Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Epistemology

Study of Knowledge

Classical Foundationalism

(●) Classical foundationalism holds that all knowledge rests on beliefs that are certain. + Anyone who has spent an afternoon with a four-year-old knows the game. "Why is the grass wet?" Because it rained last night. "Why?" Because clouds came over. "Why?" Because the air cooled and the water in it came together. "Why?" Sooner or later the grown-up says, "Because that's how it is," and goes to start dinner. The child has stumbled onto one of the oldest problems in philosophy. Most of what we believe, we believe because of something else we believe. If you keep asking for the reason behind the reason, and then the reason behind that, the way the child does, sooner or later you have to wonder where it all stops. - A belief held because of other beliefs is called inferential. You believe it rained last night because the grass is wet and the forecast called for rain. - A belief that is reasonable without being drawn from any other belief is called basic. When you stub your toe, you do not infer that you are in pain. You simply know it. - The problem of where reasons stop is called the regress problem, from a word meaning "going back." Aristotle discussed it. The ancient skeptics (philosophers who argued that we can know little or nothing) turned it into a weapon, and their arguments survive in the writings of Sextus Empiricus. As it turns out, there are only a few ways the chain of reasons could go. - It could go on forever, with no first reason. - It could circle back, so that somewhere down the line a belief supports itself. - It could simply stop at a belief that has no reason behind it at all. - Or it could end in beliefs that are reasonable without needing support from other beliefs. Foundationalism takes the last option. Some beliefs are basic, and everything else we are justified in believing rests on them, the way a house rests on its foundation. (Justified means held for good reason, so that believing is the sensible thing to do.) Classical foundationalism adds that the foundations must be certain. - Certain here does not mean feeling sure. A gambler can feel sure his horse will win, and that is only confidence. A belief is certain in the philosopher's sense when the believer's grounds for it rule out its being false, because the believer is directly aware of the very thing that makes it true. In the language of probability, where zero means impossible and one means guaranteed, it has a probability of one on the believer's evidence. On this view there are two kinds of foundation: - beliefs that simply take in one's own present experience, such as noticing an ache and thinking "this is how it feels" (P4); - truths that are self-evident, seen to be true just by understanding them, such as "two plus two is four" or "nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time." Everything else, including our beliefs about the world around us, about the past, and about other people, is built on those foundations by reasoning. Some of that reasoning is strict deduction, where the conclusion cannot be false if the starting points are true: every guest at the party is over twenty-one, Sam is a guest, so Sam is over twenty-one. Most of it, though, is probable reasoning, which moves from evidence to what is likely, the way a detective or a scientist does. Deduction is really the strongest case of probable reasoning, where the starting points give the conclusion a probability of one (C2).

(●) Coherentism, infinitism, and modest foundationalism are the main rivals. + For most of the history of philosophy, some form of foundationalism was the standard view, and from Descartes onward it was usually the classical form. In the twentieth century the classical form fell out of favor, and three rivals took its place. - Coherentism says there are no foundations. A belief is justified by how well it fits with everything else a person believes, the way a raft holds together because its planks are lashed to one another rather than to anything below. - Infinitism says the chain of reasons can go on forever, so long as there is always a further reason available. On this view the four-year-old's game never has to end. - Modest foundationalism keeps the foundations but says they need not be certain. On many versions, ordinary perceptual beliefs like "there is a tree in front of me" are basic, even though they could be mistaken. Here is roughly who holds what. - Classical foundationalism: René Descartes (1641) and John Locke (1690) in the tradition; C. I. Lewis (1946), Roderick Chisholm (1989), Richard Fumerton (1995), and Timothy McGrew (1995, 1999) among more recent philosophers. - A near neighbor of the classical view: Laurence BonJour in his later work (2001, 2003), after he gave up coherentism. He grounds the foundations in direct awareness of experience, as the classical view does, but he does not insist that they be infallible, that is, incapable of error. - Coherentism: Laurence BonJour in his earlier work (1985), Keith Lehrer (1990), and Donald Davidson (1986). - Infinitism: Peter Klein (1999). - Modest foundationalism: Robert Audi (1993) and Michael Huemer (2001). - Critics of classical foundationalism from the Christian side: Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (1983), whose Reformed epistemology argues that belief in God can be basic. (Epistemology is the study of knowledge; the view is called Reformed after the Reformed, or Calvinist, church tradition its founders come from.) Christians are found on more than one side of this, and the question is not an idle one, because it decides what kind of thing a reason is. On classical foundationalism, the reasons for any belief, belief in God included, can be traced back to what a person experiences and what they can see to be true. From there, the reasoning can be laid out on the table for anyone to check. Of course, Scripture does not teach a theory of knowledge, and every view on this list welcomes evidence. Still, the New Testament has a habit worth noticing: it rests belief on what people saw and heard. Luke reports that after the crucifixion Jesus "presented himself alive to them after his suffering by many proofs, appearing to them during forty days" (Acts 1:3). When the apostles began to preach, they spoke as witnesses of what they had seen: "of that we all are witnesses" (Acts 2:32). The argument is deductive. Its premises work like a locked chain: if each link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. That does not mean each premise has to be certain beyond all doubt. Each need only be more plausible than its denial, though by the view's own standard that plausibility must rest, in the end, on something certain, and the premises meet that standard too (D3). It comes in two halves. The first (P1, P2, C1) argues that knowledge has foundations, and the second (P3, P4, C2) argues that those foundations are certain.

(P1) A belief held by inference is justified only if the beliefs it rests on are justified. + Reasoning passes justification along from one belief to the next. It does not create justification out of nothing. (1) Inference passes along only the support it receives. - When you reason from one belief to another, the new belief inherits whatever support the old one had. If the starting belief was a wild guess, then the conclusion is a guess too, only at one remove. - Think of a check. Writing one passes money from one account to another, but if the first account is empty, the check bounces, however neatly it is written. (2) Good logic cannot rescue a bad starting point. - Reasoning is valid when the conclusion really does follow, so that it would have to be true if the starting points were. "The moon is made of cheese; cheese is food; so the moon is food" is perfectly valid. The conclusion is still absurd, because the first premise is. - No one is justified in believing a conclusion merely because it follows from premises they have no reason to accept. (3) The rival views accept the core of this. - Coherentists and infinitists agree that an inference adds no support its premises lack. Where they part company is over the picture of support flowing step by step from beliefs that were already justified. - The coherentist says support belongs first to a whole system of beliefs that hang together. The infinitist says it grows as a chain of reasons is extended. Whether either alternative works is the question of (P2). - Think of a rumor you had no reason to trust. Whatever theory of knowledge you hold, a belief drawn only from that rumor is no better off than the rumor was. Therefore, a belief held by inference is only as well supported as the beliefs it rests on.

(P2) Neither an endless chain nor a circle of reasons can supply justification. + If a belief's support has to come from other supported beliefs (P1), then it has to come from somewhere. An endless chain cannot supply it, and neither can a circle. (1) An endless chain never delivers support. - Suppose every belief got its support from another belief, which got its support from another, and so on without end. Then no belief in the chain would have any support to pass on. - Think of a train of boxcars stretching to the horizon, each pulled by the one in front. Make the train infinitely long, and it still does not move. Somewhere there has to be an engine. - Infinitists reply that support is not passed down the train at all. It grows as the chain lengthens, they say, and one version of that reply has real mathematics behind it (D9). (2) Finite minds cannot grasp an endless chain of reasons. - A reason a person could never hold in mind is not really their reason. Infinitists answer that a reason need only be available, ready to be called up when it is wanted, and a finite mind can have endlessly many reasons of that kind. You have never once thought "1,000,003 is larger than 1,000,002," but you would agree the moment someone asked. - The trouble is that the reasons in a chain do not stay simple. Each one must back up the one before it, so they grow longer and harder as the chain goes on. Very soon they are thoughts no human being could understand, let alone hold. - Think of a library with infinitely many shelves. It would be no help at all to a reader who can only ever reach a few of them. (3) A circle assumes what it is trying to show. - If belief A is supported by B, B by C, and C by A, then in the end A is supported by A. That is no support at all. - Think of two men applying for a bank loan. Bob vouches for Jim, and Jim vouches for Bob. The bank has learned nothing about either one. (4) Mutual support helps only beliefs that already have some. - Coherentists do not defend a small circle. They hold that a large web of beliefs supports each of its members by fitting together as a whole. - Beliefs that fit together really do strengthen one another, but only when each has some support of its own. Probability theory shows exactly this when it is applied to witnesses who agree (D8). - Two witnesses who tell the same story make it more likely, but only if each of them has some credibility apart from the other. Two people who saw nothing and agree are still two people who saw nothing. Therefore, the support for our inferential beliefs cannot come from an endless chain or from a circle.

(C1) Therefore, every justified inferential belief rests ultimately on beliefs justified without inference. + Every justified belief we hold by inference rests, in the end, on beliefs that are justified without inference. This follows from (P1) and (P2) by elimination, a valid form that rules out options one at a time until only one is left. The chain of reasons behind a justified belief has four places it could go: it runs on forever, it circles back, it stops at a belief with no justification, or it stops at beliefs justified without inference. (P2) rules out the first two and (P1) rules out the third, so the only place left is basic beliefs. (1) What holds for justification holds for knowledge. - Knowledge requires justification, so whatever is true of how beliefs are justified is true of the beliefs we know. - If every check you write must be backed by money in the bank, then so must every check that clears. (2) Evidence branches like a tree. - An inferred belief seldom hangs from a single line of reasons. It rests on several, each of which rests on several more, and the branches end in many basic beliefs at once. Philosophers call this picture an evidence tree. - Think of your belief that a storm passed in the night. It rests on the wet grass, the branch down in the driveway, the puddle by the back step, and your neighbor's grumbling about the thunder, and each of those traces back to what you saw and heard this morning. - So a modest set of basic beliefs can support a great deal, the way a small foundation can carry a large house. Most of what we know is built up from them by deduction and by probable reasoning, not found lying in them. (3) The conclusion so far is foundationalism, not yet classical foundationalism. - (C1) says there are foundations, but it does not yet say what they are like. (P3) and (P4) take up that question. - Knowing that a house stands on a foundation does not yet tell you whether it is poured concrete or packed sand. Therefore, knowledge has foundations.

(P3) Whatever makes a belief probable must rest ultimately on something certain. + Whatever is merely probable is probable on something else, and that chain has to end in something certain. This is the premise that makes the foundationalism classical. It carries the most weight in the argument, and it is where critics press hardest (D7, D9, D10). (1) Probability is always relative to evidence. - To say a belief is probable is to say it is likely given something: given the evidence, given what we know. Philosophers call this conditional probability, the probability of one thing given another. - Draw a card from a shuffled deck. The chance it is a heart is one in four. Given that the card is red, the chance is one in two. The "given" changes everything. (2) A conclusion's probability is calculated from its evidence. - If your evidence is itself only probable, the support it passes to your conclusion is limited by how probable it is. - Think of a relay race with ten handoffs, each with a ninety percent chance of going cleanly. The baton reaches the finish only if all ten go well, and the chance of that is about thirty-five percent. - A chain of evidence works the same way. If each of ten links is ninety percent likely given the next one down, then the chain alone guarantees the conclusion a probability of at least about thirty-five percent. That is only a floor, of course, because other branches of evidence (C1) may lift it higher. - Here is the thing worth noticing. The floor could be calculated at all only because the last link, the one at the bottom, was taken as settled. Take that away, and there is no number to start from. (3) Learning from evidence treats the evidence as settled. - When a juror learns that the defendant's fingerprint was on the glass, she raises her confidence in his guilt given that fact. Revising your confidence in light of new evidence is called updating. - The standard rule for updating, called conditionalization, works exactly the way the juror does. The evidence is taken as given, which is to say as certain. - There is also a rule for updating on evidence that is only probable (D10). But it takes the evidence's new probability as its starting input, and it does not say where that number comes from. Sooner or later something must fix the number, and it has to be something she simply has, not something she must infer from yet more evidence. (4) Without certainty somewhere, no probability is grounded. - Suppose every piece of evidence were only probable on further evidence, which was only probable on further evidence, and so on down. Then every claim would be "likely, given something else that is likely, given something else." - Mathematicians have shown that some endless chains of this kind still settle on a definite number (D9). That is true, but the number is fixed entirely by the chances linking each step to the next, and a person needs a reason to believe those chances too. So the regress has not ended. It has only moved. - Think of a stack of IOUs, each one promising payment out of another IOU. However tall the stack grows, nobody gets paid until cash turns up somewhere. - This is the old regress again, dressed in the language of probability, and the cure is the same. The ultimate grounds of probability must be certain. - Philosophers call a foundation of that kind incorrigible. In ordinary speech the word describes a child who will not be corrected. Here it means a belief that never needs correcting, because it cannot be false. Therefore, the beliefs at the foundation of probable reasoning must be certain.

(P4) Some beliefs about present experience and some self-evident truths are certain. + Foundations of that kind do exist, and you have some right now. (1) Present experience is directly present to the mind. - When you stub your toe, the pain is not something you infer from evidence. It is right there, and you are aware of it directly. Philosophers call this direct awareness acquaintance. - Being acquainted with the pain is not yet believing anything about it, though, and a foundation has to be a belief. So the real question is how a belief can connect with what you are aware of, with nothing standing between the two. (2) How things seem differs from how they are. - "There is an apple on the table" can be false, because the apple might be wax. What you are directly aware of is how it looks. A belief that simply takes in that look, "this is how it looks," is safe even if the apple turns out to be wax. - Think of the wax fruit on your grandmother's sideboard. You can be wrong that it is an apple. You cannot be wrong that it looks like one to you. (3) The simplest foundations point at the experience. - Think of a child at an ice-cream counter who cannot read the labels yet. She presses a finger to the glass and says, "That one." She has not described the flavor, so there is no description to get wrong. The tub under her finger settles what she asked for. - A word like this or that, which picks something out by pointing at it rather than by describing it, is called a demonstrative. - The simplest foundational belief is a demonstrative belief aimed at your own experience. Attending to an ache, you think, "this is like this." What a belief says, the claim it makes, is called its content. Here the ache is not only what the belief is about. It is part of the content, the way the tub is part of what the child asked for. (4) A belief that contains its object cannot be false. - Suppose there were no ache. Then this would point at nothing, and the thought would have no content. It would not be a false belief. It would not be a belief at all. So whenever the belief exists, the experience it contains is there, just as the belief presents it. - A description is different. "A sharp pain an inch below the knee" compares the experience with words and places, and a comparison can slip. The pointing belief makes no comparison, so it has nothing to slip on. That is what makes it incorrigible (P3). - Other defenders of the classical view tell it a little differently. On their account you are aware of three things together: an experience, a thought about it, and the fit between the two, the way you taste the soup and know at once that "this tastes salty" fits. - The two accounts differ in detail. On the first, the belief makes no comparison at all. On the second, it makes one, and the believer sees directly that it fits. Either way, the thought meets the experience directly, with nothing inferred in between. (5) Self-evident truths are certain too. - Some truths are seen to be true just by understanding them: two plus two is four; if all dogs are mammals and Rex is a dog, then Rex is a mammal. - Nobody checks "two plus two is four" by counting apples. Understanding it is seeing that it is true. (6) The foundations are deliberately narrow. - Not every belief about one's inner life is certain. People misdescribe their feelings, misremember yesterday's mood, and guess carelessly. The ache you are noticing right now qualifies. Your guess at how you felt last Tuesday does not. - Not every principle that feels obvious is self-evident, either. Complicated principles have sometimes seemed obvious and turned out false (D12). - The foundations are the simple, present cases a person is actually paying attention to, and the simple truths a person actually sees. That narrow foundation is enough, because the rest of knowledge is built on it by reasoning. Therefore, there are beliefs certain enough to serve as foundations.

(C2) Therefore, knowledge rests on foundations that are certain. + Knowledge rests on foundations that are certain. This follows from (C1) and (P3) in a simple syllogism, a valid form with two premises and a conclusion. The ultimate grounds of all probable reasoning must be certain (P3). The foundations are those ultimate grounds (C1). So the foundations are certain. You might ask whether deduction slips through, since (P3) speaks of probable reasoning. It does not, because deduction counts here as probable reasoning at full strength, where the premises give the conclusion a probability of one. And (P4) shows that the demand can actually be met, so the conclusion does not collapse into the skeptic's verdict that nothing is justified at all. (1) Most knowledge is probable, not certain. - Classical foundationalism does not say that everything we know is certain. It says the foundations are. Nearly everything built on them, from the existence of the room you are sitting in to the date of the Battle of Hastings, is known with high probability, not certainty. (2) The world is reached by reasoning from experience. - From what we experience, we reason to the best explanation of it, the account that makes the most sense of everything we observe. Astronomers in 1846 did exactly this when they reasoned from small irregularities in the orbit of Uranus to an unseen planet, and then found Neptune where they had calculated it would be. - A real, stable world explains the order, regularity, and agreement of our experiences better than any rival. Whether that reasoning fully answers the skeptic is still debated, and (D6) takes it up. - This is also why beliefs about the world can be wrong when the foundations cannot. They are conclusions of reasoning to the best explanation, and such reasoning yields probability, not proof, however certain its starting points. (3) The reasoning can be laid out and checked. - Each person's foundations are their own. Nobody else can feel your toothache. - But you can tell other people what you experienced, and they have experiences of the same kind. The self-evident truths are open to everyone. And anyone can check whether the reasoning you build on your experience is sound. - Think of a doctor with a patient in pain. She cannot feel the pain, but she can hear the report, examine the swelling herself, and follow the reasoning to a diagnosis that any other doctor could check. Therefore, if (P1) through (P4) hold, our knowledge rests on certain foundations and is built up from them by reasoning, just as classical foundationalism says. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Internalism Philosophy / Epistemology: Justified True Belief (JTB) Philosophy / Epistemology: Three Types of Knowledge

On classical foundationalism: BonJour, Laurence. "Toward a Defense of Empirical Foundationalism." In Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism, edited by Michael R. DePaul. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. BonJour, Laurence, and Ernest Sosa. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003. Chisholm, Roderick M. Theory of Knowledge. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989. Fumerton, Richard. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. Hasan, Ali. "Classical Foundationalism and Bergmann's Dilemma for Internalism." Journal of Philosophical Research 36 (2011): 391-410. Hasan, Ali, and Richard Fumerton. "Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Lewis, C. I. An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1946. McGrew, Timothy J. The Foundations of Knowledge. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. McGrew, Timothy. "A Defense of Classical Foundationalism." In The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed., edited by Louis P. Pojman, 224-235. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1999. McGrew, Timothy, and Lydia McGrew. Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason. London: Routledge, 2007. Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy. London: Williams and Norgate, 1912. On probability, induction, and the external world: Bovens, Luc, and Stephan Hartmann. Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. Olsson, Erik J. Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. Stove, D. C. The Rationality of Induction. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Vogel, Jonathan. "Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation." Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 658-666. Williams, Donald C. The Ground of Induction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1947. Rivals and critics engaged: Atkinson, David, and Jeanne Peijnenburg. Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem. Cham: Springer, 2017. Audi, Robert. The Structure of Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Bergmann, Michael. Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. BonJour, Laurence. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985. Chisholm, Roderick M. "The Problem of the Speckled Hen." Mind 51 (1942): 368-373. Clifford, W. K. "The Ethics of Belief." Contemporary Review 29 (1877): 289-309. Davidson, Donald. "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge." In Truth and Interpretation, edited by Ernest LePore, 307-319. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. Field, Hartry. "A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization." Philosophy of Science 45 (1978): 361-367. Huemer, Michael. "Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 30-55. Huemer, Michael. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. Jeffrey, Richard C. The Logic of Decision. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. Kitcher, Philip. The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Klein, Peter D. "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning." Philosophical Studies 134 (2007): 1-17. Klein, Peter D. "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons." Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 297-325. Lehrer, Keith. Theory of Knowledge. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. Plantinga, Alvin. "Reason and Belief in God." In Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, 16-93. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983. Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Schwitzgebel, Eric. "The Unreliability of Naive Introspection." Philosophical Review 117 (2008): 245-273. Sellars, Wilfrid. "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 1, edited by Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, 253-329. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. Siegel, Susanna. "Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification." Noûs 46 (2012): 201-222. Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Reason within the Bounds of Religion. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984. Historical sources: Aristotle. Posterior Analytics, book 1, chapter 3. Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy. 1641. Euclid. Elements, book 1. Frege, Gottlob. Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. 2 vols. Jena: Hermann Pohle, 1893-1903. Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 1690. Proclus. A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements. Translated by Glenn R. Morrow. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970. Russell, Bertrand. "Letter to Frege" (1902). In From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, edited by Jean van Heijenoort. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967. Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, book 1. Biblical citations: Luke 1:1-4; Acts 1:3; Acts 2:32; Acts 26:26; Romans 1:20; Romans 8:16; 1 Peter 3:15. Scripture quotations are from the English Standard Version.
+ Nothing is certain. Philosophers have doubted everything at one time or another, and anyone who claims certainty is simply overconfident.
1. The slogan cannot claim certainty for itself. Is it certain that nothing is certain? If it is, then something is certain after all. So the careful version of the objection, called fallibilism, claims only that it is very probable that every belief could be mistaken. That is a serious view, widely held among philosophers today, and it has to be met on its merits. The way to meet it is to ask what makes it probable (P3), and then to test it against the clearest cases. 2. The certainty claimed is narrow. Classical foundationalism does not claim certainty about the economy, the weather, or the meaning of a disputed verse. It claims certainty about a small set of things: that you are in pain when you are, that things look to you just the way they look, that two plus two is four. Most of what anyone knows, on this view, is only probable. - Try telling someone who has just stubbed his toe that he cannot be certain it hurts. He will not take it as a point in philosophy. 3. Errors in describing experience are errors in the description. The fallibilist's best argument is that even "this looks red" applies a word, and words can be misapplied. Someone who has always called magenta "purple" will report a purple look and be wrong. - That is a real mistake, but it is a mistake about how the experience compares with the cases a word was learned from, which is a matter of memory and language. It is not a mistake about the look itself. - The foundation is the pointing belief "this is how it looks," which contains the look itself and applies no learned word to it (P4). Get the label wrong, and that belief is still exactly as true as it was. 4. Doubt has to stand somewhere. Even the most famous doubter in philosophy found something he could not doubt. Descartes doubted his senses, his memory, and the existence of the world, and found that he could not doubt that he was thinking while he was doing the doubting. Doubt is itself an experience, and the doubter is aware of it.
+ Wilfrid Sellars's dilemma: either the "given" in experience is like a belief, in which case it needs justifying too, or it is not, in which case it cannot justify anything. Either way there are no foundations.
1. This objection ended an era. The strongest form of the objection runs like this. "The given" is whatever experience hands the mind before any judgment is made: the redness, the ache, the taste of the coffee. For something to justify a belief, it has to count as a reason for it. To count as a reason, it must have content: it must say that something is so. Sellars's attack, in the form later philosophers sharpened it into, is a dilemma, an argument that offers two options and shows that each one leads to trouble. Each option is called a horn, as in being caught on the horns of a dilemma. - If the given has that kind of content, it is just another belief-like state, and it needs its own justification. - If it has no content, it is a raw sensation, and a raw sensation cannot be a reason for anything, any more than a toothache is a reason to believe the moon is round. Sellars called the idea of a self-justifying given a "myth," and for decades most philosophers agreed. 2. The foundation is a belief with the experience inside it. The strongest classical answer grants the second horn. A bare sensation, standing apart from any belief, is not a reason for anything, and acquaintance alone is not enough. But the foundation is a belief, so it does have content. It is the demonstrative belief "this is like this," in which the experience itself is part of the content (P4). - Think of the child at the ice-cream counter who presses a finger to the glass and says, "That one." Her words say something, and the tub under her finger is part of what they say. Nobody asks her for a further reason to think she pointed at the tub she pointed at. 3. A belief that contains its object needs nothing behind it. The first horn assumes that anything with content can be mistaken, and so needs justifying by something further. That is true of a belief that describes the world from a distance, because a description can miss. It is not true of a belief whose content includes the very thing that makes it true. - Acquaintance is a relation to something actually there, and it cannot hold unless its object exists. A belief built around it inherits that guarantee. Without its object, it would say nothing and would not be a belief at all. With its object, it cannot be false. So the regress stops at the point where the belief takes the experience into itself. - Think of the difference between describing a table and touching it. A description can be mistaken. You cannot touch a table that is not there. - Followers of Sellars reply that even "like this" sorts the experience under a concept, and sorting can go wrong. The classical answer is that a pointing concept is fixed by the very experience it points at. Unlike the word "red," it was not learned from other cases that this one might fail to match, so there is nothing else for the experience to be sorted against. Whether that fully closes the door is still argued. 4. An allied account reaches the same place. Other classical foundationalists describe the foundation as direct awareness of three things together: an experience, a thought about it, and the fit between them. The thought has content, the experience is what it is about, and the awareness of the fit is what justifies it. - Think of an artist comparing her sketch with the person sitting for it. The sketch says something; the face is simply there; and she can see whether the one matches the other. Seeing the match is not another sketch. - On either account, the dilemma's first horn fails. Something can have content and still need no further belief behind it. 5. Accepting the dilemma has a high price. If no experience could ever count as a reason, then experience could not justify anything on any theory. The coherentist who accepts the dilemma must say, as Donald Davidson did, that only a belief can be a reason for another belief, so that experience causes beliefs but never supports them. That cuts the web of belief off from the world it is meant to be about (D8). A theory that leaves experience with no bearing on belief has a bigger problem than the one it set out to solve.
+ Alvin Plantinga's objection: classical foundationalism refutes itself. Its own rule, that one should believe only what is certain or properly inferred from what is certain, is neither certain nor inferred from what is, so by its own rule no one should believe it.
1. The objection is aimed at a rule about duty. Plantinga's target was a criterion for which beliefs a person is permitted to hold as basic. It was stated as a rule that believers must obey, a duty about what one may believe, and it was used against belief in God. That criterion also counted beliefs "evident to the senses," such as "there is a tree," as basic, which classical foundationalists today do not. The objection is strong against that rule, and the rule deserves to fall. 2. Classical foundationalism is a claim supported by argument. The claim that knowledge rests on certain foundations is not offered as a rule to be obeyed. It is the conclusion of an argument (P1 through C2), and that argument's premises are claims about inference and probability. - Claims of that kind are known the way the rules of arithmetic are known: by understanding what they say, not by surveying the world. Philosophers call knowledge of this kind a priori, Latin for "from what comes before," because it comes before any checking of the world. - Some of them are seen to be true on reflection. A conclusion drawn from a rumor is no better than the rumor, and two men vouching for each other prove nothing. The rest are drawn from those by reasoning. - So the view does not require its own premises to be foundations. It requires them to be certain or made probable by what is certain. Premises known by understanding, and by reasoning from self-evident truths, meet that standard, and so the view passes its own test. 3. A standard can apply to itself without contradiction. Picture a rule book whose rules include this one: "Every rule in this book must be printed in this book." That rule is printed in the book, so it passes its own test. Self-application is a problem only when a standard fails its own test, and that this one fails has to be shown, not assumed. - The burden here is real. Critics press hardest on whether (P3) is supported this way, and a reader can judge it for themselves. But that is a debate about a premise, not a refutation by self-reference (turning a view's own standard against it). See also: Philosophical Theology / Prolegomena: Meta-Apologetics: Reformed
+ The speckled hen: glance at a hen with forty-eight speckles, and your experience presents forty-eight, yet you cannot tell whether there are forty-seven or forty-eight. So beliefs about experience are not certain.
1. Not every belief about experience is certain. This puzzle has troubled foundationalists since the 1940s, and it makes a true point. Some beliefs about our own experience are guesses. If you said "my experience has forty-eight speckles in it," you could easily be wrong. 2. Seeing a fact is not the same as seeing a thing. You can be acquainted with the experience of a speckled hen without being acquainted with the fact that it has exactly forty-eight speckles. To know the number you would have to count, and counting is a judgment that can go wrong. It is not a belief that simply points at what is present. - Think of looking at a large crowd. You can see that it is large, and be certain the crowd looks big to you, without being able to say how many people are in it. 3. The foundations point at what is present. "This is like this," thought while attending to the speckled look, takes the look itself into its content (P4), and it cannot be false. "There are forty-eight" compares the look with numbers, and that comparison can slip. The pointing beliefs are the foundations. The count is built on them, if it can be built at all. 4. The clear cases are enough. The sharpest form of the puzzle asks whether a person can always tell a belief that points at experience from a confident guess about it. Not always. At the margins, someone can take a guess for the real thing, and the hen is exactly such a margin. - But the certainty belongs to the pointing belief, and in the clear cases the difference is plain. Nobody with a throbbing thumb wonders whether "this hurts" is a guess. - The view needs a foundation of clear cases, not a guarantee that every case will be clear. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Internalism
+ Introspection, looking inward at one's own mind, is unreliable. Research shows people are often wrong even about their present experience, such as how clear their side vision is right now, so there are no certain beliefs about experience.
1. Much of what people report about their inner lives is wrong. Eric Schwitzgebel has argued that people make confident and mistaken reports about their own experience, including their experience at this very moment: that their side vision is sharp when it is blurry, that they always think in words, that they can describe exactly what anger feels like. His target is present experience, not only memory, and this should be granted plainly. 2. The mistakes lie in hard descriptions, not simple appearances. The errors come from questions that ask a person to describe something they are not attending to, or to sum up a whole complicated experience in a phrase. "Is my side vision clear?" is a hard question because nobody looks at their side vision; we look at what is in front of us. - You can easily be wrong about how clear the edge of your vision is. You cannot be wrong about whether your head hurts right now. 3. Even the research relies on simple reports. An eye doctor asks, "Which is clearer, one or two?" and relies on the answer. The studies of introspective error lean on the same kind of thing, simple reports of what subjects see and feel, to show where the harder descriptions went wrong. The foundations are those simple, present cases a person is paying attention to, and the research leaves them standing.
+ Classical foundations are too thin: from "I seem to see a tree," nothing follows about trees. The view leaves us unable to know the world, the past, or other minds.
1. This is the strongest reason the view fell from favor. From beliefs about our own experience, nothing about the outside world follows by strict deduction. A perfect dream, or a skilled deceiver, could produce the same experiences with no world behind them. Hume pressed this hard, and many philosophers concluded that classical foundationalism leads straight to skepticism, the conclusion that we cannot know what lies beyond our own experience. 2. The foundations are thin in words, not in content. The sharpest modern form of the complaint, pressed by Michael Bergmann, aims at the foundations themselves: beliefs as bare as "this is like this" look far too meager to support any substantial conclusion about the world. - But a pointing belief is thin only in the words that voice it. Its content includes the experience itself (P4), and a single glance at a garden holds more color, shape, and arrangement than a page of description could set down. - Nor does any conclusion rest on one such belief. It rests on a branching tree of them (C1), gathered over a lifetime of looking, listening, and remembering, each checked against the others. - The complaint has a further edge: reasoning from experience means sorting it into kinds (red, round, louder than before), and sorting can go wrong. Granted. But that sorting belongs to the probable reasoning built on the foundations, not to the foundations. What must be certain is the root, not every branch (P3). - Think of a jury watching security footage. No single frame convicts anyone. Thousands of frames, taken together, can leave no reasonable doubt about what happened in the parking lot. 3. Probable reasoning can get from experience to the world. The answer to the skeptic is that the world is reached by reasoning to the best explanation, not by deduction. A real world of stable objects explains why experiences come in orderly patterns, why they agree with each other, and why they agree with other people's reports. A dream or a deceiver can match all that order only by copying the whole structure of a world into its own story, which makes it the more complicated explanation and the less probable one. - Think of footprints in fresh snow leading to your neighbor's door. You do not deduce that someone walked there, but nobody thinks the snow did it by itself. - That is also why beliefs about the world are fallible on this view (C2). They are probable conclusions drawn from certain foundations, never foundations themselves. 4. Induction can be rational. Reasoning from past experience to the future, called induction, has its own defense. It is a mathematical fact that the great majority of large samples drawn from a population closely resemble that population. So, unless we have some reason to think our sample is unusual, a large sample is very probably representative. - That is why a poll of a thousand voters can tell you a good deal about millions. - Critics answer that every sample we have comes from the past, so it may be unusual in just the way that matters for the future. Defenders reply that this is a reason for doubt only if we have some evidence that the past is unusual. 5. The past and other minds are reached the same way. A memory is a present experience, and the belief that the event happened is the best explanation of it, checked against records, other people's memories, and the traces events leave behind. Other people's minds are reached by the same kind of reasoning, from their words and actions to the best explanation of them. These are among the hardest cases, and the answers are probable, not certain, which is all the view ever claimed for them. 6. The rivals face the same skeptic. Whether these answers fully succeed is still debated. But no view escapes the question. Modest foundationalism simply declares perceptual beliefs basic, and coherentism makes the world's existence a matter of how beliefs fit together. Classical foundationalism at least gives an answer a person can examine.
+ Modest foundationalism: foundations need not be certain, since if it seems to you that there is a tree, you are justified in believing there is one unless you have a reason to doubt it. That keeps the foundations without demanding certainty.
1. This is a close cousin and a serious view. Modest foundationalism, and especially the version called phenomenal conservatism (the view that how things seem to you gives you some reason to believe they are that way), is held by serious philosophers. It agrees that knowledge has foundations, and in its phenomenal conservative form it agrees that justification depends on the believer's inner life. The disagreement is narrower than it looks. 2. The seeming is the real evidence. Ask what makes the belief "there is a tree" probable. The modest foundationalist's own answer is the seeming: it seems to you that there is a tree. - But then the seeming is doing the real work. A foundation that is only probable is probable given something (P3), and here that something is the seeming, which you are directly aware of. - So the real foundation is the seeming itself, taken in by a pointing belief ("this is how things look"). The belief that there is a tree is then reasoned to from it, as the best explanation (C2). - That is the classical view, with the foundation moved back to where it belonged. 3. Seemings can be shaped by wishes and fears. A jealous husband sees his wife smile at a stranger, and it seems to him that she is flirting. A seeming produced by jealousy does not give a reason the way a calm one does. Philosophers call this cognitive penetration: what we want, fear, or expect can shape how things seem. - Defenders of the modest view reply that the fault lies in the jealousy, not in the seeming. But on their view the husband is still justified in believing what jealousy shows him, until he notices a reason to doubt it. - The classical view asks for reasons to trust a kind of seeming before it is trusted, and so it never grants the husband that justification in the first place. 4. Relying on seemings is not the same as relying on seeing. The strongest argument for the modest view says that everyone, the classical foundationalist included, believes things because they seem true, so whoever denies that seemings justify undercuts his own beliefs. The classical reply is that a seeming and a seeing are different things. - When you believe two plus two is four, you are not relying on a pull toward believing it. You see the truth itself. When you believe you are in pain, you are aware of the pain. - Where all a person has is the pull, a hunch or an impression she cannot check, the classical view grants it no weight until she has some reason to trust that kind of impression. - Think of a stranger at the crosswalk telling you the road is clear, and then looking for yourself. Both may leave you believing the road is clear, but only one of them is seeing it. - Whether all good belief can be traced back to seeing of that kind is the very point in dispute, and phenomenal conservatives deny it.
+ Coherentism: beliefs are justified by how well they hang together, not by foundations. Knowledge is a web or a raft, with no bottom layer.
1. Coherence matters. A belief that clashes with everything else a person knows is suspect, and a set of beliefs that hang together well is usually better off than one that does not. This should be granted. 2. A coherent story can be false. The stories of Sherlock Holmes hang together beautifully. The characters are consistent, the clues add up, and every mystery is solved. None of it happened. Coherence alone does not connect a set of beliefs to the world. This is called the isolation objection, and it is the main reason coherentism has lost ground. 3. Agreement adds support only to what already has some. Probability theory has made this precise. When independent witnesses agree, their agreement makes their story more probable, but only if each witness has some credibility of his own. If none of them saw anything, their agreement proves nothing. Coherence works like that: it multiplies support that is already there. - That is (P2) again. Mutual support needs independent footing, and independent footing is what foundations are. - This result shows that coherence needs foundations. It does not by itself show that the foundations must be certain. That further step is the work of (P3). 4. The leading coherentist changed his mind. Laurence BonJour wrote the most influential defense of coherentism in the 1980s. Later he gave it up, chiefly because he could find no way for experience to bear on a web of beliefs, and argued for a foundationalism in which beliefs about experience are justified by direct awareness of the experience. A change of mind is not an argument, and other coherentists hold their ground. But his reasons were the isolation objection and the question of how experience can count as a reason (D2), and those reasons have not gone away.
+ Infinitism: reasons can go on forever, since each reason only needs to be available, not actually thought. Mathematicians have shown that an infinite chain of probabilities can still settle on a definite value.
1. The mathematics is correct. Peter Klein defends the view that reasons can go on without end. David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg have shown that certain infinite chains of conditional probabilities settle on a definite value for the belief at the end, and that the influence of far-off links fades. This is real mathematics, and it refutes a careless version of the regress argument, the claim that probabilities in an infinite chain must always shrink to zero. 2. The conditional probabilities still need grounding. In those models, the probability of the belief at the end is fixed by the conditional probabilities along the chain, that is, by the chance of each link given the next. The strongest reply on the infinitist's side is that these chances can be plain facts about the world, like the rate at which one generation of bacteria passes a trait to the next. Facts like that need no believer's reasons behind them. - Grant that the chances are facts. A person is justified in believing the conclusion only if she has reason to believe what those chances are, and that knowledge is itself learned from evidence. The regress returns at that level. - Think of a recipe that turns out perfectly every time. The recipe's reliability is a fact about the recipe, but a cook who has never tried it, and never heard from anyone who has, has no reason yet to trust it. 3. A reason no one could ever hold is not a reason anyone has. An infinite chain of reasons that are merely "available" is like a library with infinitely many shelves that no reader could ever reach. The reasons further down the chain grow too complex for any human mind to grasp, so most of them are not available to anyone in any useful sense (P2). - Infinitists grant something close to this. On their view justification is never complete: a belief gains support as the chain is extended, and the chain is never finished. That concession leaves every belief short of full justification, which is a high price for avoiding foundations.
+ Probability does not need certainty. Richard Jeffrey showed how to update on uncertain evidence: seeing a cloth by candlelight, you can raise your confidence that it is green to seventy percent without anything becoming certain.
1. Jeffrey's rule is sound. Jeffrey's method, called Jeffrey conditionalization, tells you how to revise your other beliefs when an experience shifts your confidence in something without making it certain. It is good mathematics and a useful tool, and it should be granted. 2. The rule does not say where the seventy percent comes from. Jeffrey's rule says what to do once your confidence that the cloth is green has moved to seventy percent. It does not say what justifies seventy rather than forty or ninety. Something must, or the number is arbitrary. The natural answer is the way the cloth looks to you by candlelight, which is your experience, and which you are directly aware of. - Think of a dimmer switch. The wiring tells you what happens when you set the dial, but not where to set it. That takes a reason, and the reason is what you see. 3. A look that cannot be put into words can still be known. The strongest form of the objection, Jeffrey's own, says the candlelit look of the cloth is too rich and subtle to be captured in any sentence, so there is no certain belief about it to update on. Grant that no sentence of description captures it fully. The foundation was never a description. It is a pointing belief, "this is how it looks," whose content includes the look itself (P4), and that is what fixes the seventy percent. A thing does not have to be put into words to be part of what you believe. - You cannot describe a friend's face well enough for a stranger to pick it out of a crowd, but you recognize it at once. - Philosophers still debate whether every uncertain input can be traced back to certain awareness of experience in this way. But the rule itself does not show that probability can float free of certainty. It shows how probability moves once something has set it. 4. Certainty about the present does not freeze belief. A further objection says that a belief given probability one can never be revised, because the standard rule for updating (P3) can never move it, and so a careful thinker should never treat anything as certain. But the foundations are beliefs about what is present now. Tomorrow, "it looked green to me last night" is a memory, and memories can be revised as freely as anything else. What cannot be revised is the awareness itself, while it lasts, and there is nothing in it to revise.
+ Reformed epistemology: classical foundationalism is the source of the old charge that belief in God is irrational without proof. Christians should reject it, since belief in God can be basic, and most believers have no proofs.
1. Reformed epistemology is a serious view held by fellow believers. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff did real service in exposing the double standard behind the charge that belief in God is irrational. The nineteenth-century mathematician W. K. Clifford had declared that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence," and many critics of faith applied that standard to God and to nothing else. Christians who hold Reformed epistemology are brothers and sisters, and the disagreement is over the theory of knowledge, not the faith. 2. Classical foundationalism asks for evidence, not proof. Most of what anyone knows rests on probable reasoning, not on proof. The evidence for belief in God, on this view, is the same kind of thing as the evidence for anything else: experiences, testimony from people one has reason to trust, the order of the world, and the facts of history. The inner witness of the Spirit that Paul speaks of (Romans 8:16) counts too, as an experience the believer has. 3. Ordinary believers have more than they can put into words. The strongest form of the objection says that on this view belief in God needs a long chain of probable reasoning, and a child, a farmer, or most Christians in history could never lay that chain out. That should be granted: few believers could state their reasons as an argument, and the view does judge belief by the reasons a person actually has. - But the same is true of nearly everything ordinary people know. Few could set out an argument that other people have minds or that the past was real, yet they have the experiences and the trust in good witnesses that make those beliefs reasonable. - Think of a grandmother who has never read a book on logic but knows her grandson is honest. She could not write out the argument, but she has decades of evidence, and she is not believing blindly. 4. Scripture points people to evidence. Scripture does not teach a theory of knowledge, and both sides cite the same verses. Paul writes that God's "invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made" (Romans 1:20). Reformed epistemologists read that as something close to direct perception, and the verse can bear either reading. What Scripture does consistently is point people to evidence they can examine. - Luke writes his Gospel "that you may have certainty concerning the things you have been taught" (Luke 1:4). Luke's word means firm assurance, and he offers it through eyewitness testimony carefully investigated (Luke 1:1-3). On this view, that is high probability built on good evidence, not the certainty of the foundations. - Paul tells King Agrippa that the events of the gospel are public: "this has not been done in a corner" (Acts 26:26). - Peter calls believers to be "always being prepared to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you" (1 Peter 3:15). 5. Reasons that can be checked serve the gospel. A believer's own experiences are hers alone, but her reasoning can be laid on the table for a skeptic, and the skeptic can examine the public evidence and test the reasoning for himself. That is what the apostles did in their preaching, and it is what apologetics (the work of giving reasons for the faith) is for. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Internalism Philosophical Theology / Prolegomena: Meta-Apologetics: Reformed
+ Self-evident truths have turned out false. Frege's basic law of logic seemed obvious until Russell drew a contradiction from it, so even the foundations of reasoning are not certain.
1. The case is real. In the 1890s Gottlob Frege tried to build all of arithmetic on logic alone. One of his starting principles, which he called Basic Law V, in effect guaranteed that for every property there is a collection of exactly the things that have it. In 1902 Bertrand Russell wrote to him that this leads to a contradiction. Take the collection of all collections that are not members of themselves. If it is a member of itself, then it is not; and if it is not, then it is. Frege's system collapsed, and a principle a brilliant logician had built on turned out false. That should be granted plainly. 2. It never looked self-evident, even to Frege. When he published the system, Frege himself wrote that this was the one principle over which a dispute might arise. After Russell's letter, he added in an appendix that he had never hidden from himself that this law lacked the self-evidence of his other starting points. He was right to worry. It was a sweeping claim about every property whatever, and nobody sees a claim like that to be true just by understanding it. - The same goes for the other famous example, Euclid's parallel postulate, the starting assumption of geometry that says, roughly, that through a point beside a straight line exactly one parallel line can be drawn. Commentators from antiquity onward tried to prove it from the other postulates, precisely because it never looked as plain as they did. And it was not shown false as geometry. What was learned is that other geometries are just as consistent, and that physical space, as general relativity (Einstein's theory of gravity) describes it, does not exactly obey the postulate. That is a fact about the world, discovered by evidence. 3. The error was found by self-evident steps. Russell's contradiction follows from Frege's principle in a few simple steps of logic that anyone can check. The discovery relied on self-evident truths. It did not overturn them. - Think of a long sum on a grocery receipt that comes out wrong. You find the mistake by adding the simple figures again, and nobody concludes that seven plus five might not be twelve. 4. The foundations are the simple truths a person actually sees. From the inside, a complicated principle can feel obvious without being seen to be true, and there is no test that sorts every case in advance. That is why the foundations are narrow (P4): two plus two is four; nothing is red all over and green all over at the same time; a conclusion drawn from a rumor is no better than the rumor. A complicated principle, however attractive, is held as probable and tested by what follows from it.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

Public Theology

Theological Analyses of Societal Issues

Theology of the Family

Where Faith and Family Intersect

Biographies

Notable Works & Great Quotes from Key Figures

Contemporary Voices

1960 AD – present
Playlist
Justified True Belief