Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Epistemology

Study of Knowledge

Internalism

(●) Internalism holds that whether a belief is justified depends only on what lies within the believer's own mind. + Martha comes down to the kitchen on a Saturday morning, glances at the clock on the wall, and sees that it reads twenty to eight. She believes it is twenty to eight, and as it happens, she is right. But the clock stopped twelve hours ago. It was right this morning only in the way a stopped clock is right twice a day. Was Martha being reasonable? Almost everyone says yes. She looked at a clock that had always kept good time, in a kitchen where clocks usually work, and nothing she could see gave her any reason to doubt it. Her belief was true by luck, but it was not foolish. It would have been just as sensible if the clock had stopped at seven and she had been wrong. Philosophers have a name for that sensibleness. They call it justification. - A belief is justified when the believer has good reason to hold it, so that holding it is the sensible thing to do given where they stand. Justification is the good standing a belief needs, besides being true, to count as knowledge. It is not the same thing as truth: Martha was justified, and she would have been justified even if she had been wrong. - Knowledge, on the classic analysis, is justified true belief: a belief, which is true, held for good reason. Martha's lucky belief shows that the analysis needs one more ingredient, a condition that rules out her kind of luck (D10). - Epistemology, from the Greek word for knowledge, is the part of philosophy that studies knowledge and justification. So here is the question. What does Martha's good reason consist of? What is it, exactly, that makes a belief justified? Internalism answers: only what lies inside the believer's own mind. Call this the believer's inner life. - The inner life includes experiences (the look of the clock face), memories (the clock has always kept time), other beliefs, and the reasoning that connects them. - In the ordinary case, these are things a person can become aware of simply by reflecting: by asking, "Why do I believe this?" and looking at what they find. - Think of a juror. Whether her verdict was reasonable depends on the evidence that was laid before the court, not on facts that never came out at trial. Internalism says every belief is judged the way that verdict is. Internalism is also the older view. René Descartes and John Locke both worked within it in the seventeenth century, and so did the classic analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Its most rigorous modern form goes further and adds three claims. - First, justification is a matter of probability. A belief is justified to the degree that the believer's evidence makes it probable, and that evidence is something the believer has. - Second, the principles that say what evidence supports what are analytic, true because of what their words mean, and a priori, knowable by reflection alone. "Every bachelor is unmarried" is both, which is why nobody surveys bachelors to check it. A principle of evidence works the same way: if nine of the ten tickets in a hat are winners, and you know nothing else, the ticket you draw is probably a winner. Principles like that can be seen to be true, not merely hoped to be (D7). - Third, externalism, the rival view that justification can depend on facts outside the mind, leaves a door open to the skeptic, the person who doubts we can know the world outside our minds at all. And that is the lesser problem. Followed to its end, externalism leaves no one able to show that any belief at all is justified, and so ends by denying that justification is possible at all. That result is called epistemic nihilism (D7), epistemic meaning having to do with knowledge.

(●) Externalism holds that justification can depend on facts outside the believer's mind. + Externalism is the view that some of what gives a belief the good standing that justification names can lie outside the believer's mind, in facts they may have no way of seeing. It comes in two main forms. - Reliabilism says a belief is justified when it is produced by a reliable process, one that usually gets things right. Normal eyesight in good light is a reliable process; wishful thinking is not. On this view the process need only be reliable in fact. The believer does not have to know it is, or have any reason to think so. - Proper functionalism says a belief has the good standing that turns true belief into knowledge when it is produced by faculties working as they were designed to work, in the environment they were designed for, and aimed at truth. (A person's faculties are the mental equipment that forms beliefs: perception, memory, reasoning.) On the Christian version of the view, the designer is God. • Think of a smoke detector. It does its job when it is built right, installed in a house rather than a steam room, and aimed at smoke. • Proper functionalism has its own name for this standing. It calls it warrant, meaning whatever it is that turns true belief into knowledge. • It still uses the word justification, but for something narrower: doing one's duty in believing. And it grants that this narrower thing is an inner matter. • You might think that settles the quarrel. If both sides agree that justification, in that narrow sense, is inner, what is left to argue about? Quite a lot, because the disagreement is about more than a word. Both sides are asking the same question: what gives a belief the good standing that, together with truth and freedom from luck, makes it knowledge? Internalism answers, the believer's reasons. Proper functionalism answers, faculties working as designed, whatever reasons the believer has. So where internalists speak of justification, warrant is proper functionalism's rival account of that same standing. On either view, two people with exactly the same inner life could differ in that standing, because the fact that settles it (whether a process is reliable, whether faculties are working as designed) lies outside both of them. Who holds what: - Internalism: René Descartes (1641) and John Locke (1690) in the tradition; Roderick Chisholm (1989), Laurence BonJour (1985, 2003), Richard Fumerton (1995), Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (2004), and Timothy and Lydia McGrew (2007) among recent philosophers. - Externalism: Alvin Goldman (1979), who developed reliabilism; Alvin Plantinga (1993, 2000), who developed proper functionalism; Michael Bergmann (2006); and Ernest Sosa (2007), whose view, virtue epistemology, judges a belief by whether it comes from the believer's reliable intellectual skills, much as we judge a shot by the archer's skill. Christians stand on both sides of this question, and some of the finest Christian philosophers of the last century are externalists. The difference matters all the same for apologetics, the work of giving reasons for the Christian faith. On internalism, the question "Is my faith reasonable?" has an answer a believer can look at: the reasons they actually have. Scripture does not teach a theory of justification, but its habit of giving reasons and testing them sits naturally here. The Bereans "received the word with all eagerness, examining the Scriptures daily to see if these things were so" (Acts 17:11). The argument for internalism is deductive. Its premises work like a locked chain: if each link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. Each premise need only be more plausible than its denial, not certain beyond all doubt.

(P1) If justification depended on facts outside the mind, two people with the same inner life could differ in justification. + This premise follows from what an outside fact is: something that can differ between two people whose inner lives are exactly the same. (1) An outside fact can differ while the inner life stays fixed. - Whether your eyes are reliable, whether your faculties work as designed, and whether the world is as it seems are all facts outside your mind. None of them is an experience, a memory, or a thought. - So two people can match each other in every experience, memory, and line of reasoning while differing in any of those outside facts. - Think of the film The Matrix. A man plugged into a computer simulation can have the very same experiences, moment by moment, as a man walking down a real street. From the inside, nothing tells them apart. From the outside, everything does. (2) Externalism makes those outside facts part of what justifies. - Reliabilism makes justification depend on whether the belief-forming process is reliable. Proper functionalism makes warrant, its account of the same standing, depend on whether the faculties are working as designed, in the right environment. - This is not a side feature of the theories. It is the very thing that makes them externalist, and their defenders say so. - Simple reliabilism judges a process by how it performs in the believer's own world. So it says the man in the Matrix has unjustified beliefs about the street, however carefully he reasons, because the process producing them is unreliable where he is. - Some later versions judge every process by how it performs in our world instead, and on those the man in the Matrix comes out justified (D12). Even these let two people with the same inner life differ, because their beliefs can come from different processes. Picture a man whose beliefs about the temperature come from a reliable device secretly implanted in his head, and a twin whose identical beliefs simply pop up at random. One process is reliable and the other is not, though nothing in their minds tells them apart (Mr. Truetemp, D2; Norman, P2). Therefore, if justification depended on facts outside the mind, two people with the same inner life could differ in whether their beliefs are justified.

(P2) Two people with the same inner life cannot differ in justification. + This premise carries the weight of the argument. Two famous cases test it from opposite directions: a woman who has good reasons but no reliability, and a man who has reliability but no reasons. (1) A deceived person can be as reasonable as you are. - Imagine a woman whose every experience is fed to her by a powerful deceiver, the evil demon Descartes once imagined. What she sees, remembers, and reasons is exactly what you see, remember, and reason. Philosophers call her case the new evil demon problem. It is new because Descartes used his demon to ask whether we can know the world outside our minds at all, while this version turns the demon on externalism and asks whether reliability is really what makes a belief reasonable. - She believes what her evidence supports and doubts what it does not. If she is unreasonable to believe there is a cup of coffee on the table, then so are you, because you have nothing she lacks. - Her beliefs come from an unreliable process, yet they seem every bit as reasonable as yours. So reliability is not needed for justification. - Think of a detective who reasons flawlessly from evidence a master criminal planted. We say he was fooled. We do not say he reasoned badly. (2) A reliable hunch without reasons is not justified. - Now turn the case around. Norman has a real power of clairvoyance, the ability to know distant things without using the senses, and it is completely reliable, but he has no reason at all to think he has it. One day the belief "The president is in New York" simply pops into his head, and he believes it. It is true. - Compare Norman with his twin, who has the same sudden belief, the same inner life, and no power at all. - Neither of them has any reason to believe it. It seems just as unreasonable for Norman to believe it as for his twin, even though Norman's belief comes from a reliable source. So reliability is not enough for justification either. (3) Our judgments of reasonableness follow the inner life. - When we ask whether someone acted reasonably, we ask what they saw, what they knew, and what they had reason to think at the time. - Think of a jury hearing a malpractice case. It asks what symptoms the doctor observed and what the tests showed her. It does not convict her because a lab machine was secretly faulty in a way no one could have detected. (4) Justification is meant to answer the believer's own question. - "Should I believe this?" is asked from the inside, and the answer has to come from what the asker has to go on. - A standard no one can consult cannot guide anyone. It is like a speed limit posted where no driver can see the sign. Therefore, two people whose inner lives match exactly are justified to exactly the same degree.

(C1) Therefore, justification does not depend on facts outside the believer's mind. + Justification does not depend on facts outside the believer's mind, and the reasoning takes three steps. If outside facts made a difference, two people with the same inner life could differ in justification (P1). They cannot (P2). So outside facts make no difference. That pattern of reasoning is called modus tollens, and it is valid, meaning that true premises guarantee a true conclusion. It runs: if A, then B; not B; therefore, not A. If it had rained, the street would be wet. The street is dry. So it did not rain. Here, A is the "if" half of (P1), that justification depends on outside facts. B is its "then" half, that two people with the same inner life could differ in justification. (P2) denies B, and so A falls with it. (1) Internalism does not make knowledge an inner matter. - Knowledge needs truth, and truth is a fact about the world. Martha was justified, but whether she knew the time depended on the clock. - Internalism is a claim about justification only. It leaves the world exactly where it was. (2) Internalism does not require an argument for everything. - A child who sees her mother walk into the room is justified in believing her mother is there. The experience is present to her mind, and that is her reason. - Experiences, memories, and the plain seeing that two plus two is four all count. Most justified beliefs rest on nothing more elaborate. (3) Internalism keeps justification tied to truth. - A belief is justified to the degree that the believer's evidence makes it probable, and "probable" means likely to be true, given what the believer has to go on. The tie to truth is built into the definition. - Think of a weather forecaster who says there is a seventy percent chance of rain. If the day stays dry, her forecast was still a good one, because it fit the evidence she had. Justification is like that: it aims at truth by following the evidence. Therefore, if (P1) and (P2) hold, internalism follows necessarily: a belief is justified by the evidence a person actually has, and by nothing outside the mind. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism Philosophy / Epistemology: Justified True Belief (JTB) Philosophy / Epistemology: Warrant

On internalism and justification: BonJour, Laurence. "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980): 53-73. BonJour, Laurence. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985. BonJour, Laurence, and Ernest Sosa. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003. Chisholm, Roderick M. Theory of Knowledge. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989. Cohen, Stewart. "Justification and Truth." Philosophical Studies 46 (1984): 279-295. Cohen, Stewart. "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 309-329. Conee, Earl, and Richard Feldman. "Internalism Defended." American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001): 1-18. Conee, Earl, and Richard Feldman. Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. Fumerton, Richard. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. Hasan, Ali. "Classical Foundationalism and Bergmann's Dilemma for Internalism." Journal of Philosophical Research 36 (2011): 391-410. Lehrer, Keith. Theory of Knowledge. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. Lehrer, Keith, and Stewart Cohen. "Justification, Truth, and Coherence." Synthese 55 (1983): 191-207. Lehrer, Keith, and Thomas Paxson Jr. "Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief." Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 225-237. McGrew, Timothy J. The Foundations of Knowledge. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. McGrew, Timothy, and Lydia McGrew. "Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem." Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (1998): 239-256. McGrew, Timothy, and Lydia McGrew. Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason. London: Routledge, 2007. Zagzebski, Linda. "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems." Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1994): 65-73. Externalism and critics engaged: Alston, William P. "The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification." Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 257-299. Bergmann, Michael. Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Comesaña, Juan. "The Diagonal and the Demon." Philosophical Studies 110 (2002): 249-266. Gettier, Edmund L. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123. Goldman, Alvin I. "What Is Justified Belief?" In Justification and Knowledge, edited by George S. Pappas, 1-23. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979. Goldman, Alvin I. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986. Goldman, Alvin I. "Strong and Weak Justification." Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 51-69. Goldman, Alvin I. "Internalism Exposed." Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 271-293. Kornblith, Hilary. Knowledge and Its Place in Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant: The Current Debate. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Russell, Bertrand. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948. Sosa, Ernest. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Sutton, Jonathan. Without Justification. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. Vogel, Jonathan. "Reliabilism Leveled." Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 602-623. Williamson, Timothy. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Historical sources: Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy. 1641. Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 1690. Biblical citations: Acts 1:3; Acts 17:11; Romans 1:18-20; Romans 8:16; 1 Thessalonians 5:20-21; 1 Peter 3:15; 1 John 4:1-2. Scripture quotations are from the English Standard Version.
+ The deceived woman is not justified, only blameless. Her beliefs come from a broken source, and we excuse her the way we excuse anyone who has been lied to.
1. Excused is the wrong word for her. We excuse people who fall short of a standard through no fault of their own. A sleepwalker who knocks a vase off the shelf is excused: he did something wrong, but he cannot be blamed for it. The deceived woman is not like the sleepwalker, because she did nothing wrong at all. She weighed her evidence, believed what it supported, and doubted what it did not. That is not a failure we overlook. It is good reasoning. 2. Her reasoning is a positive good. Being blameless is only the absence of a fault, and she has more than that. Compare her with a second deceived woman, fed the same false world, who believes whatever she likes regardless of the evidence. Both are blameless for being deceived. Yet the first is reasoning well and the second is reasoning badly, and the difference between them is a real difference in how well they believe. Nothing outside their minds separates them, since both are in the same demon's hands. The difference lies entirely in their inner lives. - Think of two contestants on a rigged quiz show, both fed misleading clues. One reasons carefully from the clues and the other guesses at random. Both lose, but only one of them played well. 3. The externalist's second kind of justification concedes the point. The strongest form of this objection grants that the deceived woman has something good and gives it another name. Some externalists distinguish strong justification, which requires a reliable process, from weak justification, which a careful person in a deceived world still has. Others distinguish a belief that is adroit, skillfully formed, from one that is apt, true because of that skill. - Think of an archer whose perfect shot is blown off target by a sudden gust. The shot was adroit, but it was not apt. On this picture the deceived woman's beliefs are adroit shots in a gusty world. - These distinctions are fair, and the internalist can grant that there is an outside good the deceived woman lacks. Her beliefs are not reliably true. - But notice what the distinction admits: there is a positive standing fixed by the inner life alone. Once that is granted, the quarrel is no longer over a label. The real question is which of the two standings does the work justification is for. That work has two parts: answering a person's question "Should I believe this?", and, joined to truth and freedom from luck, making knowledge. - The inner standing does both. On the internalist's account, whatever reliability adds to knowledge is already supplied by truth and the condition that rules out luck (D10). And Norman shows that reliability without reasons cannot stand in for the inner standing (P2).
+ Norman is unjustified only because he has reason to doubt his strange hunch. Externalism needs only one more clause: a reliably formed belief is justified unless the believer has a reason to doubt it.
1. Remove every reason to doubt and the problem remains. Here is a cleaner case. A surgeon secretly implants a tiny device in Mr. Truetemp's head. It reads the temperature and causes him to believe, accurately, "It is 104 degrees," whenever the temperature is 104. He never checks a thermometer. He has no idea why these beliefs come to him, and no reason to doubt them either, because he has never given them a thought. His beliefs are reliably produced and undefeated, meaning nothing he believes counts against them. Many who consider the case still judge that he has no good reason for them. 2. The no-defeater clause is an inner condition. Whether a person has a reason to doubt something is a fact about their inner life. So the clause repairs externalism by bringing internalism in through the back door. And if the presence of a reason to doubt can take justification away, it is natural to ask why the presence of a reason to believe is not what gave it in the first place. 3. Reliability you cannot see is not a reason. Suppose a stranger at a bus stop tells you a stock is about to double. As it happens, he is never wrong about stocks. But you have never met him, and you know nothing about his record. Believing him on the spot is not reasonable, however reliable he really is. The reliability is a fact about him. A reason would have to be something you have. 4. Calling Norman justified comes at a price. Some externalists accept the consequence and hold that Norman and Truetemp are justified after all. That is a consistent position, held by serious philosophers. But it asks us to call a belief justified when the believer, examining his own mind, could find no reason for it anywhere.
+ Michael Bergmann's dilemma: either internalism requires the believer to see that a justifier supports the belief, which starts an endless regress of further beliefs, or it does not, which loses what made internalism attractive.
1. This is the most serious objection to internalism. The strongest form of the objection runs like this. Internalism says a believer must be aware of what justifies a belief, which philosophers call the justifier (an experience, say, or a memory). Either that awareness includes seeing that the justifier counts in favor of the belief, or it does not. - If it does, the seeing is a further belief, "this experience supports that belief," and that further belief needs its own justification, which needs its own awareness, and so on without end. Call this strong awareness. A chain of reasons that never ends is called a regress. It is like a loan that needs a cosigner, whose signature needs another cosigner, and so on, so that the loan is never actually backed. - If it does not, the believer is aware of the justifier without seeing why it matters, and then, from the believer's own point of view, the belief might as well be a guess. Call this weak awareness. - You might answer that awareness need not be a belief at all. Bergmann closes that exit in advance. Even if the awareness is not a belief, it may involve taking the justifier as supporting the belief, which means applying a concept to it, the way you apply the concept "red" when you take a tomato as red. Any taking of that kind can be done well or badly, and so it needs justifying too. Either way, the objection concludes, internalism fails. 2. Direct awareness is not another belief. The regress starts only if every awareness is something that needs its own reason. But some awareness is direct. Philosophers call it acquaintance: the mind's plain contact with what is present to it. - Think of a headache. You do not infer that you have one from some piece of evidence. The pain itself is present to you, and you are aware of it directly. - Acquaintance is not a belief, and it is not an application of a concept that could go wrong. It is contact, so there is nothing in it to be done badly and nothing for a further reason to back. It is where the chain of reasons touches what it is about. 3. A believer can be acquainted with the fit itself. The weak horn assumes the believer is aware of the experience but not of how it bears on the belief. But a person can be directly aware of three things at once: the experience, the thought "this looks red," and the way the thought matches what is present. Seeing the match is not a guess, and it is not another belief that needs support. - Think of holding a paint chip against a wall. You do not reason your way to the conclusion that the colors match. You see it. - The strictest form of the view closes the gap altogether. Take the simplest foundational belief, one that rests on no other belief: "this is like this," where the word this points straight at the experience. The experience itself becomes part of what the belief says. Imagine a card that, instead of describing a paint swatch, has the swatch itself pinned to it beside the words "this is like this." A belief that contains what it is about needs no further belief to connect the two. And it cannot be false, because without its object it would say nothing at all, like the card with the swatch torn off. - Bergmann replies that awareness of the fit is strong awareness in disguise, which restarts the regress. He also doubts that beliefs as thin as "this is like this" can carry much weight, a worry for classical foundationalism to answer. Whether the regress restarts is the live question in this debate, and it is not settled. The internalist's answer is that the regress needs something that can be done well or badly, and contact with what is present is not that kind of thing. 4. The regress itself is the question of foundations. At bottom the dilemma is a version of the oldest question in the theory of knowledge: where do reasons stop? That question gets its own answer from classical foundationalism, the view that all knowledge rests on beliefs that are certain, such as your belief that you have a headache while it throbs. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism
+ Small children and animals know things, but they cannot reflect on their reasons. Internalism, by tying justification to what a believer can become aware of, wrongly denies them knowledge.
1. Internalism asks what is present to the mind. It does not ask for philosophical reflection. A toddler who sees her mother walk in has the visual experience of her mother, and that experience is present to her mind. She does not need the concept of "evidence," or the ability to explain herself, for the experience to be her reason. Internalism says her justification is fixed by her inner life, and she has one. 2. Reflection is how adults usually find their reasons. The conclusion (C1) is that justification depends only on the inner life. Being able to find one's reasons by reflecting is the usual mark of that in adults, who can turn their attention inward, but it is not the core of the view. A small child cannot yet do that well. Still, her experiences are hers, and they are inside her mind. The view does not require her to be a philosopher. 3. Reliable information is not yet justification. The strongest form of this objection, pressed by Hilary Kornblith, says animal knowledge is no loose way of talking. It is a real thing that animal-behavior science studies: reliably gathered information that guides how a creature acts. - Grant that animals have such states. Where an animal has experiences, as a dog surely does, the same answer as the toddler's applies: whatever justification its beliefs have is fixed by what is present to it. - But reliable, behavior-guiding information is also present where there is no inner life at all. A thermostat carries reliable information about the room and acts on it. Nobody thinks it has reasons for anything. - So reliable information alone cannot be what justification is. What the dog has and the thermostat lacks is an inner life, which is just what internalism says matters.
+ Two women read years ago that broccoli is healthy, one in a respected science section and one in a tabloid, and both have forgotten where. Their inner lives now match, yet only the first seems justified.
1. Memory is evidence present now. This is one of the stronger externalist cases, pressed by Alvin Goldman, and it aims straight at (P2). Start with what the two women have. Each has a clear and confident memory that broccoli is healthy, and the sense that this is something she learned, not something she made up. That memory is in her mind now, and it is a reason. - Think of a recipe card in a kitchen drawer. You may have forgotten who gave it to you, but the card is still there, and it is still a good guide to the cake. 2. The fault lies in how the second woman first came to believe. Here the internalist must bite a small bullet. Both women are justified now, given what they now have: a clear memory and no reason to doubt it. What separates them is their history. The second woman believed a tabloid she should not have trusted, and that earlier believing was unjustified. Her fault is real, but it belongs to the past, and her present memory is no worse a reason than her neighbor's. - Go back to the recipe card. Suppose the cook copied it years ago from a source she should never have trusted, and has long since forgotten where it came from. Copying it then was careless. Following it now, with no memory of its origin and no reason to doubt it, is not. - People's judgments about this pair are divided, and the externalist verdict has a price of its own: it makes the second woman unjustified today because of a fact she cannot recover by any amount of honest reflection. 3. What is stored in the mind is still in the mind. Goldman also points to beliefs nobody is thinking about at the moment, like your belief that Paris is in France while you are reading this sentence. Such beliefs are stored rather than active, but they are stored in you. They come back the moment you ask yourself, and that is all internalism needs. Your coat in the closet is still your coat when you are not wearing it.
+ Internalism grew out of the idea that we have duties about what to believe. But we cannot simply choose our beliefs, so that idea collapses, and internalism with it.
1. The history is right. This objection, pressed by William Alston and Alvin Plantinga, gets the history right. Descartes and Locke did speak of duties in believing, and that language shaped much of later internalism. Philosophers call this the deontological picture of justification, from the Greek word for duty. The point about choice is fair, too. Try to believe, right now, that your hair is on fire. You cannot do it by deciding to. 2. Internalism does not need the idea of duty. The strongest form of this objection, Plantinga's, says duty was the root that made internalism look obvious, so once the root is cut, nothing keeps the view alive. But justification can be understood as fit with evidence, not as obedience to a rule. A belief is justified when the believer's evidence makes it likely, in the same way an answer to a math problem is correct when it follows from the numbers given. No one needs a duty, or a free choice, for a belief to fit the evidence. The leading internalist accounts today are built on this idea, and it has a name: evidentialism, the view that a belief is justified by how well it fits the believer's evidence. - The case for internalism has roots of its own. The deceived woman and Norman (P2) say nothing about duty. They ask only whether a belief fits what the believer has to go on. 3. We control our beliefs indirectly. Even where duty matters, we have real control over how we form beliefs: whether we gather evidence, check sources, and give the other side a hearing. Paul's command to "test everything; hold fast what is good" (1 Thessalonians 5:21) was given about weighing prophecies in the church (1 Thessalonians 5:20), and it takes for granted that testing is something believers can do. A person cannot choose to believe the bridge is safe, but they can choose to walk out and inspect it.
+ Internalism leads straight to skepticism, since no one can prove from the inside that their senses are reliable. Externalism explains how ordinary people know things without first answering the skeptic.
1. Externalism's answer to the skeptic is conditional. A skeptic, in this sense, is someone who doubts that we can know the world outside our minds at all: for all you can tell, he says, you might be dreaming, or in the deceived woman's place. The externalist replies: if your perception is in fact reliable, then your perceptual beliefs are justified. That is true on the theory. But the skeptic's question is precisely whether the "if" holds, and the externalist answer does not touch it. It tells you that you know things if you are lucky enough to be in a good world, which is something the skeptic happily grants. - Think of a bank that tells you your check will clear if there is money in the account. True enough, but whether there is money in the account was your question. 2. The regress ends in something worse than skepticism. Suppose you ask, "Am I justified in believing my perception is reliable?" On externalism, the answer depends on whether that belief was itself reliably formed, which is another fact outside your mind. Ask again and the same thing happens one level up, and then again. This climb of questions about whether one's ways of believing are any good is called the metaregress. - At no level do you reach anything you can check. So the trouble is not only the skeptic's, that you cannot know the world. It is that no one, at any level, can ever find out that any belief of theirs is justified. That is the epistemic nihilism externalism ends in, the loss of the very possibility of justification. - Think of a school that grades every exam correctly and locks each grade in a safe whose combination is locked in a second safe, and so on without end. Every grade is real. No student will ever learn one. - The externalist answers that a belief can be justified, and even known to be justified, without the believer being able to show it from the inside. Demanding the showing, he says, simply assumes internalism. On the externalist's own terms, that is consistent. But then "justified" has stopped answering the question people ask with it, "Should I believe this?" (P2). 3. Internalism's principles stop the regress. The natural reply is that internalism climbs the same ladder, since "Is my evidence really good evidence?" asks about a principle too. Everything turns on what kind of principle it is. - An epistemic principle is a rule about what evidence supports what belief. For example: if nine of the ten tickets in a hat are winners, and you know nothing else, it is probable that the ticket you draw is a winner. - On reliabilism, whether a way of reasoning gives justification depends on whether it happens to work in this world. That makes epistemic principles contingent: true, if at all, only because the world happens to be a certain way, like "this fuel gauge is accurate." A contingent principle has to be checked against the world, and each check needs another principle. Any view on which epistemic principles are contingent has no way off the ladder. - On internalism at its strictest, epistemic principles are analytic and a priori, like "every bachelor is unmarried." The ticket principle follows from what "nine in ten" and "probable" mean. Nobody needs a record of past raffles to see it, so the regress stops at a principle the believer can see to be true. - Whether every principle of good reasoning is analytic is the most disputed part of the view. The hardest test is the principle behind induction, reasoning from past cases to new ones, and its defenders give a separate argument for why it holds. 4. Epistemic circularity cannot certify a source. Imagine a driver whose car has a fuel gauge, which in fact works, though he has no idea whether it does. He glances at it many times, each time noting, "It reads full, and the tank is full." After a hundred readings he concludes, "This gauge is reliable." On reliabilism, each of those beliefs about the tank is justified, because the gauge is reliable, so he seems to be entitled to the conclusion too. This is called bootstrapping, after the old joke about lifting yourself off the ground by your own bootstraps, or epistemic circularity: using a source to certify itself. - The circle is vicious, not merely unpersuasive. Had the gauge been broken, the same hundred glances would have "confirmed" it just as well. A test that cannot come out the other way tells you nothing. - Some externalists answer that circularity of this kind is unavoidable for our most basic sources, and harmless. But it is unavoidable only on a view that must certify perception by perception. The internalist never asks a source to vouch for itself, and reasons instead from experience to the best explanation of it. - To be fair, the trouble is not externalism's alone. It reaches any view that lets a source deliver knowledge before the believer has any reason to trust it, internalist views of that kind included. What it does not reach is a view on which beliefs about the world rest on reasons the believer can see. 5. The internalist answers the skeptic by reasoning. Internalism does not leave the skeptic unanswered. It reasons from experience to the best explanation of its patterns: the world we seem to see explains the order, stability, and agreement of our experiences far better than any rival. Leave a cup of coffee on the table, come back an hour later, and it is still there, a little colder, exactly where a real cup would be. A real cup explains that better than a long run of coincidences does. Whether that answer fully succeeds is still debated, but it is an answer a person can actually examine. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism
+ Most Christians cannot give arguments for their faith, yet their faith is not unreasonable. Reformed epistemology holds that belief in God can be warranted without argument, and internalism would condemn ordinary believers.
1. Reformed epistemology is a serious view held by fellow believers. Reformed epistemology, named for the Reformed (Calvinist) tradition its founders drew on, holds that belief in God can be properly basic: reasonable without resting on any argument, the way your belief that other people have minds is reasonable though you have never proved it. Alvin Plantinga and the Reformed epistemologists have done Christian philosophy a great service. They showed that the old charge, that belief in God is irrational without proof, rested on a standard nobody can meet for ordinary beliefs either. Christians who hold their view are brothers and sisters, and the disagreement is about the theory of knowledge, not about the faith. 2. Internalism does not require arguments. Internalism requires reasons present to the mind, and an argument is only one kind of reason. A believer's experience of God's presence in prayer, the testimony of people they have good reason to trust, the beauty and order of the world, and the inner witness Scripture speaks of all count, insofar as they are experienced. Paul writes, "The Spirit himself bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God" (Romans 8:16). How much weight such experiences carry is a further question. But they are not nothing, and they are inside the believer's mind. 3. Externalism has a cost for the believer. On proper functionalism, whether Christian belief is warranted depends on whether it is true, because only if Christianity is true were our faculties designed to produce it. Plantinga says as much. So the question "Is my faith warranted?" cannot be settled without settling "Is my faith true?", and the believer is back to needing reasons. - Plantinga counts this as no defect, since most of what anyone knows they could not show to a doubter. That is fair as far as it goes. But the believer's own question, "Is it reasonable for me to believe this?", is left with no answer she can look at. - Worse, the same model can be adopted by any faith. A Latter-day Saint (Mormon) who reports a "burning in the bosom," the inner feeling his church takes as the Spirit's confirmation, can say that if his faith is true, his faculties were designed to produce that belief in that way. Critics of Reformed epistemology have pressed this as the "Son of Great Pumpkin" objection, named for Linus in the Peanuts comic strip, who waits every Halloween for the Great Pumpkin to rise from the pumpkin patch. - Internalism lets a believer face these questions with reasons they can look at and share. 4. Scripture's pattern is to give reasons a person can see. The New Testament again and again offers evidence and calls people to weigh what they are told. - Peter's instruction to believers: "always being prepared to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you" (1 Peter 3:15). - Luke reports that Jesus "presented himself alive to them after his suffering by many proofs" (Acts 1:3). - John warns, "Beloved, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are from God" (1 John 4:1). His test is whether a teaching confesses Christ come in the flesh (1 John 4:2), a standard the hearer can apply. - Reformed epistemologists have texts too, above all Paul's claim that what can be known about God is plain even to people who suppress the truth (Romans 1:18-20). Yet Paul grounds that knowledge in what is clearly perceived in the things God has made, which is something present to the mind. See also: Philosophical Theology / Prolegomena: Meta-Apologetics: Reformed Philosophy / Epistemology: Warrant
+ Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument shows that no interesting mental condition is always knowable when it holds. So justification cannot be something a believer can always find by reflection.
1. The argument is powerful at the margins. Imagine waking at dawn feeling cold, as the room warms by a fraction of a degree each minute. At the start you feel cold and know it. By noon you feel warm and know that. Somewhere in between there is a minute when you still feel cold but cannot tell whether you do, because the difference from the minute before is too small to notice. Williamson argues that every interesting condition has margins like that, so no such condition is luminous, always knowable when it holds. This is a strong argument, and it should be granted for what it shows. 2. Internalism needs only that the inner life fixes justification. The conclusion (C1) says justification depends on nothing outside the mind. It does not say every fact inside the mind is always knowable. Borderline cases inside the mind are still inside the mind. - Think of the exact moment twilight becomes night. It is hard to say when it happens, but it is still a fact about the sky, not about something else. 3. Justification comes in degrees. Justification is a matter of more and less, not on or off. In a borderline case of feeling cold, the support the feeling gives is borderline too, and that is just what one would expect. The clear cases, where internalism's account matters most, remain clear. - Think of a dimmer switch rather than a light switch. Between full dark and full bright there are settings nobody could name, and the room is still lit exactly as brightly as the dial is set.
+ Edmund Gettier showed that justified true belief is not knowledge. What fills the gap is an outside link between belief and fact, and once that link is in place, inner justification has no work left to do.
1. Gettier cases rely on ordinary justification. In 1963 Gettier described cases in which a person has a justified true belief that is true only by luck, like Martha's belief about the time. Nearly everyone agrees such a person does not know. But the cases work only because everyone also agrees the person is justified, in the ordinary sense of having good evidence. They show that knowledge needs more than justification. They show nothing about where justification comes from. 2. The missing ingredient can sit alongside inner justification. Knowledge requires truth, and truth is a fact about the world. Internalists have never denied it. One well-known proposal for the fourth ingredient is the defeasibility analysis: knowledge is justified true belief that no hidden truth would defeat, meaning that no truth the believer is missing would, if added to her evidence, take away her good reason. - Martha fails that test. The hidden truth is "the clock stopped twelve hours ago." Add it to what she knows, and her reason to believe it is twenty to eight is gone. - An ingredient like that is partly outside the mind, since it concerns truths the believer lacks. That is no threat to internalism, which is a claim about justification, and the defeasibility analysis keeps justification exactly where it was. - Some internalists go further and argue that the Gettier problem collapses once two senses of "justified" are kept apart. In the first, a belief is justified when it is rational given the believer's evidence, and Martha's belief is. In the second, the sense that knowledge reached by reasoning requires, the premises a belief is drawn from must themselves be true, and Martha's belief fails here, because she reasoned from a clock she took to be working. On that view the Gettier problem gives no reason to turn to externalism. That claim is debated, and (P1, P2) do not depend on it. 3. Inner justification still has work to do. If an outside link were enough, a reliable belief with no reasons behind it would be knowledge. Norman and Mr. Truetemp have exactly that kind of link, and their beliefs still seem to lack the good standing knowledge needs (P2, D2). So the outside link does not make the inner standing idle. 4. Externalism did not escape Gettier. Gettier cases arise for any account on which the standing a belief has does not guarantee its truth. Externalist accounts fall short in just that way. - Martha's case troubles reliabilism just as much. Reading a wall clock is a reliable process, and it produced her lucky true belief. - Proper functionalism has had to add a further condition about the believer's immediate surroundings to handle such cases. The problem belongs to everyone who theorizes about knowledge, and it gives no special reason to prefer externalism. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Justified True Belief (JTB)
+ Justification that does not track truth is worthless: if the deceived woman's beliefs are all false, calling them justified is an empty compliment. Only a reliable link to truth makes justification worth having.
1. Justification connects to truth through probability. The strongest form of this objection says the whole value of justification is that it leads to truth, and in the demon's world the deceived woman's careful reasoning leads to truth no more often than guessing would. The answer turns on two different senses of "likely." - One sense is how often a method succeeds out in the world. The other is how strongly the evidence in hand supports a claim, which philosophers call evidential probability, and which a person can work out by reflection, as with the tickets in the hat (D7). - Good evidence makes a belief likely in the second sense, and that is a real link to truth: it is the best bet anyone could make from where the believer stands. The deceived woman's beliefs are likely in just that sense, relative to everything she has. - Think of a card player holding a hand that, given every card she can see, is very likely to win. She loses, because a cheat stacked the deck. Her bet was still a good one. She is the victim of a game that lied to her, not a person reasoning poorly. 2. A link the believer cannot see does not help the believer. Reliability that no one can detect cannot guide anyone toward truth. Think of a compass that works only if there is no hidden magnet nearby. If you have no way of checking for magnets, the compass's accuracy is real but useless to you as a guide. What you can use is what you can check. 3. The deceived woman's justification does its job. Her careful reasoning is the best anyone could do toward truth in her position. Put her in an ordinary world, and the very same habits would lead her to the truth. That is what makes them good habits, and it is why the compliment is not empty.
+ Reliabilism can handle the deceived woman. Judge each process by how it performs in normal worlds, or in our actual world, and her careful reasoning comes out justified after all.
1. This is a real improvement. The strongest form of this reply comes from Alvin Goldman, who proposed judging a process by how it performs in normal worlds, worlds that are the way we ordinarily take our own world to be. Later reliabilists judge every process by how it performs in the actual world. Either way, the deceived woman's perception and reasoning, which work well here, count as reliable, and she comes out justified. - That answers the first case in (P2), and it should be granted that it does. - Goldman himself later set the normal-worlds version aside in favor of the strong and weak justification answered in (D1). 2. Twins still differ. The refinement changes where reliability is measured. What gets measured is still the same thing: the process that produced the belief. - Take Mr. Truetemp (D2) and a twin with the same inner life, whose temperature beliefs pop into his head at random. Truetemp's device works in our actual world, so actual-world reliabilism, the version still defended, counts his beliefs as reliably formed. His twin's random guesses are reliable nowhere. - So the refinement calls Truetemp justified and his twin unjustified, though nothing in their minds tells them apart. The second half of (P2) stands against it exactly as before. 3. The fix follows the inner life. On the refinement, the deceived woman is justified because her processes work in a world other than her own. Her own world, where nearly everything she believes is false, plays no part in the verdict. That gives up what made reliabilism attractive, a link between justification and truth in the believer's own situation (D11). It gets the right answer by following the one thing the case holds fixed, which is her inner life. - Think of a pilot flying through a storm in which every instrument has failed without warning. An inspector could grade her by how those same instruments perform on a clear day, and his verdict on her flying may come out right. But if it does, it comes out right because of what he is really grading, the one thing the storm and the clear day share: how she handled what was in front of her.
+ Timothy Williamson's knowledge-first view: your evidence is exactly what you know. The deceived woman knows far less than you, so she has less evidence, and the same inner life does not mean the same justification.
1. This is the most influential externalist account of evidence today. Knowledge-first epistemology takes knowledge as the basic notion and explains evidence and justification in terms of it. Its slogan is E = K: your evidence is the things you know. - You know there is a cup of coffee on your table, so that fact is part of your evidence. The deceived woman sees only an illusion of one, so she does not know it, and it is not part of hers. - The view denies (P2) outright, by denying that she and you have the same evidence. It is a serious position held by serious people, and it has to be met head on. 2. Evidence a person cannot tell she has cannot be weighed. On this view, whether something is part of your evidence depends on whether the world cooperates, so you cannot always tell what your evidence is. Williamson accepts this. But weighing evidence is something a person does, and the deceived woman does it exactly as you do, step for step. - Think of two accountants handed ledgers that look identical, page for page. One ledger is genuine and the other a skilled forgery. Both do the books flawlessly. You may say, if you like, that the second worked from false figures. But to say she was less reasonable in her conclusions is to say the forger made her a worse accountant. 3. The view lands back in (D1). Knowledge-first theorists commonly reply that the deceived woman is blameless, or excused, but not justified. That is the excuse answered in (D1): her good reasoning is a positive standing, not merely the absence of blame, and it separates her from a deceived woman who believes whatever she likes. 4. Its strictest form denies that a false belief can be justified. Some in this camp go further and hold that only knowledge is justified belief. Then Martha, had the clock stopped at seven and she been wrong, would not have been justified in trusting it, and neither would anyone who believed a careful forecast that turned out wrong. Few who consider those cases will accept that verdict.
+ On internalism, a man who has watched nothing but conspiracy videos is justified in his conspiracy theory, and anyone raised inside a false religion is justified in it. That makes justification too cheap to be worth having.
1. A person can be justified in a false belief. Much of this should be granted. Justification is the best a person can do with what they have, so a person can be justified and wrong, as Martha would have been had the clock stopped at seven. That is not a scandal. It is why evidence has to be shared, and it is why apologetics exists at all. - Think of a juror who heard only the prosecution's case because the defense lawyer never showed up. Her guilty verdict may be wrong, and still be the reasonable verdict on what she heard. The remedy is to put the rest of the evidence in front of her. 2. Internalism judges a person by all of their evidence. The conspiracy theorist has almost never seen only one side. He knows that nearly every expert disagrees with him, he has seen photographs and heard explanations that cut against his theory, and he has watched its predictions fail. All of that is in his inner life too. - Philosophers call this the requirement of total evidence: a belief is judged by everything the believer has, not by the part he likes. A man who sets aside the evidence in his own mind is believing badly, and internalism says so. 3. How a person gathers evidence is judged too. Someone who chooses only the sources that agree with him can be faulted for how he inquires, even when his beliefs fit what he has let in. That is a verdict on his conduct as an inquirer, the indirect control over belief described in (D6). - Think of a man who never opens his bank statements because he does not want to know. His belief that his account is fine may fit what he has seen. The fault is in what he refused to look at. 4. Externalism gives no better verdict. The externalist can call the man unjustified only if the process behind his belief is unreliable, a fact he has no way to check. The same verdict falls on a careful person fed by a lying source (P2). And the externalist calls a reliable belief justified even with no reasons behind it at all, as with Norman and Mr. Truetemp (P2, D2). Externalism is not stricter where it matters. It is strict and lenient in the wrong places. See also: Philosophical Theology / Prolegomena: Meta-Apologetics: Evidentialist

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