(●)Five lines of argument, drawn from three independent sources, give us good reason to believe that we are, at least sometimes, the ones who settle our choices.
+It is late, and a man stands at the top of the stairs with his phone in his hand. His brother said something unkind at dinner, and he said something worse back. He could go down to the kitchen and call to apologize, or he could go to bed and let it keep until morning, or for good. He has not decided yet. And notice what he is doing while he stands there. He is not waiting to find out what he will do, the way he waits to find out whether it will rain tomorrow. He is deciding. Nobody has ever stood at the top of those stairs and experienced that moment as watching.
Most of the argument over free will is spent on hard cases, and each of them can be met on its own:
- the manipulated man, designed by a scientist to choose exactly as she intends;
- the neurosurgeon's hidden device, ready to step in if a man shows signs of choosing otherwise, though it never has to;
- the luck objection, that a choice nothing fixed in advance would be a matter of mere chance;
- the brain scans, said to catch the brain deciding before the person does.
Answering a hard case, though, is not the same as giving a reason. Suppose every one of them were answered. The positive question would still be standing: what reason is there to believe we are free at all?
Everything turns on one word, and the word is settle. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. Someone who knows the man on the stairs well may be quite sure he will call tonight, sure enough to bet on it. But being sure does not dial the phone. That a thing is certain to happen is one fact, and what makes it happen is another.
In those terms, a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. He is then its source, the one it comes from, and defining freedom this way is called the source view. So if nothing but the man on the stairs settles whether he calls, and he calls because he is sorry, then he is the source of that call, and it is free.
A choice is determined when it is settled beforehand by prior conditions that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. Those conditions might be the past together with the laws of nature. Or they might be a decree of God, an order of his that fixes what will happen. Picture a row of dominoes: the first push and the spacing of the row are enough by themselves to bring the last one down.
The view that every event is determined is called determinism. Those who hold that we really are free, and that a free choice is not determined, are called libertarians (a name that has nothing to do with politics). Compatibilists hold that freedom and determinism can both be true, so that a determined choice can still be free.
It helps to keep two strengths of freedom apart from the start.
- Weak libertarian freedom is being the source of a choice: its first mover, the one who sets the choice going. It is the necessary condition of freedom, the thing no free choice can be without. It is also all the case needs.
- Strong libertarian freedom adds an opportunity to choose between at least two options, where nothing before the choice makes it go one way. That is sufficient for freedom, meaning that whoever has it is free, and it is what people ordinarily have.
• Think of the man on the stairs again. If the call is his to make, he has the weak kind. If, as it seems to him, he could just as well go to bed, with nothing before the choice making it go either way, he has the strong kind as well.
- One defender of free will puts the logic plainly: "if one cannot demonstrate strong libertarian freedom, but can demonstrate weak libertarian freedom, one has demonstrated libertarian freedom and dispatched the idea of determinism." So evidence that real options are open does more than the case needs. Evidence that shows only the source still does enough.
The argument is a cumulative case: several lines of evidence that point to one conclusion. Think of the difference between a chain and a rope. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, but a rope still holds if one strand frays. A jury works the same way when it convicts on a fingerprint, a receipt, a witness and a motive, none of which would be enough alone.
There are five strands here, drawn from three independent sources. Three of the strands come from the same source, our own choosing seen from the inside (C):
- the experience of choosing (P1);
- the best explanation of that experience (P2);
- what every act of deliberation takes for granted (P4).
The other two each have a source of their own:
- what we know about praise and blame (P3);
- the way God addresses people in Scripture (P5).
Beside these five stands a sixth strand, which comes from our responsibility for what we believe. It is an argument in its own right, called the free-thinking argument. Its claim is that if our thinking were settled for us by something or someone else, nobody would ever be rationally responsible for a belief he reasoned his way to (C).
Who holds what, on whether we have good reason to believe we are free:
- Support: Thomas Reid (1788) held that the conviction of our own active power is natural to every person. Immanuel Kant (1785) held that anyone who acts must act under the idea of freedom. William James (1884) held that determinism cannot make sense of our judgments of regret. Peter van Inwagen (1983) held that we know we are responsible better than we know any premise of an argument against freedom (a premise is one of the claims an argument starts from). Richard Swinburne (2013) and Timothy O'Connor (2019) held that belief in free will is rational without argument.
- Oppose: Galen Strawson (1994) holds that no one can be ultimately responsible. Derk Pereboom (2001, 2014) holds that the scientific and philosophical evidence tells against the freedom responsibility needs. Sam Harris (2012) holds that free will is an illusion.
- Between: Stephen Kearns (2015) recommends agnosticism, believing neither that we are free nor that we are not.
(P1)We experience choosing as doing it, not as watching it happen.
+The oldest evidence for freedom is the experience of choosing itself. That experience is evidence rather than proof, and the first thing it points to is the source: the choice is yours to make.
(1) Choosing feels like acting, not like being acted upon.
- A sneeze happens to you, while a decision is something you make. Everyone knows the difference without being taught it. Our whole practice of praise and blame is built on it, which is why nobody is ever blamed for a sneeze.
- Philosophers mark the difference with two old terms. An active power is a power to do something: to lift an arm, to weigh a reason, to decide. A passive liability is a capacity to have something done to you, the way a window is liable to break.
• A choice, as we live it, is the exercise of an active power. It is not a liability being triggered.
- Go back to the man at the top of the stairs. The call to his brother is not something that will happen to him. If it happens, he will have done it.
(2) Looked at closely, the experience of choosing has parts we can describe.
- Start with the weighing. You are aware of yourself as the one doing it: you turn the reasons over, attend to some and set others aside.
- The weighing also aims at something. You are trying to reach the right answer, or at least the most reasonable one.
- You can even catch yourself refusing a conclusion you see coming, looking for a way around evidence you do not like. That refusal is felt as yours, which is exactly why it can be shameful.
- Picture a juror who sees where the evidence points and notices herself hunting for a reason to vote the other way. She does not experience the hunting as weather, something that simply blew in. She experiences it as something she is doing and could stop.
(3) Thinkers have long appealed to this evidence.
- The standard encyclopedia survey of the free will debate, a reference philosophers themselves rely on, reports that "philosophers have long claimed that we have introspective evidence of freedom in our experience of action." Introspective evidence is what we find by looking inward, at our own minds. The survey names Augustine, the North African bishop who died in 430, and Duns Scotus, a Scottish theologian of around 1300, as "two examples among many."
- One defender of free will puts the stakes simply: "my sense of freely choosing is not mere appearance only, since if it were, nothing I think or do is of any significance whatsoever."
- Think of a pilot flying through cloud. He cannot see the ground, so he reads his instruments and reasons from them to where the plane is. He sets one aside only when something explains its readings better, such as a fault he can find. The experience of choosing is an instrument everyone carries, and setting it aside takes a better explanation of what it shows (P2).
(4) The experience shows first that the choice is yours.
- What it presents first is that the choice is yours to make. It has not already been made for you. It waits on you.
- In the ordinary case it presents more than that: two ways are open, and either could be taken. Whichever you take, the other is an open door, another way the choice could have gone, there for the taking.
- Think of a customer choosing between two coats on a rack. She is aware that the choice is hers, and aware too that either coat could go home with her.
- That open door is freedom's ordinary mark, and the experience usually carries it. It is not freedom's definition, though. A mark is how we usually recognize a thing, while a definition says what the thing is. Flying is how we usually recognize a bird, and a penguin is still a bird.
(5) Philosophers still debate what the experience contains.
- The debate is in earnest, and its sharpest question is whether the experience presents our choices as undetermined. Some philosophers argue that it does. Others find it neutral between freedom and determinism (D2).
- All the experience has to do, though, is count for something. An experience can be evidence without being proof, the way seeing a tree is evidence that a tree is there, even though eyes can be fooled.
Therefore, we experience choosing as doing it, not as watching it happen, and that experience is evidence that we are the ones who settle our choices.
(P2)Our freedom is the best explanation of what we experience when we choose.
+The experience of choosing (P1) is the evidence, and evidence needs explaining. The best explanation of this evidence is that we really are the ones who settle our choices.
(1) What is basic is the experience, not the freedom.
- Some beliefs are reasonable without being reasoned to from other beliefs, and philosophers call them basic. The most secure of them are beliefs about our own present experience: that your toe hurts when you have just stubbed it, or that the coffee tastes bitter to you right now.
- Think of the wax fruit on your grandmother's sideboard. You can be wrong that it is an apple. You cannot be wrong that it looks like one to you.
- The experience of deciding gives us a belief of that kind, one that simply takes in how deciding seems to the one deciding. The man at the top of the stairs can be wrong about a great deal, including whether he is free. What he cannot be wrong about is how deciding seems to him as he stands there: this is what it is like to decide.
- That he is free is a further claim. It is not read off the experience but reasoned to from it, the way a doctor reasons from a fever and a rash to measles.
- That the experience is basic is old ground. Thomas Reid, the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher, put beliefs about our own present experience first among the principles every argument relies on: what we are conscious of in our own minds really exists.
(2) No one can stop acting on the experience of choosing.
- Picture a philosopher who argues for determinism all morning. At lunch he still decides what to order, and he is annoyed if the waiter decides for him.
- Or listen to a child who says "you made me do it" to a sibling. No one taught her the difference between doing and being made to do; she already lives by it.
- Reid also held that the conviction that we act freely is natural to everyone, and that we act on it whenever we deliberate, resolve or promise. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant argued in 1785 that anyone who acts at all must act under the idea of his own freedom, whether or not freedom can be proved in theory.
- In 1870, at the bottom of a long depression, the young William James wrote in his diary that his first act of free will would be to believe in free will. He went on to become one of the founders of American psychology.
- The encyclopedia survey (P1) lists three marks of a belief that is reasonable without argument:
• it is instinctive for all or most people;
• it is embedded in everyday experience;
• it is central to how we understand an important part of the world.
- The survey reports, "Our belief in free will seems to meet these criteria, but whether they are sufficient is debated." Whatever the answer to that, the marks fit the experience beneath the belief just as well. It is instinctive, it runs through everyday life, and it is central to how we understand ourselves. That makes it evidence that has to be explained. It cannot be waved away.
(3) Freedom explains the experience better than an illusion or unseen steering.
- Inference to the best explanation is reasoning from evidence to the account that explains it best. Think of a detective. She cannot deduce the culprit the way a mathematician deduces a theorem; the culprit is whoever best explains all the evidence at once.
- Four candidates are worth taking seriously as explanations of the experience of deciding:
• we really are the ones who settle our choices, so the experience is what it seems to be;
• we really do decide, but our deciding is itself settled beforehand by the past and the laws of nature, and the experience, on the compatibilist's reading, never claimed otherwise (D2);
• our choices are settled beforehand by processes we never see, and the sense of deciding is an illusion laid over them (D3);
• something or someone else steers our choices without our knowing, the way the manipulated man is steered (D1).
- The first explains the experience directly. It is exactly what deciding would be like if we were free.
- The illusion and the steering have to add something: that the experience is false, systematically, for everyone who has ever decided anything. Neither has evidence of its own for that addition.
- The illusion view does point to real cases where the sense of doing misfires. But those come from setups built to fool it. And the scientific case that our everyday choices are made before we know it has not found the decision before the decider (D3).
- Think of footprints in fresh snow leading to your neighbor's door. Someone could have faked them by walking in boots strapped on backward, and pranksters have done such things. But a prank somewhere is no reason to think these prints were faked. For that you would need evidence about these prints.
(4) The illusion explanation undercuts the reasoning that reaches it.
- Suppose the illusion view is right, and our sense that we settle what we conclude is as false as our sense that we settle what we do. Now think about the person who reasons his way to the illusion view. While he reasons, he trusts that his own weighing of the evidence is what settles his conclusion, and that is the very experience his theory says is false.
- Its defenders have a real reply: a determined process can still track reasons, the way a calculator gets sums right with nobody at the keys deciding the answers. That reply is fair as far as it goes. It shows that a determined reasoner could be reliable.
- What it does not show is that the reasoner is the one who settles his conclusion, and so that he is rationally responsible for holding it. That is the question the free-thinking argument presses (C, D11), and the illusion explanation owes an answer to it before it can claim to explain the experience better.
- Think of a student who hands in an essay arguing that no student ever writes his own essay, because a hidden program writes them all. His teacher can grant that the program might write good essays. She still wants to know whose essay this one is.
- This is a real cost to the rival, but it is counted only once. Its force is borrowed from the free-thinking argument, the sixth strand (C). So here it weighs against the illusion explanation, and it does not become a further strand for freedom.
(5) The compatibilist's explanation is the closest rival.
- The compatibilist offers a quieter rival than the illusion view. He agrees that the experience is accurate: we really do weigh reasons and decide, and our deciding really does produce what we do. He adds only that the deciding was itself settled beforehand by the past and the laws of nature. And, he says, the experience never claimed otherwise.
- If he is right about what the experience contains, his explanation fits it as well as freedom does. It needs no illusion and no hidden error, and that is a real strength.
- So against this rival, everything turns on one question: does the experience present the decision as not yet fixed by anything before it? There is good reason to think it does. The man on the stairs does not experience a decision that his deliberating will merely deliver, like a parcel already in the post. He experiences one that waits on him.
- One way to test what an experience says is to ask what discovery would show it wrong. Suppose the man learned that a hypnotist had fixed his decision an hour earlier. He would say his sense of deciding had misled him, though nothing he felt at the time was any different (D2). And if a discovery about the past could show the experience false, then the experience was saying something about the past.
- Philosophers still debate the point (P1). Against this rival, the experience gives freedom an edge, not a verdict.
- The rest of the dispute lies outside the experience. It is the question whether a deciding settled beforehand by the past and the laws is the person's own settling at all, and responsibility (P3) and the manipulation argument carry that question (D5). The manipulation argument holds that a determined agent differs from the manipulated man, designed by a scientist to choose as she intends, only in having no designer. The experience is never asked to answer that question alone (C).
- Think of a letter signed in your own hand. A handwriting expert can confirm that the signature is yours: you really did sign it. Whether your signing was settled long before you picked up the pen is another matter, and on the compatibilist's picture the signature never addresses it.
(6) A best explanation stands until a better one is offered.
- That is how we hold our belief in the world outside us. We reason to it from experience, as the best explanation of what we see and hear, and nobody waits for a proof before getting out of bed.
- So the burden sits with the one who says we are not free. He needs a better explanation of the experience, not merely a possible one.
- The strongest challenges have been answered one by one: the luck objection, the regress of self-creation, and the scientific case built on physics and the brain scans.
• The regress of self-creation is the claim that to be responsible for what you do, you would first have to have made yourself the way you are. But making yourself needs a self already there to do the making, and that self would need making too, and so on back without end.
• The scientific case argues that the laws of physics leave no room for a person who settles his own choices, and that brain scans catch the brain deciding before the person does.
• Two famous cases are sometimes put on this list, and neither belongs there. The manipulated man tells against compatibilism, the view that freedom can survive determinism; he is no evidence against freedom itself. The neurosurgeon's device shows at most that freedom never needed an open door, which the source view already says.
- Some philosophers go further and hold that belief in our freedom is itself basic, reasonable without being inferred from anything at all. Reid was one, and some philosophers in our own day agree with him. One of them calls the belief "basic but defeasible": defeasible means open to being overturned, the way a verdict stands until new evidence reopens the trial.
- The case for freedom does not need that stronger claim. It needs only that the experience is real and that freedom explains it best.
Therefore, our freedom is the best explanation of what we experience when we choose: the illusion and the unseen steering explain it worse, and the compatibilist's explanation matches it only by reading the experience as silent about what came before the choice, which the hypnotist test gives reason to doubt.
(P3)We know that some people deserve praise and blame for what they do.
+We know some things about right and wrong more surely than we know any premise of any philosophical argument against them, and one of them is that some people deserve praise and blame.
(1) Some people really do deserve praise and blame.
- A teacher who stays late all term to help a struggling student deserves thanks, and not merely because thanking her will encourage more of the same.
- A man who drives home drunk and kills a child deserves blame. Nobody at his trial thinks the right response is only to fix whatever caused him to do it.
- Notice how differently we speak of the two. We thank the teacher, and we hold the driver to account. We are not merely reacting to good and bad outcomes, the way we are glad of sunshine and sorry about hail.
(2) We know this more surely than any argument against it.
- In 1939 a British philosopher answered the skeptic who doubted the outside world by holding up his hands: here is one hand, and here is another. He could not prove it, he said, and he knew it all the same.
- An argument that he had no hands would have to be built out of premises, and none of them could be known as well as he knew his hands.
- The same move works here. The survey reports that some philosophers take "belief in the reality of moral responsibility" to be "epistemically basic," that is, reasonable to hold without being inferred from anything else, and reason from it to free will.
- Suppose an argument concluded that the drunk driver deserves no blame at all, and never could. Most people would rightly conclude that the argument has gone wrong somewhere, even before finding the faulty premise.
(3) Responsibility requires that the deed was up to the person.
- Nobody deserves praise or blame for a deed that was not up to him. That is the rule behind every excuse we accept.
- On the source view, a deed is up to a person when he settled it himself. One defender of free will states the principle behind blame this way: "An agent is morally responsible for an action only if nothing prevented the agent from doing otherwise." An agent, in this debate, is simply someone who acts.
- The word that matters in that principle is prevented. To be prevented is for something to do the stopping, there and then. A cancelled flight prevents you from arriving, and a shove from behind prevents you from standing still.
- So the principle asks what did the stopping, not how many doors stood open. Every excuse names something other than the person that did the settling.
(4) Praise and blame follow the source.
- God is the clearest case. He is praised for his goodness though he cannot do evil, and nothing outside him settles what he wills. So the road from praise to freedom runs through the source. Praise does not wait on an open door.
- What praise needs is that the person himself settled what he did. If some people really deserve praise and blame, then some deeds were theirs in exactly that sense.
- Think of a court. Every defense it hears names something other than the man that did the settling: a threat, a seizure, a hand forced around the knife. A court does not rule on the laws of physics. What it looks for, though, is the source: whether the man himself settled what he did.
- Whether the past and the laws of nature count as something other than the man, so that determinism would take his deeds out of his hands, is exactly where compatibilists disagree (D5).
Therefore, we know that some people deserve praise and blame, and since what a person deserves depends on whether he himself settled what he did, that is good reason to believe that some people settle what they do themselves.
(P4)Everyone who deliberates takes the outcome to be not yet settled.
+Whoever deliberates takes it for granted that the outcome is not yet settled. That is a presupposition, something taken for granted without being said, and everyone who deliberates shares it.
(1) Nobody deliberates about what he believes is already settled without him.
- To deliberate is to weigh reasons in order to decide what to do.
- A woman does not deliberate about whether the sun will rise tomorrow. A traveler told that his flight is cancelled stops deliberating about whether to take it. Wherever we believe the matter is fixed without us, deliberation stops.
- So whoever deliberates believes, at least while he is doing it, that the outcome is not yet settled. It waits on him.
(2) Everyone deliberates, determinists included.
- The determinist deliberates about which job to take, about what to say to his daughter, even about how best to argue for determinism.
- Watch a chess player in a tournament. Whatever she believes about the mind, she studies the board as if the next move is hers to find, because in the only sense that matters to her, it is.
- In the ordinary case the deliberator also takes more than one option to be open to him. That is the ordinary mark of a free choice, though not its definition, since God is free with no door open to evil, and free without deliberating at all.
(3) A presupposition everyone shares is evidence, not proof.
- A belief that every deliberating person holds, and cannot set aside while deliberating, is at least evidence that it is true.
- The compatibilist, who holds that freedom and determinism can both be true, has an answer. Deliberation, he says, needs only that we do not yet know what we will do. But a man told that a hypnotist has already made his decision for him stops deliberating, though he still does not know what the decision is (D7).
Therefore, everyone who deliberates takes the outcome to be not yet settled, and that universal presupposition is evidence that it is not.
(P5)In Scripture God sets real alternatives before people and calls them to choose.
+Scripture turns the philosophical case into a Christian one. The evidence here lies in what God's way of addressing people presupposes. And the inference runs from open alternatives to freedom, never the other way round.
(1) The evidence is what the texts presuppose.
- Christians on every side agree that Scripture is full of choices. But a determinist can read every command as addressed to a will that God has fixed, so a list of verses with the word "choose" in them does not decide anything.
- The real question is what God's words to a person presuppose:
• a road said to be within reach;
• a test whose outcome the tester did not fix (God tested Abraham, Genesis 22:1);
• a way of escape that could be taken or not;
• a lament that lays a refusal at the refusers' door.
- Suppose a teacher wrote the answers on a student's paper and then graded it. If God's tests were like that, the grading would be theater. The texts read like the real thing.
(2) God tells Israel that the road to life lies within their reach.
- Near the end of Deuteronomy, Moses sets the choice before the whole people: "I call heaven and earth to witness against you today, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life, that you and your offspring may live" (Deuteronomy 30:19).
- The word "choose" is not the evidence. The evidence is what Moses says a few sentences earlier: "For this commandment that I command you today is not too hard for you, neither is it far off" (Deuteronomy 30:11), and "the word is very near you. It is in your mouth and in your heart, so that you can do it" (Deuteronomy 30:14).
- The address presupposes that the road to life lies within reach of the very people being pleaded with. The witnesses are called so that whichever road they take will be laid to their account.
- Had God already settled that they would take the other road, the good one would not have been near them in any sense they could use. It would have been closed to them, however near it was said to be.
- Think of a father who lays out two roads for his grown son, tells him the good one is well within his reach, and begs him to take it. If the father had already made sure the son would take the other, "within your reach" would be true only in a sense the son could never use.
(3) Moses says the command is not beyond them.
- Not every reader hears "so that you can do it" that way. A Reformed reader, one in the tradition of John Calvin, reads each choice in Scripture as a choice God has determined. He takes the words to mean that the people could do it if they chose to, with nothing but their own unwillingness in the way.
- That "could" is the conditional one, a "could" with an "if" attached, and a man can meet it while something other than him settles what he will choose. Think of a man terrified of open spaces. He could walk out of his front door if he chose to, and yet he cannot bring himself to choose it.
- Luther read the passage in yet another way. He took "far off" and the words around it to describe "the distance of places only." On his reading, the law had been set before the people and taught to them, so that no one could plead ignorance. He also pointed out that Paul applies the passage to the gospel preached (Romans 10:6-8).
- But the Hebrew word Moses uses for "too hard" is the one Scripture uses for what lies beyond someone's power: "Is anything too hard for the Lord?" (Genesis 18:14). So Moses denies that the command is beyond the people, and not only that it is far away.
(4) Moses offers the choice to people whose hearts are not yet changed.
- The same speech says that "to this day the Lord has not given you a heart to understand" (Deuteronomy 29:4), and promises that one day "the Lord your God will circumcise your heart" (Deuteronomy 30:6), a picture of God changing them from within. A Reformed reader finds the matter decided in those two verses. Until God changes the heart, the people cannot choose life, and when he changes it, they will.
- Grace does come first, and nobody turns to God without it. But the promise looks ahead to Israel's return from exile (Deuteronomy 30:1-3). And the speech that says the heart has not yet been given still tells the people that the choice before them that day is within their reach.
- In the next chapter God foretells that the people will turn away (Deuteronomy 31:16-21). Knowing what they would choose did not make them choose it. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing, any more than a friend's certainty dials the phone for the man on the stairs.
(5) Joshua sets the same choice before Israel again.
- Joshua, Moses' successor, closes his life with the same scene: "choose this day whom you will serve" (Joshua 24:15).
- When the people promise too quickly, he warns them, "You are not able to serve the Lord, for he is a holy God" (Joshua 24:19). When they insist, he makes them "witnesses against yourselves that you have chosen the Lord, to serve him" (Joshua 24:22), and tells them to put away the foreign gods still among them (Joshua 24:23).
- At first hearing, "You are not able" can sound like a flat denial that they could choose. Read in its scene, though, the warning was against a light promise made with other gods in the house. And the witnesses were there so that the choice would be laid to their account.
- Think of a man who swears off drink with a bottle still in the cupboard, and a friend who tells him, "You'll never manage it." The friend is warning him against a promise made too lightly, with the bottle still in the house.
(6) God provides a way of escape that can be taken or refused.
- "God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your ability, but with the temptation he will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it" (1 Corinthians 10:13). Paul is writing to Christians, so the promise concerns the Christian life and not how anyone first comes to faith.
- Two verses later Paul adds, "judge for yourselves what I say" (1 Corinthians 10:15), an appeal that presupposes his readers can weigh his words and reach a verdict that is theirs.
- An old standard commentary on the letter, published in 1911, puts the point memorably: the power to endure is given, but "the endurance is not given; that depends on ourselves."
- One defender of free will lays the inference out as a syllogism, a short argument in which two premises lead to a conclusion. It begins: "If Christians possess the opportunity to indeterministically choose between a range of options, then they possess libertarian freedom." To choose indeterministically is to choose with nothing before the choice fixing which option is taken. The way of escape is that opportunity.
- Imagine a fire door that is unlocked and clearly marked. A man who stays in the burning room is not trapped by the building.
(7) God's laments lay the refusal at the refusers' door.
- "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the city that kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to it! How often would I have gathered your children together as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you were not willing!" (Matthew 23:37).
- Through the prophet Isaiah, God calls his hearers in as a jury, "judge between me and my vineyard" (Isaiah 5:3), and asks, "What more was there to do for my vineyard, that I have not done in it? When I looked for it to yield grapes, why did it yield wild grapes?" (Isaiah 5:4). The question expects the answer "nothing," and it lays the fault with the vineyard, not with anything God failed to do.
- Every Christian account allows that God can grieve over what he in some sense wills (D12). What these laments add is where they put the refusal: with the people who refused, after God had done everything for them.
- Think of a doctor who has done everything medicine can do and watches a patient refuse the treatment. She grieves, and she does not blame herself, because she left nothing undone and the refusal was the patient's own.
(8) A real alternative is enough to show freedom.
- The addresses presuppose that, in the ordinary run of life, more than one way lies open to the people God speaks to, and that the choice between them is put to them. That is the ordinary mark of freedom.
- Where a person could refuse with everything before the choice held fixed, nothing before the choice settled it, and he has the strong kind of freedom. As one defender of free will notes, "if one possesses strong libertarian freedom, then they necessarily possess weak libertarian freedom." In plain words, the one who takes the way is its source.
- The same defender states the rule: "if one possesses this opportunity and ability to choose otherwise (as implied in 1 Cor 10:13), then it is sufficient to demonstrate libertarian freedom." Sufficient, not necessary: enough to show freedom, but not something every free choice must have.
- Think of a passport. It is enough to show that a traveler is a citizen, and plenty of citizens have never owned one.
- God and the saints in glory (the redeemed in heaven) have no door open to evil and are free, because nothing outside them settles what they will. That is why the inference runs from alternatives to freedom and never the other way round.
(9) Overturning this reading would take two things.
- To overturn this reading from Scripture itself, the same defender argues, one would have to show two things: that every person in these texts "truly had only one course of action in those precise circumstances," and also "that God predestines all things by way of determinism (rather than through some other means)." To predestine is to ensure beforehand.
- The second half carries the weight, because a person can have only one course open to him and still not be determined.
- Pilate, the Roman governor who tried Jesus, may be the case in point. He may have had no other road, and still he freely sent Jesus to the cross, since nothing determined him to do it. If God had resolved that Jesus would die, that resolve may have shut every other road. It would have settled where Pilate stood, and it would have left what he did there to Pilate.
• Here is how a resolve could do that. It works on the view that God knows what every creature would freely do in any situation, a knowledge called middle knowledge, and the view has serious critics and serious defenders. Suppose God knew what Pilate would freely do in any situation he might be placed in, and resolved to place him only where he would hand Jesus over. Had Pilate been going to let Jesus go, God would never have put him on the judgment seat. So, standing where he stood, Pilate could not have let Jesus go. And yet the resolve did none of his deciding.
• God need not arrange things this way, and in the ordinary run of choices the door stands open.
Therefore, in Scripture God sets real alternatives before people and calls them to choose, and a person who chooses between real alternatives is the source of the choice he makes.
(C)Therefore, we have good reason to believe we are free.
+Five lines of argument, drawn from three independent sources, point the same way: we are, at least sometimes, the ones who settle our choices. None of them proves it alone. Together, though, they make belief in freedom more than permissible. They make it the more reasonable view.
(1) The five strands come from three independent sources.
- The first source is our own choosing, seen from the inside, which can be called the inside view. Three strands come from it: what choosing is like (P1), the best explanation of it (P2), and what deliberating takes for granted (P4). Each adds something the others do not:
• the experience is evidence the way a perception is, something we are directly aware of;
• the inference adds no new evidence, but it adds the weighing: it sets that experience against its rivals, finds that an illusion or unseen steering explains it worse, and stands until a better explanation is offered;
• the presupposition is held even by the determinist, every time he deliberates.
- But the three are views of one fact, not three independent witnesses. A doubt about the inside view as a whole touches all three at once. The manipulated man, who would feel, believe and deliberate just as we do, is a doubt of exactly that kind (D1).
- The second source is what we know about right and wrong. Responsibility (P3) rests on it, and nothing in it depends on how choosing feels. It does share one link with the free-thinking argument, the sixth strand: the step from responsibility to the source, which compatibilists dispute (D5).
- The third source is God's address in Scripture (P5). Nothing in it depends on how anything seems to the reader.
- Think of the jury again. Three neighbors who watched from the same window are worth more than one. Still, they share one view, and a curtain that fooled one of them fooled all three. The fingerprint and the receipt do not depend on the window at all.
(2) Our responsibility for what we believe is a sixth strand.
- It has an argument of its own, the free-thinking argument. If our thinking were settled for us by something or someone else, no one would ever be rationally responsible for a belief he reasoned his way to. Every ought about our thoughts would be empty, including the plain one that you ought to check the facts before you believe a rumor. Yet we are sometimes responsible for what we believe.
- The argument concerns beliefs reached by reasoning, not what we simply see or remember. It has been put in more than one version, but the versions make one argument, and it counts as one strand (D11).
- Even a philosopher who is no friend of theism, the belief in God, wrote: "If the act is completely determined then rationality can make no difference."
- Think of an exam. We blame a student for a careless answer because the carelessness was hers: nothing settled how much care she took but her.
(3) The strands are not equally strong.
- For most readers the strongest is responsibility (P3), because almost no one can sincerely believe that nobody ever deserves thanks or blame.
- For Christians, Scripture's address (P5) carries great weight, since it is God's own way of speaking to people.
- The inside view (P1, P2, P4) is the most contested. Like the three neighbors at one window, it carries the weight of one strand rather than three. Philosophers argue about what the experience contains (D2), and compatibilists offer explanations of the experience (P2) and of deliberation (D7) that need no choice left unsettled beforehand. It is evidence, but it is not decisive.
(4) The case survives the loss of any one strand.
- A rope works this way: cut one strand, and the others still take the weight.
- The experience (P1) and the inference from it (P2) stand or fall together, since the inference is how the experience counts for freedom. If those two fell, deliberation (P4) would remain, with responsibility and Scripture beside it. If deliberation fell alone, the experience and its best explanation would remain.
- Now suppose the objections to every strand of the inside view all succeeded (D2, D3, D4, D7, D14), so that the whole inside view was lost. Responsibility and Scripture would still remain, with the free-thinking argument beside them.
- Lose responsibility, which almost no one can do sincerely, and the inside view and Scripture remain.
- Lose Scripture, and the philosophical case stands on its own. That is how it stands, in any case, for a reader who does not yet accept Scripture's authority.
(5) The skeptic has not met his burden.
- Consider what freedom has behind it. It is the best explanation of an experience everyone has (P1, P2). What we know about praise and blame supports it. Deliberation presupposes it, and so does God's way of addressing people in Scripture. A conclusion like that does not need to apologize for itself.
- The skeptic needs a better explanation of all of that, not merely a possible one. The strongest rivals on offer have been answered one at a time, and suspending judgment is no safer ground (D13).
- A family does not move out of the house it has lived in for thirty years because a stranger says the house is his. He is the one who has to make a case.
See also:
NT / Moral and Rational: Free-Thinking ArgumentPhilosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism
On the evidence for free will:
Bayne, Tim. "Free Will and the Phenomenology of Agency." In The Routledge Companion to Free Will, edited by Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith, and Neil Levy, 633-644. Abingdon: Routledge, 2017.
Deery, Oisin, Matthew Bedke, and Shaun Nichols. "Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency." Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 1 (2013): 126-150.
Guillon, Jean-Baptiste. "Van Inwagen on Introspected Freedom." Philosophical Studies 168 (2014): 645-663.
Horgan, Terence. "Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency into the Free Will Debate." Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 3 (2015): 34-61.
Moore, G. E. "Proof of an External World." Proceedings of the British Academy 25 (1939): 273-300.
O'Connor, Timothy. "How Do We Know That We Are Free?" European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2019): 79-98.
O'Connor, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. "Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2022.
Swinburne, Richard. Mind, Brain, and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Taylor, Richard. Metaphysics. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974.
van Inwagen, Peter. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
On how freedom is known:
Lipton, Peter. Inference to the Best Explanation. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2004.
McGrew, Timothy J. The Foundations of Knowledge. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995.
McGrew, Timothy, and Lydia McGrew. Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason. London: Routledge, 2007.
Plantinga, Alvin. "Reason and Belief in God." In Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, 16-93. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983.
On freedom defined by its source:
Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013.
Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026.
Stratton, Timothy A., and J. P. Moreland. "An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument." Religions 13 (2022): 988.
On reason and responsibility for belief:
Lockie, Robert. Free Will and Epistemology: A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018.
Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Searle, John R. Rationality in Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
Critic sources engaged:
Bignon, Guillaume. "A Critical Review and Fairly Comprehensive Refutation of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism." December 2020.
Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018.
DeRose, Keith. "Voodoo Epistemology." Unpublished paper, 1999.
Harris, Sam. Free Will. New York: Free Press, 2012.
Kearns, Stephen. "Free Will Agnosticism." Noûs 49 (2015): 235-252.
Martin, Michael. Atheism: A Philosophical Justification. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990.
McKenna, Michael. "A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2008): 142-159.
Nisbett, Richard E., and Timothy DeCamp Wilson. "Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes." Psychological Review 84 (1977): 231-259.
Pereboom, Derk. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Pereboom, Derk. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Piper, John. "Are There Two Wills in God?" In Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace, edited by Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware, 107-131. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000.
Preciado, Michael Patrick. A Reformed View of Freedom: The Compatibility of Guidance Control and Reformed Theology. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2019.
Schwitzgebel, Eric. "The Unreliability of Naive Introspection." Philosophical Review 117 (2008): 245-273.
Strawson, Galen. "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility." Philosophical Studies 75 (1994): 5-24.
Wegner, Daniel M. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002.
Historical sources:
Edwards, Jonathan. Freedom of the Will. 1754. Part I, section 4. In The Works of Jonathan Edwards, edited by Edward Hickman, vol. 1. London, 1834.
James, William. "The Dilemma of Determinism." In The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Longmans, Green, 1897.
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 1785. Section III.
Luther, Martin. The Bondage of the Will (1525). Translated by Henry Cole. London, 1823.
Plummer, Alfred, and Archibald Robertson. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians. International Critical Commentary. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1911.
Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Edited by Baruch Brody. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969. First published 1788.
Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Edinburgh, 1785. Essay VI, chapter 5.
Biblical citations:
Genesis 18:14; Genesis 22:1; Genesis 50:20; Deuteronomy 29:4; Deuteronomy 30:1-3, 6, 11, 14, 19; Deuteronomy 31:16-21; Joshua 24:15, 19, 22-23; Isaiah 5:3-4; Isaiah 53:10; Matthew 23:37; Luke 13:34; Luke 19:42-44; Romans 9:18-21, 30-32; Romans 10:6-8, 21; 1 Corinthians 10:13-15; 2 Corinthians 10:5.
+Every strand is an appeal to how things seem. A person manipulated from birth to choose as he does would report the very same impressions, so they are no evidence against determinism.
1. The structure of the objection is right.
A man designed by a scientist to choose exactly as she intends would still feel himself deciding, still believe himself free, still blame others and deliberate. His impressions alone do not tell him that he was designed. Incompatibilists, who hold that freedom and determinism cannot both be true, need evidence that some choices are undetermined at the right place, the point where deliberation turns into a choice. An impression does not supply that directly.
2. Two of the strands are not seemings at all.
The objection is right about the strands from inside our own choosing (P1, P2, P4). It is right, too, that the manipulated man would share our everyday judgments of blame, so it reaches (P3) as well. But it is not right about every strand.
- Scripture's address (P5) is not an impression. Its evidence is what God's words to people presuppose, and a manipulated reader would change nothing in what those words presuppose.
- The free-thinking argument is a piece of reasoning about what responsibility for belief requires, not a report of how believing feels (C).
- Think of a man who suspects his watch is wrong. He does not find out by looking at the watch harder. He checks it against the clock on the church tower, which his watch does not control.
3. Freedom is the best explanation of the impressions.
The case never rested on impressions proving freedom. The impressions are the evidence, held with certainty as impressions: the man at the top of the stairs cannot be wrong about how deciding seems to him. What the strands establish is something more modest, and more important:
- that freedom is the best explanation of that evidence (P2);
- that belief in freedom is therefore rational;
- and that the burden of proof sits with the one who offers a rival explanation.
The designed man is such a rival. A person in a perfect virtual world would have the same experiences of trees and tables that you have. That does not make your belief in the tree irrational. A real tree is still the best explanation of what you see. The virtual world is a rival with nothing behind it.
4. The designed man is a reason to look for a designer, not a reason to assume one.
If there were evidence that we had been designed like the manipulated man, the designed man would become the better explanation of those impressions (P2). The arguments that determinism is true, or that the sciences have found something else settling our choices, are exactly the places to look. They have not produced that evidence.
Counterfeit twenty-dollar bills exist. That is a reason to check a bill that looks wrong, not a reason to throw away every bill in your wallet.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated OnePhilosophy / Free Will: The Brain Scans Have Not Found the Decision Before the Decider
+The experience of choosing does not show that our choices are undetermined. A compatibilist says we really do decide, and our deciding was itself settled beforehand, which fits the experience exactly as well as freedom does.
1. What the experience contains is a live debate.
The strongest form of this objection grants everything (P1) describes. We really do weigh reasons, and our weighing really does produce the choice. What the compatibilist denies is that the experience says anything about what came before the weighing. On that reading his explanation fits it as well as freedom does, with no illusion needed (P2).
The objection is right about one thing more: nobody feels a choice to be uncaused. Some philosophers who have looked closely at the experience of choosing find it neutral between the views, since people feel in control of what they do without feeling their choices to be uncaused. Others argue that the experience does present our choices as open in a way determinism denies. The question is still being argued (P1).
2. The experience presents a decision still to be made.
(P1) does not say that we experience our choices as uncaused. On the source view the chooser causes them. What we experience is a decision not yet reached and waiting on the one deciding: the man on the stairs is not waiting to find out what he will do.
- One way to learn what an experience contains is to ask what discovery would show it wrong. Suppose the man learned that a hypnotist had fixed his decision an hour before. He would conclude that his sense of deciding had misled him, though nothing he felt at the time would have been any different.
- So the experience does say something that could turn out false: that nothing else fixed the decision beforehand. A hypnotist would show it false. Would the past and the laws of nature, if they had fixed it? That is the question the manipulation argument presses. A determined agent, it argues, differs from a designed one only in having no designer.
- That is why the experience counts as evidence and not as proof. It conflicts with determinism exactly as far as determinism means that something other than the chooser settles the choice.
3. Against the compatibilist, the experience gives an edge, not a verdict.
If the experience said nothing at all about what came before the choice, the compatibilist's explanation would fit it as well as freedom does. That should be granted plainly.
- The hypnotist test is the reason to think the experience does say something. If it does, determinism needs the experience to be wrong about one thing, and freedom does not.
- The compatibilist's best reply is that a hypnotist goes around the man's reasoning, while the past and the laws of nature work through it. So change the case to meet the reply. Let a designer fix the decision through the man's reasoning instead, with every reason weighed and every response to reasons left whole. If the man learned of that designer, he would still say his sense of deciding had misled him.
- Some compatibilists answer that he decided freely after all. At that point the dispute passes to the manipulation argument.
- Where the experience leaves the question open, it does not stand alone. Whether a deciding settled beforehand by the past and the laws is the person's own settling is the question that responsibility (P3) and the manipulation argument press (D5). The experience is never asked to answer it by itself (C).
- A witness whose testimony is a little vague is still a witness. A jury does not throw out what she saw because it needs a second witness to settle what she could not.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+The feeling of freedom is an illusion. Our choices are settled by brain processes we never see, and the sense of deciding is only the mind's guess about its own causes, so the experience is no evidence of freedom.
1. The illusion view is freedom's strongest rival.
The psychologist Daniel Wegner argued in 2002 that the feeling of willing an act is the mind's guess about its own causes, built from cues, while processes we never see produce both the thought and the act. In 2012 Sam Harris put the conclusion bluntly: "Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control," and added that, looked at closely, even our decisions simply appear.
This is a serious position held by serious people. If they are right, the experience of choosing (P1) is no evidence of freedom.
2. Cases where the feeling misfires do not show that it always misfires.
Wegner's cases are real. They show that the sense of doing something can be mistaken in setups built to fool it. Players at a Ouija board sincerely feel the pointer move on its own while their own hands push it, and laboratory studies have been rigged to fool the same sense. What the cases do not show is that it is mistaken everywhere.
- A mirage on a hot road shows that eyesight can be fooled. It does not show that the road is never there.
- To get from "sometimes mistaken" to "always mistaken," the illusion view needs evidence that our everyday choices are settled before and apart from our deciding. That is what the scientific case sets out to supply. Examined closely, it falls short: the brain scans have not found the decision before the decider.
- Harris's report that even decisions merely appear is his reading of his own experience, not a finding of any laboratory. A worry that surfaces in the shower simply arrives. The man on the stairs does not find his decision arriving; he finds himself making it.
3. The illusion has to be added, not observed.
Wegner's account has a real strength: one mechanism explains both the ordinary feeling and its misfires. Grant it. A feeling built from cues can still be accurate. The cues he named (a thought that comes just before the act, fits it, and has no rival cause in view) are the ordinary signs of what caused what.
- What turns the mechanism into an illusion is a further claim, that the thought we are aware of is never what does the work. On that claim, the experience of deciding is false for everyone who has ever decided anything.
- Nobody observes that falsity, and cases built to fool the mechanism cannot show it. It is added to make the experience fit determinism. An explanation that needs a universal error, with no evidence of its own for it, is the weaker explanation (P2).
- Think of a smoke alarm. It reacts to smoke, not to fire, and burnt toast can set it off. Learning how the alarm works is no evidence that there is never a fire.
4. The illusion view undercuts the reasoning that reaches it.
The person who reasons his way to the illusion view trusts, while he reasons, that his own weighing of the evidence settles his conclusion. If that sense is an illusion too, he owes an account of whose conclusion it is (P2).
- Defenders of the illusion view reply that a determined process can still track reasons well, the way a calculator gets sums right. That is a fair reply about reliability.
- It does not show that the reasoner is the one who settles his conclusion and is responsible for holding it, which is the question the free-thinking argument presses (C, D11). Harris himself asks his readers to weigh his case and change their minds, a request addressed to people who do their own weighing.
- Think of a man sawing through the branch he is sitting on. Whatever else is true of his work, he is relying on the branch the whole time he saws.
5. The Great Pumpkin objection does not apply.
Critics sometimes add a second complaint: if belief in freedom may be held without argument, why not belief in fairies, or in the Great Pumpkin that Linus waits up for every Halloween in the Peanuts comic strip?
- The complaint has a history. It was first raised against the claim that belief in God can be properly basic, reasonable without being inferred from other beliefs. The philosopher who made that claim named the Great Pumpkin objection himself in 1983 and answered it. In 1990 Michael Martin, and later Keith DeRose, pressed a sharper form, now known as the Son of Great Pumpkin objection: if one community may treat its own beliefs as basic by its own standards, so may any other, voodoo included.
- Either way, it is aimed at a claim the case for freedom does not make. What is basic is the experience of deciding. Freedom is reasoned to as its best explanation, and has to beat its rivals to earn the name.
- The Great Pumpkin explains nothing anyone has ever experienced. Linus waits up in the pumpkin patch every year, and nothing comes.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Brain Scans Have Not Found the Decision Before the DeciderPhilosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism
+Evolution explains the experience. Creatures that felt themselves deciding, and believed themselves free, would plan and cooperate better, so natural selection would give us both whether or not we are free.
1. A story about where an experience came from does not show it false.
Evolution would also have given us our experience of a world outside us and our beliefs in the reality of the past and in other minds, because creatures that have them survive. Nobody concludes that the past is unreal. An explanation of why we have an experience or a belief tells us nothing, by itself, about whether it is accurate.
2. The careful version needs more than a story.
Stated carefully, the objection does not say that every evolved belief is suspect, which would take the scientists' own beliefs down with it. It says a belief is undercut when the process that produced it would have produced it whether or not it was true, the way a witness's testimony is undercut when you learn he was paid to give it. That principle is sound. Applied to eyesight it leaves eyesight standing, because seeing the tiger pays only when the tiger is there.
- To use it here, the debunker, the one arguing that the experience's origin discredits it, has to show that feeling ourselves decide, and believing ourselves free, would pay off just as well if we were not free. What is on offer is a conjecture, a story about how the belief might have arisen. No one has shown that natural selection favored the belief, or that its usefulness floats free of its truth.
- One version of the story is no debunking at all. If evolution built creatures who really weigh reasons and decide, with their deciding settled beforehand, the experience is accurate about the deciding. That is the compatibilist's explanation, and it is met where the content of the experience is weighed (P2, D2).
- A conjectured origin is not a better explanation. To displace the best explanation of an experience, a rival has to explain it better (P2), and a story that might be true does not.
3. The best explanation of the usefulness may be the truth.
Believing we are free helps us plan, promise and deliberate. The simplest explanation of why a belief helps a creature find its way in the world is often that the belief is true. A map that keeps getting travelers home is probably accurate.
+Responsibility does not need libertarian freedom. Compatibilists grant that people deserve praise and blame and hold that determinism leaves that untouched, so (P3) assumes what is in dispute.
1. Compatibilists agree with the premise.
This is a serious position held by serious philosophers. Most compatibilists grant that some people deserve praise and blame, and they agree that nobody deserves either for a deed that was not up to him. They deny only that determinism takes the deed out of his hands.
Put a compatibilist on the drunk driver's jury and he holds the driver to account as readily as anyone. Show him a hand forced around the knife and he excuses the man just as readily. He parts company with the source view only over whether the past and the laws of nature are one more hand on the knife.
2. The dispute is over what "up to him" means.
On the source view, a deed is up to a person when he settled it himself. Determinism says the past and the laws settled it before he was born. Compatibilists have an account of the source too: a deed is his own when it comes from his own way of deciding, one that responds to reasons. Two arguments make the full case that determinism does take the deed out of his hands:
- The Consequence Argument: if determinism is true, our acts are consequences of the laws of nature and of events before we were born, and since neither of those is up to us, neither are our acts.
• Nothing you do today can change what happened before you were born, or suspend the law of gravity. If those two together already settle what you will have for breakfast tomorrow, in what sense is breakfast up to you?
- The manipulation argument, aimed at the compatibilist's account of the source, argues that a determined agent differs from a designed one only in having no designer.
3. Responsibility does not carry the conclusion alone.
(P3) is only as strong as the case that responsibility requires the source. That case is made on its own terms, and (P3) adds its weight to the others (C) rather than carrying the conclusion by itself.
A single strand of a rope is only as strong as its own fibers, and it never has to hold the climber alone.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to UsPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated OnePhilosophy / Free Will: Wanting What You Want to Want Is Not Enough: The Hierarchical and Reasons-Responsive Accounts
+Nobody truly deserves praise or blame. Free will skeptics like Derk Pereboom argue that our practices of thanking, correcting and forgiving can be kept without desert, that is, without anyone deserving anything, so (P3) is not known at all.
1. The skeptic is serious and humane.
Pereboom does not ask anyone to stop locking doors or protecting the vulnerable. He argues that much of ordinary life can be kept on grounds of safety, teaching and reconciliation, without anyone deserving anything.
2. We know what people deserve, not only what blaming achieves.
When a con man empties a widow's savings account, people do not merely judge that correcting him would do some good. They judge that he deserves blame for what he did. The skeptic can keep the actions. What he cannot keep is what they mean to the people doing them.
3. Weighing a premise is not assuming it.
(P3) is not assumed. It is set beside the premises of the skeptic's argument, one at a time.
- One of them is granted: a determined agent, like a manipulated one, deserves nothing (D5). On that the skeptic and the source view agree.
- The skeptic needs two more. One is that a choice nothing settled beforehand would be a matter of luck. The other is that the laws of physics leave no room for a person who settles his own choices.
- Each is a serious thesis defended by serious people, and each has been answered on its own terms. Neither is as certain as the judgment that the con man deserves blame for what he did to the widow.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-CreationPhilosophy / Free Will: The Brain Scans Have Not Found the Decision Before the DeciderPhilosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It Matters
+Deliberation needs only ignorance. We deliberate because we do not yet know what we will do, and a determined agent can be just as ignorant of his future as a free one.
1. This is the compatibilist's best answer to (P4).
Take a woman weighing two job offers. She does not know which she will accept, and on this reply that is all her deliberating needs, even if the past and the laws of nature already settle which one it will be.
The reply says, in other words, that deliberation presupposes only epistemic openness. Epistemic means having to do with knowledge, and epistemic openness means only that the deliberator does not know which way he will choose. A determined person can lack that knowledge, so determinism, on this reply, leaves deliberation intact.
2. The deliberator believes more than that he does not know.
A man who learns that his decision has already been made for him, by a hypnotist or a drug, stops deliberating even though he still does not know what the decision is. What deliberation presupposes is not only that the outcome is unknown, but that it waits on him. Ignorance of a verdict already reached is not the same as a verdict still to be reached.
The exchange runs further than this on both sides, in the deliberation argument, but (P4) needs only this core.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: You Cannot Deliberate About What You Believe Is Settled: The Deliberation Argument
+Scripture's choices do not require libertarian freedom. Reformed theologians affirm every one of these texts and read each choice as a choice God has determined, so the texts cannot decide between the views.
1. The objection is right about counting texts.
Both sides agree that Scripture is full of choices, commands and invitations, and a list of them decides nothing (P5). The Reformed theologians who press this objection, often called Calvinists after the Reformer John Calvin, are right about that. Martin Luther, the German Reformer, made a related point in 1525: a command shows what we ought to do, not what we are able to do.
2. The evidence is what the address presupposes.
The question is never how many texts there are. It is what would have to be true for each of them to mean what it says.
- A test whose outcome the tester fixed beforehand would find in the one tested only what the tester had put there, like a teacher grading answers she wrote on the paper herself.
- A way of escape that God provides so that the tempted "may be able to endure it" (1 Corinthians 10:13) is a way that can be taken.
• The Reformed answer, in the terms of Jonathan Edwards, the eighteenth-century American theologian, is that the tempted man has the natural ability to take it: he could take it if he chose to, and nothing but his own unwillingness stands in the way.
• That "could" is the conditional one (P5). A man can meet it while something other than him settles that he will not choose to.
- God's laments lay a refusal at the refusers' door, and a reading on which his decree settled the refusal has to add what the laments never say (D12).
3. Both readings carry a burden.
The libertarian reading has to show what the address presupposes (P5). A determinist who wants these texts on his side, and not merely compatible with his reading, carries a heavier load. He must show two things:
- that every person in them had only one course open;
- and that the one course was fixed by determination rather than in some other way.
The first can happen without the second. Pilate, the Roman governor who tried Jesus, may have had no other road and still freely sent Jesus to the cross, since nothing determined him to do it (P5). So even the texts where only one course was open do not deliver determinism.
4. Luther's point is answered by the texts themselves.
Luther is right that a command, taken alone, says what we ought to do and not what we are able to do. A speed-limit sign tells you how fast you ought to drive and says nothing about how fast the car can go.
But the texts in (P5) do not stop at commanding. Moses tells the people that the commandment "is not too hard for you, neither is it far off" (Deuteronomy 30:11), and Paul's way of escape is not a command but a promise about what is open. Both state what is possible instead of leaving it to be read into an imperative, a sentence that gives an order. They speak like a mechanic who tells you the engine will do seventy.
Whether every "ought" implies a "can" is a separate question, and (P5) does not rest on it.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free WillPhilosophy / Free Will: Doing What You Want Is Not the Same as Being FreePhilosophy / Free Will: Ought Implies Can: What a Command Presupposes
+Romans 9 decides the question. When the objector asks, "Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?" (Romans 9:19), Paul answers with the potter and the clay rather than "you can resist," because only a determinist's teaching provokes that complaint.
1. Romans 9 is a hard chapter."So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills" (Romans 9:18). The objector's question follows, and then the rebuke: "But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, Why have you made me like this?" (Romans 9:20).
The strongest form of this objection is an inference, not a proof-text (a single verse quoted as though it ended the argument). The question Paul anticipates is the one a determinist's teaching provokes and a libertarian's never would, so Paul must have taught what provokes it. And he does not reply, "But you can resist." He rebukes the question. That is a fair way to read a rebuke, and pretending otherwise would be cheap.
2. The objector's question arises on more than one reading.
- Any account on which God has mercy on whom he wills and hardens whom he wills invites the complaint, whether or not it makes God the determiner of every choice. Even if every free choice is settled by nothing but the chooser, God still chooses which people to create and where to place them, knowing what each would freely do. A man could complain just as loudly that nobody resists a will like that.
- So the fact that Paul anticipates the question does not tell us which reading of him is right. It tells us that he taught God's freedom to show mercy and to harden, which every reading grants.
- A fan who shouts that the referee was against his team would shout it whether the referee had taken a bribe or had only made one hard call. The complaint alone cannot tell you which happened.
3. The rebuke presupposes that the answering back is the man's own.
If God causally determined everything, he would also have determined the man's answering back. One defender of free will compares that to a man who puts a sock puppet on his hand, makes it say insolent things, and then scolds the puppet for talking back. The rebuke makes sense only if the one who answers back is the one doing it.
- The Reformed reply is that a man is not a sock puppet: he thinks, and he means what he says. True. The question is whether words whose every source was settled by the decree are his own in the way a rebuke needs. That is the question the manipulation argument presses.
4. The potter image is about God's rights, not about who settles a choice.
That the potter may shape the clay as he pleases is a claim about God's authority over what he makes. A right answers the question "may he?", not the question "who settled this choice?" The chapter can teach God's freedom in election, his choosing of whom he will for his purposes, without teaching that every human choice is settled by God.
5. Paul's argument ends with what Israel did.
The argument does not stop at the rebuke. It closes by saying that Israel stumbled because it pursued righteousness, a right standing with God, by works instead of by faith (Romans 9:30-32), which is an account of what Israel did and not only of what was decreed about it.
- A page later Paul borrows Isaiah's picture of God with his arms stretched out: "All day long I have held out my hands to a disobedient and contrary people" (Romans 10:21). It is the same shape as the lament over Jerusalem (P5), and it stands in the middle of the letter most often quoted against such laments.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around ItPhilosophy / Free Will: What the Sovereignty Texts Say, and What They Do NotPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+Matthew 23:37 does not show a will resisting God. Jesus says he would have gathered "your children" and "you" were not willing: the leaders refused, not the children, so the verse is about rulers standing in the way.
1. The distinction is in the text."How often would I have gathered your children together as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you were not willing!" (Matthew 23:37). "Jerusalem" is addressed as the city that kills the prophets, and its "children" are its people. Some readers take the unwillingness to be the rulers', standing between Jesus and the people he wanted to gather.
2. The reading still has a will refusing what Jesus willed.
On that reading, someone was unwilling, and Jesus would have gathered the people. The rulers' refusal thwarted what he said he wanted, and he laments it rather than approving it. Whoever did the refusing, the verse describes a human will declining what the Lord desired, and it lays the refusal at the refusers' door, which is what (P5) draws on. Whether a decree stood behind the refusal is the question of God's two wills (D12).
If a gatekeeper turns away the guests a host has invited, the invitation has still been refused, only by someone other than the guests.
3. The same grief appears where the distinction does less work.
Luke records the same lament (Luke 13:34), and later has Jesus weep over the city itself: "Would that you, even you, had known on this day the things that make for peace!" (Luke 19:42). The grief is over a people's refusal of an offer that was real.
- The next words, "But now they are hidden from your eyes" (Luke 19:42), belong to the judgment that follows, and Jesus gives the ground of that judgment in the people's own failure: "because you did not know the time of your visitation" (Luke 19:44).
+The free-thinking argument equivocates. Its support slides between two kinds of ability and two kinds of control, and a Calvinist can keep everything it needs.
1. The versions make one argument.
The strongest published critique of the free-thinking argument comes from the Reformed side. It is careful, it has read the argument closely, and each of its eight moves deserves a hearing.
The first move says that every version of the argument rests on one conditional, an if-then claim: if determinism is true, there is no knowledge. It adds that the argument's reach wanders between all beliefs and only those reached by reasoning.
About the shape, the move is right. The versions are one argument in several dresses, and ten newspapers that print the same wire story are one source, not ten. That is why the free-thinking argument counts as a single strand (C).
- Resting on one conditional is not a weakness in itself. The argument runs by modus tollens: if one thing would bring another with it, and the second is not so, then the first is not so either. If it had rained overnight, the street would be wet; the street is dry, so it did not rain. Every argument of that form rests on one conditional, and the only question is whether it is true.
- In its careful form the conditional is about responsibility rather than knowledge in general: if our thinking is settled for us by something or someone else, we are never rationally responsible for what we believe. Knowledge comes into it only as far as knowing needs responsible believing.
- Its reach no longer wanders. Its defenders now restrict it to beliefs reached by reasoning, conclusions in metaphysics and theology above all, and leave alone what we simply see, remember or feel. A man who sees a tree is not asked to have reasoned his way to it.
Whether the conditional is true is what the other seven moves contest.
2. The argument keeps one sense throughout: the source.
The second move charges that the argument's support equivocates: it slides between two senses of its key words as if they were one, the way "bank" can slide from a riverbank to a savings bank in the middle of a sentence. It names three such slides:
- a categorical ability (the power to do otherwise with everything before held fixed) and a conditional one (the power to do otherwise if one had wanted to);
- regulative control (control over which of several options happens) and guidance control (acting from one's own way of deciding, one that responds to reasons, whether or not other options were open);
• think of a student driver who steers the car herself, even though the instructor beside her would have grabbed the wheel had she swerved;
- two senses of "up to us," the compatibilist's and the incompatibilist's.
An equivocation is cured by holding a word to one meaning, the way you cure the slide in "bank" by picking the riverbank or the savings bank and keeping it. Once the word is held, the only question left is whether the claim is true in that meaning.
- The argument's condition is that a person's judgment is "not ultimately determined by something or someone else," which is the source view applied to thinking. Its defenders hold that it "can be defended with or without the assumption of alternative possibilities." So it needs no categorical ability to think otherwise, and the slide between two kinds of ability never gets started.
- It asks for no regulative control either. What it denies is that guidance control installed and run by an outside determiner is the thinker's own settling of his judgment.
• Its defenders add that the slide runs the other way. On determinism, "I can weigh the evidence" means only that weighing happens in me; the argument needs the active sense, that I do the weighing.
- "Up to us" carries one sense in every premise, the source sense. The compatibilist's sense is not a second meaning the argument slides into. It is the rival view, and whether the source sense is the one responsibility needs is a real question with its own argument, the manipulation argument. That is a disagreement about a premise, not an equivocation.
3. Denying that anyone is ever responsible for a belief refutes itself.
The third move answers a charge the argument's defenders make: that affirming determinism is self-refuting, that it undercuts itself. That charge, the move says, confuses affirming the conditional (holding that if determinism is true, there is no knowledge) with denying its consequent, its "then" part (holding that we do have knowledge). The determinist does the second and not the first. He rejects the conditional and says we do have knowledge, and nothing in that refutes itself.
About that determinist, the move is right. He says we have knowledge and denies that determinism takes it away, and he does not contradict himself. Affirming determinism refutes itself only if the conditional is true. And the conditional has to be shown on its own ground, the source.
- A man who says, in English, "I cannot speak a word of English" has refuted himself. A man who says "determinism is true" has not, unless determinism would leave him no way to have come by that belief responsibly. That "unless" is the conditional.
- Stated with care, then, the charge is one of the conditional's own consequences: if determinism is true, no one could rationally affirm determinism, because that belief too would be settled for the believer by something else. When the argument's defenders set the charge out step by step, that conditional is the form they give it.
- Where self-defeat bites on its own is the argument's other premise, that we are sometimes responsible for what we believe. Anyone who argues that no one ever is asks his hearers to weigh his argument and hold his conclusion responsibly, which is the very thing he denies.
4. Retold to fit determinism, the mad scientist still settles the verdict.
The fourth move says the argument's mad scientist, who controls a person's thoughts, is not like determinism, because he breaks the person's responsiveness to reasons, and determinism leaves it whole.
About the case as first told, the move is right: there the scientist leaves the person no guidance control at all, which determinism does not do. So retell it to fit determinism. The designer leaves the person perfectly responsive to reasons, while fixing in advance every conclusion the person reaches. He has not broken the person's reasoning. He has settled it.
- Whether the determiner works around a person's reasons or through them makes no difference to who settled the verdict. If prior conditions were enough to make the reasoning come out one way, then how well or badly it went was fixed before it began, by the determiner and not by the thinker.
- That is the manipulation argument applied to thinking: a determined thinker, it argues, differs from a designed one only in having no designer.
- Think of a trial where every witness is heard, every exhibit weighed and every argument answered, and the verdict was written before the jury sat down. Nothing in the procedure broke. The verdict still was not reached in that courtroom.
5. Design is not the question.
The fifth move turns to design. Faculties (the powers we know with, such as memory, perception and reasoning) "aimed at truth" in the sense that matters for knowledge are faculties designed for it, and a determining God designs them. So, the move concludes, the best-known theistic argument from the reliability of our faculties against naturalism (the view that nature is all there is, with no God behind it) is fully available to a Calvinist, who has no need of the free-thinking argument.
The move is right that God designed our faculties to aim at truth, and right that the best-known argument from our faculties against naturalism serves a Calvinist as well as anyone. But the free-thinking argument does not compete with it. The argument from our faculties asks whether they can be trusted. The free-thinking argument asks who settles each judgment reached with them.
- If God's decree settles every judgment, the answer is the decree, and every false belief a careful believer holds was decreed along with the true ones. A Calvinist can reply that God designed the faculties for truth and decreed the errors for reasons of his own, as he decrees sins that he forbids (D12). Grant it. Every judgment the believer reaches, and every check he runs on one, was still settled by the decree and not by him.
- A God who designs minds aimed at truth and leaves the judging to them is exactly what the free-thinking argument requires.
- Think of a rifle built to hit the bull's-eye when it is handled with care. It is aimed at the target in a way that still leaves the aiming to the marksman.
6. Indirect influence moves the question back a step.
The sixth move says a person can still influence his future beliefs indirectly, by choosing what to attend to, and guidance control is enough for that.
The move is right that belief is rarely chosen directly. Nobody could believe he is an octopus for a billion dollars. Responsibility for belief is mostly indirect: a person chooses what to consider, how careful to be and whether to hear an argument out, and his beliefs follow. The argument's defenders hold exactly that.
- But indirect responsibility is borrowed. Derivative responsibility, responsibility for what follows from a choice, needs direct responsibility somewhere up the line: responsibility for a choice the person himself settled when he made it.
- Under determinism each of those earlier choices, to look again, to read the other side, to slow down, was itself settled beforehand. Guidance control steers the chain without starting it, so the indirect route leads back to the same question, asked this time of the choice to attend.
- The drunk driver is blamed for the crash at eleven because of his choice at eight, when he pocketed his keys and went into the bar. If that choice too was settled for him before he walked in, the crash has nothing to borrow from.
7. Evidence moves a mind without settling it.
The seventh move says a properly working mind believes what the evidence moves it to believe, the way the smell of bread moves a hungry man toward the kitchen.
The move is right that a working mind is moved by evidence. A mind that weighed the evidence and believed the opposite would be malfunctioning. What evidence does not settle is how carefully a mind attends to it.
- If the evidence alone settled belief, a careful thinker and a careless one given the same evidence would always believe alike. They do not. Careful scholars with the same Bible and the same arguments come down on opposite sides of this very debate.
- Scripture commands us to "take every thought captive to obey Christ" (2 Corinthians 10:5), a command that presupposes the thinker's part in what he believes.
- If the care or the carelessness was itself settled beforehand, then something other than the thinker settled the belief after all, and the question is the one about the source.
- A hungry man smells bread and heads for the kitchen. Whether he stops to ask whose bread it is was never in the smell.
8. God is never an exception to the condition.
The eighth move says that God cannot believe otherwise, since his beliefs always match reality. If his knowledge needs no categorical ability to think otherwise, neither does ours.
The question, then, is how God can know without being able to believe otherwise. The answer lies in the argument's condition, that a judgment is not ultimately determined by something or someone else. That condition is never violated in God, since nothing outside him determines what he believes, and it is always violated under determinism. So the argument needs no account of whether God could "believe otherwise."
- Its defenders add a second answer: the argument concerns beliefs reached by inference, and God infers nothing. He knows without reasoning his way to anything.
- Think of a perfectly honest witness who could never bring himself to lie. His testimony is still his own, because nothing outside him put the words in his mouth.
See also:
NT / Moral and Rational: Free-Thinking ArgumentPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated OnePhilosophy / Epistemology: Internalism
+God can grieve over what he himself decrees. Scripture shows him commanding one thing and decreeing another, so his laments measure how far a sin falls from his command, not a refusal he left unsettled.
1. God does have two wills, on every Christian account.
In its strongest form, the objection starts from an old distinction. Theologians have long spoken of two wills in God: what he commands, and what he decrees will happen. Anyone can want a thing and decide against it for a weightier reason, the way a man wants to stay in bed and gets up for work. Scripture shows God doing the same.
- Joseph tells the brothers who sold him, "you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good" (Genesis 50:20).
- Of the suffering servant, whose death was a crime, Isaiah says, "it was the will of the Lord to crush him" (Isaiah 53:10).
- So a lament is coherent even over what God decreed. The further a sin falls from his command, the deeper the grief, and nothing in the grief shows that his decree was thwarted. A libertarian needs two wills as well, since his God wants people to do right and wants something more, that they do it freely.
All of that is true, and the source view keeps two wills as well. Jesus wanted Jerusalem's children gathered, and he willed something more than the gathering: that the answer be theirs. So the laments do not show that the decree reading, on which God's decree settles the refusal itself, is incoherent. (P5) does not claim that they do.
2. What divides the readings is who settles the refusal.
Both readings have two wills. They differ over what the second will does.
- On the source view, God permits a refusal that nothing settles but the one who refuses, and the invitation and the wish behind it are one. He chose to create free people, knowing what each would do, and he ensures his purposes without making their choices for them.
- On the decree reading, the decree settles the refusal itself. The people refuse because they do not want to come, and their not wanting was settled for them.
- Think of two coaches whose star receiver drops the winning pass. One trained him, pleaded with him and watched him ignore every word. The other also arranged, for the good of the season, that he would drop it. Both may grieve. Only the first grieves over something the player alone decided.
3. The laments lay the refusal at the refusers' door.
- Jesus says, "you were not willing" (Matthew 23:37). His sentence names who refused, and it says nothing of a decree behind the refusal.
- Isaiah's courtroom asks the hearers to "judge between me and my vineyard" (Isaiah 5:3), and the question "What more was there to do for my vineyard, that I have not done in it?" (Isaiah 5:4) expects the answer "nothing." On the decree reading there was one thing more: the grace that makes the unwilling willing, which that reading holds God gives to some and withholds from others.
• Its defenders answer that the question is about what a vinedresser does for a vineyard, not about what grace could have done. That is a fair reading of the picture. But the hearers are still asked to reach a verdict, that the fault is the vineyard's alone. That verdict holds only if a refusal the decree settled is still wholly the refuser's, and that is the question the manipulation argument presses.
- So the laments are evidence by fit, not proof. They read without strain on the source view. The decree reading can read them too, but only by adding what they never say, that the refusal they lament was settled by the one lamenting.
- A key that turns smoothly is good evidence that it belongs to the lock. It does not prove that no other key could be made to turn with enough jiggling.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around ItPhilosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of SinPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+Nobody can know whether we are free. The arguments on each side are strong enough, and the evidence thin enough, that the honest course is to believe neither that we are free nor that we are not.
1. Agnosticism is a serious and modest position.Agnosticism here means suspending judgment, believing neither that we are free nor that we are not. Serious philosophers hold it, and Stephen Kearns has defended it in print. It asks for less than either side, which makes it attractive. A person who has watched this argument go back and forth for two thousand years could fairly wonder whether anyone will ever resolve it.
2. Suspending judgment needs level scales.
- Agnosticism is the right response when the reasons on each side weigh about the same. Here one side has five lines of argument from three independent sources (C), and the other has arguments that have been met one at a time (P2).
- A best explanation is not given up because a rival is possible. It is given up when a rival explains the evidence better.
- A philosopher can argue that the whole world sprang into being five minutes ago, complete with your memories of breakfast. You do not put your belief that you had breakfast on hold until you have refuted him. You keep the belief, because an ordinary past is still the best explanation of your memories, and his argument has given you no reason to give it up.
3. Nobody lives as an agnostic about this.
- The agnostic still deliberates as though the outcome waits on him (P4). He still resents the man who lies to him and thanks the friend who helps him move (P3).
- He also offers his suspension as the careful verdict on the evidence, which takes for granted that he weighed it himself, the point the free-thinking argument presses (C).
- Think of a juror who declares herself undecided about whether anyone ever deserves anything, and then, walking to her car, is furious at the man who keyed it. Her anger is not a proof, but it tells you what she believes.
- The agnostic can answer that acting as if we are free is not the same as believing it, the way a defense lawyer argues for her client's innocence without having made up her own mind. That holds for a performance. The juror's anger is not a performance. It is a judgment that the man deserved it, made by someone who was not playing a part.
- Holding a belief in every act of life while withholding it in the study looks less like neutrality than like the belief itself, kept in practice and refused a name.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Brain Scans Have Not Found the Decision Before the DeciderPhilosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism
+Introspection is unreliable. Psychologists and philosophers such as Eric Schwitzgebel have shown that people are often wrong about their own minds, so the experience of deciding is no secure place to start.
1. The evidence against introspection is real.Introspection is looking inward at one's own mind. The strongest form of this objection draws on two bodies of work.
- In a well-known 1977 review, the psychologists Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson showed that people asked why they acted often give confident reasons that played no part. Shoppers choosing among four identical pairs of stockings favored the pair on the right, and explained their choice by the quality of the stockings, never by where they hung.
- Eric Schwitzgebel has argued that people are often wrong even about their present experience when asked to describe it: whether their side vision is sharp, whether they always think in words, what exactly anger feels like.
Both findings should be granted plainly. Anyone who appeals to experience has to meet them.
2. Being wrong about causes is not being wrong about seemings.
Nisbett and Wilson's shoppers were wrong about why they chose, which is a claim about causes, reached by inference. They were not wrong that they chose, or about how choosing seemed to them.
- That is exactly the line (P2) draws. The seeming is basic. What caused the choice, and whether the chooser is free, are inferred, and inferences can fail.
- Think of the shopper who swears the stockings on the right were better made. She is wrong about why she picked them. She is not wrong that she picked them, or that the picking felt like hers.
3. The basic belief about deciding is simple, not a detailed description.
Schwitzgebel's cases ask for hard descriptions of things a person is not attending to, or for a whole complicated experience summed up in a phrase. The belief that is basic here asks for none of that. It takes in only that deciding is going on and how it seems to the one deciding.
- You can easily be wrong about how clear the edge of your vision is. You cannot be wrong about whether your head hurts right now.
- The harder questions about what the experience of choosing contains do belong among the descriptions that can go wrong. That is why (P1) treats its content as debated, and why the experience counts as evidence rather than proof (D2).
4. The case does not rest on the inside view alone.
Suppose introspection were even less reliable than its critics claim. The inside view (P1, P2, P4) would weaken, and responsibility (P3) and Scripture (P5) would stand untouched, since neither depends on how choosing seems from the inside (C).
The three neighbors at one window could all be fooled by the same curtain, and the fingerprint and the receipt would still be on the table.
See also:
Philosophy / Epistemology: Classical FoundationalismPhilosophy / Free Will: The Brain Scans Have Not Found the Decision Before the Decider