Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

Public Theology

Theological Analyses of Societal Issues

Theology of the Family

Where Faith and Family Intersect

Biographies

Notable Works & Great Quotes from Key Figures

The Hellenistic & Roman World

300 BC – 300 AD

Pyrrho of Elis c. 360 – c. 270 BC

(●) The painter from Elis who taught that nothing can be known for certain, and that peace comes from no longer trying to decide. + Every age has someone at the dinner table who answers every confident claim with a shrug and a question: "How do you know?" Pyrrho of Elis turned that shrug into a way of life. He held that the senses and reason cannot tell us what things really are, that the wise person therefore holds back from deciding, and that a deep calm follows once you stop insisting. His name became a word: for two thousand years, a thoroughgoing doubter has been called a Pyrrhonist, and the school that claimed him is a chief ancestor of later skepticism. He belongs on a Christian apologetics site because the gospel makes claims to knowledge, and Pyrrho is the man the ancients remembered as the first to say, as a settled way of living, that no such claim can be made. The church fathers met his followers, Augustine wrestled with their near relatives, and Pascal, thirteen centuries later, used their doubts to humble proud reason and then refused to let them have the last word. The signature fact is a strange one: Pyrrho wrote nothing at all. Everything we know comes through his devoted disciple Timon, through a hostile critic named Aristocles whose summary survives only because a bishop copied it out, and through Diogenes Laertius, a third-century AD collector of philosophers’ lives. Even his dates are an estimate. Ancient writers say he lived to nearly ninety and travelled on Alexander’s campaigns, and from those two facts modern scholars reckon a birth around 365 to 360 BC and a death around 275 to 270 BC. Every date in his life is that kind of convention, a careful guess rather than a record, and each one is marked "c." for circa, Latin for "around."

(●) c. 360 BC: Born in Elis, he began as a painter, and not a very good one. + Elis was a small city in the northwest of the Peloponnese, the southern peninsula of Greece, and its one claim on the wider world was that it ran the Olympic Games, held a short ride away at Olympia. Diogenes Laertius names his father as Pleistarchus (the travel writer Pausanias calls him Pistocrates), and his first trade was not philosophy but paint. He was, by every account, an ordinary painter. Antigonus of Carystus, who wrote a life of him within living memory, called him "a poor and unknown painter," and added that some of his pictures of torch-racers could still be seen in the gymnasium at Elis: competent work on a public wall, the kind a town commissions from a local man. Keep that picture in mind, because there is a quiet irony in it. The man who would later doubt that the eye tells us what things are began by spending his days trying to get the eye to see.

(●) c. 340 BC: He turned to philosophy and attached himself to Anaxarchus, a follower of Democritus. + The date is an estimate, fitted between his birth and the campaigns that followed. Diogenes Laertius reports, from an older writer named Alexander, that Pyrrho first studied under a teacher called Bryson, though the ancient sources disagree about which Bryson that was. The teacher who mattered was Anaxarchus of Abdera. Abdera was the hometown of Democritus, the philosopher who taught that the world is nothing but atoms moving in empty space, and that colors, tastes and warmth exist only "by convention," in the way we happen to perceive things. Aristocles, a hostile later critic, sneers that Pyrrho read the books of Democritus and found nothing useful in them, but a friend, Philo of Athens, remembered it the other way: Democritus was the author Pyrrho loved best, with Homer second. Here is the seed of what came later. If sweetness is not in the honey but only in the tongue, a thoughtful painter might begin to wonder what, if anything, the senses ever report about the thing itself.

(●) c. 334–324 BC: He marched with Alexander the Great’s army as far as India, and met the naked philosophers there. + Anaxarchus became a court philosopher to Alexander of Macedon, and Pyrrho went with him. They followed the army east through Persia to the Indus valley, where Alexander campaigned from 327 to 325 BC. We cannot say exactly when Pyrrho joined or when he left. All we can do is set him inside the decade the campaign lasted and leave it there. In India the Greeks met men they called gymnosophists, "naked wise men," ascetics who lived outdoors with almost nothing and seemed untroubled by heat, hunger or pain. They also met the Magi, the priestly sages of Persia. Diogenes Laertius, quoting an earlier writer, says these meetings led Pyrrho to "a most noble philosophy" of "agnosticism and suspension of judgement": not knowing, and not pretending to know, and so declining to decide either way. Scholars still argue over how much he actually learned from India and how much he brought with him; what we can say is that he came home changed. One small scene stayed with him. An Indian rebuked Anaxarchus, telling him he would never teach anyone what is good while he danced attendance on kings in their courts. Pyrrho took the rebuke to heart, even though it was aimed at his teacher. Plutarch adds that Alexander paid him ten thousand gold pieces at their first meeting, and Sextus Empiricus says it was for a poem in the king’s honor; whatever the reason, the money did not hold him at court.

(●) c. 324 BC: Home in Elis, he lived quietly with his sister and tried to practice what he had come to believe. + Back in Elis, Pyrrho kept to himself, rarely even visiting relatives. He shared a house with his sister Philista, a midwife, and the stories of those years are wonderfully ordinary. He took poultry and piglets to market. He dusted the furniture. He once washed a pig, apparently to show that no chore was beneath a man who held nothing better or worse than anything else. The stories also show where the doctrine strained. When a friend let his sister down over a sacrifice, Pyrrho lost his temper, and when the friend teased him about his famous calm he answered that a weak woman was no place to make a display of indifference. When a dog rushed at him and he was frightened, he admitted that it was hard to strip off the human being entirely. (His reply, in his own reported words, is the last (Q) row among the teachings.) Antigonus told darker tales: that Pyrrho would not step aside for carts, cliffs or dogs, and that his friends had to follow him around to keep him alive. A later Pyrrhonist, Aenesidemus, flatly denied this, saying Pyrrho doubted in philosophy but showed ordinary good sense in daily life. The truth is probably that a man who tried to live without opinions made a good subject for jokes.

(●) c. 300 BC: His calm drew disciples, and Elis made him its high priest. + Pyrrho founded no school building and charged no fees, but people came. The most devoted was Timon of Phlius, a former chorus dancer who moved to Elis with his wife to be near him and spent the rest of a long life writing satirical verse in his master’s honor and in mockery of every other philosopher. Nausiphanes, who later taught Epicurus, was captivated as a young man; he used to say that one should imitate Pyrrho’s disposition but his own doctrines, which is to say: copy the man’s calm temper, but take your teaching from Nausiphanes. Epicurus himself, the founder of a rival school, kept asking Nausiphanes about Pyrrho’s way of life. His fellow citizens honored him as well. Elis made him high priest, and for his sake, Diogenes Laertius says, voted that all philosophers should be exempt from taxes. The date of the honor is not recorded; it belongs to his later years. One story from this period has him so pestered by his students’ questions that he stripped off his clothes and swam the river Alpheus to get away from them, which is either a philosopher’s indifference or a teacher’s exasperation, depending on how you tell it.

(●) c. 270 BC: He died at nearly ninety, and his name outlived the school he never founded. + Diogenes Laertius says simply that Pyrrho lived to be nearly ninety. Four centuries later Pausanias saw a statue of him in a colonnade facing the marketplace of Elis, and his tomb at a place called Petra outside the city. The little circle around him did not outlast Timon by much, and for a while it looked as if Pyrrho would be remembered only as an odd local saint. Then, some two hundred years later, around the first century BC, a philosopher named Aenesidemus broke away from the skeptical wing of Plato’s Academy and revived the old man’s name, calling his own movement Pyrrhonism. Around AD 200 a Greek physician named Sextus Empiricus set the whole system down in books that survive. So the man who wrote nothing became, by the gratitude of later disciples, the patron of the most thorough doubt the ancient world produced.

What He Taught

(T1) Things as they are in themselves cannot be pinned down by the senses or by reason. + Put one hand in a bowl of ice water and the other in a bowl of hot, wait a minute, and then plunge both into a bowl of lukewarm water. One hand reports that it is warm, the other that it is cold. The water has not changed; your hands disagree. Pyrrho’s thought begins with puzzles like that one and pushes them all the way. Our best summary of his view comes from Timon, preserved by Aristocles. Timon said that anyone who wants to be happy must ask three questions: what things are like by nature, what attitude we should take toward them, and what will come of taking it. His answer to the first was that things are "indifferent, unstable, and indeterminate," three words in E. H. Gifford’s 1903 English translation for Greek terms meaning, roughly, that nothing in things themselves lets us tell them apart, weigh them, or settle what they are. So neither our perceptions nor our opinions can be called true or false. Scholars still debate whether Pyrrho meant that reality itself is indefinite or only that it is indefinite to us. Either way, the conclusion for daily life is the same: no impression, however vivid, gives us a firm grip on what is really there. Christian thinkers would agree that human knowledge is partial; Paul says that "now we see in a mirror dimly" (1 Corinthians 13:12). But Paul says dimly, not never, and that difference is the whole quarrel.

(Q) "The things themselves then, he professes to show, are equally indifferent, and unstable, and indeterminate, and therefore neither our senses nor our opinions are either true or false." + Source: Aristocles of Messene, On Philosophy VIII, quoted in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.18 (Gifford translation, 1903). Pyrrho wrote nothing, so the words are Aristocles’ summary of Timon’s summary of his master. The "he" is Timon. Aristocles was a Peripatetic, a follower of Aristotle, writing to refute the Pyrrhonists, which makes his careful report of their view all the more striking.

(T2) The wise person suspends judgment and says of each thing that it no more is than is not. + Imagine a juror who has heard the prosecution and the defense and finds the two cases exactly balanced. The honest thing is not to flip a coin but to say, "I cannot decide." Pyrrho proposed taking that juror’s stance toward everything. The Greek word his followers used was epochē, "holding back" or suspension of judgment: neither affirming nor denying, but leaving the question open. His characteristic phrase was "no more" (ou mallon): this thing is no more sweet than bitter, no more good than bad, no more so than not so. Later Pyrrhonists such as Sextus Empiricus turned it into a method, setting every argument against an argument of equal weight until the mind came to rest in balance. You may already be thinking, "Wait. Isn’t refusing to judge anything itself a judgment?" It is a little like a sign on a wall that reads "Ignore all signs." Critics saw the problem at once. Aristocles asked whether "nothing can be known" is itself known. In the very act of telling us to hold no opinions, he wrote, the Pyrrhonists bid us form an opinion, and in saying we should make no statement they make one. The Pyrrhonists had an answer: their "no more" was not a doctrine but a report of their own state, like a purge that flushes itself out along with everything else. Whether that answer works has been argued ever since.

(Q) "For this reason then we must not trust them, but be without opinions, and without bias, and without wavering, saying of every single thing that it no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not." + Source: Aristocles of Messene, On Philosophy VIII, quoted in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.18 (Gifford translation, 1903). This is Timon’s answer to the second of his three questions, what attitude we should take toward things, following directly on (T1). "Them" means our senses and our opinions.

(T3) Peace of mind follows when we stop insisting on what things really are. + Posidonius, a later philosopher, told this story. Pyrrho was on a ship caught in a storm, and the other passengers were terrified. Pyrrho stayed calm, pointed to a little pig on board that went on eating its food, and said that the wise man should keep himself in that same untroubled state. That calm was the point of the whole philosophy. The Greek word is ataraxia, literally "not being stirred up": imperturbability, tranquillity, peace of mind. Timon said the result of the attitude in (T2) would be first speechlessness and then tranquillity. The reasoning runs like this. Most of our anxiety comes from believing that some things are truly good and others truly bad, and then fearing to lose the one or meet the other. Stop believing it, and the anxiety has nothing to feed on. Sextus Empiricus would later say that tranquillity follows suspension of judgment "as the shadow follows a body" (Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.29, Patrick’s translation). A Christian reader will hear something familiar and something very foreign. The longing for peace is as old as the Psalms, and Jesus promised his disciples a peace the world cannot give (John 14:27). But the peace of Pyrrho is reached by ceasing to believe, and the peace of the gospel by trusting someone who can be believed.

(Q) "This, Pyrrho, this my heart is fain to know, / Whence peace of mind to thee doth freely flow, / Why among men thou like a god dost show?" + Source: Timon of Phlius, Images (the work Hicks calls the Conceits), quoted in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers IX.65 (Hicks translation, 1925). Pyrrho left no words of his own, and this is how his closest disciple remembered him: not as a man with clever arguments but as a man with an uncanny calm. "Fain" is an old English word for "eager."

(T4) A person can still live by appearances and custom without claiming to know what lies behind them. + The obvious objection is the one the jokes about carts and cliffs were making: if you believe nothing, how do you get out of bed, cross a road, or eat lunch? The Pyrrhonists answered with a distinction a child can follow. You can say "this honey tastes sweet to me" without saying "this honey is sweet in itself." The first is a report of how things appear; the second is a claim about what they really are. You can eat the honey on the strength of the first and leave the second alone. So the Pyrrhonist lives by what appears, by habit, by the customs and laws of his city, and by the ordinary pressures of hunger and thirst, without ever turning any of them into a doctrine. Aenesidemus said that Pyrrho "determines nothing dogmatically" but "guides himself by apparent facts," and Timon wrote that he had not gone outside what is customary. A dogmatist, in this vocabulary, is anyone who claims to know how things really are, which is to say almost everyone else. Augustine and many after him would ask whether anyone can actually live that way, and Pascal answered flatly that no one ever has (†3). A harder question waits behind it: whether a person who follows custom without believing it to be good has any reason to resist when custom turns cruel.

(Q) "I do not lay it down that honey is sweet, but I admit that it appears to be so." + Source: Timon of Phlius, On the Senses, quoted in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers IX.105 (Hicks translation, 1925). The most quoted line of early Pyrrhonism, and the cleanest statement of the difference between how things appear and how they are (T4).

(Q) "It was not easy entirely to strip oneself of human weakness; but one should strive with all one’s might against facts, by deeds if possible, and if not, in word." + Source: Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers IX.66 (Hicks translation, 1925), reporting Pyrrho’s reply. A dog had rushed at him and frightened him, and someone mocked the great philosopher of calm. His answer is the most human thing he is recorded as saying, and the nearest he comes to admitting that a person cannot simply decide to stop being stirred up by the world.

What Christian Thinkers Made of Him

(†) The church fathers saw his skepticism as a solvent of faith, and preserved the case against it. + Early Christians claimed to know things: that God had made the world, that Jesus had risen, that the apostles had seen him. Luke opens his Gospel by telling Theophilus he writes "that you may have certainty concerning the things you have been taught" (Luke 1:4). A philosophy that said no claim could ever be more than "no more so than not" was bound to look like an acid poured on that kind of certainty. Eusebius of Caesarea, the bishop and church historian of the early fourth century, did not bother to write his own refutation. In his Preparation for the Gospel, a long survey of Greek philosophy written to show why Christians had left it behind, he copied out long extracts from Aristocles’ attack on Pyrrho and Timon. That is why we have the attack, and, by a happy irony, why we have the best summary of Pyrrho’s own teaching (T1, T2). Later in the same century Gregory of Nazianzus, preaching in praise of Athanasius, lamented that "the Sextuses and Pyrrhos, and the antithetic style," arguing both sides of everything, had infected the churches like a disease.

(†) Augustine answered the doubters with a certainty no doubt can touch: if I am deceived, I exist. + The skeptics Augustine actually met were not Pyrrho’s followers but their near cousins, the Academic skeptics, who had taken over Plato’s old school and taught that nothing can be grasped with certainty. As a young man in Milan he was half persuaded by them, and after his conversion one of his first books, Against the Academics (AD 386), was written to climb back out. His most famous reply comes in The City of God. Suppose the skeptic asks, "What if you are deceived?" Then, says Augustine, I exist, because something that does not exist cannot be deceived: "if I am deceived, I am" (XI.26). Twelve centuries later Descartes would build his "I think, therefore I am" on the same ground. Elsewhere in the same work Augustine says the city of God "thoroughly detests such doubt as madness" (XIX.18), while gladly admitting that our knowledge is partial and that we know only in part (1 Corinthians 13:9). Faith, for Augustine, was not a leap made because reason had failed; it was trust in witnesses it would be absurd to disbelieve.

(†) Rediscovered in the Renaissance, his doubts were turned by Pascal into a road toward humility before God. + For a thousand years the Latin West barely knew Pyrrho. Then, in the 1560s, the works of Sextus Empiricus were printed in Latin translation, and Pyrrhonism burst back into European thought. Michel de Montaigne had skeptical mottoes painted on the beams of his library and argued that human reason is too weak to reach God unaided. Some Christians welcomed the doubts as a way of clearing the ground for faith. Blaise Pascal, the seventeenth-century mathematician and Christian thinker, took the doubts more seriously than almost anyone and refused to stop there. In his Pensées he grants the skeptic that reason cannot prove its own first principles, the starting points every argument has to take for granted (that you are awake and not dreaming, for instance, when in sleep we believe we are awake just as firmly), then grants the dogmatist that no one can actually live as a complete skeptic: "there never has been a real complete sceptic." His verdict is that "Nature confutes the sceptics, and reason confutes the dogmatists" (Pensées 434, Trotter translation). Caught between the two, proud human reason is meant to fall silent and listen: "Hear God." In Pascal’s hands, Pyrrho’s doubt became not a resting place but a doorway, a way of showing a person how much they need to be told.

(†) Where the gospel parts company with him: God can be known, and peace comes by trusting him rather than by ceasing to believe. + Pyrrho deserves credit for honesty about how often confident people are wrong, and Scripture shares his suspicion of human pride. But on four points his own teaching and the gospel go separate ways. - Knowledge. Pyrrho taught that nothing can be known as it really is (T1). Scripture says that God has made himself known: his "invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made" (Romans 1:20). John writes "that you may know that you have eternal life" (1 John 5:13), and Paul could say, "I know whom I have believed" (2 Timothy 1:12). - Evidence. Pyrrho taught that nothing settles a question one way rather than the other, that each thing is "no more" so than not (T2). The apostles pointed to public events that tip the scales: God "has given assurance to all by raising him from the dead" (Acts 17:31). Christian faith is trust given on the strength of testimony, not a decision made in the absence of reasons. - Peace. Pyrrho sought calm by holding nothing to be truly good or truly bad (T3). The gospel offers "the peace of God, which surpasses all understanding" (Philippians 4:7), a peace that comes from trusting a God who is good, not from deciding that nothing is. - Feeling. Pyrrho admired the unmoved pig in the storm and counted being frightened by a dog a weakness to be overcome. At the tomb of his friend Lazarus, "Jesus wept" (John 11:35). The Christian ideal is not freedom from being moved, but being moved by the right things in the right way. Pyrrho is a permanent reminder of how little the unaided mind can secure by itself. That is exactly the point at which, on the Christian view, God does not leave us to our shrug but speaks.

Pyrrho wrote nothing. Diogenes Laertius says so twice (I.16 and IX.102), and Aristocles confirms it. The one possible exception is a poem in honor of Alexander the Great, which Sextus Empiricus mentions (Against the Professors I.282) and which is lost. Everything known about him therefore comes from witnesses, friendly and hostile, and those are catalogued here. His disciple Timon of Phlius (c. 320–230 BC), surviving only in fragments: - Silloi (Lampoons): Satirical verses in the style of Homer, mocking nearly every philosopher before and around him and sparing almost no one but Pyrrho (Xenophanes gets a grudging half-compliment). The source of several lines quoted by Diogenes Laertius and Sextus. - Indalmoi (Images, or in Hicks’s rendering the Conceits): Elegiac verses on how things appear; contains the address to Pyrrho asking whence his peace of mind flows (T3). - Python: A prose dialogue telling how Timon met Pyrrho on the road to Delphi and what they discussed. Contains the claim that Pyrrho never went outside what is customary (T4). - On the Senses: Known only from the honey line (T4). - Against the Physicists: A prose work attacking the natural philosophers, cited by Sextus Empiricus for its objection to arguing from unproved assumptions. - Funeral Banquet of Arcesilaus: A poem in which Timon, who mocked Arcesilaus in the Silloi, praised the head of the Academy after his death (Diogenes Laertius IX.115). - Plays and other poems: Diogenes Laertius credits him with epics, tragedies, satyr plays, thirty comedies and sixty tragedies, and obscene verses, all lost. - The three-question summary preserved by Aristocles (T1, T2) probably comes from one of these works, though it is not said which. Ancient accounts of his life and teaching: - Antigonus of Carystus, Life of Pyrrho (third century BC): Lost, but used heavily by Diogenes Laertius and Aristocles. The source of the poor-painter detail and the tales of carts and cliffs. - Aristocles of Messene, On Philosophy VIII (late first century BC or first century AD): A Peripatetic’s refutation of Pyrrho, Timon and Aenesidemus, preserved in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.18. Our best summary of the teaching (T1, T2) and the earliest surviving systematic attack on it. - Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers IX.61–108 (third century AD): The fullest life, gathering the anecdotes (the pig on the ship, the frightening dog, the swim across the Alpheus) and a long outline of later Pyrrhonist arguments. - Cicero, On Ends (De finibus) and Academica (45 BC): Mention Pyrrho several times, but as a stern moralist who held that nothing besides virtue makes any difference, not as a skeptic about knowledge. A reminder that even ancient readers disagreed about what he taught. - Plutarch, On the Fortune of Alexander I.10: The report of Alexander’s gift of ten thousand gold pieces. - Pausanias, Description of Greece VI.24.5 (second century AD): The statue in the marketplace of Elis and the tomb at Petra. The later Pyrrhonist tradition: - Aenesidemus, Pyrrhonian Discourses (first century BC): Lost, summarized by the Byzantine patriarch Photius (Bibliotheca, codex 212). The work that revived Pyrrho’s name and set out the ten "modes," standard patterns of argument for suspending judgment. - Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (c. AD 200): The one complete surviving handbook of the school, three books long. Book I defines skepticism as the ability to set appearances and arguments against each other until the mind reaches suspension and then tranquillity (T2, T3). - Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors (Adversus Mathematicos): A long series of attacks on the claims of grammarians, logicians, physicists and ethicists, and the source of the Alexander poem report. Christian responses named in the reception rows: Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.18; Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 21.12; Augustine, Against the Academics and The City of God XI.26 and XIX.18; Pascal, Pensées 434. Translations quoted: Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, translated by E. H. Gifford (1903); Diogenes Laertius, translated by R. D. Hicks (Loeb, 1925); Augustine, The City of God, translated by Marcus Dods (1887); Gregory of Nazianzus in the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (1894); Pascal, Pensées, translated by W. F. Trotter (1910); Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I, translated by Mary Mills Patrick (1899). Scripture from the English Standard Version. Standard English editions and studies: Richard Bett, Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy (Oxford, 2000); A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1987), sections 1–3; Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, translated by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge, 2000). Mary Mills Patrick’s Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism (1899), with a translation of the first book of the Outlines, is in the public domain and free online.

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