985, and president of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, the profession’s main body, in 1986 and 1987. Meanwhile the argument itself kept growing. In 1988 he set a second case beside the fawn, and this one was not imagined: the murder of a five-year-old girl in Flint, Michigan, on New Year’s Day 1986. In 1996 he went further and set his first argument aside for a new one built on probability theory, the mathematics of how much a piece of evidence ought to raise or lower our confidence in a belief. And in 2004 Oxford published Can God Be Free?, his last major book (T5).

(●) 2015 AD: He died in Lafayette at eighty-four, remembered by believers and unbelievers alike as a kind man. + Rowe retired from Purdue in 2005 as professor emeritus. He died on August 22, 2015, at a care home in Lafayette, Indiana, at the age of eighty-four, survived by his wife Margaret Moan, by his first wife Betty Barnwell, by their three children, Susan, John, and Norman, and by three grandchildren. In lieu of flowers the family asked for gifts to Save the Children, the Lafayette Urban Ministry, a food bank, and an animal shelter. The tributes said less about his arguments than about the man. A former student remembered him as one of the kindest professors she ever had. Paul Draper, the philosopher of religion who was his colleague and friend at Purdue, called him "one of the most virtuous people I have ever known." The next summer Purdue held a memorial conference in his name, on what would have been his eighty-fifth birthday, and among the speakers were Christian philosophers who had spent their careers answering him.

What He Taught

(T1) The cosmological argument survives its famous objections, and stands or falls with the principle that everything has an explanation. + Imagine walking into a room and finding a lamp switched on. The light comes from the bulb, the bulb from the current, the current from the power station, and you could keep going. But suppose someone said that every link in the chain is explained by the one before it, and the chain goes back forever, so there is nothing left to explain. Something in you would still ask: why is there a chain at all? That is the question at the heart of the cosmological argument (from the Greek kosmos, "world"), the argument from the existence of the world to a cause beyond it. Rowe’s The Cosmological Argument (1975) studied its strongest form, given in 1704 by the English theologian Samuel Clarke. Clarke distinguished a dependent being, one whose existence is explained by something else, from a self-existent being, one whose existence is explained by its own nature. Not everything can be dependent, he argued, or there would be no explanation of why there are dependent beings at all. Rowe defended the argument against two of its best-known objections. The first says the argument simply assumes that a causal chain must have a first link, something no one has proved. Clarke’s argument does not depend on that claim at all, he showed; the idea that it does is "a popular but mistaken idea" of how it works. Clarke grants the endless chain for the sake of argument and asks why the whole chain exists. The second objection comes from David Hume, the eighteenth-century Scottish skeptic: once you have explained every member of a collection, you have explained the collection. Rowe thought this rests on a mistake. Go back to the lamp. Explaining each link by the one before it is not the same as explaining why there is any chain to begin with. The weak point, in his judgment, lay elsewhere, in the principle of sufficient reason (PSR for short). That is the claim that every being and every positive fact must have an explanation, so that nothing simply happens to be there for no reason at all. If we knew that principle was true, the argument would go through. He did not think we know it, though he granted it might be true, and in the 1975 book he argued that a theist (a believer in God) may still reasonably accept it. Christian philosophers who defend the argument today still work from the map he drew.

(Q) "Since we do not seem to know that PSR is true, we cannot reasonably claim to know that the premises of the Cosmological Argument are true. They might be true." + Source: William L. Rowe, Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1993), the chapter on the cosmological argument; reprinted in anthologies as "An Examination of the Cosmological Argument." The verdict of his textbook chapter, after he has cleared away the objections he thought failed. The final sentence is the characteristic Rowe touch: he will not claim more than he has shown, in either direction.

(T2) Suffering that appears pointless gives us reasonable grounds to believe there is no God. + Most people who doubt God because of suffering do not think evil and God are flatly contradictory, the way a square circle is. They think something more modest and more troubling: that the world does not look the way it would if a loving and all-powerful God were in charge. Rowe turned that ordinary thought into an argument, and called it the evidential form of the problem. The older logical form had claimed that God and evil cannot both exist, the way a square circle cannot; the evidential form claims only that evil makes God unlikely. In the same paper he granted, with a footnote to the Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga, that the logical form had failed. The argument has two premises and a conclusion: - Premise (1). There are instances of intense suffering that an all-powerful, all-knowing being could have prevented without losing some greater good or allowing some evil as bad or worse. - Premise (2). A wholly good, all-knowing being would prevent any intense suffering it could, unless preventing it would cost such a good or allow such an evil. - Conclusion. Therefore there is no all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good being. The second premise, he thought, believers and unbelievers share. A good parent lets a child feel the sting of a vaccination for the sake of the health it brings, but no good parent lets a child suffer for nothing. Everything rides on the first. To support it he asked his readers to picture a fawn in a distant forest, burned in a fire started by lightning, lying in agony for days before it dies. No one sees it, and so far as we can tell no good comes of it. He did not claim to prove that it serves no purpose; he admitted it would take something like omniscience, knowing everything there is to know, to be sure of that. His claim was more modest. It is reasonable to believe the suffering is pointless, the way it is reasonable to believe many things you cannot prove, and it grows more reasonable still once you multiply the fawn by all the apparently pointless suffering that happens every day. The strongest Christian replies start from that word "appears."

(Q) "Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn’s intense suffering is pointless." + Source: William L. Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 337. The most discussed animal in modern philosophy of religion. Later writers, following William Alston, nicknamed the fawn "Bambi," and the case is still called E1, the label Rowe gave it in 1988.

(T3) The believer’s best answer is to run the argument in reverse. + G. E. Moore, the Cambridge philosopher, used to answer skeptics who claimed no one can know the outside world exists by holding up his hand, or a pencil. If your principles imply I cannot know this pencil exists, he said, then I am more sure of the pencil than of your principles, so your principles are wrong. Rowe named the move "the G. E. Moore shift" and handed it to his opponents. Here is how it works on his own argument. An argument is valid when its conclusion has to be true if its premises are, and every valid argument can be turned around. Take an everyday one: if it rained last night, the street is wet; it rained; so the street is wet. Now walk outside and find the street bone dry. The same reasoning, run backward, tells you it did not rain. In the same way, if premises one and two imply the conclusion, then the denial of the conclusion plus premise two implies the denial of premise one. So a believer can reason: there is an all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good God; such a God would not permit pointless suffering; therefore the suffering that looks pointless is not. Which way you run the argument depends on which first premise you have better reason to believe, that some suffering really is pointless, or that God exists. Rowe judged this "the theist’s best response," far better than trying to name the specific good behind every evil, which no believer can do and which, he noted, the believer’s own tradition usually says we are not given to know in this life. It is a striking thing for an atheist to say. It means the problem of evil is never settled by evil alone: everything else a person has reason to believe about God, from the arguments of natural theology (the case for God drawn from the world and from reason alone, like the cosmological argument of T1) to the resurrection of Jesus, comes to the scales too.

(Q) "The best procedure for the theist to follow in rejecting premise (1) is the indirect procedure. This procedure I shall call ‘the G. E. Moore shift,’ so-called in honor of the twentieth century philosopher, G. E. Moore, who used it to great effect in dealing with the arguments of the skeptics." + Source: William L. Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 339. Premise (1) is the claim that there is intense suffering an all-powerful, all-knowing being could have prevented without losing a greater good (T2).

(T4) An atheist can hold that some believers are rationally justified in believing in God. + Rowe told a story to make the point. Your friends see you off on a flight to Hawaii. Hours later they hear the plane has gone down at sea, and after a day’s search no survivors have been found. Your friends are rationally justified in believing you are dead. You, meanwhile, are bobbing in your life vest wondering why the search planes have not spotted you, and you are rationally justified in believing you are alive. Being justified, in other words, does not require being right. Two people with different evidence can both believe reasonably, even when one of them is wrong. From this he drew a distinction among atheists. The unfriendly atheist holds that no one is rationally justified in believing in God. The indifferent atheist holds no view on the question. The friendly atheist holds that some believers are rationally justified, even though, as the atheist sees it, their belief is false. Rowe was a friendly atheist and defended the position. He went further than many would expect. Even a believer who knows every reason for unbelief the atheist has might, he suggested, still be justified in believing. An atheist can hold that "excessively friendly" view, he wrote, if he also has some reason to think that "the grounds for theism are not as telling as the theist is justified in taking them to be." In other words, the believer weighs his evidence correctly by his own lights, while the atheist suspects the evidence itself is weaker than it looks from where the believer stands. The phrase entered the language of the field, and it described the man. He thought the traditional arguments, religious experience, and theism’s power to explain the world could give a modern, educated believer real grounds for faith.

(Q) "Finally, the atheist may believe that some theists are rationally justified in believing that the theistic God exists. This view we shall call ‘friendly atheism.’" + Source: William L. Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 340. The third of his three varieties of atheism, after the unfriendly and the indifferent, and the one the final part of the paper defends.

(T5) A perfectly good creator could not settle for a world less good than one he could have made. + Think of a gifted carpenter who could build a sturdy, beautiful table and builds a wobbly one instead, not because of any obligation to the customer, but simply because he chose to. We would think less of him. Rowe thought the same intuition applies to God, only more so: a being who makes a world when it could have made a better one is a being we can imagine surpassed, by one who would have made the better world. Can God Be Free? (2004) works this out through a history of the question, from Thomas Aquinas to Leibniz, Samuel Clarke, and Jonathan Edwards, and ends in a dilemma. If there is a best world God could make, a perfectly good God must make it, and then it is hard to see how he was free not to. If there is no best world, so that every world could be bettered, then whatever world God makes, a better creator is possible, and no creator could be perfectly good. Either way, he concluded, the traditional idea of a God who is both perfectly good and free to create or not is in serious trouble. Christian philosophers have answered him from several directions. Robert Adams had argued in 1972 that God does no one any wrong in creating a world less than the best, and that choosing to create beings who are not the best possible is an expression of grace; Rowe replied that perfect goodness may require more than avoiding wrongs. Others have questioned the step from "a better world was possible" to "a better God was possible." The exchange is still open.

(Q) "If an omniscient being creates a world when there is a better world that it could have created, then it is possible that there exists a being morally better than it." + Source: William L. Rowe, Can God Be Free? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 112. The principle on which the whole second half of the book turns. Its word "possible" carries the weight: the argument does not say a better being exists, only that one could.

(Q) "It is as though God has been on holiday for centuries." + Source: William Rowe, interviewed by Nick Trakakis, "William Rowe," Philosophy Now 47 (2004). Asked which criticism of his argument had the most force, Rowe named the skeptical theists, the Christian philosophers who argue that we are in no position to judge what goods God might know of, and granted that their reply had weakened his inference. Then he pressed back. The usual picture, he said, is of God as a loving parent whose suffering child cannot understand the medicine. But loving parents do not leave for Bermuda while their child is in the hospital; they stay at the bedside. So many people suffer with no sense of God’s presence at all that the problem of the hiddenness of God, he thought, shores up whatever weakness his argument from evil had.

What Christian Thinkers Made of Him

(†) His fawn drew from Christian philosophers their most important modern reply on evil: we should not expect to see God’s reasons. + A dog at the veterinarian cannot see why the person who loves it is letting a stranger hold it down for a needle. The dog’s failure to see a reason is no evidence that there is none, because a dog is not the kind of creature that would see it. In 1984 the Christian philosopher Stephen Wykstra pressed the same point against Rowe’s fawn. Before "I see no reason" can count as evidence that there is no reason, he argued, it has to be the sort of case where we would expect to see one if it were there; and if God exists, with a mind as far above ours as a parent’s above an infant’s, we should not expect to see most of his reasons. Wykstra called his principle CORNEA, from the "Condition Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access." Epistemic means having to do with knowledge, and the name fits: the cornea is the window at the front of the eye, and the principle asks whether we are placed to see the thing at all. Rowe replied in the same issue of the journal. The position came to be called skeptical theism: theism (belief in God) joined to a modest skepticism, or doubt, about our ability to judge what goods an infinite mind might see. William Alston, Rowe’s old teacher at Michigan, developed it in 1991, and Michael Bergmann and Daniel Howard-Snyder have carried it further. Essays by Wykstra, Alston, and Howard-Snyder, with Rowe’s answers, fill much of The Evidential Argument from Evil (1996), edited by Howard-Snyder, still the standard collection on the subject. Rowe himself granted that the reply had real force, and that his inference from the goods we know of to all the goods there are was harder to defend than he had first believed. The other line of reply was theodicy, the attempt to say what goods God might actually be bringing about, from the formation of souls to the value of a world governed by regular natural laws, and Rowe’s cases became the test any theodicy had to pass. Either way, the church’s philosophers of the last half-century have worked with Rowe’s statement of the problem in front of them, and they are better for it.

(†) Believers took up the Moore shift and friendly atheism, and his fairness set a standard for the debate. + The G. E. Moore shift (T3) became a standard tool in Christian answers to the problem of evil, because it states plainly what believers had always said: the question is not whether evil, taken alone, makes God look unlikely, but whether it outweighs everything else we know. A cumulative case is one where many lines of evidence each add their weight, the way strands add strength to a rope. Christian philosophers who build one, adding the arguments of natural theology to the historical evidence for the resurrection, are making exactly the move Rowe described. His concession that the logical problem of evil had failed, with its footnote to Plantinga, is still cited for that point. Friendly atheism (T4) mattered just as much. At a time when many in the profession thought religious belief simply irrational, the most formidable atheist argument of the period came from a man who said in print that thoughtful believers could be fully rational. His textbook gave the arguments for God a fair hearing, and his book on the cosmological argument (T1) is still a standard starting point for defenders of the Leibnizian form of that argument, named for the German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, which reasons from the principle of sufficient reason. It is one reason Christian philosophers who disagreed with him, many of them, also counted him a friend.

(†) The gospel parts company with Rowe on what unseen reasons, divine hiddenness, and God’s freedom prove. + Rowe was a serious and honest critic, and he deserves an answer at full strength rather than a dismissal. The places where the Christian faith parts from what he taught are these. - Seeing no reason. Rowe’s argument moves from "we see no good that this suffering serves" to "probably there is none." Scripture says plainly that we should expect the first without the second. When God answers Job out of the whirlwind, he gives no explanation of Job’s suffering at all; he asks, "Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? Tell me, if you have understanding" (Job 38:4), and Job confesses that he spoke of "things too wonderful for me, which I did not know" (Job 42:3). Isaiah gives the reason: "For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts" (Isaiah 55:9). Rowe himself granted the force of this reply. - God on holiday. His closing picture was of a God who leaves the sick child’s bedside for Bermuda. The center of the Christian faith is the claim that God did the opposite. The Son came to the bedside as one of us: "a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief" (Isaiah 53:3), a high priest able "to sympathize with our weaknesses" (Hebrews 4:15), who died the death of the condemned. The promise is not that the sufferer will always feel God near but that God is near: "The Lord is near to the brokenhearted and saves the crushed in spirit" (Psalm 34:18). Paul, who suffered more than most, judged that "the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us" (Romans 8:18). Rowe’s own long and unanswered search for a felt sense of God is a sorrow to be met with respect, not an argument that the God of the cross is absent. - The making of the Bible. Part of what loosened his faith was the belief that the Bible’s books were selected "among competing manuscripts of dubious authorship." The record is better than that. The four Gospels and Paul’s letters were already read as Scripture across the churches by the second century, long before any council listed them, and the books that lost out were mostly later works that never had a serious claim. The canon was recognized, not invented. - God’s freedom. His dilemma (T5) assumes that a perfectly good God must make the best world, or at least a world nothing could better. Scripture presents creation instead as a free gift, owing nothing to any necessity: "you created all things, and by your will they existed and were created" (Revelation 4:11). A God who need not have created at all, and who creates out of love rather than obligation, is not convicted of a defect because another world was possible. Rowe asked the hardest question honestly and answered it as an atheist. The Christian answer is not that the fawn does not matter, but that the God without whom not one sparrow falls to the ground (Matthew 10:29) has not left the forest.

Rowe wrote five books, edited two, and published many articles, most of them on the philosophy of religion. His papers on the problem of evil appeared across journals and collected volumes over a quarter century, and the best of them are gathered in the selected writings edited by Nick Trakakis. Books: - Religious Symbols and God: A Philosophical Study of Tillich’s Theology (University of Chicago Press, 1968): His doctoral work on Paul Tillich’s claim that all talk of God is symbolic, and on whether Tillich’s "God beyond God" is the God of theism at all. Rowe later counted Tillich a theist in the broad sense but an atheist in the narrow one. - The Cosmological Argument (Princeton University Press, 1975; reissued by Fordham University Press, 1998): A close study of Samuel Clarke’s argument from dependent beings to a self-existent being, clearing it of its most famous objections and locating its real weight in the principle of sufficient reason (T1). - Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction (Dickenson, 1978; later editions from Wadsworth, the fourth in 2007): The textbook through which many students first met the arguments for and against God, fair to both sides; its chapter on the cosmological argument anchors (T1), and its chapter on evil first set out the argument of 1979. - Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality (Cornell University Press, 1991): A study of the Scottish philosopher’s defense of free agency, the view that a person, not a prior event, is the cause of his free acts, and of what that view means for moral responsibility. - Can God Be Free? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004): The history of the question from Aquinas to Edwards, and his argument that a perfectly good God could not be free to create a lesser world than he could (T5). Edited volumes: - Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, with William J. Wainwright (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973; later editions): A widely used anthology of classic and contemporary texts. - God and the Problem of Evil (Blackwell, 2001): A reader gathering the main papers on the logical and evidential problems, among them his own "Grounds for Belief Aside, Does Evil Make Atheism More Reasonable than Theism?" Principal articles on the problem of evil: - "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 335–341: The fawn, the evidential argument, the G. E. Moore shift, and friendly atheism, in seven pages (T2, T3, T4). - "Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis: A Response to Wykstra," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984): His first reply to the CORNEA objection, in the same issue that printed it. - "The Empirical Argument from Evil," in Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright, eds., Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment (Cornell University Press, 1986): The argument restated and defended against its early critics. - "Evil and Theodicy," Philosophical Topics 16 (1988): 119–132: Introduces the second case, E2, beside the fawn, and asks whether any known good could justify either. - "Ruminations about Evil," Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 69–88: A reply to his critics, appearing in the same volume as Alston’s skeptical-theist essay. - "William Alston on the Problem of Evil," in Thomas D. Senor, ed., The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith (Cornell University Press, 1995): His answer to his old teacher, in a volume of essays in Alston’s honor. - "The Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look," in Daniel Howard-Snyder, ed., The Evidential Argument from Evil (Indiana University Press, 1996): Abandons the original argument for a new one built on probability theory. - "Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 59 (2006): A late return to the themes of 1979, weighing skeptical theism against friendly atheism. Other articles: - "The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom," in Eleonore Stump, ed., Reasoned Faith (Cornell University Press, 1993): An early statement of the dilemma later worked out in Can God Be Free? (T5). - "Religious Experience and the Principle of Credulity," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (1982): 85–92: A critique of Richard Swinburne’s principle that how things seem to us is good evidence for how they are, applied to experiences of God. - "Two Concepts of Freedom," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 61 (1987): 43–64: His presidential address to the Central Division, on Reid and the freedom of agents. - Papers on the cosmological argument in The Monist and Noûs (1970–1971), which prepared the 1975 book, and on the ontological argument in the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion later in the decade. Interview: - "William Rowe," interviewed by Nick Trakakis, Philosophy Now 47 (2004): His own account of his conversion, the Bible Institute, Nakhnikian, the loss of faith, skeptical theism, and divine hiddenness. Collected edition: William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion: Selected Writings, edited by Nick Trakakis (Ashgate, 2007; later reissued by Routledge). For the debate as a whole, see Daniel Howard-Snyder, ed., The Evidential Argument from Evil (Indiana University Press, 1996), and Nick Trakakis, The God Beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil (Springer, 2007).
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Justified True Belief