Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

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Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

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Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

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Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

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Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

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Biographies

Notable Works & Great Quotes from Key Figures

Contemporary Voices

1960 AD – present

Graham Oppy of Benalla b. 1960 AD

(●) The Australian atheist philosopher who examined every major argument for God, judged that none of them succeeds, and still granted that believers can be perfectly reasonable. + Most popular atheists of the early twenty-first century wrote as prosecutors. Graham Oppy wrote as an auditor. Where others dismissed the arguments for God in a chapter, he took them one at a time, in the form their best Christian defenders actually gave them, and worked through every premise with the patience of a man checking a long column of figures. His field was natural theology, which is simply the attempt to show that God exists by reason and evidence open to anyone, without first appealing to the Bible. The ontological argument, the cosmological arguments, design, fine-tuning, Pascal’s wager, the moral argument, religious experience, miracles: by the time he was done, there was very little in it he had not audited. His verdict was that none of those arguments succeeds, and he meant something precise by that: none of them ought to change the mind of a thoughtful, reasonable person who does not already believe. But he paired that verdict with a concession that set him apart from the best-known atheist writers of the day. He held that the same is true in the other direction. No argument against God succeeds either, and a believer who has thought carefully need not be failing at reason at all. He is on a Christian apologetics site because the Christian philosophers he argued with have said, in print, that their own arguments are not finished until they have answered him. A Christian who wants to know whether the case for God survives contact with its strongest critic should know his name.

(●) 1960 AD: Born in country Victoria and raised a Methodist, he stopped believing as a young teenager. + Graham Robert Oppy was born on 6 October 1960 in Benalla, a small town in the north-east of Victoria, Australia. His family were Methodists, and when he was about five they moved to Ballarat, the old gold-rush city west of Melbourne, where he went to Wendouree Primary School. So the faith he would spend his life examining was not something he met first in a seminar room. He grew up inside it, in a Methodist household. As a young teenager (one account puts it at about thirteen) he stopped believing, and he has remained an atheist ever since. He has not made a drama of the story; the published accounts record only that he ceased to be a believer early. What he did make of it was a career: he has spent his working life examining, with unusual care, the arguments for the faith he left. He was a bright child as well as a doubting one. In 1972 he finished at the top of his primary school (the Australian word is "dux") and won a full scholarship to Wesley College, a Methodist school in Melbourne, where he finished in 1978 with distinctions in English and chemistry.

(●) 1979 AD: At the University of Melbourne he studied mathematics and physics, and fell for philosophy. + He went up to the University of Melbourne in 1979 and took two degrees side by side: a science degree majoring in mathematics with a minor in physics, and an arts degree in philosophy, finishing both, with honours in philosophy, in 1985. He won the university’s Hastie Exhibition in philosophy (an exhibition, in the old university sense, is a prize for top results) four times along the way. The mathematics matters for everything that came later. A great many arguments for God turn on questions about infinity, probability, and the structure of time, and Oppy came to them as someone who had done the mathematics himself. When a Christian philosopher later argued that an actual infinite collection of things cannot exist (T4), Oppy was the critic who could follow the set theory line by line. Set theory is the branch of mathematics that studies collections and their sizes, and it is where mathematicians learned to count past the finite: it can say, for instance, exactly why there are as many even numbers as there are whole numbers.

(●) 1987 AD: A Fulbright award took him to Princeton, where he wrote his doctorate on the logic of what people believe. + In 1987 a Fulbright graduate award, one of the scholarships the United States offers to bring promising students from other countries to its universities, carried him to Princeton University, then one of the strongest philosophy departments in the world, where Gilbert Harman supervised his work and David Lewis was on the faculty. He took his MA in 1989 and his PhD in 1990. His dissertation was titled Attitude Problems: Semantics for Propositional Attitude Ascriptions, which sounds forbidding and is about something quite ordinary. A "propositional attitude ascription" is any sentence that says what someone believes, hopes, or fears: "Lois believes that Superman can fly." The puzzle is that Lois may believe that Superman can fly without believing that Clark Kent can fly, even though they are the same man, so the sentence cannot simply be about the man. Working out what such sentences really say is careful, unglamorous philosophy of language, and it trained him in exactly the precision he later brought to arguments about God.

(●) 1991 AD: An early paper on religion took on William Lane Craig’s kalam argument, and began a thirty-year conversation. + Back in Australia he tutored at the University of Sydney in 1990 and lectured at the University of Wollongong from 1991 to 1992, then held a research fellowship at the Australian National University in Canberra from 1993 to 1996. Around the same time he wrote short papers on Pascal’s wager (Blaise Pascal’s seventeenth-century case that believing in God is the wiser bet, because so much more is at stake if God exists) and on the ontological argument (1996 AD), and in 1991 the journal Religious Studies published his "Craig, Mackie, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument." The kalam argument (named from the Arabic word for medieval Islamic theology, whose thinkers developed it after the Christian John Philoponus) reasons that the universe began to exist, that whatever begins to exist has a cause, and so the universe has a cause. William Lane Craig, the Christian philosopher who had revived it, had criticized the atheist John Mackie’s objections to it, and the young Oppy came to Mackie’s defense. Craig answered, and Oppy answered back, in the journal Sophia in 1995 and many times after. It was the beginning of one of the longest-running exchanges in the philosophy of religion. The two men went on arguing in journals, books, and public dialogues for three decades, and each has treated the other as a serious opponent to be answered rather than a foil to be scored against.

(●) 1996 AD: He joined Monash University, the year after his first book took on the ontological argument. + In 1995 Cambridge University Press published Ontological Arguments and Belief in God. The ontological argument is the oldest and strangest of the arguments for God: first set out by Anselm of Canterbury in the eleventh century, it tries to prove that God exists from the very idea of God, as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived," with no appeal to the world at all. Oppy surveyed every major version and offered what he called a "general objection" meant to sink them all at once. In mid-1996 he moved to Monash University in Melbourne as a senior lecturer, and Monash has been his home ever since: associate professor in 2000 and full professor in 2005, with several terms along the way as head of his school (in Australian universities, a school is a large department) and as the faculty’s Associate Dean of Research. One small detail from these years says a great deal about the man. A decade later, in Arguing about Gods, he wrote plainly that he no longer believed his own general objection to ontological arguments "has any teeth," and spent a section explaining why. Few philosophers retract their signature argument in print. Oppy did it in the introduction.

(●) 2006 AD: Arguing about Gods audited the whole of natural theology, and William Lane Craig called it essential reading. + In 2006 Cambridge published two books by Oppy in the same year. Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity surveyed how the infinite behaves in mathematics, physics, probability, and the theory of parts and wholes. Arguing about Gods was the larger achievement: some four hundred and fifty pages working through ontological, cosmological, and design arguments, Pascal’s wager, the arguments from evil, and a long list of others, in each case taking on the strongest defenders he could find: among them Alexander Pruss and Robert Koons on the cosmological argument, Richard Swinburne on the probability of God, Michael Behe on design in living things, and Craig. The reaction from the other side was remarkable, and it came in the language of the boxing ring, where a "right" is a punch thrown with the right hand. Reviewing it in the journal Philosophia Christi in 2008, Craig wrote that natural theology, already "reeling" from one atheist critique, "is now staggered by Graham Oppy's smashing right in Arguing about Gods," and near the end called it "not merely recommended but essential reading for anyone interested in natural theology today." Recognition at home followed. In 2009 he was elected a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities.

(●) 2013 AD onward: He turned from auditing arguments to building a positive case for naturalism, often in open dialogue with Christians. + With The Best Argument against God (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), Oppy moved from defense to offense. Having argued that no single argument settles the matter, he set out a different way of deciding it: lay out the whole picture each side believes, and ask which picture is the better theory (T3). A stream of books followed, among them Describing Gods (2014) on the divine attributes, and in 2018 alone Atheism: The Basics, the short Atheism and Agnosticism, and Naturalism and Religion. Much of this work was done in conversation rather than at a distance. With the Jesuit philosopher Joseph Koterski he edited Theism and Atheism (2019), in which a theist and an atheist write a chapter each on every question; he wrote a debate book with the theist Kenneth Pearce (Is There a God? A Debate, 2021); and on the online program Capturing Christianity he held long public exchanges with the Thomist (a follower of Thomas Aquinas) Edward Feser in 2019 and 2020 and, in 2020, with Craig on whether the fit between mathematics and the physical world points to God. He has also served his discipline in the plain ways that keep it running: as chair of council and then chief executive of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, as the founding editor of the Australasian Philosophical Review, and on the editorial boards of journals such as Religious Studies and Sophia.

What He Taught

(T1) No argument about God, for or against, ought to change the mind of a reasonable person on the other side. + Think of a jury that has been arguing over the same case for a week. Each juror has heard all the evidence, each is honest and intelligent, and still they divide. You might say one side has the better argument. Oppy would ask a stricter question: is there an argument that ought to bring every last reasonable juror round? If not, then however good it is, it has not succeeded in his sense. That is the standard he set in Arguing about Gods. Where a question has been argued for as long as the existence of God has, a successful argument would be one that ought to persuade everyone who has so far rejected its conclusion. He set the bar, as he admitted, very high, and then argued that no argument clears it: not the ontological argument, not the kalam, not fine-tuning, not the arguments from evil against God either. His phrase "orthodoxly conceived monotheistic gods" needs a word of teaching. Monotheism is belief in one God; "orthodoxly conceived" means the God of the classic creeds of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good, creator of everything else. Oppy wrote this way to be exact about which God he was discussing, and he granted at the outset that there is nothing incoherent in the idea of such a God creating the universe from nothing. Christians would reply that the bar is set where no argument in any field could clear it. Oppy’s point, however, was never that the arguments are foolish. It was that each premise can be reasonably doubted by someone who starts from different, equally reasonable beliefs.

(Q) "The main thesis that I wish to defend in the present book is that there are no successful arguments about the existence of orthodoxly conceived monotheistic gods ... that is, no arguments that ought to persuade those who have reasonable views about the existence of orthodoxly conceived monotheistic gods to change their minds." + Source: Graham Oppy, Arguing about Gods (Cambridge University Press, 2006), Introduction, p. xv. The opening statement of the book’s thesis. The word "about" is chosen with care: the thesis covers arguments against God as well as for him.

(T2) A thoughtful believer need not be failing at reason, even though there is no God. + Two friends grow up in the same town, read the same books, and are equally honest and equally sharp. One becomes a Christian and the other an atheist. Must one of them have made a mistake in reasoning? Many of the popular atheists of his day said yes, and said it loudly: belief in God was a delusion, a failure of the mind. Oppy said no. He was, in his own words, "very firmly" convinced that there are no supernatural beings of any kind. But he was also convinced that people who believe in God need not be irrational for doing so. He thought both beliefs could be held together without contradiction: you can think someone is wrong without thinking they are foolish. He said the same about agnostics, the people who suspend judgment and neither believe nor disbelieve, and devoted a section of Arguing about Gods to defending the reasonableness of their position too. This is the hinge of his whole outlook. Because reasonable people can start from different places, an argument that works only from your starting point will not move someone who reasonably starts from theirs (T1). For a Christian it is also a striking concession from the opposing bench, and it is why conversations with him have so often been courteous rather than combative.

(Q) "I am very firmly of the belief that there are no supernatural entities of any kind ... I am also pretty firmly of the belief that, even by quite strict standards, those who believe in the existence of orthodoxly conceived monotheistic gods need not thereby manifest some kind of failure of rationality." + Source: Graham Oppy, Arguing about Gods (Cambridge University Press, 2006), Introduction, pp. xviii–xix. The closing paragraph of the introduction. He adds that if he ever found he could not hold both beliefs together, it would be the second one, the generous one, that he gave up.

(T3) Naturalism and theism should be compared as whole theories, and naturalism wins because it is simpler. + Two mechanics look at the same car that will not start. One says the battery is dead. The other agrees that the battery is dead and adds that a gremlin drained it. If the dead battery alone explains everything the car is doing, you go with the first mechanic: the gremlin is an extra with no work to do. The rule behind that choice is called Ockham’s razor, after the medieval friar William of Ockham: do not multiply entities beyond necessity. Oppy’s positive case runs on that rule. Naturalism is the view that the natural world, the world of things with causes and effects that science studies, is all there is. Theism is the view that there is also a God who made it. Oppy asks us to set each view out as a complete theory and compare them the way scientists compare rival theories: which is simpler, and which fits all the evidence better? On his telling, the theist believes everything the naturalist believes and something more besides. So if the two do equally well with the evidence, the simpler theory, naturalism, should be preferred. He then argued, across the whole range of evidence the arguments for God appeal to, that naturalism explains it at least as well. That is what he meant by "the best argument against God." Christians have answered this at two points. Some deny that God is an "extra" at all: on the classical Christian view God is the source of everything else, not one more item on the list. Others deny that naturalism explains the evidence equally well, pointing to the beginning of the universe, the fine-tuning of physics (the way the basic constants of nature sit within the narrow range that allows life to exist at all), consciousness, and the resurrection of Jesus.

(Q) "From the standpoint of the naturalist, the theistic beliefs of the theist are pure addition; and, from the standpoint of the theist, the naturalistic beliefs of the naturalist are pure subtraction." + Source: Graham Oppy, "An Argument for Atheism from Naturalism," in Philosophy for Us, edited by Lenny Clapp (Cognella, 2018), p. 2, as quoted by Tyler McNabb and Michael DeVito, "Ockham on the Side of the Angels: Why a Classical Theist Shouldn’t be Moved by Oppy’s Argument from Simplicity," New Blackfriars 104 (2023), pp. 190–194. Oppy goes on to draw the conclusion: if all else is no better than equal, there is no reason to hold the additional theistic beliefs. The same argument is laid out at book length in The Best Argument against God (2013).

(T4) Nothing shows that an actual infinite is impossible, so the kalam argument need not move a reasonable atheist. + Imagine a hotel with infinitely many rooms, every one of them full. A new guest arrives, and the manager simply moves the guest in room 1 to room 2, the guest in room 2 to room 3, and so on forever, and room 1 is free. The hotel was full, and now it has room. This is Hilbert’s Hotel, named for the mathematician David Hilbert, and Craig uses it to argue that an "actual infinite," a completed collection of infinitely many real things, cannot exist in the real world. If it cannot, the past cannot be an infinite series of real events, so the universe must have had a beginning. Oppy’s reply, sustained across thirty years, was not that the universe certainly had no beginning. It was that nothing Craig had said proved an actual infinite impossible. The mathematics of infinite collections, worked out by Georg Cantor in the nineteenth century, is consistent; the hotel is strange, but strange is not the same as contradictory. And if a reasonable atheist can doubt that premise, then the kalam does not succeed in his sense (T1), however persuasive a believer finds it. In later work he went further. In "Uncaused Beginnings" (2010) he argued that a naturalist can consistently hold that the first state of reality had no cause at all, even while holding that everything after it does, much as a theist holds that God has no cause. Craig answered in the same issue of Faith and Philosophy, Oppy replied again in 2015, and the exchange is still going.

(Q) "I see no reason to say that it is broadly logically impossible for there to be physically instantiated infinities." + Source: Graham Oppy, "Reply to Professor Craig," Sophia 34, no. 2 (December 1995), pp. 15–29 (text as transcribed in the Internet Infidels library). "Broadly logically impossible" means impossible in any way the world could be, not merely forbidden by the rules of formal logic. "Physically instantiated infinities" are infinite collections of real things: infinitely many past days, or infinitely many rooms.

(Q) "I spent a lot of the early part of my career just arguing with Christians especially, discussing arguments for and against the existence of God." + Source: Graham Oppy, interview with Charles J. Styles, "The Best Books on Atheist Philosophy of Religion," Five Books (2 August 2018). A plain description of a life’s work, and a reminder that his thought grew in conversation with the people who disagreed with him most. He goes on to say that he has since come to want a more inclusive discipline, one that gives more time to religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism alongside the Abrahamic faiths.

What Christian Thinkers Made of Him

(†) Christian philosophers treated him as the critic their arguments had to answer. + It is unusual for one side of an argument to tell its own people to go and read the other side’s best book. Christian philosophers did that with Oppy. Alexander Pruss reviewed Arguing about Gods for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, and Craig, the man Oppy had been arguing against since 1991, called him "a highly competent and impressively widely-read philosopher" and ended his review with a line that amounts to a set reading list: "No one can pretend to a successful theistic argument unless he has dealt with Oppy's criticisms first." That respect has shaped how the case for God is now made. Christian defenders of the kalam, the ontological argument, and the argument from contingency (the argument that a world which did not have to exist needs an explanation outside itself) write with his objections open on the desk, and the stronger versions of those arguments in print today are partly what they are because he pressed so hard on the weaker ones. A critic who forces you to tighten every premise has done you a service, even if he meant to do something else.

(†) They answered that his standard of success was set too high, and that God is no mere addition to the world. + The Christian replies have come at both of his central ideas. - The standard of success (T1). Craig argued that Oppy’s test "sets the bar unrealistically high" and even appears self-defeating: Oppy offers no argument for his account of success that would itself persuade every reasonable person who doubts it. By that test, almost no argument in any field, about history, ethics, or physics, would succeed. A good argument, on the Christian reply, is one with true premises that are more plausible than their denials, and the arguments for God can meet that ordinary standard. - Simplicity (T3). Classical theists, the heirs of Augustine and Aquinas, answered that God is not one more thing added to the inventory of the world, the way a gremlin is added to a dead battery. He is the uncaused source of everything there is, and a picture with one ultimate source may be simpler than one that leaves the existence of the world unexplained. Edward Feser pressed this in public exchanges with Oppy, and Tyler McNabb and Michael DeVito argued it in print in New Blackfriars. - The first state of the world (T4). Craig replied in Faith and Philosophy (2010) that Oppy’s uncaused first state of nature rests on confusing the order of causes with the order of time (what brings about what with what comes first on the clock), and that Oppy framed his premises without tense, in terms that fit just as well a picture of time in which past, present, and future all exist alike and nothing truly comes into being, while passing over whether things really do come to be. The suppositions that only certain basic things can arise without a cause, and only at the first moment of time, struck him as "simply fantastic." Christians have also valued the way he argues. He has granted from the start that believers can be reasonable (T2), and the long, good-humored exchanges with Craig, Feser, and Pearce, along with the volume he edited with Koterski giving each side its own chapter, show what Peter asked of Christians themselves: a reason for the hope that is in you, given "with gentleness and respect" (1 Peter 3:15).

(†) Where the gospel parts company with him: God is clearly seen in what he made, and the faith rests on a risen man. + Honesty requires the other column of the ledger. A Christian can learn from Oppy’s rigor and admire his fairness, and still part company with him at four points. - The evidence is not evenly balanced. Oppy holds that the case for and against God comes out level, so that reasonable people can land on either side. Paul says otherwise: "For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse." (Romans 1:20). On the Christian view, the knowledge of God is not a close call that only the best arguments can tip. - God is not an extra. Oppy’s simplicity argument pictures God as an addition to the natural world. Scripture pictures him as the one in whom the world itself exists: "In him we live and move and have our being" (Acts 17:28), and "in him all things hold together" (Colossians 1:17). Take him away and you do not get a simpler world; you get no world. - Nature had a maker. Where Oppy allows that the first state of nature might simply exist of necessity, Scripture opens with the plain claim that the universe was made: "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." (Genesis 1:1). - The case is historical as well as philosophical. Oppy’s life’s work is an audit of natural theology, the arguments from the world in general. Christianity, however, stakes itself on a particular event: "And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins." (1 Corinthians 15:17). The evidence for the resurrection is a different kind of case from the kalam or the ontological argument, and the question of God is not settled until it has been weighed on its own terms. Oppy showed how much careful work the arguments for God can survive and where an honest critic still balks. Christians who have followed him that far have found the arguments stronger for it, and the question he leaves open is one the gospel claims to answer.

Oppy is a living author with a large and growing body of work: well over a dozen books, written or edited, and some hundreds of journal articles, chapters, and reviews. The books are grouped by kind, with a short selection of the articles that matter most for Christian readers. Dates are those of first publication. Books on the arguments about God: - Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge University Press, 1995): A survey of every major version of the ontological argument from Anselm to Plantinga, with a "general objection" to the whole family that Oppy later withdrew. - Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity (Cambridge University Press, 2006): How the infinite behaves in mathematics, physics, probability, decision theory, and theology, and why paradoxes of the infinite do not show an actual infinite impossible (T4). - Arguing about Gods (Cambridge University Press, 2006): His major work: a full audit of ontological, cosmological, and design arguments, Pascal’s wager, arguments from evil, and many others, defending the thesis that no argument about God succeeds (T1, T2). - The Best Argument against God (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): The positive case: set naturalism and theism side by side as whole theories, and naturalism comes out ahead on simplicity while explaining the evidence at least as well (T3). - Reinventing Philosophy of Religion: An Opinionated Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014): A proposal for how the discipline should be done, comparing worldviews as complete theories rather than trading single arguments. - Describing Gods: An Investigation of Divine Attributes (Cambridge University Press, 2014): A study of what the classical attributes (infinity, simplicity, omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness) mean and whether they hang together. - Naturalism and Religion: A Contemporary Philosophical Investigation (Routledge, 2018): Naturalism set out as a worldview in its own right and compared with the religions across the full range of evidence. Introductions: - Atheism: The Basics (Routledge, 2018): A short, even-tempered introduction to what atheism is, what atheists believe, and how they argue. - Atheism and Agnosticism (Cambridge University Press, Elements in the Philosophy of Religion, 2018): A brief study defining both positions and defending the reasonableness of each. Debate book: - Is There a God? A Debate, with Kenneth L. Pearce (Routledge, Little Debates about Big Questions, 2021): A book-length exchange, each author stating his case and replying to the other twice, Pearce for classical theism and Oppy for naturalism. Edited works: - The History of Western Philosophy of Religion, five volumes, edited with Nick Trakakis (Acumen, 2009): A reference history of the philosophy of religion from the ancient world to the twentieth century. - Reading Philosophy of Religion, edited with Michael Scott (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010): A teaching anthology of classic and contemporary readings, from Berkeley and Ayer to Plantinga and Hick, each with the editors’ commentary, on religious language, the existence of God, faith and reason, the divine attributes, and religious diversity. - A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand, edited with Nick Trakakis (Monash University Publishing, 2010): A reference work on the philosophers and movements of his own region. - The Antipodean Philosopher, two volumes, edited with Nick Trakakis, Lynda Burns, Steven Gardner, and Fiona Leigh (Lexington Books, 2011): Public lectures by philosophers of Australia and New Zealand in the first volume, and interviews with fourteen of them in the second. - The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (Routledge, 2015): A collection surveying the field’s live debates. - Interreligious Philosophical Dialogues, four volumes, edited with Nick Trakakis (Routledge, 2017–2018): Philosophers of many traditions, from Daoism and Theravada Buddhism to Sunni Islam and classical Christian theism, each state their position and answer one another; the fourth volume, Inter-Christian Philosophical Dialogues, sets Catholic, Orthodox, Reformed, and other Christian positions side by side. - Ontological Arguments (Cambridge University Press, Classic Philosophical Arguments, 2018): Essays by several hands on the history and present state of the argument he first wrote about in 1995. - A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy (Wiley-Blackwell, 2019): A large reference volume on the history and philosophical defense of atheism. - Theism and Atheism: Opposing Arguments in Philosophy, edited with Joseph W. Koterski (Macmillan Reference USA, 2019): Forty chapters by many hands on twenty questions, a theist and an atheist writing on each, from religious experience and miracles to the origin of the universe and the problem of evil. Selected articles: - "Craig, Mackie, and the Kalam Cosmological Argument," Religious Studies 27 (1991), pp. 189–197: One of his earliest papers on religion, defending Mackie against Craig, and the start of the long exchange (T4). - "Minimalism and Truth Aptness," with Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, Mind 103 (1994): A widely cited paper in metaethics (the study of what moral claims are and whether they can be true) and the theory of truth, outside the philosophy of religion. - "Reply to Professor Craig," Sophia 34 (1995): His answer to Craig’s reply, on actual infinities and the causal principle (T4). - "Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil," with Michael Almeida, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003), pp. 496–516: An argument that skeptical theism, the view that we cannot expect to see God’s reasons for permitting evil, carries unwelcome moral consequences. - "Uncaused Beginnings," Faith and Philosophy 27 (2010), pp. 61–71: A defense of the possibility that reality has an uncaused first state, mapped across the possible "causal shapes" of reality; Craig replied in the same issue (pp. 72–78), and Oppy answered in "‘Uncaused Beginnings’ Revisited," Faith and Philosophy 32 (2015) (T4). - "An Argument for Atheism from Naturalism," in Philosophy for Us, edited by Lenny Clapp (Cognella, 2018): A compact statement of the simplicity argument (T3). Unpublished: Attitude Problems: Semantics for Propositional Attitude Ascriptions (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1990). Where to start: Atheism: The Basics for a first reading; Arguing about Gods for the full case; and, from the Christian side, Craig’s review essay "Arguing Successfully about God," Philosophia Christi 10 (2008), pp. 435–442.
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Justified True Belief