Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

Science

Is Science Compatible with Christian Theism?

TBD

Bad Claims

Common "Bad Information" Challenges to Christianity

Miscellaneous

Objections That Fit No Other Category

How Can Jesus Be the Only Way?

(P1) The world's religions cannot all be true. + People often say the religions are different paths up the same mountain, but that picture only works if they agree about what is at the top, and they do not. When one claim denies what another affirms, the two contradict, and then at most one of them can be true, though both could be false. (1) They disagree about whether ultimate reality is a someone or a something. - Judaism, Christianity, and Islam say it is a someone: a personal God who knows things, wants things, and does things, and who can be spoken to in the second person, as "you." - Advaita Vedanta, the school of Hindu philosophy that Shankara shaped in the eighth century, says ultimate reality is Brahman. Brahman has no personality and no qualities, and in the end no real line divides you from it. - Theravada Buddhism, the oldest surviving Buddhist school, says there is no creator at all. - Think of it this way: either somebody is home or nobody is. There is no third thing those words could mean, and these traditions give opposite answers at the front door. (2) They disagree about what has gone wrong with us. - Christianity says the trouble is moral, and that it runs deep. We are really guilty before a good God, and our condition is one that no amount of effort repairs. - Islam agrees that the trouble is moral but denies that it goes that deep. Every child is born in a state of natural soundness, called fitra, so what a person needs is guidance rather than rescue, and God grants mercy directly (Qur'an 30:30). - Buddhism locates the trouble somewhere else again. Craving and ignorance keep a person turning on the wheel of rebirth, and underneath all that turning there is no permanent self. • Anatta, "no-self," is the teaching that what you call "I" is a stream of changing experiences with nobody standing behind it. A river is a fair picture: the word names moving water, not some thing the water belongs to. Responsibility survives, because actions still carry consequences. What does not survive is the somebody who could stand guilty before a personal God. - A doctor's diagnosis decides the treatment, and these three diagnoses do not prescribe the same thing. (3) They disagree about one plain fact of history. - The Qur'an says Jesus was not killed and not crucified, but that it was made to appear so to those who said they had killed him (Surah 4:157). Muslim interpreters have overwhelmingly read that as a denial of the crucifixion. - The New Testament says he was crucified, and the whole Christian claim runs through that death. - Notice what kind of question this is. It is about what happened on a Friday afternoon outside a city wall, in public, under an occupying army that kept records. - So somebody has to lose, and evidence decides who. Historians, non-Christian historians included, treat the crucifixion as one of the most securely established facts about Jesus. (4) Real overlap is not the same as agreement. - Some version of "treat others as you would want to be treated" turns up almost everywhere, and so do prayer, charity, and fasting. A Christian does not have to say other religions are wrong from top to bottom, and the historic Christian position never has. - But try telling a devout Muslim, a Theravada monk, and a Christian that they are all describing one reality in local accents. All three will tell you that you have misread their faith at exactly the point they care about most. The Muslim confesses that God has no son and never had one (Qur'an 112:1-4). The Christian confesses that he does. - And "all religions are equally valid" rules something out as well: every religion that denies it, which is every one of them. Ruling things out, in other words, is not a habit Christians brought into the conversation. Therefore, the religions contradict one another at the center rather than at the edges, and at most one of them is right about God.

(P2) Whether a religion is true does not depend on the character or the upbringing of those who hold it. + Christian exclusivity is the claim that Christ alone saves. When it comes up at a kitchen table, usually raised by a brother-in-law, it tends to arrive as something to be embarrassed about rather than weighed: Christians are arrogant to say it, and they only say it because of where they were born. (1) An attack on the believer's character is not evidence about the claim. - An ad hominem argument (Latin for "to the person") goes after the character of whoever holds a position instead of the position itself. - Whether a claim is true depends on how things are, not on the manners of the man saying it. If a conceited researcher cured cancer, nobody would refuse the treatment because he was insufferable. - That said, grant the moral complaint in full. Christians have been smug about this, and a good deal worse: conversion at swordpoint, missions riding in behind conquest, contempt aimed at people who had asked for none of it. - What answers that is repentance, not argument. Reaching for the logic before the apology gets the order wrong. (2) The charge disqualifies everybody who holds an opinion. - Look at the man making it. He believes all religions are equally valid, he believes that is true, and so he believes that billions of people who hold an exclusive faith are wrong about what matters most. That is the very shape of the belief he objects to. - If holding a view that many sincere people reject makes you arrogant, then nobody is left standing: not him, not the atheist, not the agnostic. - Picture an exam that every single candidate fails. Nobody walks out thinking the exam was demanding. They conclude it is broken. (3) Where a belief came from is a different question from whether it is true. - The second accusation goes like this: born in Pakistan, you would probably be a Muslim, and born in Thailand, a Buddhist, so your Christianity is an accident of geography. - That is the genetic fallacy, the mistake of settling whether a belief is true by pointing at how the believer came to hold it. - Think of a nine-year-old who believes the earth goes around the sun because her father told her so, and who has never checked. She got the belief by an accident of birth, and it is still true. (4) The serious form of the charge goes after method rather than character. - Philosophers have pressed a sharper version, and it is no fallacy. If the process that handed you your religion would have handed you an incompatible one four thousand miles away, then that process is tracking your surroundings rather than the truth, and what it produces deserves less confidence. - The trouble comes when you run it over anything else people disagree about. Politics moves with birthplace. So do many moral intuitions, and the sense of what religion even is, and quite possibly atheism itself. - Nothing inside the argument could make it stop at the church door, so it does not stop there. A standard that no belief on any disputed subject could pass has not set the bar high. It has stopped working. - So stop asking where a belief came from, and start asking what supports it. Whether a man was executed in Jerusalem under Pontius Pilate, and whether people who knew him said they had seen him alive, does not change with your passport. (5) What survives all this is a fair warning. - The honest residue is not "your religion is false." It is "you did not pick it, so go and find out whether it is true." - Nobody should hold a religion the way he holds a loyalty to his father's football team. That request, to find out rather than simply inherit, produced the whole tradition of Christian evidences: centuries of books setting out the historical and philosophical reasons for believing. It has never been an unwelcome request. Therefore, neither the character nor the birthplace of a religion's believers settles whether it is true.

(C1) Therefore, whether Jesus is the only way is a question of evidence. + Whether Jesus is the only way gets settled the way any question about what is actually the case gets settled, by evidence. "All roads lead to God" is not the humble position it sounds like (P1), and the two charges people bring against Christian exclusivity have not laid a finger on whether it is true (P2). (1) Nobody gets a seat above the disagreement. - The religions contradict one another at the center rather than at the edges (P1), which means that at most one of them is right about God. It also means that the possibility that none of them is right stays wide open the whole way through. - Say "all of them are right," and you have contradicted every religion that denies it, which is all of them. Say "all of them are wrong," and you have just made the most exclusive claim on the table, one that rules out every option except your own. - There is no position available that rules nothing out. So being exclusive, all by itself, cannot be the complaint. (2) The usual reasons for rejecting the Christian claim never reach it. - Arrogance is a charge about someone's character, and birthplace is a fact about someone's biography (P2). Neither one is about the claim. - There is a sharpened version that genuinely is about belief: the charge that a process shaped by culture is unreliable. It turns out to apply to every contested belief anybody holds, the objector's own included. (3) Both steps run on the plainest piece of reasoning there is. - Logicians call it modus ponens, Latin for "the way of affirming." If it rained, the street is wet. It rained. So the street is wet. Nobody needs training to use it, and everybody uses it a hundred times a day. - Here it is the first time. If the religions contradict one another, then "all roads" is not the modest middle position. They do contradict one another. So it is not. - And here it is the second time. If the usual objections are about the believer, or fall on everyone alike, then they do not settle whether the belief is true. They are about the believer, or they fall on everyone alike. So they do not settle it. (4) Neither link has to be certain for the chain to hold. - Both steps are deductive, and a deductive argument works like a chain: if every link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out of the bottom. - But a link does not need to be certain to hold. A premise earns its place by being more believable than its denial. That is a much lower bar than proof, and it is the right bar for an argument about anything real. Both premises (P1, P2) clear it comfortably. (5) What is left is the ordinary question anybody asks about any claim. - Is there good reason to think it is true? That is a modest result, and it is a real one. - It does not show that Christianity is true, and it was never built to. What it shows is that good manners have not settled the question. - Think of a man who declines to look into it because looking would be impolite. He has declined, but he has not declined for a reason. Therefore, the question is still standing, and it is standing the way any question about what is actually the case stands: waiting on evidence.

(P3) The New Testament names who saves and sets no number on the saved. + The phrase "the only way" carries two separate questions: who does the rescuing, and how many get rescued. The New Testament itself keeps them apart. (1) The texts name a person and never set a number. - "I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me" (John 14:6). - "There is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved" (Acts 4:12). - "There is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all" (1 Timothy 2:5-6). - Each of these names a person as the means of salvation, and not one of them gives a figure. (2) Scripture already applies the claim to people who never heard the name. - Abraham never heard of Jesus of Nazareth, and neither did Moses, Ruth, David, or Isaiah. Christians have always said that they are saved, and saved by Christ. - Hebrews says it outright: Christ is "the mediator of a new covenant, so that those who are called may receive the promised eternal inheritance, since a death has occurred that redeems them from the transgressions committed under the first covenant" (Hebrews 9:15). - Paul makes the same move. God had "passed over former sins," and the cross is where that account was settled (Romans 3:25-26). - So if "only through Christ" meant "only for those who hear his name in this life," Abraham would be left outside. No Christian has ever said he is. (3) Orthodox Christians agree on who saves and divide over how far his work reaches. - Pluralism says the religions are equally valid roads and none of them is uniquely true. It denies what Christianity claims, so it stands outside the question. - Particularism, also called exclusivism, says salvation comes through Christ alone. Particularists, meaning Christians who hold the historic creeds, then divide over the reach of his work: • Restrictivism holds that conscious faith in Christ is required, so the unevangelized, those who never hear of him, are lost. • Inclusivism holds that Christ's work can be applied to someone who responds to whatever light he has, the way it was applied to Abraham. • Two further views, one built on God's middle knowledge (his knowledge of what every person would freely do in any circumstance) and one that holds out an encounter with Christ at death, are set out with the others in (D6). - They agree completely about who does the saving. Their whole disagreement is about the reach, and the two sides have argued it out for centuries. (4) The claim rules definite things out. - Picture a man who wakes up in a hospital bed and is told his bill has been paid. Whether or not he ever learns who cleared it, that changes nothing about who paid. - "One person cleared this debt" is a definite claim. It would be false if somebody else had paid, and false if the debt were still sitting there. - The Christian claim has that same shape. It rules out being saved by your own record, by some other go-between, or by a different god, and it rules out the idea that nobody needed saving at all. Most religions deny at least one of those. (5) On the numbers, the texts pull in both directions. - Jesus speaks of a narrow gate and a hard way, "and those who find it are few" (Matthew 7:13-14). - Somebody once asked him point blank whether the saved would be few. He gave no figure. He turned the question back on the asker: strive to enter through the narrow door (Luke 13:23-24). - John's vision counts the redeemed as "a great multitude that no one could number, from every nation, from all tribes and peoples and languages" (Revelation 7:9). - Serious Christians read those passages together and arrive at different totals. Jesus himself declined to give a figure, which is a reasonable model for anybody tempted to supply one. Therefore, "Christ alone" fixes who saves and leaves how far his work reaches as a separate question.

(P4) Guilt, unlike ignorance, admits of only one remedy. + What counts as a remedy depends on what is wrong, and guilt is a kind of wrong that leaves room for only one. The complaint hiding inside the question is that a single road is stingy, as though God had simply picked a policy. (1) Guilt is not a shortage of information. - If the human problem were ignorance, many teachers could fix it, and many roads would make sense. - Christianity says the problem is a wrong done to a person, and that is a different kind of trouble. - Picture yourself standing in your neighbor's driveway, explaining for an hour how your car ended up going through his fence. Every word is true and every word is understood, and the fence is still lying in his yard. Explanation is not repair. (2) The debt is owed by the one who cannot pay it. - Anselm settled this in 1098, nine centuries before anyone called exclusivity bad manners. His question was a plain one: given what has gone wrong, what fixes it? - The debt is owed by man. Human beings did the wrong, so if paying is what puts it right, a man must pay. - But no man can, and this is the step people miss. Obedience, sorrow, a lifetime of trying harder: every one of those was already owed before the debt was ever run up. Paying what you already owed does not reduce the debt, any more than paying this month's rent settles last year's. - God can pay, because God owes nothing, so whatever he gives is his to give. - So the one who pays has to be a man, and has to be God, which means he has to be both at once. That is what the incarnation claims: that in Jesus, God became a man. Athanasius had reasoned the same way in the fourth century: since the Word (the name John's Gospel gives the Son) is the one through whom everything was made, only he could remake what had gone wrong inside it. Neither man was arguing against anybody's religion. (3) Things that happen, happen once. - A boat comes out for a man in the water and pulls him aboard. Looking back, there was one way off that water, because one boat came. - Christianity claims that God became a man, lived, died under Roman execution, and rose. If that occurred, it occurred once, the way everything that ever occurred did. - Complaining that there was only one incarnation is like complaining that there was only one Normandy landing. Nobody set that number as a policy. It is simply what it means for something to have happened. (4) Every true account of anything excludes its rivals. - A doctor who says the infection needs this antibiotic and not that one is not being closed-minded. He is right or he is wrong. - Once a subject has a fact of the matter, exclusion arrives with it. Religions claim things: whether there is a God, what he is like, what has gone wrong, what was done about it. Some of those claims are wrong. - So the alternative to exclusion is not humility. The alternative is that religion is not talking about anything at all, and that is less respectful than saying it might be mistaken. (5) The whole thing stands or falls on the event. - None of this shows that the diagnosis is correct or that the rescue happened. It shows only what would follow if they are. - If Jesus of Nazareth did not rise, then the exclusivity is not offensive. It is false, and Christianity goes into the ground with it. Paul said as much: if Christ has not been raised, the faith is worthless and Christians are still in their sins (1 Corinthians 15:14, 17). - It is a strange sort of arrogance that names, in its own founding documents, the fact that would sink it. Therefore, if the human trouble is guilt rather than ignorance, one remedy is what the trouble allows, not a limit somebody imposed.

(C2) Therefore, Jesus can be the only way. + Jesus can be the only way. If the human problem really is guilt, and if Jesus rose from the dead, then the phrase "the only way" describes a rescue, not a boast. (1) None of the three usual complaints survives. - The first says the religions are all true at heart. They are not. They contradict each other about God, about what has gone wrong with us, and about whether a particular man died on a particular Friday (P1). - The second says the Christian claim is disqualified by the character or the birthplace of the people who hold it. But a charge about character is a charge about believers. And the charge about birthplace, once it is sharpened into the form that actually bites, bites everyone who picks it up (P2). - The third says exclusivity means a small God with a short guest list. That misreads the claim from the start. It is a claim about who does the saving, and how far his work reaches is a question orthodox Christians have genuinely disputed with each other for centuries (P3). (2) What is left is a definite claim. - The human problem is guilt, and guilt is not the sort of thing information fixes. The repair was carried out by one person, at one time, at his own expense (P4). - Think back to the boat that came for the man in the water (P4). There was one way off the water because one boat came. In the same way, uniqueness is not an extra insult bolted onto the story afterward. It is the story. (3) None of this shows that Jesus is the only way. - What it shows is what the phrase means, what would have to be true for it to hold, and where the weight finally comes to rest: on the evidence that Jesus rose from the dead. - Showing that the usual objections fail (P2) clears the ground, and it does nothing more than clear it. The question is left standing open, and only evidence closes it. - So the honest form of the answer is not "Jesus is the only way because Christians say so." If there is no God and Jesus stayed dead, then Christian exclusivity is false, and no amount of humility on one side or offense taken on the other changes that by a hair. (4) Somebody once paid for the word "only." - In AD 203 a young mother named Perpetua, about twenty-two years old and still nursing her baby, was killed in the arena at Carthage. What she had refused to do was a small thing: she would not offer the sacrifice made for the emperors' welfare. - Rome would have let her keep Jesus. Roman religion took on new gods the way a growing city takes on new streets, and one more would have cost the empire nothing at all. What the empire could not allow was the word "only." - She thought "only" was true. And if it is true, she was right about what it was worth. Therefore, if there is a God and Jesus rose, the question was never whether one road is narrow, but whether a rescue happened. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument (Habermas) • CE / Resurrection: Core Facts Argument (Craig) • World Religions / Islam: The Islamic Dilemma • Philosophy / Logic: Deductive Arguments

On Christian particularism and the exclusivity of Christ: Craig, William Lane. "'No Other Name': A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation Through Christ." Faith and Philosophy 6, no. 2 (1989): 172-88. Craig, William Lane. Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics. 3rd ed. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008. (Chapter 8, on Christian particularism.) Geivett, R. Douglas, and W. Gary Phillips. "A Particularist View: An Evidentialist Approach." In Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World, edited by Dennis L. Okholm and Timothy R. Phillips. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996. McGrath, Alister E. "A Particularist View: A Post-Enlightenment Approach." In Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World, edited by Dennis L. Okholm and Timothy R. Phillips. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996. Nash, Ronald H. Is Jesus the Only Savior? Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994. Netland, Harold A. Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism and the Question of Truth. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991. Netland, Harold A. Encountering Religious Pluralism: The Challenge to Christian Faith and Mission. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2001. Plantinga, Alvin. "A Defense of Religious Exclusivism." In The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith, edited by Thomas D. Senor. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995. Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. (Chapter 13, on pluralism.) On the fate of those who never hear: Morgan, Christopher W., and Robert A. Peterson, eds. Faith Comes by Hearing: A Response to Inclusivism. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2008. Pinnock, Clark H. A Wideness in God's Mercy: The Finality of Jesus Christ in a World of Religions. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992. (An inclusivist case.) Sanders, John. No Other Name: An Investigation into the Destiny of the Unevangelized. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992. (Surveys the range of Christian positions.) On hell and what is lost: Crockett, William V., ed. Four Views on Hell. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996. Lewis, C. S. The Problem of Pain. London: Centenary Press, 1940. (Chapter 8, on hell.) Walls, Jerry L. Hell: The Logic of Damnation. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992. On religious epistemology and the contingency of belief: Alston, William P. Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. (Chapter 7, on religious diversity.) Griffiths, Paul J. Problems of Religious Diversity. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001. McGrew, Timothy, and Lydia McGrew. Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason. London: Routledge, 2007. (On justification as fixed by the reasons a believer has.) Pascal, Blaise. Pensées. Translated by A. J. Krailsheimer. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966. Ward, Keith. "Truth and the Diversity of Religions." Religious Studies 26, no. 1 (1990): 1-18. White, Roger. "You Just Believe That Because..." Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010): 573-615. On the atonement and the incarnation: Anselm of Canterbury. Cur Deus Homo. In Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, edited by Brian Davies and G. R. Evans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Athanasius. On the Incarnation. Translated by John Behr. Popular Patristics Series 44a. Yonkers, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2011. On Jesus' own exclusive claims and the earliest preaching: Davies, W. D., and Dale C. Allison Jr. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew. Vol. 2. International Critical Commentary. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991. (On Matthew 11:25-30 and its Johannine character.) Dodd, C. H. The Apostolic Preaching and Its Developments. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1936. (On the primitive material preserved in the speeches in Acts.) On the historical evidence for the crucifixion and resurrection: Ehrman, Bart D. Did Jesus Exist? The Historical Argument for Jesus of Nazareth. New York: HarperOne, 2012. (A non-Christian historian on the security of the crucifixion.) Ehrman, Bart D. How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee. New York: HarperOne, 2014. (A non-Christian historian granting that some of Jesus' followers had experiences they took to be sightings of him alive after his death, which he explains as visions.) Habermas, Gary R., and Michael R. Licona. The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus. Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004. Licona, Michael R. The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2010. McGrew, Timothy, and Lydia McGrew. "The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth." In The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, edited by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. (On why a low prior probability is a starting point rather than a verdict.) On early Christian persecution and religious liberty: Moss, Candida R. Ancient Christian Martyrdom: Diverse Practices, Theologies, and Traditions. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012. Wilken, Robert Louis. The Christians as the Romans Saw Them. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. On religion and state power in the twentieth century: Froese, Paul. The Plot to Kill God: Findings from the Soviet Experiment in Secularization. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. Goossaert, Vincent, and David A. Palmer. The Religious Question in Modern China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011. Critic sources engaged: Crossan, John Dominic. Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1994. D'Costa, Gavin. John Hick's Theology of Religions: A Critical Evaluation. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987. (A critical study, listed here for the exposition of Hick it examines.) Hick, John. God Has Many Names. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982. Hick, John. An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. Hick, John. The Metaphor of God Incarnate: Christology in a Pluralistic Age. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1993. Knitter, Paul F. No Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World Religions. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1985. Lindbeck, George A. The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984. Runzo, Joseph. "God, Commitment, and Other Faiths: Pluralism vs. Relativism." Faith and Philosophy 5, no. 4 (1988): 343-64. Schellenberg, J. L. Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993. Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. The Meaning and End of Religion. New York: Macmillan, 1962. Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. Towards a World Theology: Faith and the Comparative History of Religion. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981. Ancient sources: Justin Martyr. First Apology 46. In The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, Ante-Nicene Fathers 1. Lactantius. Divine Institutes 5.20. The Passion of Perpetua and Felicity (Carthage, AD 203). In The Acts of the Christian Martyrs, edited and translated by Herbert Musurillo. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Pliny the Younger. Letters 10.96 (to the emperor Trajan, c. AD 112). Tacitus. Annals 15.44. Tertullian. Ad Scapulam 2. Other religious texts cited: The Qur'an, Surah 4:157; 4:171; 5:73; 30:30; 112:1-4. Biblical citations: Genesis 18:25; Deuteronomy 6:4; Isaiah 45:22; Ezekiel 18:23; 33:11; Matthew 7:13-14, 21-23; 10:32-33; 11:25-30; Mark 8:38; Luke 10:22; 13:23-24; 19:41; John 1:9; 3:16-18; 14:6; Acts 4:12; 10:34-35; 11:14; 14:16-17; 17:26-27, 30-31; Romans 1:19-20; 2:14-16; 3:23, 25-26; 5:8; 9:2-3; 10:9, 13-17; 1 Corinthians 8:6; 13:12; 15:3-8, 14, 17; Galatians 3:8; Philippians 2:9-11; 1 Thessalonians 1:9; 1 Timothy 2:4-6; Hebrews 9:15; 11:6; 1 Peter 3:15, 18; 2 Peter 3:9; Revelation 7:9.
+ The religions are many culturally shaped responses to one ultimate reality that lies beyond all our concepts. The differences are in the human packaging, not in what is being responded to, so no tradition gets to say the others are wrong.
The strongest form of this objection belongs to John Hick, and it is a worked-out philosophy of religion rather than a slogan. Behind every tradition, on his account, stands what he called the Real, which lies beyond every category we have. It is not personal and not impersonal, not one and not many, not good and not evil, because all of those are our concepts and the Real exceeds them. Each tradition meets the Real through its own history, its own language, and its own long habits of prayer. What each one ends up describing (Allah, the Trinity, Brahman, the Tao) is a genuine appearance of the Real, shaped by the people it appeared to. So the contradictions are entirely real at the level of the descriptions and unreal at the level of the thing described. A tradition counts as authentic not by whether its doctrines are correct but by whether it turns people away from self-centeredness and toward reality. 1. A reality beyond all categories cannot support the claims made about it. If nothing we can say applies to the Real, then "the Real is the source of every tradition" does not apply to it either. Neither does "responding to it transforms people." Neither, come to that, does "it exists." Each of those sentences says something about the Real, and the position needs all three. Hick saw the difficulty coming, and his answer was a distinction between two kinds of description. Think of somebody you have never met, the woman who wrote an anonymous letter. "The person who wrote this letter" is a formal description: it picks her out and tells you nothing whatever about her. "She is patient, and left-handed, and afraid of dogs" is a substantial description, and it tells you what she is like. Hick's claim is that formal descriptions of the Real apply and substantial ones do not. The trouble is that the framework runs on substantial descriptions from end to end: - That the Real grounds every tradition's experience. - That responding to it saves. - That no tradition's account of it is accurate as it stands. Every one of those says what the Real is like, and not merely that it can be mentioned. What the position needs is a Real describable enough to unify the religions and indescribable enough that no religion's description of it could ever be wrong. It cannot have both, and it needs both. 2. It enlarges exclusivism instead of escaping it. Look at what the position actually says to the traditions it means to include. - It tells Muslims that God's oneness, confessed five times a day, is a human appearance of something that is not, strictly speaking, one. - It tells Christians that the incarnation is a myth in the technical sense, a story true in what it expresses rather than in what it reports as having happened. - It tells Theravada Buddhists that they are in fact responding to a transcendent reality which they explicitly deny. Every tradition gets corrected on exactly the point it holds most firmly. That is not less exclusive than particularism. It is a good deal more, because it excludes everybody at once, and does it in the name of including them. 3. It is a religious position of its own. Ask what the framework itself believes about ultimate reality and it turns out to have a very definite answer: there is an unknowable reality sitting behind all the appearances anyone can know. That picture did not come from the religions. It came from Kant, who argued that we never encounter the world as it is in itself, but only the world as it shows up to minds built like ours. It also has a definite test of authenticity, which is the turn from self toward reality, and a definite verdict on which religious claims may be taken at face value, which is none of them. A picture of what is ultimately real, a test of true religion, and a ruling on everyone else's doctrine: those are the marks of a religious philosophy, not of a neutral vantage point above the others. A man who adopts it has not risen above the religions. He has changed religions. 4. And it must still meet the historical question. Then there is the awkward matter of the body. Whatever is finally said about categories and appearances, either a first-century man was raised from the dead or he was not. That is not a claim about something lying beyond our concepts. It is a claim about a tomb outside Jerusalem and what was or was not inside it on a particular morning. Hick grants that historical questions like this one have real answers, and files them as questions the traditions cannot settle and salvation does not depend on. But if the answer to this one is yes, the framework is finished, because a resurrection would be God putting his weight publicly behind one man's specific claims about himself, and that is the one thing the framework has ruled out before any evidence is opened. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument (Habermas)
+ Saying your religion is right and everyone else's is wrong is arrogant, and the arrogance of it is reason enough to reject it.
1. A great deal of the complaint is true. Much of this is deserved, and pretending otherwise would be a small demonstration of the very problem. Christians have been arrogant about this, and the historical record holds a good deal worse than arrogance. Anyone who has been condescended to by a believer has a real complaint, and what he is owed for it is an apology rather than an argument. 2. Bad manners cannot make a claim false. What makes a claim true is whether things are as it says they are. Nothing else gets a vote, and character certainly does not. If it did, a discovery would turn false the moment a disagreeable man announced it and true again when a modest one repeated it after him, and nobody believes that about any other subject. 3. The test disqualifies every position that exists. Anybody who holds any view at all on a contested question thinks the people who disagree with him are mistaken. That is what holding a view is. And it includes the person raising this objection, who thinks that Christians are mistaken about the thing they care about most. So if that is arrogance, then arrogance is universal, and a charge that lands on everyone in the room tells you nothing about anyone in it. 4. The serious version is about knowledge, not manners. Sharpened, the charge stops being about rudeness. It becomes this: holding a view that billions of thoughtful people reject takes more confidence than anybody in that position could possibly justify. That is an epistemic charge, meaning a charge about knowledge and evidence rather than about character, and it is a far better objection than the one about manners. It has the same difficulty, though, in a new place. Taken seriously, it applies to every contested question there is, and the man stating it is himself holding a view that billions of thoughtful people reject. What does survive the sharpening is a real distinction, though not the one the objection was hoping for: the difference between how a person holds a claim and what the claim says. Somebody can believe Christianity is true while granting, without any strain at all, that those who reject it are as intelligent as he is, as sincere as he is, and as morally serious as he is, and while granting that he himself might be wrong. That is the ordinary condition of anybody who has convictions about anything. The New Testament attaches a manner to defending the faith, and it is quite specific about it: give the reason for your hope, and do it with gentleness and respect (1 Peter 3:15). Arrogance is a failure to obey that instruction. It is not a consequence of believing the thing.
+ If you had been born in Pakistan you would be a Muslim, and in Thailand a Buddhist. Your religion is an accident of birthplace, which is no reason to think it is true.
The strongest form of this objection is not the slogan but an argument about reliability, and it is a good one. If the process that produced your religious belief would have produced an incompatible belief in another culture, then that process is responding to your surroundings rather than to the truth, and a belief produced that way should be held with a good deal less confidence than you are holding it with. Notice what kind of objection that is, because the two kinds behave differently. This is an undercutting objection: it does not claim your belief is false, it claims your grounds for holding it are not worth what you think they are. The other kind, a rebutting objection, argues that the belief itself is mistaken. This one never tries to. 1. The factual claim is simply true. Religion does track geography, and it tracks it closely. Anyone who has not noticed that has not been paying attention. It is a correlation rather than a law, since people convert in both directions and in very large numbers and always have. But the correlation is strong enough that the objection has earned an answer rather than a quibble. Once a person does notice it, the noticing is itself evidence he now has. It tells him that some of his reasons, the ones he took on trust from the people who raised him, would have pointed somewhere else had he been raised somewhere else, and so they are worth less than he thought. That is a genuine reason for humility about how certain any of us ought to be. 2. The undercutting version applies to nearly everything, including itself. Move a man's birthplace and watch how much else moves with it: - Political convictions move. - Moral intuitions move. - The general views about religion that a person absorbs from everyone around him move, including the view that all religions are equally valid, which is far more common in a modern Western university than it is in Lahore or Bangkok. - Whether he is an atheist at all moves. So if the argument works, it works on the man making it. Nobody in this conversation has a birthplace-independent origin for anything he believes. 3. The way out is the same for everybody. A belief that arrived by upbringing can be examined afterward. That is exactly what people do when they take a hard look at what they were raised with, and it is why some of them change their minds and others keep the belief but hold it on new grounds. So the question that matters is whether the evidence is the sort of thing that varies with culture. The documents, the dates, and the testimony behind the resurrection claim are the same in Lahore as in Dallas. Every reader brings his upbringing to them, but the texts he opens are the same texts, and anyone can go and look. 4. What the argument does establish is worth keeping. It does not show that inherited beliefs are false. What it shows is that an inherited belief stays unexamined until somebody examines it, which is true and worth saying. That is a demand for evidence, and it is a demand Christianity has been willing to meet since the first century. See also: • Philosophy / Epistemology: Internalism
+ Showing that the arrogance and birthplace charges boomerang does not make Christianity true. If everyone's beliefs are shaped by accident alike, the honest conclusion is suspicion of all of it, not confidence in yours.
The strongest form of this objection grants that the two charges fall on everyone alike, and so cannot single out Christians, and then goes further. The believer cannot escape by pointing to his reasons, because his reasons came down the same road as his belief: his parents' word, his church's teaching, an experience in prayer understood in the words he was raised with. If the process that hands people their religion is unreliable across cultures, then everything it handed him is suspect, reasons included, and the only consistent response is to suspend judgment about every religion, his own first. 1. Granted: parity is not proof. Parity is the name for what happened to the arrogance and birthplace charges: each one lands on the objector as squarely as it lands on the Christian. That is a reason to stop using them against one side. It is not a reason to believe anything. The argument claims only that the two charges fail to settle the question (P2), and so the question is still open (C1). Neither step moves an inch toward Christianity being true. Nothing but evidence does that. Parity does answer the charge as it was first made. That charge was not "all religious belief is unreliable." It was "yours is, so give it up," usually from someone who was not offering to give up his own. A charge that lands on every position alike cannot tell anybody which one to leave. What it can still do is send everyone back to check, and that global version is the one left to answer. Think of two friends arguing over a restaurant bill, each with his own total. One tells the other that his number cannot be trusted, because he never checked it. If the accuser never checked his own number either, he has no grounds for preferring it, and the quarrel over whose total wins is over. But the bill is exactly where it was. Nobody, so far, has added it up. 2. The proposed conclusion cannot stop where the objector wants it to stop. Suppose we adopt the rule the objection recommends: give up any belief you would not have held had you grown up somewhere else. Now turn it on itself. The rule is a belief, and it is a belief far more at home in some places and centuries than in others. So is confidence that the natural world is all there is. The best stopping point on offer is method. Physics gives the same answers in Lahore and in Dallas because its claims can be checked in ways that do not depend on who is doing the checking, and religion, the objector says, has nothing like that. That is a fair line to draw. But it divides beliefs that can be checked from beliefs that cannot. It does not divide religion from everything else, and some religious claims are of the checkable kind. 3. Suspicion is a resting place only when there is nothing to check. And there is something to check: - Whether a man was executed in Jerusalem under Pontius Pilate. - Whether his followers said afterward that they had seen him alive. - Whether the testimony they left behaves the way invention behaves or the way report behaves. Those questions have answers, and the answers come from looking at particular documents rather than from a general mood. The objection is right about part of what a believer has to go on. His parents' word and his church's teaching did come down the same road as the belief, and so did the words he was given for an experience in prayer. Once he knows that religion tracks birthplace, those reasons are worth less to him (D3), and honesty asks him to hold the belief with no more confidence than his remaining reasons support. The experience itself is one of those remaining reasons. It is present to his own mind whatever words he first learned for it, and it counts as evidence, though what it is evidence of still has to be weighed. The documents did not come down that road: - They are the same texts wherever they are opened. The Roman historian Tacitus, writing early in the second century with no sympathy at all for Christians, names Pilate as the governor who executed Christ (Annals 15.44), and a reader in Lahore finds the same sentence in his copy as a reader in Dallas. - The weighing is still done by a person his upbringing shaped, and that is true of every historian on every question. The remedy is the ordinary one: lay the reasoning out where people raised elsewhere can check it. Nearly all historians who work on these texts, including many who do not share the faith, grant the execution under Pilate and the followers' reports of seeing him alive. Whether that testimony behaves like report or like invention is where the real argument is. - None of this shows that the resurrection happened. It shows that some reasons for the Christian claim are of a kind the birthplace point does not reach, and whether they are good enough is the open question that (C1) leaves for the evidence. 4. Suspicion is a verdict of its own. Doubting every religious belief sounds like declining to decide. It is not. To say that nobody's religious belief deserves trust is to say something about evidence: that nobody's reasons for it are good enough, and that nobody could get better ones. That is a conclusion, and like any conclusion it needs evidence of its own. - A belief is justified when the believer has good reason to hold it, so that holding it is the sensible thing to do given where he stands. Internalism holds that whether a belief is justified depends only on what lies within the believer's own mind: the reasons he has, in view or within reach of a moment's honest reflection. - Think of a boy whose father drilled him at the kitchen table until he believed that seven times eight is fifty-six. Had his father drilled him wrong, he would have believed that too, for a while. But once he can count it out in his head, eight, sixteen, twenty-four, and on to fifty-six, the reason is his, and it would be the same reason whoever had taught him. - So where a belief came from does not by itself settle whether it is justified. Learning where it came from is different, because that discovery is evidence (D3). But it undercuts only the reasons that came down the same road as the belief, and leaves the others standing. - "Suspect all of it" skips that sorting. It treats the birthplace point as though it reached every reason anybody has or could come to have, and it hands down that verdict without opening any of the evidence. - A good juror who learns that one witness is the defendant's brother gives that testimony less weight, and then goes on to look at the fingerprints. A juror who announces before the trial that any witness might be biased, so he will believe none of them, has not stayed neutral. He has decided the case for the defense without hearing it. There is something to check, and the only honest way to find out whether a religious belief deserves suspicion is to check it. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Minimal Facts Argument (Habermas) • Philosophy / Epistemology: Internalism
+ It is the parable of the blind men and the elephant: one grabs the trunk and says snake, another the leg and says tree, another the ear and says fan. Every religion has part of the truth and none has the whole.
1. The parable is told by someone who can see the elephant. That is the whole difficulty with it, and it is easy to miss because the story is charming. It only works because the narrator can see. He knows it is an elephant. He knows the men are blind. He knows which piece each of them has hold of, which is how he is able to tell you they are each getting part of something larger. So anybody who tells this parable about the world's religions is quietly claiming the narrator's chair: full sight of the religious situation, the ability to say what every tradition is really touching, and the standing to correct all of them at once. That is a stronger claim to knowledge than any religion on earth makes, and it is offered as a lesson in humility. 2. The blind men are not contradicting each other. A trunk really is quite like a snake. Every man in the story gives a partial description that is accurate as far as it goes, and all of their descriptions can be true at the same time, which is exactly why the story is comforting. The religions are not in that position. "God is one person" and "God is three persons in one being" cannot both be partial truths about the same being, any more than "the animal has a trunk" and "the animal has no trunk" could both be partial reports on one elephant. The parable models compatible partial knowledge. The religions present incompatible claims, and the difference between those two things is the whole question. 3. What the image does prove, Christianity already grants. Something in the parable is right, and Christianity says it outright rather than being cornered into it. Human knowledge of God is partial. "Now we see in a mirror dimly" (1 Corinthians 13:12), and no creature comprehends God, and serious Christian theologians have said so for two thousand years. But partial knowledge is still knowledge. The man holding the trunk has learned something true about the elephant, and if a fourth man arrives and announces that the animal is a wristwatch, the first three are entitled to tell him he is wrong. That is the part the parable is usually used to forbid, and the parable itself does not forbid it.
+ If Jesus is the only way, what happens to the billions who lived and died without ever hearing his name? A God who condemns people for missing information they were never offered is not just.
1. Nobody is condemned for missing an exam he never sat. This is the serious one. No Christian who has looked at it squarely has found it comfortable, and anybody who answers it briskly has not understood what is being asked. Scripture states the principle long before it states any conclusion, which means that whatever the answer turns out to be, God's justice is not the thing left in doubt. - "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just?" (Genesis 18:25). - God "desires all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth" (1 Timothy 2:4). - He takes "no pleasure in the death of the wicked" (Ezekiel 33:11). - Judgment is by what a person actually had, not by what he was never offered: those who never had the written law are judged instead by what was written on their hearts and by conscience (Romans 2:14-16). That principle is not universalism smuggled in, universalism being the view that everybody is saved in the end. Paul's argument across Romans 1 through 3 is that measured by whatever light they did have, nobody clears the bar, which is exactly why the rest of the letter is about rescue rather than about grading. But the narrower point stands, and it is the one the objection needs: a person is measured by the light he was given. 2. Christians have disagreed about the reach of it for a very long time. There is no single Christian answer to hand over here, and it would be dishonest to invent one. There are four, and they have all been on the table for centuries. - Restrictivists hold that conscious faith in Christ is necessary and that the unevangelized are lost. They rest the case on the chain in Romans 10:14-17: calling requires believing, believing requires hearing, and hearing requires a preacher. - Inclusivists hold that Christ's work can reach someone who responds to the light he has, as it reached Abraham. They point to Acts 10:34-35, where God accepts anyone in any nation who fears him and does what is right. - Some argue, on an approach called middle knowledge, that God knows what every person would freely do in any circumstance he might have been placed in, and has arranged history so that nobody is lost who would have accepted the gospel had he heard it. They read Acts 17:26-27 that way: God set the times and the places of every nation so that they would seek him. - A smaller number hold out an encounter with Christ at death. Not one of those is a recent invention forced on Christianity by embarrassment. In the second century Justin Martyr was already arguing that those who lived by the divine reason before Christ came, and he names Socrates and Abraham in the same breath, belonged to Christ. The question is as old as the faith is. 3. All four positions say the same thing about who saves. Whatever else they disagree about, every one of them holds that whoever is saved is saved by Christ and by nothing else. They divide over the reach of his work. They do not divide over whose work it is. So however this question is finally resolved, and it may not be resolved this side of the grave, it leaves the claim that Christ alone saves exactly where it found it. The objection is asking a different question, and a harder one, and the answer to that one is genuinely disputed among Christians who hold the historic creeds. 4. The objection also has to answer its own question. If the complaint is that a just God would not let anybody be lost for lack of information, then the complaint has already assumed a God who is just, who is under some obligation to human beings, and who has a standard he could fail to meet. Those assumptions are perfectly at home in Christianity. They are not at home everywhere. On the view that there is no God, nobody who died without hearing the gospel was wronged by anyone, because there was nothing to hear and no one there to do the wronging. The force of the objection is borrowed from the moral furniture of the house it is attacking. See also: • CO / Miscellaneous: What About Those Who've Never Heard of Jesus?
+ Allowing that people who never heard can be saved empties the claim. Either the name of Jesus is required, and the objection about the unevangelized stands, or it is not, and Jesus is not the only way after all.
1. The dilemma turns on a phrase that carries two meanings. Both horns need "the only way" to mean one thing, and it means two. It can mean the only one who saves. It can also mean the only route by which people come to hear of him. Return to the man in the hospital bed. "One person cleared this debt" is a claim about who paid it. "The patient knows the donor's name" is a claim about what the patient was told. The first can be perfectly true whether or not the second is, and neither collapses into the other. Christianity claims the first. What it says about the second is that God is just and that the reach of Christ's work is not fully specified. A dilemma built by sliding between two senses of a phrase is not a dilemma. 2. Take the first horn and the claim is hard, not empty. Suppose conscious faith in Christ really is required, which is what restrictivists hold and hold seriously. Then the question about the unevangelized is live and painful, and it gets answered on its own terms rather than by being waved off: judgment is by the light a person actually had (Romans 2:14-16), God is said to set the times and places of every nation so that people would seek him (Acts 17:26-27), and he is said to want all of them saved (1 Timothy 2:4). Christians press those texts against each other, and the pressing is not finished. What none of it does is show that "Christ alone saves" has no content, which is what the dilemma promised to show. Hard and empty are not the same thing, and this is hard. 3. The claim rules out a great deal. - It rules out that anyone is saved by his own moral record. - It rules out a second go-between. - It rules out a different god. - It rules out that nobody needed saving in the first place. Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and every secular account of the human situation deny at least one of those four, and most of them deny more than one. Whatever else is true of a claim that contradicts every major alternative on the planet, it has not been drained of content. 4. It names the facts that would sink it. Three specific facts would defeat it, and Christianity's own scripture names one of them out loud: - If Jesus did not rise, the claim is false and Christianity collapses along with it (1 Corinthians 15:14, 17). - If somebody else paid the debt, it is false. - If there was no debt to pay, it is false. A claim that publishes the conditions under which it loses is not a claim being protected from testing. 5. None of this is borrowed from pluralism. Pluralism says the religions are equally valid roads and that Christ is one option among several. Every Christian position on the unevangelized says the opposite: there is one road, and the argument is about who gets carried down it (P3). Those are not neighboring views that shade into each other. Restrictivists, who allow no exception whatsoever, are as far from pluralism as anyone in the discussion, and the case stands whether or not their long disagreement with the inclusivists is ever settled.
+ A sincere Muslim who prays five times a day is plainly a better person than a lukewarm Christian who shows up at Christmas. If God cares about the heart, sincerity has to be what counts.
1. The comparison is fair. There are devout Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists whose discipline and kindness would put most Christians to shame, and any Christian who denies it is not looking at his own congregation. Christianity has no stake at all in denying it. Jesus saved his hardest words for religious people who kept the forms and missed the point (Matthew 7:21-23), and when he wanted a hero for a story about who really loves his neighbor, he made the hero a member of the group his audience despised. The comparison is fair. It is the conclusion drawn from it that does not follow. 2. Sincerity is not a truth-detector. A pharmacist who fills a prescription sincerely, and fills it wrong, has still handed you the wrong drug. His sincerity is real, and it is worth something, and it will not do you the slightest good on the way home. That is why nobody applies this standard anywhere outside religion. Sincerity is a virtue, and a virtue is not a method for finding out what is the case. The objection is the arrogance objection wearing a different coat: it grades the person instead of examining the claim. 3. If the diagnosis is right, sincerity is the one thing that cannot fix the problem. The problem Christianity describes is guilt, not insufficient effort. Sincerity is effort. Sincere effort is exactly what a man offers when he is trying to clear a debt himself, and the whole Christian claim is that the debt was past clearing and somebody else settled it. Which is why the New Testament is at least as hard on religious performance as it is on irreligion. Both are ways of presenting your own record. 4. And on the Christian account the sincere seeker is not in danger from his sincerity. "Whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him" (Hebrews 11:6). "In every nation anyone who fears him and does what is right is acceptable to him" (Acts 10:34-35). It is worth knowing who prompted that second line. He was a Roman army officer, a Gentile, outside Israel, praying to a God he did not yet know by name. And the story does not end with him being turned away. It ends with somebody being sent to tell him the name.
+ "I am the way, the truth, and the life" appears only in John, the last and most theological Gospel, written sixty years after the fact. The historical Jesus never made exclusive claims about himself; the church put them in his mouth.
1. The claim is not confined to John. Matthew and Luke both preserve a saying with exactly the same shape: "no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" (Matthew 11:27; Luke 10:22). That saying sits in the material Matthew and Luke share independently of Mark. So it stands in the Synoptic Gospels, which is the usual name for Matthew, Mark, and Luke, the three that overlap closely enough to be printed side by side in parallel columns and read across. And yet it sounds so much like John that critics nicknamed it a bolt from the Johannine blue: a flash of John's Gospel out of a clear sky, landing in the middle of Matthew and Luke. Access to the Father runs through the Son, stated outside John's Gospel entirely. Alongside it there is this: whoever acknowledges Jesus before others, he will acknowledge before his Father, and whoever denies him, he will deny (Matthew 10:32-33; Mark 8:38). A man who makes his own name the hinge of another man's standing before God has already made an exclusive claim, whatever words he used to do it. 2. The earliest material of all is exclusive. Acts places "there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved" in a sermon preached in Jerusalem within weeks of the crucifixion (Acts 4:12). Paul, writing in the early 50s, reminds the Thessalonians that they "turned to God from idols to serve the living and true God" (1 Thessalonians 1:9). Turned from. That describes abandonment rather than addition, and it is his ordinary way of speaking. He sets one God and one Lord against the many gods and many lords of the world around him (1 Corinthians 8:6). None of that depends on John, and all of it is earlier. 3. The behavior of the first Christians is the hardest evidence of all. Rome was not in the business of persecuting people for adding a god. Roman religion took on new gods routinely, the way a port city takes on new trade, and it would have taken on this one without blinking. The trouble was never the addition. The trouble was the refusal. Pliny the Younger, governing a province for the emperor Trajan around AD 112, wrote to him to describe the test he had settled on. Those who invoked the gods, offered wine and incense before the emperor's image, and cursed Christ were released. Those who would not do it were executed. That was the whole test, and it was over in a minute. People do not accept that outcome on behalf of a claim invented decades later by their successors. The exclusivity is the thing that got them killed, which is strong evidence that the exclusivity was there from the start. 4. Dating John late does not do what the objection needs. Grant the late date for the sake of argument, since the case does not need that dispute settled. The date of a document is not the date of what it reports, and John presents itself as testimony rather than as theology floating free of events. Then remove John from the file entirely and see what is left. The exclusive claim still stands in Matthew, in Luke, in Acts, and in Paul. A critic can press further and throw out the Matthew and Luke saying too, on the grounds that it sounds too developed to be authentic. Then the case rests on three things: - The sermon material in Acts, whose way of speaking about Jesus is in places more primitive than Luke's own way of writing elsewhere and looks inherited rather than composed. - Paul in the early 50s. - What the first Christians were prepared to die rather than say. None of it turns on any single verse, which is what makes it so hard to dislodge. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Dating and Eyewitness Proximity of the New Testament
+ Exclusive religious claims cause intolerance. Crusades, inquisitions, and colonial missions all followed from somebody being certain they alone had the truth, and the world would be safer if nobody made that claim.
1. The historical charge is partly true. Christians have used force to compel belief, and in doing it they betrayed the thing they claimed to believe. Nothing in the Christian case makes those episodes acceptable, and nothing said here is trying to. 2. The variable that produces coercion is not exclusivity. Coercion does not come from holding an exclusive view. Doctors hold exclusive views about which treatments work and do not conscript their patients. Judges hold exclusive views about what the law says and are kept inside procedure while they hold them. What produces coercion is unaccountable power joined to a belief that licenses force, and it is the joining that does the damage. The twentieth century made the point at scale. The largest campaigns against religion in living memory were run by officially atheist states. The Soviet Union closed nearly all of its tens of thousands of churches and killed clergy on a mass scale through the 1920s and 1930s. China's Cultural Revolution closed churches, temples, and mosques together and drove religious practice underground for a decade. The sharp reply to that is worth stating, because it is correct: those states held exclusive claims of their own, secular ones, so the objection still stands. That reply is right about the facts, and it gives the argument away. If a political creed counts, then the thing doing the damage is not religion. And it is not exclusivity either, since every position on a contested question excludes its rivals, this objection included. What is left is the same variable as before: a belief that licenses force, in the hands of people who answer to nobody. None of which is the claim that atheism causes violence, which would be repeating the objection's mistake instead of answering it. 3. The argument against coercion came from Christians first. Around AD 212 Tertullian wrote that it is a human right and a matter of natural liberty for each person to worship according to his own conviction, and that a religion forced on somebody is no religion at all. Lactantius, a century later, argued that religion cannot be imposed by force because belief is simply not the sort of thing force can produce. Both of them were writing while Christians were the ones being killed. The case against coercion is not a modern correction applied to Christianity from outside it. 4. For three centuries they held the claim and held no power. They were the ones in the arena, not the ones filling the seats. Whatever the exclusive claim produced later, once it had been welded to imperial power, it produced no persecution at all in the years when Christians had no power to persecute anybody with. That locates the problem in the power rather than in the claim. See also: • CE / NT Criticism: Early Christian Persecution
+ Other religions also have miracle reports, martyrs, and lives transformed for the better. If that evidence supports Christianity, it supports all of them equally, and it cancels out.
1. The transformed lives are granted. People are changed by Buddhism. People are changed by Islam. People are changed by causes with nothing religious about them at all, and by a good marriage, and by getting sober. A changed life shows that a belief has power over the person holding it, which is worth knowing and is not nothing. It does not show that the belief is true, and the Christian case has never claimed that it does. 2. Martyrdom shows sincerity, which nobody is disputing. People die for beliefs they hold sincerely and hold wrongly, in every century and in every tradition, and no one is pretending otherwise. The Christian argument turns on a much narrower point, and the narrowness is the whole of it. The first witnesses were not dying for a doctrine they had received from somebody else. They were dying for a claim about something they said they had personally seen, in public, within recent memory, in the city where it was supposed to have happened. A man can sincerely die for a mistaken belief; that happens often. It is a very different thing for a group of people to die for a fact they know they made up. 3. Competing miracle claims do not cancel automatically. Two reports cancel each other only if the evidence behind each one is comparable, and finding out whether it is comparable means doing the comparison rather than doing the arithmetic. The questions are the ordinary ones anybody asks of any testimony: - How early is the report? - How many independent lines carry it? - Were the witnesses in a position to know? - What did the claim cost them? - Was the event public or private? A resurrection attested by named individuals within a few years, in a passage Paul says he received as already-formed tradition rather than composed himself (1 Corinthians 15:3-8), is a different kind of claim from a private wonder written down generations afterward. That comparison may come out badly for Christianity. The way to find out is to make it, and not to assume symmetry because two things are both filed under miracles. 4. Most reported miracles would not settle the question anyway. A healing in another tradition, supposing it genuine, does not show that the human problem is craving rather than guilt, and it does not show that ultimate reality is impersonal. It shows that a healing happened. The Christian claim rests on one specific event which, if it happened, vindicates one specific man's specific claims about himself. Very few miracle reports anywhere are load-bearing in that particular way, and most of the ones being counted up here are not. See also: • CE / Resurrection: Core Facts Argument (Craig)
+ If getting this right mattered as much as Christians say, God would have made it unmistakable to everyone. The sheer number of sincere people who reach different conclusions is evidence that no one religion is the truth.
The strongest form of this objection is not about numbers at all. It is about how a loving God would be expected to behave. If God exists, is perfectly loving, and wants a relationship with people, then he would make sure that everyone capable of that relationship has evidence enough for it. And there are sincere people who want to believe and cannot, which makes them evidence against a God of that description. That is the argument from divine hiddenness, it has been developed with real care, and it is not answered by pointing out that plenty of other people do believe. 1. Disagreement among sincere people is not by itself evidence about truth. Experts disagree about the causes of the First World War, and they disagree about how to interpret quantum mechanics. Neither disagreement suggests that the war had no causes or that the mathematics means nothing. Where a subject is genuinely difficult and the stakes reach into how people want to live, a spread in the answers is what anybody would expect, whether or not there is a fact of the matter underneath. Disagreement tells you the question is hard. It does not tell you the question is empty. 2. The objection assumes God's aim is certainty. Evidence overwhelming enough to compel every rational person would produce assent, in the way a proof produces assent. What it would not produce is trust, which is a different thing and is not the sort of thing that can be compelled out of anyone. Pascal put the point in a sentence: light enough for those who want to see, and darkness enough for those who do not. That claim could be wrong. But the objection needs it to be wrong, and it usually assumes rather than argues that a loving God would prefer certainty to willing love. 3. Christianity expects something close to this situation. Its own account is that God has left evidence in creation and in conscience, that the evidence is sufficient, and that people put it aside (Romans 1:19-20), and that he "did not leave himself without witness" among the nations (Acts 14:17). On that account, religious diversity is roughly what you would expect to find: a real signal, universally available, variously received, and variously suppressed. The competing account, that there is no signal at all, has a question of its own to answer, which is why nearly every human society that has ever existed produced religion in the first place. 4. Hiddenness leaves a real cost unanswered. Hiddenness is the strongest argument in this neighborhood, and it should be said plainly that it leaves a cost behind. There are people who have sought honestly and found nothing. No argument repays that, and it would be indecent to pretend otherwise. What the objection does not do is establish pluralism. If the hiddenness argument works, its conclusion is that there is no God of the kind described. Its conclusion is not that all the religions are equally valid roads to him. See also: • CO / Problem of Evil: Intellectual PoE: Probabilistic
+ Thousands of religions have existed and at most one can be right. You are already an atheist about every god but yours, and the honest step is one more: from all that contradiction, the reasonable conclusion is that none of them is true.
1. The first half is exactly what (P1) says. Contradiction among the religions is not evidence for Christianity, and nothing here has treated it as though it were. It rules out the comfortable option and does nothing else at all. That none of them is true stays a live possibility the whole way through, and only evidence closes it. 2. Counting candidates is not weighing them. The objection turns a headcount into odds by treating every religion as an equally likely draw from a hat. Evidence does not work that way anywhere else, and nobody would accept it if it did. A jury does not begin by giving each of a city's million residents a one-in-a-million chance and then going home on the grounds that the odds are hopeless. It asks where the fingerprints are. A low starting number is not a verdict; it is a starting point, and testimony that is early, multiple, independent, and expensive to the people who gave it moves a starting point a very long way. That is why juries convict at all, and why nobody thinks they are being unreasonable when they do. 3. Most of the thousands are not offering evidence about the same question. The count is doing a lot of quiet work. It sweeps in three groups at once: - Traditions with no view at all about a personal creator. - Traditions making no historical claim anyone could check. - Traditions long extinct, with nothing on the table either way. Very few candidates on that list say that a specific man in a specific decade was raised from the dead in public and left behind witnesses who could be questioned by anybody who wanted to. These are not interchangeable lottery tickets, and once the ones making no testable claim are set aside, the list gets short in a hurry. 4. "None of them" is one of the answers being counted. If the sheer number of options is what drives the probability down, notice which option quietly gets exempted from the count. That nothing transcendent has ever acted is a position about the same question. It is held by a minority of the human race. And the arithmetic just used against everybody else does not hand it a free pass on the way through. Line the options up honestly and the first fork is a two-way one: either something beyond nature has acted in history, or nothing ever has. Counting up the answers people have given does not settle that fork, and nothing but the evidence for particular claims ever will. That is also why the one-god-further version misdescribes what a Christian is doing. He is not running a general policy of unbelief and then flinching at the final step. He holds that a personal God exists, which is the opposite of the atheist's answer at that fork, and then he judges rival accounts of that God by what supports them. The atheist and the Christian part company at the first fork, not the last one.
+ Treating religions as rival theories that contradict is a modern Western distortion. They are ways of life rather than sets of doctrines, and the tidy contradictions come from describing other faiths in Christian categories they would not use.
The strongest form of this comes from religious studies rather than from atheism, and it has real scholarship behind it. "Religion," understood as a bounded system of beliefs, is a category the modern West assembled and then exported. A tradition works more like a language than like a theory. And what looks from outside like two traditions contradicting is often two grammars doing different jobs. On that account, (P1) has lined up sentences that were never rivals in the first place. 1. The point about the category is a good one. Comparing traditions as though they were competing scientific hypotheses does flatten them, and the flattening loses most of what is there. Practices, communities, memories, meals, songs, habits of the heart: those carry more of any tradition than its propositions do, and a summary that leaves them out has left out the bulk of it. Christianity is in exactly the same position, and it is worth admitting that first. A man who has read the Nicene Creed has not thereby met a church. 2. The believers are the ones insisting on the contradictions. Tell a Muslim that "God has no son" (Qur'an 112:1-4) is a grammar rather than a denial and he will correct you on the spot, because he means it as a denial and says so. Buddhist philosophers argued against a creator God in formal debate with Hindu opponents for centuries, and the arguments survive in both traditions' own literature, written by people who thought they were disagreeing because they were. The contradictions are drawn from those same texts, which is the answer to the charge of imposing foreign categories. - Qur'an 4:157 on the crucifixion is Muslim scripture speaking about its own subject in its own voice. - Anatta is Buddhism's word for a Buddhist teaching. - The account of a Brahman without qualities belongs to one particular school, which is exactly why that school gets named rather than "Hinduism," a word covering traditions that disagree with each other about this very question. Where a summary of another tradition can be improved, the improvement will come out of that tradition's own texts too. 3. A way of life carries claims inside it. Prostration five times a day toward Mecca is not neutral about whether there is a personal God there to be worshipped. Sitting in meditation in order to see through the illusion of a permanent self is not neutral about whether there is one. Practice is not the alternative to belief. It is belief with a body. Strip the claims out of a practice and you have not purified it, you have removed the reason anybody had for doing it. 4. Respect requires that somebody be claiming something. The objection is offered in the name of respect, and it quietly withdraws the very thing that makes respect possible. Taking people seriously enough to think they might be wrong is how adults treat one another about everything else that matters: politics, medicine, how to raise a child. The alternative on offer is admiring the grammar of a tradition while assuming that nothing is at stake inside it, which is a strange sort of compliment to pay to people who have died for it.
+ The offense is not the narrow road, it is what waits at the end of the others. Eternal conscious torment for a finite life is not a rescue, and no distinction between who saves and who is reached softens it.
The strongest form of this is an argument from proportion, and it is not hard to state. A human life is finite, and so is any wrong done inside it. An unending punishment is not finite. A penalty infinitely out of proportion to the offense is unjust however it is administered, and calling the alternative a rescue does not change the arithmetic. 1. This is an objection to hell. It is not an objection to exclusivity, and running the two together is common and helps nobody. It would have exactly the same force against a Christianity in which every human being had heard the gospel, and no force at all against a version of exclusivity in which those who finally refuse simply cease to be. So let it be what it is. Nothing in Christian teaching is harder to say out loud than this. 2. Orthodox Christians disagree about what is at stake. Three views are held inside the historic creeds: - The traditional and majority view is unending conscious punishment. - A minority has held that those who finally refuse God cease to exist rather than continue forever, on the grounds that immortality is a gift rather than a possession. - Another minority has hoped, since the fourth century, that nobody finally refuses at all. Christians argue about which of those Scripture teaches, and the argument is not settled. What is worth noticing is that nothing in the claim that Christ alone saves depends on the answer. On all three views the same person does the saving, at the same cost. 3. The arithmetic in the objection is not what either main Christian account says. The first answer measures a wrong by who was wronged rather than by how long it took to commit. Human courts already do a version of this. The same blow is treated differently depending on who receives it, and nobody calls that a miscount. On that view, an offense against the source of all good is not the sort of thing a number of years was ever going to measure. That answer has serious critics, and it should not be handed over as though it were obvious. The second answer says hell is not a sentence imposed from outside at all. It is a refusal that continues. God does not force his company on anybody, and a person who will not have him finally gets exactly what he insisted on. Lewis put it as bluntly as anyone ever has: "the doors of hell are locked on the inside." On that account nothing is out of proportion, because the duration belongs to the refusal rather than to a price somebody set against a finite crime. On neither answer is God matching a quantity of pain against a quantity of wrongdoing, which is the picture the objection is refuting. 4. Nothing in the Christian texts treats the outcome as satisfying. Whatever the doctrine turns out to mean in detail, the texts themselves are not pleased about it, and that is worth knowing. Jesus wept over a city that would not have him (Luke 19:41). Paul says he carries unceasing anguish and would be cut off himself if it would save his own people (Romans 9:2-3). God is said to take no pleasure in the death of the wicked and to want everyone saved (Ezekiel 33:11; 1 Timothy 2:4). A faith whose central act is one man dying to keep people out of that outcome is not a faith that ever wanted them in it. See also: • CO / Problem of Evil: Intellectual PoE: Probabilistic

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