Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

The Future Is Not Open to God: Answering Open Theism

(●) The future is not open to God, and freedom never needed it to be. + At Sunday lunch Marcus, who is sixteen, announced to the whole family that he would never, ever work at his uncle's hardware store. His grandmother June said nothing at the table. Afterward, drying the dishes, she told Marcus's mother, "He'll be behind that counter by August." She was right, as she usually is. June has watched three generations of the family grow up, and she knows Marcus: his pride, his need for money, the way he always comes round. Her prediction was a forecast, a judgment about what was likely, drawn from what she knew of him that day. It could have gone wrong. Had it, nobody would have called her a liar. She would simply have been mistaken, the way the best forecasters sometimes are. Now listen to a different kind of prediction. On the night he was arrested, Jesus told Peter, "Truly, I tell you, this very night, before the rooster crows twice, you will deny me three times" (Mark 14:30). Nobody forecasts a count and a deadline like that from a man's character. It was either knowledge or a gamble. Some Christians hold that even God knows what free people will do only the way June does. The view is called open theism, because it holds that the future is open, even to God: what free creatures will do is not yet there for anyone to know. On this view God knows everything that can be known. He knows the present and the past perfectly, every possibility the future holds, and whatever he has resolved to do himself. But until a free person chooses, God can forecast the choice, as June did, and cannot know it. Open theists are not trying to make God small. Their motive is a good one, and defenders of free will share it: they want human freedom to be real. They believe that if God already knew what you will do tomorrow, your choice would be fixed before you made it, and so they give up God's knowledge of it to keep the choice free. The worry behind that trade is an old argument with a name, theological fatalism: the claim that whatever God knows, happens by necessity. Everything turns on one word, settle, and June shows what it means. She was sure about August. But when Marcus took the job, the deciding was all his, and her being sure did none of it. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. Even if his uncle had made sure of it, ready to step in had Marcus wavered, a guarantee that never had to be used would have done none of the deciding. Marcus did that himself. The same word says what makes a choice free. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. He is then its source, the one it comes from, the way the decision to take that job came from Marcus and from nobody else. In the ordinary run of human choices a free choice also carries an ordinary mark: the person could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was, as Marcus could have held out all summer. It is the mark and not the definition. A signature is the usual sign that a man agreed to a contract, but it is not what agreeing is, and a man who agreed with a handshake agreed all the same. With those words in hand, the open theist's trade can be seen for what it is. A free choice is one that nothing settles but the chooser. God's knowing it settles nothing, any more than June's being sure made Marcus take the job. So freedom never needed the future to be open to God, and giving up his knowledge of it protects no one's freedom. Two questions are easily run together, and they need to be kept apart. The first is whether God's knowing a choice would take its freedom away. It would not, because knowledge settles nothing. That claim has a full defense of its own, and (D1) gives the heart of it. The second is the real question to put to the open theist: whether God knows what free people will do at all. The argument is deductive: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. The premises work like a locked chain: if every link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. No premise has to be beyond all doubt. Each needs only to be more plausible than its denial. It runs in two chains. The first comes from Scripture: the God of the Bible foretells what people will freely do, and a God to whom the future was open could not (P1, P2, C1). The second comes from what God is: he is perfect, a perfect being knows every truth, and there are truths about what people will freely do (P3, P4, P5, C2). Defenders of free will usually find themselves answering the Reformed: Protestants in the tradition of John Calvin, who hold that God's decree, his eternal plan for all that happens, settles every choice. On this question, for once, the two stand on the same side. Both hold that God knows the whole future, against the open theist, who says he does not. Who holds what, on whether God knows what free creatures will do: - Support: in the fifth century Augustine answered the Roman orator Cicero, who had given up foreknowledge to keep freedom, by keeping both (City of God 5.9), and William Lane Craig defends God's foreknowledge of free acts today. - Oppose: in 1994 Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker and David Basinger set out open theism in The Openness of God, and Gregory Boyd and Hasker defend it today. The argument that follows holds that the future is not open to God, and that freedom never needed it to be.

(P1) The God of Scripture foretells what people will freely do. + Scripture does more than say that God knows the future in general. It shows him foretelling, announcing as certain before it happens, what particular people will freely choose. And it makes that power the mark of the true God. (1) Foretelling is the test Scripture sets for deity. - Isaiah stages a trial and summons the idols to the stand. The test put to them is not thunder or spectacle: "Tell us what is to come hereafter, that we may know that you are gods" (Isaiah 41:23). Knowing what has not happened yet is offered as the credential of deity itself. - God claims the credential for himself, as the one "declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done" (Isaiah 46:10). And he says why he announced things ahead of time: "before they came to pass I announced them to you, lest you should say, My idol did them" (Isaiah 48:5). - A forecast would not pass this test. June made one over the dishes, and nobody calls her a god. What the trial demands is the announcement of what nobody could see coming, and the whole force of the claim is that the announcement came first. (2) The foretelling reaches free acts of particular people. - "Even before a word is on my tongue, behold, O Lord, you know it altogether" (Psalm 139:4). A word half-formed and about to leave a mouth is about as free and as small as a human act ever gets. - Isaiah announces Cyrus, the Persian king who would let the exiles go home, by name: "who says of Cyrus, He is my shepherd, and he shall fulfill all my purpose" (Isaiah 44:28). God says to Cyrus, "I call you by your name, I name you, though you do not know me" (Isaiah 45:4). Cyrus would act for reasons of his own. - Whenever these chapters were written, they announce what was not yet done, which is the very thing in dispute. Their date is an old argument between scholars, and it does not change the point. • On the traditional dating, Isaiah names a king not yet born. On the later dating, which most scholars today favor, the chapters come from the exile, and they still announce Babylon's fall and the exiles' return before either happened. (3) Jesus offered his foretelling of free acts as a reason to believe. - Jesus gave Peter's denials a count and a deadline: three denials, that very night, before the rooster crowed twice (Mark 14:30). Mark records the second crowing, and Luke adds the moment after it: "And the Lord turned and looked at Peter" (Luke 22:61). - Of Judas, John says that "Jesus knew from the beginning who those were who did not believe, and who it was who would betray him" (John 6:64). - And Jesus said why he foretold the betrayal: "I am telling you this now, before it takes place, that when it does take place you may believe that I am he" (John 13:19). A foretelling that might have failed would have been a strange thing to stake that on. - Think of the difference between a weather forecast and a history book. A forecast says what the clouds make likely. A history book says what happened. Jesus spoke of Peter's night the way a historian speaks of yesterday. (4) Some texts seem to show God learning. - They belong on the table before anyone else puts them there: • The Lord says of Sodom, "I will go down to see whether they have done altogether according to the outcry that has come to me. And if not, I will know" (Genesis 18:21). • At Moriah, when Abraham has raised the knife over Isaac, the angel says, "now I know that you fear God" (Genesis 22:12). • God says of Israel, "It may be they will listen, and every one turn from his evil way" (Jeremiah 26:3). • Of Israel's unfaithfulness he says, "And I thought, After she has done all this she will return to me, but she did not return" (Jeremiah 3:7). • Others have God regretting (Genesis 6:6), relenting at a man's prayer (Exodus 32:14), and planning for more than one outcome (Exodus 4:8-9). (D6) through (D9) and (D17) take them one at a time. - Read cold, with nothing else in view, those look like a God who did not see it coming. It would be dishonest to pretend otherwise, and the open theist is right to press them. - But reading them that way proves too much, because it proves things no open theist believes. The God who says he will "go down to see" what Sodom has done is, in the same chapter, the God who knows that Sarah laughed to herself, out of sight in the tent (Genesis 18:12), and asks Abraham why she laughed (Genesis 18:13). Read literally, Genesis 18:21 makes God ignorant not of the future but of the present (D6). (5) Read with the same literalism, Scripture would give God a body. - The literalism does not stop at Sodom. Scripture gives God eyes, hands, a mighty arm and nostrils far more often than it gives him an uncertain future. And it says outright that God is spirit (John 4:24) far less often than it credits him with knowing what is to come. Read them all the same way and the result is a God with a body. - That is why, one philosopher observes, theologians of the Latter-day Saints, who do believe God has a body, have "warmly embraced" the open theists. An open theist who declines that destination owes an account of what stops him. - Open theists and their critics alike read these texts as speaking of God in human terms. That way of speaking is called anthropomorphism, from the Greek for "human form." The only question between the two sides is how far it reaches. - The open theist's own rule for it is a fair one: read a text figuratively when plainer texts teach otherwise. The texts that call God spirit are why neither side gives him a body. By the same rule, the texts in (1) to (3), which teach God's knowledge in plain statements, are why the "may be" is not ignorance either. - Scripture flags the habit itself. To people who took his silence for approval, God says, "you thought that I was one like yourself" (Psalm 50:21). And in the very chapter where God regrets making Saul king, Samuel says he "is not a man, that he should have regret" (1 Samuel 15:29). Therefore, the God of Scripture foretells what people will freely do.

(P2) A God to whom the future was open could not foretell what people will freely do. + If the future were open to God, every announcement he made about a free choice would have to be something other than knowledge. Open theists have three candidates, and none of them reaches the prophecies that matter. (1) The open theist has three ways to read a prophecy. - A prophecy may announce what God himself intends to do. "I will stretch out my hand and strike Egypt" (Exodus 3:20) needs no knowledge of anyone's choice, only God's own resolve. - A prophecy may forecast what present causes make likely, the way June forecast Marcus. God knows every present fact, including every heart, so his forecasts are the best there could be. - A prophecy may be a warning with a condition in it: this will happen unless you turn. - One defender of middle knowledge (God's knowledge, before he decides what world to make, of what any creature would freely do in any circumstance, including circumstances that never come about) sets out this three-way account of prophecy as open theists give it. He grants that many prophecies are of the first or the third kind. (2) Some prophecies really are warnings or forecasts. - Scripture says so itself, long before any open theist did. Jonah preached, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown!" (Jonah 3:4), and it was not overthrown. - Jeremiah states the standing rule: when God announces that a nation will be destroyed and that nation turns from its evil, he relents and does not bring the disaster (Jeremiah 18:7-8). And Jeremiah set both futures before King Zedekiah at once: if he surrendered to the Babylonians, his life would be spared and the city would not be burned; if he did not, the city would burn and he would not escape (Jeremiah 38:17-18). - Such prophecies are, as one defender of middle knowledge puts it, "pictures of what was going to happen unless." They are warnings, not foreknowledge. - The hearers understood them that way. The king of Nineveh said, "Who knows? God may turn and relent" (Jonah 3:9). David fasted for his dying son because, he said, "Who knows whether the Lord will be gracious to me, that the child may live?" (2 Samuel 12:22). - Some prophecies also read like forecasts, built on knowledge of what a people is inclined to do. Of Israel's coming apostasy, its falling away to other gods, God says, "For I know what they are inclined to do even today" (Deuteronomy 31:21). - So a good many prophecies could be read as the open theist reads them. The question is whether all of them can. The prophecies about Peter, Judas and Cyrus are not warnings, and (3) and (4) show that they are not announcements of God's own plan or forecasts either. (3) An announcement of God's own plan cannot cover a free act. - Many prophecies are announcements of God's own plan, and the open theist is right to say so. Isaiah describes a good deal of prophecy that way: God declared what he would do, and then he did it (Isaiah 48:3). - The open theist can stretch this reading to the hard cases. On his view the future is partly open and partly fixed, and God fixes some human acts in advance when his plan needs them. So perhaps God brought about Peter's three denials himself, arranging the questions around the fire and settling each answer, so that the prophecy announced what God would do. - Then Peter's denials were not free, on the open theist's own terms, and neither was Judas's betrayal. The view was built to keep such choices free, and this reading gives them up at exactly the points where Scripture foretells them. - It also puts the open theist where he will not let the Calvinist stand. One of his chief complaints against theological determinism (the view that God's decree settles every choice) is that it makes God the author of sin. This reading has God settling two of the best-known sins in the Gospels, while Jesus pronounces woe on the betrayer (Matthew 26:24) and Peter weeps for what he did (Matthew 26:75). - The same holds for Cyrus, and what it costs the open theist depends on the dating (P1). On the traditional dating, naming a king before his birth means fixing, generation by generation, every choice that led to him. - On the later dating the open theist's reading is at its strongest, since Scripture itself says God stirred up Cyrus's spirit (Ezra 1:1). Even then, the rebuilding that Isaiah 44:28 announces came by the proclamation of a king who did not know the Lord (Isaiah 45:4). To count that proclamation as God's own act, the open theist must say God fixed the king's decision too. (4) A forecast cannot promise a count and a deadline. - A forecast from character can say that Peter, under pressure, is likely to crack. It cannot know that he will deny Jesus three times, that night, before a rooster crows twice. One defender of middle knowledge asks of that reading, "But three times before the cock crows twice?" - A card counter in a casino can do very well at blackjack, but he cannot tell you which card comes next. He knows the odds. - God "is not man, that he should lie" (Numbers 23:19), and he does not announce as certain what he does not know. So if the words to Peter were a forecast, "Truly, I tell you" claimed a certainty the speaker did not have. And a forecast, however good, can fail. The law gave Israel a test for a prophet: "if the word does not come to pass or come true, that is a word that the Lord has not spoken" (Deuteronomy 18:22). - Adding God's control of the setting does not rescue the forecast. Arranging the scene so tightly that only one answer is left is (3) again, and anything less still leaves a guess (D10). - Reading the prophecies as inferences from the present also, in the same writer's words, "denudes them of any theological significance": it strips them of anything they could teach about God. Jesus did not say that Peter's denial was likely. And he foretold the betrayal so that, when it came, his disciples would believe that he was who he said he was (John 13:19). (5) Some prophecies describe free choices that were never made. - Some prophecies say what free people would do in circumstances that never came about. God told David that if he stayed in the town of Keilah, Saul would come down and the men of Keilah would hand him over. David left, and neither thing happened (1 Samuel 23:11-13). - Jesus said that if his mighty works had been done in the pagan cities of Tyre and Sidon, "they would have repented long ago" (Matthew 11:21), and that Sodom would still be standing (Matthew 11:23). - The open theist has replies. Saul's intention to come was already known (1 Samuel 23:10), so that answer could be a forecast from it, and the saying about Tyre and Sidon may be deliberate overstatement about the hard heart of Chorazin, the Galilean town Jesus was rebuking. - But the men of Keilah had just been rescued from the Philistines by David himself (1 Samuel 23:5). Gratitude pulled them one way and fear of Saul the other, and God answered without a hedge that they would hand him over (1 Samuel 23:12): a certainty, not the odds. (6) Knowing what people would do is more than foreknowledge. - Such answers are not God's own intentions, and they are not warnings to the people they describe. They are knowledge of what people would freely do. That is a larger claim than foreknowledge, not a smaller one, and the open theist denies it too. - The texts do not say where this knowledge comes in the order of God's knowing: whether God has it because of what he has decided, or has it before he decides anything. The Reformed, who hold that God's decree settles every choice, say he knows it through the decree. Defenders of middle knowledge say he has it before he decides what world to make. Either way it is more than a forecast. - And the open theist cannot take the Reformed road. He holds that the men of Keilah would have chosen freely, and a decree that settled their choice would give up that freedom (3). - This is where the third reading, a prophecy with a condition in it, ends up when it is pressed as far as it will go. God's answer about Keilah had a condition in it (if David stayed), but what it announced under that condition was the free choice of other people. On the open theist's own terms, the only knowledge that fits these answers is middle knowledge, the view he is trying to avoid. (7) The texts that teach God's knowledge resist the three readings. - The three readings were built for prophecies. But in the end the case rests on the passages that teach God's knowledge in general: • The trial of the idols (Isaiah 41:21-23). • The end declared from the beginning (Isaiah 46:9-10). • The word known before it is on the tongue (Psalm 139:4). • The days written in God's book "when as yet there was none of them" (Psalm 139:16). - The open theist has readings for these too, and some are fair. Isaiah pairs "declaring the end from the beginning" with God's own resolve, "I will accomplish all my purpose" (Isaiah 46:10), so much of what Isaiah foretells really is God announcing his own work. And a word not yet on the tongue may already be in the mind. - But the same chapters claim more than that. "For I knew that you would surely deal treacherously" (Isaiah 48:8) is about Israel's conduct, not God's. The open theist can call it a forecast from Israel's known stubbornness (Isaiah 48:4). Then each text needs a reading of its own: one an intention, one a forecast, one a warning. The one reading on which God knows covers them all at once. - A defendant who needs a different story for each piece of evidence, a coincidence for the fingerprint and a mix-up for the receipt, is losing to the one explanation that covers them all. - One defender of middle knowledge draws the conclusion from the whole survey: "given that certain human actions are freely chosen, divine foreknowledge of such actions cannot be biblically denied." Therefore, a God to whom the future was open could not foretell what people will freely do.

(C1) Therefore, the future is not open to the God of Scripture. + The God of Scripture foretells what people will freely do (P1), and a God to whom the future was open could not (P2). So the God of Scripture is not a God to whom the future is open. (1) The conclusion follows from the premises. - The form is modus tollens, Latin for "the way that denies": if one thing were so, a second would be; the second is not so; so neither is the first. If it had rained overnight, the driveway would be wet. The driveway is dry, so it did not rain. - Applied to God: if the future were open to him, he could not foretell free acts (P2). He does foretell them (P1). So the future is not open to him. - A man who could not have known the final score is not the man who told it to you, goal by goal, before the kickoff. A God who, on the open view, could not do what Scripture shows him doing is not the God Scripture shows. (2) The conclusion is not a verdict on open theists. - They are Christians who read the same Bible and want the same thing, a freedom that is real. What fails is one reading of the texts, not their faith. - Their strongest texts carry real weight (P1, P2), and several of them teach something true: God grieves, God responds to prayer, and God's warnings are real warnings. - Two brothers can argue all evening about what one line in their father's letter means, and both are still his sons. (3) Freedom never needed the future to be open to God. - The open theist gives up foreknowledge to keep freedom. But a free choice is one nothing settles but the chooser, and knowledge settles nothing (D1). Being certain is a fact about the one who knows, not a push on the one who chooses. - Sixteen centuries ago Augustine met the same trade in Cicero. Cicero thought a man must choose between God's foreknowledge and human freedom, and chose freedom; "wishing to make men free he makes them sacrilegious," Augustine answered. "But the religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both by the faith of piety" (City of God 5.9). - A mapmaker who charts a coastline does not move the rocks. His chart is right because the rocks are where they are. Therefore, the future is not open to the God of Scripture.

(P3) God is a perfect being. + God is the greatest being there could be. No one in this debate disputes it. (1) Scripture presents God as beyond comparison. - "To whom then will you compare me, that I should be like him? says the Holy One" (Isaiah 40:25). "Great is our Lord, and abundant in power; his understanding is beyond measure" (Psalm 147:5). - Whether that understanding reaches tomorrow's free choices is what (P4) and (P5) have to show. What nobody disputes is that it has no measure. (2) Worship requires perfection. - God is worthy of worship without reserve, and no imperfect being merits worship without reserve. Anselm, the eleventh-century Archbishop of Canterbury, called God that than which nothing greater can be conceived, and in substance every Christian tradition agrees. - Think of the difference between admiring a great violinist and worshiping her. Admiration allows for a bad night. Worship does not. (3) Every party to the debate grants it. - Open theists affirm that God is perfect as firmly as anyone. They argue that a perfect being need not know what free creatures will do, because there is nothing there to know. The dispute is over (P4) and (P5), not (P3). - One defender of free will gives the rule that governs the whole question: "Anything is better than affirming that God is not a maximally great being." Therefore, God is a perfect being.

(P4) A perfect being knows every truth. + Ignorance is an imperfection, so a perfect being knows everything there is to know. Some open theists accept that, and deny instead that there are any truths about tomorrow's free choices (P5). Others grant the truths and redefine what "everything" includes, and the redefinitions do not hold. (1) Knowing is greater than not knowing. - Other things being equal, a being who knows is greater than one who does not. Philosophers who write about God agree on this more than on almost anything. - One survey reports that "Virtually no debate exists among analytic theologians concerning the great-making status" of omniscience, knowing everything there is to know, even where they argue about what it includes. • A great-making quality is one that makes whoever has it greater. Analytic theologians are philosophers and theologians who study God with careful definitions and step-by-step logic. - A doctor who knows what is wrong with you is, in that respect, a better doctor than one who does not, however kindly the second one guesses. (2) To be omniscient is to know every truth. - A proposition is what a statement says, the thing that is true or false. "It is raining in Leeds" says one; so does "Peter will deny Jesus tonight." - In its traditional definition, omniscience is this: for every proposition, if it is true, God knows it, and he believes no falsehood. - On that definition, if there are true propositions about what free creatures will do, God knows them. Whether there are is the question of (P5). (3) The open theist's new definition, as worded, makes God know falsehoods. - One leading open theist offered a new definition: God is omniscient if he knows all the propositions it is logically possible for him to know. He granted that there are truths about what free creatures will do. His claim was that those truths are impossible for God to know, so God can be ignorant of them and still be omniscient. • Something is logically possible if it involves no contradiction. A solar system with six planets is logically possible; a square circle is not. - The trouble is in the wording. It speaks of all the propositions it is possible for God to know, not all the true ones, and so it requires God to know falsehoods. Take the false proposition that there are six planets in our solar system. There could have been six, and had there been, God would have known it. So it is logically possible for God to know that proposition. On the new definition, then, he knows it now, which is absurd. - That is the definition as it was published. Its author presumably meant the repaired version in (4), and that is the version that has to be answered. (4) The repaired definition does not hold either. - The obvious repair is to say that God knows only and all the true propositions it is possible for him to know. But a definition has to answer to what the word means, and "omniscient" means knowing every truth. A definition built so that a God ignorant of countless truths still counts as omniscient has been cooked to taste. One critic calls it "unacceptably contrived." - It also collapses. What does a proposition need in order to be knowable? So far as anyone has shown, only one thing: to be true. Apart from the fatalist's argument, which (5) takes up, no one has produced a truth that cannot be known, so "every truth it is possible to know" is just "every truth." In the same writer's words, "the only intrinsic property which a proposition must possess in order to be logically knowable is truth." • An intrinsic property is one a thing has in itself, not because of how it stands to anything else. - A map drawn so that it leaves out half the roads is not made complete by defining "complete" as "showing every road this map shows." (5) Fatalism shows at most that God does not know, not that he cannot. - Why say that future free acts cannot be known? Because, the open theist holds, if God knew what you will do, you would do it necessarily. That is theological fatalism: the claim that whatever God knows, happens by necessity. - That can sound like the end of the matter. If God cannot know an act while it is free, and the act is free, surely he cannot know it. - But start with something ordinary. Nobody can be at a desk in Leeds and on a beach in Spain at the same moment. If you are at your desk this morning, it follows that you are not on the beach. It does not follow that you could not have been there, since you could have taken the week off. - The fatalist's premise has exactly that shape. Grant it, for the sake of argument, and let the letter p stand for some free act, such as Peter's denial. From "it is impossible that God knows p and p is a free act" together with "p is a free act," what follows is only that God does not know p. It does not follow that he could not have known it. - To see why, notice that Peter's denial could have happened without being free, had someone forced the words out of him, and then nothing in the fatalist's premise would keep God from knowing it. So it is possible for God to know that Peter denies Jesus. What the premise rules out is only knowing it while the act is free. - The step from "does not" to "could not" is the modal fallacy. Modal words are words about what must be and what could be, such as "necessarily," "possibly" and "could not." The modal fallacy is the mistake of sliding the word "necessarily" onto the wrong part of a sentence. In the fatalist's premise, "impossible" covers the pair together, God's knowing p and p's being free. "Could not have known" slides it onto God's knowing alone. (6) The open God fails even the repaired definition. - The repaired definition says that God knows all the true propositions it is possible for him to know. "Peter denies Jesus" is true, and it is possible for God to know it (5), so the definition says that he knows it. - The open God does not. So even on the repaired definition, the open God is a being who could know a truth and does not. One critic concludes that the open theist, on his own terms, "must deny divine omniscience and therefore reject God's perfection." - The open theist can tighten the definition once more: God knows every truth he could know while the acts in question stay free. That escapes the modal point, but it leaves the whole definition resting on the fatalist's premise, that knowing a free act would take away its freedom. That premise is the one (D1) answers, and without it the definition has nothing left to stand on. - A lock that happens to be shut is not a lock that cannot be opened. The fatalist shows, at most, that God does not know tomorrow's free choices. He never shows that God could not. (7) No truth has been found that God cannot know. - Some philosophers have suggested that there are truths God cannot know anyway, such as how it feels to be a sinner, so one more class of unknowables does no harm. But knowing how something feels is know-how, a skill of experience, not knowledge of a truth. The truths about it (that being a sinner feels hopeless, that guilt is heavy) God knows. - A man can know every true thing about seasickness, how it starts and what it does to a stomach, without ever having been to sea. What he lacks is the experience, not a truth. - The same goes for a person's knowledge of himself as himself. After an accident, a man in a hospital bed may know "I am in hospital" before he can remember his own name. On the leading accounts of such knowledge, what he has that no one else has is a way of grasping a fact about himself, not a truth closed to everyone else. • And a truth private to one person, if there were such a thing, would be closed to every other knower by its very nature, the way no one else can be you. A truth about tomorrow is private to no one. Nothing in it ties it to one knower's point of view, and when the day comes everyone can know the same fact it describes. - Open theists agree that God knows every truth about the present. But suppose "Peter will deny Jesus tonight" is true this afternoon. Then "that statement is true" is itself a truth about this afternoon, and a God who knows it knows what Peter will do. - So an open theist who grants the truths about tomorrow must count this as a present truth God cannot know, and the only reason on offer is the fatalist's premise in (5). - The stable way out is to deny that there are such truths, which is (P5). The leading open theist who proposed the redefinition has since given it up, in answer to critics who argued that it cannot stand, and now denies that there are such truths. Therefore, a perfect being knows every truth.

(P5) There are truths about what people will freely do. + If "Peter will deny Jesus tonight" was true that evening, then a perfect God knew it (P4). So the open theist who keeps God's perfection must hold that statements about tomorrow's free choices are not true. Neither of the two ways of holding that survives examination. (1) Every statement is true or false, the future-tense ones included. - The principle of bivalence (from the Latin for "two values") says that every proposition is either true or false, with no third option. One way to deny that God knows tomorrow's choices is to deny bivalence for statements about them: "Peter will deny Jesus tonight," said before the courtyard, is neither true nor false, but waiting. - The main reason offered for this is that the future does not exist yet, so there is nothing for such a statement to be true of. - But that misunderstands what truth is. A statement is true when things are as it says. "It is snowing" is true if it is snowing. "It will snow tomorrow" does not need tomorrow's snow to exist today; it needs only that tomorrow it will snow. To demand that the snow exist now is, in one philosopher's phrase, "a complete misunderstanding." - Saying that a statement about tomorrow is true now does not say that anyone can know it now, or that anything has settled it. It says only that when tomorrow comes, things will be as it said. (2) The same facts make all three tenses true. - One logician put it with a rainy day. "It will rain tomorrow," said on April 12, and "It did rain yesterday," said on April 14, "make (from temporally distinct perspectives) precisely the same claim about the facts, viz., rain on April 13." (Viz. is Latin shorthand for "namely.") - If "it is raining" is true on the thirteenth, it is hard to see how "it will rain tomorrow" could have been anything but true on the twelfth. The rain that makes the one true makes the other true. - And if statements about the future cannot be true because their events do not yet exist, statements about the past cannot be true because their events no longer exist. Nobody believes that about the past. For anyone who holds that only the present exists, a view called presentism that many open theists share, the two cases stand or fall together (D3). (3) A dated statement is true at every time. - Tense can be taken out of a statement by giving the date. "The Allies invaded Normandy" becomes "On June 6, 1944, the Allies invade Normandy." - A statement like that, if true at all, is true always, because it carries its date with it. So it was true in 1943 that on June 6, 1944, the Allies invade Normandy, which is to say that it was true in 1943 that they would. - To deny it, one has to say that a sentence with its date built in, and nothing in it about when it is spoken, went from untrue to true when the day arrived. (4) Denying bivalence has absurd results or a steep price. - Consider "Either Bush will win the 2004 election or he will not," said in 2002. If neither half is true or false, and the whole takes its truth from its halves, the whole is neither. But it was certainly true that he would win or he would not; there was no third outcome. - Worse, "Bush will both win and not win in 2004" could not be called false, since it is built from two statements neither true nor false. But it is a contradiction, and contradictions are false. - Careful defenders of truth-value gaps, statements that are neither true nor false, escape both results with a device called supervaluation. A statement about the future counts as true if it would come out true on every way the future could go, false if it would come out false on every way, and neither otherwise. "He will win or he will not" comes out true on every way, so it is true. "He will both win and not win" comes out false on every way, so it is false. - The price is still high. An "either-or" is now true while neither of its halves is. Picture a man who says on Monday that one of two horses will win Saturday's race, and is proved right. He would be told that what he said about the pair was true, but that what he said about each horse was neither true nor false. - And a prediction that comes to pass was still never true when it was made. That is much the same result the author of the other way out had to accept (5). (5) The other way out calls every such statement false. - An Oxford logician proposed a second way. Every statement about a contingent future, a future that could still go either way, is false: "Bush will win" and "Bush will not win" alike. Some open theists defend a form of this today, on which "he will" is true only if how things stand now already determines that he will, so that of a free choice not yet made only "he might" is true. - It needs a new reading of "not." Ordinarily, if "he will win" is false, "he will not win" is true. The logician had to say both are false. - On this view, "he will win" says that the win is already bound to happen, and "he will not win" says that the loss is. While the race is still open, neither is bound to happen, so both are false. The logician read the denial of "he will win" as "it is not the case that he will win," which says only that the win is not yet bound to happen, and so is always true while the future is open. - Nothing in ordinary speech recommends the reading, and in ordinary speech "he will" does not mean "he is already bound to." - It also has a consequence the logician himself accepted. If someone said in 2002 that Bush would win in 2004, and Bush won, he had to say the statement was false all the same, because he denied that whatever happens was always going to happen. Its modern defenders accept the result too, and argue that we can live with it. What we would be living with is that no prediction of a free choice has ever been true when it was made, however it turned out. What else can it mean for a prediction to be true than for things to turn out as it said? - A friend who bets you in March that the Cubs will win on opening day, and watches them win, will not be persuaded that his March prediction was false. (6) Statements about people not yet born can still be true. - The same logician added that statements about particular people who do not yet exist cannot be true, since there is nobody for them to be about. On his view, "William Willis will be president in 3000" is about no one. - But God, before creating, knew every person he could create and which world he chose to make. He can pick out the not-yet-born the way a builder can pick out the house on lot 12 before the foundation is poured. - And even granted, the point does not do the open theist's work. It covers only people not yet born. Once a person exists, it gives no reason why statements about his future cannot be true, so what the view was built to prevent, true statements about free choices still to come, arrives one birth at a time. Therefore, there are truths about what people will freely do.

(C2) Therefore, God knows what people will freely do. + God is a perfect being (P3), a perfect being knows every truth (P4), and there are truths about what people will freely do (P5). So God knows what people will freely do. (1) The conclusion follows from the premises. - Put the three premises side by side. God is perfect, and a perfect being is omniscient, so God knows every truth. Some of those truths are about what people will freely do, so God knows them. - The chain is valid, which means that if every link holds, the conclusion holds too. (P4) and (P5) are where the open theist must break it, and neither has given way. - Scripture and reason arrive at the same place by different roads (C1), and in one defender's words, "the God of the philosophers coincides with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." (2) Knowing takes nothing from the one who chooses. - The open theist's whole motive was to keep freedom real, and the motive stands. What falls is the premise that God's knowing would take freedom away. - God knows what Peter will do because Peter will do it, not the other way round. His knowing did none of Peter's denying. When the rooster crowed, Peter did not say that God had made him do it. He "went out and wept bitterly" (Matthew 26:75), because the denials were his. - Freedom does not even need another door to have stood open (D1). A choice is free when nothing settles it but the chooser, and that holds even in the rare case where no other way was left. (3) The Reformed agree that God knows the whole future. - Theologians who hold that God's decree settles every choice agree that God knows the whole future. Reformed theologians wrote some of the first book-length answers to open theism. • Determinism is the view that every choice is settled beforehand by conditions that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes; for Reformed determinism, that condition is God's decree. Libertarian freedom is the freedom determinism would rule out, where nothing settles a choice but the chooser. The word has nothing to do with politics. - The most thorough modern defense of Reformed determinism mentions the argument that libertarian freedom excludes foreknowledge, and its author adds, "I for one don't find the argument compelling at this point." - Others in that tradition do press that argument. Jonathan Edwards, the eighteenth-century American theologian, pressed it, and so has a leading Reformed philosopher of providence (God's governing of everything that happens) in our own time (D1). - They share the argument's premise with the open theist: that God's foreknowledge and a choice nothing but the chooser settles cannot both be. From there the two go opposite ways. They keep the foreknowledge and give up that freedom, while the open theist keeps the freedom and gives up the foreknowledge. Augustine refused the premise itself, in its original form, that foreknowledge and free will cannot both be (C1). (4) Only a God who knows can promise what free people will do. - Consider the cross, which was carried out by Judas, Pilate and a crowd. On the open view God can bring about particular events himself when his plan requires it, and otherwise takes the risk that comes with making free creatures. - God is, on that view, a risk-taker who plans, responds, and is sometimes surprised. He can promise what he will do himself and hope for what free people will do, but he cannot promise their free choices (D12). - Sovereignty is God's rule over everything that happens. One defender of free will sets the standard that any account of God and freedom must meet: "A solution cannot occur by denying free will (by some flavor of divine determinism), nor by denying God's sovereignty. Whatever solution is proposed, it cannot be affirmed by diminishing the role of one or the other." The open view keeps freedom by diminishing sovereignty, as determinism keeps sovereignty by denying freedom. - The view that keeps both is middle knowledge: God knows what every creature would freely do in any circumstance, and places each where his purposes are served through their free choices. It is also called Molinism, after the sixteenth-century Jesuit Luis de Molina. "The Molinist God is not a risk taker," one of its defenders writes. "He never has to deal with acting in situations where he knows only what probably would result from his actions." - Peter, restored on the shore after the resurrection, answered Jesus, "Lord, you know everything; you know that I love you" (John 21:17). He had learned both halves of that sentence the hard way. Therefore, God knows what people will freely do. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It Philosophy / Free Will: God Does Not Look Ahead: How Foreknowledge Is Possible Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door

On open theism: Boyd, Gregory A. God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000. Boyd, Gregory A. "The Open-Theism View." In Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, edited by James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy, 13-47. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001. Hasker, William. "Future Truth and Freedom." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 90, no. 2 (2021): 109-119. Hasker, William. God, Time, and Knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989. Hasker, William. "A Philosophical Perspective." In Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker and David Basinger, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994. Page 136, as cited in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 6.3.1, note 39. Hunt, David, and Linda Zagzebski. "Foreknowledge and Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman. Substantive revision, February 17, 2026. Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 3. Rhoda, Alan R. "Presentism, Truthmakers, and God." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2009): 41-62. Rhoda, Alan R., Gregory A. Boyd, and Thomas G. Belt. "Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future." Faith and Philosophy 23, no. 4 (2006): 432-459. Sanders, John. The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998. Sanders, John. "Why Simple Foreknowledge Offers No More Providential Control Than the Openness of God." Faith and Philosophy 14, no. 1 (1997): 26-40. Tuggy, Dale. "Three Roads to Open Theism." Faith and Philosophy 24, no. 1 (2007): 28-51. On foreknowledge and omniscience: Arbour, Benjamin H. "Future Freedom and the Fixity of Truth: Closing the Road to Limited Foreknowledge Open Theism." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73, no. 3 (2013): 189-207. Arbour, Benjamin H. "Maximal Greatness and Perfect Knowledge." In T&T Clark Handbook of Analytic Theology, edited by James M. Arcadi and James T. Turner Jr., 113-114. London: T&T Clark, 2021. As quoted in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 6.2.1, note 9. Craig, William Lane. Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, On God: Attributes of God. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2025. Sections 6.1.3.2, 6.1.3.3.1-6.1.3.3.2, 6.2.1, 6.2.2.2 (note 34), 6.2.3, 6.3-6.3.1 (notes 39-46), 6.3.2.1.1, 6.3.2.1.4, 6.3.2.2 and 6.4.2.1. Craig, William Lane, and David P. Hunt. "Perils of the Open Road." Faith and Philosophy 30, no. 1 (2013): 49-71. Parunak, H. Van Dyke. "A Semantic Survey of NHM." Biblica 56, no. 4 (1975): 512-532. Especially 519-520 and 522-527. Pike, Nelson. "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action." Philosophical Review 74, no. 1 (1965): 27-46. Prior, Arthur N. "The Formalities of Omniscience." Philosophy 37, no. 140 (1962): 114-129. Reprinted in Papers on Time and Tense, 26-44. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. Pages 31 and 38-39. Prior, Arthur N. "Identifiable Individuals." In Papers on Time and Tense, 66-77. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. Prior, Arthur N. Past, Present and Future. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. Pages 113-136. Rescher, Nicholas. Many-Valued Logic. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. Pages 2-3, as quoted in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 6.3.1, note 44. Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Pages 103, 469-470 (quoting Thomas Flint, Divine Providence, 1998), 596 and 605. Thomason, Richmond H. "Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps." Theoria 36, no. 3 (1970): 264-281. Todd, Patrick. The Open Future: Why Future Contingents Are All False. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Chapter 7 and its appendix, 173-180. Todd, Patrick. "Defending The Open Future: Replies to MacFarlane, Green, Wasserman, and Bigg and Miller." Analytic Philosophy 66, no. 2 (2025): 249-277. On the Reformed refusal: Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018. Pages 229-230, note 448. Frame, John M. No Other God: A Response to Open Theism. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2001. Helm, Paul. "The Augustinian-Calvinist View." In Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, edited by James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy, 161-189. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001. The argument from the fixed past is at 184-189. Helm, Paul. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. Pages 98, 124-127 and 143-144. Ware, Bruce A. God's Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2000. Historical sources: Augustine. The City of God 5.9. Translated by Marcus Dods. In Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 2. Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1887. Cicero. On Divination 1.82-83 and 1.125-127 (the Stoic case, put by his brother Quintus) and 2.18 (his own reply). Translated by W. A. Falconer. Loeb Classical Library 154. London: Heinemann, 1923. Pages 315-317, 359-363 and 389-391. And On Fate 9, 20-21 and 31-33. Irenaeus. Against Heresies 2.28.6. Translated by Alexander Roberts. In Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, 401. Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1885. Biblical citations: Genesis 3:9; Genesis 4:9; Genesis 6:6; Genesis 18:12, 13, 21; Genesis 22:12; Genesis 50:20; Exodus 3:18, 20; Exodus 4:1, 8-9, 10, 31; Exodus 13:17; Exodus 32:10-14; Leviticus 18:21; Numbers 13:28, 33; Numbers 14:3-4; Numbers 23:19; Deuteronomy 8:2, 3, 5; Deuteronomy 18:10, 22; Deuteronomy 31:21; 1 Samuel 15:11, 29, 35; 1 Samuel 23:5, 10, 11-13; 2 Samuel 12:22; Ezra 1:1; Psalm 50:21; Psalm 106:23; Psalm 139:4, 16; Psalm 147:5; Isaiah 5:4; Isaiah 38:1, 5; Isaiah 40:25; Isaiah 41:21-23; Isaiah 44:28; Isaiah 45:4; Isaiah 46:9-10; Isaiah 48:3, 4, 5, 8; Isaiah 55:8; Jeremiah 3:7, 20; Jeremiah 7:27, 31; Jeremiah 18:7-8; Jeremiah 19:5; Jeremiah 26:3; Jeremiah 32:35; Jeremiah 38:17-18; Ezekiel 3:7; Ezekiel 12:3; Ezekiel 22:30; Ezekiel 33:14; Amos 7:1-6; Jonah 3:4, 9; Jonah 4:2; Matthew 11:21, 23; Matthew 26:24, 75; Mark 13:32; Mark 14:30, 31, 50, 54, 66-71; Luke 2:52; Luke 22:32, 61; John 4:24; John 6:64; John 13:19; John 18:10; John 21:15-17; Philippians 2:7; James 5:16.
+ If God already knows what I will do tomorrow, I cannot do otherwise, and a choice I cannot avoid is not free. That is why the future must be open.
1. This is the open theist's own reason. It is the old argument called theological fatalism, which claims that whatever God knows happens by necessity. It moved Cicero before it moved anyone in the church. Most open theists find it sound, and they give up foreknowledge because they do. So it deserves an answer: if the argument fails, the reason for the trade fails with it. Its careful form does not say that knowing pushes anyone around. It says that God's belief about your tomorrow was formed long ago, that the past is out of anyone's reach, and that God cannot be wrong. On that argument, doing otherwise tomorrow would take a power nobody has: to make God mistaken, to undo a belief he held long ago, or to bring it about that the one who held it was never God at all. 2. Knowing a choice settles nothing about it. - God knows what you will do because you will do it. His knowing depends on your choice, not your choice on his knowing, the way a photograph depends on the scene and not the scene on the photograph. - As one defender of free will puts it, "Certainty is an epistemic property, not a causal force." Epistemic means having to do with knowledge. God's being certain of what you will choose is a fact about his knowledge, and it does none of your choosing. 3. Freedom does not need the open door. - A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. In the ordinary run of choices the person could also have chosen otherwise, which is the ordinary mark of freedom, not its definition. - So even if we grant that God's belief is fixed, and that no other door stood open, the choice would still be free, because nothing but the chooser settled it. What the fatalist would need to show is that something other than the chooser settled it, and knowledge settles nothing. - Think of a guest who stays late at a dinner because she is enjoying the company. If, unknown to her, snow has closed every road home, she still stays freely. The closed roads did none of her staying. 4. The simple version slides at a single word. - True: necessarily, if God knows you will do something, you will do it. God cannot be wrong. - Not true: if God knows you will do something, then you will necessarily do it. That moves "necessarily" from the whole if-then onto your act alone, which is the modal fallacy (P4). - A perfectly accurate thermometer that reads 70 degrees guarantees that it is 70 degrees. It does not make the room warm. 5. The careful version needs a fixed past it does not have. - A hard fact about the past is one made true by how things stood then, which waits on nothing still to come: that Socrates drank hemlock. A soft fact waits on the future: that 1066 was the year of the last successful invasion of England depends on whether another invasion ever succeeds. - God's belief about your choice waits on your choice, so it is soft, and it is not among the things that stay fixed. In the ordinary case you could have done otherwise, and had you done so, God would always have believed otherwise. Nobody reaches back and changes anything. A different choice would simply have meant a different belief all along. - That God cannot be wrong does not make his belief hard. It is the very thing that makes it soft. Because he cannot be mistaken, his belief goes wherever your choice goes, so doing otherwise never needed a power to make him wrong, to undo his belief, or to unmake him. None of those powers exists, and none is needed. - Take Peter. Nothing but Peter settled his denials that night. Had he stood firm, God would always have known that instead, and Jesus would have said something else that night. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+ God knows everything that can be known. A free act that has not happened cannot be known, any more than God can draw a square circle, so the open God is fully omniscient.
1. The comparison sounds right. Nobody thinks it a limit on God that he cannot make a square circle, because a square circle is not a thing at all. The open theist says the same of tomorrow's free choice: there is nothing there to know, so not knowing it is no limit. Its strongest form borrows from God's power. God cannot make a creature freely choose something, since a choice God made him make would not be the creature's free choice, and nobody counts that a defect in God's power. So why, the open theist asks, should God's knowledge not stop where his power stops, short of the free choices of his creatures? 2. The square circle is the wrong comparison. - The square circle fails because it is a contradiction. Nothing about it could be true. - "Peter will deny Jesus tonight" is not a contradiction. It describes a perfectly possible night, and by the time the rooster crowed everyone knew it had come true. If it was true before the courtyard, a God who did not know it was ignorant of a truth, which is what omniscience rules out (P4). - The only thing a proposition needs in order to be knowable is to be true (P4). 3. Power and knowledge part company at exactly this point. - God cannot make you freely choose, because a choice he settled would be his doing and not yours. That limit comes from a contradiction: "made by God to choose freely" describes nothing at all. - "God knows what you will freely choose" contains no contradiction, because knowing a choice settles nothing about it (D1). It would be contradictory only if knowing were a kind of doing, which is the fatalist's premise and not a fact about knowledge. - Knowing how a match will end is not playing in it. 4. So the objection is really about (P4) or (P5). If "there is nothing there to know" means that statements about tomorrow's free choices are not true, the objection is either a denial of bivalence, the principle that every statement is true or false, or the view that every such statement is false (D5). (P5) answers both. If it means that they are true but cannot be known, it is the redefinition of omniscience that (P4) answers. A grocery list that leaves out the milk is not complete because milk is hard to carry.
+ The future does not exist yet. There is nothing there for a statement about tomorrow's free choice to be true of, so no such statement is true.
1. This is the main reason anyone has given. It has force. Many philosophers hold that only the present is real, a view called presentism: yesterday's breakfast no longer exists, and tomorrow's does not exist yet. If only the present exists, a statement about tomorrow can seem to be about nothing. 2. Truth does not need its subject to exist now. - A statement is true when things are as it says. "It will snow tomorrow" says only that tomorrow it will snow. It is true if tomorrow it snows (P5). - For a presentist, the same demand would sink the past. Caesar does not exist now, and "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is still true. - One of the most careful defenders of God's foreknowledge is himself a presentist, and holds for exactly this reason that the future-tense statements are true or false all the same. 3. Treating the past differently from the future costs more than it saves. - Some presentist open theists answer that truths about the past rest on God's present memory of it. But if God's present memory can make the past true, his present knowledge could make the future true. To deny that he has such knowledge is to assume the very point in dispute. - They can reply that memory had a source in what God once saw, while foreknowledge would have none. That rejoinder is the question (D4) takes up. - Others hold that the past is real and the future is not, so that history is a growing block, adding each new moment to everything that already exists, the way a wall going up gains a new row of bricks with nothing yet above the top one. That view is coherent, and it explains why past and future differ. But it still assumes that a statement needs an existing thing to be true of, which (2) denies, and it has to give different verdicts on three statements that make the same claim about the same rain (4). 4. The same facts make all three tenses true. The rain on April 13 makes "it will rain tomorrow" true on the twelfth, "it is raining" true on the thirteenth, and "it rained yesterday" true on the fourteenth (P5). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding Objection
+ Grant that the statements about tomorrow are true. Nothing now makes them true, so there is nothing for God's knowledge to rest on, and a knowledge that rests on nothing is not knowledge.
1. This is a different and better objection. It grants bivalence and grants that there are truths about tomorrow's free choices. What it asks is how God could know them: not whether they are true, but what his knowledge of them is based on. 2. The concession has already cost the open view its case. - Omniscience asks whether God knows every truth. It does not ask how. A truth with no present ground, nothing now that makes it true, is still a truth. A God who does not know it is not omniscient, whatever the ground (P4). - So the objector who grants that there are truths about tomorrow has lost the argument on his own definition, and has to win it now on another question. - A child who asks how her mother always knows when she is lying has not shown that her mother does not know. 3. That other question has an answer. - God does not learn the future by looking ahead, as though it were a road he could see from a tower, and his knowledge does not have to rest on causes in the world. - On the account one defender of middle knowledge gives, God's knowledge is not acquired at all. It is more like a mind's knowledge of what it knows by its own nature: as a perfect being, God simply knows every truth, and the truths about tomorrow are among them. - Asking how he can know them, on that account, is like asking how God can be almighty or holy. He is that way, and the answer to the question is in what God is, not in a telescope. - Skeptics hear that as a refusal to answer. It would be one if it claimed to describe how God finds things out. It is a denial that he finds anything out at all, and nobody asks through what window God sees that two and two make four. 4. Christians who differ on much else agree that the knowledge rests in God. - The Reformed say God knows the future by knowing his own decree. On middle knowledge, God knows what every creature would freely do in any circumstance and which circumstances he chose to create, and his knowledge of what will happen follows from the two. - Either way the knowledge rests on something in God, not on peering down the road. The demand for something in the world now that makes tomorrow true assumes a picture that both sides reject. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Does Not Look Ahead: How Foreknowledge Is Possible
+ "Will" means "will certainly." Since a free choice is not yet certain, "he will do it" and "he will not do it" are both false, and only "he might do it" is true.
1. This is a serious modern position. It follows the logician Arthur Prior. Some open theists defend it today, and a recent book argues at length that every statement about a free future is false. On this view the future is open in the strongest sense. "He will" is true only when how things stand now already determines that he will, so of a free choice not yet made nothing is true except that it might go either way. 2. Ordinary speech does not mean "certainly" by "will." - When a friend says she will come to dinner, she is not claiming that her coming is guaranteed by the laws of nature. She is saying that she will come. - If she comes, what she said was true. On this view it was false when she said it, and so was every prediction of a free choice ever made, however things turned out. Prior himself accepted that consequence, and the view's modern defenders accept it too and argue that we can live with it (P5). 3. The view needs a new logic of "not." On it, "he will not come" and "he will come" are both false, though ordinarily one of them must be true. Nothing recommends that reading of "not" over the ordinary one except that the view needs it (P5). 4. It leaves Jesus' prediction false or Peter unfree. On this reading, "you will deny me three times" was true only if Peter's denials were already determined by how things stood that night, and then, on the open theist's own terms, they were not free. If they were not determined, then "you will deny me three times" was false when Jesus said it. Jesus did not say that Peter might deny him. He said he would.
+ The Lord says he will "go down to see" what Sodom has done (Genesis 18:21), and at Moriah the angel says, "now I know that you fear God" (Genesis 22:12). Scripture's God learns.
1. These texts deserve their weight. They are real sentences about knowledge, and the word "now" in the second is doing exactly the work the objection wants done. Anyone who says open theism has no good texts has not read them. 2. Read that way, they make God ignorant of the present too. - "I will go down to see whether they have done altogether according to the outcry that has come to me" is about what Sodom has already done, not what it will do. A God who must go and look is ignorant of the present, and no open theist believes that. - The same chapter has God answering the laugh Sarah kept to herself, out of sight in the tent: "Why did Sarah laugh and say, Shall I indeed bear a child, now that I am old?" (Genesis 18:13). The God who said he would "go down to see" knew what was said in private. - God asks Adam, "Where are you?" (Genesis 3:9), and Cain, "Where is Abel your brother?" (Genesis 4:9). Nobody takes those questions as requests for information. 3. A test shows as well as finds out. - Moses says that God tested Israel in the wilderness "to know what was in your heart, whether you would keep his commandments or not" (Deuteronomy 8:2). The open theist rightly points out that "to know" is given as the test's purpose. But a test brings into the open what was hidden, and it forms the one who passes it. - The same passage names those purposes in the next breath. The hunger was sent so that Israel would learn to live by God's word and not by bread alone (Deuteronomy 8:3), and it was the discipline a father gives a son (Deuteronomy 8:5). - At Moriah, the knife over Isaac made Abraham's fear of God a fact in the world and in Abraham's own life, not only a fact in God's mind. - A teacher who has known for months that a student understands long division still gives her the exam. The exam is for the student and for the record. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+ God says, "It may be they will listen" (Jeremiah 26:3) and "Perhaps they will understand" (Ezekiel 12:3), and of Israel, "I thought, After she has done all this she will return to me, but she did not return" (Jeremiah 3:7). His expectations fail.
1. These are among the open theist's best texts. The "may be" and the "perhaps" are God's own words, and Jeremiah 3:7 has God reporting a thought that did not come true. There are more like them. God looked for his vineyard to yield grapes and it yielded wild ones (Isaiah 5:4), and he looked for someone to stand between the land and its destruction and found no one (Ezekiel 22:30). Taken on their surface they describe a God who hoped and was disappointed. 2. The same prophets were told the answer in advance. - When Ezekiel was called, God told him, "But the house of Israel will not be willing to listen to you, for they are not willing to listen to me" (Ezekiel 3:7). The "perhaps" of Ezekiel 12:3 was spoken by the God who had already said that. - Jeremiah was told the same about the same people: "So you shall speak all these words to them, but they will not listen to you. You shall call to them, but they will not answer you" (Jeremiah 7:27). - Isaiah records God saying to Israel, "For I knew that you would surely deal treacherously, and that from before birth you were called a rebel" (Isaiah 48:8). - So "perhaps" in these books is not a confession of ignorance. It is an appeal, the voice of one who wants his hearers to turn, telling them that it is not too late. Even on the open view, God had already judged Ezekiel's hearers unwilling, so his "perhaps" there cannot have been his honest estimate of the odds either (D18). 3. "I thought" is the language of a wronged partner. - The chapter frames Israel's unfaithfulness as a marriage betrayed, and it is God himself who uses the image of a treacherous wife leaving her husband (Jeremiah 3:20). - In a lament like that, "I thought she would come back" measures the betrayal against what was owed. It says what any faithful partner had every right to expect, and so how great the treachery was. Whether the speaker saw it coming is not what the sentence is about. - Think of a mother at her son's sentencing who says, "After everything we gave him, I thought he would turn out well." She may have seen it coming for years. She is not reporting a forecast that failed. She is saying what he owed and did not give. 4. Human words for God are used this way throughout. Scripture uses the language of human expectation, grief and surprise for God because it is the language we have (P1). The prophet who records "I thought" also records God saying that the people would not listen, and the two sit together only if the first is the voice of grief. Isaiah, speaking of the reach of God's mercy, gives the principle behind it: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways" (Isaiah 55:8).
+ God announced that Nineveh would be overthrown and it was not, told Hezekiah he would die and gave him fifteen years, and relented when Moses and Amos pleaded (Exodus 32:14; Amos 7:1-6). He does not always do what he said.
1. The texts are plain. "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown!" (Jonah 3:4). Isaiah told King Hezekiah, "Set your house in order, for you shall die, you shall not recover" (Isaiah 38:1), and then, "I have heard your prayer; I have seen your tears. Behold, I will add fifteen years to your life" (Isaiah 38:5). Twice Amos prayed, and twice "The Lord relented concerning this" (Amos 7:3, 6). The strongest of them is the golden calf. God told Moses to leave him alone so that his wrath might burn against the people and consume them, Moses pleaded, and the Lord relented from the disaster he had spoken of (Exodus 32:10-14). On its surface, a man talked God out of what he had said he would do. 2. Scripture states the rule these stories follow. "If at any time I declare concerning a nation or a kingdom, that I will pluck up and break down and destroy it, and if that nation, concerning which I have spoken, turns from its evil, I will relent of the disaster that I intended to do to it" (Jeremiah 18:7-8). Ezekiel gives the same rule for one man: "though I say to the wicked, You shall surely die, yet if he turns from his sin and does what is just and right" (Ezekiel 33:14), he shall live. A psalm looks back on the golden calf and reads it the same way: God said he would destroy them, and would have, had Moses not stood between the people and his wrath (Psalm 106:23). The threat carried a condition, and God had put the intercessor there to meet it. 3. A warning with a condition is not a failed prediction. - These announcements told what would happen if nothing changed, and they were spoken so that something would (P2). Their hearers understood them so. Jonah himself says he fled because "I knew that you are a gracious God and merciful, slow to anger and abounding in steadfast love, and relenting from disaster" (Jonah 4:2). - A condition being met is not news to the one who set it. When a mother says "Keep that up and there's no dessert," and the child stops, she has not been proved wrong. 4. The objection is right about these prophecies. These prophecies are warnings, not foreknowledge (P2). What they cannot show is that God does not know what will happen. And the prophecies of free acts that are not warnings (Peter, Judas, Cyrus) remain.
+ God regrets that he made man (Genesis 6:6) and that he made Saul king (1 Samuel 15:11), and he says of child sacrifice, "nor did it come into my mind" (Jeremiah 7:31). A God who regrets and is surprised did not see it coming.
1. These are strong texts. God's regret over man and over Saul is some of the most painful language in the Old Testament, and it is meant to be felt. Read on its surface, it is the language of someone who would have done otherwise had he known. Jeremiah's third saying about child sacrifice is stronger still: "though I did not command them, nor did it enter into my mind, that they should do this abomination" (Jeremiah 32:35). Read on its surface, that is a God who never imagined his people would do such a thing. 2. The chapter itself shows that the word has more than one sense. - "And also the Glory of Israel will not lie or have regret, for he is not a man, that he should have regret" (1 Samuel 15:29) stands between "I regret that I have made Saul king" (1 Samuel 15:11) and "the Lord regretted that he had made Saul king" at the chapter's end (1 Samuel 15:35). A narrator who says within a few verses that God regrets and that he does not is not using the word the same way twice. - A careful survey of the Hebrew verb behind "regret" found that in these verses, as in Genesis 6:6, it means to suffer emotional pain, and elsewhere to take back a promised blessing or judgment because people's conduct has changed. God grieved over Saul. He did not discover him. - A father can grieve over a son's choices without having been surprised by them, and the grief can be deeper for having been foreseen. 3. Child sacrifice never came into God's mind as something he willed. - Jeremiah pairs the words with command all three times: "which I did not command, nor did it come into my mind" (Jeremiah 7:31); "which I did not command or decree, nor did it come into my mind" (Jeremiah 19:5); and the third saying, in (1), pairs them the same way (Jeremiah 32:35). The point is that child sacrifice had no place in God's will for his people, not that he failed to foresee it. - The Law had already forbidden it by name. Moses warned Israel against burning a son or daughter as an offering (Deuteronomy 18:10), and against giving children to Molech (Leviticus 18:21), the very god Jeremiah 32:35 names. A practice God had legislated against centuries earlier had come into his mind in every sense but one: he never willed it. - Read with strict literalness, the words about what entered God's mind would make him unable even to conceive of the practice. The open theist denies that too, since on his view God knows every possibility there is (D14). So he also reads the words as something other than a report of what God had thought of, and the only question is which reading. The pairing with "command" answers it.
+ Peter's denial was predictable. God knew Peter through and through and could arrange the questions around the fire and the rooster's timing himself, so the prophecy needs no knowledge of a free choice.
1. This is the open theist's best answer on Peter. God knows every present fact, including every fear in Peter's heart, and he can arrange circumstances. On this view the prophecy combines a perfect reading of character with God's control of the setting. Its best defenders add that a character can harden until, in a given setting, only one response is left, and that the person is still to blame because he formed that character by his earlier free choices. On that view Peter's denial was fixed by the Peter he had made, and God had only to set the scene. 2. It faces a dilemma. - Either Peter's character and the circumstances God arranged settled the three denials before he made them, or they did not. - If they did, then on the open theist's own terms the denials were not free when Peter made them: what made them go as they went was his earlier self and the scene God set, not Peter at the fire. Its defenders accept that for this case and point to the earlier choices. But the Gospels treat the denials as Peter's own act that night. He "went out and wept bitterly" (Matthew 26:75), and Jesus restored him with three questions for three denials (John 21:15-17). - If they did not, then "Truly, I tell you" was a bet on the odds, however good the odds. A bet can lose, and the Lord's word cannot fail (Deuteronomy 18:22). 3. Peter's character that night pointed the other way. Peter said he would die with Jesus before he would deny him (Mark 14:31). He drew a sword in the garden against an armed crowd (John 18:10). When the others fled, he followed Jesus right into the high priest's courtyard (Mark 14:50, 54). Anyone reading Peter's character that evening would have bet on almost anything before three denials by dawn. 4. The questions came from other people. The servant girl and the bystanders in the courtyard (Mark 14:66-71) asked their own questions. Arranging them would mean settling their choices too, and the dilemma returns for each of them. 5. Jesus staked his identity on his foretelling. The same night he foretold Judas's betrayal "that when it does take place you may believe that I am he" (John 13:19). A prediction of free acts that could have failed is a strange foundation for that claim (P1), and Peter's denials were foretold at the same table in the same way.
+ If God already knows everything that will happen, prayer changes nothing. Only a God who does not yet know can really answer, and the open view makes prayer matter.
1. The worry is pastoral and real. Christians pray because Scripture tells them prayer matters: "The prayer of a righteous person has great power as it is working" (James 5:16). A doctrine that made prayer idle would be a strange doctrine. 2. God's knowledge includes the prayers. - If God knows the future, he knows the prayers too, and what he will do in answer to them. The prayers are part of what happens, not something that happens around it. - Hezekiah prayed, and fifteen years were added (Isaiah 38:5). God knowing that Hezekiah would pray does not make the prayer idle; it makes it part of the story God knew. 3. The prayer makes the difference. God's answer to Hezekiah is grounded in the prayer itself: "I have heard your prayer; I have seen your tears" (Isaiah 38:5). Had Hezekiah not prayed, God would have known that instead, and the fifteen years would not have been added. What God does depends on the prayer, and knowing the prayer in advance does not remove the dependence. It is what lets the answer be ready. 4. On middle knowledge the prayers are part of the plan. God knew what his creatures would freely pray in every circumstance, and chose the world in which their prayers, freely offered, are part of how his purposes are carried out. Prayer is not a way of informing God. It is one of the ways he has chosen to act. The Reformed say the same in their own terms: God ordained the prayer together with its answer. A father who knows his daughter will ask for help with her homework, and sets the evening aside for it, has not made her asking pointless. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+ Love takes risks. A God who cannot be surprised or disappointed cannot really love, and the open God, who risks, is the more loving one.
1. The picture of love is right in part. Love opens itself to being grieved, and Scripture shows God grieved again and again (D9). A love that could not be hurt by its beloved would not be the love of the prophets. 2. Grief does not need surprise. - God's grief over Israel is real without his having been mistaken about Israel (D7, D9). A mother who has known for years that her son is an addict still weeps when he relapses. Her knowing makes her love costly, not cold. - The deepest vulnerability in Scripture is the cross, and the cross was foreknown. Jesus went to Jerusalem saying what would happen there, and went. 3. A God who takes risks cannot promise what free people will do. - The open theist answers with a chess master: a player infinitely wise, with a reply ready for every move, cannot lose the game whatever his opponent does. That is fair as far as it goes. God can promise whatever he will do himself, and the resurrection of the dead and the new creation are his acts. - What the chess master cannot tell you is which moves his opponent will make, and some of Scripture's promises are about exactly that. On the night he foretold the denials, Jesus told Peter that after he had turned back he was to strengthen his brothers (Luke 22:32). That was a promise about Peter's own repentance, and a God who could only forecast it could not have made it as a promise. - So on the open view the risk falls on us. The love that gives certain promises is not the lesser love. 4. A God who knows can still be the one who gives. Knowing what the beloved will do is not the opposite of love. Jesus knew Peter would deny him, and he prayed for him before it happened (Luke 22:32).
+ The God who knows the whole future and never changes is the God of Greek philosophy, read into the Bible. The biblical God is dynamic, relational and responsive.
1. The charge has a history. Open theists argue that the classical doctrine of God, the one taught through most of the church's history, absorbed ideas from Greek philosophy, especially an unchanging, untouchable deity. The Bible's God, they argue, is more personal than that. Some classical formulations did lean on Greek philosophy, and the charge is not foolish. 2. The case for foreknowledge comes from Scripture first. Isaiah's trial of the idols, the word known before it is on the tongue, the count of Peter's denials: those are not Greek ideas (P1). The second chain comes from God's perfection, which Scripture also teaches (P3). 3. Greek philosophy stood on both sides. The Stoics, a school of Greek philosophers, taught a providence that foreknew everything and fixed it as fate. Cicero, the Roman orator trained in Greek philosophy, answered them by giving up God's foreknowledge to keep human freedom. So the foreknowing God and the unforeknowing one both had pagan advocates, and the presence of Greek ideas proves nothing about which side is biblical. The church's answer came from Scripture: it was Augustine who refused Cicero's trade, saying that "the religious mind chooses both" (C1). 4. A God who knows is still responsive. He answers prayer, relents when people turn, grieves over sin and rejoices over repentance (D8, D9, D11). None of that requires ignorance of what people will do. It requires only that God act in a world where people really act.
+ The open God knows more than the classical God. He knows every way the future might go, while the classical God knows only the one way it will go.
1. The point is clever. The open theist Gregory Boyd has pressed it. A God who knows all the possibilities, the argument runs, knows a great deal more than a God who knows only the single actual future. 2. The classical God knows the possibilities too. On every classical view God knows everything that could happen, every possible course the world could take, down to every way Peter's night could have gone. Theologians call this his natural knowledge, because he has it by his very nature. He also knows which course will be actual. 3. So the open God knows strictly less. He knows the possibilities and not which of them will be. The classical God knows both. A reader who knows every way a story might end, and also how it does end, knows more than one who knows only the possibilities. The open theist's point has force only on the reading of "will" in (D5), on which "he might not" contradicts "he will." On that reading, a God who knew that Peter will deny Jesus could not also know that Peter might not, because the second would be false. On the ordinary reading both can be true together: Peter will deny Jesus, and, as in the ordinary run of choices, he could have stood firm.
+ Foreknowledge without middle knowledge is useless for providence. God cannot use his knowledge of what will happen to decide what to do, because what will happen already includes what he does, so the classical God plans no better than the open God.
1. The charge is largely true of simple foreknowledge. Simple foreknowledge is foreknowledge without middle knowledge: God knows what will happen, but not what free creatures would do if things went otherwise. The open theist William Hasker has pressed this argument for decades. It is largely right about the view it targets, though some defenders of simple foreknowledge dispute even that. Knowledge of what will actually happen already includes God's own decisions, so it comes too late to plan with. A coach given the final score before the whistle still does not know what would happen if he moved his winger. 2. It is not true of middle knowledge. The God who knows what every creature would freely do in any circumstance can plan through that knowledge, choosing where to place each person. A coach who knew how each player would play in every position could pick his lineup by it. That is why the account of providence (God's governing of everything that happens) that keeps both freedom and sovereignty is middle knowledge, not bare foreknowledge. 3. It leaves both conclusions standing. Whether foreknowledge is useful for planning is a question about providence. Whether God has it is a different question, and (C1) and (C2) answer it. A fact does not stop being known because it cannot be used. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+ Jesus said that not even the Son knows the day or the hour, only the Father (Mark 13:32). If God the Son could be ignorant of the future, ignorance of the future is compatible with being God.
1. This is a hard verse. "But concerning that day or that hour, no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father" (Mark 13:32). Christians have wrestled with it since the second century. 2. The same verse says the Father knows. The verse names someone who does know the day: the Father. Whatever it says about the Son, it does not say that the future is open to God. 3. It concerns the Son as he lived among us. The mainstream answer, in different forms across the traditions, is that the verse speaks of the Son in the limits of the human life he took on, the life in which he grew "in wisdom and in stature" (Luke 2:52) and "emptied himself, by taking the form of a servant" (Philippians 2:7). How to state that is a question for the doctrine of Christ, and it does not turn on the open view. 4. The same Jesus foretold Peter's denials. He knew the night and the count of Peter's denials (Mark 14:30), and Peter could say to him afterward, "Lord, you know everything" (John 21:17). The verse about the day and hour is not a general confession of ignorance of what people will do.
+ God gives Moses extra signs in case the elders do not believe the first (Exodus 4:8-9), and leads Israel the long way in case war makes them turn back (Exodus 13:17). A God who plans for what might happen does not know what will.
1. These texts show God planning for more than one outcome. The strongest form of this objection points to the "if" and the "may." - Before Moses goes back to Egypt, God gives him signs with an "if" attached: "If they will not believe you, God said, or listen to the first sign, they may believe the latter sign" (Exodus 4:8). Then he gives him a third sign in case the second fails too (Exodus 4:9). - When Israel leaves Egypt, God leads them away from the short road through Philistine country, and the text gives his reason: "Lest the people change their minds when they see war and return to Egypt" (Exodus 13:17). Contingency plans are what a planner makes when he does not know which way things will go, and on their surface these read that way. 2. The "if" answers Moses' fear. - The conversation begins with Moses' objection that the people will not believe him (Exodus 4:1), and it runs on through his protest that he is slow of speech (Exodus 4:10). God meets a frightened man with enough provision for any answer the elders might give. - And God had already given the answer. Only a few verses earlier he told Moses flatly that the elders would listen to him (Exodus 3:18). Moses' objection contradicted what he had just been told, and the "if" was spoken to his fear, not out of any doubt in God. - A general who tells a nervous captain, "If the bridge is out, take the ford," may know perfectly well that the bridge is standing. The "if" is for the captain. - In the event, the people believed (Exodus 4:31). 3. The long road shows knowledge of what people would do. - God's reason for the long road is a judgment about what Israel would have done on a road they never took. On the open view it is a guess about a probability. On the classical view it is knowledge of what they would have done, which is more than foreknowledge (P2), and exactly what a planner who knew everything would use to choose a route. - The words fit either reading, and that is all the reply needs: a text that fits knowledge does not show ignorance. - The judgment was borne out. When the spies came back with news of fortified cities and of giants (Numbers 13:28, 33), the people said it would be better to go back to Egypt (Numbers 14:3-4). That is what God had said the sight of war would make them want. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+ If God knew all along that Nineveh would repent and that Israel would not listen, his threats and his "perhaps" were play-acting. A God who knows the ending and speaks as if he does not is not being straight with people.
1. The charge is a serious one. God does not lie, and open theists are right that a reading on which his words mislead people would be a bad reading. If the classical view needed God to say what he did not mean, it would fail. 2. A warning is sincere when it is true and meant. - "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown!" (Jonah 3:4) was true as a warning. Nineveh was on course for destruction unless it turned, and God meant the warning to be heard and heeded. - Both of those hold whether or not God knew the ending. Jonah, who knew God's ways, took the warning exactly so. He ran from the job because he expected God to relent (Jonah 4:2). 3. Knowing a warning will work is a reason to give it. - The warning is how the turning came about. What God foreknew was not a repentance that would have happened anyway, but a repentance brought about by the warning he sent. - A doctor who can see that one look at the X-ray will frighten his patient off cigarettes still shows him the X-ray. He would be at fault if he left it in the drawer because he knew how the story ended. 4. The open view needs the same answer. - On the open view too, God announced Nineveh's overthrow in flat words while knowing that Nineveh might repent and that, if it did, he would relent (Jeremiah 18:7-8). - So either the announcement carried an unspoken condition, and then it was sincere on both views, or it did not, and then it was false on both. The charge falls on the open God as heavily as on the classical one. - The same holds for "perhaps." Ezekiel had been told at his call that the people would not be willing to listen (Ezekiel 3:7), so on either view God's "Perhaps they will understand" (Ezekiel 12:3) was an appeal and not an estimate of the odds (D7).
+ A God who knew before creating what evil people would do, and created them anyway, shares the blame for it. A God who could not have known carries less of it, and that is one of open theism's real attractions.
1. This is one of the view's strongest attractions. Open theists write about suffering with real pastoral care, and some of them argue that a God who took a genuine risk need not answer for evils he did not foresee. The pain behind the question deserves better than a quick reply. 2. The open God knew the risk. - He made free creatures knowing that they could sin and that some of them might do great evil, and he made them anyway. He knows every present heart, so he saw each great evil taking shape in the person who would do it, and often he did not stop it. - So the question "why create, and why permit?" is asked on both views. Not knowing the exact outcome makes it smaller at the edges. It does not change what kind of question it is. - Parents who hand a teenager the car keys cannot know the day of the first fender-bender, but they know one is likely. If they are right to hand over the keys, it is because of what driving will make of their child, not because they did not know the date. 3. Foreknowledge lets God permit an evil for a purpose. On the open view God permits evils he did not foresee and brings what good he can out of them afterward. On the classical view nothing reaches his people that he did not see coming and permit for a purpose of his own. Joseph could tell his brothers that what they meant for evil, God meant for good (Genesis 50:20), and that is a comfort the open view cannot give in the same form. 4. The answer to evil lies elsewhere. Every Christian view has to answer the problem of evil, and ignorance of the future answers little of it. The answers that carry weight, the goods only free creatures can have and the hope of a world set right, are open to all of them. See also: CO / PoE: Intellectual PoE: Logical CO / PoE: Emotional PoE
+ If God has always known everything he will do, then God himself never really decides anything. A God who already knows his next move cannot choose it, respond to prayer, or change course.
1. The worry comes from our own case. It can seem that nobody deliberates about what he is already sure he will do. If God knows every act of his own from the beginning, it can look as though he never makes up his mind about anything, and a relationship with him would be a relationship with a script. 2. Knowing settles nothing, God's own knowing included. - What settles what God does is God himself, and nothing outside him. His knowing what he will do depends on his willing it, not the other way round. - You can know on Monday that you will keep Saturday's promise to a friend, and the keeping is still yours. Your knowing follows your resolve. 3. God does not need to deliberate to be free. - Deliberation is how a creature who does not yet see everything finds his way to a choice. God does not deliberate. He sees every consideration at once. - Freedom is not the weighing. God is free because nothing outside him settles what he wills. - A friend who says yes the moment you ask for help, without weighing a thing, has chosen to help you as surely as one who thought it over. 4. His responses are real. God's answer to a prayer is a real response, because it depends on the prayer (D11). He relents when people turn (D8) because their turning is what he answers. That the response was known from the beginning makes it no less a response. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God Philosophy / Free Will: You Cannot Deliberate About What You Believe Is Settled: The Deliberation Argument

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