Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

Public Theology

Theological Analyses of Societal Issues

Theology of the Family

Where Faith and Family Intersect

Biographies

Notable Works & Great Quotes from Key Figures

Contemporary Voices

1960 AD – present

G. E. M. Anscombe of Limerick 1919 – 2001 AD

(●) A Catholic convert, Wittgenstein’s chosen translator, and the philosopher who told modern ethics it had lost its foundations. + Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe signed her work with her initials, and the philosophers who argued with her mostly called her Elizabeth. She smoked cigars, wore trousers to lecture when few women did, raised seven children in a cheerfully chaotic house, and was by common consent one of the sharpest minds of the twentieth century. She was also a convert who had read her own way to the Catholic faith as a schoolgirl and never treated her faith as something to keep out of the seminar room. She belongs on a Christian apologetics site for three reasons. In 1948 she took apart an argument in C. S. Lewis’s book Miracles, and Lewis, to his credit, rewrote the chapter; the episode is still misreported, and her own account of it is worth hearing. In 1958 she published a short essay arguing that modern moral philosophy was talking about "moral obligation" while having thrown away the only thing that could make sense of it, a divine lawgiver. And she spent a lifetime defending, in public and at real cost, the old Christian rule that it is never right to kill the innocent on purpose. One fact sums her up. When Oxford proposed in 1956 to give an honorary degree to Harry Truman, the president who had ordered the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, she stood up in Convocation, the university’s assembly of graduates, and opposed it, almost alone, because in her judgment he had ordered the deliberate killing of civilians.

(●) 1919 AD: Born in Limerick to an English family, she read her way toward the Catholic Church as a schoolgirl in London. + She was born on 18 March 1919 in Limerick, in Ireland, where her father, Allen Wells Anscombe, was serving with the British army. The family soon returned to England, and she grew up in south London, where her father taught science at Dulwich College and her mother, Gertrude Elizabeth, was a classical scholar who worked as a headmistress. The household was Church of England. Between about twelve and fifteen she read her way into Catholicism. Then, by her own later account, it was the reading she went on to do as a young convert that caught her for philosophy. A nineteenth-century Jesuit’s textbook of natural theology (natural theology is the part of philosophy that asks what reason alone can show about God) offered a proof that whatever comes about has a cause, and she found that the proof assumed what it set out to show, a little like a witness who proves he is honest by assuring you that he never lies. She could not accept it, and she could not let it go. In two or three years of effort, she remembered, she wrote five versions of a proof of her own, and her own later reflection refuted each one. The question of what a cause is would stay with her for the rest of her life (T4).

(●) 1937 AD: At Oxford she was received into the church, attacked the justice of Britain’s war, and married Peter Geach. + She went up to St Hugh’s College, Oxford, in 1937 to read Greats, the Oxford course in Greek and Latin literature, ancient history, and philosophy. In 1938, in her first year and against her parents’ wishes, she was received into the Catholic Church. Around the same time she met Peter Geach, another young convert and philosopher, and the two were married in December 1941. It was a marriage of minds as much as anything: for nearly sixty years they argued, co-wrote, and raised seven children together. In 1939, as Britain went to war, she and a fellow student, Norman Daniel, published a pamphlet called The Justice of the Present War Examined. Picture a twenty-year-old undergraduate telling her country, in the first months of a war most people thought plainly right, that it could not be fought justly. Her argument was not pacifist: she held that a nation may rightly go to war, and she granted Britain a just cause. It was that Britain’s aims had no limit at which the fighting could stop, and that the means it was likely to use, war that struck at civilians rather than at combatants, would be unjust in themselves. Because the pamphlet called itself Catholic without church approval, the Archbishop of Birmingham had it withdrawn. The conviction behind it never moved (T3).

(●) 1942 AD: At Cambridge she became Wittgenstein’s student, then his friend, translator, and literary executor. + After taking a first-class degree in 1941 she moved to Cambridge to do research at Newnham College, and there she began attending the classes of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Austrian philosopher who had already changed the subject once and was in the middle of changing it again. Wittgenstein had little patience with academic philosophy and with most of the people who practised it, but he took to her. By one well-known account he called her, affectionately, "old man." She returned to Oxford in 1946 with a research fellowship at Somerville College, and the friendship continued. In his last illness Wittgenstein lodged for a time in her house in Oxford, and when he died in 1951 he left her, with two other trusted friends, Rush Rhees and Georg Henrik von Wright, in charge of his unpublished papers, the role called a literary executor. He had already chosen her as his translator and arranged for her to spend time in Vienna perfecting her German, and her English version of his Philosophical Investigations, published in 1953, is the one through which most of the English-speaking world first met him. For several generations of students, Wittgenstein simply sounded like Anscombe.

(●) 1948 AD: At Oxford’s Socratic Club she showed a flaw in C. S. Lewis’s argument against naturalism, and Lewis rewrote the chapter. + The Socratic Club was an Oxford society, with C. S. Lewis as its president, where Christians and unbelievers met to argue in public about the faith. On 2 February 1948 the twenty-eight-year-old Anscombe, herself a Christian, read a paper there criticising the third chapter of Lewis’s recent book Miracles. Lewis had argued that naturalism (the view that nature is the whole of reality, a closed system of physical causes) refutes itself: if all our thoughts are the products of "irrational causes," then no thought, including the thought that naturalism is true, could be trusted. Her objection was about the words, and it was serious. Lewis, she said, ran together two different things. To ask what caused a belief (a chemical, a habit, a blow on the head) is one question; to ask whether the belief is supported by good reasons is another, and an answer to the first does not settle the second. Think of a calculator: it is a physical machine running on physical causes, and its sums are still correct or incorrect. Lewis had also called causes "irrational" when he meant "non-rational," and the slide between the two words carried more of his argument than it should have. Lewis took the criticism seriously. When Miracles was reissued in 1960 the chapter had been rewritten and retitled "The Cardinal Difficulty of Naturalism," with the distinction between causes and reasons now at its center. A legend later grew up among some of Lewis’s friends that she had crushed him and driven him out of apologetics; she rejected it, and the record supports her (Q, after T4).

(●) 1956 AD: In three years she opposed Truman’s honorary degree, wrote Intention, and indicted modern moral philosophy. + These were the years that made her name. In 1956 Oxford’s Convocation, the assembly of the university’s graduates, was asked to approve an honorary degree for Harry Truman. Most members expected a formality. Anscombe rose and opposed it, on the ground that Truman had ordered the deliberate killing of the civilians of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and that to honor him was to honor that choice. She lost the vote by a wide margin, and published her reasons in a pamphlet, Mr Truman’s Degree (T3). The next year came Intention, a slim book of fewer than a hundred pages that set the agenda for a whole branch of philosophy, the philosophy of action, which asks what it is to do something on purpose (T1). And in January 1958 the journal Philosophy printed "Modern Moral Philosophy," an essay of about twenty pages that may be the most influential single paper in twentieth-century ethics (T2). In it she also coined a word that is now everywhere: consequentialism. She meant it as a charge. English moral philosophy since Henry Sidgwick, the Victorian Cambridge philosopher, had in her judgment erased the line between what a man intends and what he merely foresees. Think of a man who knows his early errand will wake the neighbors, and a man who sets out to wake them: the first foresees, the second intends. Once that line is gone, she argued, no act is ruled out whatever its results. Today, stripped of the charge, the word names any theory that judges an act right or wrong only by its results.

(●) 1970 AD: She took Wittgenstein’s old chair at Cambridge, and outside the lecture hall she was arrested protesting abortion. + In 1970 she was elected Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge, the chair Wittgenstein himself had held, and she kept it until she retired in 1986. Her inaugural lecture, Causality and Determination (1971), returned to the schoolgirl’s question about causes and gave it a new answer (T4). She published on the first person, on time, on Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle, on what it is to believe someone, and in 1981 she gathered her essays into three volumes of Collected Philosophical Papers. She was never only a professor. She wrote in defense of the church’s teaching on marriage and contraception when Pope Paul VI reaffirmed it in 1968, and in old age she and one of her daughters joined the sit-in protests outside abortion clinics, and were arrested for it. A woman in her seventies with a world reputation was carried off by the police for blocking a doorway, and she seems to have regarded that as the ordinary consequence of taking an argument seriously.

(●) 2001 AD: She died in Cambridge at eighty-one and was buried near Wittgenstein. + Elizabeth Anscombe died in Cambridge on 5 January 2001, at the age of eighty-one. She was buried in the Ascension Parish Burial Ground in Cambridge, the small cemetery off Huntingdon Road where Wittgenstein lies; when Peter Geach died in 2013 he was buried beside her. Her papers kept appearing after her death. Her family and friends edited four further volumes of essays, among them Human Life, Action and Ethics (2005) and Faith in a Hard Ground (2008), the second a collection of her writings on religion, ethics, and the Christian faith. Read together, they show a single mind at work: the same exacting attention to what words mean, turned on a promise, a cause, a bomb, or a piece of consecrated bread.

What She Taught

(T1) An action is intentional when the question "Why?" has a reason for its answer, and we know what we are doing without watching ourselves do it. + Picture a man pumping water into the tank that supplies a house. He is moving his arm up and down; he is working the pump; he is filling the tank; and, as it happens, the water is poisoned, so he is also poisoning the people inside. One movement of one arm, and four true descriptions of what he is doing. Which of them did he do intentionally? Anscombe’s answer in Intention was that an action is intentional under a description. The test is a particular sense of the question "Why are you doing that?" If the man can answer "To fill the tank," then filling the tank is intentional. If he answers "I didn’t know it was poisoned," then poisoning is not intentional under that description, though he still did it. So one and the same act can be intentional in one way and not in another, and what decides it is what the agent was up to. She noticed something else that has puzzled philosophers ever since. You know what you are doing, when you are acting on purpose, without having to observe yourself. Her example is a shopping list. A man walks round a town with a list, and a detective follows him writing down everything he buys. If the two lists disagree, the detective’s list has made a mistake and needs correcting; but if the man comes home with margarine instead of butter, the mistake is not in his list but in what he did. One kind of knowledge copies the world; the other kind, the knowledge of an agent, is meant to be copied by it. The detective’s list is a record of the shopping; the man’s list is the plan the shopping is supposed to match. Her name for this was practical knowledge. This matters for the Christian moral tradition, which has always judged acts partly by what the agent intends. The doctrine of double effect (the old teaching that you may sometimes accept a bad side effect you foresee, but may never aim at an evil as your end or your means) only makes sense if intention can be picked out clearly. A doctor who gives morphine to ease a dying man’s pain, knowing it may shorten his life, stands in a different place from one who gives it in order to end that life, and the difference is entirely in what each is doing it for. Intention gave that old teaching back the tools it needed.

(Q) "What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that I shall suggest is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting." + Source: G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), §5. These two sentences carry the thesis of the whole book. The rest of Intention works out which senses of "Why?" do not count (a twitch, a start of surprise) and which do.

(T2) A moral "ought" with no divine lawgiver behind it is a word left over from a law that has been forgotten. + Imagine a country that abolishes its criminal law and its courts, and a few generations later has forgotten they ever existed, but people still go about calling one another "criminals." The word would still sound weighty, and they would still feel it meant something serious. But what would it mean? Nothing makes a person a criminal except a law, and the law is gone. That, Anscombe argued in "Modern Moral Philosophy," is the state of the special moral "ought" in modern ethics. For many centuries Christianity had taught that ethics has the shape of a law: God commands, and the moral "ought" means what a person is bound to do under that divine law. Modern moral philosophers had dropped belief in the lawgiver, but they kept the vocabulary of obligation, of "moral duty" and the "morally right," and they kept it in a heavy, binding sense that only a law conception of ethics could give (ethics understood as commands from someone with the authority to command). The words survived the belief that gave them sense, and so, in her phrase, they now carry a "mesmeric force," a hypnotic pull on the hearer, and little meaning. She drew a startling conclusion. Philosophers who do not believe in a divine lawgiver should stop using the special moral "ought" and go back to the older way of Aristotle, asking what kinds of acts are just or unjust, and what the virtues are that make a human being good, as health makes a body good. That, she added, would require a far better philosophy of psychology (what wanting, intending, and acting are) than anyone yet had. The essay is widely credited with launching what is now called virtue ethics, the approach that asks first what a good person is like rather than which rules to follow. It also handed Christians an argument they still use, a new form of the moral argument (the case that real moral obligation points to God): if the language of obligation needs a lawgiver to make sense, then a world without God has lost the right to it.

(Q) "It is as if the notion ‘criminal’ were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten." + Source: G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," Philosophy 33, no. 124 (January 1958), p. 6. She is describing what happens to the notions of "obligation" and "being bound" once the belief in God as lawgiver that gave them their sense has been abandoned (T2).

(T3) To choose to kill the innocent as a means to an end is always murder, whatever good it is meant to buy. + Suppose a surgeon has five patients who will die without transplants and one healthy visitor in the waiting room whose organs would save them all. Almost everyone sees at once that he may not kill the visitor, even though five lives are more than one. Anscombe thought that instinct was exactly right, and that the moral philosophy of her day had lost the ability to explain it. Her teaching was the old Christian one, stated without softening: there are some acts it is never right to choose, whatever the consequences, and the intentional killing of the innocent is the clearest of them. "Innocent" here does not mean sinless. It means not engaged in harming, the way a soldier in the field is engaged and a child in a city is not. A nation may defend itself, and a soldier may kill an enemy combatant; what no one may do is make the deaths of noncombatants the means by which a war is won. Paul had already ruled out the shortcut: evil may not be done that good may come (Romans 3:8). She applied this without fear or favor. It was why she opposed the bombing of German cities, why she opposed Truman’s degree, and why she later opposed abortion. In "War and Murder" (1961) she turned it against both sides of the nuclear debate: against those who would plan to destroy cities, and also against pacifism, which, by teaching that all killing is equally wrong, blurs the one line that matters most.

(Q) "For men to choose to kill the innocent as a means to their ends is always murder, and murder is one of the worst of human actions." + Source: G. E. M. Anscombe, Mr Truman’s Degree (Oxford: privately printed, 1956); reprinted in Collected Philosophical Papers, vol. 3, Ethics, Religion and Politics (1981), pp. 62–71. The pamphlet carries no date, but the Bodleian Library’s copy was stamped on 11 July 1956, so the years 1957 and 1958 sometimes given for it are too late. The sentence states the principle on which she opposed Oxford’s honor to the president who ordered the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

(T4) A cause is what an effect comes from, and being able to imagine a thing beginning uncaused does not show that it could. + Since David Hume in the eighteenth century, philosophers have tended to say that causation is nothing more than regularity: to call A the cause of B is to say that things like A are always followed by things like B. Anscombe thought this had it backwards. When a child knocks a cup off a table and it breaks, we see that the fall broke the cup; we do not first need a law about all cups and all falls. In her Cambridge inaugural lecture she argued that the core of causation is derivation: the effect comes from its cause, arises out of it. Regularities are how we often find causes, not what causation is. She also took on one of Hume’s best-known arguments directly. Hume had said that we can imagine something beginning to exist with no cause at all, and that whatever we can imagine is possible; so the principle "whatever begins to exist has a cause" cannot be proved. In a short paper of 1974 Anscombe pointed out what the imagining really contains. I can picture a rabbit appearing without picturing where it came from; but that is not the same as picturing that it came from nowhere. Nothing in the picture shows the absence of a cause. If I write "rabbit with no cause" underneath it, the caption is doing all the work; "no cause" is only, as she put it, "the title of the picture." Her conclusion was modest and careful: Hume’s argument does not show that an uncaused beginning is possible, though she did not claim to have proved the causal principle either. Christian philosophers have noticed the relevance. The kalam cosmological argument (the argument that the universe began to exist, and so has a cause) rests on exactly the principle Hume challenged, and her paper answers one of the best-known objections to it.

(Q) "Causality consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its causes. This is the core, the common feature, of causality in its various kinds. Effects derive from, arise out of, come of, their causes." + Source: G. E. M. Anscombe, Causality and Determination: An Inaugural Lecture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); reprinted in Collected Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (1981), p. 136. Here is her positive account of causation, set against the view that a cause is just a case of an exceptionless regularity, a pattern that holds every time without fail (T4).

(Q) "The fact that Lewis rewrote that chapter, and rewrote it so that it now has these qualities, shows his honesty and seriousness." + Source: G. E. M. Anscombe, Introduction to Collected Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), p. x. Thirty-three years after the Socratic Club meeting, she judged the rewritten chapter of Miracles much deeper than the first version, and said that her own recollection of the evening was of sober discussion, not of a rout. Accounts by some of Lewis’s friends of a shattering defeat she put down, drily, to what she called "projection."

What Christian Thinkers Made of Her

(†) Her debate with Lewis made his argument stronger, and the argument from reason still stands in its rewritten form. + For years the Socratic Club evening was told as a cautionary tale: the Christian champion humbled by a young philosopher and retreating from apologetics into children’s stories. The facts do not bear it out. Lewis kept writing and speaking for the faith, and he answered her by doing the most honest thing a writer can do, which is to rewrite. The 1960 version of his chapter separates the question of what causes a belief from the question of what grounds it, which is exactly the distinction she had pressed. The argument from reason, as that line of thought is now called, has since been developed by philosophers such as Victor Reppert and Alvin Plantinga, whose evolutionary argument against naturalism makes a related case: if our minds were shaped only to survive and not to find the truth, we would have no reason to trust them, including when they tell us naturalism is true. Their versions are careful about causes and reasons in a way the first edition of Miracles was not, and Reppert’s book, C. S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea (2003), takes up her criticism of Lewis directly. It is a fair picture of what Christian argument ought to look like: a believer correcting a believer in public, the correction accepted, and the case made better.

(†) "Modern Moral Philosophy" reopened the old Christian ethics of virtue and law, and Christian ethicists have built on it ever since. + Her essay began a movement. Philosophers including her friend Philippa Foot took up the call to return to Aristotle and the virtues, and Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981), with its picture of modern moral language as fragments of a lost tradition, reads in places like an expansion of her criminal-law image (T2). MacIntyre went on to find his way into the Catholic Church and to defend the tradition of Aquinas. For Christian moral thought she did two things at once. She showed that the Aristotelian and Thomist ethics of virtue (Thomist means following Thomas Aquinas) was not a museum piece but a live option in the best philosophy of the day. And she made the law conception of ethics, with God as lawgiver, look less like an embarrassment to be explained away and more like the thing modern ethics had quietly been living on. Apologists who make the moral argument for God still quote her for that reason.

(†) She restored the line between intending a death and foreseeing one, and Christians across the traditions still argue war and medicine with it. + The ideas that some acts are wrong whatever their results, that the innocent may never be targeted, and that a foreseen side effect differs from an intended means all come from the Christian just-war tradition (the long reflection on when a war may be fought and how) and from moral theology, from Augustine and Aquinas onward. By the 1950s they had been largely abandoned by secular ethics, and in wartime many in the churches had made their peace with the bombing of cities. Anscombe made them respectable again in the hardest company there was, and she did it in the open, against her own government and her own university. Christians of different traditions receive her work differently at one point, and it is fair to say so. On contraception she defended the Catholic teaching of Pope Paul VI’s 1968 encyclical Humanae Vitae, and most Protestant and many Orthodox Christians do not hold that teaching; there she spoke as a Catholic, and the wider church has not followed. On the protection of the innocent, the conduct of war, and the wrongness of abortion, her arguments have been taken up by Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox alike.

Anscombe wrote few books and a great many papers. Her major essays were gathered in her lifetime into three volumes of Collected Philosophical Papers (1981), and after her death her family and friends edited four more volumes from published and unpublished work. Her translations of Wittgenstein are a body of work in their own right. Books and pamphlets: - The Justice of the Present War Examined (1939, with Norman Daniel): A student pamphlet granting that Britain had a just cause but arguing that its war aims were unlimited and its means would strike at civilians, so that the war could not be fought justly. Withdrawn at the request of the Archbishop of Birmingham because it called itself Catholic without church approval. - Mr Truman’s Degree (1956; undated, and often misdated 1957 or 1958): Her case against Oxford’s honorary degree for the president who ordered the atomic bombings, built on the principle that choosing to kill the innocent is murder (T3). - Intention (1957; second edition 1963): The founding work of modern philosophy of action: intentional action, the question "Why?", acting under a description, and practical knowledge (T1). - An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1959): A guide to Wittgenstein’s first book that insisted on reading it through Frege, the German logician whose work it built on, rather than through the logical positivists, the Vienna Circle philosophers who held that, outside logic and mathematics, only statements experience could check have meaning. - Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege (1961, with Peter Geach): Her essay on Aristotle and his account of substance and change, with Geach’s on Aquinas and Frege; an introduction for readers who wanted the old philosophy treated as live. - Causality and Determination (1971): Her Cambridge inaugural lecture: causation as derivation, not exceptionless regularity, and determinism not required by physics (T4). Collected Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981): - Vol. 1, From Parmenides to Wittgenstein: Essays on ancient and modern philosophers, including "Aristotle and the Sea Battle," "Whatever Has a Beginning of Existence Must Have a Cause: Hume’s Argument Exposed," and her papers on Parmenides, Plato, Hume, and Wittgenstein. - Vol. 2, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Includes "The Intentionality of Sensation," "The First Person," "Causality and Determination," "Times, Beginnings and Causes," and the 1948 reply to Lewis, with an introduction recalling her first puzzles about causes and the Socratic Club meeting. - Vol. 3, Ethics, Religion and Politics: Includes "The Justice of the Present War Examined," "Modern Moral Philosophy," "Mr Truman’s Degree," "War and Murder," "On Brute Facts," "On the Source of the Authority of the State," and "On Transubstantiation." Major essays (each reprinted in the collections above or below): - "A Reply to Mr C. S. Lewis’s Argument that ‘Naturalism’ Is Self-Refuting" (1948, Socratic Digest): The paper read at the Socratic Club, distinguishing causes of belief from grounds for it. - "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958, Philosophy): The essay that coined "consequentialism" and called philosophers back to virtue (T2). - "War and Murder" (1961): Against plans to target cities and against the pacifism that refuses to distinguish combatant from innocent (T3). - "Contraception and Chastity" (1972): Her defense of the teaching of Humanae Vitae. - "Whatever Has a Beginning of Existence Must Have a Cause: Hume’s Argument Exposed" (1974, Analysis): A short demolition of Hume’s argument that an uncaused beginning is conceivable and so possible (T4). - "The First Person" (1975): The argument that "I" is not a name, nor any other kind of referring expression; one of her most discussed papers. - "What Is It to Believe Someone?" (1979): On faith as belief in a person who tells you something, the structure that Christian faith in God’s word shares with ordinary trust in testimony. - "Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect’" (1982): Her own account of the principle of double effect, the line between an intended means and a foreseen side effect (T1, T3). - "Twenty Opinions Common Among Modern Anglo-American Philosophers" (read in Rome 1986, published 1987): A brisk list of twenty philosophical errors, in ethics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of science, that she judged a believing Christian ought not to hold. Posthumous collections: - Human Life, Action and Ethics (2005, ed. Mary Geach and Luke Gormally): Essays on action, intention, double effect, and the ethics of life and death. - Faith in a Hard Ground (2008, ed. Mary Geach and Luke Gormally): Her writings on religion, ethics, and the Christian faith, including sermons and talks. - From Plato to Wittgenstein (2011, ed. Mary Geach and Luke Gormally): Further essays on the history of philosophy. - Logic, Truth and Meaning (2015, ed. Mary Geach and Luke Gormally): Her papers in logic and the philosophy of language. Translations and editions: - Descartes, Philosophical Writings (1954, translated and edited with Peter Geach). - Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953): The standard English translation for half a century. - Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (1956, edited with G. H. von Wright and Rush Rhees, translated by Anscombe). - Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916 (1961, edited with G. H. von Wright, translated by Anscombe). - Wittgenstein, Zettel (1967, edited with G. H. von Wright, translated by Anscombe). - Wittgenstein, On Certainty (1969, edited with G. H. von Wright, translated with Denis Paul). - Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour (1977, edited by Anscombe). - Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1 (1980, edited with G. H. von Wright, translated by Anscombe). Standard editions: Intention (Harvard University Press, 2000); the four posthumous volumes are in the St Andrews Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs series (Imprint Academic). The standard short life is Jenny Teichman’s British Academy memoir, "Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe 1919–2001," Proceedings of the British Academy 115 (2002).
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