Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

Public Theology

Theological Analyses of Societal Issues

Theology of the Family

Where Faith and Family Intersect

Biographies

Notable Works & Great Quotes from Key Figures

Contemporary Voices

1960 AD – present

Timothy McGrew of Kalamazoo b. c. 1965 AD

(●) The probability theorist who brought the old evidential case for Christianity back into the philosophy journals, and its forgotten books back into print. + Look up "Miracles" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the free online reference work that philosophy students everywhere reach for first, and the first name at the bottom of the entry is a chess master from southwest Michigan. Timothy McGrew wrote that article alone when it first appeared in 2010 and has tended it ever since, from 2024 with the Canadian philosopher Robert Larmer, and it is a fair picture of the man: careful, encyclopedic, fluent in the mathematics of evidence, and quietly convinced that the case for Christianity is much stronger than most modern philosophers have bothered to find out. His field is the part of philosophy that asks how evidence works. He is a specialist in probability theory, the mathematics of how likely things are, and in the history of science, and for more than twenty years he has applied both to a question most of his colleagues treat as closed: can testimony to a miracle ever be good evidence? His answer is yes, and he has made it in the places where philosophers argue, not only in church halls. Alongside that work he has spent years recovering the evidential apologists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. An apologist, from the Greek apologia, the speech a defendant made in court, is someone who gives reasons for the faith, and an evidential apologist is one who builds that defense out of evidence: witnesses, documents, the kind of facts a historian or a lawyer would weigh. These were the writers who answered the deists, the thinkers who believed in a Creator who made the world and then left it to run on its own, with no miracles and no revelation, and who answered David Hume, the Scottish skeptic who argued that no report of a miracle could ever be trusted enough to found a religion on. McGrew has been putting their arguments back in the hands of readers who had never heard their names. The best known of those arguments, the argument from undesigned coincidences in the Gospels (small details in one account that are quietly explained by another, the way two honest witnesses fit together without trying), reached a wide audience through his wife, Lydia McGrew, after he handed it to her. His dates need a word of explanation. He has never made his birth year public and no reference work records it, so the year given for him carries a "c." for circa, about: an estimate worked backwards from his bachelor’s degree in 1988, which puts his birth in the middle of the 1960s. His name is joined to Kalamazoo not because he was born there, since his birthplace is also unrecorded, but because it is the city where he has taught since 1995. Both are conventions, and they should be read as such.

(●) 1988 AD: He graduated summa cum laude in philosophy from a Jesuit university, having already argued in print about Aquinas and Kant. + The University of Scranton, in northeastern Pennsylvania, is a Jesuit school, run in the tradition of the Catholic teaching order that has been founding colleges since the sixteenth century, and a Jesuit philosophy department is a good place to meet Thomas Aquinas early. McGrew met him there and set him beside Immanuel Kant, the eighteenth-century German who argued that the mind shapes the world it knows. As an undergraduate he gave a paper on the two of them at a regional conference in 1986, and in October 1987 Dialogue, the journal of the philosophy honor society Phi Sigma Tau, published his "The Missing Link: Aquinas and Kant Revisited." It was a student journal, but it was print, and he still had a year of classes to finish. The honors piled up the way they do for a student whose teachers have noticed him. He was elected to the national Jesuit honor society, Alpha Sigma Nu, and to the philosophy honor society, Phi Sigma Tau, and served as president of its Scranton chapter. In 1987 he won the chapter’s essay contest, and in 1988 he took the university’s award for excellence in philosophy and graduated summa cum laude, with the highest honors the school gives.

(●) 1992 AD: He finished a Vanderbilt doctorate in four years and went west to teach at Washington State. + Vanderbilt University in Nashville gave him a graduate fellowship for four years, from 1988 to 1992, and he used every one of them. He took his master’s degree in 1991 and his doctorate in 1992, and in between he won the Franklin J. Matchette Award for excellence in teaching, which tells you that the young man explaining logic to undergraduates was already good at it. His conference papers from those years range from Descartes to the philosophy of language to the question of whether scientific progress is real or only a change of fashion. Vanderbilt is also where the McGrews’ two careers start to run side by side. Lydia took her own doctorate there, in English literature, in 1995, and the two of them have now been married for more than thirty years and have raised three daughters. His first post was three years as an assistant professor at Washington State University, from 1992 to 1995. In 1995 he published his first book, The Foundations of Knowledge, a defense of the view that what we know rests on a floor of beliefs that need no further support (T1).

(●) 1995 AD: He joined the philosophy department at Western Michigan University, and began writing with his wife. + Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo hired him in the fall of 1995, and he has stayed for three decades: assistant professor until 1999, associate professor until 2005, then full professor. The family settled in southwest Michigan, and Lydia, at home with the children, began to work through the philosophy alongside him. From 1997 the papers carried both their names, in American Philosophical Quarterly, the Journal of Philosophical Research, Idealistic Studies and Dialogue. The subject was epistemology, the branch of philosophy that asks what makes a belief count as knowledge rather than a lucky guess, and in particular internalism, the view that what makes a belief reasonable must be something the believer can get at by reflection. In 2007 Routledge published their joint statement of the case, Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason. His other papers in those years went to the most demanding journals in the field. One, in Analysis, took on the famous two-envelope paradox: you are handed one of two envelopes and told that one holds twice as much money as the other, and a simple-looking calculation seems to prove that you should always swap, and then swap back, forever. Others went to Philosophical Studies on "How Foundationalists Do Crossword Puzzles," The Monist on the old problem of induction (how we are entitled to reason from what we have seen to what we have not), and the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science on how scientists reason toward explanations.

(●) 1997 AD: A chess master as well as a philosopher, he was among the online watchers who saw a draw that Kasparov missed against Deep Blue. + In May 1997 the world chess champion, Garry Kasparov, played a six-game rematch against IBM’s computer Deep Blue, and an enormous audience followed it live on the internet. In the second game Kasparov was ground down for forty-five moves and resigned. Then the analysts went to work, and it emerged that in the final position he could have forced a draw by perpetual check, chasing the white king with his queen so that the game could never be won. Western Michigan University’s own account credits McGrew with spotting the saving line among the online commentators, and that is how the encyclopedias tell it too. The analysis itself has not aged entirely well: the strongest chess engines of today do not rate the final position as a clear draw, so the story is better told as a sharp human find than as a proven one. The episode was no accident of a hobby. McGrew holds the title of National Master from the United States Chess Federation, and in 2006 he shared the Michigan championship. He told the story of that shared analysis himself within weeks, in "Collaborative Intelligence: The Internet Chess Club on Game 2 of Kasparov vs. Deep Blue" for IEEE Internet Computing (May/June 1997). He had also been thinking hard about what a chess computer is actually doing when it seems to think, and the next year he asked it outright in "The Simulation of Expertise: Deeper Blue and the Riddle of Human Cognition" in Origins and Design (1998). The three daughters play chess too, and he still coaches at his local club.

(●) 2004 AD: Invited to address the Society of Christian Philosophers, he argued that Plantinga’s case against the historical argument fails. + By the turn of the century the most admired Christian philosopher in America, Alvin Plantinga, had made a case that defending Christianity from historical evidence could never get very far. His reasoning was arithmetic: the argument has many steps, each step is less than certain, and when you multiply the probabilities together they shrink, the way ninety percent of ninety percent of ninety percent quickly falls toward a coin flip. He called it the principle of dwindling probabilities. In February 2004 the Pacific Division of the Society of Christian Philosophers invited McGrew to give a plenary address, a lecture to the whole meeting rather than one session among many, and he gave them "Has Plantinga Refuted the Historical Argument?" His answer was no, and he showed why with the same mathematics Plantinga had used (T4). The paper came out in Philosophia Christi that year, a rejoinder with Lydia followed in 2006, and the dispute has been part of the philosophy of religion ever since. He was no automatic partisan for Christian arguments, and the same years show it. In 2001, with Lydia and the statistician Eric Vestrup, he published a paper in Mind, one of the oldest philosophy journals in English, arguing that a popular probabilistic version of the fine-tuning argument for God does not work as stated. The fine-tuning argument starts from the discovery that certain numbers in physics, such as the strength of gravity, have to fall within a very narrow band for life to be possible at all, like the dials on a control panel that all happen to be set just right, and it argues that design explains this better than chance. The trouble the McGrews found was in the arithmetic of the popular version: its probabilities cannot be made to add up across an infinite range of possible values. Try to give every whole number the same small chance of being picked, and the chances, added together, either come to nothing or overflow past one hundred percent, so no fair lottery over an endless range can be set up. Christian philosophers, Robin Collins and Alexander Pruss among them, replied, and the McGrews answered them in turn. In 2005 he became chairman of his department.

(●) 2010 AD: He wrote the Stanford Encyclopedia’s article on miracles, a year after a seventy-page case for the resurrection written with his wife. + The year 2009 brought two large pieces of work. With Marc Alspector-Kelly and Fritz Allhoff he edited Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology for Blackwell, a collection that lets students read the great scientists and philosophers of science in their own words, from the ancients to the twentieth century. And with Lydia he wrote "The Argument from Miracles" for The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, edited by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland: seventy pages that take the testimony to the resurrection of Jesus, weigh it against the main rival explanations in turn, and then count, with the mathematics of probability, how much it ought to move a reasonable person. On 11 October 2010 the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy published his entry "Miracles" (T2, T3). He revised it substantially in 2019 and again in 2024, the second time with Robert Larmer of the University of New Brunswick, and it remains the article a philosophy student meets first on the subject. Behind both lay years of reading in the old apologists. By 2008 he was building a large digital collection of them, which became the Library of Historical Apologetics: a catalog of some three thousand works, mostly English writing from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century, with links to free scans wherever they exist. He directs it still. For DeWard Publishing he edited two of those books back into print: Brooke Foss Westcott’s The Gospel of the Resurrection (2012) and J. W. McGarvey’s The Evidences of Christianity (2017).

(●) 2014 AD: He co-directed a Templeton project on divine action with Oxford and debated an atheist author on what faith is. + From January 2014 he was the American co-principal investigator, one of the scholars leading the Special Divine Action Project, a study funded by the John Templeton Foundation of whether and how God acts in the world, run with partners at Oxford University. In the summer of 2014 he lectured at Oxford on "Special Divine Action: The State of the Art and the Uses of History," and in 2015 he co-edited an issue of the European Journal for Philosophy of Religion with Andrew Pinsent. On 24 May 2014 he was on the British radio program Unbelievable?, opposite Peter Boghossian, author of A Manual for Creating Atheists. Boghossian tells his readers to hear the word "faith" as "pretending to know things you don’t know," a false way of knowing. McGrew contested the definition: Christian faith, he argued, is trust, and trust can be well grounded in evidence or badly grounded, like any other. Christian listeners judged that he had the better of the exchange; that was their verdict, and it should be weighed as such. Two years later, in Zondervan’s Four Views on Christianity and Philosophy (2016), he took the position the editors titled "Convergence: Philosophy Confirms Christianity," against Graham Oppy for the atheist side, K. Scott Oliphint for a Reformed view that puts Christianity over philosophy, and Paul Moser for a view that remakes philosophy under Christ. He chaired his department again in the second half of the decade, until 2019, and, after more than a quarter of a century at Western Michigan, still teaches there.

What He Taught

(T1) What we know rests on foundations, and a theory of knowledge without them cannot tell science from horoscopes. + Every parent of a four-year-old knows the game. "Why?" You answer. "Why?" You answer that. "Why?" McGrew points out that the grown-up version, "How do you know?", has the same structure, and only a few possible endings. Either the answers go on forever, or they circle back to something already said, or they stop. If they stop, either the person answering gave up, or he reached a belief so basic that he is entitled to it without reasoning his way there from anything else. Philosophers call a belief justified when the person holding it has good reason to hold it: you are justified in thinking it rained overnight when you see the street wet and the puddles on the porch. Foundationalism is the view that every justified belief either is basic in that sense or can be traced back to beliefs that are, the way every branch of an upside-down family tree runs down to its roots. McGrew defends a strong form of it, close to Descartes’. The basic beliefs, he argues, must be certainties, as Descartes said; but unlike Descartes he allows the reasoning that climbs up from them to be the ordinary, fallible kind that science runs on. The candidate for a certainty is not "Here’s an apple" but "I seem to see something red," his own pair of examples: a report of your own present experience, which you cannot be wrong about. Why should anyone outside a philosophy department care? His answer is blunt. If no theory of knowledge can show that our beliefs about cars, houses and sidewalks are better off than the beliefs of people who take their cues from astrologers, then they are not better off, and the difference between the two is an accident of fashion. Christians have a stake in that answer, because the gospel presents itself as true and as something people can come to know (Luke 1:4).

(Q) "A sound and defensible theory of knowledge is our only rational line of defense against conceptual anarchy." + Source: Timothy McGrew, "A Defense of Strong Foundationalism," the closing paragraph, from the text posted on his website (printed as "A Defense of Classical Foundationalism" in Louis Pojman, ed., The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed., Wadsworth, 1998). The sentence that follows is the whole case for epistemology in two clauses: "This is the best and perhaps the only reason to take epistemology seriously; but it is also a sufficient one."

(T2) A miracle is an event beyond the productive power of nature, not a broken law of science. + Before you can argue about whether a miracle happened, you have to say what one is, and since David Hume most people have used his definition: a miracle is "a violation of the laws of nature." McGrew thinks that definition causes more trouble than it solves, and he gives three reasons. - It is younger than the idea. People spoke of miracles for many centuries before anyone had the modern concept of a law of nature, so Hume’s definition cannot be what they meant. - It is hard to say which law is broken. Think of the most famous miracle claim of all, a dead man raised. That the dead stay dead is something everyone has observed, but it is not a law of physics. The laws at work in a body’s decay are deep down in biochemistry and thermodynamics, and none of them says "the dead stay dead." - No one agrees what a law is. On Hume’s own view, a law is only a summary of what usually happens, and then an exception would simply show that we had the summary wrong, not that anything was violated. The older definition, which he traces to Aquinas, is cleaner: a miracle is an event that exceeds the productive power of nature, something nature left to itself could not bring about. That keeps the idea that matters, a cause beyond the natural order, without staking the argument on a disputed theory of laws. It also fits how the New Testament speaks of Jesus’ mighty works, as signs that point beyond themselves to the one who does them (John 20:30–31).

(Q) "That dead men stay dead is a widely observed fact, but it is not, in the ordinary scientific use of the term, a law of nature that dead men stay dead." + Source: Timothy McGrew, "Miracles," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, section 1.2, "Miracles as violations of the laws of nature" (first published 2010). The sentence stands in his sole-authored revision of 2019 and unchanged in the current text of 2024, revised with Robert Larmer. The example is chosen with care. The miracle on which the Christian case rests is a resurrection, and he shows that even this, the plainest case anyone could pick, does not name a law that it breaks.

(T3) Testimony to a miracle can be weighed like any other testimony, and Hume’s barrier cannot be applied consistently. + Suppose a friend tells you that the quiet neighbor down the street won the lottery. You would want more than a rumor before you believed it, because lottery wins are rare. But you would not refuse to believe it whatever the evidence, and if the neighbor showed you the check and the local paper ran the story, you would believe it. That is the shape of McGrew’s reply to Hume. Hume argued, in his essay "Of Miracles" (1748), that our uniform experience of nature is so strong that no testimony could ever outweigh it. McGrew grants the reasonable half of this: an extraordinary claim needs more evidence than an ordinary one. What he denies is the leap from "more evidence" to "no possible evidence." Applied evenly, he argues, that standard would wreck ordinary history, which is full of improbable events known only through testimony. He likes to point out that the nineteenth century had already made the point by satire. In 1819 the logician Richard Whately published a pamphlet "proving," by Hume’s own scruples about improbable testimony, that Napoleon Bonaparte had never existed. Napoleon was still alive at the time. The joke lands because it is a fair application of the rule, and the rule plainly fails. Christians have a stake in this, because the faith rests on testimony from the start. Paul names the witnesses to the risen Christ and adds that most of them were still alive to be asked (1 Corinthians 15:6), which is the sort of claim a man makes when he expects to be checked.

(Q) "One may legitimately require more evidence for a miracle story than for a mundane story (Sherlock 1729/1843: 55); but in exaggerating this sensible requirement into an insuperable epistemic barrier, Hume and his followers are applying a standard that cannot be applied without absurdity in any other field of historical investigation." + Source: Timothy McGrew, "Miracles," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, section 3.3, "The impact of Hume’s ‘Of Miracles’" (first published 2010). The sentence stands in his sole-authored revision of 2019 and unchanged in the current text of 2024, revised with Robert Larmer. The parenthesis is his own citation of the bishop Thomas Sherlock, whose 1729 Tryal of the Witnesses made the same concession a generation before Hume. The sentence closes his account of the nineteenth-century satires on Hume, Whately’s Napoleon among them. An insuperable epistemic barrier is a wall of evidence no testimony could ever climb.

(T4) The historical case for Christianity is cumulative, and it stands or falls with the evidence, not with a shortcut around it. + Think of a jury in a murder trial. No single witness proves the case: one saw a car, one heard a shot, one found a receipt. But each piece makes the others more likely, and together they can put the verdict beyond reasonable doubt. That is a cumulative case, and McGrew argues that the historical case for Christianity is one. That is why he thought Plantinga’s dwindling probabilities, the target of his 2004 address, went wrong. Plantinga laid the argument out as a chain of steps, from God’s existence to God’s wish to reveal himself to the resurrection to God’s endorsement of Jesus’ teaching, and multiplied rough guesses for each link. McGrew answered that a chain is the wrong picture. The evidence for the resurrection does not merely add a link at the end; it bears on the earlier links too, raising the probability that there is a God who acts at all. You cannot judge such a case by assigning "generous" numbers off the cuff and multiplying. You have to sift the evidence itself and update on it, raising or lowering your confidence as each new piece comes in, the way a jury does. Probability theorists have a formula for that updating, Bayes’s theorem, named for the eighteenth-century minister Thomas Bayes, and it is the tool the McGrews used to measure the resurrection evidence in their Blackwell chapter. The same conviction runs through his public work. Against Peter Boghossian he argued that Christian faith is not belief without evidence but trust that can be well or badly grounded, and in Four Views on Christianity and Philosophy he argued that honest philosophy, done well, ends up confirming what Christians believe. He closed the Plantinga paper by quoting George Campbell, the eighteenth-century Scottish minister who answered Hume, on the duty to "prove all things," an echo of Paul’s charge to the Thessalonians (1 Thessalonians 5:21).

(Q) "The final lesson is that the historical argument cannot be evaluated by proxy: it stands or falls not with the clamor of conflicting voices but with the strength of the evidence." + Source: Timothy McGrew, "Has Plantinga Refuted the Historical Argument?" Philosophia Christi 6 (2004), 7–26, the closing section, from the text posted on his website. He goes on to lament "a curious lack of communication" between the philosophers who study the structure of arguments and the historians who know the evidence. Much of his later work, the Library of Historical Apologetics above all, is an attempt to close that gap.

(T5) An author’s silence about an event is weak evidence that it never happened. + In one of the Sherlock Holmes stories a racehorse is stolen in the night, and Holmes points to "the curious incident of the dog in the night-time." The inspector objects that the dog did nothing. "That was the curious incident," says Holmes: the dog did not bark, so the thief was someone it knew. That is an argument from silence, reasoning from what a source did not say, and critics of the New Testament use it constantly: Paul says little about Jesus’ miracles, a Roman historian does not mention some event, so perhaps it never happened. McGrew’s paper "The Argument from Silence" (2014) does for this argument what he did for Plantinga’s: it writes it out in the mathematics of probability, and the mathematics shows how much it needs. For silence to count heavily, three things must all be nearly certain: that the author would have known of the event, that he would have written it down if he knew, and that what he wrote would have survived for us to read. Fail at any of the three and the argument collapses. His best example is a famous one. Pliny the Younger wrote two long letters to the historian Tacitus describing the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in AD 79, which he watched, and in which his uncle died. He never mentions the destruction of Pompeii or Herculaneum. No sane historian concludes that the towns survived. Silence, McGrew concludes, is not nothing, but it is far weaker than almost any other kind of evidence, and it cannot by itself overturn a direct, early report.

(Q) "Omission alone does not have the evidential force of an explicit negative claim." + Source: Timothy McGrew, "The Argument from Silence," Acta Analytica 29 (2014), 215–28, the concluding section, from the text posted on his website. An explicit negative claim is a source actually saying "this did not happen." The paper ends with what he calls a modest proposal: anyone who argues from silence should give a separate argument for each of the three conditions (T5), because if any one of them fails, "the argument from silence, whatever its superficial attractions, will be weaker than almost any other kind of historical evidence."

How Christians Have Received Him

(†) He reopened the library of the old evidential apologists, and a new generation went back to reading them. + Between Joseph Butler’s Analogy of Religion in 1736 and the First World War, English-speaking Christians produced an enormous literature of evidence: replies to the deists, replies to Hume, books on the reliability of the Gospels by lawyers, bishops and classical scholars. By the late twentieth century almost none of it was read. Most of it sat in research libraries, and even apologists knew it chiefly by a handful of names. McGrew’s Library of Historical Apologetics put it back within reach of anyone with an internet connection, and his talks and reading lists, circulated widely online from around 2012, sent students to Paley, Campbell, Leslie, Blunt and Westcott as living arguments rather than museum pieces. The best known recovery is the argument from undesigned coincidences, the small, unplanned ways the Gospels and Acts explain one another. He found it in William Paley and John James Blunt, gave it away in church talks for years, and then handed it to Lydia, whose Hidden in Plain View (2017) carried it into ordinary Christian teaching. She has always been the first to share the credit with him.

(†) Among philosophers he made the evidential case respectable again, in the reference works students actually read. + For most of the late twentieth century many of the leading Christian philosophers in America favored Reformed epistemology, Plantinga’s view that belief in God can be rational without being based on argument at all, the way belief in other minds or in the past is. It is a serious position, held by serious Christians, and McGrew does not deny that a believer can know God without a syllogism. What he challenged was its companion claim, that the evidential route could never get very far. The plenary address of 2004, the rejoinder of 2006, and Lydia’s later paper in the Journal of Analytic Theology (2018) made that a live debate again. The more lasting influence may be quieter. When a philosophy student anywhere looks up miracles in the Stanford Encyclopedia, the first serious account of the question they meet is his, written alone for its first fourteen years and since 2024 with Robert Larmer: fair to Hume and his defenders, thorough on the eighteenth-century replies, and built around the conviction that the matter is decided by evidence. The Blackwell chapter with Lydia is cited in turn as one of the most detailed probabilistic cases for the resurrection in the philosophical literature.

(†) He held Christian arguments to the same standard as everyone else’s, and that is part of why his own are trusted. + The paper in Mind on the fine-tuning argument is the clearest example. Here was a Christian philosopher telling fellow believers that one popular version of their argument did not add up, in the most public place he could find to say it, and then standing by the point through a long exchange with Robin Collins and Alexander Pruss. Christians still disagree with him on that question, and the exchange is a fair one on both sides. But the episode shows the habit behind all his work: an argument is good because the evidence makes it good, not because it reaches a welcome conclusion. Nothing in his own teaching or conduct calls for a ledger of where he went wrong. Where Christians have differed with him, over Reformed epistemology or over fine-tuning, the disagreement is about method among fellow believers, and it deserves to be heard that way, with each side taken seriously.

His work is recent and nothing is lost, but much of it sits in technical journals, and the list below follows his own curriculum vitae (current to June 2019), with the later revisions of the encyclopedia entry noted. It falls into three bodies that are more connected than they look: epistemology and probability, the history and philosophy of science, and the philosophy of religion, where the first two are put to work on miracles and the evidence for Christianity. Books: - The Foundations of Knowledge (Littlefield Adams, 1995): his first book, a defense of foundationalism, the view that knowledge rests on basic beliefs that need no further support (T1). - Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason, with Lydia McGrew (Routledge, 2007): the joint case that what justifies a belief must be accessible to the believer by reflection, and the theoretical base for their later work on testimony. - Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology, co-edited with Marc Alspector-Kelly and Fritz Allhoff (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009): primary readings in the philosophy of science from the ancient world to the twentieth century, with editorial introductions. Edited works: - Brooke Foss Westcott, The Gospel of the Resurrection (DeWard, 2012): a new edition of the Victorian bishop and New Testament scholar’s classic on the resurrection. - John William McGarvey, The Evidences of Christianity (DeWard, 2017): a new edition of the nineteenth-century American scholar’s defense of the New Testament’s reliability. - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7.4 (2015), co-edited with Andrew Pinsent: a special issue from the Special Divine Action Project. Encyclopedia and reference entries: - "Miracles," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (11 October 2010; substantive revisions 23 January 2019 and 7 May 2024, the second with Robert Larmer): the standard reference article, covering definitions, arguments for and against miracle claims, Hume’s influence, and what credible miracle reports would establish (T2, T3). - "Evidence," in Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, eds., The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (Routledge, 2011), 58–67: what evidence is and how it supports belief. - "Physics in Islam," in Helaine Selin, ed., Encyclopaedia of the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine in Non-Western Cultures (Kluwer, 1997): the medieval Islamic contribution to physics. Philosophy of religion: miracles, testimony and the evidence for Christianity: - "Has Plantinga Refuted the Historical Argument?" Philosophia Christi 6 (2004), 7–26: the reply to the principle of dwindling probabilities, first given as a plenary address to the Society of Christian Philosophers (T4). - "On the Historical Argument: A Rejoinder to Plantinga," with Lydia McGrew, Philosophia Christi 8 (2006), 23–38: the answer to Plantinga’s reply. - "Review of Robert Fogelin, A Defense of Hume on Miracles," Mind 114 (2005), 145–49: a critical review of the most prominent recent defense of Hume. - "The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth," with Lydia McGrew, in William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 593–662: the resurrection evidence weighed against its rivals and then measured with Bayes’s theorem (T4). - "The Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony to the Miraculous," with Lydia McGrew, in Jake Chandler and Victoria Harrison, eds., Probability in the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford University Press, 2012), 46–63: how reliable witnesses can establish an improbable event. - "Inference, Method, and History," Southeastern Theological Review 3 (2012), 27–39: historical method and the evidence for Christianity, for a seminary readership. - "Natural Theology and the Uses of Argument," with John DePoe, Philosophia Christi 15 (2013), 299–309: what arguments for God are for and what they can reasonably achieve. - "Faith and Reason in Historical Perspective," with David Marshall, in Tom Gilson and Carson Weitnauer, eds., True Reason (Kregel, 2013): a reply to the New Atheist claim that faith means belief without evidence, from the history of Christian thought. - "There are Serious Reasons for Belief in the Existence of God," in Corey Miller and Paul Gould, eds., Is Faith in God Reasonable? (Routledge, 2014), 97–111: his side of a published debate. - "The Argument from Silence," Acta Analytica 29 (2014), 215–28: the conditions under which silence counts as evidence, and why they are rarely met (T5). - "Thinking About Reported Miracles," in Lippert-Rasmussen, Brownlee and Coady, eds., A Companion to Applied Philosophy (Wiley, 2016), 555–66. - "Convergence: Philosophy Confirms Christianity," with responses to Graham Oppy, K. Scott Oliphint and Paul Moser and a closing rejoinder, in Paul Gould and Richard Davis, eds., Four Views on Christianity and Philosophy (Zondervan, 2016), 123–50 and elsewhere: his case that good philosophy supports the Christian faith. - "Of Miracles" and "A Philosopher’s Reflections," in Graham Twelftree, ed., The Nature Miracles of Jesus (Wipf and Stock, 2017), 152–73 and 217–21: a philosopher’s contribution to a volume of New Testament scholars on the stilling of the storm, the feeding of the five thousand and the like. - "Arguments from Providence and from Miracles," in Jerry Walls and Trent Dougherty, eds., Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God (Oxford University Press, 2018), 341–55. Fine-tuning and design: - "Probabilities and the Fine Tuning Argument: A Sceptical View," with Lydia McGrew and Eric Vestrup, Mind 110 (2001), 1027–37, reprinted in Neil A. Manson, ed., God and Design (Routledge, 2003): the normalizability objection to a popular probabilistic fine-tuning argument. - "Toward a Rational Reconstruction of Design Inferences," Philosophia Christi 7 (2005), 253–98: how design reasoning can be stated rigorously. - "A Response to Robin Collins and Alexander R. Pruss," with Lydia McGrew, Philosophia Christi 7 (2005), 425–43: the McGrews’ reply in the fine-tuning exchange. - "Fine Tuning and the Search for an Archimedian Point," Quaestiones Disputatae 8 (2018), 147–54. - Review of Dean Overman, A Case Against Accident and Self-Organization, Philosophia Christi (1999), 154–56. Epistemology and probability: - "Unraveling Innate Ideas," History of Philosophy Quarterly (July 1992). - "Two Cheers for Bayes’s Theorem," Analysis 55 (1995). - "The Two Envelope Paradox Resolved," with Harry Silverstein and David Shier, Analysis 57 (1997), 28–33: a solution to a famous puzzle in decision theory. - "Level Connections in Epistemology," with Lydia McGrew, American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997), 85–94. - "A Defense of Classical Foundationalism," in Louis Pojman, ed., The Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Wadsworth, 1998): the case for certain foundations, posted on his website as "A Defense of Strong Foundationalism" (T1). - "Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem," with Lydia McGrew, Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (1998), 239–56. - "Psychology for Armchair Philosophers," with Lydia McGrew, Idealistic Studies 28 (1998), 147–57. - "How Foundationalists Do Crossword Puzzles," Philosophical Studies 96 (1999), 333–50: how basic beliefs and mutual support work together, using the crossword as the model. - "What’s Wrong with Epistemic Circularity," with Lydia McGrew, Dialogue 39 (2000), 219–39. - "Foundationalism, Transitivity and Confirmation," with Lydia McGrew, Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (2000), 47–66. - "Direct Inference and the Problem of Induction," The Monist 84 (2001), 153–74, expanded in Henry Kyburg and Mariam Thalos, eds., Probability is the Very Guide of Life (Open Court, 2003): a probabilistic answer to the problem of induction. - "Confirmation, Heuristics, and Explanatory Reasoning," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2003), 553–67: why explanatory power counts as evidence. - "Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual Support," with Lydia McGrew, Erkenntnis 68 (2008), 55–77. - "The Spirit of Cromwell’s Rule," in Kevin McCain and Ted Poston, eds., Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation (Oxford University Press, 2017), 242–47: on never assigning a probability of zero to anything that might be true. History and philosophy of science, and other papers: - "The Missing Link: Aquinas and Kant Revisited," Dialogue: Journal of Phi Sigma Tau (October 1987): his first article, published in the philosophy honor society’s student journal while he was an undergraduate. - "A Postscript to Kuhn," The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy (May 1994): on Thomas Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions. - "Collaborative Intelligence: The Internet Chess Club on Game 2 of Kasparov vs. Deep Blue," IEEE Internet Computing 1.3 (May/June 1997), 38–42: his account of how the commentators on the Internet Chess Club worked through the second game together, the game whose missed draw made his name in chess. - "The Simulation of Expertise: Deeper Blue and the Riddle of Human Cognition," Origins and Design 19 (Summer 1998): what a chess computer’s success does and does not show about the human mind. Other reviews: of Richard Swinburne, Epistemic Justification, and of Michael Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, both Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2002); of Albert Casullo, A Priori Justification, International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2004), 441–42; and of The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, Dialogue: Journal of Phi Sigma Tau (April 1988). Debates, lectures and online work: the debate with Peter Boghossian on Unbelievable? (Premier Christian Radio, 24 May 2014); the plenary address to the Pacific Division of the Society of Christian Philosophers (February 2004); the Oxford lecture on special divine action (2014); many recorded church and university lectures on miracles, the reliability of the Gospels and undesigned coincidences; and the Library of Historical Apologetics (historicalapologetics.org), which he directs. His homepage, with annotated bibliographies and several papers, is timothymcgrew.com. Where to start: the Stanford Encyclopedia entry "Miracles," free online, then "Has Plantinga Refuted the Historical Argument?" and "The Argument from Silence," both posted on his website. For the full case for the resurrection, the Blackwell chapter with Lydia McGrew (2009). For the older writers he recovered: George Campbell, A Dissertation on Miracles (1762), William Paley, A View of the Evidences of Christianity (1794), and John James Blunt, Undesigned Coincidences in the Writings both of the Old and New Testament (1847), all long out of copyright and freely available.
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