Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

Public Theology

Theological Analyses of Societal Issues

Theology of the Family

Where Faith and Family Intersect

Biographies

Notable Works & Great Quotes from Key Figures

Contemporary Voices

1960 AD – present

Daniel Dennett of Boston 1942 – 2024 AD

(●) The Tufts philosopher who spent fifty years arguing that a mind is what a brain does, and that Darwin explains the rest. + Most atheists of his generation argued that God does not exist. Daniel Dennett did something harder and, for Christians, more useful to understand: he tried to show how everything believers point to as a sign of God (the design in living things, the inner light of consciousness, free choice, moral responsibility, religion itself) could have been built from the bottom up by processes with no mind behind them. He called those processes cranes, after the machines on a building site that lift steel from the ground up rather than lowering it from the sky (T1), and he spent a career showing what he thought cranes could lift. That makes him the clearest guide there is to the materialist picture of the world, the view that matter is all there is. Where other critics mocked, Dennett explained, and he usually explained well. He was one of the "Four Horsemen" of the New Atheism, the wave of best-selling books against religion that broke in the middle of the 2000s, alongside Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens. But he was the only professional philosopher among them, and the one whose academic work Christian philosophers had been answering longest, well before the label was invented. What a reader tends to remember, though, is the man himself. He was big and bearded and looked like a sea captain, and in a way he was one: he sailed his own boat, played the piano, and made cider on a farm in Maine. When a torn aorta nearly killed him in 2006, he wrote an essay thanking the surgeons and the goodness of human skill, and pointedly not God.

(●) 1942 AD: Born in Boston and raised partly in Beirut, he lost his father to a plane crash just before his fifth birthday. + Daniel Clement Dennett III was born in Boston on 28 March 1942. His father, Daniel Clement Dennett Jr., held a Harvard doctorate in Islamic studies and spent the war years in Beirut working for the Office of Strategic Services, the American wartime intelligence service, under the cover of a cultural attaché at the American legation (a small diplomatic mission, one step below an embassy). So the boy’s earliest memories were of Lebanon, not New England. In March 1947, four days before the boy turned five, his father was killed in a plane crash in Ethiopia. His mother, Ruth, brought the children home to Massachusetts, and Dennett grew up in Winchester, outside Boston. He went to Phillips Exeter Academy, graduating in 1959, and spent a year at Wesleyan University before transferring to Harvard.

(●) 1963 AD: A book by Quine drew him to Harvard, and Harvard sent him on to Gilbert Ryle at Oxford. + At Wesleyan he read From a Logical Point of View, a book by the Harvard logician and philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine, and decided he had to study with its author. So he moved to Harvard, where Quine taught, and took his degree in philosophy in 1963. Quine’s habit of mind stayed with him for life: philosophy should not stand apart from science, telling it from an armchair what is possible, but should work alongside it, the way a good engineer works beside the builders on site. From Harvard he went to Oxford to study under Gilbert Ryle, the philosopher who had mocked the old picture of the mind as "the ghost in the machine," Ryle’s phrase for an invisible soul steering the body the way a pilot steers a ship. Dennett earned his doctorate there in 1965, and the thesis became his first book, Content and Consciousness (1969). Already the question was set that would occupy him for the rest of his life. A thought about Paris is about Paris; a stone lying in a Paris street is about nothing at all. So how can a lump of living matter be about anything, see anything, or mean anything? Along the way, in 1962, he had married Susan Bell, and they were together for the remaining sixty-two years of his life.

(●) 1971 AD: At Tufts he began a career of five decades, building a bridge between philosophy and the brain sciences. + After six years at the University of California, Irvine, Dennett moved in 1971 to Tufts University near Boston, and stayed for the rest of his working life, as Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy and co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies. He was unusual among philosophers in spending as much time with neuroscientists, psychologists and computer scientists as with other philosophers, and they took him seriously in return. The essays of these years, collected in Brainstorms (1978), reached far beyond the profession. One of them, "Where Am I?", is a comic short story about a man whose brain is kept in a vat in Houston while his body goes on a mission, and it has been setting undergraduates arguing about the self ever since. With the cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter he edited The Mind’s I (1981), an anthology of stories and puzzles about minds that sat on a great many student bookshelves.

(●) 1991 AD: Two large books, one on consciousness and then one on Darwin, made him a public intellectual. + Consciousness Explained (1991) promised in its title what most philosophers thought impossible, and its argument (T2) made him famous and much argued with. Critics joked that the book should have been called Consciousness Explained Away, or Consciousness Ignored, and the jibe followed it for the rest of his life. Four years later came Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995), his case that natural selection is not just a theory in biology but an idea that eats through every traditional answer about meaning, purpose and value (T1). Between them the two books turned a professor’s reputation into a public one, and over the next decade he became a regular voice in magazines, lecture halls and, eventually, debates about religion.

(●) 2006 AD: He survived a torn aorta, published a book on religion, and became one of the Four Horsemen. + In 2003 he had written an op-ed for the New York Times proposing that people with a naturalistic worldview (the belief that nature is all there is, with nothing supernatural behind it) call themselves "brights", a cheerful new name to cover atheists, agnostics and naturalists of every kind. It was a suggestion that won him more teasing than converts. In 2006 he published Breaking the Spell, his book on religion as a natural phenomenon (T4). That autumn he was rushed to hospital with an aortic dissection: the lining of the great artery leaving his heart had torn, and most people with that injury die within days without surgery. After a nine-hour operation, in which his heart was stopped and his body chilled, he woke with a fabric aorta and a carbon-fibre valve that, he said, made a little click every time his heart beat. Friends asked whether he had had a change of heart of the other kind. His answer was the essay "Thank Goodness!" (the closing quotation under What He Taught). In September 2007 he sat down in Christopher Hitchens’ Washington apartment with Hitchens, Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris for a filmed two-hour conversation, and the four became "the Four Horsemen" of what journalists were already calling the New Atheism. Dennett was the quiet one at that table.

(●) 2009 AD: He debated Alvin Plantinga, and turned his attention to pastors who had lost their faith. + In February 2009, at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Chicago, Dennett met Alvin Plantinga, the most important Christian philosopher of the age, in a formal exchange on whether science and religion are compatible. The texts were published together as Science and Religion: Are They Compatible? (2010). It was a philosopher’s debate, conducted without theatrics, and both men gave as good as they got. The same year he began interviewing, with the social worker Linda LaScola, serving pastors who no longer believed what they preached. Their study "Preachers Who Are Not Believers" (2010) became the book Caught in the Pulpit (2013), and it led directly to the Clergy Project (2011), a confidential support network for ministers leaving faith, which Dennett helped to found.

(●) 2024 AD: He died in Maine at eighty-two, months after publishing his memoir. + The late books gathered a lifetime. Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking (2013) was a handbook of the thought experiments he had used and abused for fifty years; From Bacteria to Bach and Back (2017) was his last large attempt to tell the whole story of minds, from single cells to symphonies. He retired from teaching in 2022, and in 2023 published a memoir, I’ve Been Thinking, as cheerful and combative as he was. He died on 19 April 2024 at Maine Medical Center in Portland, of interstitial lung disease, a slow scarring of the lungs. He was eighty-two, and he left his wife Susan, two children and six grandchildren.

What He Taught

(T1) Natural selection builds design from the bottom up, with no mind needed at the top. + Picture a building site. There are two ways a heavy beam could reach the tenth floor. It could hang from a hook let down from the sky, from nothing, by a power no one can see. Or it could be lifted by a crane: a machine that stands on the ground, was itself built by smaller machines, and can be inspected bolt by bolt. Dennett called the first a skyhook and the second a crane, and he thought the whole history of thought was a contest between them. A skyhook, in his sense, is any explanation that starts with a mind: God designing the eye, a soul giving a body life, a creator lowering order into chaos from above. A crane is any explanation that builds complexity up from simpler things that understand nothing. Natural selection, the process by which slight variations that help an organism survive and reproduce get passed on and pile up over immense time, is in his telling the greatest crane of all. It is, he wrote, a "universal acid": an idea so corrosive that it eats through every container you try to keep it in, from biology into psychology, ethics and culture. Christians agree with more of this than he expected. The church has no stake in denying that God works through processes, and theologians from Augustine to the present have taught that God governs the world through secondary causes, the ordinary causes he creates and sustains, as a rule rather than an exception. Where the parting comes is the last step: whether a crane, however tall, can account for there being a building site, a ground to stand on, and lawful materials to build with in the first place (see the parting-ways row at the close).

(Q) "If I were to give an award for the single best idea anyone has ever had, I’d give it to Darwin, ahead of Newton and Einstein and everyone else." + Source: Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, chapter 1, "Tell Me Why", p. 21 (Simon & Schuster, 1995). He goes on to say why: in a single stroke, the idea of evolution by natural selection unites the world of life, meaning and purpose with the world of space and time, cause and effect, mechanism and physical law. The award is not for an answer in biology but for what he took to be the end of skyhooks (T1).

(T2) Consciousness is not a private inner theater, but the brain’s many processes telling a story about themselves. + Most of us picture the mind as a little cinema behind the eyes. Signals come in from the senses, and somewhere in the middle they are projected onto a screen where "I" sit and watch. Dennett called that picture the Cartesian theater, after the seventeenth-century philosopher René Descartes, who drew the sharpest line anyone ever drew between the thinking self and the body it lives in. Dennett argued that there is no such place. The brain has no central screen and no viewer. What it has is a crowd of parallel processes, each drafting and redrafting its own version of what is going on, like a newsroom where many reporters file overlapping versions of the same story and no editor ever signs off on a final cut. He called this the multiple drafts model. Two tools carried the argument. The first is the intentional stance. When you play chess against a computer, you do not try to predict its next move from its wiring. You ask what it wants (to win, to protect its queen) and what it believes about the board, and you are usually right. We do the same with a dog at the door or a neighbour at the fence. Dennett held that having beliefs and desires simply is being reliably predictable in that way; there is no further inner fact to look for. The second tool is his attack on qualia, the philosopher’s word for the felt quality of an experience: the redness of a ripe tomato, the sting of a burn on the back of your hand. His essay "Quining Qualia" (1988) took its title from a joke verb coined from Quine’s name: to "quine" something is to deny resolutely that it exists or matters. In it he argued that, as philosophers define them, there are no such things, and that the sense that there must be is itself something the brain produces. Many philosophers, believers and unbelievers alike, thought this denied the one fact we know best: that experience is had by someone. Christians in particular read it as the price materialism pays for its own consistency, and as a confirmation that a human person cannot be fully described from the outside (see the second reception row).

(Q) "Human consciousness is just about the last surviving mystery." + Source: Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, chapter 2, "Explaining Consciousness", section 1, "Pandora’s Box: Should Consciousness Be Demystified?", p. 21 (Little, Brown, 1991). The opening line of the argument proper, after a prelude on hallucinations. He goes on to define a mystery as a phenomenon people do not yet know how to think about, and the rest of the book is his attempt to turn this one into an ordinary problem for science (T2).

(T3) Free will is real and worth wanting, but it is an evolved ability, not an escape from cause and effect. + A cricket fielder sees a ball coming at speed and, without thinking, ducks. A good driver sees a child step off the curb and brakes. Neither escapes the laws of physics, yet one creature is plainly more free than a falling stone: it can see trouble coming and avoid it. Dennett thought that is what freedom is. In Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (1984) and Freedom Evolves (2003) he defended compatibilism. To see what that means, start with determinism, the view that every event, including every choice, is fully fixed by the causes that came before it, the way each domino in a row falls because the one before it fell. Compatibilism is the view that freedom and determinism are compatible: even if every choice is fixed like that, we can still be free in every sense that matters. The freedom worth wanting, he argued, is the ability to weigh reasons, foresee consequences and control oneself, and evolution and culture built it up in us over a long history, the way they built eyes and language. What he rejected is libertarian free will (no relation to the political word), the view that a person is the real source of a choice in a way that prior causes do not fully settle. He thought that view both incoherent and unnecessary. Christian philosophers have been divided on compatibilism for centuries. Many Reformed thinkers, the Protestant tradition that runs back to John Calvin, hold a compatibilism of their own, though grounded in God’s providence rather than in Darwin. But many more hold the other view, from Augustine’s reading of the will as a real power of the person, to Thomas Reid, to today’s agent-causal libertarians (philosophers who hold that the person himself, and not some earlier event inside him, is the cause of a free choice). They hold that if the only causes of my choice are causes running back to before I was born, then I am not the source of it, and praise and blame lose their grip.

(Q) "Free will is real, but it is not a preexisting feature of our existence, like the law of gravity." + Source: Daniel C. Dennett, Freedom Evolves, chapter 1, "Natural Freedom", p. 13 (Viking, 2003). The thesis of the book in a sentence. The next sentence says what it is also not: what tradition says it is, a God-like power to exempt oneself from the causal fabric of the physical world (T3).

(T4) Religion is a natural phenomenon, and it should be studied like any other. + Breaking the Spell (2006) opens with an ant climbing a blade of grass, over and over, until a sheep eats it. The ant gains nothing; a parasite in its brain, a lancet fluke, needs to get into the sheep’s stomach to breed. Dennett’s question was whether religious ideas might work like that: whether they spread because they help the people who hold them, or simply because they are good at spreading. He borrowed Richard Dawkins’ word meme, a unit of culture, a tune or a custom or a belief, that copies itself from mind to mind the way a gene copies itself from body to body. The book’s main demand was modest, and more reasonable than its reputation: that religion be open to scientific study like music, language or marriage. His proposed history of it was less modest. Religion, he suggested, began with a mind over-eager to see agents everywhere (the rustle in the grass taken for a lion), passed through folk religion, and was later "domesticated" by organised churches that cultivated loyalty to its doctrines. Christian reviewers answered that there was no taboo to break, since anthropologists and sociologists had studied religion as a human phenomenon for over a century, and that explaining how a belief spread tells you nothing about whether it is true. That second point is the genetic fallacy, judging a belief by its origin rather than its evidence, and Dennett’s own atheism, after all, also has a natural history.

(Q) "The spell that I say must be broken is the taboo against a forthright, scientific, no-holds-barred investigation of religion as one natural phenomenon among many." + Source: Daniel C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, chapter 1, "Breaking Which Spell?", p. 17 (Viking, 2006). Dennett is clarifying the title. The spell he means is not faith itself but the reluctance he thought believers and unbelievers alike felt about putting faith under the microscope (T4).

(Q) "I really do mean thank goodness! There is a lot of goodness in this world, and more goodness every day, and this fantastic human-made fabric of excellence is genuinely responsible for the fact that I am alive today." + Source: Daniel C. Dennett, "Thank Goodness!", Edge, 2 November 2006. Written two weeks after the surgery that saved his life. He thanks the cardiologist, the surgeons and the generations of researchers behind them, and says he has had to forgive the friends who told him they were praying for him. The gratitude is real and generous. The question it leaves open is the one a Christian reader cannot help asking: to whom is gratitude owed for the goodness itself?

What Christian Thinkers Made of Him

(†) Christian philosophers met him as a serious opponent, in print and on the platform. + Dennett was the one New Atheist whom Christian philosophers did not have to translate into philosophy first. His 2009 exchange with Alvin Plantinga is the clearest example. Plantinga argued that there is no real conflict between science and Christian belief, and that the conflict lies between science and naturalism, the view that there is no God or anything like him. His sharpest tool was the evolutionary argument against naturalism: if our minds were shaped only to survive, not to find truth, then a naturalist has no good reason to trust the very reasoning that led him to naturalism. Dennett replied that mere consistency proves very little: a story about Superman can be made consistent with science too, and nobody thinks that makes Superman real. Plantinga answered him under the title "Superman vs. God?". Readers still argue about who had the better of it, which is itself a tribute to both. Others answered him in print. The Eastern Orthodox writer David Bentley Hart reviewed Breaking the Spell with a sharp pen, and Edward Feser’s The Last Superstition (2008) and Plantinga’s Where the Conflict Really Lies (2011) took up his arguments on design and mind directly.

(†) His account of the mind showed, more clearly than anyone’s, what materialism has to deny to stay consistent. + Dennett’s great virtue was that he did not flinch. Other materialists said consciousness would one day be explained by the brain. Dennett saw that, if matter is all there is, the inner life cannot be what it seems to be from the inside, and he said so (T2). Christian philosophers who defend the reality of the soul, such as Richard Swinburne and J. P. Moreland, have argued against materialist accounts of the mind like his, and many readers, believers or not, took his candour as the best evidence they could ask for that the materialist picture leaves something out: if a theory requires you to doubt that you are having an experience right now, the theory is in trouble, not the experience. So he did the church an unintended service. Students who meet Dennett meet materialism at its most honest, and many of them find, in the end, that the price is too high.

(†) Where the gospel parts company with him: on what built the cranes, what a person is, and whom to thank. + Dennett taught clearly enough that the disagreements can be stated plainly. - The cranes themselves. Every crane he described works only because something is already there: a universe with stable laws, matter that can copy itself, starting conditions balanced finely enough for life to happen at all. A crane explains how a beam got to the tenth floor; it does not explain the ground. Scripture says the order of things points beyond itself: God’s "invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made" (Romans 1:20). - The person. He held that the self is a useful story the brain tells, a "center of narrative gravity". He meant it the way an engineer speaks of a chair’s center of gravity: a useful point for predicting whether the chair will tip, though no atom sits there being the center. Scripture holds that each person is made in the image of God (Genesis 1:27), a real someone known by name, not a pattern that happens to be predictable. - Freedom and blame. He kept moral responsibility while denying that anyone is the ultimate source of a choice. Christians have generally held that judgment presupposes a real agent who could answer for what he did, and that this is why repentance means something. - Whom to thank. His gratitude after surgery was sincere, and Christians share it: for doctors, for skill, for the long human work of medicine. But goodness is not the kind of thing that can receive thanks, and the Christian claim is that it has a source who can. "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change" (James 1:17). He was courteous, funny and honest about where his view led. That is exactly why he is worth reading, and why the answer to him is worth giving well.

Dennett wrote across half a century and almost all of it remains in print. The books fall into three rough shelves: the philosophy of mind, where his professional reputation was made; evolution and free will; and, late in life, religion. His hundreds of articles are partly collected in Brainstorms and Brainchildren; the most important essays are listed separately below. Mind and consciousness - Content and Consciousness (1969): His Oxford thesis made into a book. Draws the distinction between the personal level (what a person believes and sees) and the subpersonal level (what the brain’s parts do), which ran through all his later work. - Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (1978): The essays that made his name among philosophers and cognitive scientists, including "Where Am I?", the story of a brain in a vat in Houston, and "Why You Can’t Make a Computer That Feels Pain". - The Mind’s I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul (1981), edited with Douglas Hofstadter: An anthology of stories, dialogues and essays about minds, each followed by the editors’ reflections. A generation of students met the philosophy of mind here. - The Intentional Stance (1987): His theory of belief and desire: to have beliefs is to be a system whose behaviour is reliably predictable when we treat it as a believer (T2). - Consciousness Explained (1991): The Cartesian theater rejected and the multiple drafts model put in its place. His most famous and most argued-over book (T2). - Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness (1996): A short popular book for the Science Masters series, tracing a ladder of minds from simple organisms to human beings. - Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds (1998): A second collection of essays, on artificial intelligence, animal minds and the intentional stance. - Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness (2005): His Jean Nicod lectures, restating and defending the argument of Consciousness Explained against its critics. - Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language (2007), with Max Bennett, Peter Hacker and John Searle: A debate, Dennett and Searle replying to Bennett and Hacker’s charge that neuroscience is riddled with conceptual confusions. - Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mind (2011), with Matthew Hurley and Reginald Adams Jr.: A theory of why we find things funny, as the reward for catching our own mistaken inferences. Evolution and free will - Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (1984): His first book on free will, originally the John Locke Lectures at Oxford. Argues that the freedoms we actually care about survive determinism (T3). - Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (1995): Natural selection as universal acid, skyhooks and cranes, and his long quarrels with Stephen Jay Gould and Noam Chomsky (T1). - Freedom Evolves (2003): Free will retold as the product of biological and cultural evolution (T3). - From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds (2017): His last synthesis: competence without comprehension, how minds that understand grew out of processes that do not. - Just Deserts: Debating Free Will (2021), with Gregg Caruso: An extended exchange with a philosopher who denies moral responsibility of the deserving kind, Dennett defending it. Religion - Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (2006): The case for studying religion scientifically, with a speculative natural history of it (T4). - Science and Religion: Are They Compatible? (2010), with Alvin Plantinga: The texts of their 2009 exchange at the American Philosophical Association, with replies. - Caught in the Pulpit: Leaving Belief Behind (2013; expanded 2015), with Linda LaScola: Interviews with serving clergy who had stopped believing, grown out of their 2010 study. - The Four Horsemen: The Conversation That Sparked an Atheist Revolution (2019), with Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens: The transcript of their 2007 filmed conversation, with new essays by the three survivors. For a general reader - The Philosophical Lexicon (from the 1970s; 8th edition 1987), edited, later with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen: A joke dictionary that turns philosophers’ names into words ("to quine" is to deny resolutely the existence of something real), circulated for decades among the profession; it gave "Quining Qualia" its title. - Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking (2013): Seventy-odd short chapters on the thought experiments and habits of argument he used, and the ones he thought misled. - I’ve Been Thinking (2023): His memoir: childhood, Oxford, sailing, the farm, the friendships and the feuds. Selected essays - "Intentional Systems" (Journal of Philosophy, 1971): The first statement of the intentional stance. - "Where Am I?" (1978, in Brainstorms): The brain-in-a-vat story about personal identity. - "Quining Qualia" (1988): The case that qualia, as philosophers define them, do not exist (T2). - "Real Patterns" (Journal of Philosophy, 1991): How beliefs can be real without being things inside the head. - "The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity" (1992): The self as a useful fiction the brain spins, real the way a center of gravity is real. - "The Bright Stuff" (New York Times, 2003): The proposal that naturalists call themselves "brights". - "Thank Goodness!" (Edge, 2006): Gratitude after heart surgery, addressed to goodness rather than God. - "Preachers Who Are Not Believers" (Evolutionary Psychology, 2010), with Linda LaScola: The pilot study of unbelieving clergy. Answered by: Alvin Plantinga, in Science and Religion: Are They Compatible? (2010) and Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (2011); Edward Feser, The Last Superstition (2008); David Bentley Hart, "Daniel Dennett Hunts the Snark", First Things (January 2007); Richard Swinburne, Mind, Brain, and Free Will (2013); J. P. Moreland, Consciousness and the Existence of God (2008).
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Justified True Belief