Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

Public Theology

Theological Analyses of Societal Issues

Theology of the Family

Where Faith and Family Intersect

Biographies

Notable Works & Great Quotes from Key Figures

Contemporary Voices

1960 AD – present

Eleonore Stump of Frankfurt b. 1947 AD

(●) The medievalist who helped bring Thomas Aquinas back into modern philosophy and answered the problem of suffering through the stories of Job, Samson, Abraham and Mary of Bethany. + Most philosophers who write about the problem of evil work with letters: God is G, evil is E, and the question is whether the two can sit in the same sentence without contradiction. Eleonore Stump has spent much of her career insisting that this is not enough. Suffering happens to people, she argues, and people are known the way a friend is known, through what they say and do and go through, which is why the Bible tells so much of what it teaches as story. Her largest book reads four of those stories slowly, the way a person reads a letter from someone they love. She is on a Christian apologetics site for two reasons. First, she wrote some of the most discussed Christian answers of her generation to the hardest objection to belief in God, the suffering of the world, and she wrote them without ever pretending the suffering is less terrible than it is. Second, she is one of the people most responsible for making Thomas Aquinas, the great theologian of the thirteenth century, a living partner in present-day philosophy instead of a museum piece. One fact to remember her by: the title of that largest book, Wandering in Darkness, echoes the book’s epigraph, lines from a poem that she describes as found written on a wall at Auschwitz after the war, about those "compelled to wander in darkness." She chose to begin her answer to suffering with the worst suffering of her century.

(●) 1947 AD: Born in Frankfurt two years after the war, to a German mother and an American soldier, she grew up in small-town Minnesota and Wyoming. + Eleonore Stump was born on 9 August 1947 in Frankfurt am Main, in a Germany still clearing the rubble of the Second World War. By her own account, her mother was a German woman who had been a small child when Hitler came to power; her father was an American soldier in the occupying army, the son of immigrants from Romania who were practicing, Yiddish-speaking Orthodox Jews. He had rejected their faith entirely and become, in her words, "a zealous atheist, a fervent Marxist, and an unstoppable political activist." The family crossed the Atlantic more than once in her early years. She lived in Germany until she was three, when her father brought the family to the United States; at four her mother took her back to Frankfurt for more than a year; and at six she made her third crossing to start school in a very small town in northern Minnesota. Later came eight years, not all of them in a row, in Wyoming. A child who has learned two languages and two countries before first grade learns early that how people talk and what they have lived through shape what they can understand, and that lesson runs through everything she later wrote.

(●) 1969 AD: She graduated first in her class at Grinnell in Greek and Latin, became a Christian, and went on to study the New Testament at Harvard. + At Grinnell College in Iowa she read classical languages, the Greek and Latin that unlock both the ancient philosophers and the New Testament. She was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, the oldest of America’s academic honor societies, in 1968, and she graduated in 1969 as valedictorian, the student with the highest record in her class, winning the college’s prize for the highest scholarship. What she did not bring to college was any faith at all. For her, she later said, the hypothesis that there is a God was "as dead as the hypothesis that there is a real Santa Claus," and she had been inside a church only once, when her father was organizing something at a local AME (African Methodist Episcopal) church. Then a classics professor, John Crossett, annoyed that the college taught nothing on the Bible, offered an informal course on it over dinner in the student union. Reading Ecclesiastes there, she was, in her words, "blown away." By the time she reached Harvard she was "a new, theologically illiterate Christian, but still a Christian," and when she told her parents she would be baptized, her father was shocked and dismayed and her mother angry. At Harvard she took a master’s degree in biblical studies, with a focus on the New Testament, in 1971. Most philosophers of religion come to the Bible as amateurs. She came to it trained in its languages and its scholarship, and decades later, when she built a whole philosophy of suffering out of biblical stories, she read them with the care of someone who had once meant to spend her life on them.

(●) 1975 AD: At Cornell she earned her doctorate in medieval philosophy and began a long partnership with Norman Kretzmann. + She applied to Cornell’s medieval studies program hoping to keep reading the Bible through its medieval interpreters, and found, as she later told it, that in practice there was no such program. She was simply handed over to the philosopher Norman Kretzmann, whose interests at the time lay wholly in medieval logic. She took a master’s degree (1973) and a doctorate (1975) in medieval studies there. She had wanted to write on Augustine, but Kretzmann turned the idea down. So her dissertation was on Boethius, the Roman statesman and philosopher of the early sixth century who wrote The Consolation of Philosophy in prison while awaiting execution, and in particular on his textbook of logical argument, De topicis differentiis (On the Different Topics). A "topic," in that old logic, was a place to go looking for an argument, a stock pattern such as reasoning from a cause to its effect, the way a debater keeps a mental list of angles to try. The dissertation became her first book in 1978. The teacher became her great collaborator. Together they wrote some of the most cited papers in the philosophy of religion, among them "Eternity" (1981) and "Absolute Simplicity" (1985); she was associate editor of the Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (1982) that he edited with Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg; and together they edited the Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (1993) and the Cambridge Companion to Augustine (2001). Picture two scholars passing a single manuscript back and forth across a desk for twenty years, and you have something of how much of her early work was made.

(●) 1978 AD: At Virginia Tech, over thirteen years, she wrote the papers on evil, prayer, eternity and simplicity that made her name. + First came the wandering years most young scholars know: short appointments at Oberlin and Cornell and two postdoctoral fellowships (paid years of research after the doctorate). Then she joined the philosophy department of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in 1978, rising to full professor in 1984. She stayed until 1991, with a year at the University of Notre Dame in 1988 to 1989, and she won Virginia Tech’s teaching awards along the way. These were the years when Christian philosophy was coming back to life in American universities. The Society of Christian Philosophers was founded in 1978, and its journal, Faith and Philosophy, began in 1984. Stump was in the middle of it. Her "Petitionary Prayer" (1979) asked why a God who already knows what we need would wait to be asked. "Eternity" (1981, with Kretzmann) gave the old idea of a timeless God its most careful modern defense. And in a single issue of Faith and Philosophy in October 1985 she published both "Absolute Simplicity" (with Kretzmann) and "The Problem of Evil," the paper in which her own answer to suffering first appeared (T1, T2).

(●) 1992 AD: She became the Robert J. Henle Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University, where she taught for three decades. + After a year as professor at Notre Dame, she moved in 1992 to Saint Louis University, a school of the Jesuits (the Catholic religious order founded by Ignatius of Loyola), to hold a chair named for a Jesuit philosopher, Robert J. Henle. A "chair" in this sense is a named professorship, a post of honor, and she held it for the rest of her career. Her husband, Donald Stump, a scholar of English literature, taught at the same university, and the two had already edited a volume of essays together in 1983. Her colleagues kept asking her to lead them. In those years she served as president of the Society of Christian Philosophers (1995 to 1998), of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (1999 to 2000), and later of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, the country’s largest professional body of philosophers (2005 to 2006). She directed more than thirty doctoral dissertations, and a good number of her students now teach philosophy themselves. Her Aquinas (2003), a book of more than six hundred pages in Routledge’s series on the great philosophers, set out Thomas’s thought as a set of live arguments to be tested, not a monument to be admired.

(●) 2003 AD: She gave the Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen on suffering and the Bible’s stories, and they became Wandering in Darkness. + The Gifford Lectures, founded in Scotland in the 1880s for the study of "natural theology" (what can be known of God by reason), are probably the best known lecture series in the philosophy of religion. William James, Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga have all given them. In the spring of 2003 Stump gave them at the University of Aberdeen under the title "Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering." The book took seven more years. When it appeared from Oxford University Press in 2010 it ran to nearly seven hundred pages, with long readings of the stories of Job, Samson, Abraham, and Mary of Bethany, the sister of Martha and Lazarus (T4). In between came the Wilde Lectures at Oxford (2006) and a fellowship at Princeton (2009), and in 2012 she was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

(●) 2018 AD: She published Atonement, followed it with two more books on suffering, and in 2023 began a phased retirement. + In 2018 she published Atonement and gave the Stanton Lectures at Cambridge on the same subject: how the life and death of Christ overcome what stands between human beings and God (T5). Many scholars would have rested there. She kept going. The Image of God: The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Mourning followed in 2022, and a volume of collected essays, Philosophical Theology and the Knowledge of Persons, in 2023. The phased retirement she began that year, stepping back from teaching a little at a time, did not slow the books: Grains of Wheat: Suffering and Biblical Narratives came in 2025. Honorary doctorates, degrees a university gives to honor a life’s work rather than for study done there, came from Marquette, from Tilburg in the Netherlands, from Austral University in Buenos Aires, and in 2024 from the Jesuit school of philosophy in Munich. In 2023 the American Philosophical Association invited her to give one of its Dewey Lectures, in which a senior philosopher looks back over a life in the field. She took her title from Augustine: Dilige et quod vis fac, "Love, and do what you will." It is a fair summary of where all the books were headed.

What She Taught

(T1) God allows suffering because it can turn a damaged will toward the God who alone can heal it. + Think of a family whose child is born with a serious inherited illness. Nobody in that family thinks the answer is to give up on the child. They spend years of pain, money and sleepless nights caring for the child and trying to cure the disease. Stump uses exactly that picture in her 1985 paper "The Problem of Evil." On Christian teaching, she says, persons once created are everlasting and of infinite worth, so if they become damaged, a good God will not throw them away. He will try to mend them. What is damaged, on her reading of the Christian story, is the will. Since the Fall, the first human turning away from God in Eden, human beings have a strong inclination to want their own power or pleasure more than greater goods, and a person in that condition cannot share the life of heaven, which she describes as union with God: freely wanting what God wants. God cannot simply override the defect without destroying the freedom that makes the union worth having, any more than a friendship can be installed in someone against their will. What a person must do is want to be helped. And that is where suffering comes in. Pain, disaster, old age and the nearness of death take away a person’s satisfaction with himself; they tend to humble him and turn his attention toward what lasts. You might hear that and think it makes pain sound like a tool in God’s hand. She feels the weight of that. She admits she cannot prove her claim with data, because the evidence would require following thousands of lives to their end. And she refuses to make suffering look smaller than it is. The suffering of children, she writes, is the hardest case of all, and any answer that dulls our grief over it has become something monstrous.

(Q) "No amount of moral or natural evil, of course, can guarantee that a man will seek God’s help. If it could, the willing it produced would not be free. But evil of this sort is the best hope, I think, and maybe the only effective means, for bringing men to such a state." + Source: Eleonore Stump, "The Problem of Evil," Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 4 (October 1985), p. 409. The "state" is the humbled recognition of one’s own evil, joined to a desire for something better, that leads a person to ask God for help. Moral evil is the evil people do; natural evil is the suffering that comes from disease, disaster and death.

(Q) "The suffering of children is in my view unquestionably the instance of evil most difficult for the problem of evil, and there is something almost indecent about any move resembling an attempt to explain it away." + Source: Eleonore Stump, "The Problem of Evil," Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 4 (October 1985), p. 410. She has just recalled Ivan Karamazov’s protest in Dostoevsky’s novel, that no future bliss could justify the torture of one innocent child, and she says she shares his attitude. Only then, "with considerable diffidence," does she offer her own suggestion.

(T2) God is not built from parts: his power, knowledge and goodness are one reality seen from different sides. + The ancient Greeks had two names for the brightest light in the sky. In the evening they called it Hesperus, the evening star; before dawn they called it Phosphorus, the morning star. It took astronomy to show that both are the planet Venus. The two names were not wrong. They named one thing seen at two different times. Stump and Kretzmann used that picture to defend an old and difficult teaching, the doctrine of divine simplicity. "Simplicity" here does not mean God is easy to understand. It means God has no parts: he is not assembled from a portion of power, a portion of knowledge and a portion of goodness, the way a car is assembled from an engine and wheels. Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas all taught it. Critics, Alvin Plantinga most prominently in 1980, had objected that the doctrine is incoherent, since it seems to say that God’s power simply is his knowledge. Stump and Kretzmann answered that "perfect power" and "perfect knowledge" can name one and the same reality, as "morning star" and "evening star" do, without power and knowledge themselves being the same thing. Put simply: there is only one thing there, God himself, and we call it "power" when we see it acting and "knowledge" when we see it knowing, just as the Greeks called one planet by two names depending on when they saw it. Alongside it they defended God’s eternity, in their 1981 paper of that name, taking Boethius’s definition: eternity is the complete possession, all at once, of life without limit. God does not live through time one moment after another; every moment of our history is present to him. Not every Christian philosopher has followed them. Alvin Plantinga has argued that God has distinct properties, and Nicholas Wolterstorff and William Lane Craig that God is in some sense in time, and the debate between the two camps is still open.

(Q) "There are as much truth and as much potential misinformation in ‘Perfect power is identical with perfect knowledge’ as there are in ‘The morning star is identical with the evening star’." + Source: Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "Absolute Simplicity," Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 4 (October 1985), p. 357. The sentence that follows makes the point with a mountain: the summit of the east slope is the same as the summit of the west slope, but that does not make the two slopes the same.

(T3) A person acts freely when she herself is the ultimate source of what she does. + In 1969 the philosopher Harry Frankfurt told a kind of story that has troubled every theory of free will since. In the version philosophers usually tell now, a neuroscientist has secretly planted a device in your brain. If you were about to choose to vote for the wrong candidate, the device would step in and make you choose his candidate. As it happens, you choose his candidate entirely on your own, and the device never does a thing. You could not have done otherwise. Yet you seem plainly responsible for your choice. Libertarians (no relation to the political party) are the philosophers who hold that free will cannot coexist with determinism, the view that every event, our choices included, is fixed in advance by earlier causes, the way each domino in a row is knocked over by the one before. Libertarians had mostly said that freedom requires being able to do otherwise: you chose the coffee, but you could have chosen the tea. Philosophers call this the principle of alternative possibilities. Stump argued that Frankfurt’s stories show that ability is not the heart of freedom, and that Thomas Aquinas had seen this long before. On her reading of Aquinas, what freedom requires is that nothing outside the person causally fixes the state of her mind and will: if you trace the causes of her act backward, the chain begins in her own intellect and will. Ordinarily a free person can choose otherwise, and Aquinas never denied it. But that ability is a usual mark of freedom, not its definition. The definition is that the person is the source. She still counts herself a libertarian, because she holds that a person whose choices are determined by prior causes is not responsible for them. Her view, she says, is simply a second kind of libertarianism, and the better one.

(Q) "What is essential to moral responsibility on Aquinas’s view is that a person be the ultimate source of what she does, that her intellect and will be the ultimate causes of her acts." + Source: Eleonore Stump, "Dust, Determinism, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Goetz," Faith and Philosophy 16, no. 3 (July 1999), p. 414. The philosopher Stewart Goetz had argued that her view was not really libertarian. Her reply closes with the claim that, of the two kinds of libertarianism, "the better one is Aquinas’s, which doesn’t require alternative possibilities for moral responsibility."

(T4) Some truths are known only the way persons are known, and the Bible’s stories carry that knowledge about suffering. + You can know a great many facts about your grandmother: her birthday, her maiden name, the town she grew up in. None of that is the same as knowing her, the way you know her when she takes your hand at a funeral and says nothing. Stump calls this second kind of knowing knowledge of persons, or second-person knowledge, the knowledge one "I" has of a "you." It cannot be fully put into a list of propositions (statements that are true or false), and that is why stories matter: a good narrative hands it on in a way an argument cannot. In Wandering in Darkness she complains that analytic philosophy, the careful, logic-first style that dominates English-speaking universities, suffers from a kind of half-blindness, trusting only the skills of precise analysis and missing what narrative shows. So she lets the stories speak first, then reasons about them. Job loses his children and his health and demands an answer; Samson ends blind in a Philistine prison; Abraham is told to sacrifice Isaac (Genesis 22:2); Mary of Bethany pleads for her dying brother and seems to be ignored (John 11:1–6). In each story, she argues, suffering that no one would choose ends by giving the person something greater than what they had wanted, a deeper union with God that they would not have known how to ask for. She keeps the claim honest. Her case applies, she says, only to adults in full possession of their minds, and she grants that the evidence of human lives could count against it. Her last pages admit that some suffering breaks a person past healing in this life.

(Q) "...makes Abraham into something glorious. It moves him from being a prosperous nomad with powerful religious experiences to being the father of faith, and so it brings Abraham to the flowering of his life." + Source: Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), p. 306, as quoted by John Cottingham in his review in Philosophy 86 (2011). The subject of the sentence is the binding of Isaac: the test Abraham feared would cost him his son ends by bringing him to trust God fully, and so makes him the father of faith.

(T5) Christ’s atonement makes possible a union in which God dwells in us and we in God. + Two people can sit side by side on a bus for an hour and never be present to each other. Two old friends can sit in a hospital room in silence and be wholly present to each other. Stump builds her account of the atonement on the difference. The word itself is English, "at-one-ment," the making of two into one, and she asks what keeps human beings from being one with God. Her answer follows Aquinas: the obstacle is on our side, not God’s. A human will that does not want the good, and the guilt and shame that wrongdoing leaves behind, keep us at a distance. God’s love never needed to be bought. So she rejects the accounts she calls Anselmian, after Anselm of Canterbury, on which God’s honor or justice must first be satisfied before he can forgive. Penal substitution, the view that Christ bore in our place the penalty our sins deserved, falls under that heading for her. On her account, Christ in his passion (his suffering and death) took into his own mind the burden of every human being’s wrongdoing, enough that he could cry out at being forsaken (Mark 15:34), and so opened a way for God to dwell in each person. The Holy Spirit then dwells in anyone who stops resisting, and works the slow healing of the will. The picture she uses for that union comes from Jesus’ own prayer, "that they may all be one, just as you, Father, are in me, and I in you" (John 17:21). It is a union, she writes, that makes two one without merging one into the other.

(Q) "For mutual indwelling, then, all that is needed from any human being is the cessation of resistance to God’s love." + Source: Eleonore Stump, Atonement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 369, as quoted by Rolfe King in his review for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2020). She means that grace does all the giving. What a person contributes is not even an act of accepting it but a ceasing to refuse, a stillness of the will she calls quiescence: it lies in the person’s power, but it is not itself an act of will.

What Christian Thinkers Made of Her

(†) Her work helped move the problem of evil from abstract logic to the suffering of particular people. + In the 1970s the problem of evil was mostly argued as a puzzle in logic, and Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense had shown that no contradiction could be proved. (That defense argues that God might allow evil because a world of creatures who freely choose, and so can choose wrongly, is worth more than a world of puppets.) Stump’s 1985 paper pushed past that. It was not enough, she said, to show that God might have some reason for allowing evil; a Christian should be able to say what the reason plausibly is, drawing on Christian doctrine itself. Alongside Marilyn McCord Adams, who insisted that God’s goodness must reach each person who suffers, she helped turn the debate toward the single human life. Wandering in Darkness carried that further, and it was widely read and widely argued with. The philosopher John Cottingham, reviewing it, wrote that it "spectacularly disproves" the assumption that nothing new could be said about suffering. Christian critics pressed it hard too: William Hasker, in a review essay in Faith and Philosophy (2011), questioned whether her answer covers the suffering that never leads anyone closer to God. Both kinds of response took her seriously, which is the point.

(†) She helped make Aquinas a working partner for Christian philosophers again. + For much of the twentieth century Aquinas was studied mainly in Catholic seminaries, in what is called the manual tradition, standard textbooks (the "manuals") that boiled his system down for students training for the priesthood. English-speaking analytic philosophers rarely read them. Stump, with Kretzmann, translated him into the questions those philosophers were already asking: about eternity, about simplicity, about free will, about how knowledge works. The Cambridge Companion they edited, her Aquinas, and the Oxford Handbook of Aquinas she edited with Brian Davies (2012) became standard tools. Her reading of Aquinas on freedom (T3) has been especially fruitful. Defenders of free will who define it by the agent as source have found in her work a medieval precedent for their view; Kevin Timpe, who edited a volume of essays in her honor (2009), defended that view at book length and carried her account of grace further. Her debates with Stewart Goetz and others in Faith and Philosophy are still cited. The American Catholic Philosophical Association gave her its Aquinas Medal in 2013.

(†) Christians who hold penal substitution have answered her account of the atonement, and the exchange continues. + Her rejection of Anselmian and penal accounts (T5) is a place where Christians read the Bible differently, not a fault in her. Many Protestants, and many Catholics who follow Anselm and Aquinas’s own talk of satisfaction, hold that the cross deals with a real debt of justice, pointing to texts such as "he was pierced for our transgressions" (Isaiah 53:5) and "For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin" (2 Corinthians 5:21). They have answered her in print, and at length. William Lane Craig, who defends penal substitution, argued in Faith and Philosophy (2019) that her objections fail against the view as its defenders actually hold it, because she treats God as a private party to a quarrel rather than as Judge. A symposium in the European Journal for Philosophy of Religion (2019), a set of essays all written on Atonement, brought critical pieces from Michael Rea, Trent Dougherty and Brandon Warmke, and Stump replied. Joshua Thurow and Jada Twedt Strabbing took a gentler line in Faith and Philosophy (2020): love, they argued, does not demand unconditional forgiveness, and the Anselmian idea of satisfaction can be woven into her Thomistic account (the one she draws from Thomas Aquinas) rather than set against it. The Baptist theologian David L. Allen, who holds penal substitution, called the book balanced and generally fair to the views it rejects even as he disagreed with it. What all sides share is the conviction she put at the center of her book: that the point of the cross is union with God.

Stump is living and still writing. Her curriculum vitae at Saint Louis University lists her books, edited volumes and more than two hundred articles, beginning in 1974, many of them reprinted and translated into at least nine other languages, Chinese among them; the catalog below gives every book she has written and edited and a selection of the articles that matter most to Christian thought. Dates are of first publication. Medieval logic and Boethius (the early books): - Boethius’s De topicis differentiis (1978): A translation, with notes and essays, of Boethius’s handbook on how to find arguments. It grew out of her Cornell dissertation and showed how ancient logic passed into the Middle Ages. - Boethius’s In Ciceronis Topica (1988): A translation, with notes and essays, of Boethius’s commentary on Cicero’s Topics, the companion to the first book. - Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic (1989): Collected essays tracing how the art of debate shaped medieval logic, from Boethius to the fourteenth century. Aquinas, suffering and the atonement (the major books): - Aquinas (2003): A large study in Routledge’s Arguments of the Philosophers series, setting out Aquinas’s metaphysics, theory of knowledge, ethics and account of freedom as live philosophy (T2, T3). - Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (2010): The Gifford Lectures expanded. Second-person knowledge, Aquinas on love, and long readings of Job, Samson, Abraham and Mary of Bethany, built into a defense of God’s goodness in the face of suffering (T4). - The God of the Bible and the God of the Philosophers (2016): Her Aquinas Lecture at Marquette, arguing that the timeless, simple God of classical theology and the personal God who speaks and acts in Scripture are one and the same. - Atonement (2018): Her account of how Christ’s life and passion overcome what separates human beings from God, by mutual indwelling rather than by the satisfaction of God’s honor or justice (T5). - The Image of God: The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Mourning (2022): A return to suffering, arguing that even if every suffering is defeated, something is left to grieve, the good the fallen world has lost, and weighing the old answer of the felix culpa, the "happy fault" that made the Fall worth what it brought. - Philosophical Theology and the Knowledge of Persons (2023): Collected essays on God, persons and the kind of knowledge that comes only through relationship. - Grains of Wheat: Suffering and Biblical Narratives (2025): Readings of seven biblical narratives of suffering, Job, Samson, Abraham and Mary of Bethany once more, then the temptation and the passion of Christ, and Ecclesiastes, the book that first drew her to Scripture. Edited volumes: - The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (1982, associate editor with Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg): The standard reference history of philosophy from the rediscovery of Aristotle to 1600. - Hamartia: The Concept of Error in the Western Tradition (1983, with Donald V. Stump and others): Essays in honor of John M. Crossett, the Grinnell classics professor whose informal Bible course first drew her to Scripture, on error and wrongdoing from Greek tragedy onward. - Simon of Faversham’s Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum (1984, with others): A critical edition of a medieval commentary on Aristotle’s treatise on fallacies. - The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1: Logic and the Philosophy of Language (1988, with Kretzmann): English translations of medieval texts for students. - Hermes and Athena: Biblical Exegesis and Philosophical Theology (1993, with Thomas Flint): Essays on how philosophers and biblical scholars might read Scripture together. - The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (1993, with Kretzmann): An introduction to Aquinas’s thought by leading scholars. - Reasoned Faith (1993): Essays in philosophical theology in honor of Norman Kretzmann. - Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (1999, with Michael J. Murray): A widely used teaching anthology. - Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann (1999, with Scott MacDonald). - The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (2001, with Kretzmann; expanded edition with David Meconi, 2014). - The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas (2012, with Brian Davies). - Göttliches Vorherwissen und menschliche Freiheit (2015, with Georg Gasser and Johannes Grössl): German translations of recent essays on divine foreknowledge and human freedom. - Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives (2015, with Adam Green): Essays on why God does not make himself more obvious. - The New Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (2022, with Thomas Joseph White): Not a revision of the 1993 volume but a new one, begun again from the start nearly thirty years on. - Biblical Narratives and Human Flourishing: Knowledge Through Narrative (2024, with Judith Wolfe): Essays by philosophers and theologians on what particular biblical stories add to an understanding of human flourishing; her own chapter reads Ecclesiastes. Selected articles: - "Petitionary Prayer" (American Philosophical Quarterly, 1979): Why God might wait to be asked: to keep a person from being overwhelmed by God or spoiled by him. One of the most reprinted papers in the field. - "Eternity" (with Kretzmann, Journal of Philosophy, 1981): The modern defense of Boethius’s timeless God, with an account of how eternity relates to time (T2). - "Knowledge, Freedom and the Problem of Evil" (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 1983): A critique of Richard Swinburne’s argument that natural evil is needed to teach us the consequences of our choices; she argues that God could give that knowledge in other ways, so the argument fails. - "Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt’s Concept of Free Will" (Journal of Philosophy, 1988): Frankfurt’s account of the will, with its desires about our own desires, put to work on two Christian questions, how God sanctifies a person and what it means for God to harden a heart; an early step toward her reading of freedom (T3). - "Absolute Simplicity" (with Kretzmann, Faith and Philosophy, 1985): The defense of divine simplicity (T2). - "The Problem of Evil" (Faith and Philosophy, 1985): Her first full answer to suffering, built on the Fall and on heaven as union with God (T1). - "Dust, Determinism, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Goetz" (Faith and Philosophy, 1999): Aquinas’s account of freedom defended as a kind of libertarianism without the principle of alternative possibilities (T3). Where to start: "Petitionary Prayer" and "The Problem of Evil" for her early method in a single sitting; Wandering in Darkness for the major work; Atonement for her theology of the cross.
Playlist
Justified True Belief