Wanting What You Want to Want Is Not Enough: The Hierarchical and Reasons-Responsive Accounts
(●)Wanting what you want to want, and answering to reasons, mark a free choice without making it free.
+Two men at a party are offered a cigarette, and both take it. The first has been trying to quit for a year. He hates the craving, he hates himself a little as he lights up, and if he could press a button and never want a cigarette again, he would press it. The second has no quarrel with himself at all. He likes smoking, he wants to be a smoker, and if you offered him the button he would laugh. Both men do the same thing, and most people sense at once that they are not doing it in the same way. The first is at war with himself. The second is at peace.
In 1971 the American philosopher Harry Frankfurt built an account of free will out of exactly that difference, and it changed the debate.
It begins with two levels of wanting. A first-order desire is a want for something: a cigarette, a drink, a promotion. A second-order desire is a want about one's own wants, and the first smoker has one, since he wants to stop wanting cigarettes. When a person wants a particular want to be the one that actually moves him, Frankfurt called that a second-order volition (volition is a formal word for an act of will). The first smoker has one of those as well. He wants his wish to quit, and not his craving, to be the want that wins.
A wanton, in Frankfurt's word, is a creature with no second-order volitions at all. Whatever want happens to be strongest wins, and he does not care which. Frankfurt counted animals and very young children as wantons, and perhaps some adults.
The first smoker is what Frankfurt called an unwilling addict. The want that moves him is the one he does not want to move him, and so he is, in Frankfurt's phrase, "a helpless bystander to the forces that move him."
The second smoker is a willing addict. He could not stop if he tried, but the craving that moves him is the one he wants to move him. So is he free? Frankfurt's answer comes in two halves. Strictly, he said, the man's will is not free, since the craving would move him whatever he wanted to want. Yet because it is the want he wants, he lights up "of his own free will," and he is responsible for it, though he could not have done otherwise.
The agreement between the want that moves a person and his wants about his wants is called mesh. On Frankfurt's account a person acts of his own free will, and can be held responsible, when his will meshes: when the want that moves him is the one he wants to move him. Freedom of the will, in his strictest sense, asks a little more. It asks that a person be free to have the will he wants. That is why the willing addict acts freely without having a free will. His will meshes, but the craving would move him whatever he wanted to want.
This is called the hierarchical account, after its levels of wants.
A generation later John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza built the other great modern account, and they built it on reasons rather than wants.
Their account turns on a distinction that is easiest to see in a driving lesson. Picture a training car with a second steering wheel on the instructor's side. The instructor wants the car to turn right at the corner, and if the student starts to turn left, he will take over and turn it right himself. As it happens, she turns right on her own, and his hands never leave his lap. Did she steer the car? Of course she did. Could she have turned left? Not really, since left was never on offer.
Fischer and Ravizza have names for the two kinds of control at work here. Regulative control is control over which of several ways things go: the power to take this road or that one. The student lacked it. Guidance control is the power to steer the road you do take, by your own way of weighing reasons. She had that. Responsibility, they hold, needs only the second.
What does guidance control take? On their account a person has it when his act comes from his own reasons-responsive way of deciding, and that asks two things of the way of deciding. It must be receptive to reasons, picking them up in a sensible, regular pattern. And it must be reactive to them, so that at least one good enough reason to act differently would have moved it. A man who takes a bribe, but would have refused it had he known a policeman was watching, is reactive in this sense: the bribe won, but a good enough reason would have turned him. Fischer and Ravizza call a way of deciding a mechanism, and one that is receptive and reactive in this way moderately reasons-responsive.
Guidance control needs one thing more. The way of deciding must be the person's own, a condition they call ownership. He makes it his own by taking responsibility for it, and a child grows into that over years, from the toddler who says "the cup fell" to the grown man who says "I dropped it." Taking responsibility, on their account, comes to three things:
- he sees himself as an agent, someone whose choices make a difference in the world, when he acts from that way of deciding;
- he sees himself as a fair target of praise and blame for doing so;
- and he holds both views based, in an appropriate way, on his evidence.
Both accounts also take a side in an old quarrel, and a row of dominoes shows what the quarrel is about. The first push and the spacing of the row are enough by themselves to bring down the last one. Determinism is the view that every choice is like that last domino: settled beforehand by prior conditions (the past and the laws of nature, or a decree of God) that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. God's decree is his eternal plan for all that happens.
Compatibilism is the view that a choice can be free even if determinism is true. Both accounts are compatibilist. Frankfurt held that his was neutral toward determinism: a person's being free to want what he wants to want could itself, he thought, be causally determined. Fischer and Ravizza call their view semicompatibilism, and the name tells you how much they claim. Traditional compatibilists held that two things survive determinism, responsibility and the ability to do otherwise alike. Fischer and Ravizza claim only the first: responsibility fits with determinism whether or not the ability to do otherwise does. That is where the "semi" comes from.
Both accounts see something true, and it is worth keeping. Each offers a test to put to a person who has just chosen. Does he want what he wants to want? Does he act from a way of deciding that answers to reasons, and that he has made his own? What they see is a set of marks, signs that ordinarily come with a free choice.
Everything turns on one word. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. A friend who knows you well can tell in advance that you will order the chocolate cake, and her knowing does not make you order it. You do. Even if it were certain that you would order the cake, the certainty would not make you order it either.
With that word in hand, freedom takes one sentence to define. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. He is then its source, the one it comes from, and defining freedom this way is called the source view. In the ordinary run of human choices, a free choice also carries the ordinary mark: the person could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was. It is the mark and not the definition, the way a fever is the usual sign of an infection without being what an infection is. Another way the choice could have gone, there for the taking, is called an open door.
Wanting what one wants to want, and answering to reasons, are marks of a free choice, present in the ordinary run of them. Neither is what makes a choice free, because both can be installed whole in a person from outside.
The difference between shaping a person and installing something in him whole is easiest to see side by side. A teacher who gives a boy a love of honesty shapes his wants without installing them whole. The boy still settles what he does with that love. A designer who builds a boy's every want and way of reasoning, in a world whose laws carry them to one choice, installs them whole. To install something in a person whole, then, is to put it there as part of a starting point that, carried forward by the laws of nature or by a decree of God, is enough by itself to make each of his choices go the way it goes. Knowing in advance how he will choose is not installing: knowledge and guarantees settle nothing.
One of the most discussed cases in the debate is built on exactly this. A man named Ernie is designed before he is conceived by a designer named Diana, in a world where everything that happens is fixed by what came before it. He grows up to want what he wants to want, and to do what she planned, down to the murder of a man named Jones. Call him the designed man.
That is where compatibilism, in its two best modern forms, goes wrong. It claims that mesh is enough, or that responsiveness to reasons, in a way of deciding a person has made his own, is enough. The accounts are right about what they add. They are wrong to leave out the source.
The argument is deductive: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. The premises work like a locked chain: if every link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. No premise has to be beyond all doubt. Each needs only to be more plausible than its denial. It runs in two chains. The first shows that a person can meet both tests without choosing freely (P1 through P4, C1). The second shows that the tests are marks of a free choice all the same (P5, C2).
Who holds what, on compatibilism:
- Support: Jonathan Edwards gave it its classic defense in 1754, and John Feinberg defends it today.
- Oppose: Thomas Reid answered views like Edwards's in 1788, and William Lane Craig argues against it today.
The argument that follows holds that wanting what one wants to want, and answering to reasons, are marks of a free choice and not what makes it free.
(P1)A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own.
+A free choice is one that comes from the chooser. The ability to have chosen otherwise usually comes with it, and it is freedom's mark rather than its meaning.
(1) A choice is free when it comes from the one who makes it.
- Ask what makes a choice someone's own, and the first answer that holds up is that it came from him. Nobody forced it, nobody designed it, and nothing before it made it go the way it went. He did, for reasons he had in mind.
- The reasons matter. A knee that jerks when the doctor taps it has nothing to say for itself. A man who gets up to leave a meeting can tell you why.
- A leading defender of free will puts the whole idea in one line: "what is critical to free will is not the ability to choose differently in identical circumstances but rather not being caused to do something by causes other than oneself."
- Take your own signature. What makes it yours is not that you could have signed another name. It is that your hand, guided by you, wrote it.
(2) The ability to choose otherwise is the ordinary mark, not the definition.
- In everyday life the quickest test of whether a choice was really a person's own is to ask whether he could have gone the other way. When a friend misses your wedding, you want to know whether he could have come.
- The test usually works, because in the ordinary run of choices the source and the mark travel together. If a man could have refused with everything before the choice held fixed, then nothing before it settled the choice for him.
- But the test runs in one direction only. A choice that nothing settled but the chooser can still have had only one road open.
- A defender of free will ranks the two this way: the ability to choose otherwise "is sufficient for libertarian freedom, while" being the source "is necessary."
• Libertarian freedom is the name for freedom understood as something determinism would rule out, and a libertarian, in this debate, is someone who holds that people have it. The word has nothing to do with politics.
• A thing is sufficient when it does the job by itself, and necessary when the job cannot be done without it. Rain is sufficient to wet a lawn but not necessary, since a sprinkler will do it too. Water is necessary, since nothing wets a lawn without it. In the quotation, the ability to choose otherwise is the rain and the source is the water.
- A doctor reads a fever the same way. She checks for one first because it is the usual sign of infection, and yet an infection without a fever is still an infection.
(3) A choice is not free when something else settles it.
- The clearest cases of unfreedom are the ones where something other than the person did the settling: the shove that knocks a guest into the wedding cake, the seizure that jerks a driver's hands on the wheel, the drug slipped into a drink.
- Aristotle, writing over two thousand years ago, called an act compulsory when "the moving principle is outside" the man, "being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting." By the moving principle he meant what sets the act going.
- Or take a puppet. Its strings may let it move in a hundred directions, and it is still not free, because whatever it does, the hand above it does.
Therefore, a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own.
(P2)A person's wants about his own wants can be installed whole by someone else.
+Everything the hierarchical account looks at is a fact about how a person's wants stand to one another right now. A designer who can install the wants whole can install how they stand.
(1) The account looks only at the shape of the will at the moment of choice.
- On the hierarchical account, what makes an act the person's own, done of his own free will, is the structure of his will: the want that moves him is the one he wants to move him. Nothing in the test asks where the wants came from.
- Its founder said as much. He held that a person's being free to want what he wants to want could itself be causally determined, and that this only looks like a paradox.
- Four years later he went further. How a person's actions, and his identification with the wants behind them, came to be caused has nothing to do, he held, with whether he acts freely or is responsible for them.
- A photograph has the same blind spot. Take a picture of a family at dinner, everyone smiling. It can tell you who is sitting where. It cannot tell you whether the photographer arranged the smiles a moment before.
(2) Two men can share the same shape and differ in everything that matters.
- Picture a man who fought his drinking for ten years, relapsed, fought again, and finally came to want to be sober with his whole heart. Now picture a second man, a heavy drinker until last night, whom a neuroscientist rewired while he slept, so that this morning he wants to be sober with his whole heart. At breakfast the two are the same: each wants what he wants to want.
- Philosophers call this the ahistorical problem, ahistorical meaning blind to history. A test that looks only at the present shape of the will cannot tell the reformed man from the rewired one.
- The account's critics have pressed the point with cases of just this kind, among them a professor whose values are secretly implanted to match a colleague's.
- The best-known answer adds a history condition: a person's values count as his own only if they did not come about in ways that bypassed his own capacities to govern his mind. That answer is itself the admission. The shape was never enough.
- It is like two paintings hung side by side, one by the master and one a flawless forgery. You cannot tell them apart by looking. Everything that matters about them is in their history.
(3) A higher want is one more want that can be given like any other.
- The hierarchical account was met almost at once with a question it has never shaken off. Why should a want about my wants speak for me any more than the wants it rules over? It is one more want. If it needs a third level to endorse it, the third needs a fourth.
• This is called the regress: a chain of explanations in which each step needs another behind it, and none ever finishes the job.
- The repairs move the weight elsewhere:
• to what a person values, rather than what he merely wants;
• to his standing policies;
• to his wholehearted commitment;
• to his wish to make sense of himself.
- Each repair is a real improvement. Each is still a fact about his mind that could be put there by someone else.
- So a designer who can install a craving can install the want to have it, the value that approves it and the policy that protects it. Diana does exactly this with Ernie (●). He grows up to want what he wants to want, and to do what she planned. That is installing whole: the starting point she chose, carried forward by the laws, fixes every want and every choice to come.
- Picture a bank vault with three locks. Add a fourth and a fifth, and the vault is no safer if one stranger cut every key.
Therefore, a person's wants about his own wants, like any of his wants, can be installed whole by someone else.
(P3)A way of answering to reasons, and a person's taking responsibility for it, can be installed whole by someone else.
+The reasons-responsive account is the stronger of the two. Yet every feature it describes is one a designer could install whole.
(1) The account asks the right questions about a way of deciding.
- It asks whether a person's way of deciding picks up reasons in a sensible pattern, and whether it would respond to a good enough reason to act differently. That catches the cases the older accounts missed. A man whose phobia would keep him indoors even if his house were on fire is not deciding in a way that answers to reasons, and so he is excused.
- It adds an ownership condition: the way of deciding must be the person's own. He makes it his own by taking responsibility for it over time, coming to see himself as an agent and as fairly praised and blamed for what he does from it.
- It rightly grants that responsibility does not require regulative control, the ability to do otherwise. The training car is a case in point (●). So is the famous neurosurgeon's case, in which someone stands ready to take over a person's choice and never has to. A defender of free will accepts the point with a version of his own.
- In his version a mad scientist has secretly fitted a man's brain with electrodes, ready to make him vote for one candidate if he goes into the booth to vote for the other. The man votes for the first candidate on his own, and the electrodes are never used. "Yet it was not within his power to do anything different!" the defender writes. And the vote is still his.
- In the case as told, though, a sliver of an alternative survives. The man could still have begun to lean the other way, though he could not have carried the other vote through. Philosophers call a sliver like that a flicker (D6).
- An experienced judge shows what the account gets right. What makes her rulings trustworthy is not that she might have ruled otherwise on a whim. It is that she weighs the evidence, and would rule differently if the evidence were different.
(2) Every one of those features can be installed whole.
- The standard reference work on free will says so plainly about the designed man: "we can easily imagine Diana creating Ernie so that his murdering Jones is a result not only of a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, but also a mechanism for which he has taken responsibility."
- The same goes for any account that ties freedom to reasons rather than wants. One influential version holds that a person is free when he can see what is true and good and act on it. A designer can build a man who sees what is true and good, or who is blind to it, and in either case the seeing, or the blindness, was hers.
- Or consider a chess computer. It weighs every move, answers to every threat, and would play differently if the position were different. It is as responsive to reasons as any grandmaster, and the way it weighs every move was built in by the people who made it.
(3) Taking responsibility can be installed with the rest.
- Taking responsibility is a set of beliefs a person holds about himself, formed over time, on the basis of his evidence. Beliefs and their evidence are exactly the sort of thing a designer who works from the start of a life can arrange.
- Diana does not need to reach in on the day of the murder. She chooses the zygote, the single fertilized cell his life grows from, and she chooses it with the whole life in view: the growing up, the reflection and the self-understanding included.
- Think of a novelist who gives her hero a hard childhood, a slow change of heart and a long night of soul-searching. All of it is real in the story, and she wrote every page.
Therefore, a way of answering to reasons, and a person's taking responsibility for it, can be installed whole by someone else.
(P4)Whoever installs another person's wants and reasons whole settles the choices made from them.
+When the wants, the reasons and the way of weighing them were installed whole, fixed from outside together with everything they would lead to, whoever installed them settles what the person does through them.
(1) A settling that runs through the chooser's mind is still a settling.
- The designed man settles nothing that Diana did not settle first. She settled his character, and through his character, every choice it would produce. That the settling runs through his wants and reasons does not make it his, any more than a letter becomes the postman's because it passed through his hands.
- The principle is old. In 1788 the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid wrote that if another being causes a man's will to come down as it does, "either by producing it immediately, or by means and instruments under his direction, then the determination is the act and deed of that being, and is solely imputable to him." To be imputable to someone is to be counted as his, to his credit or to his blame. The designed man's wants and reasons are such means and instruments.
- His deliberation is real, and his choice really came out of it. But which way it would come out was fixed before he was conceived. Even if he settles it too, in whatever sense a determined deliberation settles anything, it is still not a choice that nothing settles but him (P1).
- Most people who meet the case judge that he is not free, and many compatibilists share the verdict. So does the leading Reformed defender of compatibilism, though he gives a reason of his own (D8).
• Reformed theology is the Protestant tradition that runs back to John Calvin in the 1500s.
(2) Giving a person his character settles nothing unless the character is installed whole.
- Everyone's character came partly from outside, from genes, parents and a culture nobody chose. Being shaped is not being settled: a person shaped by a great deal he did not choose can still settle his choices himself, for reasons of his own.
- On the source view, God gives every person his nature, and he gives it without fixing what the person will do with it (D14).
- A designer in a world that is not determined, who built a man only likely to murder, would not have settled the murder either. The man would have.
- So not everything that comes from outside takes a choice away from the chooser. What takes it away is an installing that, carried forward by the laws or by a decree, is enough by itself to make the choice go the way it goes. Then whoever did the installing settled it.
- Compare a music teacher with a player piano. A teacher can drill a student for years and shape every phrase she plays, and what she plays tonight is still hers. The punched roll that drives a player piano leaves nothing to the piano. The music is fixed before a key goes down.
(3) Ownership installed whole is ownership in name only.
- The reasons-responsive account makes a way of deciding the person's own when he takes responsibility for it. But if the way of deciding and his taking responsibility were both installed whole, his ownership is, as one defender of free will puts it, "merely nominal," "grounded not in the agent's agency but in the determiner's agency and causal activity."
- In fairness to him, he makes the point first about reasoning, the weighing of arguments by which a person comes to his conclusions, and he limits it to beliefs a person reasons his way to, not what he simply sees or feels. It carries over to choices all the same, since the ownership condition he is answering was built for choices in the first place.
- He draws the lesson with a factory assembly line programmed by an engineer. The line sorts, assembles and inspects, and it answers to every signal it was built to answer to, yet nobody credits it with what it makes. "The responsibility lies with the engineer," the true source of what the line turns out, "not with the mechanism."
- What the accounts describe is a person who is the place where his choices happen. What freedom asks is a person who is the one who makes them: in that defender's words, "the active source of their evaluative judgments," and "not merely the passive locus where determined processes play out."
- Picture a house with the owner's name on the deed, where every room, every lock and every decision about the house was settled by someone else. The name is on the paper. The house is not his in any way that matters.
(4) Having a mind of one's own does not escape the point.
- The usual reply is that people are not puppets: they think, weigh reasons and know right from wrong, and a puppet does none of that. True, and beside the point. What makes a puppet a puppet is not that it lacks thoughts but that another settles what it does.
- A defender of free will points to a character from the Captain America films, Bucky Barnes, a soldier turned by his captors into an assassin who carries out their orders awake and thinking. He had intentions and a mind, "yet was still rightly called a puppet." His is the easy case, since his captors overrode his mind. Nobody touched the designed man's mind at all, and still another settled what he did.
- A stage hypnotist's subject shows the same thing. He crosses the stage and, asked why, gives reasons that sound perfectly sensible to him. His reasons are real, and the hypnotist settled them.
(5) When God installs a character whole, God settles the choices made from it.
- Christians who hold that God determines every choice answer that God is not Diana. He does not meddle with a character that belongs to someone else. He gives the character in the first place, and on their view a choice that flows from the character God gave is free.
- The same structure is older than the modern accounts. Jonathan Edwards, the New England pastor and theologian, held that the virtue or vice of a disposition, a lasting bent of character such as kindness or greed, "consists not in the origin or cause of these things, but in the nature of them." That is the hierarchical account's own claim: look at the shape of the will, not at where it came from.
- But look at what kind of difference separates God from Diana. It is a difference in who does the settling, not in whether the chooser settles his choice. God's rights over his creatures answer the question "may he?" They do not answer the question "is the creature the source?" If God installs a character whole, then God settles every choice through it, as Diana did through hers.
- Nor does it help that God works from a higher level than Diana, as the first cause of everything rather than one more cause alongside the others. A settling from a higher level is still a settling.
- Imagine a family business where the founder writes every employee's instructions. That he owns the company answers whether he may write them. It does not make the instructions the employees' own ideas.
Therefore, whoever installs another person's wants and reasons whole settles the choices made from them.
(C1)Therefore, a person can want what he wants to want, and answer to reasons, without choosing freely.
+A person can meet both tests and still not choose freely. He can have wants about his wants that were installed whole (P2), and a way of answering to reasons, owned as his own, that was installed whole (P3). One designer can install both in one man, as Diana does in Ernie. Whoever installed them settles the choices made from them (P4). And a choice settled by anyone other than the chooser is not one that nothing settles but him, so it is not free (P1).
- The designed man is a counterexample: a single case that breaks a general rule. To show that a key does not open every lock, you need only one lock it fails to open. He is that lock for both keys.
(1) What the tests leave out is the source.
- Both tests describe a person in whom a choice happens in the right way: through wants he endorses, through reasons he weighs. Neither asks whether he is the one who settles it. That is the one question the designed man fails.
- Watch a car that holds its lane, stops at every red light and signals every turn. You can tell it is being driven well. You cannot tell who is doing the driving.
(2) A shut door is not what makes the designed man unfree.
- What makes the designed man unfree is not that he could not have done otherwise. It is that someone else settled what he did. The ability to do otherwise is the ordinary mark of a free choice, not its definition (P1).
- Remember the puppet (P1). Its strings could pull it a hundred ways, so a shut door is not its trouble. The hand above it is.
- The accounts are right that responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise. That is the part of semicompatibilism worth keeping. Where they go wrong is in holding that mesh is enough, or that responsiveness to reasons, made one's own, is enough.
(3) The same holds for every refinement that looks at the person.
- The accounts have been refined many times over: values instead of desires, wholeheartedness, standing policies, a history of taking responsibility, a clear view of the true and the good. Every one of these is a fact about a person's mind or his past that a designer could install whole. None of them is the fact that the person himself settled his choice.
- Another kind of refinement looks past the person to his maker. It excuses the designed man because someone else planned him. But that moves the question from the man to his designer, and it meets trouble of its own. Suppose Diana had meant to build a surgeon, miscalculated, and built the very same zygote by mistake. Nothing in the man would change, and yet on this refinement he would suddenly be responsible (D5).
- A stage set built to look like a kitchen makes the point. The designer can add a working tap, a ticking clock and bread in the oven, and each detail makes it more convincing. None of them makes it anyone's home.
(P5)In the ordinary run of free choices, the chooser answers to reasons and wants what he wants to want.
+The two accounts are not wrong about what they notice. Free choices ordinarily have both features. Where one is missing, something other than the person is usually at work, pulling on the choice or, in the worst cases, settling it.
(1) A will divided against itself is a real kind of bondage.
- Paul describes the unwilling addict's condition from the inside: "For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate" (Romans 7:15). And he names the power at work against his own will: "Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells within me" (Romans 7:20).
- He describes the war in the members as well: "I see in my members another law waging war against the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members" (Romans 7:23). Christians have long disagreed over whether the "I" is a man under the law without the Spirit or a Christian still fighting the flesh. The picture of a will at war with itself stands on either reading.
- Paul does not disown what he does, though. Even the verse that names the power says "if I do what I do not want" (Romans 7:20), and the one doing it is Paul. Four verses later he grieves over himself, not over a stranger: "Wretched man that I am!" (Romans 7:24). The power pulls against what he wants to want, and the deeds are still his.
- The same struggle is in Galatians: "For the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and the desires of the Spirit are against the flesh, for these are opposed to each other, to keep you from doing the things you want to do" (Galatians 5:17).
- Anyone who has been on a diet at a birthday party knows the scene: a third slice, taken by someone who does not want to want it. Everyone knows the feeling of being pushed around by a part of oneself.
(2) A life run by whatever want is strongest is a kind of slavery.
- Jesus puts it bluntly: "everyone who practices sin is a slave to sin" (John 8:34). The wanton, turned by whichever craving is loudest and caring nothing which, is the plainest picture of that slavery.
- The slavery reaches further than the wanton, though. The man who hates his sin is a slave to it, and so is the man who loves it. And the slave still makes his own choices.
- The freedom Scripture prizes is not a will in one piece around anything at all. The willing addict's will is in one piece, around his craving. What Scripture prizes is a will set free from sin and given to righteousness: "having been set free from sin, have become slaves of righteousness" (Romans 6:18), and "So if the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed" (John 8:36).
- A ship with no one at the helm is turned by every wave. It moves all day and goes nowhere it chose.
(3) A choice deaf to reasons is usually not the chooser's doing.
- Some ways of deciding would ignore every reason: the phobia that keeps a man indoors even when his house is on fire, the compulsion that washes his hands a hundredth time. When we meet one, we rightly suspect that something other than the man is doing the deciding.
- God argues his case with his people as with those who can weigh it and turn: "Come now, let us reason together, says the Lord" (Isaiah 1:18).
- A thermostat stuck at ninety degrees does not answer to the temperature in the room, and nobody thinks it is choosing to be hot.
(4) The accounts' words are worth keeping.
- Wanton, unwilling addict, willing addict, mesh, guidance control and ownership name real features of human agents. Some of them are marks of bondage and some of freedom. A free choice ordinarily has mesh, guidance control and ownership. What it has besides them is a chooser who settles it.
- Go back to the two smokers at the party. The words say in a breath what most people sense at once: one is an unwilling addict, at war with himself, and the other a willing addict, at peace.
(5) Not every free choice has perfect mesh.
- A man can act against his own better judgment and still act freely. He knows he ought to call his mother tonight, he means to, and he turns on the game instead. Philosophers call this weakness of will.
- Scripture counts weakness of will as sin, not as an excuse: "whoever knows the right thing to do and fails to do it, for him it is sin" (James 4:17). So mesh is a usual mark of a free choice, not a requirement in every case.
- Answering to reasons goes deeper. Even the weak-willed man answers to reasons, since word that his mother had been rushed to the hospital would have had him on the phone at once.
- Nearly all libertarians hold that every free choice answers to reasons, since a free choice is made for reasons of the chooser's own (P1). The quarrel is over whether that is enough (C1).
Therefore, in the ordinary run of free choices, the chooser answers to reasons and wants what he wants to want.
(C2)Therefore, wanting what you want to want, and answering to reasons, mark a free choice without making it free.
+Both features are marks of a free choice. Neither is what makes it free. A free choice ordinarily has both (P5), and yet a person can have both without choosing freely (C1). A feature that ordinarily comes with a thing, and can also be present without it, is a mark of the thing and not what makes it what it is.
- A mark is a sign that ordinarily goes with a thing, the way smoke goes with fire, and is not the thing itself. A fog machine at a concert makes smoke with no fire at all.
(1) The marks are good evidence, not proof.
- In the ordinary case, when a person acts wholeheartedly on reasons he weighs, we are right to count the act his own. Courts and friends and churches are right to judge by the marks.
- What the marks cannot do is decide the hard cases, where someone else built the mind that shows them.
- Caller ID works the same way. When your mother's name lights up on the phone, it is ordinarily your mother calling, and you are right to answer expecting her. A scammer can make the same name light up, and the voice on the line is not hers.
(2) None of the three marks is what freedom is.
- There are three marks in all: the ability to have chosen otherwise, mesh, and answering to reasons.
- The ability to have chosen otherwise is the ordinary mark of a free choice (P1). When it is really there, with everything before the choice as it was, it shows that nothing before the choice settled it.
- Mesh and answering to reasons show less. They show that the choice came through the person in the right way, through wants he endorses and reasons he weighs. A designer can arrange that much (C1).
- The two differ from each other as well. Answering to reasons is something nearly every libertarian requires, since a free choice is made for reasons (P5). Mesh is only the usual case, since the weak-willed man acts freely against it (P5).
- What freedom is, in every case, is a chooser who settles his choice for reasons of his own.
- Think of a family away on vacation. The lights come on at seven on a timer, the car sits in the driveway, and a neighbor takes in the mail. Each is a good sign that someone is home, and none of them is someone being home.
(3) The accounts are right as far as they go, and wrong about what they leave out.
- What they add is a real understanding of inner bondage, of addiction and compulsion, of the divided will Scripture describes. What they leave out is the one fact the designed man lacks: that he himself settles what he chooses.
- Picture a doctor who can describe every symptom of a disease with perfect accuracy, and has not yet found its cause. Her description is valuable. The patient still needs the cause.
On the hierarchical account:
Bratman, Michael E. Structures of Agency: Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Frankfurt, Harry G. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (1969): 829-839.
Frankfurt, Harry G. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 (1971): 5-20.
Frankfurt, Harry G. "Identification and Wholeheartedness." In Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, edited by Ferdinand Schoeman, 27-45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Frankfurt, Harry G. "Three Concepts of Free Action." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 49 (1975): 113-125.
Mele, Alfred R. Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Chapters 9-10.
Velleman, J. David. "What Happens When Someone Acts?" Mind 101, no. 403 (1992): 461-481.
Watson, Gary. "Free Agency." Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 8 (1975): 205-220.
On the reasons-responsive account:
Fischer, John Martin. "Compatibilism." In John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom and Manuel Vargas, Four Views on Free Will. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007.
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Wolf, Susan. "Asymmetrical Freedom." Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 3 (1980): 151-166.
Wolf, Susan. Freedom Within Reason. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Wolf, Susan. "Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility." In Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, edited by Ferdinand Schoeman, 46-62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
On the manipulation argument:
Fischer, John Martin. "The Zygote Argument Remixed." Analysis 71, no. 2 (2011): 267-272.
McKenna, Michael. "A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77, no. 1 (2008): 142-159.
Mele, Alfred R. Free Will and Luck. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Sartorio, Carolina. Causation and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
On freedom defined by its source:
Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013.
O'Connor, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. "Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2022. Section 2.4.
Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Pages 38-39, 416-417, 580 and 613-619.
Critic sources engaged:
Bignon, Guillaume. "A Critical Review and Fairly Comprehensive Refutation of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism." December 2020. Pages 21-33.
Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018. Pages 36-40.
Dennett, Daniel C. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984.
Edwards, Jonathan. Freedom of the Will. 1754. Part I, sections 2 and 5, and Part IV, section 1.
Helm, Paul. Reforming Free Will: A Conversation on the History of Reformed Views on Compatibilism (1500-1800). Fearn: Mentor, 2020.
Preciado, Michael Patrick. A Reformed View of Freedom: The Compatibility of Guidance Control and Reformed Theology. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2019.
Strawson, P. F. "Freedom and Resentment." Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962): 1-25.
On the Reformed scholastics:
Asselt, Willem J. van, J. Martin Bac, and Roelf T. te Velde, eds. Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010.
Muller, Richard A. Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017.
Historical sources:
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics III.1. Translated by W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908.
Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Edinburgh, 1788. Essay IV.
Biblical citations:
Ecclesiastes 7:29; Isaiah 1:18; Jeremiah 13:23; Matthew 12:33-36; Luke 12:47-48; John 8:34-36; Romans 6:16-18; Romans 7:15-25; Galatians 5:17; James 4:17.
+These accounts were never meant to find some deep metaphysical freedom. They describe what "free" means in courts and ordinary life, and the demand for an ultimate source asks for something the word never meant.
The strongest form of this objection comes from two philosophers, P. F. Strawson and Daniel Dennett.
Strawson argued that our practice of holding one another responsible needs no metaphysical foundation at all, that is, no theory of what freedom ultimately is. The practice runs on what he called reactive attitudes, the feelings we have toward people for how they treat us and others: resentment at someone who wrongs us, gratitude to someone who helps us, indignation at someone who wrongs another. It is part of the web of human relationships, he held, and it would survive any discovery about determinism.
Dennett argued that the free will worth wanting is the kind the compatibilist accounts describe: the capacity to deliberate, to respond to reasons and to control oneself. The libertarian's source, on his view, is a free will nobody needs. The cases that make determinism look frightening, the puppeteer and the scheming brain surgeon among them, he called bugbears, an old word for the imaginary monsters used to frighten children. An ordinary determined world has no controller in it, he argued, so a story that adds one proves nothing about ordinary life.
1. Ordinary life does use the marks.
Grant the observation. Courts, parents and friends judge by the marks: whether a person was acting on reasons, whether he was himself (P5, C2). They ask what he knew as well. In nearly every case that is all they need.
2. Ordinary excuses name what did the settling.
But look at the cases where ordinary judgment takes blame back. Each excuse points to something other than the person, something that did the work:
- the shove that sent the guest into the cake;
- the seizure at the wheel;
- the drug slipped into a drink;
- the brain tumor that changed a gentle man's character in a year.
In some of these the marks are intact. The man with the tumor may want what he wants to want, and weigh his reasons as carefully as he ever did. What excuses him is that something other than him, the tumor, settled what he did. The ordinary concept already contains the condition the accounts leave out.
- Even the accounts' own history shows it. The first question put to the hierarchical account was whether a want about a want really speaks for the person (P2). That is the ordinary question, "but was it really him?", turned on the theory.
3. Strawson's own exemptions go beyond the marks.
Resentment is the right response to someone who wronged you. Once you learn that another person did the settling, the resentment moves to that person. Strawson's own list of exemptions, the cases in which we set resentment aside, includes a man acting under a hypnotist's suggestion and a man whose mind has been systematically corrupted. Neither need be missing a mark. The hypnotized man can want what he wants to want while the suggestion holds, and the corrupted mind can weigh reasons with care.
- Strawson explains such cases by the man's condition: for the moment he is not himself, or he has been warped until he is unfit for ordinary dealings with other people. The source view explains them too. The hypnotist settled what the first man did, and the second is excused so far as someone else settled his mind for him and so far as he could not see what was wrong with it (D7).
- Only the source view's explanation reaches the designed man. He is himself, as sane and as fit for ordinary dealings as his neighbors, and someone else still settled what he did.
- Suppose a guest insults you at a party, and then you learn that a stage hypnotist put the words in his mouth. Your resentment crosses the room to the hypnotist.
4. The designed man shows what more there is to want.
Most people who hear the story of the man designed before he was conceived judge that he is not free, whatever marks he shows. That judgment is not a philosopher's invention. It is the ordinary concept, applied to a case the courts have never seen.
- Dennett himself counts being controlled by another agent as a real loss, which is why his bugbears frighten anyone. The designed man shows that the loss needs no controller at work. Take the designer out of the story, and the starting point and the laws still did all the settling, with nothing in the man changed.
- Think of a jury told that a defendant's every choice, down to the crime, was built into him before he was born by a hidden scientist. The jury's anger would move to the scientist, and it would not stay with the man she built.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It MattersPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+How a person came by his will does not matter. If he wants what he wants to want and acts on reasons, he is free and responsible, and the designed man is no exception.
This is the hard line, which answers the designed man by biting the bullet: accepting the hard verdict, that he is responsible, rather than giving up the theory. The soft line, by contrast, grants the verdict most people reach, that he is not responsible, and looks for some difference, in the man's history or in his designer, that excuses him without excusing an ordinary determined man (D5).
Frankfurt held the hard line outright. How a person's actions, and his identification with the wants behind them, came to be caused has nothing to do, he argued, with whether he acts freely and is responsible for them. Its defenders today press it in three ways.
- The designer manipulates no one, since there is no one yet to manipulate. Making a person in a determined world differs from the laws' making him only in having a planner. John Martin Fischer takes this line on the zygote case, as the story of Diana and Ernie is known. He still excuses a man whose way of deciding is replaced in middle age, since that man never took responsibility for the new one.
- Run the cases backward. Michael McKenna starts from an ordinary determined man, whom compatibilists hold responsible, and walks back a step at a time to the designed man, finding no step at which responsibility is lost.
- Look at the actual sequence, the way the choice really came about, as opposed to what would have happened had things gone differently. In the neurosurgeon's case (P3) the actual sequence is the man voting on his own, and the electrodes belong to a sequence that never happened. Carolina Sartorio holds that freedom turns on the actual causes of an act. In the designed man's actual sequence, his own sensitivity to reasons did the work.
The verdict against the designed man, the hard-liners add, is a reaction to the villain in the story, not to anything in him.
1. The hard line pays for its consistency.
It is honest about its cost. To hold it, one must give up the judgment that the designed man is not responsible for the murder Diana planned. Most people who meet the case share that judgment. So do the compatibilists who take the soft line, and so does the leading Reformed compatibilist. A theory that has to overturn the clearest verdict in the debate needs a reason stronger than the theory itself.
- Picture a bathroom scale that says a grown man weighs nine pounds. Nobody believes the scale over what they can see, not without a far better reason than the scale's own reading.
2. Taking away the villain changes nothing in the man.
The hard-liners have a point about first reactions: a villain in a story can sway them. So the verdict that counts is the one that survives a second look.
- Take Diana's wish away and keep everything else, as when she miscalculates and builds the same zygote by mistake. Nothing in the man changes. He is still the product of a starting point he never chose, carried forward by the laws to every choice he makes.
- So the verdict survives the second look. It never rested on the villain's wish, because the starting point and the laws still did all the settling.
- Anyone whose verdict vanishes with the wish has made the man's freedom wait on a stranger's arithmetic, on whether Diana got her sums right (D5).
- Think of a trap set on purpose and the same trap left by accident. The animal is caught just the same.
3. Sharing the blame is not the question.
Frankfurt allowed that if another person had deliberately led the willing addict into his addiction, both may be fully responsible.
- Where the other only led him, the source view agrees. Blame is not a fixed amount that the planner's share uses up: a hired killer and the man who hired him both answer in full.
- The designed man was not led. His wants, his want to have them and his way of reasoning were installed whole. The question then is not how to divide the blame but whether any of it was his to begin with.
- Consider a forged will, written by the heir in the dead man's handwriting. The document looks the same either way. Whether it is the dead man's will depends entirely on who wrote it.
4. Making a man is not leaving him alone.
Call it making rather than manipulating, and nothing changes. Diana chose a starting point that, carried forward by the laws, fixed every choice the man would make. She did not need to reach in on the day of the murder, because the murder was already in the zygote.
- The actual sequence is the right place to look. Traced all the way back, it reaches her workbench: every step fixed by the step before it, back through the man's weighing and deciding to the zygote she built.
- A man who sets up a row of dominoes, taps the first one and walks out of the room never touches the last domino. He does not need to.
5. The walk back starts from the case in dispute.
The ordinary man we confidently blame is the neighbor who lies about the fence. Our confidence about him does not come labeled "and every choice he makes was fixed before he was born." Spell that out, and whether he is responsible is exactly what is being argued. The verdict on the designed man, by contrast, is shared across the lines of the debate. When two chains of reasoning collide, the one that starts from the clearer case deserves more trust.
- Think of two surveyors who disagree about where a boundary runs. One measures from a marker everyone accepts. The other measures from the very line in dispute.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+The regress stops at wholehearted commitment. When a person decisively identifies with a want, with no reservation left in him, the question of further levels no longer arises.
This is Frankfurt's own answer to the regress (P2). A person who decides, without reservation, which of his wants shall be his will has closed the question. His decision, he wrote, resounds through all the higher levels, so no fourth or fifth want is needed.
1. The answer stops the regress of wants.
Grant it. A decisive commitment is not one more want in line. It is the person making up his mind, and that is a real improvement on a mere stack of desires.
2. A decision can be installed whole like anything else.
But a wholehearted commitment is still an event in a person's mind. A designer who can build the wants can build the decision to stand behind them, and the man will feel it as the most personal thing about him. Wholeheartedness is a fact about how a mind is arranged. The question is who arranged it.
- Picture a soldier programmed to love his country with all his heart. His devotion is sincere and complete, and his programmers settled it.
3. What the answer points to is the source.
The answer is right that what ends the regress is the person himself deciding. That is the source view's claim. It asks only that the decision be his in fact, not just in feeling: settled by him, not by whoever built him.
+What a person values, not what he merely wants, is his own. Gary Watson showed that free agency is acting on one's values, and a man who acts on his considered judgment of what is best is free.
1. Values are a real advance on wants.
Watson's account was a genuine improvement. He distinguished two systems in a person. His valuational system is his considered judgments about what is worth doing, all things considered. His motivational system is whatever actually moves him to act. A free agent, on Watson's account, is one whose motivational system follows his valuational system, so that what moves him is what he judges best. That explains the unfreedom of the addict and the compulsive better than a stack of wants does, since they are moved by what they themselves judge not worth doing.
- Take a man who judges his health worth more than a cigarette, and wants one anyway. The judgment belongs to his valuational system and the craving to his motivational one. On Watson's account he acts freely only when the judgment wins.
2. Values can be installed too.
A child raised by a cruel father to admire cruelty grows up valuing it, acts on his values, and passes Watson's test. Philosophers have discussed exactly this case (D7). A dictator's son is raised to share his father's values and acts on them wholeheartedly, and yet he seems to deserve blame less than an ordinary tyrant, because he could not see that his values were wrong.
- A family recipe handed down three generations makes the same point. The cook follows it faithfully and loves it, and nobody thinks she invented it.
3. The question returns one level up.
Where did the values come from, and who settled them? If someone else installed them whole, then the person's acting on them is someone else's settling carried through (P4).
+History conditions solve the problem. A person is free only if his values, and his taking responsibility for his way of deciding, came about through his own reflection and not through manipulation.
1. The history condition is an admission.
Adding a history condition concedes that the present shape of the will was never enough (P2). A test that must look back at how the will was formed has already agreed that where a will comes from matters.
2. Diana can install the history.
The standard reference work says plainly that a designer can build a man whose act comes from a reasons-responsive mechanism for which he has taken responsibility (P3). The same holds for any condition about the history inside a life: reflection, self-endorsement, slow growth. A designer who works from the zygote writes the whole story, the history included.
- Think of the novelist again. She can give her hero a slow change of heart as easily as a sudden one.
3. A clause against manipulation has to say what it rules out.
Some history conditions simply add that a person's values must not have come from manipulation. But what counts as manipulation?
- If it means going around a person's mind, Diana goes around nothing. She builds the mind, and it does all its own work (P3).
- If it means being planned by another person, the condition has stopped looking at the man and started looking at his designer.
- Then take the plan away. Suppose Diana wanted a surgeon, miscalculated, and built the very same zygote by mistake. Nothing in the man changes, and yet on this condition he is suddenly responsible. His freedom would wait on a stranger's arithmetic.
4. The only history that helps is one the person settled.
The history condition gets its force from the thought that a person's past choices, made by him, stand behind his present character.
- The source view agrees that such a history makes a character more fully his own. It does not make a history of that kind a condition of freedom, though. What it asks is that the chooser settle this choice himself (D11).
- And the history helps only if the person settled those earlier choices himself. If something else settled those too, the history is one more thing installed.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+Frankfurt showed that responsibility does not need the ability to do otherwise. With that gone, the libertarian has lost his main ground, and the compatibilist accounts are all that is left.
1. The source view never stood on that ground.
The source view grants the point. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own (P1). The ability to have chosen otherwise is its ordinary mark and not its definition.
- A leading defender of free will accepts the neurosurgeon's case in just these terms: "I'm persuaded by illustrations like that given by Harry Frankfurt to show that freedom does not require the ability to choose other than as one does."
- Whether the case fully succeeds is still argued, because of the flicker (P3): in the case as told, the man could still have begun to lean the other way before the device stepped in. The source view stands either way.
2. Losing the open door leaves the source standing.
The neurosurgeon's case removes an alternative. It does not add a settler. The voter in that case settles his vote himself, and the device never acts.
- Someone could retell the case so that the voter was determined all along. But then the case would simply assume that a determined choice can be free, which is the very thing in dispute.
- What the compatibilist needs is a case where someone else settles the choice and the person is still free. The designed man is the case that shows the opposite.
3. The accounts inherit the source question.
So the accounts are not all that is left. What is left is the question the accounts do not ask: whether the chooser settles his choice.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door
+Susan Wolf showed that praise and blame are asymmetrical. Someone who does right for the right reasons deserves praise even if she could not have done otherwise, but blame needs the ability to have done right, so the dictator's son is not to blame.
The strongest form of this objection is Wolf's Reason View. What matters for freedom, on her account, is the ability to see what is true and good and act on it. A person who does right because she sees that it is right is free and praiseworthy even if nothing else was possible for her. A person who does wrong is blameworthy only if she could have seen and done what was right.
Her case is JoJo, the son of a cruel dictator, raised to share his father's values. He acts on values he fully endorses. Yet it seems wrong to blame him as we blame an ordinary tyrant, because he could not see that his values were wrong.
1. The praise half is right that praise needs no open door.
Grant it. A person who does good because she sees that it is good deserves praise whether or not she could have done otherwise. God's freedom shows it, since God cannot do evil and is praised for his goodness.
2. The blame half asks for an open door that blame does not need.
Praise and blame answer to the same fact: whether the deed came from the person. The principle for blame is non-prevention, in one defender's words: "An agent is morally responsible for an action only if nothing prevented the agent from doing otherwise." To be prevented is for something to do the stopping, there and then. A lock that never has to stop anyone prevents nothing, and blame does not wait on it.
- Think of a man who stays in a room to finish a conversation he is enjoying, not knowing that the door swung shut and latched behind him. The latch never has to stop him, so it prevents nothing. He stays because he chooses to.
- Or take a football referee. He asks the same first question whether he is crediting a goal or calling a foul: whose foot was it?
- Now take every other option away from a person. On the asymmetry, a good deed he then does stays fully praiseworthy, while a bad one is excused. So whether he had control enough to answer for what he did would depend on whether what he did was good. The asymmetry ties a person's control to how well he used it.
3. JoJo's excuse is not a missing door.
So far as JoJo is excused, two things do the excusing, and neither is a missing door.
- The first is knowledge. Responsibility has a knowledge condition (what did he know?) as well as a control condition (was it up to him?). A man raised never to see that cruelty is wrong knows less than an ordinary tyrant. Scripture grades blame the same way: the servant who knew his master's will and did not do it "will receive a severe beating," the one who did not know, "a light beating" (Luke 12:47-48).
- The second is that his values came from another will. So far as his father installed JoJo's values whole, and through them his acts, his father did the settling (P4). So far as the upbringing only shaped him, as every upbringing shapes a child, JoJo settled his own acts and answers for them, with a share lightened by what he could not know.
- Think of a boy taught by his father to cheat at cards before he could read. We hold the father far more to blame, and we hold the boy less to blame the less he could know, not because a door was shut.
4. The Reason View leaves out the source on both sides.
What makes the praise half right is not simply that a good agent tracks the Good, keeping in step with what is truly good. It is that nothing settles her tracking of it but her. God shows that best, since there is nothing outside him to do the settling.
- Build a man to see the Good and act on it, installing the sight in him whole, and he tracks the Good the way the chess computer plays chess (P3): flawlessly, and to his builder's credit. The same holds for a man built blind to it.
- Whether a person tracks the Good or fails to, the question the Reason View leaves open is who settled it.
- A compass that always points north makes the point. It tracks the truth about direction perfectly, and nobody praises the compass. The credit goes to whoever magnetized the needle.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open DoorPhilosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God
+A responsible choice is one made from the character God gave. A manipulator meddles with a character that is not his, but God gives it, and the tree is known by its fruit.
The strongest form of this objection is the Reformed one. A leading Reformed philosopher holds that a choice is responsible when it is made "on the basis of that person's God-given character and desires." Manipulation excuses, on his view, because it meddles with a God-given character, and God himself never does that: "self-evidently, God is the giver of that which is God-given."
Jesus seems to say the same: "Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad, for the tree is known by its fruit" (Matthew 12:33).
1. A test about the installer is a test of something else.
The proposal locates freedom in a fact about who installed a character, not in anything about the person who has it. Picture two men, one designed by Diana and one by God, identical in every thought and want. They differ only in their designer. If one is free and the other is not, what makes the difference is the designer's standing, and a fact about the designer's standing is a fact about the designer.
- God's rights over his creatures answer the question "may he?" They do not answer the question "is the creature the source?"
- The same philosopher grants that if God does not exist he finds it very hard to think of a relevant difference between manipulation and ordinary determined choice. The difference he relies on is God's right to give, and that answers only "may he?"
2. The fruit reveals the tree, not its planter.
Jesus' saying is about how to know a person, by what he does: "For out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks" (Matthew 12:34). It says the fruit reveals the tree. It says nothing about who settles what the tree bears. And it is spoken to people Jesus holds responsible for the kind of trees they are.
- Earlier in the same verse Jesus asks, "How can you speak good, when you are evil?" (Matthew 12:34). That is the kind of inability Jeremiah describes with the leopard's spots (D12), and Jesus holds the speakers to account all the same: "on the day of judgment people will give account for every careless word they speak" (Matthew 12:36).
- Think of an orchard. The fruit tells you what kind of tree you are looking at. It does not tell you whether the gardener grafted every branch.
3. Jonathan Edwards's older version meets the same answer.
Edwards held that virtue lies in the nature of a disposition, "not in the origin or cause" of it. That is true of the disposition's goodness: a kind heart is kind wherever it came from. But where the disposition came from does matter to whether the person settled the choices that flow from it. That is the question freedom asks.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated OnePhilosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin
+Reformed theology can take guidance control on board. Michael Preciado showed that the reasons-responsive account fits the Reformed doctrine of providence, so a person can be free and responsible while God determines everything.
1. The fit is real.
Grant it. Nothing in the reasons-responsive account requires that anything be left undetermined. So it fits a doctrine of providence (God's governing of everything that happens) on which God settles every choice, just as neatly as it fits a doctrine on which the laws of nature do. That is exactly why it is compatibilist.
2. The fit carries the ownership problem with it.
If God's decree installs the way of deciding whole, and the person's taking responsibility for it, then the ownership the account relies on is ownership in name only, grounded in the determiner's agency and not the agent's (P4). The assembly line runs perfectly, and it is still the engineer's.
- Picture an actor delivering lines with every appearance of spontaneity. The audience believes him, and the playwright wrote every word.
3. The source question comes back in theological form.
Reformed guidance control faces the question the designed man raised, with God in Diana's place. It answers that God has the right to give. That answers "may he?", not "is the creature the source?" (D8).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of SinPhilosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free
+The Reformed tradition always held that the will follows the intellect's judgment. A will that necessarily follows its own best judgment is free, and God's own will follows his perfect judgment.
Another leading Reformed philosopher reads the Reformed theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as holding that once the practical intellect, the mind as it judges what to do, has judged between options, the will necessarily follows the judgment. That is a reasons-responsive account in older dress: the will is free because it follows the person's own judgment of what is best.
Historians of Reformed thought dispute that reading. A number of them read the same theologians as holding that the will, at the moment of choice, could have chosen otherwise. Nothing in the answer turns on who is right about the history.
1. A will that follows its own judgment is not thereby unfree.
Grant the core of it. God's will follows his perfect judgment, and as one defender of free will writes, "God cannot choose to do evil, yet He freely does the Good because nothing outside Him determines Him to do so." A will that follows a judgment the person himself arrived at, with nothing outside him settling it, is as free as a will can be.
2. It fails only where the judgment was settled by something else.
The trouble starts one step back. If the judgment itself was settled beforehand, by a decree or by the past and the laws, then the will follows a judgment something or someone else settled, and the choice is settled with it. The account does not fail because the will follows the intellect. It fails where the intellect's judgment was settled by something or someone else.
- Think of a pilot who flies exactly by her instruments. That is good flying, until you learn that someone else set the instruments to take her where he wanted.
3. Reasons explain a free choice without settling it.
A person's reasons are what he acts on, and he is the one who acts on them. That his will follows his judgment says what the choice was for. It does not say that something other than the chooser settled it.
- Why, then, is a choice made for reasons not settled by the reasons? Because the agent himself is the cause of his choices, and that is also what explains how judgment and will fit together in a free choice (D15).
- A doctor who follows her own diagnosis is a good picture of it. The diagnosis explains the treatment she chooses, and she is still the one who chooses it.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the ChoicePhilosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation
+Asking where a will came from leads nowhere. If a good act counts only when it comes from a good cause in the person, that cause needs a good cause too, and the regress banishes virtue from the world.
Jonathan Edwards pressed this against the libertarians of his day. If the viciousness of an act, its being wicked, lies not in its nature but in its cause, he argued, then "we must drive faultiness back from step to step, from a lower cause to a higher, in infinitum; and that is thoroughly to banish it from the world." In infinitum is Latin for "to infinity."
1. The source view asks for no chain of good causes.
The regress bites only if every responsible choice must be caused by an earlier responsible choice. The source view asks something different: that the chooser settle this choice, now, for reasons of his own. It does not ask him to have made himself first.
- Edwards is right that the badness of a cruel act lies in what it is. Whether it is the man's to answer for lies in whether he settled it (D8).
- Think of a runner who wins a race. Nobody asks whether she chose her legs. They ask whether she ran.
2. The chooser is where the explanation stops.
Ask why a free person chose as he did, and the answer names him and his reasons. It does not need a further cause behind him, because a person who settles his own choice is where that line of explanation properly ends.
3. Edwards's view has a regress of its own.
If every choice follows the strongest motive, and every motive has a cause, then the explanation of every act runs back out of the person entirely, to the start of the world or the decree. That is the regress that leaves the person with nothing of his own to answer for.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation
+Scripture itself says character determines conduct: "Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots?" People act from the natures they have, and that is compatibilism.
1. The verse describes an inability the people brought on themselves.
Read to the end: "Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots? Then also you can do good who are accustomed to do evil" (Jeremiah 13:23). The inability belongs to people "accustomed to do evil," and they grew accustomed by doing it.
- Take a man who has lied for thirty years and can hardly tell the truth now. His inability is real, and it is his own doing.
2. Responsibility can run back to the choices that built a habit.
A person who ruined his own power to do good is responsible for what follows from the choices that ruined it. Philosophers call this derivative responsibility: responsibility for what follows from a choice a person himself settled. A drunk driver answers for the crash at eleven because his choice at eight, when he pocketed his keys and walked into the bar, made the crash likely.
3. Character explains conduct without settling it.
Jesus says, "The good person out of his good treasure brings forth good, and the evil person out of his evil treasure brings forth evil" (Matthew 12:35). A person's character explains what he does, and much of it he built himself, choice by choice. Explaining a choice is not settling it: a character that inclines a man one way still leaves the choice to him, unless it was installed whole (P4).
- Think of a man with a quick temper. Everyone who knows him expects him to snap when he is tired, and still, each time, he chooses whether to bite back the words.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will
+The argument wins by a word. On the compatibilist's reading a man who deliberates settles his own choice, and (P4) comes out true only on a reading of "settle" that assumes what is in dispute.
1. The charge would be fatal if it were true.
An equivocation is a word that changes its meaning partway through an argument, so that each premise is true in a different sense and the chain between them breaks. "A crow's feather is light. Whatever is light is not dark. So a crow's feather is not dark." If "settle" meant one thing in (P1) and another in (P4), the chain would break in just that way, and the charge deserves a straight answer.
2. "Settle" keeps one meaning throughout.
To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes (●). (P1) and (P4) both use the word in that sense, and the compatibilist can accept the sense as it stands.
- Grant him everything he says about the designed man. The man's deliberation was real, and his choice came out of it. It came out the way the zygote and the laws had already made it go.
- So even if the designed man settles his choice too, in whatever sense a determined deliberation settles anything, Diana settled it first. A choice she settled is not one that nothing settles but him (P1).
- Think of a jury whose every member was picked, and every opinion formed, by a man who wanted a particular verdict. They deliberate and vote for real, and the verdict came through their deliberation. It is still his verdict.
3. The source view rests on a verdict, not a definition.
Once the word's meaning is pinned down, the dispute moves to whether a choice someone else settled first can still be free (P1). There the source view does not win by defining anything. It points to a case. Most people who meet the designed man judge that he is not free, and among them are the compatibilists who take the soft line and the leading Reformed compatibilist (P4, D2). A verdict about a case is evidence. It does not beg the question, quietly assuming what it sets out to prove, just because it favors one side.
- The accounts themselves were built from verdicts about cases: the unwilling addict, and the man whose phobia no reason can move (P3). A method that counts such verdicts when they favor compatibilism has to count them when they do not.
4. The compatibilist's own hard cases use the same sense.
The compatibilist who takes the soft line holds that the values of the man rewired in his sleep are not yet his own (P2), though he deliberates from them as carefully as anyone. So he does not think a deliberation makes a choice the man's own whatever came before it. He looks to what came before, which is the source view's question asked about the past (D5).
- Picture a counterfeit banknote that passes through an honest cashier's hands. Her honesty is real, and it does not make the note genuine.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+"Installed whole" makes (P4) either empty or false. If it means installed so as to fix the choice, (P4) only restates determinism; if it means given entire, then God, who gave the first human beings their whole characters, settled their first sin.
1. "Whole" has only the first meaning.
The objection is a dilemma, an argument that offers two options, called its horns, and says each is fatal. But "whole" has one meaning wherever it carries weight in (P2) through (P4), and that meaning is laid down at the start (●). To install something in a person whole is to put it there as part of a starting point that, carried forward by the laws of nature or by a decree of God, is enough by itself to make each of his choices go the way it goes. "Given entire" was never the meaning. So the second horn attacks a sense of the word that (P2) through (P4) never use, and the first horn is the one to answer.
2. A premise that is plainly true is no fault.
Read with that meaning, (P4) is close to true by the meaning of its words, and a deductive argument could ask for nothing better in a premise. It still says more than that the choice was determined: it says who did the settling, which is what (P1) asks about. The real dispute lies elsewhere, over (P1) and over the verdict about the designed man that supports it (D13). Both are argued for rather than assumed.
- Think of a fire investigator. "The fire was started" and "the arsonist started the fire" can both be true of the same blaze, and only the second tells the court whom to charge.
3. A nature given is not a choice fixed.
Grant the fact the second horn points to. Every creature's nature is God's gift, and the first human beings came from God's hand with characters they had done nothing to form. But God gave them a nature and, with it, a power of choice whose use that nature did not fix, and they settled what they did with both: "God made man upright, but they have sought out many schemes" (Ecclesiastes 7:29).
- The difference lies in what a gift does, not in the giver's standing, where the Reformed reply looks (D8). A gift that, carried forward by the laws or by a decree, is enough by itself to make every choice go the way it goes settles them. A gift that leaves the choice to the one who has it settles nothing.
- On theological determinism, the view that God determines everything that happens, the decree fixes every choice. So God's giving of each character there is installing it whole, and (P4) applies to it as it applies to Diana.
- Think of a father who gives his son a car, the keys and years of driving lessons. Everything the son drives with came from his father, and where he drives tonight is still up to him.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free WillPhilosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin
+Take away a person's wants, reasons and ways of weighing them, and nothing is left to do the settling. The source view can only point at chance or at a ghostly second self behind the self.
1. One counterexample needs no rival theory.
(C1) shows by a single case that the tests are not enough. Showing that does not wait on a finished account of what would be enough. A locksmith can tell you a key does not fit without owning the one that does. So (C1) and (C2) stand even if the source view's own account of freedom were unfinished.
2. What is left is the person.
The source view adds no second self behind the wants. It says the person who has the wants and weighs the reasons causes the choice, for those reasons. That is agent causation: the agent himself, a persisting person and not merely his desires or brain states, is the cause of his actions, and his decisions are, in one defender's words, "done by the agent himself for reasons the agent has in mind."
- Think of a carpenter at her bench. Take away the saw, the plane and the plans, and you have not found a ghost hiding behind them. You have found the carpenter, who was using them all along.
3. Not settled beforehand is not the same as settled by chance.
A choice that nothing before it settled is not thereby settled by nothing. One defender of free will defines a free choice as "neither random nor determined by something or someone else."
- Imagine a friend deciding over supper whether to take a job in another city. Nothing earlier in the day fixed which way she would go, and when she decides, nobody calls it a coin toss. She had reasons on both sides, and she settled it.
- Whether that can be spelled out without sliding into luck is a serious question, and it has an answer of its own.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the ChoicePhilosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation