Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

You Cannot Deliberate About What You Believe Is Settled: The Deliberation Argument

(●) Deliberating takes for granted that nothing has settled your choice yet, and that is evidence that nothing has. + Late on a Sunday evening a nurse named Anna sits at her kitchen table with two sheets of paper. One is an offer to run the ward at the hospital in her hometown, an hour from her aging parents. The other is a list of what she would leave behind: eleven years at her own hospital, friends she trusts, a church she loves. For an hour she adds a line to one list and crosses a line off the other. That is deliberating: weighing reasons in order to decide what to do. Then her phone rings. A doctor she trusts tells her something strange. At her checkup last week, he says, she was given a drug that has already fixed how her weighing will go tonight, and so which job she will take. It will not stop her thinking or go around it. It will work through it. He does not tell her which job it will be. Something happens to Anna's deliberating at that moment. She can still wonder which job it will be, the way she might wonder how a football match will end. What she cannot do is go on weighing the offer as a question that waits on her, because she now believes it does not. Her two lists have become a way of guessing. The deliberation argument starts from that moment. The American philosopher Richard Taylor told a story with the same shape. A man named Osmo finds, in a library, a book about his own life, written long before he was born. Entry after entry comes true, and the book ends with his death in a plane crash. The difference is that Osmo knows what his next chapter says, while Anna has no idea what her drug has fixed. Yet the two of them have lost the same thing: a choice they can treat as still waiting on them. Philosophers have noticed for centuries that deliberating takes something like this for granted. Thomas Reid, the Scottish philosopher, wrote in 1788 that "Deliberation about an action of moment, whether we shall do it or not, implies a conviction that it is in our power." An action of moment is one that matters, like Anna's. In 1983 another American philosopher, Peter van Inwagen, turned the point into a challenge: "Anyone who rejected free will could not consistently deliberate about future courses of action." He pictured it with two doors. "One cannot deliberate about whether to perform a certain act unless one believes it is possible for one to perform it," he wrote. And he invited anyone who doubted it "to imagine that he is in a room with two doors and that he believes one of the doors to be unlocked and the other to be locked and impassable, though he has no idea which is which; let him then attempt to imagine himself deliberating about which door to leave by." Everything in the argument turns on one word. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. A friend who knows Anna well might be sure which job she will take, and her being sure would not make Anna take it. Even if Anna's choice were somehow guaranteed, the guarantee would not make it for her. The drug is different. It does not know the answer. It makes the answer. There is a word for a choice like Anna's. A choice is determined when it is settled beforehand by prior conditions (the past and the laws of nature, or a decree of God) that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. A row of falling dominoes is determined in this sense: the first push and the laws of motion are enough by themselves to bring down the last one. God's decree is his eternal plan for all that happens. Determinism is the view that every choice is determined. If it is true, every choice anyone makes is like Anna's after the phone call, already fixed, though nobody has told us which way. Compatibilism is the view that a choice can be free even if determinism is true, and compatibilists have an answer ready for Anna's kitchen table. All she needs in order to deliberate, they say, is not to know which job she will take, and for her own weighing to be the road by which the choice gets made. A determined person can have both. So determinism, on this reply, leaves deliberation exactly as it was. The trouble is that Anna has both of those after the phone call, and still she cannot deliberate. She does not know which job it will be, and the drug works through her own weighing. What she has lost is something else: the belief that the choice waits on her. With the word settle in hand, freedom takes one sentence to define. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. He is then its source, the one it comes from, and defining freedom this way is called the source view. So if Anna takes the hometown job, and nothing settles that but Anna herself, weighing her parents against her friends, the choice is free and she is its source. Philosophers who hold that people make free choices of a kind determinism would rule out are called libertarians, a name that has nothing to do with politics. In the ordinary run of human choices, a free choice also carries an ordinary mark: the person could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was. It is the mark and not the definition, the way a fever is the usual sign of an infection without being what an infection is. Deliberating is no part of the definition either. God is free without deliberating, and a person can choose freely with only one road open (C1, D7, D8). So the argument is about deliberation, not a definition of freedom. What deliberation shows is that we take ourselves to be the ones who settle our choices. The argument makes three claims, and they have to be kept apart. - First, deliberating takes something for granted about the choice. Nearly everyone agrees with that much. Nobody deliberates about yesterday, or about flying to the moon. - Second, what it takes for granted is that the choice is not yet settled. That is more than not knowing the outcome, and more than believing that you would do each thing if you chose it. After the phone call Anna still does not know the outcome, and she would still take either job if she chose it, yet she cannot deliberate. This is where the compatibilist's reply falls short (P1, P2). - Third, a belief that every deliberator holds, and cannot set aside while he deliberates, is evidence that it is true (P3). The argument is deductive: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. The premises work like a locked chain: if every link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. No premise has to be beyond all doubt. Each needs only to be more plausible than its denial. It runs in two chains. The first shows that deliberation is evidence that nothing settles our choices before we make them (P1, P2, P3, C1). The second adds what determinism says and draws the verdict: deliberation is evidence that determinism is false (P4, C2). Who holds what, on compatibilism: - Support: Thomas Hobbes held in 1651 that we may deliberate about whatever we think possible, and that beasts deliberate too. John Feinberg defends compatibilism today. - Oppose: Thomas Reid held in 1788 that deliberation implies a conviction that the act is in our power. William Lane Craig argues against compatibilism today. The argument that follows holds that deliberating takes for granted that nothing has settled your choice yet, and that this is evidence that nothing has.

(P1) Nobody can deliberate about a choice he believes is already settled. + A person who believes his choice is already settled cannot deliberate about it, even if he has no idea which way it will go. Nearly everyone agrees that deliberating takes something for granted; what it takes for granted is more than not knowing the outcome. (1) Deliberating takes something for granted about the choice. - Nobody sits down after dinner to deliberate about which dessert he ordered. That question is closed, and he knows it. - Even Hobbes, the great English defender of determinism, granted the point in 1651: "Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think such Deliberation vain." • Manifestly means plainly, and vain means pointless. - Reid made the same point with a man and the moon: "If a man should make an effort to fly to the moon; if he should even deliberate about it, or resolve to do it, we should conclude him to be lunatic; and even lunacy would not account for his conduct, unless it made him believe the thing to be in his power." - A leading compatibilist today agrees. He does not deliberate about whether to jump to the moon, he writes, "because (in part at least) I would not successfully jump to the moon, even if I were to choose to jump to the moon." (2) What it takes for granted is more than not knowing the outcome. - The compatibilist's answer is that deliberating needs only epistemic openness. Epistemic means having to do with knowledge, and a choice is epistemically open to a person when he does not know which way it will go. - After the phone call Anna still does not know which job she will take. Her choice is as epistemically open as it was before, and yet she cannot go on deliberating. • Some compatibilists answer that she could go on deliberating after all, and that her stopping is a mistake (D12). - So her deliberating needed more than her ignorance. It needed her belief that the choice was still hers to settle, and that belief is what the call took away. - Osmo is the opposite case. He knows exactly what his book says, while Anna has no idea what her drug has fixed. Knowing the answer ends deliberation. So, as Anna shows, does believing that something other than yourself has already fixed it. (3) It is more than believing he would do each thing if he chose it. - A second compatibilist answer points to what is called the conditional ability: the ability to do something in the sense that you would do it if you chose to. Anna would take the hometown job if she chose it, and she would stay if she chose that. - After the call she still has the conditional ability, and she would still take either job if she chose it. What has changed is that she now believes which one she will choose is already fixed, and she cannot deliberate. - So the belief deliberation needs is not the conditional one. It is a belief about how things stand now: that nothing has yet fixed which way her choosing will go. - Think of a pianist who learns that a drug like Anna's, working through her own tastes and her own weighing, has already fixed which of two pieces she will choose to play tonight. Her hands are as free as ever, and she would play either piece if she chose it. What she can no longer do is weigh the program as though the choice were still hers to make. (4) Already settled means fixed by something besides his deciding. - What ends deliberation is the belief that something besides the deliberator has already done the settling: a drug, a decree, or the past and the laws of nature. - Knowledge settles nothing. A Christian who believes that God knows today what she will choose tomorrow can still deliberate about tomorrow, because God's knowing leaves the choice to her. Her choice is known in advance, and it is not settled without her. - Think of a mother who knows that her son will pick the red bicycle. He still picks it himself, and her knowing does not pick it for him. Therefore, nobody can deliberate about a choice he believes is already settled.

(P2) Everyone who deliberates believes, while he deliberates, that his choice is not yet settled. + Every deliberator takes his choice to be waiting on him, and that includes the determinist. It is a belief he actually holds, not just a failure to believe that the choice is settled (D14). (1) Deliberating treats the choice as waiting on the deliberator. - Nobody sits down to deliberate the way he sits down to watch a match, waiting to see how it turns out. - Reid said as much in two places. One of them reads: "All our volitions and efforts to act, all our deliberations, our purposes and promises, imply a belief of active power in ourselves." • Volitions are acts of the will. Active power is the power to do something, as opposed to having something done to you. - Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher, held that every rational being with a will "has also the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this idea." A reason cannot regard its own judgment as settled from outside, he explained, "for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its judgement not to its own reason, but to an impulse." • To act under the idea of freedom is to act taking it for granted that you are free. - A defender of free will describes what anyone can notice by attending to his own deliberating: that he is doing it rather than undergoing it, that he himself is the one weighing, and that he weighs for the sake of reaching a conclusion. (2) The determinist deliberates too. - He deliberates about which job to take, what to say to his daughter, and whether determinism is true. While he does, he weighs his options as options that wait on him. - Reid noticed this in 1788: "Some of the most strenuous advocates for the doctrine of necessity acknowledge that it is impossible to act upon it." • The doctrine of necessity was the eighteenth century's name for determinism. - An atheist philosopher of mind, one who studies what minds are and how they work, draws the conclusion for rational choice: "If the act is completely determined then rationality can make no difference. It doesn't even come into play." - Picture a determinist philosopher deciding which argument to put first in his lecture on determinism. He weighs the order as though the lecture waited on him, and he could not prepare it except by weighing it that way. (3) In the ordinary case he also believes that more than one option is open. - This is a second belief, about an open door: another way the choice could have gone, there for the taking. An open door is the ordinary mark of a free choice. - Paul, writing from prison, weighed living against dying: "Yet which I shall choose I cannot tell. I am hard pressed between the two" (Philippians 1:22-23). - Jesus assumes the same of anyone making a hard decision: "Or what king, going out to encounter another king in war, will not sit down first and deliberate whether he is able with ten thousand to meet him who comes against him with twenty thousand?" (Luke 14:31). If not, "he sends a delegation and asks for terms of peace" (Luke 14:32). - The same atheist philosopher writes that "When we perform conscious voluntary actions, we typically have a sense of alternative possibilities." - The two beliefs usually travel together, but they are not the same belief. The first, that nothing has yet settled the choice, is the one every deliberator holds. (4) The belief is about the present, not a hypothetical. - It is not the belief that he would do each thing if he chose it (P1). It is the belief that, as things stand now, nothing has yet fixed which way his choosing will go. - A shopper who says "I haven't decided yet" is not reporting that she would buy either coat if she chose it. She is reporting that nothing has settled the matter yet, and that it waits on her. (5) Scripture calls its hearers to choose as people whose choice waits on them. - Moses, at the end of his life, told Israel, "I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life" (Deuteronomy 30:19). - Joshua put the same question to the next generation: "choose this day whom you will serve" (Joshua 24:15). - Elijah asked the people on Mount Carmel, "How long will you go limping between two different opinions?" (1 Kings 18:21). - Each call treats the choice as the hearers' own, still waiting on them. A coach who tells a player "your move" means that the move has not been made for him. Therefore, everyone who deliberates believes, while he deliberates, that his choice is not yet settled.

(P3) A belief every deliberator holds, and cannot give up while deliberating, is evidence that it is true. + Beliefs that come with the use of our own faculties, the mental powers we are made with, such as memory, perception and reason, are innocent until proven guilty. The belief every deliberator holds comes with the use of reason itself. (1) We trust what our faculties give us until something shows it false. - A woman believes she had toast for breakfast because she remembers it, and she does not wait for a proof before she believes it. We treat memory and perception that way all the time. - Reid argued the same for the belief in our own freedom: "We have, by our constitution, a natural conviction or belief that we act freely: A conviction so early, so universal and so necessary in most of our rational operations, that it must be the result of our constitution, and the work of him that made us." • By our constitution means by the way we are made. - A belief given by our own faculties can be overturned, but it is not guilty until it is. (2) This belief cannot be set aside while one deliberates. - Believing the choice already settled ends deliberation (P1). So a person cannot trade this belief for its denial and go on deliberating. - Nor can he drop it and deliberate with no view at all, because every deliberator holds it (P2). That includes the person who has never made up his mind about determinism (D14). - The determinist can hold his theory in the library. At the kitchen table, weighing his own next choice, he has to set it down. - Anna cannot un-believe the phone call and go back to her lists. The determinist who applies his theory to the choice in front of him is in the same position. (3) Its denial makes every deliberator mistaken every time. - If the belief is false, then every person who has ever deliberated was wrong about what he was doing, every time he did it. - Reid thought a view like that would undo trust in every faculty. To call our natural conviction of freedom a fallacious sense, he argued, "lays a foundation for universal scepticism," since "If any one of our natural faculties be fallacious, there can be no reason to trust to any of them; for he that made one made all." • Fallacious means deceiving, and universal scepticism is doubt about everything. - Think of a car whose fuel gauge has been wrong every time anyone looked at it. Its owner starts to wonder about the speedometer too, since the same factory built both. (4) It is evidence, not proof. - A witness's testimony counts until something shows the witness mistaken or lying. This belief works the same way. - It could be outweighed by strong enough evidence against it. The strongest candidates, each with its own answer, are these: • The brain scans: experiments said to show the brain deciding before the person notices (D10). • The luck objection: the worry that a choice nothing settled beforehand is only a matter of luck, like a coin that happens to land heads. The answer is that "nothing earlier settled it" does not mean "nobody settled it." The chooser settles it himself, for his reasons, and a coin has no reasons. Therefore, a belief every deliberator holds, and cannot give up while deliberating, is evidence that it is true.

(C1) Therefore, deliberation is evidence that nothing settles our choices before we make them. + Deliberation is evidence that, in the choices we deliberate over, nothing settles the choice before we make it. Every deliberator believes, while he deliberates, that his choice is not yet settled, so nobody deliberates without that belief (P2). Nor can anyone trade it for its denial and go on deliberating (P1). And a belief like that, held by every deliberator and impossible to give up while deliberating, is evidence of its truth (P3). (1) The conclusion is about the source. - What the deliberator believes is that his choice waits on his own deciding. Nothing besides his deciding, as he sees it, has fixed it. - If that belief is true, then when he decides, nothing settles the choice but him. That is what makes a choice free (●). - The open options that ordinary deliberation also takes for granted are the ordinary mark of such a choice (P2). - Think of Anna before the phone call. What she took for granted was not only that two jobs were open, but that which one she took was hers to settle. (2) It is an argument about deliberation, not a definition of freedom. - God does not deliberate. A defender of free will notes that "the word rational does not apply to God in a deliberative sense," since God does not reason his way toward what he knows. God is free all the same, because nothing outside him settles what he wills. - Christ, as the church has mainly taught, could not have chosen to sin, and he freely resisted it. - So the argument never says that freedom requires deliberating, or that a choice with only one road open is unfree. - A chess master often sees the right move at once, without weighing anything. Her move is no less hers for coming quickly. (3) Even deliberation with one road open took for granted something true. - Pilate weighed what to do with Jesus: "From then on Pilate sought to release him" (John 19:12). - On one reading, God, knowing Pilate would send Jesus to the cross, placed him only where he would do it, so that Pilate had no other road. Yet nothing settled his choice but Pilate, and it was his (D7). - So the belief every deliberator holds, that nothing has yet settled the choice, was true of Pilate. The ordinary belief in open options was the one that failed. Therefore, deliberation is evidence that nothing settles our choices before we make them.

(P4) If determinism is true, every choice is settled before it is made. + This premise simply states what determinism says, and it holds whether the settling is done by the laws of nature or by a decree. (1) Determinism says exactly this. - A choice is determined when prior conditions (the past and the laws of nature, or a decree of God) are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes (●). Determinism says every choice is like that. - So if determinism is true, every choice was settled before the one who makes it made it. - Think of the last domino in a row. It falls because of the first push and the laws of motion, and it has no say. (2) A settling from a higher level is still a settling. - Some Christians hold that God's decree, his eternal plan for all that happens, determines every choice. A decree that is enough by itself to make each choice go the way it goes settles each choice, just as the past and the laws would. - What matters is not who does the settling. It is that something besides the chooser does it. - A player piano, the kind that plays itself from a punched paper roll, plays every note of the tune, and the roll decides each one. It makes no difference whether the roll was punched by a machine or by a master. (3) Knowing is not settling. - God's knowing every choice in advance is not determinism. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing (●). - Nor is God's governing the world by placing free creatures where he knows they would freely do what he intends. On that view God ensures what happens without settling each choice. To ensure is to make sure of an outcome; to settle a choice is to make it go the way it goes. • Think of a host who knows her guests so well that she can seat them for the evening she hopes for, without putting a word in anyone's mouth. She makes sure of the evening, and every word spoken at her table is still the speaker's own. - A teacher who knows a student well enough to predict his answer has not written the answer for him. Therefore, if determinism is true, every choice is settled before it is made.

(C2) Therefore, deliberation is evidence that determinism is false. + Deliberation is evidence that determinism is false. It is evidence that nothing settles our choices before we make them (C1), and determinism says that every choice is settled before it is made (P4). (1) On determinism every deliberator is mistaken every time. - Every deliberator believes his choice is not yet settled (P2), and on determinism it always is (P4). So on determinism every deliberation that has ever happened rested on a false belief. - A defender of free will draws the conclusion about the compatibilist's deliberator: he is "actually deluded and operating under pretense." - Picture a town where every clock was set wrong on the day it was made, and every citizen checks one before every appointment. Nobody in the town has ever read the right time. (2) The determinist can deliberate only by setting his theory aside. - On determinism, deliberating is a way of finding out what prior causes have already fixed. A person who believed that about his own deliberating, while he was doing it, would be where Anna is after the phone call. - So the determinist keeps deliberating only by not believing his theory at the moment he uses his reason. That is the same conclusion, put another way. - Kant granted this much, as far as acting goes: a being "that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is just for that reason in a practical point of view really free." • In a practical point of view means as far as acting is concerned. Kant meant to keep determinism for the world that science studies. Whether the two points of view can both be kept is a question of its own (D9). (3) The determinist's own words borrow from the belief he denies. - A defender of free will sets two sentences side by side: "Rae deliberated about P," and "A deliberating-about-P was caused to occur in Rae." The first is what we all say, determinists included. On determinism, he argues, the second is the whole truth about what happened. • P stands for whatever question she is weighing, such as whether to sell the house. - The first sentence puts Rae in charge of her deliberating. It borrows, without paying, the very belief determinism denies. - Compatibilists answer that both sentences are true, since the deliberating in Rae is her own. And so it is, in the thin sense that it runs through her, as Anna's weighing still does after the phone call (P1). It is not hers in the sense Rae means when she says "I'm still deciding," which is that the question waits on her. - Compare "the pilot landed the plane" with "the plane was landed through the pilot's hands, every movement of them fixed before takeoff." If the second were the whole truth, the pilot would be where the landing happened, not the one who landed it. (4) Weighed side by side, the evidence tips against determinism. - On one side stands a belief held by everyone who has ever deliberated, the determinist included, whenever he deliberated. - On the other stands determinism, which no science has shown. The standard reference work on free will concludes that current science "does not decisively support the idea that everything we do is pre-determined by the past." - When a claim nobody has shown collides with a belief nobody can live without, the claim carries the burden. - A map that shows a bridge where every traveler finds a river gets corrected. Nobody corrects the travelers. Therefore, deliberation is evidence that determinism is false.

On deliberation: Caruso, Gregg D. "On the Compatibility of Rational Deliberation and Determinism: Why Deterministic Manipulation Is Not a Counterexample." Philosophical Quarterly 71, no. 3 (2021): 524-543. Cohen, Yishai. "Deliberating in the Presence of Manipulation." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 1 (2018): 85-105. Dennett, Daniel C. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984. Chapter 5, "Acting Under the Idea of Freedom." Fischer, John Martin. "Compatibilism." In John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom and Manuel Vargas, Four Views on Free Will. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007. Page 49. Kapitan, Tomis. "Deliberation and the Presumption of Open Alternatives." Philosophical Quarterly 36, no. 143 (1986): 230-251. Nelkin, Dana Kay. "Deliberative Alternatives." Philosophical Topics 32, no. 1 (2004): 215-240. Nelkin, Dana Kay. Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pereboom, Derk. "A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation." Journal of Ethics 12 (2008): 287-306. Pereboom, Derk. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Searle, John R. Rationality in Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. Pages 66-67 and 202. Taylor, Richard. Metaphysics. 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992. Chapter 6, "Fate." van Inwagen, Peter. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. Pages 19 and 154. On freedom defined by its source: Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013. O'Connor, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. "Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2022. Section 3.1. Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Pages 306-327, with notes 552, 555 and 562, and Appendix VI, pages 614-615. Critic sources engaged: Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018. Pages 87-91. Feinberg, John S. No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001. Historical sources: Cicero. De fato 28-30. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. London, 1651. Chapter 6, page 28, and chapter 21, page 108. Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. London, 1739. Book I, part 4, section 7. Kant, Immanuel. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. 1785. Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott. Third Section (Ak. 4:448). Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Edinburgh, 1788. Essay I, chapter 2, page 19, and Essay IV, chapter 6, pages 312-315. The Westminster Confession of Faith (1646), chapter 3.1. In Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3. New York: Harper, 1877. Biblical citations: Deuteronomy 30:19; Joshua 24:15; 1 Kings 18:21; Psalm 139:16; Proverbs 16:9; Proverbs 19:21; Luke 14:28-32; John 19:10-12; Acts 15:6-29; Ephesians 1:11; Philippians 1:21-24; James 4:13-15.
+ Deliberation needs only ignorance of the outcome, not its openness. A chess engine weighs its options and picks the one it was always going to pick, and so do we.
This is the compatibilist's oldest answer. Thomas Hobbes gave it in 1651: "of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not knowing it is in vain." And he drew the natural conclusion, that deliberating is only the back-and-forth of wants and fears, so "Beasts also Deliberate." The American philosopher Daniel Dennett argued in 1984 that we can go on deliberating while believing the world is determined. "It is up to me," on this reply, means only that my deliberating is the cause of what I do, and determinism grants that. 1. The engine believes nothing. Nobody thinks a chess engine, the program that plays chess on a computer or a phone, believes that anything is open. It does not believe anything at all. But the argument is about what the deliberator must believe, not about what the process must be (P2), so the engine cannot show what a believer may believe while he deliberates. - Hobbes's beasts are the same case. If deliberating is only the back-and-forth of wants and fears, a dog torn between two bowls does it, and the dog tells us nothing about what a reasoner believes while he weighs reasons. - A thermostat "decides" when to turn on the heat. Nobody thinks it has reached a verdict. 2. "My deliberation is the cause" is not the whole of what deliberators believe. After the phone call, Anna's deliberating would still be the cause of her choice, since the drug works through her own weighing (●). Yet she cannot deliberate. What she lost was not the belief that her deliberating causes her choice. It was the belief that the outcome waits on her decision. 3. Hobbes's own account makes deliberation rest on a belief. Look again at Hobbes's sentence: of things impossible "which we think possible, we may Deliberate." Even for the founder of this reply, then, ignorance is not all that keeps a deliberation going. The deliberator also has to think each option possible. - The dispute is over what "possible" has to mean there. Hobbes's heirs read it as the conditional ability, what a person would do if he chose it (D3). Anna keeps that ability after the phone call and still cannot deliberate (P1), so the possibility deliberators take for granted is more than that. - Think of a woman weighing two restaurants for dinner. Tell her that one of them closed for good last month, though not which, and she stops weighing and starts phoning. Her not knowing survived the news. Her belief that both were possible did not. 4. The burden lies with the determinist. A determinist who believes his next choice is already fixed by the past, and deliberates about it anyway, is doing what Anna cannot (P1). The burden of explaining how falls on him. The hard line, which says that Anna could go on deliberating too, is his attempt to meet it (D12). - Think of a man who says he can read a newspaper in a pitch-dark room. His friends do not owe him a proof that he cannot. He owes them an explanation of how he does it. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free
+ Derk Pereboom argues that rational deliberation needs only two things, epistemic openness and a belief that deliberating works. A determinist can have both without holding any belief that contradicts his determinism.
Pereboom himself doubts that anyone has the kind of free will that deserved blame needs. But he argues that a person who believes determinism can still deliberate rationally, and his account of how is among the most careful on offer. It builds on earlier ones by Tomis Kapitan and Dana Nelkin, and it has two conditions. - Epistemic openness: to deliberate rationally among several actions, a person must not be certain which she will do, and nothing she takes as fixed for the purposes of deliberating may rule any of them out. Pereboom calls what she believes and does not doubt while deliberating settled for her (for Anna, say, that the hometown hospital is an hour from her parents). That is a different sense of "settled" from the one in (P1) and (P2), where a settled choice is one already fixed by something besides her deciding. - Deliberative efficacy, the belief that deliberating works, which Pereboom labels (DE): she "must believe that if as a result of her deliberating about whether to do A1 or A2 she were to judge that it would be best to do A1, then, under normal conditions, she would also, on the basis of this deliberation, do A1; and similarly for A2." • A1 and A2 stand for the actions she is choosing between, such as taking the new job or staying where she is. A determinist can meet both conditions. He does not know what he will choose, and he believes that his deliberating will make the difference. 1. The first condition changes the subject. The question was what deliberation takes for granted about the choice itself: whether it is still to be settled. The first condition answers a different question: what the deliberator knows. A defender of free will puts it plainly: this "shift simply changes the subject." Anna's case shows that knowing is not the whole of it (P1). - Asking whether a bridge will hold is not the same question as asking whether you know it will. 2. On determinism the deliberator believes something false. The deliberator takes each option to be a live one that waits on him. On determinism only one of them was ever going to happen, and his ignorance is what hides that from him. The same defender of free will concludes that such a deliberator "is actually deluded and operating under pretense." - Picture an actor so lost in his part that he forgets there is a script. On stage he weighs whether his character should forgive the villain, as though the scene waited on him. The script settled it months ago, and only his forgetting hides that from him. 3. Anna meets both conditions and still cannot deliberate. After the phone call Anna does not know which job she will take, so her choice is epistemically open. She believes her weighing will lead to her choice, since the drug works through it. Both conditions hold, and yet she cannot go on deliberating (P1). So the two conditions are not enough. - Think of a student told that his grade was fixed before the exam began, along with every answer he will write to earn it. He does not know the grade, and his answers will still lead to it. He can finish the exam. He cannot take it seriously. 4. Believing that deliberation works is believing in the source. The second condition, (DE), can be read two ways, and neither rescues the reply. - Read as it is written, (DE) is a conditional: if she judged one action best, she would do it. Anna still believes that after the phone call and still cannot deliberate. Read this way, the condition is not enough. - Read the way a deliberator means it when she says her weighing will make the difference, it is the belief that she will make the difference herself, by exercising a power that is hers, and not merely that the difference will be made through her. The same defender of free will draws the consequence: "if the person in (DE) believes in the efficacy of deliberation, she believes in libertarian freedom." - Think of a voter who believes her vote will make the difference. She means that she will cast it, not that a vote will be cast through her hand. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+ The argument trades on an equivocation. Deliberation needs only the belief that one would do each option if one chose it, and the story of the two doors shows nothing more.
This is the answer of the leading Reformed defender of compatibilism. The Reformed are the Protestant churches that go back to John Calvin. An equivocation is reasoning that slides between two meanings of one word, the way "A ham sandwich is better than nothing, and nothing is better than eternal happiness, so a ham sandwich is better than eternal happiness" slides on "nothing." The charge is that the deliberation argument slides between two meanings of being able to do something. He grants that nobody deliberates about the impossible. But what deliberating requires, he argues, is the conditional ability: "What matters is that we believe that the options before us would be accessible if we were to choose them." And that ability fits determinism perfectly. He then takes apart the story of the two doors (●), in which a man believes one door is locked but does not know which. On every reading of the story, he argues, the man either lacks the conditional ability too, or does not deliberate because "as far as he knows, whichever door he picks will have the exact same outcome." His verdict sets the conditional ability beside a stronger one. A categorical ability is the ability to choose either way with everything before the choice exactly as it was, as opposed to the conditional ability to act if one chose. So, he concludes, "a categorical ability is incompatible with determinism but not shown to be necessary for rational deliberation, while a conditional ability is necessary for rational deliberation but perfectly compatible with determinism." 1. His reading of the story is right. The two doors do not show what their author wanted them to show, and the argument does not rest on them. They are a picture of the belief, not a proof of it. - A police sketch helps people picture the man a witness saw. It does not prove that anyone did anything. 2. The belief at issue is not about an ability at all. It is the belief that nothing has yet settled which way the choice will go (P2). "I would leave by door A if I chose to" is compatible with its being settled that I will not choose to. The conditional ability says what would happen if I chose. It says nothing about whether my choosing is already fixed. - A diner can believe she would order the fish if she chose it, and also believe that a drug like Anna's, working through her own weighing, has already fixed which dish she will choose. 3. The reply supplies half of what the deliberator believes. Anna, after the phone call, still has the conditional ability (P1). She still cannot deliberate. So the conditional ability is necessary, as he says, but it is not enough. What she is missing is the second half, the belief that the choice is still hers to settle, and his reply is silent about it. 4. The question his reply leaves. What does a determinist believe about his own next choice while he deliberates about it? If he believes it is already settled, he is where Anna is. If he believes it is not, he believes something his theory says is false. - Think of a woman who believes a fortune-teller's word that fate has already fixed which of her two suitors she will choose, though the fortune-teller will not say which. While she believes it, she cannot weigh them in earnest. If she does weigh them in earnest, she has stopped believing the fortune-teller. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Doing What You Want Is Not the Same as Being Free
+ Anna is thrown by what is peculiar to her case: a drug, perhaps a manipulator, a steering that may not follow her reasons. The only source deliberation needs is that the choice come through one's own reasoning, and ordinary determinism leaves that intact.
The American philosopher Gregg Caruso has defended this reply against the case of the manipulated deliberator, a person like Anna who learns that someone has already fixed how her deliberating will go. He argues "that the notion of 'sourcehood' relevant to rational deliberation differs from that involved in free will." On this reply, all that deliberation needs by way of a source is that the choice come through the deliberator's own reasoning. So either Anna could go on deliberating after all (D12), or what throws her belongs to her story and not to determinism: a drug, a manipulator who meant her choice to come out a certain way, a steering that may not answer to her reasons. 1. Take the manipulator away. Suppose the drug was given by mistake, by a nurse who meant to give a vitamin. Or suppose Anna learns that a rare condition in her brain has already fixed how her weighing will go. Nobody planned anything, and her deliberating stops just the same. - A traveler who learns that the train's route was set long ago by nobody in particular is as unable to steer it as one who learns that a villain set it. 2. Nothing in the case needs to bypass her reasons. To bypass someone's reasons is to reach the outcome around them, the way a hypnotist's command does. If Anna's drug worked like that, the reply would be right that her case shows nothing about determinism, which bypasses nothing. It does not work like that: it works through her weighing (●). Suppose the doctor spells it out. The drug fixes the whole present state of Anna's mind, her reasons included, so that her weighing runs on her own reasons, answers to them as it always has, and ends in the job they lead her to. Nothing is skipped. The only change is that the outcome is fixed now, before the weighing, by conditions enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes, which is what determinism says of every choice (P4). - Hobbes pictured an action that is free and necessary at once as water that has "not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the Channel." Nothing pushes the water, and it runs by its own weight, yet the channel decides where it goes. - Told all that, Anna has learned nothing about her choice that a determinist does not believe about every one of his. If she still cannot deliberate, the settling is what stopped her. 3. There is no relevant difference from the ordinary determinist. The philosopher who built the manipulated-deliberator case argues that nothing separates the manipulated deliberator from an ordinary determinist who applies his theory to his own next choice. Both believe something other than their deciding has already fixed the outcome, and neither knows which way. - A verdict sealed in an envelope is just as final whether an honest judge wrote it or a bribed one did. The person holding the envelope can wonder what it says, but either way the deciding is over. 4. The source deliberators believe in is the full one. When Anna sits down with her lists, she does not believe merely that her choice will run through her reasoning. She believes it waits on her. That is the belief a deliberator holds (P2), and it is the same thing freedom requires: that nothing settles the choice but the one who makes it. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+ If God already knows what you will choose, or if it is already true what you will choose, then your choice is settled too. The Christian is in Anna's position.
Richard Taylor argued that Osmo's fatalism, his belief that nothing about his future was up to him, did not depend on his book. What made his future fixed, Taylor held, was simply that there were true statements about it, and there are such statements about everyone's future. On Christian belief God knows them all, and Scripture even seems to describe Osmo's book: "in your book were written, every one of them, the days that were formed for me, when as yet there was none of them" (Psalm 139:16). So the believer, the objection says, has no better right to deliberate than the determinist. 1. Knowing is not settling. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing (●). God's knowing what a person will choose makes nothing happen, and it leaves the choice as open as it finds it. Known in advance is not the same as settled without you. - A weather forecaster who knows it will rain tomorrow does not make it rain. 2. A truth about the future waits on the choice. It is true today that Anna will choose one job because she will choose it. The truth depends on the choice, not the choice on the truth. That one-way dependence is why a true statement about the future does no settling. - A photograph of tomorrow's sunrise, if one could take it, would show the sunrise because the sun will rise. It would not make the sun rise. 3. The believer's position is not Anna's or Osmo's. Osmo knows what his book says, and Anna believes her drug has fixed her choice. The believer is in neither position. She believes God knows her choice, and she believes that nothing but she herself will settle it. So she can deliberate without believing anything her theology says is false. 4. The psalmist's book is not Osmo's. - The psalm praises God for knowing the psalmist before he was born and for ordering his days. Nothing in it says the book makes his choices go the way they go. God can order what he knows without settling each choice (P4). - Osmo reads ahead, and the psalmist does not. Knowing his next chapter is what took Osmo's deliberating from him (P1), and no believer has been handed his. 5. Scripture's planners plan under God's knowledge and will. James does not tell traders to stop planning. He tells them to plan humbly: "Instead you ought to say, If the Lord wills, we will live and do this or that" (James 4:15). And the apostles and elders who met in Jerusalem to decide what to ask of non-Jewish believers, after "there had been much debate" (Acts 15:7), wrote, "For it has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us" (Acts 15:28). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+ Scripture says that the Lord establishes our steps and that his purpose will stand. If God's decree settles every choice, then believers deliberate about settled choices every day, and deliberation shows nothing.
The objection has texts behind it. "The heart of man plans his way, but the Lord establishes his steps" (Proverbs 16:9). "Many are the plans in the mind of a man, but it is the purpose of the Lord that will stand" (Proverbs 19:21). God "works all things according to the counsel of his will" (Ephesians 1:11). Its strongest form adds a counterexample. Christians who hold that the decree settles every choice deliberate every day without any sense of contradiction, because the decree ordains the means along with the ends, their deliberating included. The Westminster Confession, a Reformed statement of faith from 1646, says that by the decree "nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established." Second causes are the creatures God works through, as distinct from God himself, the first cause. Contingency is the opposite of necessity: a contingent event is one that need not have happened. 1. The texts affirm real planning. "The heart of man plans his way" (Proverbs 16:9). The planning is the man's own, and nothing in the verse calls it a pretense. What the verses add is that God's purpose governs where the plans lead. - A ship's captain plots his own course, and the harbor master decides which berth the ship will have when it arrives. 2. God can ensure his purpose without settling each choice. On the view that God knows what every creature would freely do in any circumstance, he can govern the world by choosing which free creatures to place where. He ensures what happens without making each choice go the way it goes. The verses fit that view as well as they fit determinism. - Think of a coach who knows his players so well that he can put each one where she will play her best, without making a single play for her. 3. The confession's words can be read two ways. - On one reading, God keeps the chooser and his power in existence and acts together with him, while the chooser settles which way the choice goes. Then the liberty of second causes really is established, the believer's sense that his choice waits on him is true, and the confession and (C1) do not conflict. - On the other, the decree itself makes each choice go the way it goes. God is not a rival cause inside the world, as Anna's drug is, but the first cause, working in and through the believer's deliberating. This is the answer at its strongest. Even so, the believer's deliberating is then the road the decree takes. Being the road is not what a deliberator believes about himself: he believes the choice waits on him (P2). - Catholic theologians argued over views much like these two around 1600, and in 1607 Pope Paul V ended the dispute without deciding it. - So the believers in the counterexample deliberate as Anna did before the phone call, taking the choice to wait on them. Whether that is true of them is what divides the two readings. 4. A decree that settled each choice would make each deliberation rest on a false belief. A settling from a higher level is still a settling (P4). If the decree made every choice go the way it goes, every believer who ever deliberated believed something false while he did it. The objection then meets the argument where the determinist does (C2). - Think of the characters in a novel. If one of them believed that his next decision waited on him and not on the author, he would be wrong, however wise and good the author is. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+ On the source view's own story, Pilate had no real option to release Jesus. So deliberators can be wrong about their options, and their beliefs about their choices prove nothing.
Pilate deliberated: "From then on Pilate sought to release him" (John 19:12). Yet on one reading, God, knowing Pilate would send Jesus to the cross, placed him only where he would do it. A leading defender of free will puts it this way: "Pilate did not under the circumstances have the ability to let Jesus go. Yet he freely sent Jesus to the cross, since nothing determined him to do so." If Pilate could be wrong about his options while he deliberated, why trust any deliberator's beliefs? 1. Pilate's core belief was true. What every deliberator believes is that nothing has yet settled his choice (P2). That was true of Pilate. Nothing settled his choice but Pilate, "since nothing determined him to do so." - A painter at her easel believes that what the picture will show waits on her. If nobody is guiding her brush, she is right, whatever else she may be wrong about. 2. His power to release Jesus was not taken away. Nothing prevented Pilate from releasing Jesus, and nothing took away his power to do it. What could not happen, God having resolved as he did, was that Pilate stood there and released him. That is the one sense in which his door was shut. It is also what "under the circumstances" means in the defender's sentence. - Think of a host who is never wrong about her guests, and who resolves to seat Tom beside Jane only if he would ask her to dance. Seated there, Tom keeps every power he had, and nothing stops him from staying in his chair. What cannot happen is that the host, having resolved as she did, seats him there and he stays put. Her resolve settled where he sat, not what he did. - Scripture counts the sin his: "he who delivered me over to you has the greater sin" (John 19:11), which leaves Pilate a lesser sin of his own. 3. The ordinary mark can be missing while the core belief holds. Open options are the ordinary mark of a free choice (P2), and in the ordinary run of choices the belief in them is true. Pilate's case is the rare one in which the mark was missing and the choice was still free. The belief the argument rests on, that nothing had settled the choice, never failed. - A driver who takes the only road out of town, not knowing that a bridge on the other road washed out last night, still drives where she chose to drive. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door
+ The argument proves too much. God does not deliberate, and Christ could not have chosen to sin, so if deliberation is what shows freedom, God and Christ are not free.
An argument proves too much when, if it worked, it would also prove something its own defenders reject: in this case, that God and Christ are not free. 1. The argument concerns deliberators. It shows what a person takes for granted when he deliberates, and that this is evidence that nothing settles his choice before he makes it. It never says that only deliberators are free. God does not reason his way to what he knows, since he knows all things already (C1). - A marathon shows that a runner has stamina. It does not show that nobody who never runs has any. 2. Freedom does not require deliberating. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own (●). God meets that condition without weighing options. The saints in glory (God's people in heaven) meet it without a door open to evil: nothing settles their goodness but the saints themselves, who do good because they love God. - A friend asked to help you move says yes before you have finished the sentence. He weighed nothing, and the yes was still his. 3. Christ's freedom is untouched. Christ could not have chosen to sin, and he freely resisted sin, because nothing outside him settled his choices. The argument says nothing against that. - A man who cannot be talked into betraying his friend still keeps faith himself. Nobody keeps it for him. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God
+ Kant himself held that we must act under the idea of freedom while nature is determined. The deliberator's belief belongs to the point of view of action and does not compete with the point of view of science.
Kant held that a rational being must regard itself as free when it acts, and also that everything in nature, as science studies it, is causally determined. The two claims, he argued, belong to two points of view: the practical, the standpoint of someone deciding what to do, and the theoretical, the standpoint of someone studying how the world works. Some compatibilists today make a similar move: the openness of a choice is how it looks from the point of view of the person making it, and determinism is how it looks from outside. 1. Kant's point about action is right. A rational being "acts entirely under" the idea of freedom, because it cannot regard its own judgment as settled from outside (P2). That much the argument uses. - Try adding up a column of figures while believing that your answer was fixed beforehand, whatever the figures are. You could still write a number down, but you could not treat it as the sum you worked out. 2. Two points of view cannot make one belief both true and false. The deliberator believes that nothing has yet settled his choice. Determinism says something has. Both are claims about the same choice, and at most one of them is true. A person can hold both only by not holding them together. - If the two points of view were sealed off from each other, news about causes could never reach the kitchen table. It does. The phone call was news about causes, and it ended Anna's deliberating (P1). - A pilot can fly by his instruments or by his eyes. If the two disagree about the ground ahead, he cannot believe both. 3. The belief in use has the better claim. The belief comes with the act of reasoning itself, and determinism is a theory reached by reasoning (P3). A theory that says the reasoning behind it rests on a false belief has sawn off the branch it sits on.
+ The feeling that a choice waits on us is an illusion. Evolution would have given it to us whether or not it is true, and the brain decides before we notice.
1. Explaining a belief's origin does not refute it. Suppose evolution did give us the belief that our choices wait on us. That would explain why we have it. It would not show that it is false, any more than explaining why we believe in other minds (that other people have thoughts and feelings too) shows that there are none. - A child learns from her mother that the stove is hot. How she came to believe it does not make it false. 2. The careful version needs a showing, not a story. Stated carefully, the objection does not distrust every belief produced by causes we did not choose. That crude rule would reach the determinist's own reasoning too, as the atheist philosopher of mind (P2) saw: "If the act is completely determined then rationality can make no difference." The careful version says a belief is undercut when the process that produced it would have produced it whether or not it was true, the way testimony is undercut when the witness was paid to give it. That principle is sound. - To use it against this belief, the debunker has to show that taking our choices to wait on us would have served our ancestors just as well if they did not. What is on offer is a conjecture about how the belief might have arisen. A conjecture does not defeat a belief every deliberator holds (P3). - A smoke alarm is worthless if it would sound whether or not there is smoke. Nobody has shown that this one is wired that way. 3. The brain scans have not found the decision before the decider. The famous experiments measured brain activity before simple, arbitrary movements. They did not measure deliberating about anything that mattered. The standard reference work on free will reports that after extensive study, "neuroscientists are uncertain what it signifies." - The volunteers were asked to flex a wrist or press a button whenever the urge came, with no reason to prefer one moment to another. Nobody was weighing a job offer. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: The Brain Scans Have Not Found the Decision Before the Decider Philosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free
+ People deliberate about choices they are sure they will make. A man sure he will say yes to his daughter's request still weighs it, so deliberating does not need the belief that the choice is unsettled.
1. Being sure is not believing it settled. A man can be confident of what he will decide, the way a friend can be confident of it, and still believe that the deciding is his. Confidence is a prediction about himself. The belief that ends deliberation is that something besides his deciding has already fixed the answer (P1). - A groom who is sure he will say "I do" still says it himself. 2. Where he truly knows, he deliberates about something else. When a man already knows what he will decide, he stops deliberating about that and deliberates about what is still open: how to say yes, when, and on what terms. - A father sure he will pay for his daughter's wedding may still weigh how big it should be.
+ Anna could go on deliberating, and she should, since her weighing is still the road by which her choice gets made. Quitting because the outcome is fixed is the ancient lazy argument, and the Stoics answered it long ago.
The strongest form of this reply says that Anna's reaction to the phone call is a mistake, not a discovery. She still does not know which job she will take, and she still believes her weighing will lead to her choice, which is all that some compatibilists think rational deliberation needs (D2). On their view she can deliberate as well as she ever could, and she should. A reply that denies the verdict on a case, instead of explaining the verdict away, is called a hard-line reply. 1. The lazy argument is a fallacy. The lazy argument reasoned from fate to the pointlessness of effort, and it was answered in the ancient world. - The Roman statesman Cicero reports its classic form: if you are fated to recover from an illness, you will recover whether or not you call the doctor, so calling him is pointless. The Stoic philosopher Chrysippus answered that the recovery and the calling were fated together. The outcome runs through the effort. • The Stoics were an ancient school of philosophers who held that everything happens by fate. - That answer is right, and (P1) does not deny it. If Anna's choice is fixed through her weighing, her weighing still does its work, and she has no reason to tear up her lists. 2. The Stoic answer restores the weighing's use, not the belief. (P1) is a claim about what Anna can believe while she weighs, not about whether her weighing matters. The Stoic answer shows that the outcome runs through her. It does not give back what the phone call took: the belief that which job she takes waits on her. - Two senses of "can" are in play. In the passive sense, a weighing can still go on in Anna and lead to her choice: it happens in her. In the active sense, the one she means when she says "I can decide this," the deciding is something she does. The Stoic answer secures the first. What the phone call took is her belief in the second. - Think of a driver told that her route home has been fixed, every turn of it, to be carried out through her own judgment and her own hands on the wheel. She still has to steer, and her steering still gets her home. But she steers the way a passenger reads road signs, to learn where she is going, not to decide it. 3. On this question the two sides reach bedrock. Some compatibilists answer that deciding what to do and finding out what one will do are one process described two ways, and that Anna's reaction is a feeling to be corrected, not a belief to be respected. This is where intuitions divide. (P1) claims only to be more plausible than its denial, not to be beyond dispute. Three things favor it. - The verdict is not a stray feeling. A deliberator knows what deliberating is by acquaintance, from the inside, the way a person who can see knows what red is. When he attends to it, what he finds is deciding, not finding out (P2). "I haven't decided yet" does not mean "I haven't found out yet." • A volunteer who knows the magician will force a card on her, through her own hand and her own sense of which card to take, still reaches out and takes one. She does not stand there deliberating over which. - Reid saw where the hard line leads. A man who acts on determinism, he argued, must add to every deliberation a condition that is not in his power, "if we shall be willing," and then "A man might as well deliberate, resolve and promise, upon the actions of other men as upon his own." Nobody decides what his neighbor will do. He can only predict it. - The hard line has to say that every deliberator misdescribes what he is doing every time he does it, the determinist included (C2). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+ A voter who knows a hidden device will force his vote if he wavers still weighs the candidates. He believes his vote can come out only one way, so deliberating cannot need the belief that the choice is unsettled.
The case is the neurosurgeon's, one of the best-known thought experiments in the debate (a made-up story built to test an idea). A neurosurgeon has fitted a device into a voter's brain. If the voter shows any sign of leaning toward the other candidate, the device will step in and make him vote the neurosurgeon's way. If he votes that way on his own, it does nothing. Now suppose the voter knows all this. He believes his vote can come out only one way, and he can still sit down and weigh the candidates. 1. The voter can deliberate with the other vote out of reach. That much the case shows, and it is granted. Open options are the ordinary mark of a free choice, and deliberators ordinarily believe in them. But the belief every deliberator holds is a different one: that nothing has yet settled the choice (P2). - A swimmer who knows the lifeguard will haul her out the moment she drifts past the rope still swims her own lengths, and still decides how many. 2. A guarantee is not a settling. Only one outcome is possible for the voter, but nothing besides him settles which way he votes. The device waits on him: it does nothing unless he starts to lean the other way. So when he weighs the candidates he believes his vote waits on him, and he is right (P2). - In the case as told, the device waits for a sign of how he is leaning, so he could still begin to lean the other way, though not carry the other vote through. - Whether rebuilt versions of the case can take even that away is still argued, and the source view stands either way. Pilate had no door open at all, and nothing settled his choice but him (D7). - A bank that has promised to cover any check you write makes it certain that every check clears. It writes none of them. 3. The difference shows once the device has acted. Suppose the voter learns instead that the device fired last night and fixed his vote, to be carried out through his own weighing. Nothing is waiting on him now, and he is where Anna is after the phone call (P1). - So the two voters differ exactly as a guarantee differs from a settling. The first knows only one outcome can happen, and he weighs. The second believes the outcome has already been made, and he cannot. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door
+ Deliberating needs only the absence of the belief that a choice is settled, or at most a working assumption that it is not. Agnostics about determinism deliberate every day, and neither an absence nor an assumption is evidence of anything.
The strongest form of this objection starts from a gap. (P1) shows at most that believing a choice settled ends deliberation. It does not show that deliberating needs the opposite belief. And plenty of people deliberate who have never asked whether their choices are settled, or who have asked and suspend judgment. Those who suspend judgment, believing neither that determinism is true nor that it is false, are agnostics about it. Some philosophers describe what deliberation needs as a presumption: a working assumption taken up for the purpose of deciding, the way a court presumes a defendant innocent without believing it. Evidence comes from beliefs, not from assumptions adopted to get a job done. 1. The gap is real. Not believing that a choice is settled is different from believing that nothing has settled it. (P1) gives only the first. That every deliberator holds the second is (P2)'s own claim, argued from what deliberating is like and from the way it treats the choice as waiting on the deliberator. - A man with no view about tomorrow's weather does not believe it will rain. He does not believe it will stay dry either. 2. Most beliefs are held without ever being thought about. - A man crossing a room has never once asked whether the floor will hold him. He believes it will, and you can see it in how he walks, and in his shock if a board gives way. - The deliberator's belief shows the same way: in how he weighs, as one deciding, and in what stops him, the news that his choice has already been fixed (P1). 3. A working assumption survives the knowledge that it is false. - A defense lawyer presumes the innocence of a client he privately believes guilty, and does his job well. An actor plays a king knowing he is no king. - Anna cannot presume that her choice waits on her while believing it does not (P1). An assumption she could take up at will would survive the phone call. This one does not, and that is the mark of a belief, not a tool. - Deliberating ends in a resolution, and Reid saw that a resolution rests on a conviction, not a supposition: "A man cannot resolve to lay out a sum of money, which he neither has, nor hopes ever to have." He can suppose he has it and daydream about spending it. He cannot resolve to spend it. 4. The agnostic is an agnostic in the library. - David Hume, the eighteenth-century Scottish skeptic, confessed that the doubts his philosophy raised melted away when he dined, played backgammon and talked with his friends. - The agnostic about determinism is unsure about a theory. When he weighs his own next choice, he weighs it as one that waits on him, and the theory stays on the shelf. - Someone who insists she is unsure even at the table still weighs her options as though they waited on her, and she stops the moment she believes they do not (P1). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free

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