(●)God's commands presuppose that each sin a person commits is his own, not that anyone can keep them all by his own powers.
+On the last Friday of the school year, a history teacher named Mrs. Okafor hands out her final examination. It is marked out of a hundred, and in twenty-six years of setting it she has never given a hundred. That is no accident. The paper asks for everything the course was meant to teach, and she sets it that way on purpose.
Daniel scores seventy-four. When the paper comes back he goes through it with a pencil, and he finds that every mark he lost, he lost on an answer he wrote himself. He misdated a treaty he had studied the night before. He rushed the last essay because he had spent too long on the first. Nobody held his pen, and on most of those questions, he knows, he could have written something better.
Question twelve is a different story. On Daniel's copy the printer left it off altogether, and he handed in a blank. Mrs. Okafor strikes the question from his paper, and nobody thinks he lost anything there. Of course, had Daniel torn that sheet out himself, she would have counted the question as missed, and nobody would think that unfair either.
Nobody in the class thinks it unjust that the paper was set for a hundred that nobody reaches. Nobody thinks the blank on question twelve was Daniel's failure. And nobody doubts that the marks he lost on his own answers were his. Hold on to those three verdicts, because God's commands raise the same three questions.
An old maxim, a rule boiled down to a few words, says that "ought" implies "can." Ought is the word for what a person is bound to do, and can is the word for what he is able to do, so the maxim says that nobody is bound to do what he is unable to do. Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher, gave it its most quoted form in 1781: "The action to which the 'ought' applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions." Seven years later, in 1788, the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid called it "an axiom as self-evident as any in mathematics."
The maxim has a famous difficulty, and Christians meet it before anyone else. God commands us to love him with all our heart and to be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect (Matthew 22:37; Matthew 5:48). Nobody does, and on every Christian account nobody can by his own powers. Yet God holds us to blame. So, the objection runs, "ought" does not imply "can," and any account of free will that needs the maxim has refuted itself. Martin Luther pressed the point in 1525 against Erasmus, who had defended free choice the year before (D5). Reformed theologians, in the Protestant tradition that runs back to John Calvin, press it against free will today (D1).
A good deal of that quarrel comes from treating the maxim as one claim. It is really three, and Daniel's paper holds all of them.
- The first is about the whole of the standard: that anyone can keep the whole of what God commands by his own powers. That is false, and no Christian communion, or family of churches, teaches it (P1, P2, C1). It is the hundred that nobody scores.
- The second is about deeds: that nobody is to blame for a deed unless he could have avoided it. Philosophers call it the principle of alternative possibilities. Blame does not rest on it. Blame for a deed follows the one who settled it, the one who made it go the way it went (P3). Those are the marks Daniel lost on his own answers.
- The third is about failures to act: that nobody is to blame for leaving undone what he could not have done even if he had chosen it, unless he brought the inability on himself. That one is true, and it is where the maxim's instinct is right (P3). It is question twelve.
Everything turns on that one word, settle. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. Mrs. Okafor may be quite sure which questions Daniel will miss, and her being sure settles none of his answers. She could even guarantee that he answers question five, by setting it because she knows he answers everything he is asked, and her guarantee would still write none of his answer. Nothing settled them but Daniel. It would be another matter if someone had taken hold of his hand and pushed the pen. Then someone else would have settled what went down on his paper.
With that word in hand, freedom takes one sentence to define. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. He is then its source, the one it comes from, and defining freedom this way is called the source view. Daniel's decision to rush his last essay was free in just this sense. Nothing settled it but Daniel, and he had a reason of his own: he had spent too long on the first.
In the ordinary run of human choices, a free choice also carries an ordinary mark: the person could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was. Daniel sees that mark as he goes over his paper: on most questions, he knows, he could have written something better. It is the mark and not the definition, the way a fingerprint on a glass is the usual sign that someone handled it, though a glass handled in gloves was still handled by someone. Another way a choice could have gone, there for the taking, is called an open door.
Philosophers also have a word for a choice settled before it is made. A choice is determined when it is settled beforehand by prior conditions (the past and the laws of nature, or a decree of God) that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. A row of falling dominoes is determined in this sense: the first push and the laws of motion are enough by themselves to bring down the last one. God's decree is his eternal plan for all that happens.
Determinism is the view that every choice is determined, and compatibilism is the view that a choice can be free even if determinism is true. Philosophers who hold that people make free choices of a kind determinism would rule out are called libertarians, a name that has nothing to do with politics.
The fall is Adam's first sin, and the condition it left his children in: a will turned away from God, which Christians of every tradition confess cannot turn itself back without grace, the love and help God gives that no one earns.
Commands and freedom are easy to run together, but they are different subjects. Obeying a command is no part of the definition of freedom: God is free, and nobody commands him. So the question is not what freedom is but what a command presupposes. To presuppose something is to take it for granted, the way a thank-you note takes for granted that someone gave you something.
The argument is deductive: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. The premises work like a locked chain: if every link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. No premise has to be beyond all doubt. Each needs only to be more plausible than its denial.
It runs in two chains. The first shows that God commands more than anyone since the fall can do by his own powers (P1, P2, C1). The second shows that every sin a person commits comes from a choice that nothing settled but him (P3, P4, C2).
Who holds what, on the maxim that "ought" implies "can":
- Support: Immanuel Kant wrote in 1788 that a man "judges, therefore, that he can do a certain thing because he is conscious that he ought," and Thomas Reid defended the maxim as an axiom the same year. Peter Vranas defends it today.
- Oppose: Martin Luther answered Erasmus in 1525 that by the words of the law a man is taught "what he ought to do, not what he can do." Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argued in 1984 that "ought" only suggests "can" in conversation without strictly implying it, and Peter Graham argued in 2011 that the maxim is false.
The argument that follows holds that God's commands presuppose that each sin a person commits is his own, not that anyone can keep them all by his own powers.
(P1)God commands every person to keep the whole of his law.
+God's law asks for everything, and it asks it of everyone. Nothing in Scripture marks the command down to what a person can manage.
(1) The first commandment asks for the whole heart.
- Asked which commandment was the greatest, Jesus answered: "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment" (Matthew 22:37-38). The second, to love your neighbor as yourself, is "like it" (Matthew 22:39).
- A commandment like that is not a list of things to avoid. A man could steer clear of every forbidden act on a list for forty years and still not love God with all his heart.
- The psalmist saw the same thing: "I have seen a limit to all perfection, but your commandment is exceedingly broad" (Psalm 119:96).
(2) The standard is perfection.
- "You therefore must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew 5:48). Peter repeats the law of Leviticus: "You shall be holy, for I am holy" (1 Peter 1:16).
- The law is not kept in pieces: "For whoever keeps the whole law but fails in one point has become accountable for all of it" (James 2:10). Paul quotes the curse on "everyone who does not abide by all things written in the Book of the Law, and do them" (Galatians 3:10).
- Think of Mrs. Okafor's examination. She does not set it for seventy because seventy is what her best students manage. A paper marked down to fit the class would stop telling a student how much of the course he knows.
(3) The command binds every person, not only Israel.
- The law in view is the moral law, the love of God and of neighbor on which "depend all the Law and the Prophets" (Matthew 22:40), and not the sacrifices, feasts and food laws given to Israel alone. Paul sums it up the same way: "love is the fulfilling of the law" (Romans 13:10).
- Paul says that Gentiles "who do not have the law" still show "that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness" (Romans 2:14-15).
- The law speaks "so that every mouth may be stopped, and the whole world may be held accountable to God" (Romans 3:19). And God "commands all people everywhere to repent" (Acts 17:30).
(4) No tradition lowers the standard.
- Augustine, the North African bishop, argued for nearly twenty years against the British monk Pelagius and his followers over what the fallen can do. He never lowered the command: "We must not deny that God commands that we ought to be so perfect in doing righteousness, as to have no sin at all" (On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins 2.16.23).
- Kant, who held the maxim, would not lower it either. Without the hope of an endless progress toward it, he wrote, "the moral law is quite degraded from its holiness, being made out to be indulgent and conformable to our convenience" (Critique of Practical Reason, 1788).
- A bathroom scale set to show whatever its owner hopes to weigh has stopped weighing him.
Therefore, God commands every person to keep the whole of his law.
(P2)No one since the fall can keep the whole of God's law by his own powers.
+Since Adam's first sin nobody keeps the whole of God's law, and every Christian communion confesses that nobody can by his own powers. The traditions part over what grace can do, and the premise needs neither side of that question.
(1) Scripture says that everyone sins.
- Solomon's prayer at the temple says it in passing: "for there is no one who does not sin" (1 Kings 8:46). "Surely there is not a righteous man on earth who does good and never sins" (Ecclesiastes 7:20).
- John writes to Christians: "If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us" (1 John 1:8). James counts himself in: "For we all stumble in many ways" (James 3:2).
(2) Scripture says the fallen mind cannot.
- "For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God, for it does not submit to God’s law; indeed, it cannot" (Romans 8:7). The flesh, as Paul uses the word in this verse, is human nature as sin has left it, not the body.
- Jesus says it to his own disciples: "apart from me you can do nothing" (John 15:5).
- Joshua says it to a nation that has just promised to serve God: "You are not able to serve the Lord, for he is a holy God" (Joshua 24:19). He is not refusing their promise, which he goes on to accept (Joshua 24:21-22). He is telling them what it asks of them.
(3) The church decided the question against Pelagius.
- Pelagius, a British monk teaching in Rome around the year 400, held that human nature, as God made it and as it still is, can do the good God commands. The church answered him at the Council of Carthage in 418 and again at the Second Council of Orange in 529.
- Augustine pictured fallen humanity as the traveler in Jesus's parable, left half dead by robbers on the road to Jericho (Luke 10:30). Such a man, he wrote, "is not so able to mount up to the heights of righteousness as he was able to descend therefrom" (On Nature and Grace 43.50).
- Think of a man who has fallen down a well. The fall took a moment, and the same road will not take him back up.
- The Reformed confess it in the Westminster Larger Catechism, a summary of their teaching in questions and answers drawn up in the 1640s: "no man is able, either of himself, or by any grace received in this life, perfectly to keep the commandments of God" (Q. 149).
(4) The traditions part over grace.
- Augustine held that a life without sin is possible "by the grace of God, and his own free will" (On the Spirit and the Letter 35.62), while holding that no one but Christ has ever lived one (On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins 2.20.34). Later he made an exception of the Virgin Mary, wishing to "raise no question when it touches the subject of sins, out of honour to the Lord" (On Nature and Grace 36.42).
- The Council of Trent, the council the Catholic Church called in answer to the Reformation, condemned the claim that the commandments are impossible to keep for one who has been justified, made right with God (Session 6, canon 18). It also condemned the claim that anyone avoids every lesser sin (the everyday faults Catholics call venial) through his whole life without a special privilege from God, "as the Church holds in regard of the Blessed Virgin" (canon 23).
- Westminster denies that it can be done even "by any grace received in this life" (Q. 149).
- The premise says "by his own powers," which both sides affirm, so it needs neither answer about grace and takes no side between them.
(5) The whole law is more than a list of refusals.
- Plenty of particular sins can be refused one at a time. A man tempted to pocket a twenty-dollar bill a colleague left on her desk can leave it where it is.
- You might think that refusing sins one at a time would, sooner or later, add up to keeping the whole law. But the law begins with loving God with all the heart (P1), and refusing sins one by one never adds up to that. A heart turned away from God can refuse a hundred temptations and still not be turned toward him.
- So whoever grants that particular sins can be refused has not thereby granted that the whole law can be kept.
Therefore, no one since the fall can keep the whole of God's law by his own powers.
(C1)Therefore, God commands more than anyone since the fall can do by his own powers.
+God commands more than anyone since the fall can do by his own powers. He commands everyone to keep the whole of his law (P1), and no one since the fall can keep the whole of it by his own powers (P2).
(1) Read as a claim about our own powers, the maxim is false.
- Read that way, the maxim says that whatever God commands, a person can do by his own powers. The Reformed objection is right that this is false (D1), and no Christian communion teaches otherwise. Whether grace can supply what our own powers cannot is the question on which the traditions part (P2).
- Even the maxim's great champions granted it. Reid, who called the maxim an axiom, allowed that a man "may have a model of perfection set before him which he is unable to reach." Kant granted that the holiness the moral law requires is "a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence." The sensible world, in Kant's language, is the world we know through the senses, the one we live in.
- Mrs. Okafor's hundred is still the standard, though nobody in twenty-six years has reached it.
(2) The tradition has given four answers to what a command presupposes.
If not the power to keep all of it, then what?
- Pelagius: the power to keep it by nature. That is the answer (C1) rules out.
- Augustine: "God therefore does not command impossibilities; but in His command He counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to ask His aid in what you cannot do" (On Nature and Grace 43.50). The Council of Trent quoted the thought in 1547 (Session 6, chapter 11). Augustine's most famous prayer says the same thing in a line: "Give what Thou commandest, and command what Thou wilt" (Confessions 10.29.40).
- Luther and the Westminster divines, the theologians who drew up the Westminster Confession and its catechisms: the command stands over an inability, and its office, the job it is given, is to convict a person of his sin. By the words of the law, Luther wrote, a man "is admonished and taught what he ought to do, not what he can do." Paul says it more briefly: "through the law comes knowledge of sin" (Romans 3:20).
- The compatibilist: only the conditional ability, the ability to do something in the sense that you would do it if you chose to (D9).
(3) A standard beyond reach still does its work.
- Mrs. Okafor's paper tells Daniel exactly how far he is from knowing the course. That is the office Paul gives the law: "Why then the law? It was added because of transgressions," and "the law was our guardian until Christ came" (Galatians 3:19, 24).
- For Augustine the command also sends a person to ask: "God commands some things which we cannot do, in order that we may know what we ought to ask of Him" (On Grace and Free Will 16.32). The psalmist asks exactly that: "I will run in the way of your commandments when you enlarge my heart!" (Psalm 119:32).
(4) Three things the conclusion does not claim.
- It does not say that anyone is blamed for failing to reach the whole standard, as though that failure were one more sin on top of the others. Failing to live without sin is not something done at any moment. It is the condition a person was born into, together with the sins he commits. Mrs. Okafor does not dock Daniel a further mark for missing the hundred; the marks he lost, he lost question by question.
- It does not say that the particular sin a command forbids is out of reach when the temptation comes. Particular sins can be refused one at a time (P2), and God promises the church a way of escape with every temptation (1 Corinthians 10:13; C2). The first stirring of a desire, the pull a person feels before his will has said anything, is a different case. It belongs to the condition (D15).
- It does not choose between Augustine and Westminster on what grace can do in this life (P2).
Therefore, God commands more than anyone since the fall can do by his own powers.
(P3)A person is to blame for a deed only if it comes from a choice that nothing settled but him.
+Blame for a deed goes back to the one who settled it. When something other than the person settled what he did, the blame does not reach him.
(1) Every excuse names something else that did the settling.
- A guest knocks the wedding cake off its table because someone shoved him from behind. A driver swerves into a fence because a seizure took hold of him at the wheel. In each case you can point to what did it instead of him: the shove, the seizure.
- Suppose a doctor had secretly given a man a drug that fixed which way he would choose, working through his own weighing of the options. Or suppose a scientist had designed him before he was conceived so that he would commit one particular crime. Most people's verdict is the same, and many compatibilists share it: the choice was not really his.
- Compatibilists give these excuses as readily as anyone. The quarrel between them and the source view is over what counts as something else doing the settling, not over whether it excuses.
(2) A door that was merely shut excuses no deed.
- One defender of free will calls the principle at work non-prevention: "An agent is morally responsible for an action only if nothing prevented the agent from doing otherwise."
- To be prevented is for something to do the stopping, there and then: a hand that pulls you back, a shove from behind. A lock on a door that nobody tries stops nobody. A man who stays in a room because he likes the company, and never learns that the door was locked, was not kept there by the lock.
- You might ask how anyone can be blamed for a deed when no other road was open to him. He can, if nothing settled it but him.
- Scripture blames Pilate, the Roman governor who sent Jesus to the cross, even on a reading in which God placed him on the judgment seat only because he knew Pilate would freely send Jesus there (D8, D13). On that reading Pilate had no other road, and yet nothing prevented him; (D8) shows how both can be true.
- Yet God's resolve to place him there settled only where Pilate stood, not what he did there. Nothing prevented Pilate from letting Jesus go, and the choice was his.
- That is why (P3) is not the principle of alternative possibilities, which says that nobody is to blame for a deed unless he could have done otherwise. Blame asks who settled the deed, not whether a second road was open.
(3) A deed can come from a choice made earlier.
- A man decides at eight o'clock to drink six beers at a friend's house and then drive himself home. At eleven his car crosses the center line. At eleven he could not have steered straight, but nothing settled the choice at eight but him, and the crash came from it.
- Philosophers call the first kind of responsibility direct: responsibility for a choice the person himself settled when he made it. The second is derivative: responsibility for what follows from such a choice, as the crash at eleven follows from the choice at eight.
- Reid gave a case of his own in 1788. A man who has spent his way into bankruptcy is "highly criminal in living above his fortune," and his debt is not wiped out: "His obligation is not cancelled, it returns with his ability, and can go no farther." He must pay as he becomes able, and his guilt lies in the spending.
- That is why (P3) says "comes from a choice." The choice may be the deed itself, or an earlier choice the deed came from.
(4) Failures to act need one thing more.
- As (P3) uses the word, a deed covers deciding to leave something undone as well as doing something. Deciding to stay home from a sick friend he promised to visit is as much a man's own deed as a lie he tells.
- The maxim's rule for failures to act judges something else: not the deciding, but the thing that did not happen, a child not saved, a question left unanswered, a visit never made. Here the maxim's instinct is right. Nobody is to blame for leaving undone what he could not have done even if he had chosen it, unless he brought the inability on himself. Call this the rule for failures.
- In a well-known case, a man walking on a beach sees a child struggling in the water and decides not to try a rescue. Unknown to him, sharks in the water would have kept him from saving the child if he had tried. He is not to blame for failing to save the child, since no choice of his would have done it. He can still be blamed for deciding not to try.
- Daniel's blank on question twelve is the same. No choice of his could have answered a question that was not printed on his paper, and nobody holds it against him.
- Ordinary rebukes assume the same thing. When Jesus found Peter asleep in Gethsemane, the garden where he prayed on the night he was arrested, he asked, "Could you not watch one hour?" (Mark 14:37).
(5) Scripture lays each sin where it came from.
- "The soul who sins shall die. The son shall not suffer for the iniquity of the father, nor the father suffer for the iniquity of the son" (Ezekiel 18:20). The law of Moses had already ruled: "Each one shall be put to death for his own sin" (Deuteronomy 24:16).
- You might ask how that fits with the same law's word about God "visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children to the third and the fourth generation of those who hate me" (Exodus 20:5). The verse speaks of the generations of those who hate him, and Jewish and Christian readers have long taken it of children who keep up their fathers' hatred.
- Ezekiel's chapter answers a proverb that said the children were paying for their fathers' sins: "What do you mean by repeating this proverb concerning the land of Israel, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge?" (Ezekiel 18:2).
- A boy can suffer for years from his father's gambling without being to blame for a single bet.
- James traces temptation to its source and will not let anyone lay it at God's door: "Let no one say when he is tempted, I am being tempted by God, for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one. But each person is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own desire" (James 1:13-14).
Therefore, a person is to blame for a deed only if it comes from a choice that nothing settled but him.
(P4)God blames every sinner for each sin he commits.
+Scripture holds every person to account for every sin he commits, and every Christian tradition agrees.
(1) Each is judged for what he has done.
- "He will render to each one according to his works" (Romans 2:6). "For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each one may receive what is due for what he has done in the body, whether good or evil" (2 Corinthians 5:10).
- The accounting runs down to the smallest things: "people will give account for every careless word they speak" (Matthew 12:36). "So then each of us will give an account of himself to God" (Romans 14:12).
(2) Nobody is left with an excuse.
- Of those who knew God and would not honor him, Paul says, "So they are without excuse" (Romans 1:20). The law speaks "so that every mouth may be stopped" (Romans 3:19).
- Picture a defendant who has heard the evidence against him and has nothing left to say. That is Paul's picture: the mouth stopped.
(3) Ignorance lessens blame without removing it.
- Jesus's parable of the servants distinguishes the servant who knew his master's will from the one who did not. The one who knew "will receive a severe beating" (Luke 12:47), while "the one who did not know, and did what deserved a beating, will receive a light beating" (Luke 12:48). Less blame, but blame.
(4) Every tradition agrees.
- The Westminster Confession, the Reformed statement of faith of 1646: "Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth, in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner" (6.6).
- The Council of Trent: even the just "at times fall into at least light and daily sins," and their prayer, "Forgive us our trespasses, is both humble and true" (Session 6, chapter 11).
- Forgiveness assumes it: "If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins" (1 John 1:9). Nobody forgives a debt that was never owed.
(5) The premise concerns the sins a person commits.
- A sin committed is something a person does, or chooses to leave undone: telling a lie, say, or deciding not to visit a sick friend he promised to see. Scripture counts the second kind as sin too: "So whoever knows the right thing to do and fails to do it, for him it is sin" (James 4:17).
- The tradition also calls the corruption of fallen nature sin, and Westminster counts its first stirrings as sin too (6.5). That corruption falls under what the Confession calls original sin, as against the actual sins a person commits (6.6).
- To answer for something is to be held to account for it. For a deed that means blame, but how anyone answers for a condition he was born into is a question the traditions answer in more than one way. Some say that Adam's sin is imputed to his children, counted to their account the way a debt is charged to an heir. Some say that the whole race sinned in Adam, acting in him as its head. Others point to the refusal of grace when it comes.
- On the first answer, what is counted is a debt and not a deed: the heirs stand condemned as though Adam's guilt were theirs, the way our sins were laid on Christ, who committed none of them. So it is no case of anyone blamed for a deed that did not come from him (P3).
- (P4) needs none of those answers. It is about the sins a person commits.
Therefore, God blames every sinner for each sin he commits.
(C2)Therefore, every sin a person commits comes from a choice that nothing settled but him.
+Every sin a person commits comes from a choice that nothing settled but him. God blames him for each one (P4), and blame for a deed requires exactly that (P3).
(1) The step is modus ponens.
- You use this kind of step all the time without its Latin name. If a letter is postmarked, it went through the post office. This letter is postmarked. So it went through the post office. The form is called modus ponens, Latin for "the way that affirms": if the first thing holds, so does the second; the first holds; so the second does.
- Run it on any sin you like. If a person is to blame for it, it comes from a choice that nothing settled but him (P3). He is to blame for it, since God blames him for it (P4), and God blames no one wrongly: "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just?" (Genesis 18:25). So it comes from a choice that nothing settled but him.
(2) This is what God's commands presuppose.
- A command whose breach God blames presupposes that the breach will be the breaker's own. It does not presuppose that anyone can keep the whole of God's law by his own powers (C1).
- That is why Scripture can say the ungodly are "without excuse" (Romans 1:20). An excuse is what you have when something other than you settled what you did. The defender of free will quoted in (P3) points out that if God determined everything, the unbeliever would have "perhaps the best excuse" of all: "God prevented him/her from grasping reality by determining them to affirm false beliefs."
- The same holds for our thinking. Paul tells the Corinthians, "judge for yourselves what I say" (1 Corinthians 10:15), and oughts about what we think would be empty if something or someone else always settled what we think.
- Daniel's lost marks were his because nobody held his pen. Scripture's verdict on sin rests on the same fact.
(3) The way of escape is the ordinary mark at each temptation.
- In the ordinary run of choices, the sinner could have refused this particular sin, with everything before the choice as it was. That is the ordinary mark that the sin was his. It is a mark and not the ground of his blame.
- God told Cain as much before the first murder: "sin is crouching at the door. Its desire is for you, but you must rule over it" (Genesis 4:7).
- To the church Paul makes it a promise: "God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your ability, but with the temptation he will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it" (1 Corinthians 10:13).
• The same defender takes the verse to show strong libertarian freedom: a real opportunity to choose between at least two options, when nothing before the choice fixes which. He counts it enough to show freedom, but not something freedom requires. Strong freedom is the ordinary mark under another name: an open door, with everything before the choice as it was.
• What freedom requires is weak libertarian freedom, being the source, the first mover of the choice. Pilate, on the reading in (D8), had the weak kind without the strong.
- The promise is for each temptation, never for the whole of a life: an exit at every fork, not a road without sin (C1).
(4) Three things the conclusion does not claim.
- It does not claim that anyone can live without sin (C1).
- It does not claim that every sin had another road open. Pilate's may not have (D8), and his sin was still his.
- It does not rest blame on an open door. The ground of blame is the source, the one the sin came from.
(5) The conclusion is where determinism is tested.
- If determinism is true, every choice is settled before it is made, by the past and the laws of nature or by a decree of God. Then something other than the sinner settles every sin. The same defender puts the point in a sentence: if God determines everything, "God himself prevented Hitler from doing otherwise."
- So a determinist has to deny (P3) or (P4). Most deny (P3), read as the source view reads it, holding that a sin can be the sinner's own even when a decree settled it beforehand (D10).
Therefore, every sin a person commits comes from a choice that nothing settled but him.
On "ought" and "can":
Chituc, Vladimir, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Felipe De Brigard. "Blame, Not Ability, Impacts Moral 'Ought' Judgments for Impossible Actions: Toward an Empirical Refutation of 'Ought' Implies 'Can.'" Cognition 150 (2016): 20-25.
Copp, David. "'Ought' Implies 'Can,' Blameworthiness, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities." In Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, edited by David Widerker and Michael McKenna, 265-299. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. Page 272, as quoted in Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 153.
Frankfurt, Harry G. "What We Are Morally Responsible For." In The Importance of What We Care About, 95-103. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. First published 1983.
Graham, Peter A. "'Ought' and Ability." Philosophical Review 120, no. 3 (2011): 337-382.
Robb, David. "Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2020. Section 2.4.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. "'Ought' Conversationally Implies 'Can.'" Philosophical Review 93, no. 2 (1984): 249-261.
Vranas, Peter B. M. "I Ought, Therefore I Can." Philosophical Studies 136, no. 2 (2007): 167-216.
Widerker, David. "Frankfurt on 'Ought Implies Can' and Alternative Possibilities." Analysis 51, no. 4 (1991): 222-224.
On blame and its excuses:
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Mele, Alfred R. Free Will and Luck. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Pereboom, Derk. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
On conflicts of duty:
Geisler, Norman L. Christian Ethics: Contemporary Issues and Options. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010. Chapters on unqualified, conflicting and graded absolutism.
On freedom defined by its source:
Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013.
Craig, William Lane. "Response to Gregory A. Boyd." In Four Views on Divine Providence, edited by Dennis W. Jowers, 224-230. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011. As quoted in Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 124-125.
Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Pages 38-39, 82-83, 307-308, 415-416, 422-426, 514 and 580-581.
Critic sources engaged:
Adams, Robert Merrihew. "Involuntary Sins." Philosophical Review 94, no. 1 (1985): 3-31.
Alston, William P. "The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification." Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 257-299.
Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018. Pages 72-77 and 133-154.
Edwards, Jonathan. A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of That Freedom of Will. Boston, 1754. Part I, section 4.
Marcus, Ruth Barcan. "Moral Dilemmas and Consistency." Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 3 (1980): 121-136.
Williams, Bernard. "Ethical Consistency." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 39 (1965): 103-124.
Historical sources:
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae I-II, question 19, article 6, reply to objection 3. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1920.
Augustine. On Grace and Free Will 16.32; On Nature and Grace 36.42, 43.50 and 69.83; On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins 2.6.7, 2.16.23 and 2.20.34; On the Spirit and the Letter 35.62. In Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 5. New York: Christian Literature, 1887.
Augustine. Confessions 10.29.40. Translated by J. G. Pilkington. In Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 1. Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1886.
Augustine. On Lying 13.23. In Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 3. Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1887.
Augustine. Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount 1.12.34. In Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 6. Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1888.
Council of Trent. Session 5 (1546), Decree on Original Sin, canon 5, and Session 6 (1547), Decree on Justification, chapter 11 and canons 18 and 23. Translated by J. Waterworth. London: Dolman, 1848.
Erasmus, Desiderius. De libero arbitrio (1524). As quoted and translated in Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, translated by Henry Cole. London, 1823.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason (1788). Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott. Book I, chapter 1 (Ak. 5:30), and Book II, chapter 2, section 4 (Ak. 5:122).
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan, 1929. A548/B576, page 473.
Kant, Immanuel. Religion within the Boundary of Pure Reason (1793). Translated by J. W. Semple. Edinburgh: Thomas Clark, 1838. Pages 53 and 60-61 (Ak. 6:45, 6:50-51).
Luther, Martin. The Bondage of the Will (1525). Translated by Henry Cole. London, 1823. Sections 56-57, pages 139-143.
Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Edinburgh, 1788. Essay IV, chapter 7, pages 324-328.
Westminster Assembly. The Westminster Confession of Faith. 1646. Chapters 3.1, 6.5 and 6.6. Text as printed in Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3. New York: Harper, 1877.
Westminster Assembly. The Westminster Larger Catechism. 1648. Question 149, from the London edition of 1658, spelling modernized.
Westminster Assembly. The Westminster Shorter Catechism. 1648. Question 14. In Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3.
Biblical citations:
Genesis 4:7; Genesis 18:25; Exodus 4:21; Exodus 5:2; Exodus 9:15-16, 34; Exodus 10:1; Exodus 20:5; Deuteronomy 24:16; Deuteronomy 29:4; Deuteronomy 30:6, 11-14, 19; Joshua 24:15, 19, 21-22; 1 Kings 8:46; Psalm 119:32, 96; Ecclesiastes 7:20; Ezekiel 18:2, 20, 31-32; Ezekiel 36:26; Matthew 5:22, 28, 48; Matthew 12:36; Matthew 22:37-40; Mark 3:5; Mark 14:37; Luke 10:30; Luke 12:47-48; John 15:5; John 19:11; Acts 17:30; Romans 1:18, 20-21; Romans 2:6, 14-15; Romans 3:19-20; Romans 7:7, 14, 17-18, 24-25; Romans 8:3-4, 7; Romans 9:17-21; Romans 10:8, 21; Romans 13:10; Romans 14:12; 1 Corinthians 10:12-15; 2 Corinthians 5:10; 2 Corinthians 10:5; Galatians 3:10, 13, 19, 24; Ephesians 4:26; James 1:13-15; James 2:10-11; James 3:2; James 4:17; 1 Peter 1:16; 1 John 1:8-9; 1 John 5:3.
+We are commanded to live without sin, we cannot, and we are blamed for failing. So "ought" does not imply "can," and a freedom that needs the maxim ends in Pelagianism or in excusing every sinner.
1. The strongest form takes a life one sin at a time.
The maxim has always met this objection in the church, and its modern form is a careful one. Its strongest advocate, a Reformed philosopher, holds that the maxim and the principle of alternative possibilities are "largely equivalent." He adds that the maxim "must be seen as compatibilist and true if 'can' is understood conditionally, and incompatibilist but false (or at least so far unproven) if 'can' is understood categorically."
Those two kinds of "can" are worth a sentence each. A conditional "can" means only that you would do the thing if you chose to. A categorical "can" means that you could do it with everything before the choice exactly as it was (D3). Read the first way, the maxim fits determinism. Read the second way, it rules determinism out, which is what incompatibilist means.
Then he builds an argument by recurrence, a proof that repeats one step as many times as it needs. Take a fallen person's first sin. If he is to blame for it, the principle says he could have refrained. So imagine that he did. Now take his next sin and do the same, and then the next, all through a life. At the end of that road is a life without sin.
His argument is a dilemma: it offers two options and says the view is defeated either way. Each option is called a horn, as though the view were caught between the two horns of a bull. Here the horns are these:
- Either the fallen can live without sin, which is Pelagianism, the teaching of the monk Pelagius (P2).
- Or they are not to blame for their sins, which excuses every sinner.
His own conclusion is blunt: "God gave us a law that we cannot possibly keep."
2. The counterexample is granted.
A counterexample is a single case that shows a general rule false, and the command to be perfect is one. Every Christian communion accepts it in this form: an "ought" without a "can" by one's own powers (C1). Westminster adds that no grace received in this life supplies the "can." Augustine held that grace can, and Trent that by grace the justified can keep the commandments, though no one avoids every lesser sin for a lifetime without a special privilege (P2). Nobody on the source view needs to deny any of this. Mrs. Okafor's hundred is a standard of the same kind: it stands, and nobody reaches it.
3. The source view never needed the maxim.
- It defines freedom by the source, not by an open door. Another defender of free will, one of its best known, puts it plainly: "What is essential to libertarian freedom is not the possibility of choosing otherwise but rather the absence of causal constraints outside oneself that determine how one chooses."
- Its principle of blame for deeds is non-prevention (P3), not the principle of alternative possibilities. Each sin is blamed because it came from a choice that nothing settled but the sinner (C2), and not because it could have been refused.
- The source view's principle of blame never says that a sinner who is to blame could have refrained, so the recurrence cannot borrow its first step from it. It can borrow it only from the ordinary mark, since in the ordinary run of choices each sin could have been refused. Even then, the recurrence stops at the condition.
- The second horn, that the fallen are not to blame, fails for the same reason. Inability alone excuses no sin a person commits. What excuses a deed is something other than the sinner settling what he did, and the inability to live without sin settles no particular sin.
4. Both questions need more than a yes or a no.
The objection is often pressed as two questions. Can we live a life without sin? And if we cannot, are we still to blame for failing to?
- Can we? Of ourselves, no (P2). Taken sin by sin, particular sins can be refused, and that is the ordinary mark that each one is ours (C2). By grace, the traditions part. Augustine held that a sinless life is possible by grace; Trent, that the justified can keep the commandments, though not avoid every lesser sin for a lifetime without a special privilege; Westminster, that no one can keep them perfectly by any grace received in this life (P2).
- Are we to blame for failing? Each sin is blamed, directly or through the earlier choice it came from (P3). The condition is answered for in whichever way a tradition answers the old question of original sin (P4). But the failure to live without sin is not a third thing, over and above the condition and the sins, that anyone is blamed for.
5. The recurrence stops at the condition.
- The recurrence counts a life as a list of moments, at each of which a person sins or does not. But the law begins with loving God with all the heart (P1), and a fallen heart that refused a sin at every one of those moments would still not love God with all its heart (P2). So the life the recurrence builds is not a life without sin.
- Think of a husband who never once struck his wife and never once spoke to her with love. He has kept a list of refusals and missed the marriage.
- And those who hold with Augustine that a sinless life is possible by grace can grant the conclusion and still refuse Pelagianism. Pelagius's error was never that grace can make a life sinless. It was that nature suffices without grace.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free WillPhilosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door
+"Ought" does not imply "can" at all. A promise you can no longer keep still binds, a debt you can no longer pay is still owed, and a fallen will still owes what it cannot give.
1. The strongest form comes from the philosophers.
In 1984 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argued that "ought" does not strictly imply "can." It only suggests it in ordinary conversation, since we can sensibly say that a man ought to keep a promise he has made himself unable to keep. In 2011 Peter Graham argued that the maxim is false, though he floated a restricted version of it.
Experiments have since found that ordinary people will say a person still ought to keep a promise he is unable to keep, and their authors offer the finding as evidence against the maxim. People said it far more readily when he was to blame for the inability. The Reformed add the fallen will, which owes God a love it cannot give. So, the objection concludes, God's commands tell us nothing about ability.
2. Every case of a self-made inability is granted.
- A man who made himself unable to keep a promise, or to pay a debt, is blamed through the choice that made him unable. That is derivative responsibility (P3), the same case as the drunk driver.
- Reid took up the debt case in 1788, with the man who spent his way into bankruptcy (P3). He answers for the spending, and he must pay as he becomes able.
- The experiments point the same way. What moved people's verdicts was blame for the inability, and to blame a man for an inability is to trace it back to his choice.
3. The maxim is the question, not a premise.
- The question is what a command presupposes, and the maxim is never assumed in answering it. The first chain grants the fallen will's case outright (C1), and the second argues from blame, not from obligation to ability (P3, P4).
- So if "ought" does not imply "can," neither chain loses anything. Pulling out a post that holds nothing up leaves the roof where it was.
4. What survives is the principle of blame.
- Nobody is to blame for a deed that something other than he settled (P3). Compatibilists keep that principle whenever they excuse a man who was shoved or seized.
- What is in dispute is whether, on determinism, something other than the agent settles every deed. If God determines everything, that something is God himself (C2, D10).
- Think of two men who both broke a neighbor's window. One threw a stone at it in a temper. The other was knocked into the glass by a passing cyclist. The cyclist settled the second man's fall, and nothing settled the first man's throw but the first man himself.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Doing What You Want Is Not the Same as Being FreePhilosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to Us
+"Ought implies can" and the principle of alternative possibilities are equivalent, with the same double meaning. With a conditional "can" they are true and harmless to determinism, and with a categorical "can" they are false.
1. The strongest form treats the two as one.
The same Reformed philosopher (D1) argues that if "ought" implies "can," then anyone to blame for a deed ought to have done otherwise, and so could have. He argues the reverse too, and concludes that the two principles are "largely equivalent," so that anyone who insists on a difference meets "only a language barrier."
Both, he adds, hide the same double meaning. A categorical "can" holds with everything before the choice exactly as it was. A conditional "can" says only that the person would do the thing if he chose to. Read conditionally, the maxim is true and fits determinism. Read categorically, it is false or unproven.
Think of a man who orders the fish at a restaurant. In the conditional sense he could have had the steak, since he would have got it had he chosen it. Whether he could have had it in the categorical sense, with everything before his order just as it was, is a further question, and on determinism the answer is no.
2. The equivalence rests on two further claims.
The maxim is about obligation, what a person is bound to do before he acts. The principle is about blame, what he answers for after he has acted. Two claims about two different things can still stand or fall together, but only if something joins them.
- The objection joins them with two further claims: whoever is to blame for a wrong deed ought not to have done it, and whoever ought to do a thing answers for whether he does it. Philosophers have argued from the maxim to the principle along such lines, in papers of 1991 and 2003 (D4).
- Not everyone grants those two claims. The best-known attack on the principle is a set of cases like the story of Black, a neurosurgeon who has fitted a device that would take over a man's choice at the first sign of his leaning the other way. The man never leans, the device never acts, and he chooses on his own, so he seems to answer for his choice though he could not have carried out any other. The philosopher who told it held in 1983 that giving up the principle does not mean denying the maxim, and that the maxim does not imply the principle. Some compatibilists affirm the maxim while denying the principle.
- Think of two lamps on one switch. They go on and off together, but only because of the wiring, and if one wire is cut, one lamp can shine while the other stays dark.
3. The source view holds neither principle as a universal rule.
- For failures to act it asks for the conditional "can," alongside the source: nobody is to blame for leaving undone what he could not have done even if he had chosen it, unless he brought the inability on himself (P3). The objection itself calls that true.
- For deeds it asks for neither "can." It asks who settled the deed (P3), and it blames Pilate even on the reading in which, under the circumstances, he had no other road (D8).
- So grant the two further claims, and let the two principles stand or fall together. The source view rests on neither, and it loses nothing either way.
- The double meaning has nothing to feed on either, since every time the source view says "can," it says which one it means. Two keys on one ring can look alike. The trouble comes only when nobody says which door each one opens.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open DoorPhilosophy / Free Will: Doing What You Want Is Not the Same as Being Free
+A command has a point: to get the thing done. A command nobody could keep would be pointless, and God's law is not pointless, so everyone must be able to keep it.
1. The strongest form comes from David Copp.
Copp, a moral philosopher, argues that any moral theory must account for "the intuition that there is a point to requiring an action, namely, crudely, to get it done." In his words, "There would be no point in God's commanding an agent to do something that the agent could not do." From there he argues to the principle of alternative possibilities.
2. Paul answers "Why then the law?" himself.
- "Why then the law? It was added because of transgressions" (Galatians 3:19). "Yet if it had not been for the law, I would not have known sin" (Romans 7:7). And "through the law comes knowledge of sin" (Romans 3:20).
- Luther built his reply to Erasmus on those verses: "The whole nature and design of the law is to give knowledge only, and that of nothing else save of sin." That much can be granted: a law can have a purpose besides being kept.
- Augustine names one more: the command sends a person to ask God for what it requires (C1, D6).
3. Scripture adds that each command aims at obedience too.
- Moses told Israel that "this commandment that I command you today is not too hard for you, neither is it far off" (Deuteronomy 30:11), and that "the word is very near you. It is in your mouth and in your heart, so that you can do it" (Deuteronomy 30:14; D7).
- John writes that "his commandments are not burdensome" (1 John 5:3), and Paul promises the church a way of escape with every temptation (1 Corinthians 10:13).
- So Copp's premise is right about what a command asks at each fork. It aims at being obeyed, and in the ordinary run of choices the particular sin it forbids can be refused when the temptation comes. What no single fork offers is the whole heart the first commandment asks for (C1, D15).
4. Both purposes hold at once.
- The promise is for each temptation, not for the life, and an exit at every fork is not a road without sin (C1). The law convicts because the whole of it is beyond us, and each command aims at obedience because each fork is not.
- Mrs. Okafor's paper does both jobs. It shows Daniel how far he is from the hundred, and each of its questions is set to be answered.
5. The source view does not adopt Copp's conclusion.
- The principle of blame in (P3) is non-prevention, not the principle of alternative possibilities. The defender of free will who named it says, "I am not opposed to the principle of alternative possibilities," but prefers to "dwell upon" non-prevention instead.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free
+Moses told Israel to choose life. Telling a man at a fork to take whichever road he likes, when only one road is open, would be mockery, so God's commands show that we can keep them.
1. The strongest form is Erasmus's.
In 1524 the humanist scholar Desiderius Erasmus wrote a short book defending free choice against Luther. A humanist, in his day, was a scholar of the ancient Greek and Latin writers, not a humanist in today's sense.
The book's spine was the commands of Scripture, Moses' "Therefore choose life" (Deuteronomy 30:19) among them. As Luther's reply quotes him: "It would be ridiculous to say to a man standing in a place where two ways met, Thou seest two roads, go by which thou wilt, when one only was open." He had a second picture as well: a man tied so that he can stretch out only his left arm, told that there is fine wine at his right hand and poison at his left, and invited to choose.
2. Luther's reply is that the argument proves too much.
- An argument proves too much when it would also prove something its own author denies. If a command proves that we can keep it, Luther answered, then "you actually prove that Free-will can do all things without grace," which Erasmus himself had denied. He called the argument "the old songs of the Pelagians sung over again."
- On Luther's reading the command does something else. By it a man "is admonished and roused to see his own impotency," that is, his own powerlessness.
- About the whole of the law, Luther is right (C1). A command to be perfect does not show that anyone can be perfect by his own powers.
3. What a command at the fork presupposes is that the step will be his.
- Joshua's farewell has both halves in one chapter. He sets a real choice before the people, "choose this day whom you will serve" (Joshua 24:15), and a few verses later tells them, "You are not able to serve the Lord, for he is a holy God" (Joshua 24:19).
- The choice between gods was theirs to make. The service of a holy God, kept whole, was beyond their strength. The first half is what (C2) claims, and the second is what (C1) claims.
- A driver at a crossroads can take the left fork or the right. That does not mean he can drive the whole journey without a wrong turn.
4. Scripture states what is possible instead of leaving it to be read off a command.
- Moses does not only command. He says the commandment "is not too hard for you" (Deuteronomy 30:11), and Paul promises a way of escape (1 Corinthians 10:13). Those are statements about what can be done, made in so many words.
- So neither chain needs Erasmus's step from "choose" to "you can keep it all," and neither takes it.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free WillPhilosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free
+God commands nothing impossible. Augustine said so, the Council of Trent repeated it, and Kant made it a principle, so God's commands cannot exceed what people can do.
1. The strongest form is ancient.
Pelagius's followers argued, as Augustine reports them, that "God would not command what He knew could not be done by man" (On Grace and Free Will 16.32). Augustine himself wrote that "God therefore does not command impossibilities" (On Nature and Grace 43.50), and the Council of Trent repeated it in 1547: "For God commands not impossibilities, but, by commanding, both admonishes thee to do what thou art able, and to pray for what thou art not able (to do), and aids thee that thou mayest be able" (Session 6, chapter 11).
Kant made the same instinct a principle. His example is a man ordered by his prince, on pain of death, to bear false witness against an honorable man. He may not know whether he would refuse, but "He judges, therefore, that he can do a certain thing because he is conscious that he ought."
2. Augustine's sentence has a second half.
- Read to the end, it says that God "counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to ask His aid in what you cannot do." Trent's version ends "and aids thee that thou mayest be able."
- So "not impossible" means not impossible with God's help. Augustine says so outright elsewhere: "by God's aid and help, nothing is impossible, by which is wrought what He commands" (On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins 2.6.7).
- (C1) says "by his own powers," and that is Augustine's own point against Pelagius.
3. Augustine also says that God commands some things we cannot do.
- "God commands some things which we cannot do, in order that we may know what we ought to ask of Him. For this is faith itself, which obtains by prayer what the law commands" (On Grace and Free Will 16.32).
- A girl told to carry a heavy suitcase up the stairs is not being mocked if the point is that she will call her father to help.
4. (C1) holds on Westminster's stricter view too.
- The Westminster divines hold that nobody can keep the commandments perfectly "by any grace received in this life" (Larger Catechism 149). On their view the command's office is to convict.
- (C1) needs neither side. It says only that nobody can keep the whole law by his own powers.
5. Kant drew a smaller conclusion than his principle suggests.
- Kant reasoned that "so long as the Moral Law commands, 'Thou SHALT become a better man' the conclusion is inevitable 'that thou CANST.'" The conclusion is that we can become better, not that we can be perfect now.
- He placed that becoming in "an endless progress from bad to better," and granted that we can amend "even were our own endeavour insufficient," needing "an unsearchable higher aid" (Religion, 1793).
- So even Kant did not claim that anyone can keep the whole of the moral law at any moment (C1).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will
+Moses said the commandment is near "so that you can do it" (Deuteronomy 30:14), but Paul applied those words to the gospel. The verse promises what grace brings near, not a power to keep the law.
1. The strongest form has Paul on its side.
Paul quotes Moses' words and explains them: "The word is near you, in your mouth and in your heart (that is, the word of faith that we proclaim)" (Romans 10:8). Moses had just promised that "the Lord your God will circumcise your heart and the heart of your offspring, so that you will love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul" (Deuteronomy 30:6). To circumcise the heart is Moses' picture of God changing a person from the inside. He had also told the same people, "But to this day the Lord has not given you a heart to understand or eyes to see or ears to hear" (Deuteronomy 29:4).
On this reading the nearness is the gospel's, and the verse says nothing about unaided ability.
2. The reading is granted.
- Augustine held it too. He read the passage, as he put it, "in a godly, sacred, and spiritual sense," following Paul's explanation of it as the word of faith (On Nature and Grace 69.83).
- On that reading the verse promises what grace brings near (C1).
3. Neither conclusion rests on reading the verse as a power of our own.
- (C1) says that nobody can keep the whole law by his own powers, and the circumcised heart of Deuteronomy 30:6 says the same.
- The choice Moses set before the people was still theirs to make: "Therefore choose life" (Deuteronomy 30:19). The command at that fork presupposes what (C2) says every command presupposes, that the choosing will be the chooser's own.
4. The command and the promise stand side by side.
- Ezekiel has both in the same book. God commands, "make yourselves a new heart and a new spirit!" (Ezekiel 18:31), and God promises, "And I will give you a new heart" (Ezekiel 36:26).
- Augustine's prayer holds them together in a line (C1).
- A doctor can tell a patient to walk and hand him a crutch in the same visit. The instruction and the help belong to one treatment.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will
+Paul promised believers strength to endure trials, not a way out of every sin. And if every temptation came with a way of escape, Pilate could have let Jesus go.
1. The temptation in view is a temptation to sin.
- The word Paul uses can mean a test or a temptation, and in this passage the context decides it. The verses just before warn against idolatry, sexual immorality, and grumbling, and end, "let anyone who thinks that he stands take heed lest he fall" (1 Corinthians 10:12). The verse just after draws the lesson: "Therefore, my beloved, flee from idolatry" (1 Corinthians 10:14).
- So the way of escape is a way out of falling, and to "endure" the temptation is to come through it without sinning.
- A hotel promises a fire exit on every floor. It is still up to the guest to use it.
2. The promise rests on God's faithfulness.
- Paul says "God is faithful," not "you are strong." The promise is made to the church, and it is a promise of grace (C1).
- For those outside the church, the ordinary mark that a sin was the sinner's own is the same as for everyone: in the ordinary run of choices, he could have refused that particular sin (C2). A heart that cannot turn to God can still refuse a particular sin.
3. Pilate's case is the exception the ordinary mark allows.
- Pilate was not among the Christians at Corinth, and the promise was not made to him.
- On one reading, God knew what Pilate would freely do in any circumstances, and placed him on the judgment seat only because Pilate, once there, would send Jesus to the cross.
- Then the other door was shut, and it was God's resolve that shut it, not his knowledge. What could not happen was the pair together: God placing Pilate there, and Pilate choosing the other way.
- But the resolve settled only where Pilate stood. What he did there it left to Pilate. Nothing prevented Pilate from letting Jesus go, and the choice was his. Jesus told him that "he who delivered me over to you has the greater sin" (John 19:11), which leaves Pilate a lesser sin of his own.
- Think of a host who is never wrong about her guests and seats a man by the window only when she knows he will open it. Given her rule, he was never going to sit there and leave it shut. Yet nothing held his hand, and opening it was his own doing.
- So an open door is the ordinary mark of a sin that is the sinner's own, not a requirement for it (C2).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open DoorPhilosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+A command presupposes only natural ability, that you could obey if you chose to. The sinner has it, and his unwillingness excuses nothing, so determinism supplies everything a command presupposes.
1. The strongest form is Jonathan Edwards's.
Edwards, the eighteenth-century American theologian, distinguished two kinds of inability in 1754. The first is natural inability: "We are said to be naturally unable to do a Thing, when we can't do it if we will," he wrote, that is, when we could not do it even if we chose to, because nature does not allow it or some obstacle outside the will stands in the way. Moral inability, by contrast, is only the lack of an inclination, or the strength of a contrary one.
On his view, only natural inability excuses. A sinner who could obey God if he chose to, and does not choose to, has no excuse, and on this view a command presupposes nothing more than that.
2. Edwards is right about failures to act.
- The ability to do a thing if you chose to is exactly what the rule for failures asks for (P3). Edwards's natural ability is the conditional "can" of (D3) under another name.
- A man bound and gagged is excused for his silence. A man who merely does not care to speak is not.
- Edwards is also right that unwillingness toward God is no excuse. That is the bondage of the fallen will, and it is answered for, not excused (P2, P4).
3. A man can have Edwards's natural ability while something else settles his choice.
- Picture a man so gripped by a phobia on his own doorstep that the fear decides for him. He could go out if he chose to, and his fear settles that he will not choose to. He has Edwards's natural ability, and the choice is not his.
- Or picture a man designed before he was conceived to commit one particular crime. He could refrain if he chose to, and his designer has settled that he will not choose to.
- So natural ability is not what blame for a deed presupposes. What it presupposes is that nothing settled the deed but the doer (P3).
4. "He could if he would" leaves the real question open.
- On determinism, what a person will choose is settled before he chooses it. "He could if he would" never asks who settled what he would choose.
- A puppet's arm could move if the string were pulled. That tells you nothing about who holds the string.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Doing What You Want Is Not the Same as Being FreePhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+The determinist agrees that every sin comes from the sinner's own choice. God's decree works through the sinner's own desires and deliberation, without violence to his will.
1. The strongest form comes from the Westminster Confession.
The Confession, the Reformed statement of faith of 1646, says that God "from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established" (3.1).
To ordain is to decree. A second cause is a created cause, like a person's own will, as distinct from God, the first cause of all things. Contingency is the word for what does not happen of necessity. On the determinist reading, God's decree settles every choice and works through the sinner's own desires and deliberation, so every sin still comes from the sinner's own choice.
2. The dispute is over "nothing settled but him."
- Both sides agree that a sin comes from the sinner's own choosing. The source view adds that nothing settled it but the sinner, and determinism denies exactly that.
- A settling from a higher level is still a settling. If a decree fixed beforehand that the sinner would choose as he did, the decree made the choice go the way it went, however many of the sinner's desires it worked through.
- That is where a guarantee and a settling part. A guarantee can rest on what the chooser would himself do, as God's placing of Pilate did (D8), and it writes none of his choice. A decree that fixed the choice beforehand would itself make the choice go the way it went.
- You might think this simply assumes what it sets out to prove. Against a determinist, (C2) is indeed only as strong as (P3) read this way. But the reading is not assumed. It starts from verdicts most people give, many compatibilists among them, on the secret drug and the designed man (P3), and asks what those cases share.
- The manipulation argument sets the designed man beside an ordinary determined one and asks what difference is left between them. Compatibilists meet it in one of two ways, and each has a price. Some grant the verdicts and look for a difference between a designer and a decree, or between a designer and the past and the laws of nature. The differences named so far, a designer's wish or a Creator's rights, leave the settling where it was: a wish settles nothing, and a right answers only whether God may, not who settled the choice. Others deny the verdict on the designed man, and they keep their theory only by overruling one of the clearest judgments there is.
- The defender of free will quoted in (P3) draws the contrast in two lines. On the Molinist view, "there is nothing that actually exists that prevented Hitler from doing otherwise"; on the view that God determines everything, "God himself prevented Hitler from doing otherwise."
• Molinism, named after the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, is the view that God knows what every creature would freely do in any circumstances and plans around it.
3. On determinism the command loses its "ought" for the one who breaks it.
- The same defender puts it this way: "no possible world exists where God determines me to do X, but I really should have (or ought to have) done other than X." A possible world is a philosopher's name for a complete way things could have gone, like a world in which you had tea this morning instead of coffee.
- This is not the maxim over again. It is non-prevention (P3): what God determined, something other than the sinner settled.
- A playwright who writes the villain's lines cannot fault the actor for speaking them.
4. The Confession can be read two ways.
- The Westminster sentence can be read as the determinist reads it, with the decree settling every choice. It can also be read as denying only that the decree does violence to the will, which a view that leaves the choice to the chooser affirms as well.
- Which reading is right is a question about the decree. (C2) needs only that whatever settles a sin is the sinner (P3).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of SinPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated OnePhilosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to Us
+Paul foresaw this complaint: "Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?" (Romans 9:19). He answered by rebuking the one who asked, not by denying that God's will settles what we do.
1. The strongest form reads the question itself as evidence.
Nobody asks "who can resist his will?" of a teacher who has just said that God leaves every choice to the chooser. Paul had just written that God "has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills" (Romans 9:18), and the complaint follows from that.
If the source view were right, the objection runs, Paul had an easy answer ready: God does not settle anyone's sins, so he finds fault fairly. Instead Paul answers, "But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, Why have you made me like this?" (Romans 9:20). So Paul, it is said, accepts that God's will cannot be resisted and blames anyway.
2. Paul's answer is about God's right, not about who settles a sin.
- The next verse asks, "Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use?" (Romans 9:21).
- A right answers the question "may he?" It never answers the question "is the creature the source?" A landlord's right to assign the rooms in his building says nothing about which tenant broke a window.
- So the rebuke silences the charge that God is unjust in what he does with his vessels. It does not say that God settled the sins he finds fault with.
3. The hardening Paul draws on is told as Pharaoh's own act.
- Paul's words come from the story of Pharaoh, and Exodus tells that hardening both ways. When the hail stopped, Pharaoh "sinned yet again and hardened his heart, he and his servants" (Exodus 9:34). A few lines later the Lord says, "I have hardened his heart and the heart of his servants" (Exodus 10:1).
- God's part, as the story tells it, was the respite he granted a man whose heart he knew. The sin was Pharaoh's.
- God did announce it before the first plague: "I will harden his heart, so that he will not let the people go" (Exodus 4:21). That is the word of one who knew what Pharaoh would make of every mercy, and Pharaoh's own first answer came before any sign or plague: "I do not know the Lord, and moreover, I will not let Israel go" (Exodus 5:2).
- A coach who lifts a proud player's suspension early, knowing he will take the mercy as weakness, can say truly that he hardened him. The defiance is still the player's.
4. The same question fits a God who keeps a sinner standing.
- Just before "he hardens whomever he wills" (Romans 9:18), Paul quotes God's word to Pharaoh: "For this very purpose I have raised you up" (Romans 9:17). In Exodus the word comes just after God tells Pharaoh that he could have struck him down already (Exodus 9:15-16). God kept him standing, knowing what he would do, and nothing Pharaoh did defeated God's purpose.
- Of a God like that, a reader can ask just what Paul's objector asked: "who can resist his will?" A question that fits both readings cannot tell us which one Paul held. What it shows is a God whose purpose cannot fail, which is not in dispute.
- A smoke alarm going off tells you there is smoke. It cannot tell you whether the toast burned or the curtains caught.
5. The same letter lays refusal at a human door.
- A chapter later, God says of Israel, "All day long I have held out my hands to a disobedient and contrary people" (Romans 10:21).
- Whom God chooses to harden, and why, belongs to the doctrine of election, the teaching about God's choosing of people for salvation. How the hardening and choosing of Romans 9 are to be read, text by text, is a question of its own.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: What the Sovereignty Texts Say, and What They Do NotPhilosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin
+Paul says, "I have the desire to do what is right, but not the ability to carry it out" (Romans 7:18). That is an "ought" without a "can," and he still counts his failure as sin.
1. Romans 7 confirms the first conclusion.
- The chapter is about what the law can and cannot do. It brings knowledge of sin: "if it had not been for the law, I would not have known sin" (Romans 7:7). It cannot produce the obedience it demands. God "has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do" (Romans 8:3).
- That is (C1): the whole of what the law commands is beyond the flesh.
2. The inability belongs to the condition.
- Paul locates it in the flesh: "I am of the flesh, sold under sin" (Romans 7:14), and "nothing good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh" (Romans 7:18).
- That is the condition every tradition calls fallen nature, and it is answered for in whichever way a tradition answers the old question of original sin (P4).
3. Paul never makes his sins someone else's.
- He does write, "So now it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells within me" (Romans 7:17). But the sin dwells in him, in his flesh, not in God or in fate, and he ends not with an excuse but with a cry: "Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death?" (Romans 7:24).
- Interpreters still argue whether the "I" of the chapter is Paul before his conversion, Paul after it, or a voice speaking for Israel under the law. None of the readings makes the sin the work of anyone but the one who does it.
- A man who says "I lost my temper" is not blaming his neighbor, or a drug, or fate. He is confessing that he gave way.
4. The chapter's answer is grace.
- "Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord!" (Romans 7:25). What the law could not do, God did, "in order that the righteous requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit" (Romans 8:4).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will
+Requiring a "can" for failures to act but not for deeds is special pleading. If the man on the beach is excused because he could not have saved the child, Pilate should be excused because he could not have let Jesus go.
1. The two rules judge two different things.
- The first rule judges what a person did, including what he chose to leave undone: it is his when it came from him (P3).
- The second judges an outcome that did not happen, a child not saved or a question left unanswered. Nobody is to blame for leaving undone what he could not have done even if he had chosen it, unless he brought the inability on himself (P3).
- Special pleading is holding one case to a rule while letting another off it for no good reason. A referee who calls a foul for a trip, and does not call one when a player fails to score, is not using two standards. He is judging two different things.
2. Pilate passes the rule for failures.
- The rule asks first whether the person could have done the thing if he had chosen to. The man on the beach could not: had he swum out, the sharks would have stopped him.
- Pilate's power to release Jesus was never taken. Had he chosen to release him, nothing stood between his order and the release. What was impossible was only that God should place him there and he choose the other way (D8).
- So Pilate has no excuse under either rule. His deed came from him, and every failure of his had the "can" the second rule asks for.
3. Both men are judged by the same two rules.
- The man on the beach is blamed for what he chose, deciding not to try, and not for what no choice of his could have done.
- Pilate is blamed for what he chose, sending Jesus to the cross.
- So nobody is let off, and nobody is held to a rule the other escapes.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Doing What You Want Is Not the Same as Being FreePhilosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door
+Nobody chooses what to believe. If God blames unbelievers for their unbelief, then blame for what we believe cannot require that we settled it.
1. The strongest form is doxastic involuntarism.Doxastic means having to do with belief, and doxastic involuntarism is the view that we cannot believe at will. Offered a million dollars to believe that the sky is green, you could not do it, however much you wanted the money. William Alston argued in 1988 that we have no such direct control over our beliefs. If blame required that we settle what we believe, the objection runs, nobody could be blamed for unbelief. Yet Scripture blames it.
2. Paul blames what people do.
- The unbelievers of Romans 1 are those "who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth" (Romans 1:18). "For although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him" (Romans 1:21).
- Suppressing, refusing honor, and withholding thanks are things done, not beliefs that befall a person.
3. Control over belief runs through what we do.
- We choose what to attend to, whether to look further, and whether to be honest with what we find. Paul speaks of taking "every thought captive to obey Christ" (2 Corinthians 10:5).
- A juror who refuses to look at the evidence cannot plead that his verdict simply happened to him.
4. So blame for a belief is derivative.
- It comes through choices a person settled, the way the crash at eleven comes through the choice at eight (P3).
- That is also what gives oughts about our thinking their force (C2). They are oughts about the thinking we do.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free
+The commandments that matter most reach the heart: love God with all of it, and do not covet. Nobody loves or stops wanting by deciding to, so if blame follows a choice, nobody is to blame for breaking them.
1. The strongest form is Robert Adams's.
Robert Merrihew Adams, an American philosopher and a Christian, argued in 1985 that people are rightly blamed for some states of mind they never chose and cannot simply decide away. He called them involuntary sins. Something is voluntary when it is done by choosing, or brought about by earlier choices, and an involuntary sin would be neither.
- Scripture seems to side with him. Jesus says that "everyone who is angry with his brother will be liable to judgment" (Matthew 5:22), and that "everyone who looks at a woman with lustful intent has already committed adultery with her in his heart" (Matthew 5:28). When Paul names the sin the law first showed him, it is a desire: "I would not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, You shall not covet" (Romans 7:7).
- The first commandment asks for love (P1), and love does not come on command. A husband who no longer loves his wife cannot switch the love back on by deciding to.
- So, the objection runs, either blame does not follow a choice after all (P3), or the rule for failures excuses everyone from the greatest commandment, since nobody can love God with all his heart even by choosing to.
2. The rule for failures asks what stood between the choice and the act.
- The rule for failures (P3) asks whether something stood between a person's choice and the act, the way the sharks stood between the man on the beach and the child.
- Loving God with the whole heart is not an act of that kind, done at some moment by carrying out a choice. Its absence is the condition: what the Westminster Shorter Catechism calls a "want of conformity" to the law, as against a "transgression" of it, which is a deed (Q. 14). Want there has its old meaning, lack.
- Nothing like the sharks stands between a fallen man and that love. What is wrong is the heart itself. The rule was made for the child in the water and the question missing from Daniel's paper, and it neither excuses a heart turned away from God nor condemns it.
3. The condition is answered for another way.
- (P3) is a claim about deeds, and it never says that every sin is a deed. The church has long counted the heart's condition as sin as well (P4).
- The traditions part over its first stirrings. The Westminster Confession counts the corruption of nature, and every stirring of it, as sin in the proper sense (6.5). The Council of Trent held that the desire which remains in the baptized, which Paul sometimes calls sin, is not sin in the proper sense, though it comes from sin and inclines to it (Session 5, canon 5).
- How anyone answers for the condition is the old question of original sin. Every account the church gives ends at a choice: Adam's, counted to his children as a debt; the whole race's, made in Adam as its head; or the person's own, when he turns away the grace that would lift him out of it (P4). None of them treats the condition as a failure to act at some moment.
- Think of a family that inherits a debt. Nobody says the heirs failed to pay it off last Tuesday, and nobody pretends the debt is not there.
4. A desire welcomed is a deed.
- Whatever a tradition says of the first stirring, James draws a line between a desire's pull and the sin it gives birth to: "each person is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own desire. Then desire when it has conceived gives birth to sin" (James 1:14-15). What the desire conceives, once the will takes it in, is a sin committed (P4).
- The look Jesus condemns is a look kept "with lustful intent" (Matthew 5:28), and keeping a look is something a person does. Augustine read the verse that way: sin comes by suggestion, then pleasure, then consent, and it is complete when the will consents, even if nothing outward follows (Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount 1.12.34).
- The same line runs through anger (Matthew 5:22). Jesus himself "looked around at them with anger, grieved at their hardness of heart" (Mark 3:5), and did not sin. Paul draws the line inside anger itself: "Be angry and do not sin; do not let the sun go down on your anger" (Ephesians 4:26).
- A man who catches himself wanting his neighbor's new truck has been tempted. A man who spends the evening working out how to get it, or nursing a grudge that it is not his, has done something with the wanting, and in the ordinary run of choices that is something he could have refused.
- So a command about the heart does two jobs at once. It shows the whole standard, which reaches the heart and lies beyond anyone's own powers (C1), and it forbids particular sins of the heart, each of them the sinner's own (C2).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will
+A God who commands what nobody can do, and then condemns everyone for not doing it, is a tyrant. No fair teacher sets a paper nobody can pass and then fails the whole class.
1. The strongest form turns the examination around.
Mrs. Okafor marks her paper out of a hundred and credits every answer a student gets right. God's law, the objection says, is marked another way: "whoever keeps the whole law but fails in one point has become accountable for all of it" (James 2:10). That is a paper with a pass mark of a hundred. A teacher who set one, knowing that nobody could pass it, and then failed the whole class, would not be strict. She would be cruel.
- The principle behind the charge is sound, and (P3) holds it for failures to act: nobody is to blame for leaving undone what he could not have done even if he had chosen it, unless he brought the inability on himself. A ruler who condemned people for failures the rule excuses would be unjust.
2. Nobody is condemned for missing the hundred.
- Each is judged "according to his works" (Romans 2:6), for "what he has done in the body" (2 Corinthians 5:10). For what he has done, what God holds against a person is the sins he committed, and each of them was his own, settled by nothing but him (C2). The condition he was born into is a separate question, and a harder one.
- Failing to live without sin is not one more sin laid on top of those (C1). Mrs. Okafor does not dock Daniel a mark for missing the hundred, and God does not either.
- James is not setting a pass mark. His point is that the law is one because its giver is one: "For he who said, Do not commit adultery, also said, Do not murder" (James 2:11). Whoever breaks one command has broken the law of the one who gave them all, and the breaking was his own.
3. The condition is the hard part.
- The sharpest form of the charge is about the condition. People are born into a heart not turned toward God, and none of them chose it. How anyone answers for that is the oldest hard question in the doctrine of original sin. The church has argued it for sixteen centuries without pretending it is easy.
- The traditions answer it differently. Some hold that Adam's heirs stand condemned as though his guilt were theirs. Others hold that no one is finally lost for the condition alone, only for turning away the grace that would have lifted him out of it (P4).
- Every one of those answers ends at a choice, Adam's or the person's own. None of them says that God condemns anyone for failing at the impossible.
- Think of a boy born in a country at war. He did not start the war, and he lives in it all the same. What that means for him is a real question and a hard one.
4. The God who gives the law also gives the remedy.
- "For God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do" (Romans 8:3). "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us" (Galatians 3:13). A tyrant is glad to condemn, and the lawgiver says the opposite: "For I have no pleasure in the death of anyone, declares the Lord God; so turn, and live" (Ezekiel 18:32).
- The law shows a person where he stands and sends him to ask for what it requires (C1). Augustine's prayer holds both halves together: "Give what Thou commandest, and command what Thou wilt" (Confessions 10.29.40).
- A mountain guide who tells a climber that the summit is beyond his strength, and then ropes him to herself for the climb, has not mocked him. She has told him the truth and handed him the rope.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will
+Some forks have no clean exit. When soldiers ask a family whether refugees are hidden in its attic, it must lie or hand them over, so the promised way of escape is not always there.
1. The strongest form comes from the philosophers of moral dilemmas.
A moral dilemma, in the philosophers' sense, is a situation in which a person ought to do each of two things and cannot do both, so that whatever he does, he does wrong. Bernard Williams argued in 1965 that such conflicts are real, and that the regret a person rightly feels afterward, for the duty he did not keep, shows that the duty was real and not merely apparent. Ruth Barcan Marcus argued in 1980 that even a perfectly consistent set of moral rules can produce them.
- If they are right, some forks have no road without a wrong on it, and Paul's promise of a way of escape, read as an exit at every fork (C2), fails there.
- Some Christian ethicists agree that in a fallen world a person may meet such a fork, choose the lesser wrong, and ask forgiveness for it.
- The family with soldiers at its door is the case everyone reaches for, and nobody should pretend that it is easy.
2. Many forks without an exit were built earlier.
- A man who promises to be at his daughter's recital and at a friend's hospital bedside at the same hour cannot keep both promises. The wrong lies in making both, and the blame traces back to that, the way the crash at eleven traces back to the choice at eight (P3). The rule for failures says the same in its last clause: unless he brought the inability on himself.
- Thomas Aquinas held that nobody is ever caught between two sins outright. He is caught that way only if some wrong is already in place, such as an evil intention, which he is still able to put aside (Summa Theologiae I-II.19.6).
3. Christians hold three views of the hardest cases.
- Some hold that there is always a road with no sin on it, however costly it is and however hard to see.
• Augustine told of Firmus, a bishop of Thagaste, who was hiding a man the emperor's officers were hunting. Asked where the man was, he answered that he could neither lie nor betray a man, and he held to that under torture (On Lying 13.23).
- Some hold that when two duties truly conflict, the higher one governs, and doing it is no sin.
- Some hold that the family at the door sins whichever way it goes, and must choose the lesser wrong and ask forgiveness.
4. (C2) stands on all three.
- The first two views keep Paul's promise as an exit at every fork. The third narrows it. At the few forks it has in mind, the family could still refuse either wrong, but only by doing the other. So the ordinary mark is there, and a sinless exit is not.
- (C2) never rested on a sinless exit at every fork. Whatever road the family takes, it settles which one, for reasons of its own, and any wrong done at such a fork is the doer's own.
- The reading of Paul's promise in (C2) sits most easily with the first two views. What (C2) claims needs none of the three, and this old dispute in Christian ethics can stay open.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door