Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door

(●) Black the neurosurgeon never touches what makes a choice free, and his case cannot show that determinism is harmless to freedom. + A mother stands at the edge of a park while her six-year-old walks, for the first time, all the way to the ice-cream van on the far side by himself. She has made up her mind that if he so much as turns toward the road, she will run and catch him before he reaches the curb. He never turns. He walks straight to the van, counts out his own coins and comes back grinning. Could he have wandered into the road? No: his mother would have stopped him first. Did he walk to the van on his own? Of course he did, and his mother, who did nothing at all, would be the first to say so. In 1969 the American philosopher Harry Frankfurt built the same shape into a thought experiment, a made-up story designed to test an idea, and philosophers have argued over it ever since. In its best-known telling, a neurosurgeon named Black has secretly fitted a device into the brain of a man named Jones while removing a tumor. Black wants Jones to vote for a particular candidate. The device watches how Jones is about to vote, and if he shows any inclination to vote for the other one, it will step in and make him decide Black's way. As it happens, Jones decides for Black's candidate on his own, for his own reasons, and the device never does anything but watch. Frankfurt drew a striking lesson. Jones is responsible for his vote, and yet he could not have voted otherwise. So, Frankfurt concluded, responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise. Think of that ability as an open door: a second way the choice could have gone, there for the taking. Jones's door was shut the whole time, and he never once reached for it. Those who followed Frankfurt drew a second lesson from the case: what matters is how a choice actually came about, its actual sequence, and not what else might have happened. Many then took a third step, and this is the one in dispute. It concerns determinism, the view that everything that happens, our choices included, is fixed in advance by what came before it. On that view a choice is like the last domino in a long row, whose fall was decided the moment the first one tipped. Determinism takes away the ability to do otherwise, they granted, since the last domino cannot stay standing. But if that ability never mattered, then determinism takes nothing that responsibility needs. Compatibilism is the view that free will and determinism can both be true. Incompatibilism is the view that they cannot, and an incompatibilist who holds that we really are free, and so that determinism is false, is called a libertarian, a name that has nothing to do with politics. The view built on the third step is called semicompatibilism, and it keeps half of the compatibilist's claim. It grants that determinism takes away the ability to do otherwise, but it holds that responsibility never needed that ability, so a determined person can still be responsible for what he does. The first two lessons are sound. To see why, start with what makes a choice free. A choice is free when its source is the person who makes it: nothing settles which way it goes except him, for reasons of his own. Call this the source view of freedom. On the source view, Jones's vote is free for the plainest of reasons. Black's device never did anything, so it settled nothing, and that leaves Jones as the only one who settled his vote, even though every other door was shut. That is why freedom is best defined by its source. The open door is only its ordinary mark, the usual sign in everyday life that nothing but the chooser settled the choice. The third step is another matter. It needs the case to show that a determined choice can be free. The case cannot show that, because it faces a fork. Ask what settled Jones's choice. Either something settled it before he made it, and then the case simply assumes the point in dispute. Or nothing did, and then Jones is exactly the kind of chooser that determinism rules out. The argument is deductive: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. That does not mean the premises must be beyond all doubt. Each needs only to be more plausible than its denial. Who holds what, on semicompatibilism: - Support: Jonathan Edwards argued in 1754 that a holiness that could not have been otherwise is still praiseworthy, and John Martin Fischer built semicompatibilism on the neurosurgeon's case in 1994. - Oppose: Thomas Reid held in 1788 that liberty is a power over the determinations of one's own will, meaning over which way it decides. Eleonore Stump, who grants the neurosurgeon his case, denied in 1999 that it helps determinism. The argument that follows denies that the neurosurgeon's case supports semicompatibilism.

(P1) A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it. + Here is what makes a choice free: the person who makes it settles it, and nothing else does. Being able to do otherwise usually goes along with that, but it is freedom's ordinary mark rather than its definition. (1) The one who settles a choice is its source. - To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes. That is not the same as guaranteeing which way it will go, because a thing can make an outcome certain while doing nothing at all to bring it about (P2). - When nothing makes the choice go one way ahead of time, and the person makes it go that way himself, for reasons he has in mind, he is its source: the one it comes from. - Take a man who signs a contract after reading every page twice. The pen, the desk and the lawyer across the table were all there, and none of them signed it. He did. - One of the leading defenders of free will today puts it plainly. What is critical to free will, he writes, "is not the ability to choose differently in identical circumstances but rather not being caused to do something by causes other than oneself." (2) A choice can be free with no other door open. - Another defender of free will defines a free choice as one that is "neither random nor determined by something or someone else," and adds that the definition holds "whether or not there are alternative possibilities available to the agent." The agent is simply the one who acts, and his alternative possibilities are the other ways his choice could have gone: the other open doors. - On his account, being able to choose otherwise is enough to show that a choice was free, but a choice can be free without it. Being its source is different, because no free choice can lack that. Putting the ability to choose otherwise first and the source second, he writes: "The former is sufficient for libertarian freedom, while the latter is necessary." • A thing is sufficient when it does the job on its own, and necessary when the job cannot be done without it. Rain is sufficient to wet the lawn, but it is not necessary, since the sprinkler will do it too. - Picture a door wired to lock the instant your hand moves toward the handle. You spend the evening in the room talking with friends and never reach for it. Could you have left? No. Did you stay by choice? Of course you did, and the lock that never engaged is not why you stayed. (3) God is free with no door open to evil. - Scripture says that "it is impossible for God to lie" (Hebrews 6:18) and that he "cannot be tempted with evil" (James 1:13). Yet there is no freer being than God. - Christ "in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sin" (Hebrews 4:15). Scripture also says of him that "he cannot deny himself" (2 Timothy 2:13), and to sin would be to deny himself. So the church's main tradition has held that he could not have sinned, and still he resisted temptation freely, because nothing outside him settled his choices. • Some Christians hold that he could have sinned and did not. The point does not turn on that question, since God's own freedom makes it by itself. - A philosopher who tells his own version of the neurosurgeon's case, with electrodes in a voter's brain (C1), draws the parallel himself: "Like the man with the electrodes implanted in his brain, Jesus could not have chosen to sin, but he freely resisted sin." (4) The open door is the ordinary mark, not the definition. - In ordinary life, the way to tell whether a choice was a person's own is to ask whether he could have gone the other way. A libertarian philosopher spells out why that works: "if one does possess opportunities to choose among alternative possibilities in the actual world, then it follows that one is not causally determined by something or someone else." - So an open door is the usual evidence that nothing but the chooser settled the choice. But evidence is not the same thing as what it is evidence of. - Think of a signature at the foot of a letter. It is the usual proof that the letter is yours, and yet a letter you dictated and never signed is yours all the same. Therefore, a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, whether or not another door stood open.

(P2) A device that never acts settles nothing. + Black's device makes it certain how Jones will vote, and yet it does nothing whatever to bring that vote about. (1) The device watches and waits. - The standard reference survey of the debate, a scholarly encyclopedia article that philosophers themselves rely on, tells the case in the words of the philosopher who built semicompatibilism on it (●). - In this telling Black wants a vote for Clinton. He fits the mechanism during an operation, and a computer monitors how Jones will vote: "If Jones were to show any inclination to vote for Bush, then the computer, through the mechanism in Jones's brain, intervenes to ensure that he actually decides to vote for Clinton and does so vote." - If Jones decides on his own to vote for Clinton, the computer only goes on watching, and nothing in his head is touched. That is just how it goes: Jones decides for Clinton on his own, and the device never does a thing. (2) Guaranteeing an outcome is not bringing it about. - The case's inventor described his recipe in exactly these terms. The trick, he wrote, is "to conceive circumstances which make it inevitable that a person will perform some action but which do not bring it about that he performs it." - He added that "the backup factor may contribute nothing whatever to bringing about the effect whose occurrence it guarantees." A backup factor is whatever stands ready to produce the outcome if things start to go the other way. Black's device is one: it guarantees the vote and contributes nothing to it. - Picture a lifeguard watching a boy swim his first length, ready to dive in the moment he goes under. He never goes under. She made drowning impossible, and she did not swim a single stroke of his length. (3) What threatens freedom is causing a choice, not guaranteeing it. - A libertarian philosopher draws the line exactly: in the debate over freedom, "the determinism that matters is not mere entailment of an outcome, but sufficiency to causally necessitate it." - To entail an outcome is to guarantee it, the way arithmetic guarantees that two apples and two more make four. To causally necessitate it is to make it happen. Arithmetic never moved an apple. - Black's device entails the vote in just that sense, since given the device only one vote could come out. But it moves nothing, and so it settles nothing. (4) The case's ancestor is three centuries old. - John Locke described a man carried into a room while fast asleep and locked in. He wakes to find in the room someone he has long wanted to talk with, and he stays gladly. - He could not have left, since the door was locked. But the lock is not what kept him in the room. His wish to stay did: in Locke's words, the man "stays willingly," and "prefers his stay to going away." He would have stayed with the door wide open. - Locke himself denied that the man was at liberty, though he called the stay voluntary. For Locke, liberty belonged to what a man can do, not to what he chooses: it was the power "of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct." This man could not have left even if he had chosen to. - Whatever Locke called the stay, the lock worked just like Black's device. It made one outcome certain and did nothing to produce it. Therefore, a device that never acts settles nothing, however firmly it guarantees what will happen.

(C1) Therefore, a device that never acts takes nothing from a free choice. + Put the two premises together and the conclusion comes almost at once. It is also the verdict the case itself reaches about Jones. (1) An idle device brings in no second settler. - A free choice is settled by the one who makes it and by nothing else (P1). A device that never acts settles nothing (P2). So setting such a device beside a free choice adds no second settler, and the choice stays free. - Imagine a chess game with a spectator leaning over the board, ready to grab a piece if a player ever touches the wrong one. The player never touches the wrong one, and the spectator's hand never moves. Every move on the board was still the player's. (2) Jones's vote is free, though he could not have voted otherwise. - If nothing but Jones settled his vote, it was free, and he is responsible for it, even though the device would have stopped him from voting the other way. - One defender of free will accepts the case in just these terms. Telling his own version, with a voter and a mad scientist's electrodes, he concludes: "In such a case it seems that the man freely votes for Obama. Yet it was not within his power to do anything different!" - So the case is no threat to freedom defined by its source. The only definition it refutes is one that wrote the open door into freedom itself. (3) Even in the case as told, an inner door stays open. - The device waits for a sign of how Jones is leaning, so Jones could still have begun to lean the other way before it stepped in. Philosophers call that thin remaining alternative a flicker of freedom. - Another libertarian philosopher says the same of his own version of the case: the voter "retained the mental ability to think otherwise, deliberate otherwise, and attempt otherwise," though she could not have carried the other vote through. - Nothing rests on the flicker, since freedom never depended on the door (P1). But the door is seldom as firmly shut as the case first looks. Think back to the mother at the park: her son could still have turned toward the road, and only the rest of the way was barred. Therefore, a device that never acts takes nothing from a free choice, even if it closes every other door.

(P3) Either something settles Jones's choice before he makes it, or nothing does. + The case's critics found that it faces a fork. The fork is best drawn as a single question: did anything settle Jones's choice before he made it? (1) The device needs a sign before the choice. - For the device to step in on time, it has to know how Jones is about to vote before he votes, so it watches for a sign. In the case as told, it watches for any inclination toward the other candidate and stays idle as long as none appears. The sign that Jones will vote Black's way is simply that no such inclination ever shows up. - So the critics asked a simple question. Is the link between that sign and the vote fixed, so that once the sign appears the laws of nature make the vote follow? Or is it not? - It is like a smoke alarm that has to go off before the fire spreads. It can only do that if smoke comes before flame. (2) A choice is settled beforehand or it is not. - If the sign fixes the vote, then something before Jones's choice settled it, and Jones is a determined man. - If the sign does not fix the vote, then nothing before his choice settled it. In the case as told, where Jones decides on his own and for his own reasons, he settled it himself when he chose. (D10 answers the worry that such a choice is mere chance.) - There is no third option. This is the law of excluded middle, the rule that a claim is either true or false, with nothing in between. Either the letter was mailed or it was not, and you know that much before you check the mailbox. So either something settled the choice in advance or nothing did. (3) The fork turns on what settled the choice, not on an open door. - The fork is often drawn another way: either Jones was determined, or he could have done otherwise. But that drawing misses a possibility, a choice that nothing settles in advance and that still has every other door shut. Some of the case's defenders have built exactly that version (P5), and a fork drawn around the open door would not cover it. - So the fork that covers every version of the case asks what settled the choice, not whether another door was open. A choice nothing settled in advance does not automatically come with two roads in front of it. - Imagine a hedge maze at night. A walker takes the path he likes best, not knowing that every other path was bricked up that morning. His route was his own, and no other route was open. Therefore, in every version of the case, either something settles Jones's choice before he makes it, or nothing does.

(P4) If something settles Jones's choice beforehand, the case assumes a determined choice can be free. + If Jones's vote was settled before he cast it, then Jones is simply a determined man. Whether a determined man can be free is the very question the case was brought in to answer, so on this branch it answers nothing. (1) The case was brought in to show that determinism is harmless. - The third step in the case's story (●) is the one that turns it into a defense of determinism. It needs a choice that something settled in advance and that is free all the same, because only such a choice could show that a determined choice can be free. - Consider a drug trial meant to show that a medicine is safe for children. It proves nothing about children unless there were children in it. (2) A settled Jones is the very case in dispute. - If the sign fixes the vote, Jones is a determined man, and whether a determined man is responsible is exactly what the two sides disagree about. - The standard survey spells out the result. On this horn, as philosophers call each branch of a fork like this one, Jones's action is "deterministically brought about by factors beyond his control," and those who think determinism rules out responsibility will conclude "that Jones is not morally responsible for his decision." - To beg the question is to rest an argument on the very point your opponent denies, like a man who offers himself as his own character reference. A case built on a determined Jones begs the question in exactly that way. (3) The idle device adds nothing to the verdict. - On this horn, what settles the vote is the sign and the laws that link it to the vote, not the device. Take the device away and the determined Jones votes exactly as before. - So the verdict about him is simply the verdict about any determined man. The device, which was supposed to do the work, has done none of it. - Think of a padlock hung on a door that was nailed shut years ago. The door stays shut, but the nails are doing all the work, and anything the shut door teaches you is a lesson about nails. Therefore, if something settles Jones's choice beforehand, the case assumes the very thing it set out to show: that a determined choice can be free.

(P5) If nothing settles Jones's choice beforehand, the case shows a choice he settled himself. + Most of the case's defenders have rebuilt it on purpose so that nothing settles Jones's choice ahead of time. What they end up describing is a man who settles his own choice while every other door is shut, and that is freedom by its source. (1) The rebuilt versions leave the choice unsettled until Jones makes it. - Philosophers call the neurosurgeon's case and its relatives Frankfurt-style cases. The standard survey reports that "the majority of proponents of Frankfurt-style cases have attempted to revise these cases so that they are explicitly nondeterministic," meaning that nothing before the choice fixes it. - One version blocks in advance every path in Jones's brain except the one he in fact takes, while the path he takes runs on its own. Another watches not for the choice itself but for a first step Jones would have to take on the way to any other choice, rather as a man cannot walk out of a room without first turning toward the door. - In each, nothing settles Jones's choice before he makes it, and in each he makes it on his own, for his own reasons. That is the whole point of the rebuilding. (2) What they show is a chooser who settles his own choice. - If the rebuilt versions work, Jones is free and responsible though no other door was open, and nothing but Jones settled his choice. That is freedom defined by its source (P1). - The standard survey notes that many who deny that determinism fits with freedom accept these cases. What they argue instead is that a determined agent cannot be the source of what he does. - Go back to the hedge maze (P3). The bricks prove that the walker had no other route. They prove nothing about who chose the route he took. (3) The sharpest version needs no device at all. - One defender of free will takes up the standard objection to such cases, that "no one could know what the man was going to do before he actually attempted to do so." He grants that it "seems cogent against human examples of prevention or intervention." In other words, the objection is convincing whenever the one standing guard is a human being with a machine. But it has "no force," he argues, against a God who knows what anyone would freely do in any circumstances. - Philosophers call that middle knowledge: God's knowledge of what every person would freely do in every situation he might be placed in. It is called middle because it sits between God's knowledge of everything that could happen and his knowledge of what actually will. - His example is Pontius Pilate, the Roman governor who sent Jesus to be crucified. Had God known that Pilate would not send Jesus to the cross, "He would not have placed Pilate in such circumstances. In that case, Pilate did not under the circumstances have the ability to let Jesus go. Yet he freely sent Jesus to the cross, since nothing determined him to do so." (4) God's resolve, not his knowledge, shuts the door. - God's knowledge by itself makes nothing happen. It leaves a choice as open as it finds it. What shuts Pilate's door is God's resolve to place him only where he would freely send Jesus to the cross, and that resolve decides where Pilate stands while leaving what Pilate does to Pilate. - Scripture holds Pilate to account. Jesus tells him that "he who delivered me over to you has the greater sin" (John 19:11), which leaves Pilate a lesser sin of his own. - God need not arrange things this way, and in the ordinary run of choices the door stands open. But if he has middle knowledge he could (D16), and if he did, the choice would still be the chooser's. Therefore, if nothing settles Jones's choice beforehand, the case shows a choice that Jones settled himself, which is freedom by its source.

(C2) Therefore, the neurosurgeon's case cannot show that a determined choice is free. + Whichever way the fork goes, the case never arrives at a determined choice that it has shown to be free. Neither the standard survey of the debate nor the most careful Christian compatibilist claims any more for it. (1) The reasoning is a constructive dilemma. - Either something settles Jones's choice beforehand or nothing does (P3). If something does, the case simply assumes that a determined choice can be free, and an argument that assumes its conclusion has not shown it (P4). If nothing does, the case shows a choice Jones settled himself, and a choice nothing settled beforehand is not a determined choice (P5). Either way, the case does not show that a determined choice is free. - A constructive dilemma has just this form: either A or B; if A, then C; if B, then C; so C. Either the bus comes or it does not. If it comes you ride to work, and if it does not you walk, so either way you get to work. (2) The standard survey reaches the same verdict. - Supposing the cases succeed, the survey's authors write, they show neither that responsibility needs no ability to do otherwise "in any sense" nor "that compatibilism is true." - At most, they add, the cases are a first step. The second step would be to show that a determined agent can be the source of his choices, and the cases do not take it. - A defense lawyer who proves that the victim was not killed with a knife has not yet shown that his client did not do it with something else. (3) The most careful Christian compatibilist will not lean on the case. - He thinks the case fails anyway, since Jones always keeps some flicker of an alternative. He calls such cases "a weak ally in the war against incompatibilism" (the view that free will and determinism cannot both be true) and declines to rest anything on them. - So even compatibilists are divided over the case. The philosopher who built semicompatibilism on it rests his view there, while the most careful Christian compatibilist sets it aside. Meanwhile many incompatibilists accept it (P5). - Think of a witness whom the other side is glad to call and whom one of your own lawyers will not put on the stand. Whatever else he is, he is not your star witness. (4) The question returns to who settled the choice. - What the case leaves standing is the source (P1). A determined choice was settled by the past and the laws of nature before the chooser was born, and whether such a choice can still have its source in him is the real question. - Two arguments press that question, and a device that never acts answers neither. • The Consequence Argument says that if determinism is true, every choice is the consequence of the distant past and the laws of nature, and since neither of those is up to us, nothing we do is up to us either. • The manipulation argument says that a person secretly designed by someone else to make a certain choice is not free, however well he reasons, and that a determined person is in the same position, with the past and the laws in the designer's place. - Think of a jury that has ruled out one suspect. The question of who did it is still before them, and it is the same question it always was. Therefore, the neurosurgeon's case cannot show that a determined choice is free, and it leaves the question of the source exactly where it found it.

On the neurosurgeon's case and alternative possibilities: Fischer, John Martin. The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. Fischer, John Martin. My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Fischer, John Martin. "The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories." Philosophical Review 119, no. 3 (2010): 315-336. Frankfurt, Harry G. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (1969): 829-839. Frankfurt, Harry G. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 (1971): 5-20. Frankfurt, Harry G. "What We Are Morally Responsible For." In The Importance of What We Care About, 95-103. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Franklin, Christopher Evan. "Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities." Philosophical Studies 152 (2011): 189-207. Ginet, Carl. "In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing." Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996): 403-417. Hunt, David P. "Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action." Philosophical Studies 97 (2000): 195-227. Hunt, David P. "Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005): 126-145. Kane, Robert. The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 142-143. Mele, Alfred R., and David Robb. "Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases." Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 97-112. O'Connor, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. "Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2022. Section 2.3. Pereboom, Derk. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Stump, Eleonore. "Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: The Flicker of Freedom." Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): 299-324. Widerker, David. "Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities." In Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, edited by David Widerker and Michael McKenna. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003. Widerker, David. "Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities." Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 247-261. Widerker, David, and Michael McKenna, eds. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003. Wolf, Susan. "Asymmetrical Freedom." Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 3 (1980): 151-166. Wolf, Susan. Freedom Within Reason. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Zagzebski, Linda. "Does Libertarian Freedom Require Alternative Possibilities?" Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 231-248. On freedom defined by its source: Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013. Craig, William Lane. "Response to Gregory A. Boyd." In Four Views on Divine Providence, edited by Stanley N. Gundry and Dennis W. Jowers, 224-230. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011. Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Pages 38-40, 324, 446-449, 580 and 641-647. Critic sources engaged: Adams, Robert Merrihew. "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil." American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977): 109-117. Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018. Introduction and chapters 5-6. Hasker, William. God, Time, and Knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989. Historical sources: Edwards, Jonathan. Freedom of the Will. 1754. Part III, sections 1-2. In The Works of Jonathan Edwards, edited by Edward Hickman, vol. 1. London, 1834. Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 1690. Book II, chapter 21, section 10. Edited by A. C. Fraser. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894. Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Edinburgh, 1788. Essay IV. Biblical citations: Deuteronomy 30:19; Joshua 24:15; John 19:11; 2 Timothy 2:13; Hebrews 4:15; Hebrews 6:18; James 1:13
+ If Jones could not have voted otherwise, his vote was settled. A choice with only one possible outcome is not up to the one who makes it.
1. The objection runs two different things together. One is which outcomes were possible. The other is what actually brought the outcome about. Black's device narrows the first down to a single outcome, and it has no part at all in the second (P2). 2. The case's inventor built it to pull them apart. Frankfurt described the device as a factor that "may contribute nothing whatever to bringing about the effect whose occurrence it guarantees." A guarantee that brings nothing about settles nothing (P2). - Suppose a friend co-signs your loan. He would pay if you ever missed a payment, so his signature makes repayment certain. You never miss one, and every payment is still yours. 3. Inevitability is not the enemy of freedom. God cannot lie and cannot be tempted with evil, so no road toward evil is open to him, and yet no one is freer (P1). What takes freedom away is a second decider, something or someone else settling the choice. Having only one road does not. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It Matters
+ An undetermined choice could always have gone otherwise. If nothing before it settled it, then with everything before it held fixed it could have been different, so freedom by the source is the open door under another name.
1. This is the strongest objection to the source view. It comes from the most careful Christian compatibilist, who uses it as a premise in his own positive argument for compatibilism. He starts from what it means for a choice to be undetermined: the sum of everything true before the choice does not fix it. Think of it as a replay. Rewind the world to the moment before the choice, with every fact exactly as it was, and let it run again. If nothing before the choice fixed it, the replay could come out differently, and a chooser whose replay could come out differently could have done otherwise. In his words: "If the choice could not have been other than it is while holding these other facts in place, then it is the case that these other facts did determine the one and only possible choice. This means that if the choice was undetermined, it entailed that the agent could have done otherwise." If he is right, every libertarian is stuck with the open door whether he likes it or not, and his arguments against the open door reach the source view as well. - He has an answer ready for the neurosurgeon too. Unless the case quietly assumes determinism, Jones can still begin to choose the other way and set off the device, so such cases "do not in fact feature a categorical inability to do otherwise, unless they additionally presuppose determinism." A categorical inability is an all-in one: it holds with everything before the choice kept exactly as it was. 2. The key step slides from "only one outcome" to "determined." Look closely at the step. It says that if the facts before a choice, held in place, leave only one outcome possible, then those facts "did determine" it. That is true only if "determine" means nothing more than "leave one outcome possible." As it happens, that is exactly how its author uses the word. He defines determinism as the thesis that "everything that comes to pass is determined, or necessitated by prior conditions," and he sets the word "cause" aside on purpose. But leaving one outcome possible is not the same as causing it. A device that stands ready can leave only one outcome possible while causing nothing at all (P2). And God's resolve about where to place a man decides where he stands and leaves what he does to him (P5). - In the debate over freedom, as one libertarian puts it, "the determinism that matters is not mere entailment of an outcome, but sufficiency to causally necessitate it." - Picture a child bowling with the bumpers up. The bumpers make a gutter ball impossible, so only one kind of roll can happen. She sends the ball straight down the middle, the bumpers never touch it, and nobody at the lane thinks the bumpers bowled. 3. The harder cases close even the flicker. About the case as told, he is right: Jones keeps a flicker (C1). But the rebuilt cases are designed to take even that away, and the Pilate case never had one, since nothing in it waits for a warning sign (P5). Each describes exactly what his premise says cannot happen: a choice that nothing settled beforehand, with no other outcome possible. - Whether the rebuilt cases fully succeed is still argued (D4), and the Pilate case needs middle knowledge to be at least possible (D16). But his premise does not say such choices are rare. It says they are impossible, and against a claim of impossibility one coherent case is enough. A single black swan was enough to sink "all swans are white." 4. A thinner "could have done otherwise" is not an open door. Pressed on this very point, he accepts that his premise needs only a thinner ability, one that a libertarian philosopher proposed: the ability to do otherwise "all causally relevant things being equal." Only what actually helps produce the choice is held fixed. Anything that merely stands by, like Black's device, is left out. - Go back to the replay. Rerun Jones's vote with the device left out, since it never did anything, and the vote could have gone the other way. Put the device back in, and it could not. The thin ability looks only at the first replay. - Read that way, his premise says only that nothing that causes a creature's ordinary free choice fixed it beforehand, and the source view already says that of every such choice (P1). What the premise no longer promises is an open door, a road the chooser could really have taken: Pilate still could not have let Jesus go, and Jones still could not have voted for Bush. - Nor can even the thin ability be what freedom is, because God's own nature fixes his good choices and he is free all the same (P1). Whether a nature that settles choices from within differs from causes that settle them from outside is a further question (D9). On that one, the objection's author concedes that he may never dislodge his opponents. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the Choice Philosophy / Free Will: God Cannot Sin and Is Praised for It: The Impeccability Objection
+ Jones could still have begun to lean the other way before the device stepped in. So the door was open after all, the case fails, and responsibility still requires the ability to do otherwise.
1. The flicker is real in the case as told. The device waits for a sign, so Jones keeps the power to begin leaning the other way (C1). Many critics of the case rest their reply on exactly that thin alternative. 2. Whether a flicker can bear the weight is disputed. The philosopher who built semicompatibilism on the case answers that a flicker is far too thin to be what makes anyone responsible. How could a bare power to start leaning the other way, a power Jones never used, be the thing his responsibility rests on? Those who defend the flicker reply that if responsibility needs an alternative at all, even a thin one will do. As one of them wrote, on that assumption "a flicker shines like a beacon." Even the most careful Christian compatibilist calls that reply "a fine answer." 3. Nothing rests on the flicker. Freedom never depended on the door, open or closed (P1). If the flicker is there, it is welcome evidence that Jones settled his own vote. If a rebuilt case takes it away, Jones's vote is still free, because the source is untouched (P5). And the source view's chief witness was never Jones. It is God, who is free with no door open to evil (P1), and no flicker in Jones's head opens a door in God. - The signature makes the same point (P1). A letter is yours whether or not you signed it, and a signature is still good evidence when you did. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It Matters
+ The rebuilt cases shut every door without assuming determinism. So alternatives are gone for good, and the libertarian has lost his case.
1. The rebuilt cases shut every door without settling the choice. They are serious work, and they deserve to be met at full strength. Here are three of them: - In one, every other path in Jones's brain is blocked in advance, while the path he actually takes runs on its own. - In another, the device waits for a first step that any other choice would need, such as paying a certain level of attention to the moral reasons against the act, and would block the alternative there. - In a third, a second, backup process would produce the very same decision at the very same moment if Jones did not. Each is built so that nothing settles Jones's choice beforehand. 2. They refute a definition the source view never held. If they work, they show that a free choice need not have an open door. The source view says that already (P1), which is why many libertarians accept the rebuilt cases. 3. They help the source view against its strongest critic. A counterexample is a single case that shows a general claim false, the way one black swan sinks "all swans are white." The rebuilt cases are counterexamples to the very claim that an undetermined choice always has another way open (D2). Each describes a choice that nothing settled and that had no other way open, a shape the source view allows and that objection forbids. Whether they fully succeed is still argued. Their critics reply that each one: - leaves some alternative open after all; - lets determinism in by the back door; - or fails to make the agent responsible. If the critics are right, the source view loses one set of counterexamples in (D2) and keeps its definition, which never needed the door shut (P1). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the Choice
+ Run the case with determinism assumed. Jones still seems responsible, because the device did nothing, so taking away the ability to do otherwise cannot be what threatens responsibility.
1. This is semicompatibilism's own reply to the fork. The philosopher who built semicompatibilism on the case (●) argues that even in a determined world, the idle device shows that the missing alternative is not what excuses anyone. So determinism, if it excuses at all, must do it some other way. 2. Granting the point moves the question to the source. The source view gladly agrees that taking away the open door is not the problem (P1). But then the problem, if there is one, is who settled the choice. In a determined Jones, the past and the laws of nature settled it before he was born. That is the charge the Consequence Argument presses (C2), and the case says nothing about it. - The case's critics add a further point. Our sense that a determined Jones is responsible borrows its force from the idle device, which really did nothing, and not from the determined sequence that actually produced his vote (P4). 3. Irrelevance is not proof. The standard survey makes the point directly: "showing that an argument for the falsity of compatibilism is irrelevant does not show that compatibilism is true." - A mechanic who finds that the rattle is not coming from the engine has not yet shown that the car is safe to drive. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to Us Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+ Freedom is a matter of the actual sequence, the way the choice really came about. If Jones's deliberation worked in the normal way, answering to reasons, he was the source of his vote, determined or not.
1. The actual sequence is where the source is. The case's positive lesson is exactly right: what matters is how the choice actually came about. That is the source view's own lesson. One defender of free will says the case leaves untouched "libertarian freedom understood as agent-causal sourcehood in the actual sequence." Agent-causal sourcehood means that the agent himself, and not merely something happening inside him such as a desire or a brain state, causes the choice as it actually unfolds. 2. The compatibilist's actual sequence still looks at other possibilities. The best compatibilist account of that sequence asks whether the agent's way of deciding would have answered to other reasons in other circumstances. Would Jones have switched his vote had he learned that his candidate was a crook? That is a fair question, but notice what kind of question it is. It asks what would have happened otherwise. The standard survey concludes that compatibilists "in fact still think that the ability to do otherwise in some such senses is necessary," so the move away from alternatives "is best seen as a weakening of the ability-to-do-otherwise condition." 3. Whether a determined sequence can have its source in the agent is a separate fight. Picture a man whose desires and beliefs were installed by a team of scientists, so that after careful thought he would choose exactly what they wanted. He deliberates in the normal way and answers to reasons perfectly, and most people still do not think him free. Whether a person produced by the past and the laws of nature is any different is the question the manipulation argument presses (C2). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One Philosophy / Free Will: Wanting What You Want to Want Is Not Enough: The Hierarchical and Reasons-Responsive Accounts
+ Frankfurt himself said that responsibility and free will come apart. Jones is responsible, but he is not free, because free will needs the ability to do otherwise.
1. That was Frankfurt's own later view. The standard survey reports that in 1971 he took the case to show that free will requires the ability to do otherwise while responsibility does not. 2. Free will is the control responsibility requires. If free will means the strongest kind of control that responsibility requires, as the survey and many philosophers define it, then the two cannot come apart. Whatever control made Jones responsible is his free will. 3. Nothing hangs on the word. Call it free will or call it something else. The control Jones exercised was settling his own vote, and that is the source (P1). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It Matters
+ If freedom never needed the open door, then the Consequence Argument, which is about the ability to do otherwise, is beside the point.
1. The standard survey states the worry fairly. If the cases succeed, compatibilists can grant that determinism removes the all-in ability to do otherwise, the ability to choose differently with everything up to that moment exactly as it was, and still call that ability irrelevant. 2. The Consequence Argument reaches the source too. The Consequence Argument holds that determinism leaves nobody any say in what he does. On its reckoning, determinism takes the source and the open door together, since the past and the laws settle every choice before the chooser exists. The neurosurgeon takes the door and leaves the source. Determinism, if the argument is sound, takes both. - Suppose a burglar cuts the phone line and then picks the locks. Proving that a house can be safe without a working phone does nothing to show it is safe once its locks are picked. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to Us
+ God's goodness is fixed by a nature he never chose, and he is praised for it. So being determined is not the problem, only being determined from outside, and the source view has quietly surrendered to compatibilism.
1. The objection comes at full strength from the most careful Christian compatibilist. He argues that God and a determined human have the decisive thing in common: neither chose his own nature. If the source view still objects only to what comes from outside, he concludes, "being determined isn't the problem; it's how one is determined that counts. The debate on compatibilism itself has been surrendered." 2. Its author grants that the line may hold. He agrees that the distinction the source view draws, between God, whose goodness traces back to him alone, and determined humans, whose choices trace back to causes outside them, "certainly holds true." He calls the source view's use of it "a rather effective defensive move, and a prima facie coherent position to take." (Prima facie is Latin for "at first sight.") At the end of his first reply to it, he allows that "that may be the final defensive position out of which I am unable to dislodge them." So what is left of his objection is not that the line is incoherent. It is that drawing the line hands compatibilism the victory. 3. Freedom never meant choosing your own nature. Nobody chose his own nature, God included, and Scripture praises God without reserve. So what marks a free choice cannot be having chosen one's nature. It is that nothing other than the chooser settles the choice (P1). God's choices are settled by God. A determined creature's choices are settled before he makes them: by the past and the laws, or, if God determines everything, by God's decree, the eternal plan that fixes every event in advance. 4. Nothing has been surrendered. Determinism, in the debate over freedom, means that things other than the chooser, the past with the laws of nature or a divine decree, settle every choice in advance. The source view says that is exactly what takes freedom away. The objection's author himself agrees that the source view still finds fault with determinism of that kind, since human choices determined by God "are determined by factors outside themselves." See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Cannot Sin and Is Praised for It: The Impeccability Objection Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God
+ If nothing before the choice settled it, then which way it went was a matter of chance, and chance is nobody's doing.
1. The source view is not chance. One defender of free will answers directly: a free person's decisions "are differentiated from random events by being done by the agent himself for reasons the agent has in mind." Another defines freedom as "neither random nor determined." 2. The alternative to being settled by the past is being settled by the person. A choice that nothing before it settled is not thereby settled by nothing. Jones settled his vote, for his reasons. Whether that can be spelled out without collapsing into luck is a real question, and it has its own argument. - Consider a jury that deliberates for a whole day. Nothing before the vote settled the verdict, and nobody thinks the verdict was a coin toss. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the Choice
+ God is the ultimate Black. He guarantees every outcome and we are still responsible, so a God who determines every choice takes nothing from our freedom.
1. A decree that settles every choice puts the case on its first horn. The whole force of Black's case comes from the device doing nothing while the choice is left to Jones (P2). A God who determines every choice is not in Black's position. His decree, the eternal plan that fixes every event in advance, settles each choice before the person makes it, whether it overrides the person's reasoning or, as its defenders hold, works through it. That is the first horn of the fork, where Jones is a determined man and the case assumes the very thing in dispute (P4). - Think back to the padlock on the door that was nailed shut (P4). A decree that settles every choice is not the padlock, which does nothing. It is the nails, and whether a man is free behind nails is exactly what an idle padlock cannot tell you. 2. Guaranteeing by power and guaranteeing by knowledge are different things. A libertarian philosopher draws the line. God could guarantee a choice in either of two ways: - by direct force, which would take the choice away; - or by knowing what a person would freely do and choosing the circumstances accordingly, which leaves the choice with the person. The Pilate case is the second kind (P5). - A teacher seats a talkative pupil next to the window because she knows he will spend the lesson watching birds rather than chatting. She arranged the lesson around his choice. She did not make it for him. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin
+ The case is science fiction. Intuitions about hidden brain devices prove nothing about real choices.
1. The shape is ordinary. The same shape turns up all through ordinary life, where nobody's intuitions are exotic: - a mother who would have caught her son at the curb (●); - a lifeguard who never has to dive (P2); - a man who stays gladly in a room he did not know was locked (P2). 2. Nothing rests on the case's success. If the case fails, the door was open all along. If it succeeds, freedom rests on the source (C1). Either way, the case cannot show that a determined choice is free (C2). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It Matters
+ If the open door does not matter, why call it the ordinary mark of freedom at all? Drop it.
1. It matters as evidence. In ordinary life, a choice that nothing settled in advance usually could have gone either way as well, so an open door is the usual sign that the chooser settled it. One libertarian says as much: having real alternatives means one "is not causally determined by something or someone else." 2. Among human choices, the mark and the source come apart only in unusual cases. The neurosurgeon, the rebuilt cases and the Pilate case are built precisely to separate them. In the ordinary run of human choices the two travel together. The great exception is not a contrived case at all. God, and Christ in his temptations, have the source without any door open to evil, and that is a perfection, not a lack (P1). - Think of a fingerprint on a glass. It is the ordinary sign that a person handled it, and a glass handled in gloves was still handled by someone. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It Matters
+ Scripture sets two ways before people and says "choose." A command assumes that either way is open, so the open door belongs to freedom after all.
1. The choices Scripture addresses are ordinarily open. Scripture sets real alternatives before people in the ordinary run of their lives: "Therefore choose life" (Deuteronomy 30:19); "choose this day whom you will serve" (Joshua 24:15). In such choices the door is open, and the open door is freedom's ordinary mark (P1). 2. The commands show what is usual, not what freedom consists in. God is free and has no door open to evil (P1), and on the historic view Christ resisted temptation freely though he could not have sinned (P1). A definition of freedom that required an open door would take freedom from both. 3. What a command assumes is a separate question. It is the subject of an old principle, that "ought" implies "can": nobody can be obliged to do what he is unable to do. Whether that principle holds, and in what sense of "can," has its own argument. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Ought Implies Can: What a Command Presupposes
+ God may be praised for good he cannot fail to do, but blame is different. Nobody can fairly be blamed for what he could not have avoided, so wherever there is wrongdoing, the open door is back.
1. The strongest form of this objection says blame needs a better road. David Widerker, one of the case's sharpest critics, puts the principle in one sentence: "An agent is morally blameworthy for performing a given act A only if he could have avoided performing it." He presses it with a question for anyone who blames a man in Jones's position: what should he have done instead? If nothing else was open to him, the blame seems to have nowhere to land. Susan Wolf adds a subtler version: praise and blame are asymmetrical, meaning they answer to different conditions. Someone who does right for the right reasons deserves praise even if she could not have done otherwise, but someone who does wrong deserves blame only if she could have done right. This is a serious position held by serious philosophers, and it rests on one of the most widely shared instincts in ordinary life: we take back our blame the moment we learn that someone had no choice. 2. Every excuse names something that did the work. Look at what actually does the excusing when we take the blame back. - A friend misses your birthday dinner because her flight was cancelled. A guest knocks the wedding cake off its table because someone shoved him from behind. In each case you can point to what did it instead of them: the airline, the shove. - A man in Jones's position has nothing to point to. The only thing that shut his other road was a device that never did anything, and a device that did nothing did none of his deciding. The case's inventor made this very point: a circumstance that played no part in bringing an act about gives no reason to excuse it. - So the instinct is sound. The principle drawn from it is not. We take back blame when something other than the person settled what happened, not merely because a second road was closed. • One defender of free will calls the sound principle non-prevention: "An agent is morally responsible for an action only if nothing prevented the agent from doing otherwise." The airline and the shove prevented something. A device that never acts prevents nothing. 3. "What should he have done instead?" has a plain answer. He should not have done what he did. That "should" says that the deed was wrong and that it was his. It does not report that some second road lay open. - Think of Pilate. He should not have handed an innocent man over to be crucified, and Scripture counts it a sin of his own, though a lesser one than that of the man who delivered Jesus to him (John 19:11). If God, knowing what Pilate would freely do, placed him there on purpose (P5), the sin is no less Pilate's. - Whether every "ought" needs a "can" is an old question of its own (D14). It bears hardest on failures to act, and there the instinct is right: a man bound and gagged is not blamed for keeping silent, because the ropes, not he, settled his silence. Pilate's sin was not a silence he could not break. It was something he did, and what he did came from him. 4. Praise and blame answer to the same fact. The asymmetry has an odd result. Take two people shaped in the same way by the same kind of past. One chooses well and the other badly. On the asymmetry, the first is free and the second is not, so a person's freedom would come and go depending on how well he chose. The source view gives praise and blame a single ground: the deed came from the person, and whether it was good or evil decides which of the two it earns. - A football referee asks the same first question whether he is crediting a goal or calling a foul: whose foot was it? - The asymmetry rests on an account of freedom as the ability to act on good reasons, and that account has its own argument. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Ought Implies Can: What a Command Presupposes Philosophy / Free Will: Wanting What You Want to Want Is Not Enough: The Hierarchical and Reasons-Responsive Accounts
+ The Pilate case assumes middle knowledge, which many Christians and philosophers reject: before anyone chooses, nothing makes it true what he would freely do, so there is nothing for God to know.
1. This is the most pressed objection to middle knowledge. It is called the grounding objection, because it asks what grounds, or makes true, a claim about what a free creature would do. Before there was any Pilate, what made it true that Pilate, placed exactly where he was, would hand Jesus over? Robert Adams gave the objection its modern form in 1977, and William Hasker has pressed it since. Many Calvinists reject middle knowledge in the form the Pilate case needs, holding that God knows the future by decreeing it. So do open theists, who hold that free choices not yet made are not there to be known. It is a serious objection with serious answers. 2. Not every truth needs a thing to make it true. The demand behind the objection, that some existing thing must make every truth true, fails for truths everyone accepts. It is true that there have never been unicorns, and no existing thing makes that true. If the demand is loosened, so that a truth needs only some fact to make it true, then there is such a fact. What makes it true that Pilate would hand Jesus over is that, placed there, he would freely do it. 3. Neither conclusion rests on it. - C1 follows from what freedom is (P1) and from what an idle device does (P2), and Pilate appears in neither. - C2 follows from the fork, which covers every version of the case, with God in it or not (P3 through P5). - The reply to the strongest objection (D2) loses one of its cases and keeps its argument, since the difference between guaranteeing an outcome and causing it does not depend on middle knowledge. - So if middle knowledge failed, the Pilate case would fall and both conclusions would stand. Picture a trial in which one witness is thrown out on cross-examination. If the verdict never rested on him, it does not change when he steps down. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It Philosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding Objection

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