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Robert Merrihew Adams of Philadelphia 1937 – 2024 AD
(●) The Presbyterian pastor turned philosopher who laid much of the groundwork for the modern moral argument for God: goodness is likeness to God, and duty is what a loving God commands. Ask most people why cruelty is wrong and they will say it simply is, and they will be right. Ask them what makes it wrong, what kind of fact "wrong" names, and the conversation gets harder. Robert Merrihew Adams spent fifty years on that harder question, and his answer became the most influential theistic one, that is, the most influential answer built on belief in God. It goes like this: the goodness of anything is a kind of resemblance to God, who is the Good itself, and our obligations are what that supremely good and loving God actually asks of us. He belongs on a Christian apologetics site because the moral argument for God, the argument that real moral obligations point to a real lawgiver, leans heavily on his work. When William Lane Craig tells a debate audience that God’s nature is the standard of goodness and God’s commands are the source of our duties, he is using a division of labor Adams worked out, with his friend William Alston pressing him toward it. Adams was also one of the founders of the Society of Christian Philosophers, part of the generation that brought belief in God back into serious academic philosophy after decades of neglect. He did not fit any party neatly. He was an ordained Presbyterian minister and a leading scholar of Leibniz (the German philosopher and mathematician of the late 1600s and early 1700s, famous among other things for arguing that God made the best of all possible worlds). He was a defender of divine commands and a sharp critic of Molinism (the theory, taught by the sixteenth-century Jesuit Luis de Molina, that God knows what every free creature would do in any circumstance). And at fourteen or fifteen, sitting on a lawn and staring at a blade of grass, he had already become an idealist, someone who thinks reality is at bottom mental, before he had ever heard of the philosopher who made that view famous.
(●) 1937 AD: Born in Philadelphia to a Presbyterian minister, he was already puzzling over what a blade of grass is in itself by his mid-teens. Robert Merrihew Adams was born in Philadelphia on September 8, 1937, to Margaret Baker Adams and the Reverend Dr. Arthur Merrihew Adams, a Presbyterian minister. The family moved to Rochester, New York, where he finished high school as a Regents Scholar. He later dated his first real piece of philosophy to the age of fourteen or fifteen. He remembered sitting on a lawn on a bright summer day, having just been taught that colors and smells exist only in the one who perceives them, and wondering what a blade of grass could be like in itself once its green and its fresh smell were taken away. He could not imagine anything left to fill the space. So he concluded, on his own, that the grass might exist only in being perceived, and gave himself a theological answer for why different people see the same grass: God. A year or so later he met the name of George Berkeley, the eighteenth-century Irish bishop who had argued exactly that, and the formula "to be is to be perceived." He was, in a broad sense, an idealist for the rest of his life. His later teenage years were, in his own words, a time of both deeper faith and intense wrestling with religious doubt. He decided before college that he should become a minister, and came to philosophy because he needed to think those questions through for himself.
(●) 1955 AD: He studied philosophy at Princeton and theology at Oxford and Princeton Seminary, choosing philosophy because it seemed the most urgent subject. He entered Princeton University in 1955, as it happened the same year two of the century’s great philosophers arrived to build its department: Gregory Vlastos, a scholar of Socrates and Plato, and Carl Hempel, a philosopher of science. He weighed majoring in history or classics. He chose philosophy, he said, not because he would enjoy it more but because it seemed more important. It was not a safe choice for a young man headed toward the ministry. The summer after his first year he read A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic, the manifesto of logical positivism, and was nearly persuaded. Logical positivism is the view that a sentence means something only if experience could verify it: "the kettle is boiling" passes, because you can go and look, while "God loves you" fails, and so, on that view, says nothing at all. The teacher who did most to form him was a young assistant professor named Hilary Putnam, later one of the most influential American philosophers of his generation. After graduating in 1959 he spent two years reading theology at Mansfield College, Oxford, and a year at Princeton Theological Seminary, which gave him a divinity degree in 1962. At Oxford he heard J. L. Austin, the philosopher of ordinary language, in his last term of teaching, and Austin Farrer, the Anglican philosopher and theologian, lecturing on Thomas Aquinas. At Princeton Seminary he sat in a seminar taught by the British philosopher of religion John Hick. His Oxford tutor set him to work on Anselm’s ontological argument, the attempt to prove God exists from the very idea of a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. The thought runs roughly like this: if such a being existed only in our minds, we could imagine a greater one, the same being existing in reality too, and so the greatest conceivable being must really exist. Most people meeting it for the first time suspect a trick without being able to say where it is, and Adams would live with the argument for years.
(●) 1962 AD: Ordained, he pastored a small Presbyterian church at the tip of Long Island for three years. For three years Adams was the pastor of a small Presbyterian church in Montauk, the fishing town at the far eastern tip of Long Island. He was one of eight ordained ministers in his Princeton class, and his obituary would still call him the Reverend Doctor. Picture a young minister writing Sunday sermons for a seaside congregation and, in the hours left over, working through the symbols of modal logic, the branch of logic that deals with what is possible and what is necessary. He put quite a bit of effort into it during the Montauk years, and for a reason. Anselm, answering a monk named Gaunilo who had criticized his argument, had put it in a form about necessity. A being that merely happens to exist could have failed to exist, the way the church in Montauk might never have been built; a being that cannot possibly fail to exist is greater still, and so the greatest conceivable being must exist necessarily. Adams wanted to understand that form, and modal logic was the tool for it. Hick had pointed him to the American philosopher Charles Hartshorne’s work on the necessity version of the argument, and he studied it by the sea.
(●) 1965 AD: At Cornell he earned his doctorate and married the philosopher Marilyn McCord, and at Michigan he wrote the essay that defined his career. In 1965, roughly as he had planned, Adams left the pastorate for the doctoral program in philosophy at Cornell. There he met Marilyn McCord, a fellow philosopher who would become one of the leading Christian thinkers on the problem of evil; they married in 1966 and were together for fifty years. He wrote his dissertation on the modal form of the ontological argument and received his Ph.D. in 1969. He judged the argument unlikely ever to persuade anyone, since doubts about God so easily become doubts about its premises, but the work drew him toward the thought that the necessary structures we trace in logic and mathematics are structures of God’s thinking. In 1968 he took his first post, at the University of Michigan, which hired him to teach the history of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy. The assignment was an accident that shaped his life. Leibniz, Berkeley and their contemporaries became his teachers in metaphysics, and he later wrote a whole book on Leibniz. At Michigan, too, his senior colleague William Frankena got him invited to contribute to an anthology on religion and ethics. The result, "A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness" (1973), was the essay he considered the beginning of his most important work (T1).
(●) 1972 AD: Two decades at UCLA made him a leader of the revival of Christian philosophy. Robert and Marilyn Adams moved to the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1972, and he taught there until 1993. These were his most prolific years, and the range is wide. He wrote on God’s freedom in creation (T4), on whether God can know what free creatures would do (T5), on what makes you the particular individual you are, and on sins of attitude rather than action, such as the unjust anger Jesus sets beside murder (Matthew 5:22). In 1978 he was among the founders of the Society of Christian Philosophers, a fellowship meant, as he put it, to help its members integrate their Christian faith and their philosophical vocation. He served as its second president, after William Alston and before Alvin Plantinga. When the Society launched its journal, Faith and Philosophy, in 1984, the first issue opened with his essay "The Virtue of Faith," on why Christians have counted faith a virtue and unbelief, at least sometimes, a sin. When Adams began studying philosophy of religion in the 1950s, he said, he could carry in his hands the small pile of books that made up nearly the whole analytic literature on the subject. (Analytic philosophy is the style that dominated English-speaking universities in his lifetime: careful definitions, numbered premises, arguments checked one step at a time, the way an accountant checks a ledger.) Half a century later there was a large literature of the kind he had wanted to read as a student and rarely found.
(●) 1993 AD: At Yale he rebuilt a broken department and wrote Finite and Infinite Goods, his account of ethics built around God as the Good. In 1993 Adams moved to Yale as Clark Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics. The philosophy department he found there had nearly collapsed in a feud between rival schools of philosophy, and as its chair he helped rebuild it into one of the strongest in the world. The book he had been carrying for a decade came out of an argument late one night at a conference in the 1980s, when Alston and Plantinga pressed him: why not say that the goodness of things is resemblance to God? He took up the question in his Wilde Lectures on Natural Religion at Oxford in the spring of 1989, and worked on it for nearly ten more years. Finite and Infinite Goods appeared in 1999 (T2). The same year he gave the Gifford Lectures, one of philosophy’s most distinguished lecture series, at the University of St Andrews in Scotland, four lectures on "God and Being." A Theory of Virtue followed in 2006. The honors came along the way: he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1991 and to the British Academy in 2006.
(●) 2004 AD: He followed Marilyn to Oxford, taught on into his late seventies, and died at home in New Jersey in 2024. Adams retired from Yale in 2004, when Marilyn McCord Adams was appointed Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford, the university’s senior chair in theology. He went with her, and returned to Mansfield College, where he had read theology forty-five years before, as a senior research fellow. Retirement did not take. In 2009 he wrote a long commentary for the first publication of John Rawls’s undergraduate thesis on sin and faith. Rawls would become a great political philosopher, but he wrote the thesis as a young believer, before he lost his Christian belief. The same year Adams became Distinguished Research Professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In 2013 the couple went to Rutgers, where they helped found the Rutgers Center for the Philosophy of Religion. Marilyn died of cancer in 2017. Robert finished the book of metaphysics he had been promising since the 1970s, What Is, and What Is in Itself, published in 2021. He died peacefully at his home in Montgomery, New Jersey, on April 16, 2024, at the age of eighty-six, and his memorial service was held at Princeton Theological Seminary, where he had trained for the ministry and later served as a trustee.
What He Taught
(T1) Moral wrongness is being contrary to the commands of a loving God. For centuries water was simply the clear stuff in rivers and rain. Then chemists discovered that water is H2O. Nobody had to change what they meant by "water" for that to be true; they found out what the thing they had always been talking about actually is. Adams applied that pattern to ethics. Everyone uses "wrong" competently: it names whatever property gives us reason to avoid an act and makes remorse and indignation fitting. What that property is, he argued, is a further question, and the best answer is that wrongness is being contrary to the commands of a loving God. This is called a divine command theory: the view that moral obligation depends on what God commands. Its oldest objection comes from Plato’s dialogue the Euthyphro. Is something right because God commands it, or does God command it because it is right? If the first, morality looks arbitrary, since God could have commanded cruelty. If the second, rightness seems to stand outside God, a rulebook he consults rather than writes. A dilemma like this is often pictured as a bull with two horns: take hold of either one and you get gored. Adams’s "modification" answered the first horn. It is not the commands of just any God that make an act wrong, but the commands of the God who is in fact supremely good and loving, and such a God does not command cruelty for its own sake. Later, in Finite and Infinite Goods, he split the work in two. Goodness rests on God’s nature (T2); obligation rests on God’s commands. That division is how many Christian philosophers now answer the Euthyphro dilemma: the good is neither arbitrary nor outside God, because it is God, and duty is what that good God actually asks of us, much as a duty to a friend arises when a friend we have reason to love actually asks something of us.
(Q) "But if wrongness is simply contrariety to the commands of God, it is necessarily so, which implies that it would be wrong to disobey God even if he were so unloving as to command the practice of cruelty for its own sake. That consequence is unacceptable." Source: Robert Merrihew Adams, "Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again," Journal of Religious Ethics 7, no. 1 (1979), p. 77. Adams is explaining why his theory names a loving God rather than simply "God". "Contrariety" means being contrary to: going against what God commands.
(T2) God is the Good itself, and everything else is good by resembling him. Think of the last time something stopped you: a piece of music, a face across a room, a kindness you did not expect. Adams thought every such moment points past itself. All the excellence we experience seems to be gesturing toward a standard of value that it does not quite reach. His name for the kind of goodness he meant was excellence: "the goodness of that which is worthy of love or admiration," as distinct from mere usefulness. And his account of it is a Christian version of Plato. Plato had placed at the top of reality the Form of the Good, the perfect standard every good thing imperfectly copies. Adams put God in that place. God is the Good itself, and the goodness of a sunset, a sonata or a saint is a partial, faithful imaging of God. He called the view theistic Platonism, and he thought it explains why goodness feels like something we discover rather than invent, and why our love of good things is restless until it finds the source. The title Finite and Infinite Goods names the human predicament inside that picture. We are finite, so we can love only a few of the goods worth loving. Nobody can be at once a devoted nurse, a concert pianist, a scholar of ancient Greek and a farmer who knows every field by heart; a life that tried would love none of them well. Adams argued that God’s calling, a vocation, is part of the answer: God gives each person some particular goods to be theirs to love.
(Q) "In the metaphysics of the good ... I ascribe to God a role similar to that of the Form of the Good in some classic readings of Plato’s middle dialogues." Source: Robert Merrihew Adams, "Précis of Finite and Infinite Goods," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64, no. 2 (March 2002), p. 440. Adams’s own summary of the book. The omitted words note that this part of the theory is developed in its first two chapters.
(T3) The moral argument for God is fertile ground that philosophers had left untended. In the nineteenth century the moral argument was the most characteristic proof of God. Immanuel Kant, the eighteenth-century German philosopher, had made it famous, and preachers and professors repeated it. By the 1970s analytic philosophers had stopped talking about it, the way a family stops visiting an old farm once the roads change. Adams thought that was a mistake, and in "Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief" (1979) he went back and walked the whole property, argument by argument. The first and plainest is an argument from the nature of right and wrong. If there are objective moral facts, facts that hold whatever anyone thinks, the best explanation of them is a loving God whose commands constitute them (T1). The second is a practical argument in Kant’s line. A practical argument does not try to prove that God exists. It shows instead that believing in God supports something we are already committed to, here the moral life, much as a runner who believes the finish line is real keeps running when her legs give out. This one is built on what Adams called demoralization: a weakening of moral motivation. If we had to think the history of the universe would probably turn out badly whatever we did, he argued, that belief would tend to drain the will to keep going, and believing in a moral order of the universe helps sustain the moral life, especially in its higher reaches. He was candid about the limits. He granted that the loss of such belief shows only a tendency, since plenty of unbelievers show no sign of demoralization. And he faced the hard question every practical argument raises: can it be honest to believe something because believing it helps? His answer was a careful yes, but only for an open and urgent question, and only for someone already committed to the moral life who seeks support for it rather than an excuse. The candor is part of why his version was taken seriously. Much of the moral argument’s revival since then, at the lectern and in the debate hall, runs through ground he cleared.
(Q) "Moral arguments were the type of theistic argument most characteristic of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. More recently they have become one of philosophy’s abandoned farms. The fields are still fertile, but they have not been cultivated systematically since the latest methods came in." Source: Robert Merrihew Adams, "Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief," in C. F. Delaney, ed., Rationality and Religious Belief (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), p. 116. The opening lines of the essay. He goes on to picture the rambling Victorian farmhouse of the old moral arguments, waiting for someone to strip off the sentimental gingerbread and show the clean lines underneath.
(T4) God need not create the best possible world, because his love is grace. Parents do not love their actual child less because some imaginable child would have been taller, cleverer or healthier. They do not even ask the question. Adams thought that ordinary fact says something about God. Leibniz had argued that a perfectly good God must create the best of all possible worlds. In "Must God Create the Best?" (1972) Adams denied it. That demand assumes perfect goodness means always maximizing value, which is the logic of utilitarianism, the theory that the right choice is always the one that produces the greatest total good, the way a shopper with a fixed budget hunts for the cart with the most value in it. But the Jewish and Christian moral ideal includes grace, love that does not depend on the merit of the one loved. A gracious Creator might choose to create and love creatures less excellent than the best he could have made, and that choice would express a virtue, not a defect. He added a thought he borrowed from Leibniz and kept for the rest of his life: had the history of the world been very different, without its evils, you and I would almost certainly never have existed at all, only other people somewhat like us. So the believer’s right response to life is not a calculation but gratitude: I am glad that I exist, and I thank God for the life he has given me.
(Q) "For present purposes, grace may be defined as a disposition to love which is not dependent on the merit of the person loved. The gracious person loves without worrying about whether the person he loves is worthy of his love." Source: Robert Merrihew Adams, "Must God Create the Best?" The Philosophical Review 81, no. 3 (1972), pp. 323–324. Adams adds that grace was no part of Plato’s moral ideal, but is a virtue the Jewish and Christian tradition believes God has and human beings ought to have.
(T5) Not even God can know what a free creature would have done, because there is no fact there to know. "If I had taken that job in Denver, I would have been happier." We say things like that all the time, and they sound like they are either true or false. Philosophers call them counterfactuals: statements about what would have happened if things had gone otherwise. A counterfactual of freedom is one about a free choice: what a person would freely have chosen in circumstances that never came about. Molina had taught that God knows all of these. He called that knowledge "middle knowledge," because it sits between God’s knowledge of what could happen and his knowledge of what will. With it, God can steer history without determining anyone’s choices, by placing people in circumstances where he knows how they would freely act. Alvin Plantinga revived the idea in the 1970s, and it became central to his free will defense against the problem of evil. The free will defense argues that God may permit evil because a world of genuinely free creatures is worth having, even though free creatures can choose wrong. Adams objected in "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil" (1977), and his question was a simple one. What would make such a statement true? Think of a friend who is generous by nature. Her character makes it likely she would have lent you the money had you asked, but likely is not the same as true; she was free, and might have said no. So it is not the person’s character, which can at most make a choice likely. And it is not anything the person actually did, since the circumstances never happened. With nothing to ground them, that is, nothing in reality to make them true, he concluded, these conditionals (these if-then statements) cannot be true, and so there is nothing for even God to know. This became known as the grounding objection. In "An Anti-Molinist Argument" (1991) he restated it and added a second, different argument, about whether these truths could come early enough in the order of explanation to guide God’s choices. The order of explanation is the order of which facts depend on which, the way a shadow depends on the post that casts it and never the other way round. The grounding objection remains among the most discussed objections to Molinism.
(Q) "If President Kennedy had not been shot, would he have bombed North Vietnam? God only knows. Or does He? Does even He know what Kennedy would have done?" Source: Robert Merrihew Adams, "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil," American Philosophical Quarterly 14, no. 2 (April 1977), p. 109. The opening of the essay. A few lines later he states his thesis: middle knowledge is impossible, even for God, "on the ground that conditional propositions of the sort that are supposed to be known by middle knowledge cannot be true."
(Q) "I believe that there is a metaphysically significant difference between appearance and reality; that there is a capital ‘R’ Reality that grounds everything that appears; that it is mental; that it is good; and that doing philosophy can be a way of loving it." Source: Robert Merrihew Adams, "A Philosophical Autobiography," in Samuel Newlands and Larry M. Jorgensen, eds., Metaphysics and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 32. The summary of his convictions with which he closed the banquet address his Yale colleagues asked him to give at a conference in his honor. The boy on the lawn with the blade of grass, the theistic Platonist of Finite and Infinite Goods, and the pastor who thought philosophy belonged to his vocation are all in it.
What Christian Thinkers Made of Him
(†) Christian defenders of the moral argument built on his framework: God’s nature grounds the good, and God’s commands ground our duties. When the moral argument came back into Christian apologetics in the 1990s and 2000s, it came back largely in Adams’s shape. William Lane Craig’s version, argued in books and in dozens of public debates, holds that God’s own nature is the standard of goodness and that his commands, flowing from that nature, constitute our moral duties: precisely the division Adams drew to escape the Euthyphro dilemma (T1, T2). C. Stephen Evans, in God and Moral Obligation (2013), built his divine command theory on Adams’s social account of obligation, the idea that duties arise from the demands of someone in a relationship we value (the way you owe a friend a ride to the airport because she asked, and because she is your friend), and David Baggett and Jerry Walls engaged him at length in Good God (2011). His influence went beyond conclusions to manners. He wrote for a general philosophical audience without presupposing Christian commitment, hoping, as he said, that Christian ideas might shed light on views that would commend themselves to non-Christians as well. Secular philosophers read him as a serious ethicist, not a special pleader, and that gave the theistic account of morality a hearing it had not had in decades.
(†) With Alston and Plantinga he helped make Christian belief a respected position in academic philosophy again. In the 1950s, Adams remembered, the serious analytic literature on religion was a pile of books one person could carry. A generation later it was one of the liveliest fields in the discipline, and the Society of Christian Philosophers was at its center. Adams, its second president, belonged to the small group (Alston, Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Marilyn McCord Adams among them) who showed that a Christian could do first-rate philosophy openly as a Christian. The Society’s journal printed his "The Virtue of Faith" in its first issue and, a few months later, Plantinga’s "Advice to Christian Philosophers," a call for Christians in the field to work from their own convictions. He also warned his fellow believers against a temptation he called potentially crippling: treating philosophy only as a wall to defend doctrine, when what is really needed is creative and imaginative thinking about religious questions.
(†) Molinists took his grounding objection as the challenge to answer, and answered it at length. Adams’s case against middle knowledge (T5) set the terms of a debate among Christian philosophers that is still going. Both sides agree that God is omniscient and that human beings make free choices. They disagree about whether there are truths about what free creatures would do. Those who follow Molina have answered him at length. Plantinga replied to him directly in 1985. Thomas Flint’s Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (1998) and William Lane Craig’s essay "Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the Grounding Objection" (2001) argue that a counterfactual of freedom needs nothing beyond the person to make it true: it is true because the person is such that, in those circumstances, he would freely choose that way. They add that the same demand would rule out God’s knowledge of future free choices, which have not happened yet either, and that Scripture itself records God knowing what would have happened (1 Samuel 23:10–13; Matthew 11:21–23). Adams, for his part, restated the objection in 1991, before the fullest of those replies appeared. The disagreement is an honest one within the faith, and it has sharpened both sides.
(†) Where Christians part company with him: he rejected every account in which Christ’s death acts on God or on the devil. In a short 1997 essay, "Atoning Transactions," responding to John Hick, Adams set out his own view of the atonement, the doctrine of how Christ’s death reconciles sinners to God. He affirmed a good deal. He found much to be said for the sixteenth-century Reformers’ teaching that sinners are justified not by their own righteousness but by Christ’s, though he recast justification as the restoring of the sinner’s honor more than release from punishment, and he saw in the Lord’s Supper Christ’s death as a gift his followers go on receiving. But he also said, in his own words, that we should abandon the idea that the death of Christ was necessary for God’s forgiving us; he rejected any view of that death as propitiating God, that is, as turning away God’s wrath or affecting his attitude toward sinners; and he found the old pictures of Christ’s death as a ransom paid to the devil, or a victory over him, no more satisfying. Christ acts on us, and on the relationship between us and God, but not on God. Whether God could have forgiven in some other way is an old question that great theologians, Thomas Aquinas among them, answered with a yes, so on that point Adams stands in good company. The departure is elsewhere. Scripture says plainly that Christ’s death has a Godward side and a victory side. "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only but also for the sins of the whole world" (1 John 2:2; see Romans 3:25). Christ "disarmed the rulers and authorities and put them to open shame, by triumphing over them in him" (Colossians 2:15; see Hebrews 2:14). Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant teaching have each confessed one or both of those sides in their own ways, and Adams set both aside. In the same essay he added that he saw no compelling reason to deny that relations to the divine other than union with Christ might also justify the sinner, in his sense of restoring the sinner’s honor, a suggestion the apostles’ preaching closes off: "there is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved" (Acts 4:12).