A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
(●)A man designed before he was conceived to commit a murder does not commit it freely, and nothing that takes his choice from him is missing from a determined one.
+Picture a man at his kitchen table late at night, turning a revolver over in his hands. His name is Ernie, and tomorrow he is going to kill a man named Jones. He has thought about it for weeks. He has weighed the risks, listened to the part of himself that says don't, and decided anyway. Had he learned that the police were watching Jones's house, he would have put the gun away; he is that kind of man, careful and responsive to reasons. The plan comes out of his own reasoning and out of wants he is glad to call his own.
Now add one fact. Thirty years earlier, before Ernie was conceived, a goddess named Diana built the zygote he grew from, the single fertilized cell a human life begins as. She built it exactly as she did because she wanted Jones dead thirty years later. Her world is one in which everything that happens is fixed by what came before it, and she knew its laws and its present state perfectly. So she knew that a zygote made just so, placed in a woman named Mary, would grow into a man who, thirty years on, would murder Jones out of his own careful reasoning and his own wants. Then she left him alone. She never touched his life again, and it went exactly as she planned.
Was the murder Ernie's free choice?
The story is a thought experiment, a made-up case built to test an idea, and it is the simplest form of what philosophers call the manipulation argument. To see what it tests, start with the kind of world Diana lives in.
Determinism is the view that every choice is settled beforehand by earlier conditions that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes: the state of the world long ago, together with the laws of nature. Diana's world is a determined one, and that, with her perfect knowledge of it, is how she could build a murder into a single cell.
Free will, as philosophers use the phrase, is the control over a choice that makes a person answerable for it. So for a man like Ernie, who knows exactly what he is doing, asking whether he murdered freely is asking whether he is to blame.
Could anyone have free will in a determined world? Compatibilism says yes: free will and determinism can both be true. Incompatibilism says no: they cannot both be true. An incompatibilist who holds that we really are free, and so that determinism is false, is called a libertarian, a name that has nothing to do with politics. The manipulation argument is aimed at compatibilism.
Modern compatibilists have given two careful accounts of what makes a choice your own. One asks whether the choice answers to reasons. The other asks whether you stand behind the wants you act on. Both are real improvements on the older compatibilism, which counted any choice free so long as you did what you wanted. That older view missed cases like the addict who does what he craves while hating the craving, and both new accounts catch him. The manipulation argument presses them with a man who passes both tests to the letter, and that man is Ernie.
It runs in two stages. In the first, Ernie does not murder freely (P1), and yet he meets everything the two accounts ask for (P2), so what they ask for is not enough (C1). In the second, Diana comes out of the story. What remains is an ordinary determined world, where the past and the laws settle every choice just as the zygote and the laws settled Ernie's (P3). The only thing missing is the designer, and the absence of a designer cannot be what makes a choice free (P4). So no determined choice is free (C2), and compatibilism is false. The point fits in one line: determinism is manipulation with no manipulator.
What Ernie lacks has a name. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. When you order the soup instead of the salad, and nothing but you settles which it will be, you are that choice's source, the one it comes from. Call this the source view of freedom.
To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. A friend who knows you well may be sure you will order the soup. His being sure settles nothing, and you still do the ordering.
An open door, in this debate, is another way a choice could have gone, there for the taking, the way the stairs are still there when you take the elevator. A door is shut when no such way is left.
Now look again at Ernie. His door was shut, since he could not have done otherwise, but something more had happened to him than that. Diana settled his choice, through the zygote and the laws, before there was an Ernie to settle anything. That, and not any shut door, is what takes the murder out of his hands.
The argument is deductive: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. The premises work like the links of a chain, and if every link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. That does not mean the premises must be beyond all doubt. Each needs only to be more plausible than its denial.
Who holds what, on the manipulation argument:
- Support: Derk Pereboom, who concludes that nobody has the freedom that makes blame deserved, developed its four-case form, which walks from manipulation to ordinary life in four steps (2001, revised 2014). Alfred Mele built the zygote case in 2006, though he himself stays officially neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism.
- Oppose: Michael McKenna (2008, 2014), John Martin Fischer (2011) and Carolina Sartorio (2016) answer that the designed man is free after all.
The argument that follows defends it.
(P1)Ernie does not murder Jones freely.
+The murder was settled thirty years before Ernie committed it, by someone who wanted it and built him to commit it. Many who hear the story judge at once that the choice was not his, and the judgment survives a careful look.
(1) The story is built so that nothing is wrong with Ernie.
- Nothing in Ernie is damaged. There is no drug, no hypnotist and no lie. He is healthy and he deliberates, and he would have stopped if given a good enough reason.
- That is by design. The standard reference survey of the debate, a scholarly encyclopedia article that philosophers themselves rely on, tells the case much as its inventor built it: Diana creates the zygote "in some deterministic world," because "she wants Jones to be murdered thirty years later."
- The survey fits the story to the two tests it is aimed at. Diana knows the grown man will murder "as a result of his moderately reasons-responsive mechanism and on the basis of motivations with which he is identified." Those two phrases are the compatibilists' own tests (P2). The first means that his way of choosing answers to reasons, and the second that he stands behind the wants that move him.
- Picture a watch made by a master and running perfectly. Nothing in it is broken, and it still keeps the time its maker set.
(2) Diana settled the choice before Ernie existed.
- A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it. Ernie's was settled by the zygote Diana built and the laws that carried it forward, thirty years before he made it.
- He is where the murder happened, not where it came from. His weighing and deciding were real, but every step of them was already fixed by a starting point she chose for exactly that purpose.
- A defender of free will draws the picture with a factory: "Consider a factory assembly line fully programmed by an external engineer." If the line turns out only what it was built to turn out, nobody credits the machine. The responsibility, he writes, "lies with the engineer," who is the true source of what the line produces, and "not with the mechanism."
- Notice the order, though. The verdict comes first and this explanation second. A reader who has never heard of the source view still balks at calling Ernie free, and so do many who reject the source view outright (D7). The source view explains why the balking is right, but the balking itself is the evidence, and it does not wait on the explanation.
(3) The verdict does not rest on a shut door.
- Ernie could not have done otherwise, but that is not what takes the murder from him. A shut door takes nothing from a free choice.
- The neurosurgeon's case shows why. A neurosurgeon has secretly fitted a device in a man's brain that would make him vote as the surgeon wants if he showed any sign of leaning toward the other candidate. The man votes that way on his own, and the device never does a thing.
- The man could not have cast the other vote. Even so, nothing settled his vote but him, and the idle device took nothing from it.
- What matters in Ernie's case is that Diana did not merely shut a door. She wrote the choice.
(4) Diana prevented Ernie by determining him.
- One defender of free will calls the principle of responsibility that goes with the source view non-prevention: "An agent is morally responsible for an action only if nothing prevented the agent from doing otherwise."
- The principle turns on the word prevented. To be prevented is for something to do the stopping, there and then. The neurosurgeon's device never did any stopping, so it prevented nothing. Nothing prevented the voter, and he settled his vote himself.
- In Ernie's case something did do the stopping: the state his brain was in at the moment he chose, which the laws had carried forward from the zygote. Diana prevented Ernie by determining him, through the zygote and the laws.
- Think of the difference between a locked door you never try and a hand that moves your arm. The lock took nothing from your staying. The hand took everything from the movement.
(5) Even compatibilists feel the verdict.
- Many compatibilists who answer the case grant that Ernie is not responsible, and look for some difference between him and an ordinary determined man (D2, D3).
- The most careful defender of compatibilism in the Reformed tradition, the Protestant tradition that runs back to John Calvin, grants the verdict in so many words; he speaks of "Ernie's exemption."
- Only the hard-line reply, which says Ernie is free after all, denies the verdict (D1). Its defenders reach it by argument, from their accounts of freedom and from the ordinary case, rather than by reporting that the story strikes them that way.
Therefore, Ernie does not murder Jones freely.
(P2)Ernie answers to reasons and identifies with the motives he acts on.
+Diana built Ernie to pass the two best tests compatibilists have devised for when a choice is a person's own, and he passes both.
(1) Ernie answers to reasons.
- The first test asks whether a choice answers to reasons, and it is a real advance on the older view. Think of Luke, whose fear of open spaces keeps him indoors no matter what reasons he is given. No reason ever moves his phobia, so the test rightly excuses him.
- The test's most detailed version looks at the mechanism behind a choice, which means simply the way the choice came about. Ordinary practical deliberation, thinking over what to do, is one such mechanism. Luke's phobia is another.
- The mechanism must be receptive to reasons, able to recognize them, and reactive to them. Being reactive means that in at least one possible world with the same laws of nature, it would respond to a good enough reason by choosing differently.
• A possible world is a complete way things could have gone. A world in which the police happen to be watching Jones's house is one.
- Ernie's deliberation is nothing like Luke's phobia. The police at Jones's door would have stopped him cold.
(2) Ernie stands behind the wants that move him.
- The second test asks whether you identify with the motives you act on. On the best-known version, a person has first-order desires, desires for things, and second-order desires, desires about his own desires, above all about which of them he wants to move him.
- An addict who hates his craving has a first-order desire for the drug and a second-order desire not to be moved by it. When the craving wins, he acts on a desire he disowns, and the test counts the act as less than his own.
- Ernie disowns nothing. He wants Jones dead, and he wants that want to be the one that moves him. By this test his choice is as much his own as any choice can be.
(3) Ernie even takes responsibility for how he chooses.
- Some compatibilists add a condition about how a person sees himself. He must see himself as an agent, the one doing the acting, when he acts in this way. He must see himself as a fair target for praise and blame. And he must hold both views on the basis of his own evidence. On their account, that is what it is to have taken responsibility for the way one chooses.
- Diana can build that in too. Ernie grows up regarding himself as a man who answers for what he does, and he reaches that view the ordinary way, by living.
- Nothing in either test, or in the added condition, asks where the tested man came from. A driving examiner can see how well you drive, but he cannot tell from the drive whether your instructor was paid by someone with a plan. In the same way, a test given to the grown man cannot tell whether his character grew or was grown for him.
Therefore, Ernie meets every condition the two best compatibilist accounts set for a free choice.
(C1)Therefore, answering to reasons and identifying with one's motives are not enough for freedom.
+Neither test, alone or together, is sufficient for freedom. A test is sufficient for something when passing it guarantees the thing, the way a winning lottery ticket is sufficient for a prize, and Ernie passes both tests (P2) without being free (P1).
(1) One clear case is enough.
- A general claim that something is always enough falls to a single case where it is not, called a counterexample. One black swan sinks "all swans are white."
- The compatibilist accounts claim that a choice that answers to reasons, from motives the person owns, is free. Ernie's choice answers to reasons, from motives he owns, and is not free. He is the black swan.
(2) What the tests catch is a sign of the source, not the source.
- Nearly all libertarians agree that a free choice must answer to reasons. The quarrel is over whether that is enough.
- A person who is the source of his choices will usually answer to reasons and stand behind his wants, which is why the tests work so well in ordinary life. But a man can be built to show every sign without being the source, and Ernie was.
- Think of a forged painting. It has the brushwork, the signature and the varnish of the master, and the experts sign off on every one of them. What it does not have is the master's hand.
(3) The compatibilist has two ways out.
- The hard line denies (P1): Ernie is free after all (D1).
- The soft line grants (P1) and adds a condition about history, about how a man came to be as he is, that Ernie fails and an ordinary determined man passes (D2).
• Theological determinism is the view that God's decree, his eternal plan for all that happens, settles every choice beforehand. The theological determinist's reply is a soft line of its own, with God as the difference (D3, D4, D11).
- Think of a smoke alarm that stays quiet while the kitchen fills with smoke. You can trust the alarm and decide the smoke is harmless, which is the hard line. Or you can trust your eyes and add a second sensor, which is the soft line.
Therefore, answering to reasons and identifying with one's motives are not enough for freedom.
(P3)A determined choice differs from Ernie's only in having no designer behind it.
+Take Diana out of the story and what is left is an ordinary determined world. Every choice in it is settled the way Ernie's was, by a starting state and the laws that carry it forward.
(1) Diana's whole contribution was to choose where things started.
- After conception she did nothing to Ernie. Everything that followed was the laws of nature working on the state she had arranged.
- In a determined world the same is true of everyone. The state of the world long before anyone now living was born, together with the laws, is enough by itself to produce every choice anyone makes. The long-ago past plus the laws does for each of us exactly what the zygote plus the laws did for Ernie.
- Think of two music boxes, each with a turning drum studded with pins that pluck out the tune, and the pins set identically in both. A craftsman pinned the first to play his daughter's lullaby. The second came off an assembly line pinned the same way by accident. They play the same tune, note for note, and nothing in the music tells you which one was planned.
(2) Ernie has a twin who differs only in his origin.
- Imagine a second man, Bernie, grown from a zygote identical to Ernie's, atom for atom, which came together in the ordinary way with no designer anywhere. He lives the same life, weighs the same reasons, feels the same wants and murders the same man.
- Nothing in Bernie's life is different from Ernie's. The only difference lies outside both men, in whether someone wanted the murder and arranged for it before either was conceived.
- The twins pose the whole question. Is there any fact about Bernie, as opposed to a fact about a stranger's hopes, that makes his choice free when Ernie's is not?
(3) Four cases lead by small steps from manipulation to ordinary life.
- The four-case form of the manipulation argument makes the same point in steps. In each case a man named Professor Plum kills a Ms. White (the names come from the board game Clue), and every time he meets every compatibilist condition.
• In the first case, neuroscientists manipulate his reasoning from moment to moment by something like radio.
• In the second, they program him once, at the start of his life.
• In the third, the rigorous training of his home and community determines his character before he can resist it.
• In the fourth, he is an ordinary man in a determined world.
- Each step changes one feature that seems not to matter, such as whether the programming came two seconds or thirty years before the act. By the fourth step the case is simply ordinary life under determinism.
- Anyone who excuses Plum in the first case and blames him in the fourth owes an account of which step made the difference, and why (P4).
Therefore, a determined choice differs from Ernie's only in having no designer behind it.
(P4)Having no designer behind it cannot make a choice free.
+If Ernie's choice is not free, the mere absence of someone with a plan cannot be what would have made it free.
(1) What settled Ernie's choice was the zygote and the laws, not Diana's wish.
- Diana's wish explains why she chose that zygote. But once the zygote existed, her wish did nothing further. The laws did all the rest, exactly as they did for Bernie.
- A wish settles nothing. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, and after conception Diana's hopes moved nothing in Ernie's life.
- Think of a man who winds a clock because he wants it to strike at midnight. The spring and the gears make it strike. His wish explains why he wound it, and it adds nothing to the striking.
(2) A freedom that depended on a stranger's hopes would be absurd.
- If Bernie is free and Ernie is not, the whole difference lies outside both men, before either was conceived. It lies in whether the same zygote was put together by someone who hoped for the murder or came together with nobody hoping for anything. Whether your choice is yours would then depend on whether somebody you never met had hoped for it.
- Suppose Diana had miscalculated. She wanted a surgeon, built the very same zygote by mistake, and by the same laws it grew into the same man, who killed the same Jones for the same reasons. Nothing in his life, his reasoning or the causes of his act would be any different. Only her arithmetic would be, and a man's freedom does not wait on a stranger's arithmetic.
- Or suppose you learned tomorrow that, before you were born, someone had wanted you to become exactly what you became, and had arranged the starting point so that you would. Nothing in your life would change. The only thing that would change is a fact about him.
- A fact that leaves the whole of a person's life exactly as it was cannot be the difference between his being free and his being a puppet.
(3) What prevented Ernie from doing otherwise is present in every determined choice.
- By the principle of non-prevention (P1), a man whom something prevented from doing otherwise does not answer for what he did. What prevented Ernie was determination: the zygote and the laws, making his choice go the way it went.
- In an ordinary determined world the same kind of thing does the same work. The long-ago past and the laws prevent every chooser from doing otherwise, by settling what he does before he does it.
- You might say that nothing stood in Bernie's way. Nothing needed to. What did the stopping was inside him: the state of his brain at the moment he chose. If that sounds like Bernie himself, look at where the state came from. The laws had carried it forward from long before he was born (P1), and when the want a man acts on was fixed for him, nothing outside him has to stand in his way.
- Take away the designer and the prevention stays exactly where it was. A hand that moves your arm moves it just the same whether it belongs to a man with a plan or to a machine that swung by accident, and either way you are not the one moving it.
(4) The hard-liners accept this premise too.
- The compatibilists who say Ernie is free say it precisely because they cannot find a difference between him and an ordinary determined man that matters. They accept that the two men stand or fall together, and deny (P1) instead (D1).
- So (P4) is common ground between the incompatibilist and the hard-line compatibilist. Only the soft line denies it, and it has to say what the difference is (D2, D3).
- Think of two lawyers on opposite sides who agree that two defendants must get the same verdict. They disagree only about what that verdict should be.
Therefore, having no designer behind it cannot make a choice free.
(C2)Therefore, no determined choice is free.
+No determined choice is free, however well it passes the compatibilists' tests, and so free will and determinism cannot both be true. Ernie's choice is not free (P1), and a determined choice differs from his only in having no designer behind it (P3). If such a choice were free, having no designer would have to be what made it free, and it cannot be (P4).
(1) The reasoning is modus tollens.
- Modus tollens, Latin for "the way that denies," is the name of this form: if A, then B; not B; so not A. If it had rained, the street would be wet. The street is dry, so it did not rain.
- Two choices alike in everything but one feature cannot differ in freedom unless that feature makes the difference. If one of two banknotes is genuine and the other forged, something about them must differ.
- So if a determined choice were free while Ernie's is not, having no designer would be what made it free (P1, P3). But having no designer cannot make a choice free (P4). So a determined choice is not free.
- The comparison is with the best case compatibilism has, a determined choice that passes every test Ernie passes (P2). A determined choice that fails them, like Luke's, is unfree by the compatibilists' own lights.
(2) Every determined chooser lacks what Ernie lacks.
- What Ernie lacks is not reasons, or wants of his own, or a door. It is the source: nothing but him settling the choice.
- Determinism takes exactly that from everyone. On it, something other than the chooser settles every choice, the long-ago past and the laws, just as the zygote and the laws settled Ernie's.
- Think of the cast of a play. Every actor speaks his lines with real feeling, and not one of them wrote a word of the script.
(3) The conclusion is narrower than it may sound.
- It does not say that determined people would be monsters, or that ordinary life feels like Ernie's. It says that if determinism were true, no one would be the source of his choices, and so no choice would be free.
- It says nothing against freedom itself. A libertarian agent's choice is settled by nothing but the agent, and the zygote case has no grip on him.
• The manipulation argument stops at determinism, though its best-known champion goes further. He holds that undetermined choices fare no better, and concludes that nobody has the freedom that makes blame deserved. That further step rests on different arguments, about chance and about the brain (D10).
- Nor does it touch a God who places free creatures where he knows they will freely choose. Placing a person is not settling his choice (D6).
- Think back to the forged painting (C1). Exposing a forgery takes nothing from the master's real work.
(4) The theological determinist has two options.
- He can name a difference between God's making of a character and Diana's (D3, D4, D11).
- Or he can take the hard line and say that a man whose every choice God settled is free and blameworthy (D1).
- The second is where the hardest questions about God and the authorship of sin begin: whether God would then be the author of sin, the one ultimately responsible for it. They deserve their own hearing. But notice how that answer sounded when it was said about Ernie.
Therefore, no determined choice is free.
On the manipulation argument:
Deery, Oisín, and Eddy Nahmias. "Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood." Philosophical Studies 174 (2017): 1255-1276.
Fischer, John Martin. "The Zygote Argument Remixed." Analysis 71, no. 2 (2011): 267-272.
McKenna, Michael. "A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77, no. 1 (2008): 142-159.
McKenna, Michael. "Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard-Liner Takes It on the Chin." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89, no. 2 (2014): 467-484.
Mele, Alfred R. Free Will and Luck. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
O'Connor, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. "Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2022.
Pereboom, Derk. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Pereboom, Derk. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Sartorio, Carolina. Causation and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
On compatibilist accounts of the source:
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Frankfurt, Harry G. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 (1971): 5-20.
Watson, Gary. "Free Agency." Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 8 (1975): 205-220.
On freedom defined by its source:
Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013.
Stratton, Timothy A. "Has Molinism Been Shot by Bullet Bill? Reassessing Welty's Objection." Free Thinking Ministries, April 9, 2025.
Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026.
Critic sources engaged:
Bignon, Guillaume. "A Response to Kevin Timpe's Objections." 2019.
Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018.
Helm, Paul. The Providence of God. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993.
Timpe, Kevin. Review of Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, by Guillaume Bignon. Faith and Philosophy 35, no. 3 (2018): 373-379.
Welty, Greg. "Molinist Gunslingers: God and the Authorship of Sin." In Calvinism and the Problem of Evil, edited by David E. Alexander and Daniel M. Johnson. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2016.
Historical sources:
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae I.83.1. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 2nd rev. ed. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1920.
Astrain, Antonio. "Congregatio de Auxiliis." In The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 4. New York: Robert Appleton, 1908.
Westminster Assembly. The Westminster Confession of Faith. 1646. Chapter III, section 1, "Of God's Eternal Decree." Text as printed in Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3. New York: Harper, 1877.
Biblical citations:
Deuteronomy 32:39; 1 Samuel 2:6; Ezekiel 36:26; Matthew 23:37; John 19:11; Acts 4:27-28; Philippians 2:12-13.
+Ernie is free and responsible after all. Diana made him and then left his life alone, and a maker who never interferes takes nothing from what he makes.
1. The hard line is a serious position held by serious philosophers.
It is called the hard-line reply, and its defenders do not reach it carelessly. It comes in two strong forms.
- The first runs the four cases (P3) from the other end. Begin with an ordinary determined man, whom compatibilists judge responsible, and walk backward one step at a time. Nothing that differs between the steps matters, so the designed man is responsible too. On this view the manipulators' work is no threat to freedom so long as they simply create a person and then let his life unfold.
- The second looks at the actual sequence, the way the choice really came about. Ernie weighed the reasons, heard the part of himself that said don't, and decided, exactly as Bernie did. A designer standing thirty years back changes nothing in that sequence, and on this view the sequence is all that freedom asks about.
The reply is also consistent. It accepts that Ernie and an ordinary determined man stand or fall together (P4), and it chooses to let them stand.
2. It keeps the account by giving up the verdict it was built to capture.
The compatibilist accounts were built to track our judgments about who is responsible. They were praised for excusing Luke, the man whose phobia no reason can move (P2). The hard line keeps them by overruling one of the clearest judgments there is.
The standard survey of the debate reports the cost plainly: "to some the idea that the entirety of a free agent's life can be determined, and in this way controlled, by another agent will seem incredible." Those readers include compatibilists who grant the verdict (P1). To them, an account that survives only by calling that idea true has not found a new case of freedom. It has found its limit. Its defenders know the price, too: one of them titled his second defense of the hard line "A Hard-Liner Takes It on the Chin."
3. The walk back starts from the case in dispute.
The ordinary man everyone confidently blames is the man we meet in life: a neighbor who lies about the fence, a driver who runs the red light. Our confidence is about him, and it does not come labeled "and every choice he makes was fixed before he was born." Once the ordinary case is spelled out that way, as the fourth of the four cases spells it out, whether he is responsible is exactly what is in dispute.
- The verdict on the designed man, by contrast, crosses the lines of the debate: compatibilists who take the soft line excuse Ernie along with the incompatibilists (P1). When two chains of reasoning collide, the one that starts from the clearer case deserves more trust.
- Think of two surveyors who disagree about where a boundary runs. One measures from a marker everyone accepts. The other measures from the very line in dispute. The first has the better claim, however careful the second's arithmetic.
4. The actual sequence runs back to Diana's workbench.
"Left his life alone" leaves out what she did at the start. Diana had no need to interfere with Ernie's life, because the interfering was already complete when he was a single cell.
- Trace the actual sequence back from the murder. Every step was fixed by the step before it, through Ernie's weighing and deciding and on past them, to the zygote she built. The actual sequence is the right place to look, and looked at whole, it begins with her.
- Think of a man who sets up a row of dominoes, taps the first one, and walks out of the room. He did not touch the last domino. He did not need to.
- A defender of free will makes the point about ownership. When a person's reasoning, and the way he reasons, were installed from outside, his ownership of it becomes "merely nominal," his in name only, and the responsibility "migrates upstream to whatever cause actually determines those beliefs and actions."
5. Theological determinism ends at the hard line if its difference from Diana fails.
A theological determinist who cannot name a difference between God's making of a character and Diana's (D3, D4, D11) has only this reply left: that a man whose every choice God settled is free and blameworthy (C2).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of SinPhilosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the Choice
+History matters. Ernie was made to serve another person's plan, while an ordinary determined man serves nobody's, and that difference excuses the designed man without excusing the determined one.
1. The soft line grants the verdict and looks for the difference.
This is the soft-line reply. It agrees that Ernie is not responsible (P1) and denies that an ordinary determined man is like him (P3, P4). It has looked for the difference in two places.
- In Ernie's history. The most developed version adds a condition to reasons-responsiveness, the first of the two tests (P2). A person answers for what comes from a mechanism only if he has taken responsibility for it, which means three things:
• He sees himself as an agent when he acts from it.
• He sees himself as a fair target of praise and blame for doing so.
• He holds both views on the basis of his evidence.
- In the designer. Other soft-liners look past Ernie to Diana. What excuses him, they say, is that his murder carries out another person's plan: he was made to be her instrument. On one careful version, the source of an act is whatever the act most closely depends on, and Ernie's act depends on Diana's intention more than on anything in him. Change her wish and you change the deed: had she wanted a different deed, she would have built a man who did it. Nothing upstream of Bernie stands in that relation to his act.
2. Diana can install the history too.
Any condition a grown man can satisfy, a zygote can be built to satisfy. The standard survey says so directly: "we can easily imagine Diana creating Ernie so that his murdering Jones is a result not only of a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, but also a mechanism for which he has taken responsibility."
The same holds for any condition about the history inside a life, such as reflection, self-endorsement (approving the motives one acts on) or growth. Diana chooses the zygote with the whole life in view, the history included.
- Think of a novelist who gives her hero a hard childhood, a slow change of heart and a long night of soul-searching. All of it is real in the story, and she wrote every page.
3. Being someone's instrument excuses no one by itself.
The designer view has hold of something real. Diana is guilty of murder, and her plan is the reason there is a murder at all. But being used has never, by itself, excused anyone.
- A hired killer is his employer's instrument if anyone is. Had the employer wanted a different man dead, the killer would have killed a different man. Nobody thinks that takes anything from the killer's guilt. Both men answer in full, because blame is not a fixed amount that the planner's share uses up.
- A courier who carries a parcel without knowing it holds a bomb is excused, but because he did not know, not because he was used.
- Scripture's own hard case is Pilate, the Roman governor who handed Jesus over to be crucified. His part in the cross fell within what God's hand and plan "had predestined to take place" (Acts 4:27-28). On middle knowledge, the knowledge of what any free creature would freely do in any circumstance, God may have placed him only where he would freely hand Jesus over (D6). He was the instrument of a plan if anyone ever was, and Scripture counts the sin his own (John 19:11).
4. Take away the plan and nothing in Ernie changes.
So the designer view needs more than the plan. It needs the plan to have been carried out through Ernie's being determined, and that raises a question: which of the two does the excusing, the plan or the determining? To find out, take the plan away and keep everything else, as when Diana miscalculates and hopes for a surgeon (P4). Nothing in Ernie, his reasoning, his wants or the causes of his act changes. Yet on the designer view this Ernie answers for the murder and the first one does not, and the only thing that differs between them is Diana's arithmetic.
- Think of two loaves from the same dough, baked in the same oven for the same time. One was baked because the baker hoped his rival would choke on it. The loaves are identical, and the hope did no baking.
5. What the plan worked through is what Bernie shares.
If being used does not excuse, and the plan's success changes nothing in the man, then what excuses Ernie is what the plan worked through: a starting point and the laws, which made his choice go the way it went before he could settle anything. Bernie's choice was made to go its way by exactly the same kind of thing (P3). The only change is that nobody planned Bernie's starting point, and that is not what took the choice away.
- Think of a flood that ruins a farm. Whether a saboteur opened the dam or it burst on its own makes no difference to the crops. What ruined them was the water, and the saboteur's guilt, which is real, is a fact about him.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Wanting What You Want to Want Is Not Enough: The Hierarchical and Reasons-Responsive Accounts
+A responsible choice is one that flows from the character God gave. Diana meddles with a character that is not hers to shape, while God gives the character he shapes, and that is the relevant difference.
1. This is the most careful reply on offer.
It comes from the Reformed side, and it deserves to be stated in its own words. The principle is that "in order for a human choice to be morally responsible, it is necessary that the choice be made on the basis of that person's God-given character and desires." A manipulator "meddles" with those desires. God does not, because "self-evidently, God is the giver of that which is God-given." In ordinary choices God "does not harass, blackmail, misinform, hypnotize, drug, or brain-short-circuit us."
Behind the principle lies the Creator's standing. It may be, as another Reformed theologian writes, that "whenever one creature governs another, the one governed suffers a diminution of his personal responsibility. Even if this is true, it does not follow that when God governs his creatures they are not responsible for what they do." God kills and makes alive, and says so: "I kill and I make alive; I wound and I heal" (Deuteronomy 32:39; see also 1 Samuel 2:6). What would be murder for a creature is no wrong in the Creator. So too, the reply concludes, what would be manipulation for a creature is no manipulation in him.
It adds two pictures:
- A face is authentically beautiful when God made it so rather than a surgeon.
- An athletic performance is genuine when it comes from God-given ability rather than from steroids.
Who we truly are is found in how God makes us, "not a plastic surgeon, not a steroids syringe and not a mad scientist manipulator."
2. It grants that the manipulation argument may succeed against every determinism without God.
Its author states the concession himself. Appealing to God defends only theological determinism, and to that charge he answers, "I shall simply plead guilty." Without God, he finds it "very hard to think of a relevant difference" between manipulation and an ordinary determined choice, "a tacit admission that for all I know, manipulation arguments might very well be successful against non-theological determinism." He even turns this into what he calls "an argument for the existence of God for compatibilists."
So the dispute narrows to a single question. Does the Creator's making of a character differ from Diana's in a way that makes the difference between a free choice and an unfree one?
3. Right, standing and authenticity answer a different question.
The reply offers three differences between God and Diana. God has the right to shape characters, he has the standing of their maker, and he has the authority to say who a person truly is. Every one of these is a fact about the maker, and so every one of them answers the question "May he do it?" The manipulation argument asks a different question: "Is the creature the source of the choice?" The reply's own pictures show which of the two they answer.
- Take its central analogy, the Creator's right over life. When God takes a life it is no murder, because the life is his to give and to take. His right changes what his act is: a judgment, and not a crime. It does not change what his act does, since the man is as dead as if a murderer had killed him. In the same way, the Creator's right could make his settling of a choice no wrong, and so no meddling. It could not make the settled choice one that nothing but the creature settled.
- The athlete points the same way. A doped runner still ran his race, which is why he is the one stripped of the medal. The steroids changed whose gift his strength was, not who did the running. "Genuine," in the reply's sense, is a fact about who supplied the ability, and so once more a fact about the maker.
- A face is God-given in the sense the reply needs, and a choice is not a face. A face is something a person has. A choice is something he does, and the question is who settled it.
4. What excuses Ernie is present in both cases.
Run the twin test (P3) with God in Diana's place. God puts together the same zygote, atom for atom, and the same life follows from it by the same laws. Everything in the man, and in the way his choice comes out of him, is exactly as it was in Ernie.
- On the reply's criterion, its test for a responsible choice, this man is responsible and Ernie is excused, and the whole difference lies in who put the zygote together. That makes a man's freedom hang entirely on a fact outside him (P4).
- The property that excuses Ernie is present in both cases alike: a choice made to go the way it goes by someone other than the one who makes it. Diana's making of the zygote settles Ernie's choice, through the laws. On theological determinism, God's decree settles every choice.
5. On theological determinism, Diana's meddling is God-given too.
If God settles every choice, he settled Diana's choice to build the zygote, and so the character she installed came to Ernie by God's own decree. A reviewer pressed exactly this point. The reply itself grants that in the widest sense, the sense of God's providence over everything, even a surgeon's work is God-given. So its criterion needs an account of why God's shaping of a character through one channel is proper and through another is not.
- The answer on offer is that Bernie's character came about in the normal way and Ernie's did not. But after conception nothing in Ernie's life is abnormal. He grew, learned, weighed and chose exactly as Bernie did. The one abnormal thing is who chose the starting point, and on theological determinism God chose every starting point, Diana's workbench included.
- So the proper channel comes back to the maker's right, which answers "May he?" and not "Is the creature the source?" By its author's own account, the question was left for other Calvinist philosophers to take up.
6. The burden falls on whoever treats like cases differently.
The reply's last line of defense has two parts. It says that the burden of proof, the job of making the case, lies with the incompatibilist. And it says that even if its criterion failed, the incompatibilist would still beg the question, quietly assuming what he sets out to prove.
- But the manipulation argument does not rest on the absence of a difference nobody has found. It names the one difference there is, the designer, and argues that it cannot matter (P4).
- And when two cases are alike in everything about the man and how his choice came out of him, the one who judges them differently owes the reason. A judge who hands two identical defendants different sentences is asked why, and "you have not proved there is no reason" is no answer.
- The reply has already judged Ernie excused. If its criterion fails, it has no reason left to judge the man God determines any differently, and asking for one begs no question (D7).
Theological determinism must then give the hard-line reply: that a man whose every choice God settled is free and blameworthy (D1, C2).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of SinPhilosophy / Free Will: What the Sovereignty Texts Say, and What They Do Not
+God has a right to shape human hearts that no creature has. That special access is exactly why God's determining is not manipulation.
1. The right is real.
God's authority over his creatures has no parallel among them. He made them, he owns them, and he may do with them what no one else may. No Christian need deny any of that, and none should.
2. A right answers a question about the one who acts on it.
A right decides whether the one who uses it may be blamed for using it. It does not change what his using it does to the other person, as the Creator's own right over life shows (D3).
- Think of a licensed surgeon and an unlicensed one performing the same operation on an anesthetized patient. The first has every right to operate and the second has none. In both cases the patient performs no part of the operation.
- Special access answers a question about God's blame. The manipulation argument asks about the agent's control. A manipulator with every right to manipulate still leaves the manipulated agent exactly where Ernie is.
3. A choice God settled cannot be one that nothing but the chooser settled.
Whatever God may rightly do, he cannot make it true both that he settled a choice and that nothing but the chooser settled it. That is not a limit on his authority. It is what the words mean.
- The same is true of a square circle. No power can draw one, and that is no weakness in the power, because the words cancel each other out.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin
+People are not puppets. We think, weigh reasons and know right from wrong, and a puppet does none of that.
1. Ernie has every faculty a puppet lacks.
The reply is that human beings, unlike marionettes, have rational faculties and moral awareness. That is true, and Ernie has all of them. He thinks, he weighs, he knows murder is wrong, and he does it anyway (P2).
2. A conscious agent can still be a puppet.
A defender of free will points to a familiar film character. Bucky Barnes, the Winter Soldier of the Captain America films, killed on command for HYDRA, the organization that had taken control of his mind. He had real beliefs, aims and intentions, what philosophers call intentional states, and the defender's verdict is: "Bucky had intentional states of consciousness, yet was still rightly called a puppet."
- He saw what he was doing. He chose his moves, aimed, and adjusted to circumstances. None of that made him the source of his missions.
- Bucky is the easy case, since HYDRA overrode his mind. Ernie is the hard one: nobody touched his mind at all, and the verdict holds there too (P1).
3. What makes a puppet a puppet is where its movements come from.
The strings are the point, not the wood. Consciousness is where a choice happens. The question is where it comes from. A mind can be the place a choice is made without being what made it go the way it went.
+The Molinist God is Diana with better information. He places people where he knows exactly what they will freely do and arranges the world to get what he wants, so if manipulation excuses Ernie, it excuses everyone in a Molinist world.
1. The objection asks the right question.Molinism, named for the sixteenth-century Jesuit Luis de Molina, holds that God knows what any free creature would freely do in any circumstance, and governs by choosing which creatures to create and where to place them. That knowledge of what creatures would freely do, such as what you would freely order at a restaurant you have never visited, is called middle knowledge.
Middle knowledge gives God a sure hand over what happens. At its strongest, the objection says that a sure hand is all Diana ever had. She needed the laws to carry out her plan. The Molinist God needs only the truths about what each person would freely do: given those truths, placing a man where he stands guarantees what he will do as surely as Diana's zygote guaranteed Ernie's murder. A Reformed critic has pressed the charge with a thought experiment of his own, meant to show that a God who arranges a sin through middle knowledge is no better placed than one who determines it.
The answer turns on whether God settles the choice.
2. Ensuring is not determining.
A defender of Molinism draws the line.
- God "can guarantee and ensure an outcome without determining it," and a choice is determined only "if prior conditions are sufficient to necessitate it," that is, only if what came before is enough by itself to make it go the way it goes.
- To predestine is to ensure that something will happen; to determine is "to necessitate it via antecedent conditions," the conditions that come before it.
- And "certainty is an epistemic property, not a causal force." Epistemic means having to do with knowledge. Certainty is a feature of what someone knows, and it pushes nothing.
- Think of a man who knows his friend so well that he takes him to the one restaurant where he is sure his friend will order the fish. The friend orders the fish himself. The choice of restaurant ensured the order and did not make it.
3. Placing is not scripting.
Diana settles Ernie's choice, through the zygote and the laws. On middle knowledge, God chooses which free creatures to create and where to put them, and then the choice is theirs. What they would freely do in each circumstance is not up to God, so the truths he consults are not his to write. The difference is the difference between a stage and a script.
- The same defender offers a film illustration, which he calls "helpful (if imperfect)." In Avengers: Infinity War, Doctor Strange surveys millions of possible futures, finds the one in which his friends prevail, and sets it in motion without overriding anyone's choices.
- He also names the logical difference. A condition is necessary for an event when the event cannot happen without it, and sufficient when it is enough by itself to bring the event about. A stage is necessary for a play but not sufficient, since it writes no lines.
- On Molinism God is a necessary condition of a human act, since nobody chooses anything in a world God did not create. On determinism he is a necessary and sufficient one. That is the whole difference between placing a man and making him choose.
4. The guarantee comes from the chooser's side.
Start with Ernie. The zygote made him what he is. Every reason he weighed and every want he felt came out of it by the laws, so his choice waited on the zygote, and the zygote waited on nothing in him.
Now take Pontius Pilate, the Roman governor who sent Jesus to the cross. The truth about what Pilate would freely do runs the other way. It is true because of what Pilate would freely do, and it does nothing to him.
- So when God's placing and that truth together guarantee what Pilate does, the certainty is borrowed from Pilate's own choice.
- Here, then, is the line between the two. A guarantee that comes from what makes a choice happen is determination. A guarantee that comes from the truth about how the chooser would choose is not.
- Think back to the friend and the fish. That he would order the fish at that restaurant was true because of what he would freely choose there, and the truth ordered nothing for him.
5. The reply never rests on an open door.
What keeps a creature in a Molinist world free is not that another way lay open to him. It is that nothing settles his choice but him, and Pilate shows the difference.
- On this picture, knowing what Pilate would freely do, God resolved to place him only where he would freely send Jesus to the cross.
- That resolve shut Pilate's door in one sense, and in one sense only: God's resolve and Pilate's letting Jesus go could not both have happened. The resolve settled where Pilate stood. It did not settle what he did.
- Nothing prevented him, and nothing took away his power. He chose freely and answered for it (John 19:11).
- God need not arrange things this way, and in the ordinary run of choices the door stands open.
A leading defender of middle knowledge puts the contrast in his own words: "if God secretly determines my every thought and action, then I am but a puppet whose actions are meaningless. But a God endowed with middle knowledge of what persons would freely do in any set of circumstances God might place them in can be provident over human affairs without infringing on human freedom." To be provident over human affairs is to govern them with foresight and care.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around ItPhilosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding ObjectionPhilosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door
+The verdict on Ernie is either a reaction to Diana, whom the manipulation argument itself calls irrelevant, or a reaction to his being determined, which is incompatibilism in disguise. Either way it is no evidence against compatibilism.
1. The strongest form of this objection is a dilemma.
It asks where the verdict on Ernie comes from and offers two answers, called the horns of the dilemma. On either one, it says, the verdict is no evidence.
- It may come from Diana. We are quick to blame the villain of a story, and blame heaped on her can leave little over for the man she used. But (P4) itself says that Diana's wish makes no difference, so a verdict that feeds on her is a bias, not evidence.
- Or it may come from the bare fact that Ernie was determined. Then it is the incompatibilist's conviction again, dressed up in a story, and nobody who did not already hold that conviction would share the verdict. To count it as evidence would beg the question, assuming the very thing in dispute.
Both horns deserve a straight answer.
2. The verdict does not rest on Diana's wish.
The first horn names a real risk: a first reaction can be swayed by a villain. So the verdict that counts is not the first reaction but the one that survives a second look.
- (P4) takes that second look. It asks the reader to set Diana's wish aside, and even to suppose that she miscalculated and hoped for a surgeon. What is left is a man whose every reason and want was fixed by a starting point and the laws before he existed.
- If the wish were doing the work, the verdict would vanish with it. A reader for whom it does vanish has put the difference in Diana's arithmetic, and (D2) asks whether it can live there.
3. Tracking determinism is not assuming incompatibilism.
On the second horn, the verdict is about Ernie's being determined. That is no defect. A verdict about a case is evidence about what freedom requires, and evidence does not beg the question just because it favors one side.
- Compatibilists built their own accounts from verdicts about cases. The unwilling addict and Luke came before the theories built to fit them (P2). A method that counts case verdicts when they favor compatibilism has to count them when they do not.
- The case also does something the bare conviction cannot. Compatibilists usually explain the incompatibilist's conviction away as a confusion: of determinism with compulsion, with reasoning that gets bypassed, or with a fate that comes whatever one does.
- The zygote case removes every one of those. Nothing compels Ernie, nothing bypasses his reasoning, and his deliberation makes a difference to what he does. What is left for the verdict to be about is that his choice was settled before he existed.
- Think of a doctor who suspects an allergy. She takes everything else out of her patient's diet and watches what happens when one food alone is left. The zygote case is that elimination diet.
4. Many who share the verdict are not incompatibilists.
- The soft-line compatibilists grant that Ernie is not responsible, and look for a difference (D2).
- The Reformed compatibilist grants "Ernie's exemption" (D3).
- The case's inventor stays officially neutral between the two sides.
Even the hard-liners, who deny the verdict, reach their denial by argument rather than by reporting that the case strikes them that way (D1). A judgment that much of the other side shares cannot be incompatibilism in disguise.
5. The evidence for (P1) is the verdict itself.
The account of why Ernie is not free, that something other than him settled the choice (P1), is an incompatibilist account, and it does not pretend otherwise. But nobody has to accept that account first. The evidence is the verdict, reached before any theory, the way a child knows a stolen toy should be given back long before anyone teaches him a theory of property.
- Each premise needs only to be more plausible than its denial. For a reader who has just met Ernie, "he murdered freely" is far harder to believe than "he did not." Whoever denies it owes the reason why the designed man is free.
+What excuses manipulated people is that their own faculties are bypassed or deceived, by drugs, hypnosis or lies. Determinism bypasses nothing, since a determined person's choices run through his own reasoning.
1. The distinction is real.
There are two kinds of manipulation.
- Influencing manipulation works through the agent's own mind: deception, pressure, appeals to weakness, all taken in and processed by his own faculties.
- Overriding manipulation goes around the mind: hypnosis, drugs, direct handling of the brain.
It is fair to grant that overriding manipulation excuses, and that influencing manipulation may excuse when it is strong enough.
2. The zygote case is built so that nothing is bypassed.
Diana never touches Ernie after conception. There is no drug, no hypnotist, no deception and no pressure. His reasoning runs from start to finish, and his faculties do all their own work (P2). If bypassing were what excuses the manipulated, Ernie would be responsible, and yet he is not (P1).
The same is true of the second of the four cases (P3), where Plum is programmed once at the start of his life and then left to reason for himself. Some who excuse Plum there still call that programming overriding, but what they mean is that his character came from the wrong hands, which is a different objection (D3).
3. What is left is the settling.
Ernie's reasoning ran through his own mind, but it ran on rails laid before he had a mind.
- Think of a train running on its own power along its own track, through a junction that was switched thirty years before it set out. Nothing bypasses the engine. It goes where the switch sent it.
+Everyone is shaped by genes, parents and a culture he never chose. If being shaped from outside excused a person, nobody would ever be responsible, so the verdict on Ernie cannot be right.
1. The worry is fair.
Nobody chose his genes, his parents or his century, and all three shape everything he does. An argument that excused everyone for being shaped would prove far too much.
2. Being shaped is not being settled.
The manipulation argument does not say that influence excuses. It says that settling does. A defender of free will draws the line: "it is an error to conflate a mere influence with a causally determining factor," that is, to treat the two as the same thing. On the source view, a person is shaped by a great deal he did not choose and still settles his choices himself, for reasons of his own.
- Think of a sailor on a strong current. The current is not his choice, and it bears hard on where he ends up. But it does not steer. He does, and it is his hand on the tiller that a court would ask about.
3. Determinism does not merely shape.
Diana did not influence Ernie. She settled his choice. In the same way, on determinism the long-ago past and the laws do not incline anyone; they settle every choice (C2). The manipulation argument reaches determinism, not upbringing, and the ordinary shaping of ordinary lives is left exactly where it was.
4. Whether anyone answers for his own character is a further question.
The claim that nobody can be responsible for what he does unless he made himself what he is, all the way down, is a separate argument aimed at everyone, often called the Basic Argument. It gets its own hearing.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Nobody Chose Their Own Character, and Everyone Is Still Responsible: The Basic Argument
+A designer could build an undetermined Ernie who is overwhelmingly likely to murder. If that Ernie still seems unfree, the verdict was never about determinism.
1. The case is worth taking seriously.
Suppose Diana's world is not determined. She builds a zygote that will grow into a man overwhelmingly likely, though not certain, to murder Jones, and he does. If our hesitation to blame him is as strong as it was before, perhaps the zygote case never tested determinism at all.
2. If Diana raises the odds and does not settle the choice, the choice is Ernie's.
In the undetermined case, nothing before the choice made it go the way it went. Ernie did. He is its source, and he answers for it.
- Think of a card player dealt a very strong hand by a dealer who wanted him to bet. The deal made the bet likely. The bet was still the player's, and the dealer's scheming does not make him any less the one who pushed the chips forward.
3. What remains of the hesitation has another explanation.
We may still feel that this Ernie is less to blame than a man who had no Diana. That feeling fits two real differences.
- Diana is guilty too. Her guilt adds to the total without subtracting from his (D2).
- She arranged strong pressures, and pressure strong enough can lessen what a man deserves (D8).
Lessened blame is not no blame. Nor is it what the determined case showed, where the choice was never Ernie's to settle at all.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the ChoicePhilosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation
+Diana is one more being pushing on Ernie from outside, but God is the first cause, who moves each thing according to its nature and the will as a will. His determining establishes a creature's freedom instead of taking it away.
1. The classical answer turns on what kind of cause God is.
It does not appeal to what God may do (D4) or to where a character came from (D3).
- Diana, goddess or not, is one more being inside the world. She works on Ernie from outside, through the same laws that work on everything else, and whatever she contributes is one more push among many.
- God, on this answer, is the first cause. He holds every creature in being at every moment and works in and through everything it does. The creatures he works through are called second causes. The rain that waters a field is one, and so is the man who makes a choice.
- Thomas Aquinas taught that in moving a will God does not take away its acting of its own accord; he is the cause of that very thing in it (Summa Theologiae I.83.1). The Westminster Confession of 1646 says that God's decree does not take away "the liberty or contingency of second causes," but establishes it (3.1). Contingency is the opposite of necessity: a contingent event is one that need not have happened.
- Think of the difference between a character in a novel who bullies the others and the author who writes them all. The bully is inside the story, pushing. The author is not in the story at all. On this answer Diana is the bully and God is the author.
This is a serious position held by serious people, and a great deal of the church's thinking stands behind it.
2. The first cause is common ground.
Grant it: God is not one more creature, and no creature acts without him. He holds every chooser in being and acts together with him in whatever he does, the working together theologians call concurrence. On the source view, too, freedom is a gift held in dependence, never a patch of ground God withdrew from.
- Think of a singer and the breath God gives her. Without it there would be no song at all, and still the song is hers.
3. A settling from a higher level is still a settling.
The question is still what makes the choice go this way rather than that. If God's moving of the will settles which way it goes, then something other than the chooser settles it, from whatever level the settling comes. Putting the two causes on different levels explains how God would settle the choice. It does not make God any less the one settling it.
- Go back to the novelist. She is not in the story, and she writes every line. Her distance from the characters is exactly what lets her write them all.
- Nor does the higher level make the settling any lighter. Diana acted once, thirty years before the murder. A first cause who moves a will to this choice rather than that one settles it at the very moment it is made.
4. On another reading the first cause leaves the settling to the chooser.
Some read the first cause differently: God holds the chooser and his power to choose in being and acts together with him, while the chooser settles which way the choice goes. On that reading the liberty of second causes really is established rather than taken away, and the source view has no quarrel with it. Catholic theologians argued over exactly these two readings around 1600, and in 1607 Pope Paul V ended the dispute without deciding it.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do ItPhilosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin
+Nobody could build a Diana. A goddess who calculates a whole human life from a single cell is science fiction, and intuitions about science fiction tell us nothing about real people.
1. The case needs only to be possible.
A thought experiment is not a prediction. It needs to describe something that could happen, not something that does, the way an engineer who tests a bridge against a hundred-year storm is not forecasting the storm.
- If determinism is true, Diana's world is simply ours with one more mind in it. The state of the world and the laws fix every choice, and a mind that knew both perfectly and could follow them through would know every choice to come. The story adds only that mind.
2. The strangeness is all in the designer.
Ernie's life is ordinary. He grows up, learns, weighs reasons and makes up his mind like anyone. The only strange thing in the story is Diana, and she is the one thing taken out of it (P3). By the fourth of the four cases nothing strange is left, only an ordinary man in a determined world.
3. Compatibilists rest on stranger cases.
The case that moved a generation of compatibilists away from the open door features a neurosurgeon who has secretly fitted a device into a voter's brain (P1). Philosophers build cases that hold everything fixed but one thing, the way a scientist runs a controlled experiment, and a case is not discredited by having been built.
4. On theological determinism, the designer is no fiction.
A God who decrees every choice knows the starting state of the world and every law perfectly, and chose both so that each choice would come out as it does. The theological determinist does not doubt that such a designer is possible. He believes in one (D3).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door
+God changes hearts. He works in believers "both to will and to work" (Philippians 2:13) and gives them a new heart (Ezekiel 36:26), so if shaping a will from outside took away freedom, grace would take it away too.
1. Grace comes first.
Nobody turns to God without grace, and Paul puts God's working and the believer's in a single sentence: "work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who works in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure" (Philippians 2:12-13). An account of freedom with no room for that verse would be wrong.
2. Shaping a will is not settling it.
The manipulation argument does not say that shaping a will from outside takes its freedom away. It says that settling the choice does (D9). A father's teaching, a friend's rebuke and a sermon that cuts to the heart each shape a will without settling what it chooses.
- Think of a friend who sits up all night with a man about to make a ruinous decision. By morning the man sees what he could not see at midnight, and he chooses differently. The friend changed him, and the choice was still his.
3. Grace that can be refused does not settle the answer.
Paul gives God's working as the reason for theirs, not as a rival to it: they are to work because God is at work in them. And the grace that draws a person can be refused. That rests on Scripture's texts of refusal, such as Jesus' lament over Jerusalem, "you were not willing!" (Matthew 23:37), and not on the definition of freedom. Grace that can be refused leaves the answer to the one who answers.
4. A grace that settled the answer would face Ernie's question.
The Reformed tradition holds that the Spirit's inward call, his drawing of a person to faith from within, makes a person willing and never fails. On that view grace itself settles the answer, and then the question is whether an answer so settled is still free, the same question (D3) asks about God's making of a character. It is a real disagreement among Christians, and each side argues it from the texts.
- A grace that never fails need not be a grace that settles. God, knowing how a man would answer any grace he might give, may resolve to give him only one he would freely receive. That grace is certain to be received, and still nothing takes away his power to refuse it.
- The one thing that cannot happen is that God, so resolved, gives it and the man turns it down. That is the one sense in which his door is shut, the same sense in which Pilate's was (D6).
- Think back to the friend and the fish (D6): taken to the one restaurant where his order was sure, he still ordered for himself.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will