(●)Being free takes more than being able to act on your choice.
+Luke has been offered the job he has wanted for years, and the interview is at ten o'clock on the other side of town. At nine he is dressed. His coat is on, his keys are in his hand, and the front door stands open. He does not go through it. Luke has agoraphobia, a dread of open and public places, and his is severe: for him, stepping past the gate is not merely frightening but unthinkable. At ten past ten he closes the door.
Now put to Luke's morning the question that the classic account of freedom asks. If Luke had chosen to go, would he have gone? Of course he would. His legs work, the car starts, and nobody is holding him back. By that account, which prevailed from the seventeenth century well into the twentieth, Luke was free to go to his interview and simply decided not to.
Everyone who has ever loved someone like Luke knows better.
The account behind that verdict is called classical compatibilism, and the name is worth taking apart. Determinism is the view that everything that happens, our choices included, is fixed in advance by what came before it, the way the last domino in a long row is settled the moment the first one tips. Compatibilism is the view that free will and determinism can both be true, so that a choice fixed long before you make it can still be a free one. Its classical form said what makes that possible: freedom is simply doing what you want, with nothing outside you in the way.
The view has a long pedigree. The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes put it that way in the seventeenth century, John Locke and David Hume said much the same, and the New England pastor Jonathan Edwards gave it its most rigorous Christian form in 1754. Its modern statement is the conditional analysis, named for the "if" it hangs on. On this analysis, to say that someone "could have done otherwise" just means that he would have done otherwise if he had chosen to. That gives a simple test for any deed, the conditional test, which comes down to one question: if he had chosen differently, would he have done differently?
You can see why so many found it attractive. Suppose that everything you did last night, down to the soup you ordered at dinner, was fixed long before you were born. That is what determinism says. What it never says is that if you had chosen the salad, the waiter would have refused to bring it. So on the conditional analysis a fully determined person is as free as anyone, and the old quarrel between freedom and determinism is settled by a definition.
The definition does get one thing right. Nobody is free to do a thing he could not do even if he chose it, which is why a man in chains is not free to walk away, however badly he wants to. Being able to carry out your choice, with nothing in the way, is what philosophers call free action. It matters to whether you are free to do a thing. It is just not enough to make the choice itself free.
What makes a choice free, then? Think of a woman who spends a weekend weighing two job offers and, on Sunday night, takes the one nearer her mother. Nothing settled that choice but her, and she could tell you her reasons. She is its source, the one it comes from, and that is what makes the choice free. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the person who makes it, for reasons of his own. Call this the source view of freedom.
Luke is the other kind of case. That morning he does exactly what he wants, and yet it is his fear that decides whether he goes, not Luke. The conditional test cannot tell him from the woman with the two job offers, because it asks only what would have followed a different choice. It never asks where the choice came from.
So Luke's morning shows two things. The first is that doing what you want is not the same as being free (C1). The second concerns the phrase the conditional analysis was built to explain. Everyone who loves Luke says that he couldn't have gone, and they are right, though he would have gone if he had chosen to. So "could have done otherwise" cannot mean "would have done otherwise if he had chosen to" (C2).
The argument is deductive, which means it works like a locked chain: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. The premises do not have to be beyond all doubt, though. Each needs only to be more plausible than its denial.
Who holds what, on classical compatibilism:
- Support: Thomas Hobbes gave it its classic statement in 1654, and A. J. Ayer restated it for the twentieth century in 1954.
- Oppose: John Bramhall, an Anglican bishop, answered Hobbes in 1655, and Keith Lehrer gave its conditional analysis its most famous counterexample in 1968: a man with a morbid fear of red candies, who would eat one if he chose to but cannot bring himself to choose it.
Luke's morning refutes it.
(P1)A person can do what he wants while something else decides for him.
+Everyone has met people like this: they act exactly as they want, with nothing outside them in the way, and still the choice is not theirs.
(1) Luke does what he wants with nothing in his way.
- Luke's fear does nothing to his legs. It works on the choosing itself. As philosophers usually describe a case like his, he has an irresistible desire to stay indoors, one so strong that he cannot even choose to go out.
- So when he closes the door, he is doing what he most wants at that moment. There is no lock on the door, no chain on Luke, and nobody standing in the hall.
- If the company rang at eleven to ask what had kept him, the honest answer about the world outside Luke's head would be "nothing at all."
(2) The fear decides for him, whatever his reasons say.
- Luke knows the job matters, and he has rehearsed his answers in the mirror. Put a thousand dollars on the doorstep, his for walking to the car, and he still would not choose to go.
- That is how anyone can tell whose choice it was. A person's own choice answers to his reasons, at least some of the time: give him a good enough reason, and it can change. Luke's choice answers to nothing but the fear, and that is why everyone who knows him says the fear decided.
- Picture two men who stay home on a wet evening. One has weighed it and thinks staying in wiser. The other cannot bring himself even to think of going. Both do what they want, and only the first made up his own mind.
(3) Luke has plenty of company.
- A man with a compulsion washes his hands for the twentieth time in an hour. He wants to wash them, and nothing outside him keeps him from stopping. Still, it is the compulsion that decides.
- A kleptomaniac, someone driven to steal things he neither needs nor values, pockets a pen he could buy for a dollar. He wants the pen, and nobody makes him take it.
- And a patient whose desires a mad scientist has set with a machine does exactly what he wants when the moment comes. The wanting itself was fixed by someone else.
(4) The classic definitions count every one of them free.
- Hobbes defined liberty as "the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent." In plain terms, only an obstacle outside a person's own nature counts against his liberty. Luke's fear is contained in his own nature, so by this definition it is no impediment at all.
- Hobbes's picture of it was water "that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the Channel." The water is free because nothing blocks it, though it could not run any other way. Luke is water in a channel.
- Hume called liberty "a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will," and said that this "hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains." In Hume's sense, hypothetical means an if-then liberty: if you decide to act, you can. Luke is neither a prisoner nor in chains, so Hume counts him free.
- Edwards, writing a century after Hobbes, drew the line between two kinds of inability.
• A natural inability is when "we cannot do it if we will," like a man in chains.
• A moral inability, he wrote, "consists not in any of these things; but either in the want of inclination; or the strength of a contrary inclination; or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the Will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary." Want there means lack. In plain terms, a moral inability is not wanting to, or wanting something else more.
- Only a natural inability takes away freedom on Edwards's account. Luke's inability is the strength of a contrary inclination, so Edwards counts him free.
Therefore, a person can do exactly what he wants, with nothing outside him in the way, while something else decides for him.
(P2)Nobody is free in a choice something else decided for him.
+A choice is free only when nothing settles it but the person who makes it. Almost everyone agrees about cases like Luke's, even though the classic definitions have no way to say it.
(1) Nobody thinks Luke freely turned the job down.
- His family does not think so, his doctor does not, and neither does Luke. Nobody thinks he snubbed the people who sat waiting for him at ten o'clock.
- Luke's sister drove over that evening to ask how it had gone. She did not say, "You chose not to go." She said, "It won again," and she meant the fear.
- Even the most careful modern defender of the conditional analysis agrees about cases like Luke's. He calls the objection built on compulsion and pathological fear "true but irrelevant," and the "true" is a real grant: a person can pass the conditional test and still not be to blame (D6). Of a patient steered by a hypnotist or a mad scientist, he writes that "we all realize that he is neither free nor guilty."
(2) Reid put the principle in a few sentences.
- Thomas Reid, the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher, wrote: "I consider the determination of the will as an effect. This effect must have a cause which had power to produce it; and the cause must be either the person himself, whose will it is, or some other being.... If the person was the cause of that determination of his own will, he was free in that action, and it is justly imputed to him, whether it be good or bad. But, if another being was the cause of this determination, either by producing it immediately, or by means and instruments under his direction, then the determination is the act and deed of that being, and is solely imputable to him."
- More than a century before Reid, the Anglican bishop John Bramhall had put the same point to Hobbes in one line: "If the will of man be not in his own disposition, he is no more a free agent than the fire or the poison."
- Put plainly, whoever settles a choice is its source, the one it comes from, and a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. That is the source view in a sentence.
- Luke's fear is not another being, but it does the deciding the way Reid's other being does. It was not Luke himself, weighing what he wanted and why, who settled what happened at the door. Something else did.
(3) The principle takes no freedom from God or the saints.
- The principle does not say that anyone who cannot do otherwise is unfree, and that is just as well. Scripture says that "it is impossible for God to lie" (Hebrews 6:18), and there is no freer being than God. The saints in glory will not be able to sin, and they will be freer than they have ever been.
- What makes a choice unfree, on this principle, is another decider, not a missing alternative. Nothing decides for God but God. And nothing will settle the saints' goodness but the saints themselves, who will do good because they love God. It is a love formed through their own choices in this life, and grace perfects that love rather than replacing it.
- Think of a judge who cannot be bribed. That he could never take the money is no chain on him. It is his own character, seen from outside.
(4) The usual sign of a free choice is that it could have gone otherwise.
- When a friend misses your wedding, the first thing you want to know is whether he could have come. That is how anyone tests whether a choice was really someone's own: could he have gone the other way?
- By that ordinary test, unlike the conditional one, Luke fails. With his fear exactly as strong as it was, going out was never open to him.
- Being able to choose otherwise is the ordinary mark of a free choice, though, and not its definition. (C2) says precisely what the mark is.
Therefore, nobody is free in a choice something else decided for him, however willingly he acts on it.
(C1)Therefore, doing what you want is not the same as being free.
+Doing what you want is not the same as being free, because Luke does exactly what he wants (P1) and is not free (P2). What the old definition got right still stands: nobody is free to do a thing he could not do even if he chose it.
(1) The step is modus tollens.
- You use this kind of step all the time without its Latin name. If it were Sunday, the bank would be closed. The bank is open, so it is not Sunday. The form is called modus tollens, Latin for "the way that denies": if the first thing were true, the second would be; the second is false; so the first is false.
- Luke's case runs the same way. If doing what you want were the same as being free, everyone who did what he wanted would be free. Luke does what he wants (P1), and Luke is not free (P2). So doing what you want is not the same as being free.
(2) Nobody is free to do what he could not do even if he chose it.
- John Locke told of a man carried into a room while fast asleep and locked in. He wakes to find there someone he has long wanted to talk with, and he is glad to stay. He stays willingly, Locke said, and yet he is not at liberty to leave.
- So the conditional test names something real. A person who fails it, who would be stopped even if he chose otherwise, is not free to do otherwise. Nobody on either side denies that.
- The same fact gives a real excuse when someone fails to act. Nobody is to blame for leaving undone what he could not have done even if he had chosen it, unless he brought the inability on himself.
- Suppose Locke's man had promised to be across town that morning. Nobody could blame him for failing to get there. The most anyone could hold against him is that he chose to stay without ever trying the door, and that choice was his own (D15).
- Think of a gate locked across a path you never meant to take. The lock tells you where you could not have gone. It tells you nothing about whether the road you took was your own.
(3) The classic compatibilists said being able to act on your choice was enough.
- Hobbes did not say that the absence of impediments is one condition of liberty. He said it is what liberty is.
- Hume said his hypothetical liberty belongs to everyone not in chains, and Edwards wrote that the plain meaning of freedom in common speech is power "to do as he pleases."
- That is the claim Luke refutes: that doing what you want, with nothing in the way, is all there is to freedom.
(4) The most careful modern defender of the conditional analysis grants the point.
- His defense is more modest than the old definition. It says the conditional analysis offers only "a necessary condition for attributions of moral responsibility."
- Oxygen must be present for a fire, but oxygen alone has never lit one. That is what philosophers mean by a necessary condition: something that must be there, though it may not be enough on its own. So he agrees that a person can pass the test and be neither free nor guilty.
- That leaves a question the old definition never asked: if passing the test is not enough, what makes a choice free? The answer is the source (P2). Its usual sign is an ability the conditional test does not measure (C2).
Therefore, doing what you want is not the same as being free.
(P3)A man frozen by fear would go out if he chose to.
+Put the conditional test to a man frozen by fear, and he passes it as easily as anyone.
(1) The conditional analysis turns "could have" into "would have, if."
- The standard encyclopedia survey of the free will debate puts it this way: "An agent S has the ability to do otherwise if and only if, were S to choose to do otherwise, then S would do otherwise." Here S stands for any person, and "if and only if" means the two halves stand or fall together.
- Two of Britain's leading twentieth-century philosophers built their accounts on it. In 1912 the first suggested that when we say a man could have done something, we very often mean merely that he would have done it if he had chosen. In 1954 the second made that the first of his three conditions (D3).
- Picture a vending machine. Its wiring settles, reliably, that pressing the other button would have given you the other drink. It settles nothing about whether you could have pressed the other button.
(2) Luke passes it.
- If Luke chose to go, would he go? Yes. His legs work, the car starts, and the road is clear.
- The test cannot catch him, and the reason lies in how an "if" like this one is judged. To ask what Luke would do if he chose to go, you imagine him choosing to go.
- But a Luke who chooses to go is a Luke whose fear has already loosened its grip, and on that imagined morning there is no reason to think anything would stop him. The test passes him by imagining away the very thing that held him.
- It is like a runner with a broken leg who would win the race if his leg were healed. That is perfectly true, and it tells you nothing about whether he can win the race today.
(3) Moving the test back a step does not help.
- Philosophers point out that the original test covers only free action, being able to carry out a choice, and says nothing about the choosing itself. The obvious repair moves the "if" back a step: a person could have chosen otherwise if, had he wanted to choose otherwise, he would have.
- Put to Luke, the repaired test asks: if he had wanted to choose to go, would he have chosen to go? He passes this one too, and for the same reason. Imagine him wanting to choose to go, and you have imagined a morning on which the fear has already let go. On that morning he would choose to go.
- Think of a safe with its combination written on a card locked inside it. "If you dialed the combination, the safe would open" is perfectly true, and no help at all, because getting at the combination is the whole trouble. For Luke, the wanting is the combination.
Therefore, a man frozen by fear passes the conditional test and its first repair alike: he would go out if he chose to, and would choose to if he wanted to.
(P4)A man frozen by fear could not have gone out.
+Luke could not have gone, because going meant choosing to go, and that choice was beyond him. Everyone who has met a case like his agrees, and the words they reach for show what "could have" means.
(1) Both sides grant that, in a real sense, Luke could not have gone.
- His family, his doctor and Luke himself all say that he could not. Replay that morning a thousand times with his fear exactly as it was, and he closes the door every time.
- The conditional analysis's own defenders agree. Its most careful modern defender grants that it is "perfectly fine to say that in a real sense" a person with a phobia "cannot" do what his fear forbids. What he denies is that this is the sense responsibility turns on (D2).
(2) "He couldn't help it" judges a person as he actually was.
- Picture a mother told by the school office that her son "could have come to school if he had wanted to." If panic is the reason he cannot want to, she knows exactly what is wrong with that sentence.
- When we say that someone couldn't help it, we mean that, as he actually was at that moment, the other course was not open to him. Parents and teachers use that standard every day.
- Nobody accepts "he could have, if he had wanted to" when the wanting is the trouble.
(3) Changing the want changes the case.
- Luke without his fear is a man who would have gone to the interview. The question was never about that man.
- Ask a coach whether his sprinter can run a hundred meters in ten seconds, and he will not answer by imagining the sprinter with a different pair of legs.
(4) The question was always about the choosing.
- Reid said what the freedom in question is: "By the liberty of a moral agent, I understand, a power over the determinations of his own will." The question is whether the person has power over his willing, not whether his hands would follow it.
- Luke has every power his hands need and no power over how his will is settled at the door. That is what everyone means in saying he could not have gone: the only way out of the house ran through a choice he could not make.
Therefore, a man frozen by fear could not have gone out, however true it is that he would have gone if he had chosen to.
(C2)Therefore, "could have done otherwise" does not mean "would have done otherwise if he had chosen to."
+"Could have done otherwise" does not mean "would have done otherwise if he had chosen to," because Luke would have gone if he had chosen to (P3) and yet could not have gone (P4). The reading that fits the clear cases holds everything before the choice exactly as it was.
(1) The step is modus tollens again.
- If "could have done otherwise" meant "would have done otherwise, if he had chosen to," then Luke, who would have gone if he had chosen to (P3), could have gone. He could not (P4). So the phrase does not mean that.
- A definition of "bachelor" that counted married men would be wrong, however well it handled the unmarried ones. In the same way, a definition that fits a case the word does not fit has not captured the word.
- Nothing stops a philosopher from using "can" in a conditional sense on purpose, so long as he says so. What fails is the claim that this is what the words mean when we ask whether a man could have helped it.
(2) Moving the "if" back to the wanting gets ordinary people wrong.
- The step back to "would have chosen otherwise, if he had wanted to" still passes Luke (P3). It fails ordinary people besides.
- Picture an evening with a novel on the table and a film on the television. You want to read, you also want to watch the film, and in the end you pick up the novel. Nobody doubts that you could have chosen the film.
- The repaired test asks whether, if you had wanted to choose the film, you would have chosen it. But you did want to, and you did not choose it.
- Here is why that sinks the test. When the "if" in a sentence like this has already come true, the sentence is judged by what actually happened. Suppose a friend who thinks you overslept tells you, "If you had left at eight, you would have made the train." If in fact you did leave at eight, and missed it anyway, he is simply wrong.
- Your evening works the same way. What actually happened is that you wanted the film and picked up the novel, so the test's own "if" sentence comes out false, just as your friend's did. By the test's own lights, then, you could not have chosen the film.
(3) The other repairs offered so far fail too.
- One changes "wanted" to "most strongly wanted." That assumes we always choose what we most strongly want, and anyone who has done his taxes on a sunny Saturday has reason to doubt it.
- Another changes "would have" to "might have." That only moves the puzzle, because "might" needs explaining as much as "could" did.
- A third changes it to "would probably have," and that goes wrong the other way. A choice you were unlikely to make, even wanting to, would count as one you could not make at all, and unlikely is not impossible. A shy man who wants to speak up at a meeting will probably stay quiet, and nobody concludes that he was unable to speak up.
- The newest repair holds a person's inner makeup fixed, and Luke defeats it too (D4). He keeps everything he would need to carry out a choice to go, and still cannot make one.
(4) Holding everything before the choice fixed gets Luke right.
- Listen to the difference between "he could go, if the fear let go of him" and plain "he could go." The first has an "if" in it. The second is the one we mean when we ask whether he could help it.
- Philosophers call the plain reading the categorical analysis, categorical meaning without an "if" attached. In plain English, a person could have chosen or done otherwise when, with everything up to that moment left exactly as it was, doing so was still possible for him.
• The same encyclopedia survey states it formally: "An agent S has the ability to choose or do otherwise than φ at time t if and only if it was possible, holding fixed everything up to t, that S choose or do otherwise than φ at t." In that statement φ, the Greek letter phi, is whatever he actually did, and t is the moment he did it.
- Replay the moment with nothing changed and ask whether the other choice could happen. For Luke it could not. Hold his fear fixed, as it was at the door, and there is no way things could have gone in which he chooses to go.
- Its opponents name the same ability. The most careful modern defender of the conditional analysis calls it "a categorical ability to do otherwise while holding all other things in place," and he agrees that determinism rules it out.
(5) If determinism is true, nobody has this ability.
- On determinism, everything up to the moment of choice, together with the laws of nature, fixes the one choice that is made. Hold all of that fixed and only one choice was ever possible.
- This is the ability the Consequence Argument turns on. That argument is the standard case for thinking that if determinism is true, nothing we do is up to us, since all of it follows from a distant past and from laws of nature that nobody controls.
- Picture a train on a track with no switches. It could have gone somewhere else if the track had been laid differently. On the track it actually has, it could not. That is why so much has been staked on the "if."
(6) The ability is the ordinary mark of a free choice, not its definition.
- What makes a choice free is that nothing settles it but the person who makes it (P2). Being able to choose otherwise, with everything before the choice held fixed, is how that ordinarily shows. The reason is simple: if a choice could have gone either way with everything before it fixed, then nothing before it settled it.
- The mark can be missing where the source is present. God cannot choose evil, yet he is perfectly free (P2). The same can hold for a man. A famous case about a neurosurgeon who stands ready but never acts is the best-known attempt to show it (D12).
- Think of a fingerprint on a glass. It is the ordinary sign that someone handled the glass, and yet a glass handled in gloves was still handled by someone.
Therefore, "could have done otherwise" does not mean "would have done otherwise if he had chosen to."
On compatibilism and the ability to do otherwise:
Ayer, A. J. "Freedom and Necessity." In Philosophical Essays, 271-284. London: Macmillan, 1954.
Campbell, C. A. "Is 'Freewill' a Pseudo-Problem?" Mind 60, no. 240 (1951): 441-465.
Chisholm, Roderick M. "Freedom and Action." In Freedom and Determinism, edited by Keith Lehrer, 11-44. New York: Random House, 1966.
Clarke, Randolph. "Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism." Mind 118, no. 470 (2009): 323-351.
Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013.
Fischer, John Martin, and Garrett Pendergraft. "Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?" Philosophical Studies 166, no. 3 (2013): 575-595.
Kane, Robert. The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Lehrer, Keith. "Cans without Ifs." Analysis 29, no. 1 (1968): 29-32.
Mele, Alfred R. Free Will and Luck. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Chapter 7.
Moore, G. E. Ethics. London: Williams and Norgate, 1912. Chapter 6.
O'Connor, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. "Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2022.
Pawl, Timothy, and Kevin Timpe. "Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven." Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 4 (2009): 396-417.
Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026.
Vihvelin, Kadri. "Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account." Philosophical Topics 32, no. 1/2 (2004): 427-450.
Vihvelin, Kadri. Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
On agoraphobia:
American Psychiatric Association. "Agoraphobia." In Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 5th ed. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013.
Critic sources engaged:
Bignon, Guillaume. "The Distasteful Conditional Analysis." Philosophia Christi 18, no. 2 (2016).
Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018.
Bignon, Guillaume. "A Response to Kevin Timpe's Objections." March 2019.
Dennett, Daniel C. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984.
Fischer, John Martin. "Compatibilism." In Four Views on Free Will, by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007.
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Frankfurt, Harry G. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (1969): 829-839.
Frankfurt, Harry G. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 (1971): 5-20.
Historical sources:
Alexander of Aphrodisias. On Fate.
Bramhall, John. A Defence of True Liberty from Antecedent and Extrinsecall Necessity. London, 1655. In The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God, John Bramhall, vol. 4. Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology. Oxford: J. H. Parker, 1844.
Cicero. De Fato 39-43.
Edwards, Jonathan. Freedom of the Will. 1754. Part I, sections 4-5. In The Works of Jonathan Edwards, edited by Edward Hickman, vol. 1. London, 1834.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. London, 1651. Chapter 21.
Hobbes, Thomas. Of Liberty and Necessity. London, 1654. In The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, edited by William Molesworth, vol. 4. London: John Bohn, 1840.
Hobbes, Thomas, and John Bramhall. Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity. Edited by Vere Chappell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 1748. Section VIII, "Of Liberty and Necessity." Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902.
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 1690. Book II, chapter 21. Edited by A. C. Fraser. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.
Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Edinburgh, 1788. Essay IV.
Biblical citations:
Genesis 4:7; Matthew 23:37; John 8:34, 36; Hebrews 6:18
+The conditional analysis never claimed to be enough. It names one condition that responsibility needs, and Luke is excused by some other condition, so refuting it with Luke attacks a straw man.
1. The classic compatibilists did make the claim.
None of them offered his account as one condition among several. Each offered it as what freedom is:
- Hobbes said liberty is the absence of impediments outside the agent's own nature.
- Hume said his hypothetical liberty belongs to everyone who is not in chains.
- Edwards counted nothing but natural inability as a loss of freedom.
That is why the view could claim to settle the problem of determinism with a definition.
2. The modern retreat grants the conclusion.
The most careful modern defender of the conditional analysis says just what the objection says. The analysis is, in his words, "the only analysis of choice that has so far been shown (and admitted) to be necessary for moral responsibility," and he never offers it as more than necessary. Once he retreats that far, (C1) is common ground. The old definition, taken as a definition, is gone.
- He is right about failures to act, as (C1) grants: nobody is to blame for leaving undone what he could not have done even if he had chosen it, unless he brought the inability on himself.
- Deeds are another matter. When a man actually does something, the deed can stay his even where the conditional ability is missing (D12). What he needs, to answer for it, is that he settled it himself and that nothing prevented him from doing otherwise. A device that stands ready but never acts prevents nothing (D15).
- Even where the ability is required, it is like a lifeguard's certificate. No pool will hire a lifeguard without one, and nobody thinks the certificate is the lifeguard.
3. Then he owes us the rest of the list.
Once the conditional is only one condition among several, its defender owes us the others, and that list is where the real dispute lives. As it happens, none of the conditions he names reaches Luke.
- For manipulation, he adds that a responsible choice must be made "on the basis of that person's God-given character and desires," which a mad scientist's meddling violates. Nobody meddled with Luke.
- For coercion, he points to "the use of force or threats." Nobody threatened Luke.
- For mental illness, he proposes that a person is excused when, through no fault of his own, he does not know that what he is doing is wrong. Luke knows exactly what he is doing and whom he is letting down.
- Later in the book that gives these conditions, the same defender admits that the full list, the conditions that together would be enough, is "still missing." He adds that ethics is like beauty: anyone can name what spoils a painting, a clashing color or a crude line, without being able to list everything that makes one beautiful. That is fair as far as it goes. But it still leaves the question of what the items already on the list have in common.
4. The missing condition is the source.
What the mad scientist's patient and Luke have in common is that something other than the person settled the choice. Nobody is free in a choice something else decided for him (P2).
- The manipulation argument presses the next question. If every want a determined person has was fixed before he was born, do his choices really have their source in him? The argument asks what real difference there is between a determined person and the mad scientist's patient.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated OnePhilosophy / Free Will: Wanting What You Want to Want Is Not Enough: The Hierarchical and Reasons-Responsive Accounts
+Luke's case is true but irrelevant. In one sense he "cannot" go out, but not in the sense that responsibility is about, so his case refutes nothing the analysis claims.
1. Luke's case does not turn on whether the conditional ability is needed.
Start with what the objection gets right. A person who could not have done a thing even if he had chosen it is not to blame for leaving it undone, unless he brought that inability on himself, and (C1) says so too. Luke, though, has the ability to act on a different choice. His case does not show that this ability is unnecessary, only that it is not enough.
It helps to keep three claims apart:
- The modern claim is that the conditional ability is needed for responsibility. Luke was never aimed at it.
- The first old claim is that being able to act on your choice is all there is to being free. Luke refutes it (C1).
- The second old claim is that "could have done otherwise" means "would have done otherwise if he had chosen to." Luke refutes that too (C2).
The classic compatibilists made both of the old claims (D1). The most careful modern defender of the conditional analysis gives both up, and says that if classical compatibilism ever claimed such things, "it belongs to the grave indeed."
- A salesman who once promised that a car would never break down, and now says only that it has an engine, was not misquoted the first time. He has taken the promise back.
2. The source view never made either ability a condition of answering for a deed.
- The analysis's defenders add a point of logic. Anyone who has the stronger ability, the categorical one (to do otherwise with everything before the choice held fixed), also has the weaker, conditional one, just as anyone who can lift a hundred pounds can lift fifty. So if the conditional ability is not needed for what a man does, neither is the categorical one.
- That is true, and it costs the source view nothing. On the source view, a choice is free when nothing settles it but the person who makes it, and that view never held either ability to be a condition of answering for what a man does. A man can choose freely, and answer for his choice, with every other door shut (D12).
- The same defender can press harder. If the source view does not need even the conditional ability for what a man does (D1), then Luke, he may say, was never a counterexample to anything he holds, since he only ever claimed that the ability is needed.
- He is right that Luke is no counterexample to that claim, and Luke was never aimed at it. (C1) and (C2) need only that the ability is not enough.
3. The excuse everyone gives Luke names an inability.
When people excuse Luke, they name his illness as the reason he could not go. He couldn't help it, they say; he couldn't have gone. The inability they name is the one the conditional analysis says he does not have.
- So the "could not" in the ordinary excuse is not the conditional one. It judges Luke as he was that morning, with his fear exactly as strong as it was, and as he was, he could not have gone (P4).
- Take the phrase "he couldn't help it." Nobody who says it of Luke means that his legs would not have worked.
- The defender replies that some other item on his list of conditions does the excusing. But none of the items he names reaches Luke (D1): nobody manipulated him, nobody threatened him, and he knows exactly what he is doing.
- Yet the defender grants that people like Luke can pass the conditional test and still not be to blame (D6). So Luke still counts against something he does hold: that the conditions on his list are what excuse such people. What his list leaves out is the source (P2).
4. The inability comes from the fear that settled his choice.
People name the inability because it is what they can see. What makes it an excuse, though, is where it comes from, and in Luke's case it comes from the fear. The fear settled the choice at the door (P1), and that is also why going out was never open to him. So here the inability is the outward sign of a missing source (C2), not a second requirement standing beside the source. The ordinary excuse and the source view are giving the same answer.
- A patient who says "I have a fever" is not wrong, and his doctor does not correct him. The fever is real, and it is how the infection shows. Luke's family names the inability in the same way, and what they are pointing at is the fear that decided for him.
- For the same reason, being unable to do otherwise never counts against God. God cannot lie (Hebrews 6:18), yet nobody thinks his truthfulness any less his own for that, since nothing settles it but God (P2).
- Think of a friend so loyal that he could never bring himself to betray you. Nobody discounts his loyalty because he could not help it. The loyalty is his.
5. A test that Luke passes has changed the subject.
The question was never whether a different desire, had it been present, would have moved a man differently. It was whether the man, as he was, had "a power over the determinations of his own will," in Reid's words. That is what the conditional test cannot see (P4).
- The same defender grants that a person with a phobia "cannot," in a real sense, do what his fear forbids (P4). The dispute is over which "cannot" goes with an excuse. Every ordinary excuse says that Luke's does, because his inability comes from a fear that settled the choice for him.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It MattersPhilosophy / Free Will: Ought Implies Can: What a Command Presupposes
+Luke is ill, and illness compels. Add one clause, that nothing compelled the choice, and the analysis shuts Luke out while leaving the ordinary determined man free.
1. This is the repair the classic compatibilists themselves made.
Luke is indeed ill, and nobody doubts that his illness excuses him. The question is what the illness does that makes it an excuse, and the classic compatibilists answered with a clause about compulsion. A. J. Ayer's version of the analysis had three parts:
- The man would have done otherwise had he chosen to.
- His act was voluntary in a way a kleptomaniac's is not.
- Nobody compelled him to choose as he did.
It is a better analysis than the bare conditional, and it concedes (C1): doing what you want is not enough.
2. The clause needs a principle.
Everything turns on what "compelled" means. Ayer's answer was that the kleptomaniac's deliberation, his thinking it over, makes no difference to what he does: whatever he decided, he would steal. But Luke's deliberation makes every difference. If he decided to go, he would go. His fear works by settling the deciding, so Ayer's own test passes him.
- The usual fix is a list: no hypnosis, no brain damage, no compulsion left by an old trauma, and so on. The list never closes. The compatibilist John Martin Fischer, writing about exactly this repair, calls a list like that, with nothing to tie its items together, "an unseemly miscellany."
- What ties the items together is who settled the choice. In each case something other than the person did (P2), and that one line catches the kleptomaniac, the compulsive and Luke together.
- The newer compatibilists offer a different thread, a failure to answer to reasons. But a man can answer to reasons perfectly well and still not be the source of his choice (D13).
- Picture a rigged election in which every ballot is counted perfectly. The trouble lies in who decided how the ballots were marked, and no amount of careful counting can fix that.
3. Then the question is whether determinism compels.
On determinism every want a person has was fixed by causes in place before he was born. The repaired analysis owes a reason why the fear that fixes Luke's choice compels him while the past and the laws, which fix every choice, compel nobody. That is the question the manipulation argument presses (D1), and it is where the dispute between compatibilists and their critics now stands.
- The question is old. Bramhall put it to Hobbes in 1655. A strong man who grips a weaker man's hand and kills someone with it has done violence, and the weaker man is not to blame. "But now suppose this strong man had the will of the weaker in his power as well as the hand, and should not only incline but determine it secretly and insensibly to commit this act, is not the case the same?"
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated OnePhilosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to Us
+The new dispositionalists have repaired the analysis. An ability is a disposition rooted in a person's own makeup, so Luke's phobia counts against him while the laws of nature, which belong to no one, do not.
1. This is the best repair the tradition has produced.
A disposition is a standing readiness rooted in a thing's own makeup, the way sugar is soluble even while it sits dry in the bowl. Kadri Vihvelin's revised conditional analysis treats an ability as one. Roughly, a person has the ability to do something if some set of his intrinsic properties, together with his choosing to do it, would bring about his doing it, as far as his own makeup is concerned. His intrinsic properties are the ones he has in himself, apart from his surroundings.
- A phobia is an intrinsic property, so it is held fixed: it stays in the picture when we ask what the person can do, and it counts against his ability.
- The laws of nature are nobody's intrinsic property, so they are not held fixed, and they count against no one.
2. A phobic still passes it.
Randolph Clarke answered it: "A phobic agent might, on some occasion, be unable to choose to A and unable to A without so choosing, while retaining all that she would need to implement such a choice, should she make it." (A stands for any action.) Luke keeps every property he would need to drive to the interview, if he chose to. What he cannot do is choose.
- Picture a singer with a trained voice, a full hall and an orchestra waiting, frozen in the wings by stage fright. Every power the song needs is there except the power to walk on.
- The natural reply is to make the ability to choose a disposition of its own, one set off by reasons, so that a man is able to choose to go out if a good enough reason would bring him to choose it. That turns the repair into the reasons-responsive account, which (D13) answers.
3. The standard survey's verdict still stands.
The standard encyclopedia survey of the debate gives its verdict on the whole effort: the categorical analysis, the reading that holds everything before the choice fixed, "remains an attractive option for many philosophers precisely because it seems that compatibilists have yet to furnish an analysis of the freedom to do otherwise that implies that phobics clearly lack the ability to choose or do otherwise that is relevant to moral responsibility and yet some merely determined agents have this ability."
In plain terms, it seems that nobody has yet found a reading of "could have done otherwise" that shuts the phobic out and lets the determined man in. Vihvelin herself, who remains a compatibilist, later came to hold that free will needs more than the kind of ability her analysis describes.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to UsPhilosophy / Free Will: Wanting What You Want to Want Is Not Enough: The Hierarchical and Reasons-Responsive Accounts
+Holding everything fixed builds incompatibilism into the definition. Of course a determined man fails a test designed to exclude him, so the categorical reading begs the question.
1. The categorical reading is reached by argument, not assumed.
Checking a watch against itself can never show that it keeps the right time. To beg the question is to argue that way: to rest an argument on a premise your opponent has no reason to accept unless he already accepts your conclusion. (P3) and (P4) reach the categorical reading from a case every side agrees on: the conditional readings pass Luke, and every ordinary excuse judges a person as he was at the moment. Nobody has to be an incompatibilist, someone who holds that free will and determinism cannot both be true, to agree that Luke could not have gone out.
- The reading is chosen because it gets the clear cases right. Only then does it turn out that determinism fails it.
2. The charge cuts the other way first.
The most careful modern defender of the conditional analysis concedes that, taken as an argument against incompatibilism, his own analysis begs the question, and that compatibilists "should not use it like that." Neither reading may simply be assumed. Each must be tested against cases, and Luke is the case.
3. Each side carries the burden of its own claim.
Whoever asserts a principle must argue for it, and the critic is right to insist on that. It is why (C2) is reached from cases (P3, P4) and not assumed. But the rule binds the classic compatibilists too. They claimed that a determined man could have done otherwise in the very sense we use when we ask whether someone could have helped it. That claim owes us a reading of ability that leaves Luke unable to go out and the determined man able, and the best attempt so far has not managed it (D4).
- Think of a bathroom scale that shows the same weight for a feather and a brick. You can call the scale broken without saying a word against the brick; the only complaint is that the scale cannot tell the two apart. Faulting the conditional test works the same way. It assumes nothing about the determined man, and its one charge is that the test cannot tell him from Luke.
4. The Consequence Argument does not lean on the definition.
Once the ability is spelled out this way, determinism plainly rules it out, which is why compatibilists resist the definition. The Consequence Argument does not start from it. It reasons from the past and the laws of nature, which nobody has any say over, to the conclusion that if determinism is true, nothing anyone does is up to him.
- Whether that argument begs the question is a separate charge. A careful study of it, by two philosophers with no stake in libertarian freedom (the view that we are free and that freedom cannot live with determinism), concluded that it does not.
- The last domino in a long row makes the point. Seeing that it cannot stay standing once the first has tipped takes no theory of what "could" means, only the row and the table it stands on.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to Us
+Every case that makes "could have done otherwise" sound necessary is one where the conditional ability is missing, like the man with no arms. The categorical reading borrows all its plausibility from the conditional one.
1. The diagnosis is right about those cases.
A man with no arms is not to blame for failing to embrace you, and a friend whose flight never left is not to blame for missing your party. In both cases the person could not have done otherwise even if he had wanted to. What stopped him, the missing arms or the grounded plane, explains the excuse perfectly. The critic's picture is apt: his conditional principle (that responsibility needs the conditional ability) is "shining in plain sight," while the categorical one is "lying in the nearby bushes," borrowing its light.
2. Luke is the case where nothing is borrowed.
Luke has the conditional ability. He would have gone if he had chosen to, and yet everyone excuses him. The same goes for the compulsive, the kleptomaniac and the manipulated patient. Whatever makes their excuses plausible, it cannot be borrowed from an ability they all have.
- The most careful modern defender of the conditional analysis grants that such cases are real. He calls the objection built on them "true but irrelevant": true, in that a person can pass the conditional test and still not be to blame, and irrelevant only because the conditional principle never claimed to be enough.
- He will not say how far the excuse reaches in the hardest cases. Of a killer driven by violent impulses he himself deplored, he writes, "I do not know," and he admits that he does not know what criteria would settle such cases (D1).
- Think of a new medicine tested only on patients who were also given aspirin. Every one recovers, and nobody learns whether the medicine works. Luke is the patient without the aspirin.
3. Luke's excuse follows the source.
Look again at the easy cases. Whatever took the ability away also settled the outcome: the missing arms, the grounded plane. Since something other than the man settled it, the source is missing too, and that is why the two excuses, the missing ability and the missing source, travel together there. Luke pulls them apart, and his excuse goes with the source (P2).
- Set the friend whose flight never left beside Luke. The cancelled flight took away his ability to come, and it also did the work of keeping him away. Luke's fear took away no ability his legs or his car needed, and it still did the work of keeping him home. What the two share is the second thing, and both are excused.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It Matters
+Asking whether a man could have willed otherwise is incoherent. It asks whether he can will what he wills, which starts an endless regress of wills behind wills.
1. Hobbes and Locke raised a fair question.
Hobbes wrote, answering Bramhall, "I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will; but to say, I can will if I will, I take to be an absurd speech." Locke agreed: to ask whether a man is at liberty to will what he pleases "is to ask whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleased with what he is pleased with? A question which, I think, needs no answer".
The worry is easy to feel. Anyone who says that freedom lies in the will seems to need a second will to choose the first, and a third to choose the second, without end, like a pair of mirrors facing each other. An endless backward chain like that is called a regress.
2. Reid answered that the regress never starts.
Reid thought the objection went back to Hobbes, and he answered that it asks the wrong question. The question is not whether one act of will is caused by another act of will. It is whether the person determines his will, and the person is not another act of will. "Every effect must be in the power of its cause," Reid wrote. "The determination of the will is an effect, and therefore must be in the power of its cause, whether that cause be the agent himself, or some other being."
- A carpenter who builds a table does not need a second carpenter to make his decision to build it. He decides. The regress begins only if the maker has to be another made thing.
- The view that the person himself causes a free choice, and not some state inside him such as a desire or a belief, is called agent causation. An agent is simply someone who acts.
3. The regress cuts against the conditional analysis too.
If asking whether a man could have willed otherwise is incoherent, so is asking whether Luke could have chosen to go. Yet everyone understands that question perfectly well, the conditional analysis's own defenders included, and they answer it the way everyone does (P4). The answer is no, and it matters.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the Choice
+Edwards was right that only natural inability excuses. A man who cannot do right because he does not want to is exactly the man we blame, and Scripture blames sinners for an inability that lies wholly in the will.
1. Edwards's point deserves credit.
"I didn't want to" is no excuse, and Edwards saw that clearly. The man who cannot bring himself to forgive his brother because he nurses a grudge is blamed for the grudge, and he should be. Edwards meant the distinction as a pastor's warning: a sinner cannot hide behind his unwillingness as if it were a broken leg.
- Scripture does blame the unwilling: "How often would I have gathered your children together as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you were not willing!" (Matthew 23:37). It blames them because the refusal was theirs (P2), not merely because nothing outside them stood in the way.
2. His line puts Luke beside the man with the grudge.
On Edwards's scheme both men suffer only a moral inability, "the strength of a contrary inclination," so both are free and both are to blame. But Luke's fear and the grudge are not alike. The grudge is the man's own doing, nursed and chosen. The fear happens to Luke, and it decides for him.
- What separates them is whether the person or something else settled the want (P2), not whether the inability is natural or moral.
- Think of two men who miss a funeral. One stayed away out of spite. The other was having a panic attack in the parking lot. Edwards's distinction cannot tell them apart, and everyone else can.
3. The distinction is the conditional analysis in Puritan dress.
A natural inability, in Edwards's words, is when "we cannot do it if we will." That is the conditional test exactly: a man is naturally able whenever he would act if he chose to. So the distinction stands or falls with the conditional analysis, and Luke is where it falls.
4. The sinner's inability is not Luke's.
The objection's second half is the harder one. Scripture does blame sinners whose trouble lies wholly in the will. But the inability Scripture charges belongs to a condition: a heart not turned toward God. And a heart that cannot turn itself to God can still refuse a particular lie or a particular theft.
- Consider a husband who no longer loves his wife. He cannot switch the love back on by deciding to. He can still refuse to lie to her this afternoon.
- Scripture blames the sinner for sins that are his own, settled by him and by nothing else. And in the ordinary run of life, each is one he could have refused, at the moment or by an earlier choice that led to it. Before Cain murdered his brother, God told him that "sin is crouching at the door. Its desire is for you, but you must rule over it" (Genesis 4:7).
- Luke's fear leaves him no such choice at the door. It settles the particular choice itself.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free WillPhilosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin
+Scripture's own picture of freedom is the heart doing what it wants. The saints are free because they delight in God's law, not because they could choose otherwise, so freedom is doing what you want after all.
1. The saints are free though they cannot choose evil."So if the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed" (John 8:36). The freedom Christ gives is a heart that loves what it should, and in glory it will not be able to sin. That freedom is real, and (P2) takes nothing from it.
2. What makes the saints free is that nothing else decides for them.
The saints do what they want, and their wanting is their own: formed through their own choices and perfected by grace, not settled for them by a fear, a compulsion or a manipulator. That is the source (P2). The freedom of the saints is wanting what is good with nothing else doing the deciding, which is a different thing from doing what you want, whatever settled the wanting.
- A man fifty years married, for whom betraying his wife is out of the question, is nobody's prisoner. His faithfulness is his own, built by fifty years of his own choices.
3. Scripture refuses the equation too.
Two verses earlier Jesus says that "everyone who practices sin is a slave to sin" (John 8:34). The slave of sin does what he wants, and Scripture calls him a slave. Whatever freedom the Son gives, it is not doing what you want, or the slave would have had it already.
- The freedom Christ promises is freedom from sin, which is not the same thing as the freedom of choice Luke lacked at the door. A slave of sin still makes real choices, and each particular sin is his own. But neither kind of freedom is doing what you want.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of GodPhilosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will
+The Stoics settled this long ago. A cylinder rolls because it is pushed, but how it rolls depends on its own shape, so an act that comes about through a person's own nature is up to him even if it was determined.
1. The cylinder is the oldest form of the view.
The Stoics were a school of Greek philosophers who held that fate governs everything that happens. They also held that a fated act can still be up to you, and they had a good image for it.
- The Stoic Chrysippus, as Cicero reports, compared a person to a cylinder, like a garden roller, set rolling by a push. The push starts it, but its own shape makes it roll the way it does, so its rolling comes about through it and not merely to it.
- An act is up to you, on his view, when it comes about through you, through your own choices and your own view of the options before you, rather than by outside force.
2. Coming about through a person is not being settled by him.
Someone else gave the cylinder its shape, and its push came from outside, so everything about its rolling was settled by things other than the cylinder. Luke's fear is part of his nature too, and it is exactly what decided for him (P1). An act can pass through a person's nature from beginning to end and still be settled by something other than the person.
- A message passed down a row of people comes through each of them, and none of them wrote it.
3. The answer came from Aristotle's great commentator.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, the most important ancient commentator on Aristotle, answered the Stoics around AD 200 in a treatise on fate. Given every factor that shapes a person, he held, it remains open to him, when he acts freely, to do or not to do what he in fact does. Many scholars count him the first thinker to hold, without ambiguity, the view now called libertarian freedom: that we are free, and that freedom cannot live with determinism. The name has nothing to do with politics.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Nobody Chose Their Own Character, and Everyone Is Still Responsible: The Basic Argument
+Freedom needs determinism. A choice that nothing before it fixed would be random, a fluke, and a fluke is nobody's doing, so doing what you want is the only freedom there could be.
1. This is Hume's objection, the second half of the classic case.
Hume argued that without a fixed connection between a person's motives and his act, the act would be mere chance, and nobody could be blamed for a chance event. So, he concluded, liberty not only fits with necessity, his word for that fixed connection, but requires it.
2. A choice the past did not settle can be settled by the chooser.
The alternative to being settled by the past is being settled by the person, for reasons of his own (P2), and that is a different thing from being settled by chance. Whether that account can be made to work without collapsing into luck is a real question.
- Think of a jury that deliberates for a day. The jurors settle the verdict, for reasons they could give you, and nobody thinks it was a coin toss.
3. The worry would not rescue the old definition.
Even if an undetermined choice were a fluke, Luke would still pass the conditional test and still not be free. Hume's worry, if it succeeded, would show that freedom is hard to explain. It would not show that doing what you want is the same as being free (C1).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-CreationPhilosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the Choice
+A man can be responsible even when he could not have done otherwise. If a neurosurgeon stood ready to force his choice but never had to, the man chose on his own and is to blame, so the categorical ability does not matter.
1. Frankfurt's case is a famous challenge to "could have done otherwise."
In Harry Frankfurt's case, a neurosurgeon named Black has planted a device in Jones's brain that will force him to vote one way if he shows any sign of voting the other. Jones votes that way on his own, and the device never fires. He seems responsible, and he seems unable to have done otherwise. Whether the device really took away his ability to vote the other way is still disputed.
2. The ability was never the definition of a free choice.
What makes a choice free is its source (P2), and the categorical ability to choose otherwise is its ordinary mark (C2). Even if the neurosurgeon did take the other vote away, Jones's vote was settled by nothing but Jones. A case with the source present and the mark missing leaves the source view standing. It shows the difference between the two, which (C2) already draws.
- It is the glass handled in gloves (C2): no fingerprint, and still someone's hand on it.
- Martin Luther is said to have told the emperor, at the German city of Worms in 1521, that he could do no other. If he could not, nothing held him there but Luther himself, standing on a conviction formed over years of his own study and choosing. That is the source at its strongest, not its absence.
3. The case does nothing for the conditional analysis.
Luke passes the conditional test and is not free. Whatever the test says about Jones, it says because of a device that never did anything. The difference between the two men that matters is whether anything but the man settled the choice (P2), and that is the one thing the test never asks.
- The most careful modern defender of the conditional analysis does not rest on these cases either. He judges that they fail to show that a person can be responsible without being able to do otherwise.
- The source view (P2) judges that such cases do succeed: a device that stands ready but never acts takes nothing from a free choice, so Jones's vote is his with no other door open. Either way, nothing in (C1) or (C2) needs the cases to fail.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door
+Newer compatibilists grant that doing what you want is not enough, and their tests catch Luke: his choice would not answer to reasons, and he hates his fear. An ordinary determined man passes both, so Luke is no case for the categorical ability.
1. The newer accounts get Luke right.
They are the two main compatibilist accounts today, and both do far better with Luke than the conditional analysis does.
- The reasons-responsive account, worked out most fully by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, says a person acts freely enough to be responsible when the process that produces his choice would notice a good reason to act otherwise and would, in at least some cases, act on it. Luke fails it. A thousand dollars on the doorstep would not move him (P1).
- The hierarchical account, which began with Harry Frankfurt, looks at a person's wants about his own wants: one want sitting above another, which is where the name comes from. A man's will is free when the want that moves him is one he wants to be moved by. Luke fails that too. The want that keeps him inside is the one he would give anything to be rid of.
- Both are serious positions held by serious people, and both grant (C1).
2. Neither account rescues the conditional analysis.
- Neither says that "could have done otherwise" means "would have done otherwise, had he chosen," so (C2) stands on both, and with it the categorical reading that fits Luke.
- The reasons-responsive test has an "if" of its own. It asks whether the same process would have done otherwise had there been a good enough reason. That is a far better question than the old one, but it is a different one.
- Its authors do not claim that a determined man could have done otherwise in the categorical sense Luke lacks. They hold that responsibility does not need that ability. They call the view semicompatibilism, compatibilism about half the question: responsibility fits with determinism whether or not the ability to do otherwise does.
- Think of a tailor who mends your coat by selling you a new one. It may be the better coat, and the old one is still torn.
3. Both tests can be passed by a man someone else designed.
Philosophers have a well-known case that tests exactly this. In a world where everything is determined, a designer named Diana puts together a zygote, the single cell a human life begins as. She builds it atom by atom, so that the man it grows into will, thirty years later, kill a man she wants dead. The man is Ernie. He grows up in the ordinary way, and at thirty he answers to reasons as well as anyone and wants the wants that move him. Then he does exactly what Diana planned.
- Many who meet Ernie judge that he is not responsible for the killing. The most careful modern defender of the conditional analysis agrees; he speaks of "Ernie's exemption."
- Fischer and Ravizza add a second condition, that the person has taken responsibility for the process as his own. Diana can design Ernie to meet that too.
- Some compatibilists accept the hard consequence: Ernie, they say, is responsible after all, since Diana made him and then left his life alone. That exchange belongs to the manipulation argument.
- So answering to reasons, and wanting your own wants, are signs of the source and not the source itself. The ability to choose otherwise can be missing where the source is present (D12), and answering to reasons can be present where the source is missing.
4. What is missing is the source.
Nearly every libertarian agrees that a free choice must answer to reasons. The disagreement is over whether that is enough. A free choice is one that nothing settles but the person who makes it, for reasons of his own (P2), and Ernie's reasons were settled for him by Diana before he was born.
- Think of a car salesman who haggles well. He answers every argument you make and gives ground when you push, and yet the lowest price he can accept was fixed by his manager before you walked in. Nobody thinks the salesman decided that price. His manager did.
- That leaves the question the manipulation argument presses. Every weight an ordinary determined man gives every reason was fixed before he was born, so does he differ from Ernie in any way that matters? The same defender concedes that, if God does not exist, he finds it "very hard to think of a relevant difference" between manipulation and an ordinary determined choice.
- His own answer is that God, unlike Diana, is the rightful maker of the character he shapes. Whether that answer holds is the manipulation argument's question too.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Wanting What You Want to Want Is Not Enough: The Hierarchical and Reasons-Responsive AccountsPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+Luke could have gone if he had tried harder. Real phobias give way to effort, and a fear so strong that a man cannot even choose to go out is a philosopher's invention, so the case proves nothing about ordinary words.
1. Much of this is true.
The objection starts from things anyone who has lived with a phobia knows.
- Many phobias do give way to effort. The usual treatment for agoraphobia works by small, planned steps out of the door, and people who were housebound walk to the corner store again.
- A man whose fear could have been beaten that morning, and who never tried, may carry some of the blame for staying in.
- People do say "he couldn't help it" loosely, of things that were only very hard.
2. A claim about meaning must fit every possible case.
The conditional analysis is not a report on how most phobias go. It is a claim about what "could have done otherwise" means, and a claim about meaning has to fit every case the words could describe, rare ones included.
- Suppose a friend tells you that checkmate just means the king is under attack. You need no famous game to show him he is wrong. Set up the pieces on the kitchen table, with the king under attack and a free square to step into.
- Luke's case is set up the same way, and nothing in it is incoherent: a fear can work on the choosing itself. Nor is it far from life. In its severest forms, agoraphobia keeps a person indoors for years.
3. Ordinary judgment grades what the conditional test lumps together.
Put two men at the same door on the same morning.
- The first is badly frightened, and he could have made himself go, at a cost he dreaded. Of him we say that he could have gone, and we may blame him a little, or feel for how hard it was. If someone says loosely that he couldn't help it, a friend will correct him: he could have, but it would have cost him dearly.
- The second cannot bring himself even to choose to go. Of him we say that he could not have gone, and we blame him not at all.
- The conditional test says the same thing of both: if either chose to go, he would go. "He could have gone if he had tried harder" is one more "if," and for the second man trying is exactly what the fear forbids, just as it forbids the wanting in the repaired test (P3).
- When it blames the first man a little and the second not at all, ordinary judgment follows who settled the choice. The first man settled it himself, however hard the fear pressed him. The second man's fear settled it for him, and that is also why going out was never open to him.
- And when it says that the first could have gone and the second could not, it judges each man as he actually was, with his fear exactly as strong as it was. That is the reading (C2) arrives at, and the everyday cases the objection prefers confirm it.
+Excusing a man for failing to do what he could not have done, while blaming another for a deed he could not have refused, is special pleading. Locke's lock and the neurosurgeon's device both stand idle, so either both excuse or neither does.
1. The strongest form of this objection presses on the word "prevented."Special pleading is holding one case to a rule while letting a case just like it off, with no reason for the difference, like a referee who calls a foul on one team and waves the same play through for the other. The charge is that the source view does exactly that. It deserves a straight answer, because the source view really does lean on both rules: the excuse for failures to act (C1) and the principle for deeds (D1).
- For deeds, the source view says a man answers for what he did only if nothing prevented him from doing otherwise (D1). The neurosurgeon's device made the other vote impossible, and making something impossible, the objection says, is preventing it in any plain sense.
- Locke's lock made leaving impossible in just the same way. His man never tried the door, as the voter never leaned the other way, and he would have stayed with the door wide open.
- So if the idle lock excuses Locke's man for missing a promised appointment (C1), the idle device should excuse the voter for his vote. If the device excuses nothing, neither should the lock.
2. The same two rules judge both men.
The first rule is that each man answers for the choice he made, and an obstacle that took no part in that choice excuses nothing.
- The voter answers for his vote. It came from him, and the device did nothing (D12).
- Locke's man answers for his choice to stay. It came from him, and the lock did nothing. If staying broke a promise, he can fairly be blamed for letting the promise go and never trying the door.
The second rule is that neither man answers for failing to do what no choice of his could have done (C1).
- Nobody blames the voter for failing to cast the other vote, and nobody blames Locke's man for failing to arrive across town.
- Think of a friend who promises to take the train in to see you and then decides to stay home. Unknown to him, every train that day was cancelled. What hurts is that he chose to stay home, and for that you can fairly blame him. That he never arrived is another matter, since no choice of his would have brought him.
So the idle lock and the idle device come out exactly alike, and nobody is let off.
3. Leading compatibilists draw the same line.
A line drawn only to rescue one's own view would be special pleading. This one is drawn in the same place by two philosophers with no stake in the source view, the pair who worked out the reasons-responsive account (D13). They hold that a man can answer for a deed he could not have avoided (D12).
- In a well-known case of theirs, a man walking on a beach sees a child struggling in the water and decides not to try a rescue. Unknown to him, sharks in the water would have kept him from saving the child if he had tried.
- They judge that he is not to blame for failing to save the child, since no choice of his would have done it. He can still be blamed for deciding not to try.
4. The principle for deeds asks what did the stopping.
- To be prevented from doing otherwise, in that principle, is for something to do the stopping, there and then: a hand that pulls you back, a shove from behind, a fear that settles the choice at the door. A device that never acts stops nobody, and neither does a lock that nobody tries.
- An idle lock or device does something else. It makes an act impossible, the trip across town or the other vote, and that is why neither man is blamed for leaving that act undone. It is no reason to excuse either man for what he chose.
- A shop that stayed closed all day did not stop you from buying bread if you never went out for any. It only meant that you could not have bought any there.
- Luke is the other kind of case. His fear did the stopping, at the door, that morning, by settling the choice for him (P1). So the principle excuses him and not the voter. Nothing in (C1) or (C2) turns on this dispute, since both need only that the conditional ability is not enough.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open DoorPhilosophy / Free Will: Ought Implies Can: What a Command Presupposes