Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

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Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

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Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

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World Religions

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Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

Does God See All Times at Once? Eternity and the Boethian Answer

(●) Whether or not God is outside time, he knows what you will freely do, and it stays yours. + On the morning of the city marathon, Margaret, who is seventy-nine, carries a thermos of coffee up the hill above the river. Her grandson Sam is running his first race. From the bench at the top she can see nearly the whole course at once: the leaders already crossing the far bridge, the long middle of the field strung out along the river road, and the last walkers just leaving the start. Sam, down on the road, can see the back of the runner in front of him and the next bend, and that is all. Somewhere around mile twenty Sam will face the choice every marathoner knows: keep running, or walk for a while. Nobody has decided it for him, and he has not decided it yet. Many Christians have pictured God's knowledge rather like Margaret's view. Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth-century theologian, put it in a sentence: "he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way." On that picture God does not peer ahead at Sam's choice. He sees it, together with every other moment of every life, all at once. Like every picture of eternity, this one limps somewhere, and it helps to see exactly where. From her bench Margaret sees every place on the course at one time: the whole river road as it looks at a quarter past nine on a Sunday morning. She cannot see mile twenty at noon, because noon has not come yet. The picture asks for more than any hill can give. It says that God sees every time, mile twenty at noon included, as plainly as Margaret sees the far bridge. Two words carry the whole question. - To be timeless is to have no before and after in one's own life at all: no past to remember, no future to wait for, the whole of one's life present at once. - To be everlasting is to be in time, with a before and an after, at every time there ever is, without beginning and without end. Philosophers also call this being omnitemporal. So the question is whether God is timeless, and Christians have answered it both ways. Augustine, Boethius, Anselm and Aquinas said yes, and careful philosophers still say so. Isaac Newton said no, and many Christian philosophers today agree with him. Some hold a view in between: that God, without the world, would be timeless, and that he has been in time since he made it. The question belongs to the doctrine of God, the part of theology that asks what God is like, and it does not divide the churches: Christians of more than one communion (Catholic, Orthodox or Protestant) stand on each side of it. Sam's choice at mile twenty is exactly the kind of choice the question touches. When he makes it, nothing will settle it but Sam himself, tired legs and all, for reasons of his own. That is what it means for a choice to be free: nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. Margaret may be quite sure that Sam will walk for a while, since his long training runs always came apart at about mile twenty, but her being sure moves neither of his legs. A guarantee would move them no more. Suppose a prophet who cannot be wrong had told her that Sam would walk. Then the outcome would be certain, and still the prophet's word would not make Sam walk. The walking would be Sam's own doing. In the ordinary run of human choices, a free choice also carries an ordinary mark: the person could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was. At mile twenty, with everything up to that moment just as it was, Sam could keep running or he could walk. It is the mark and not the definition, the way a uniform is the usual sign of a police officer and not what makes someone one. The question matters for freedom because of two old worries about God's knowledge. The first is the fatalist's. God's knowing ahead of time is called his foreknowledge, and theological fatalism is the view that it takes our choices out of our hands. The fatalist's argument runs in three short steps: - Yesterday God already believed that Sam will walk at mile twenty, and God cannot be wrong. - Nobody can change what God believed yesterday, because it is in the past. - So when mile twenty comes, Sam cannot do anything but walk. That conclusion takes away the ordinary mark, and with it, the fatalist says, the choice is out of Sam's hands. The worry has a full answer of its own. The second worry asks something different: how God could know a choice that has not been made at all, with nothing yet in the world to go on. That too has a full answer of its own. An answer far older than either worry's modern form seems to dissolve both at a stroke. It is called the Boethian answer, after Boethius, the Roman statesman who gave it around 524 while he waited in prison to be executed. If God is timeless, he did not believe anything yesterday, so the fatalist's first step has nothing to stand on. Nor does he look ahead. He sees. The Boethian answer is a real help, but it does not finish the job by itself (P1, P2). Even for a timeless God, the truth about Sunday can be told on Saturday, and that turns out to be all the fatalist needs. What does finish the job holds whether God is timeless or in time. God's knowledge of a choice settles nothing, and it depends on the choice: God knows that Sam walks because Sam walks, and not the other way round (P3). A God in time, too, can know the choice before it is made, as surely as a timeless God can (P4). Nothing else in the account of God's knowledge and his providence, his governing of all that happens, waits on the question of time either: - middle knowledge, his knowledge of what every creature would freely do in any circumstance, reads the same on either view (P5); - whether God is timeless decides nothing about what his knowledge rests on (P6); - Scripture does not decide the question (P7); - and the arguments philosophers give on each side turn chiefly on what time is, not on whether you are free (P8). So three claims are refused: - that the Boethian answer, by itself, defeats the fatalist (P2); - that a God in time could not know a free choice before it is made, which is where open theism, the view that God does not know what free creatures will do, begins (P4); - that a God outside time must know our choices by having decided them (P6). The question of God and time can stay open, then. Whichever way it goes, the freedom of Sam's choice, and God's knowledge of it, do not wait on the answer. The argument is a cumulative case: several lines of evidence that point to one conclusion. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, but a rope still holds when one strand frays. A jury can convict on a fingerprint, a receipt, a witness and a motive, none of which would be enough alone. Here the two main strands follow the two answers Christians give about time, one for a timeless God (P1, P2) and one for a God in time (P4). Both run through the same answer to the fatalist (P3), which is why that answer carries the most weight. The other strands show that nothing else forces a choice between the two views (P5 to P8). And if either view of time had to be given up, the other would still carry the case (C). Who holds what, on whether God is timeless: - Support: Boethius wrote, around 524, that eternity is "the possession of endless life whole and perfect at a single moment," and Eleonore Stump, with Norman Kretzmann, revived the view for modern philosophy in 1981. - Oppose: Isaac Newton wrote in 1713 that God "endures for ever," and Nicholas Wolterstorff argued in 1975 that God is everlasting, not timeless. - Between: William Lane Craig has argued that God is "timeless without creation and temporal subsequent to creation." The argument that follows takes no side on whether God is timeless. It holds that on either answer God knows what you will freely do, and nothing settles it but you.

(P1) If God is timeless, every moment of time is present to him at once. + This is the heart of the Boethian answer: a timeless God does not foresee your choice, he sees it. The answer deserves its full strength before its limits are weighed (P2), and it begins with what eternity is. (1) Boethius gave the church its definition of eternity. - Boethius wrote The Consolation of Philosophy in a prison cell while he waited to be executed, and its last book takes up exactly this worry about God's knowledge and our freedom. - His answer starts from a definition: "eternity is the possession of endless life whole and perfect at a single moment." - He sharpened it by contrast with everything that lives in time: "To-morrow's state it grasps not yet, while it has already lost yesterday's." Even a world that lasted forever, he argued, would not be eternal in his sense, because it would have its life only a little at a time. So "God indeed is eternal, but the world everlasting." - Think of the difference between a river and a lake. A river that never runs dry carries endless water, but only a little at a time: the stretch flowing past you now. A lake has all of its water at once. Boethius's eternity is the lake, and the world, even a world that lasts forever, is the river. (2) God's knowledge, on this view, is not foresight but sight. - If God's life is all present at once, so is his knowledge. Boethius said it should be called "not foreknowledge as of something future, but knowledge of a moment that never passes." - Its right name, he added, is "not prevision, but providence, because, since utterly removed in nature from things mean and trivial, its outlook embraces all things as from some lofty height." Prevision means seeing ahead of time. By providence he means an outlook that takes in all things together, as from a height. - And seeing forces nothing. "Does the act of vision add any necessity to the things which thou seest before thy eyes?" he asked. When you see a man walking and the sun rising in a single glance, you still know that the walking is chosen and the sunrise is not. - Margaret's watching from the hill does not move Sam's legs. On this picture, neither does God's. (3) Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas taught the same eternity. - Augustine, bishop of Hippo in North Africa, addressed God in prayer around 400: "Thy years are one day; and Thy day is not daily, but To-day, seeing Thy To-day gives not place unto tomorrow, for neither doth it replace yesterday." In plain words, God's today never gives way to a tomorrow, and it never took the place of a yesterday. - Anselm, the monk who later became archbishop of Canterbury, said the same around 1078 in a single phrase: "thou art, outside all time." - Aquinas took over Boethius's definition and his answer. In his words, "all things that are in time are present to God from eternity," because "His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality," that is, as each thing is present at its own time. - His picture is the one Margaret enjoys from her bench: the traveller on the road sees only the next bend, while the one on the height sees the whole road at once. (4) If God is timeless, there is no ancient belief for the fatalist to use. - The fatalist's most persuasive premise is that nobody can change the past. For that premise to bite, his argument needs God's knowledge to sit in the past, as a belief God held yesterday, or a thousand years ago. - On the timeless view there is no such belief, because God did not believe anything yesterday. There is no entry in a divine diary, dated 1950, recording what Sam would do at mile twenty. - The second worry eases as well. A timeless God does not look ahead into a future that is not there yet, since every time is present to him. - The view is alive and well defended. It was revived for modern philosophy in a celebrated article of 1981, and careful philosophers, Catholic and Reformed (Protestants in the tradition of John Calvin) among them, defend it today. Therefore, if God is timeless, he does not so much foresee your choice as see it, because every moment of time is present to him at once.

(P2) What a timeless God knows about tomorrow can truly be said today. + The Boethian answer takes God's knowledge out of the past. It does not take the truth about tomorrow out of today, and that truth turns out to be all the fatalist needs. (1) A timeless truth can still be told in advance. - Suppose God is timeless and knows that Sam walks at mile twenty. Then on the Saturday before the race it is already true to say, "God knows, timelessly, that Sam walks at mile twenty." Nothing about God's being timeless stops that sentence from being true on Saturday. - A leading defender of God in time, who also defends God's foreknowledge, presses exactly this point against anyone who thinks timelessness is an escape. A truth about a timeless God's knowledge can still be truly asserted in advance, "which is once more all the fatalist needs." - And a timeless God can tell what he knows. Suppose that on Saturday God told a prophet that Sam would walk at mile twenty, and the prophet wrote it on a card and sealed it in an envelope. Whatever eternity is like, the sealed card is a fact about Saturday. - One philosopher has made the same point with a stone slab instead of a card, carved in advance with a man's name and the hour at which he will answer the phone. (2) The fatalist's argument comes back in a timeless form. - A philosopher who is friendly to the timeless view showed that the argument can be rebuilt for it, step for step: • where it said "God believed yesterday," it now says "God timelessly knows"; • where it said "nobody can change the past," it now says "nobody can do anything about what is in eternity." - Eternity, after all, is at least as far out of reach as yesterday. You cannot vote in last year's election, and you cannot climb into eternity and change what God knows there either. - So the premise that did the work comes back, with eternity in place of the past as its example, and the conclusion comes back with it: Sam cannot do anything at mile twenty but walk. (3) The timeless form of the argument is the weaker one. - Everyone feels that the past is fixed. You can regret what you said yesterday, but you cannot unsay it. That feeling is deep and ordinary, and it does a great deal of the fatalist's work. - Nobody has any everyday feeling at all about what is fixed in eternity. The timeless form therefore leans on an intuition nobody has ever had occasion to use, and that is a real gain for the Boethian answer. - Some defenders of timelessness go further, and argue that eternity is more like the present than like the past (D4). What is present is not out of a free person's reach in the way the past is. - Boethius had already said that knowing what is present forces nothing. "If you know that someone is walking, he must necessarily be walking," and yet nothing compels the walker to walk. (4) The Boethian answer is available but not sufficient. - It helps, because it takes God's knowledge out of the past, which is where the fatalist's intuition is strongest. A believer who holds that God is timeless may rightly use it. - But it is not sufficient. The truth told in advance survives it, whatever eternity is like. The timeless form of the argument survives it too, unless eternity can be shown to be unlike the past in the way that matters. Defenders of timelessness argue that it is, and their critics deny it (D4). Both are met by a different answer (P3). - The same defender of God in time concludes that "even holding that truth and God are timeless will not suffice to enable us to elude fatalism." - Think of a good umbrella. It keeps off most of the rain, but in a storm you still want a coat. Therefore, what a timeless God knows about tomorrow can truly be said today, and the Boethian answer, real help though it is, does not answer the fatalist on its own.

(P3) God's knowledge of a choice depends on the choice, in time or out of it. + The answer that does finish the fatalist, the dependence answer, never asks when God knows. It asks which way the dependence runs, from the knowing to the choice or from the choice to the knowing, and it gives the same reply on either view of time. (1) The source comes first. - Nothing settles Sam's choice at mile twenty but Sam. He is its source, the one it comes from. God's knowing it, whether yesterday or in eternity, does none of the settling. - Knowledge settles nothing, which is why Margaret's certainty and the prophet's card are not causes of anything Sam does. - Suppose God's knowledge were granted to be as fixed as the past. A choice that nothing but the chooser settles would still be free, because a piece of knowledge does not start doing the settling just by being fixed. (2) God knows a choice because it will be made. - The principle is as old as Origen, the third-century Christian teacher, whom Aquinas quotes before qualifying him (D13): "A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists." - For a timeless God the same holds without the word "future." God knows that Sam walks at mile twenty because Sam walks there. Sam does not walk because God knows it. - A forecaster's "It will rain tomorrow" is true because it rains tomorrow. The rain does not fall because the forecast was true. (3) What waits on the choice is not out of reach. - The ordinary mark says that Sam could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was. But "everything before the choice" does not take in every fact about the past. What stays fixed, when a choice is weighed with everything before it as it was, is every hard fact: a fact made true by how things stood then, which waits on nothing still to come. - A fact that does wait on something still to come is a soft fact. That Socrates drank hemlock is a hard fact: nothing that happens from now on has any bearing on it. That 1066 was the year of the last successful invasion of England is a soft fact, because it waits on whether another invasion ever succeeds. - If God is in time, his belief about Sam's choice waits on the choice, so it is a soft fact, past though it is. If God is timeless, his timeless knowing of the choice waits on it in just the same way, and it counts as soft too, since nothing in the definition of a soft fact requires the fact to be a past one. - So in the ordinary case Sam could have kept running, and had he done so, God would have known that instead: always, if God is in time, and timelessly, if he is not. That is the ordinary mark of a free choice, and it survives on either view. - The sealed card is the same. Its words were written on Saturday, but they were written because God told the prophet what Sam would do on Sunday. Had Sam kept running, God would have told the prophet something else, and the card would never have said what it says (D12). (4) Even inside the Boethian answer, dependence does the real work. - One recent study argues that once the dependence answer succeeds, timelessness adds nothing distinctive of its own to the reply to the fatalist. - The standard survey of the debate, on the other hand, suggests that eternity may still be where the dependence answer works best. - Either way, that is the honest place to leave the two answers: the Boethian answer helps, and the dependence answer finishes. - Think of one key that opens two doors. It turns the same way in both locks. Therefore, whether God knows in time or in eternity, his knowledge of your choice depends on your choice, and on either view it settles nothing.

(P4) If God is in time, he knows tomorrow's free choices without looking ahead. + Many careful Christians hold that God is in time: everlasting, with a past and a future of his own, though with no beginning and no end. The question is whether a God like that could know a choice before it is made. (1) One argument says that only a timeless God could know the future. - It runs in three steps: a being in time cannot know future free choices; God knows them; so God is not in time. - Its first step rests on a picture of knowing as looking. A free choice not yet made cannot be read off anything present, so if knowing the future means seeing it, only a God for whom tomorrow is somehow already there could know it. - Think of a weather forecaster. She knows tomorrow only by reading today's pressure charts, and where today holds no sign of tomorrow, she cannot know it at all. - The same defender of God in time (P2) grants that the argument "has some force in motivating a doctrine of divine timelessness." But he judges that force "mitigated by the availability of viable alternatives and the high price exacted by a tenseless theory of time." A tenseless theory of time is the view that past, present and future are all equally real, so that tomorrow is already there, as surely as yesterday is (P8). That is the price of the looking picture: a God who knows tomorrow by seeing it needs a tomorrow that is already there to be seen. (2) A God in time does not have to find anything out. - The alternative is that God's knowledge is not like looking at all. God knows every truth by his very nature, the way a mind knows what belongs to it, and among the truths are truths about what people will freely do. So he knows those too, and knows them without looking ahead. After all, nobody asks through what window God sees that two and two make four. - Nothing about being in time changes that. A God in time has never had to find anything out either. - Even on the looking picture, a God in time would have something present to know. If a statement about tomorrow is true today, then its being true is a fact about today. - Isaiah's God speaks from inside history, and still declares "the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done" (Isaiah 46:10). (3) A God in time learns nothing about what happens as time passes. - On Saturday he knows that Sam will walk at mile twenty. At noon on Sunday he knows that Sam is walking. On Monday he knows that Sam walked. That is three tenses and one fact. - A logician once made the point with the weather. "It will rain tomorrow," said on April 12, and "It did rain yesterday," said on April 14, make "precisely the same claim about the facts," namely rain on April 13. - What changes is only which moment is now. A God in time knows, at each moment, which truths are true at that moment, with no telescope, no messenger and no delay. (4) Being in time is not waiting to see. - Some Christians, the open theists, do conclude that God waits to see what free creatures will do. But that conclusion is a further step, and they take it by giving up foreknowledge, not by putting God in time (D7). - Defenders of God in time are divided over that step. Some of them take it, and many of the best known refuse it, holding God's knowledge of the future as firmly as any defender of timelessness does. Being in time does not decide the matter either way. - David sang of a book in which his days were written "when as yet there was none of them" (Psalm 139:16). A God in time can hold that book as firmly as a timeless one. Therefore, if God is in time, he knows what you will freely do without looking ahead and without waiting, as surely as a timeless God would.

(P5) God knows what creatures would freely do logically before his decree, not earlier in time. + The fullest account of God's providence, his governing of all that happens, says that God knows what every creature would freely do in any circumstance, and then decides what to create. Its "before" is a before in the order of reasons, and it reads the same whether God is timeless or in time. (1) Middle knowledge sits between two other kinds of knowledge. - Luis de Molina, the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit, distinguished three kinds of knowledge in God: • natural knowledge, of everything that could be, including every possible person and every choice that could be open to each; • middle knowledge, of what each free creature would freely do in any circumstance God might place it in; • free knowledge, of what will actually happen, which God has once he decides what to create. - God's decree, his decision about what to create and where, comes between the second and the third. The three kinds are called the moments of God's knowledge, though they are steps in an order, not stretches of time. - Peter is the example. By natural knowledge God knows that Peter, in the high priest's courtyard, could deny Christ or not. By middle knowledge he knows what Peter would do there. Knowing that, and deciding to create Peter and place him there, God knows that Peter will deny him three times (Mark 14:30). - So God governs by choosing which free creatures to place where. He ensures without necessitating: knowing what Peter would do, he makes sure of it by placing Peter there, and he does not script him. (2) "Before" means before in the order of reasons. - Philosophers call a "before" of this kind a priority. Molina said that the priority holds "in our way of conceiving it, with a basis in reality." The order, in other words, belongs to the way we think about God's knowledge, but it is not made up, because something real answers to it. - The priority is one of condition. God can know what will happen only on condition of knowing what would happen, and what he himself has decided. - Think of a proof in a geometry book, printed on a single page. The small result the proof needs first, which mathematicians call a lemma, comes before the theorem in the order of reasons, though the whole page is printed at once. (3) Theologians who held God timeless used the same kind of order. - Aquinas distinguished three aspects of God's one timeless act of knowing: his knowledge of everything possible, the approval by which he wills to create some of it, and his vision of what actually is. - Duns Scotus, the Franciscan theologian of around 1300, spoke of distinct moments within God's timeless knowledge. - So the device middle knowledge uses, an order of moments with no time between them, was built by theologians who held God timeless. It has never needed a clock. (4) A God in time keeps the same order without any time of not knowing. - If God is in time, there was never a time when he did not yet know what Peter would do, or had not yet decided where to place him. - The defender of God in time (P2, P4) is also a leading defender of middle knowledge, and he puts it this way: God's free decisions are not "preceded by a period of ignorance and indecision." They are sempiternal, held through all time. - Molina himself did not rest God's certainty on what eternity lets him see. He placed God's knowledge of what would freely come to be before "any created thing existing in the duration of eternity," that is, logically before anything God made is present to him in eternity at all. - So the same three moments, and the same decree between them, can be stated word for word on either view. Therefore, middle knowledge, and the providence built on it, says the same thing whether God is timeless or in time.

(P6) Timelessness leaves open what God's knowledge rests on. + To say that God is timeless is to say how his life stands to time. It is not yet to say what his knowledge of our choices rests on, and the history of the doctrine shows timelessness joined to three different answers. (1) Boethius's timeless God knows by sight. - Boethius compared God's knowledge to ours when we "see a man walking on the earth and the sun rising in the sky," and know at one glance that the first is chosen and the second is not. - His whole point is that seeing imposes nothing, so God's knowledge, being a kind of seeing, leaves the walker free. (2) Other timeless theologians ground it in God's decree. - Duns Scotus held God eternal, yet he denied that God knows future choices because they are present to eternity. He objected that the eternity answer makes all of time exist at once and destroys its flow. God knows what will be, Scotus taught, by knowing what his own will has decided. - His example was the number of the stars, which could as well be odd as even. Suppose it is even. On his view, that becomes true when God's will joins "stars" and "even in number," and the divine mind knows it at once. - Scotus did not think this took a choice out of the chooser's hands, for he was one of the stoutest medieval defenders of the will's freedom. He also granted that God knows truths about creatures' sins that his will does not choose, though he never said how. His readers still argue over how his account of God's knowledge leaves the will free. - A leading Reformed philosopher today holds God timeless, and says that God knows what will happen "as a result of ordaining or effectively willing or otherwise ensuring" it. On his view God "brings into being (timelessly) the whole temporal matrix," that is, the whole of time and everything in it. (3) Molina's timeless God knows by middle knowledge and decree. - Molina allowed that created things exist "in the duration of eternity," and still placed God's certainty about them in middle knowledge and the decree (P5). - So Molina's God is certain that Peter will deny Christ, but not because the courtyard lies open before eternity. He is certain because he knows what Peter would do there, and has decided to place him there. (4) Aquinas held two pictures at once. - He taught the sight, and he also taught that God's knowledge is the cause of things "in so far as His will is joined to it," as a builder's plan is the cause of the house he builds. - His readers have argued ever since over which of the two carries the weight (D10). (5) The quarrel with the decree reading is not about eternity. - Call the view that God knows our choices by deciding them, so that his decree is what makes each choice go the way it goes, the decree reading. Whether it is true is a question about what settles a creature's choice. - The decree reading is refused because on it something other than the creature settles every choice. That is argued on its own ground, and the ground is not eternity. - A neighboring question is separate as well. Can truths about what creatures would freely do be true before God's decree, with no decision yet in place to make them true? The doubt that they can is called the grounding objection, and it has its own answer. - From her bench, Margaret sees every runner at once. Her view cannot tell her whether each runner is choosing his own pace or running to a coach's orders written out the night before. Both races look the same from the hill. Therefore, whether God is timeless decides nothing about what his knowledge rests on, and so nothing about whether he knows your choices by deciding them.

(P7) Scripture does not decide whether God is timeless. + Christians on both sides read the same Bible, and both find their view in it. Read with care, it leaves the question open. (1) Scripture speaks of God in the language of time. - "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever you had formed the earth and the world, from everlasting to everlasting you are God" (Psalm 90:2). The four living creatures sing, "Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord God Almighty, who was and is and is to come!" (Revelation 4:8). - God remembers, promises, waits and answers. Page after page, the Bible tells his acts in order: first this, then that. - One careful survey of the biblical texts concludes that "the Bible knows nothing of a timeless divine eternity in the traditional sense." (2) Scripture also speaks of God before time. - Jude closes with glory to God "before all time and now and forever" (Jude 25). Paul says that grace was given "before the ages began" (2 Timothy 1:9), and that eternal life was promised "before the ages began" (Titus 1:2). - Some read "In the beginning" (Genesis 1:1) as the beginning of time itself, and not only of the world. - If time had a beginning and God did not, then God, "before" that beginning, was not in time. The same defender of God in time (P2, P4) grants that there is "some evidence, at least," for this reading, and adds, "Still the evidence is not clear." (3) Scripture's language of space warns against reading its language of time flatly. - "Do I not fill heaven and earth? declares the Lord" (Jeremiah 23:24). "If I ascend to heaven, you are there!" (Psalm 139:8). Nobody concludes from these that God is spread out through space, bigger in the sky than in a closet. Solomon prayed, "heaven and the highest heaven cannot contain you" (1 Kings 8:27). - Defenders of timelessness argue that the biblical writers were no more giving a theory of time than a theory of space. Aquinas said the same long before: eternity "is called by names implying time and succession," just as God, "although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names." Incorporeal means without a body: Scripture speaks of God's arm and his eyes, though God, as God, has no body. - The parallel is not perfect, and defenders of God in time say so. Scripture says outright that God is not contained by space. It never says, in so many words, that he is not in time. (4) So the question passes to philosophy. - A leading biblical scholar of time concluded that a Christian doctrine of time, if one is to be developed, "must belong not to biblical but to philosophical theology." - That is no slight on Scripture, which simply leaves open what it does not teach. It does not state a theory of the will either: it addresses people as accountable, and it confesses God as sovereign. Therefore, Scripture speaks of God in the language of time and also before all time, and it does not decide between the two views.

(P8) Whether God is timeless turns chiefly on what time is. + Where Scripture leaves a question open, arguments take over, and on this question they are strong on both sides. Most of them, in the end, turn on what time itself is. (1) The strongest case for timelessness is an argument from perfection. - Boethius's contrast is the heart of it: whatever lives in time "has already lost yesterday's." A perfect being, the argument runs, would lose none of its life, so God must be timeless. - One defender of timelessness asks us to put the matter to a widower. Would his grief ease if his memories of his wife were made more vivid and more detailed? Memory, however perfect, is not the person. - Even the defender of God in time (P4) calls this argument "really promising," and grants that it "could motivate justifiably a doctrine of divine timelessness in the absence of countermanding arguments," that is, if no argument pointed the other way. - He replies in three ways: • God forgets nothing, so the tooth of time, which wears the past away from us, is dulled for him. • The people God loves are not lost to him, since they live on with him. • And some goods unfold in time by their nature: a melody heard all at once would not be a melody. (2) The strongest case against it begins from a world in time. - The first argument starts from creation. God made a world in time, and in making it, he came to stand in a relation he did not stand in without it: sustaining it, existing alongside it. On that ground the defender of God in time argues that "even if God is timeless without creation, his free decision to create a temporal world also constitutes a free decision on his part to exist temporally." - The second starts from God's knowledge. God knows everything, including what is happening now. A timeless God, the argument runs, could know that Sam walks at mile twenty at noon, but not whether it is noon yet, or whether the race is over. So if God knows what is happening now, he is in time. - A third argument, that a timeless God could not be a person, is judged a failure even by the defender of God in time. A timeless God could know, will, love and choose. (3) Defenders of timelessness have replies to both arguments. - To the argument from creation, Aquinas long ago replied that God stands in no real relation to creatures: creating changes the world and not God, the way walking around a pillar changes which side of you it is on without changing the pillar. The defender of God in time answers that a cause with real effects must itself be really related to them. - To the argument from knowledge, some reply that the tense in "it is now noon" belongs to the way a fact is grasped and not to the fact itself, so that a timeless God misses no fact there is. The defender of God in time finds that reply "plausible and attractive," and still argues that knowing what is happening now is a perfection of knowledge a timeless God would lack. (4) Both arguments assume that time really passes. - Each assumes that the difference between past, present and future belongs to the world and not only to our point of view, and that things genuinely come to be. Philosophers call this the tensed theory of time. On it, the race is real while it is being run: on Saturday it was not yet anything, and by Monday it is over. - The tenseless theory denies it. On it, all times are equally real, and "now" is like "here": each time is "now" to those who live at it, as each place is "here" to those who stand in it. If that is right, nothing ever comes to be, God's relations to the world never change, and every fact about time is one God can know from outside it. He can be timeless after all. - Albert Einstein put the tenseless view in a letter of comfort to the family of his old friend Michele Besso, who had just died: "For us believing physicists the distinction between past, present, and future is only an illusion, even if a stubborn one." Some argue that Einstein's physics requires the view, and the defender of God in time, the tenseless theory's leading critic among Christian philosophers, argues that it does not. - The Reformed philosopher who holds God timeless (P6) takes this road: the times still future to us, he says, "exist for God." (5) The defender of God in time refuses the tenseless road. - He argues that the tenseless theory exacts a high price, philosophical and theological. He closes his case with a theological thesis: such a theory is "theologically objectionable, since its claim that God and the universe co-exist tenselessly is incompatible with a robust doctrine of creatio ex nihilo," that is, of creation out of nothing. - His thought is that if nothing ever comes to be, the universe never truly comes into being either. It depends on God for its existence, but it simply exists alongside him. Those who take the tenseless road answer that creating out of nothing does not need time to pass, since in one timeless act God gives the whole of time, and everything in it, all the being it has (P6). - His own verdict: "I am convinced that time is tensed and that therefore God exists in time." Since God never begins or ceases, he is omnitemporal, existing at every time there is. (6) Two defenders of God in time have argued that God, without the world, would be timeless. - The defender of God in time sees two ways to think of God without the world: either he existed literally before creation, or he is timeless without it. His systematic work leaves the choice between them for a later volume, on creation. - Picture what the first would mean: God counting down, "-3, -2, -1. Let there be light!" In earlier writings he defended the second: God is "timeless without creation and temporal subsequent to creation." - Another leading defender of middle knowledge holds the same view, and says of God's choice to create, "His choice is not the result of time, but the cause of it." - Both hold that God's choice to create was free, since nothing outside him settled it. So on their own showing, timelessness and freedom are not at odds. (7) None of these arguments turns on whether you are free. - What decides the question, for the most part, is whether time passes and how God stands to a world in time. Neither side rests its case on human freedom, and neither has to give freedom up to win. - The one argument that reached as far as foreknowledge has an answer that needs no verdict on time (P4). - Two doctors can disagree about how the heart keeps its rhythm and agree completely that the patient is alive. Therefore, whether God is timeless turns chiefly on what time is and on how God stands to a world in time, and neither side's arguments turn on whether you are free.

(C) Therefore, whether God is timeless or in time, he knows what you will freely do, and it stays yours. + The strands meet at one point. On either answer, timeless or in time, God knows your choice, and nothing settles it but you. (1) Two roads lead to the same place. - If God is timeless, every moment is present to him (P1), the truth about tomorrow can still be told today (P2), and his knowing waits on your choosing (P3). - If God is in time, he knows tomorrow's choices without looking ahead (P4), and again his knowing waits on your choosing (P3). - Either way, God knows what Sam will do at mile twenty, and Sam settles it. (2) Nothing else forces a choice between them. - Middle knowledge reads the same on either view (P5). - Timelessness decides nothing about what God's knowledge rests on (P6). - Scripture leaves the question open (P7), and the arguments that decide it turn on time, not on freedom (P8). - Whether a family drives to a wedding or takes the train, it is the same wedding: the vows, the guests and the cake do not change with the route. (3) The case survives the loss of either view of time. - If the timeless picture were shown to make no sense (D5), God would be in time, and (P4) with (P3) would carry the case. - If a God in time could not know the future, the argument from foreknowledge would make him timeless, and (P1) and (P2) with (P3) would carry it. - If eternity proved unlike the past in the way that matters (D4), the timeless form of the fatalist's argument would fail outright, and the case would only be stronger. - If middle knowledge failed, God's knowledge and your freedom would still stand together (P3), and only his providence would reach less far than the model says. - A footbridge hung from two cables, each strong enough to carry it alone, stays up when either cable is cut. (4) Both roads run through one answer. - The two strands are not independent at their root. On either view of time the fatalist is met by the same reply (P3), so (P3) carries the most weight. The footbridge's two cables, in other words, hang from a single tower. - That reply has two parts: • The first is that knowledge settles nothing, so that even a piece of knowledge granted to be as fixed as the past would leave free a choice that nothing but the chooser settles. • The second is that God's knowledge waits on the choice, and this is what keeps the ordinary mark: had Sam kept running, God would have known that instead, always if he is in time and timelessly if he is not. - The second part is disputed in print by serious philosophers, and its hardest test is the prophet's sealed card (D12). If it failed, the ordinary mark would lose its defense against the fatalist. The first part would still keep Sam's choice his own, though, since a choice is free by its source and not by its mark. - So the fatalist could take the choice from Sam only by showing that knowing settles a choice, and on neither view of time does it. (5) The question of time is left open, not dismissed. - None of this decides whether God is timeless or in time. That belongs to the doctrine of God, where Christians of more than one communion stand on each side. - The question is not idle. It matters for how Christians speak of God's life, of creation, and of the incarnation, God the Son becoming man. - The Boethian answer keeps its place. A believer who holds that God is timeless may use it as the real help it is. - Sam walked at mile twenty, as his grandmother thought he might, and then ran the last mile anyway. Whether God knew it from eternity or walked those miles beside him through time, the walking and the running were Sam's. Therefore, God knows what you will freely do, whether he sees all times at once or lives through them with us, and nothing settles your choice but you. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It Philosophy / Free Will: God Does Not Look Ahead: How Foreknowledge Is Possible Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It

On eternity and the Boethian answer: Cyr, Taylor W. "Atemporalism and Dependence." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87, no. 2 (2020): 149-164. Deng, Natalja. "Eternity in Christian Thought." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman. First published March 22, 2018; substantive revision August 24, 2023. Sections 3.1, 4.1.2, 4.2.3 and 6.2. Hasker, William. "Can Eternity Be Saved? A Comment on Stump and Rogers." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87, no. 2 (2020): 137-148. Hunt, David, and Linda Zagzebski. "Foreknowledge and Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman. Substantive revision, February 17, 2026. Sections 2.3 and 2.5. Kenny, Anthony. The God of the Philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. Pages 38-39, as quoted in Deng, "Eternity in Christian Thought," section 4.1.2. Leftow, Brian. Time and Eternity. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. Plantinga, Alvin. "On Ockham's Way Out." Faith and Philosophy 3, no. 3 (1986): 235-269. Rogers, Katherin A. "Anselmian Eternalism: The Presence of a Timeless God." Faith and Philosophy 24, no. 1 (2007): 3-27. Rogers, Katherin A. "The Necessity of the Present and Anselm's Eternalist Response to the Problem of Theological Fatalism." Religious Studies 43, no. 1 (2007): 25-47. Rogers, Katherin A. Perfect Being Theology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000. Stump, Eleonore, and Norman Kretzmann. "Eternity." Journal of Philosophy 78, no. 8 (1981): 429-458. Stump, Eleonore, and Norman Kretzmann. "Prophecy, Past Truth, and Eternity." Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 395-424. Stump, Eleonore, and Norman Kretzmann. "Eternity, Awareness, and Action." Faith and Philosophy 9, no. 4 (1992): 463-482. van Inwagen, Peter. "What Does an Omniscient Being Know About the Future?" In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, vol. 1, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, 216-230. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Chapter 2. Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. "Eternity and Fatalism." In God, Eternity, and Time, edited by Christian Tapp and Edmund Runggaldier. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011. On God in time: Craig, William Lane. "God, Time, and Eternity." Reasonable Faith. Lecture at the Oxbridge Conference, July 23, 2002. Craig, William Lane. God, Time, and Eternity: The Coherence of Theism II: Eternity. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. Craig, William Lane. Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, On God: Attributes of God. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2025. Sections 6.3.1 (notes 41 and 44), 6.3.2.1.3, 6.3.2.1.4 (notes 72 and 80), 6.3.2.2, 6.4.1 (notes 88-90, 96 and 99), 7.1 (notes 5, 15 and 19), 7.2.1, 7.2.2 (notes 24-28), 7.2.3, 7.2.4 (notes 81-90), 7.3.1, 7.3.2 (notes 96-105), 7.3.3 (notes 106-115), 7.4 (notes 116-123) and 7.5 (note 124). Craig, William Lane. The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000. Craig, William Lane. The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination. Synthese Library 294. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000. Craig, William Lane. "Timelessness and Omnitemporality." Philosophia Christi, series 2, 2, no. 1 (2000): 29-33. Craig, William Lane. Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001. Ganssle, Gregory E., ed. God and Time: Four Views. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001. Mullins, R. T. The End of the Timeless God. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Padgett, Alan G. God, Eternity and the Nature of Time. London: Macmillan, 1992. Page 33, as quoted in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 7.1, note 5. Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Pages 529-539 and notes 853-860 (pages 565-566); Appendix I, note 17. Swinburne, Richard. The Coherence of Theism. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Wolterstorff, Nicholas. "God Everlasting." In God and the Good: Essays in Honor of Henry Stob, edited by Clifton Orlebeke and Lewis Smedes, 181-203. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975. Sources quoted at second hand: Barr, James. Biblical Words for Time. London: SCM Press, 1962. Page 149, as quoted in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 7.1, note 19. Hepburn, R. W. "Time-Transcendence and Some Related Phenomena in the Arts." In Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements, Fourth Series, edited by H. D. Lewis, 152-173. London: Allen and Unwin, 1976. As cited in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 7.2.4, note 90. Hoffmann, Banesh. Albert Einstein: Creator and Rebel. London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1972. Page 258, Einstein's letter of March 21, 1955, as quoted in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 7.2.4, note 84. Leftow, Brian. Time and Eternity. Page 278, as cited in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 7.2.4, notes 81-82. Philo of Alexandria. On the Creation of the World. As cited in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 7.1, note 15. Rescher, Nicholas. Many-Valued Logic. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. Pages 2-3, as quoted in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 6.3.1, note 44. On middle knowledge and the Reformed alternative: Helm, Paul. "Divine Timeless Eternity." In God and Time: Four Views, edited by Gregory E. Ganssle, 28-60. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001. Helm, Paul. "Eternal Creation: The Doctrine of the Two Standpoints." In The Doctrine of Creation: Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, edited by Colin E. Gunton. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997. Pages 42-43, as quoted in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 7.4, notes 118-119. Helm, Paul. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. Pages 25-27, 33 and 129-130 (pages 26-27 and 33 as quoted in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, sections 7.3.2 and 7.4, notes 101 and 120). Molina, Luis de. On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the Concordia). Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988. Disputations 49.8, 50.15, 52.9 and 52.10, as cited in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 6.4.1, notes 88, 96, 99 and 100-101. Historical sources: Anselm. Proslogium. Translated by Sidney Norton Deane. Chicago: Open Court, 1903. Chapter 19. Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1920-1922. Part I, question 10, articles 1-2 and 4; question 13, article 7; question 14, articles 8 and 13. The Athanasian Creed (Quicunque vult). As quoted in Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part I, question 10, article 2. Augustine. The Confessions of Saint Augustine. Translated by Edward Bouverie Pusey. Oxford: J. H. Parker, 1838. Book 11, chapters 13-14. Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. Translated by H. R. James. London: Elliot Stock, 1897. Book V, prose 6. Duns Scotus, John. Ordinatio I, distinctions 38-39, questions 1-5; Lectura I, distinction 39; Reportatio Parisiensis I, distinction 46, question 2. As reported in Knuuttila and Frost, "Medieval Theories of Future Contingents." Duns Scotus, John. Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle IX, question 15. Knuuttila, Simo, and Gloria Frost. "Medieval Theories of Future Contingents." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published June 15, 2006; substantive revision April 9, 2025. Section 4.2. Newton, Isaac. "General Scholium." In The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, translated by Andrew Motte. New York: Daniel Adee, 1846. Book III. Tanner, Norman P., ed. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. 2 vols. London: Sheed and Ward; Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990. Vol. 1: Council of Chalcedon (451), Definition of the Faith; Fourth Lateran Council (1215), constitution 1. Westminster Assembly. The Westminster Confession of Faith. 1646. Chapter II, section 1. Text as printed in Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3. New York: Harper, 1877. Biblical citations: Genesis 1:1; Exodus 3:12, 14; 1 Kings 8:27; Psalm 90:2, 4; Psalm 139:8, 16; Isaiah 46:10; Isaiah 57:15; Jeremiah 23:24; Malachi 3:6; Mark 13:32; Mark 14:30, 72; Luke 2:52; John 1:2; John 8:58-59; 2 Timothy 1:9; Titus 1:2; Hebrews 13:8; 2 Peter 3:8-9; Jude 25; Revelation 4:8.
+ Timelessness is the church's classical doctrine, taught by Augustine, Boethius, Anselm and Aquinas. Treating a God in time as an equal option breaks with the faith once received, and Mere Christianity has no room for it.
1. The classical pedigree is real. Augustine, Boethius, Anselm and Aquinas all held that God is timeless, and most of the theologians of the Middle Ages and the Reformation era followed them. That is a serious point, and it deserves its full strength (P1). Anyone who sets the classical view aside should feel the weight of the company he is leaving. 2. No creed defines eternity as timelessness. The creeds confess that God is eternal. The creed that bears Athanasius's name says it of each person of the Trinity: "The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal." Both views confess every word of that. An everlasting God, without beginning or end, is eternal in the plain sense of the word. - Later councils and confessions add that God is unchangeable. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215), a gathering of the medieval Western church, says so, and so does the Westminster Confession (1646), a Reformed statement of faith. Neither defines that as timelessness either. - Scripture's own word for it comes inside a promise: "For I the Lord do not change; therefore you, O children of Jacob, are not consumed" (Malachi 3:6). Both views confess an unchanging God in that sense, the same in character and faithful to his word. Whether it also rules out every change in what is true of God as the world changes, such as his knowing that it is now noon, is the further question that divides them (D8). - Timelessness is a way of spelling out what eternal means, in the way that classical simplicity (the teaching that God is not made up of parts of any kind) spells out God's oneness. - Christians may question a traditional formulation of that kind while holding fast the substance it was meant to protect: that God has no beginning, no end, and no rival. 3. Neither side belongs to one communion. Mere Christianity, the faith that Christians of every communion hold in common, must not be used to grade one communion against another. And this question does not divide the communions at all. - Among those who hold that God is in time are a Reformed philosopher, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and an Eastern Orthodox one, Richard Swinburne. - Among those who hold that God is timeless are a Catholic, Eleonore Stump, and a leading Reformed philosopher of providence (P6). Each list crosses a line that divides the churches. Reformed philosophers, in fact, stand on both. The question is open among Christians. 4. The classical view is not set aside. No side is taken on it. The Boethian answer is a real help to anyone who holds that God is timeless, though not by itself a complete one (P1, P2), and the timeless view's best replies to its critics, still argued in print, get their hearing (D4, D5). Even the defender of God in time (P8) grants that the case for timelessness "could motivate justifiably a doctrine of divine timelessness in the absence of countermanding arguments." A believer who holds the classical view will find it described in words he could sign. See also: NT / Cosmological: The Kalam Argument
+ Scripture puts God in time: he is the one "who was and is and is to come" (Revelation 4:8), and he remembers, waits and answers. Timelessness is Greek philosophy read into the Bible.
1. The Bible's language about God is the language of time. That is true, and it should be granted at once. The psalmist says that God is God "from everlasting to everlasting" (Psalm 90:2). "Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today and forever" (Hebrews 13:8). God hears a cry and then answers it, makes a promise and then keeps it. Nicholas Wolterstorff built his case for God in time on exactly this: a God who redeems, who hears and answers and acts in history, has a before and an after in his own life. It is a serious argument, made by a serious Christian philosopher. 2. The Bible's language about God is also the language of space. "Do I not fill heaven and earth?" (Jeremiah 23:24). "If I ascend to heaven, you are there!" (Psalm 139:8). Readers do not take these as a theory of space, or conclude that God has a size. Defenders of timelessness argue that the language of time deserves the same care. Aquinas made the point long ago: eternity "is called by names implying time and succession," as God, though he has no body, is named "by corporeal names," words for bodily things such as an arm or an eye. The parallel is not perfect, and that should be said too (P7). Scripture says outright that "heaven and the highest heaven cannot contain you" (1 Kings 8:27). It nowhere says, in so many words, that time cannot contain him. The question is open, not closed in the other direction. 3. Where an idea came from does not decide whether it is true. Timelessness did come into Christian thought through Greek philosophers, above all the Platonist Plotinus, a third-century follower of Plato. But tracing an idea to its source is not the same as refuting it. - Some biblical texts point the same way. Jude speaks of God's glory "before all time and now and forever" (Jude 25), and Paul of grace given "before the ages began" (2 Timothy 1:9). - The Gospel of John begins with the Word, who "was in the beginning with God" (John 1:2). The Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria, an older contemporary of John's, already taught that time began with creation. 4. If Scripture does put God in time, freedom loses nothing. Suppose the objection is right. Then God is everlasting, and he knows what you will freely do without looking ahead (P4), and his knowing waits on your choosing (P3). The case stands on that strand.
+ Scripture teaches timelessness. God's name is "I am who I am" (Exodus 3:14), Jesus said "before Abraham was, I am" (John 8:58) rather than "I was," and "with the Lord one day is as a thousand years" (2 Peter 3:8).
1. These texts teach what both views confess. Each of them is precious, and each teaches something every Christian believes. - God has no beginning, and his nature and character do not change. - The Son did not begin with his birth in Bethlehem. When Jesus said, "before Abraham was, I am" (John 8:58), the crowd understood him to be claiming what only God can claim, and "they picked up stones to throw at him" (John 8:59). - God is not hurried or worn down by time. Peter's next sentence explains his point: "The Lord is not slow to fulfill his promise as some count slowness, but is patient toward you" (2 Peter 3:9). An everlasting God, without beginning or end, fits every one of these as well as a timeless God does. 2. A present tense is not a theory of time. The Hebrew of "I am who I am" can also be read another way, and the English Standard Version's own footnote gives it: "I will be what I will be." It is the same verb God uses two verses earlier, when he promises Moses, "I will be with you" (Exodus 3:12). That is a promise of presence through time. - In John 8:58 the contrast is between Abraham, who came to be, and the Son, who simply is. Everlasting existence without beginning makes the same contrast. - "For a thousand years in your sight are but as yesterday when it is past, or as a watch in the night" (Psalm 90:4). A watch was one shift of the night guard, a few hours long. The verse compares lengths of time from God's side. It does not say that God has no time at all. 3. Isaiah does not stop to say what eternity is. Isaiah calls God "the One who is high and lifted up, who inhabits eternity" (Isaiah 57:15), and moves straight on to God's care for the lowly, without pausing to analyze what eternity is. A doctrine of time has to be built from philosophy as well as from these texts (P7). 4. If Scripture does teach timelessness, freedom loses nothing. Suppose the objection is right. Then God is timeless, every moment is present to him (P1), the truth about tomorrow can still be told today (P2), and his knowing waits on your choosing (P3). The case stands on that strand.
+ Eternity is not the past. The fatalist's whole force comes from the fact that nobody can change the past, and a timeless knowing is not past, so the Boethian answer dissolves the problem after all.
1. This is the timeless view's best reply. It is a good one. The philosopher Katherin Rogers argues that eternity is more like the present than like the past. What is present is not out of a free person's reach in the way the past is. While Sam is choosing at mile twenty, his choice is present, and that does not stop it from being his. Boethius had already pointed the same way. Knowing what is present imposes only a conditional necessity, a must that belongs to the if-then and not to the deed: "if you know that someone is walking, he must necessarily be walking," and nothing compels him to walk. And the timeless form of the fatalist's argument is weaker than the form it replaces, since nobody has everyday intuitions about what is fixed in eternity (P2). 2. The argument was never about pastness as such. What drives the fatalist is a fact beyond everybody's reach. The past was only the most obvious example of such a fact. Critics of Rogers reply that a timeless knowing is at least as far beyond reach as yesterday: nothing anyone does can get behind it or in front of it. That exchange is still running, in print. 3. The truth about tomorrow is in today. Even if God's knowing is like a present, the truth about Sam's choice can be truly told on Saturday, and a prophet's sealed card is a fact about Saturday (P2). The objection says nothing about either, so even if Rogers is right, the Boethian answer does not carry the case alone. 4. Freedom stands however the exchange ends. If Rogers is right, the timeless form of the argument fails outright and the case is only stronger (C). What remains then is the truth told in advance, which the dependence answer meets (P3). If her critics are right, the dependence answer meets the timeless form as well (P3). Either way, God knows what Sam will do, and Sam settles it.
+ If my typing is simultaneous with eternity, and Nero's burning Rome is simultaneous with eternity, then Nero is fiddling while I type. Timelessness collapses all of time into one moment, so the Boethian picture makes no sense.
1. This is the sharpest objection to timelessness. It deserves to be heard in its author's own words. Anthony Kenny put it against Aquinas: "on St. Thomas' view, my typing of this paper is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Again, on his view, the great fire of Rome is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Therefore, while I type these very words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on." The worry is real. Simultaneity, happening at the same time, carries over from one pair of things to the next, at least as we ordinarily know it: if the kettle boils at the same time as the phone rings, and the phone rings at the same time as someone knocks at the door, then the kettle boils at the same time as the knock. If every moment is "at the same time" as eternity, every moment seems to be at the same time as every other. 2. Defenders of timelessness answer with a new kind of simultaneity. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann proposed a relation that holds only between something eternal and something in time, and does not carry over. Your typing is present to eternity, and so is Nero's fire, but that does not make them present to each other. - Their image is two parallel lines. The lower line is time, lit by a light that moves along it, one point at a time. The upper line is eternity, lit all at once. - Every point of the lower line, when it is lit, faces the whole of the upper line. No two points of the lower line are lit together. - So your typing and Nero's fire each face the whole of eternity, without ever being lit together. 3. The answer is still disputed. Critics on both sides have pressed hard. The Reformed philosopher who holds God timeless (P6) complained that the new relation "has no independent merit or use, nothing is illuminated or explained by it." When its authors revised it, critics argued that the revision was circular, and amounted to saying "that God can be causally active in time because he can be causally active in time." Other defenders of timelessness have offered other models. The dispute is still open. 4. Freedom does not hang on it. Suppose Kenny is right and the timeless picture makes no sense. Then God is in time, and he knows what you will freely do without looking ahead (P4). If Kenny is wrong, the timeless strand stands (P1 to P3). Either way the case stands (C).
+ For a God outside time, my future has already happened, like a film he has already watched. Then my choices only play out what is already there.
1. The strongest form of this objection says the future is already real. On the tenseless theory of time, all times are equally real (P8). Tomorrow is already there, as surely as yesterday is, and only our point of view makes one of them seem gone and the other not yet come. If a timeless God sees all of time, the objection runs, it must be because all of time is already there to see, and then Sam's choice at mile twenty is already there too, waiting for him to arrive at it. 2. "Already happened for God" mixes two clocks. In our time, Sam's choice happens on Sunday, at mile twenty, and it happens because Sam makes it. On no timeless view is it over before Sunday. Boethius said that God's knowledge "beholds things present before it, just as they will hereafter come to pass in time." God's eternal present does not move Sunday to Saturday. 3. Being real at a later time is not being settled beforehand. A choice is determined when it is settled beforehand by prior conditions (the past and the laws of nature, or a decree) that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. Even on the tenseless theory, nothing earlier has to be enough to produce Sam's choice. What is there at mile twenty is a choice Sam makes. The film comparison is where the objection goes wrong. A film is fixed before anyone watches it, by the filming. Nothing settles Sam's choice before Sunday, and on Sunday Sam settles it. 4. The tenseless theory has disputed costs of its own. The defender of God in time (P8) argues that the tenseless theory has a cost for responsibility. On it, he claims, a person is spread through time in temporal parts, the way a road is spread through space in stretches: Sam on Saturday, Sam at mile twenty, Sam on Monday. That view is called perdurantism, and he argues that it is "incompatible with moral accountability," since the part punished is not the part that sinned. Defenders of the tenseless theory reply that it forces no one into temporal parts: on it, a person can still last through time whole, all of him there at each moment of his life. - That worry is about how a person lasts through time, and so about who answers on Monday for what was done on Sunday. It arises for anyone who holds the tenseless theory, believer or unbeliever, so it is a cost of a theory of time and not of God's knowledge. - A timeless God is tied to that theory only if the two arguments for God in time succeed (P8). If they fail, timelessness has no need of it. 5. Freedom stands either way. If the future is already real and God is timeless, God's knowing still waits on Sam's choosing (P3), and nothing earlier settles it. If the future is not yet real, the leading arguments for God in time are at their strongest (P8), and a God in time knows the choice without looking ahead (P4).
+ A God in time cannot know the future: if tomorrow does not exist yet, there is nothing for him to know. Either God is timeless, or open theism is true.
1. This is a real argument for timelessness. It runs: a being in time cannot know future free choices; God knows them; so God is not in time. It has carried many thinkers, and its first premise has real force on one picture of knowledge: the picture of knowing as looking. A free choice not yet made leaves nothing in the world to look at. 2. God's knowledge is not looking. God knows every truth by his nature, without finding anything out, and there are truths about what people will freely do (P4). A statement about tomorrow is true today if things will turn out as it says: "On June 6, 1944, the Allies invade Normandy" was true before 1944, because the Allies did invade on that date. A God who knows every truth knows that one, in time or out of it. - The defender of God in time (P4) grants the argument "some force," and judges it "mitigated by the availability of viable alternatives and the high price exacted by a tenseless theory of time." 3. Even the looker would have something to see. If a statement about tomorrow is true today, then its being true is a fact about today. A God who knows every present fact knows that one, even on the looking picture. 4. Open theism is a further step that Scripture refuses. The open theist does not reach his view by putting God in time. He reaches it by giving up God's knowledge of what free creatures will do. Isaiah puts that knowledge forward as the mark of the true God: "declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done" (Isaiah 46:10). A God in time can keep that knowledge, and many who hold the temporal view do. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: The Future Is Not Open to God: Answering Open Theism Philosophy / Free Will: God Does Not Look Ahead: How Foreknowledge Is Possible
+ If God is in time, he learns something new every moment: at noon he learns that it is now noon. So his knowledge is acquired after all, and the claim that God never finds anything out is false.
1. A God in time does know new truths of one kind. That should be granted plainly. "It is now noon" is true only at noon, so a God in time who knows every truth knows it at noon and not at eleven. Philosophers call truths like this tensed truths: truths about what is past, present or future at a given moment. 2. Knowing the time is not finding out what happens. What happens at noon, God always knew. On Saturday he knew that Sam would walk at mile twenty at noon on Sunday; at noon he knows that Sam is walking (P4). The fact about Sam is the same fact. What is new is only that this moment is now. - The defender of God in time (P8) describes such a God as knowing, at each moment, the truths that are true at that moment, with no physical observation at all. 3. Nothing reaches God by a route. Knowledge is acquired when it reaches the knower by some route: seeing, hearing, being told, working it out. Nothing reports to God that it is noon. No messenger runs to him, and no clock is consulted. He knows each truth when it is true, as he knows every other truth, by his nature. - Picture someone who never needs to look at a clock because he simply always knows what time it is. Each minute he knows something new, and nothing has told him. 4. The alternative is a God who does not know what is happening. Some defenders of timelessness accept that God does not know tensed truths at all, and count it no loss. The same defender replies that this gives up God's omniscience, his knowing every truth there is, and that it is "a poor bargain, indeed, to auction off omniscience in order to purchase timelessness." Whichever side is right, neither has God finding anything out. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Does Not Look Ahead: How Foreknowledge Is Possible
+ Middle knowledge needs a "before": God is supposed to know what you would do before he decides to create you. If God is timeless there is no before, and if he is in time there was a time when he had not yet decided.
1. The "before" is an order of reasons. Middle knowledge comes before God's decree the way a reason comes before what it is a reason for (P5). Molina said the priority holds "in our way of conceiving it, with a basis in reality." God can know what will happen only on condition of knowing what would happen and what he has decided, and that condition is the whole of the "before." - A judge's verdict rests on the evidence. If she weighs the evidence and gives her verdict in the same breath, the verdict still rests on the evidence and not the other way round. 2. On the timeless view the order is an old one. Aquinas distinguished his three aspects of God's knowing, and Scotus his moments, within a God they held to be timeless (P5). Middle knowledge adds one more step to an order that timeless theologians had already built. 3. On the temporal view there was never a time of not knowing. If God is in time, there was no moment when he had not yet decided. His decisions are not, in the words of the defender of God in time (P5), "preceded by a period of ignorance and indecision." He has always known what every creature would freely do, and always decided what he decided. The order of reasons stands, and no stretch of time is needed to hold it. 4. The objection asks for a clock the account never needed. Two leading defenders of middle knowledge, the defender of God in time and another (P8), have argued that God, without the world, would be timeless. On their view the three moments are an order of reasons within God's timeless life without the world, and the decree is his free decision that time should begin. On the classical view the moments are an order within eternity and nothing more. On the everlasting view they are an order held through all time. In none of the three is there a moment when God did not know. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It Philosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding Objection
+ A timeless God brings the whole of time into being in one act. Then every event in it, your choices included, is the work of that one act, and timelessness brings the decree with it.
1. The strongest form of this objection is a Reformed one. A leading Reformed philosopher who holds God timeless (P6) says that God "brings into being (timelessly) the whole temporal matrix," and that he knows what will happen "as a result of ordaining or effectively willing or otherwise ensuring" it. On that view the timeless picture coincides with the decree reading, on which God knows our choices by deciding them. The one act that makes time also makes everything in it go the way it goes. 2. Giving someone existence is not settling his choices. God gives Sam his existence at every moment of the race, mile twenty included. Without God, Sam would not be there to choose anything. But to give a person his being is not to make his choices go the way they go. - On the account of middle knowledge, God is a necessary condition of Sam's choice: without God, no choice. On the decree reading, God is a necessary and sufficient condition: God's act alone is enough to make the choice go the way it goes. The first leaves the choice Sam's. The second does not. - Think of the owner of a theater who keeps the lights on and the stage standing for a whole evening of improvised comedy. He gives the show everything it needs in order to happen, and he writes none of its lines. God places, and he does not script. 3. History pulls the two apart. Reformed theologians have held timelessness together with the decree reading. Boethius and Molina held it without the decree reading: Boethius grounded God's knowledge in sight, and Molina grounded it in middle knowledge together with a decree that places and does not script (P5, P6). So the decree reading does not come with timelessness. It comes with a further claim, about what settles a creature's choice. Two medieval masters are harder to place. - Scotus grounded God's knowledge of what will be in what his own will has decided, and yet he defended the will's freedom as stoutly as anyone (P6). - Aquinas, who taught both the sight and the causality of God's knowledge, is read by some with the decree reading and by others without it. 4. That further claim is answered on its own ground. The decree reading is refused because on it something other than the creature settles every choice, and a choice settled from outside is not the chooser's own. That case does not depend on what time is, and neither does the refusal. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin Philosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding Objection
+ Even if God is timeless, Jesus was not. On the night he was betrayed he foretold Peter's denial, a man in time knowing a free choice before it was made, and the Boethian answer cannot reach that.
1. The incarnate Son did know in time. That should be granted at once. Christians confess Jesus as the incarnate Son, God the Son become man. On the night he was betrayed, after Peter had promised never to fall away, Jesus told him, "Truly, I tell you, this very night, before the rooster crows twice, you will deny me three times" (Mark 14:30). Whatever is true of God's eternity, the man who said those words said them that night at the Mount of Olives, a few hours before Peter chose. - So for Christians, knowledge of a free choice, held in time before the choice is made, is not optional on any view of eternity. - That is one more reason the Boethian answer cannot carry the case by itself (P2). A believer who holds that God is timeless still needs another answer for the words spoken that night. 2. The words spoken that night waited on Peter. Jesus said it because Peter would do it, and Peter did not do it because Jesus said it. Had Peter stood firm in the high priest's courtyard, the words spoken that night would never have been those words (P3). - The knowledge was no guess, and still it did none of Peter's denying. Margaret's certainty on her bench moves neither of Sam's legs, and a certainty that cannot be wrong moves them no more, since knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. - When the rooster crowed the second time, Peter remembered what Jesus had said. Mark tells the rest in six words: "And he broke down and wept" (Mark 14:72). Those are the tears of a man who knew the denial was his own. 3. How the Son knew belongs to the doctrine of Christ. Christians confess one person in two natures, truly God and truly man, as the Council of Chalcedon put it in 451. How the Son's human mind came to know what it knew is a question inside that confession, and Christians answer it in more than one way. - Some hold that his human mind shared, as far as a human mind can, in what he knew as God. - Others point to his own words, that the day and hour of his return were known to the Father and not to the Son (Mark 13:32), and hold that the Father made things known to him as he willed, much as he did to the prophets. - On either answer, what Jesus knew about Peter waited on what Peter would do, and it settled nothing. 4. Whether the incarnation puts God in time is disputed. The defender of God in time (P8) calls the incarnation "a special thorn in the side of advocates of divine timelessness." A God who becomes a man, who "increased in wisdom and in stature" (Luke 2:52), who sleeps and wakes and dies, seems to have a before and an after. - Defenders of timelessness answer with the two natures. Whatever the Son does and suffers in time, they say, he does and suffers as man, while as God he remains what he eternally is. - That question belongs to the doctrines of God and of Christ, and freedom does not wait on it. On either answer, what the Son knew waited on Peter's choosing (P3). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+ A prophecy is not a belief tucked away in eternity. It is ink on a card, written on Saturday, as hard a fact as there is, so Sam could choose otherwise on Sunday only if he had power over Saturday.
1. This is the hardest case for the dependence answer. Part of this should be granted at once. The card is a real thing, written on Saturday, and nobody on Sunday can reach back and change a drop of its ink. A prophecy spoken or written is a harder case than a belief God keeps to himself, and if the dependence answer needed any power over Saturday, it would fail on the spot. - The card also shows why the Boethian answer cannot finish the job alone. Whatever eternity is like, the card sits in Saturday (P2). 2. Sam needs no power over Saturday. The dependence answer does not say that Sam can change the card. It says what would have been: had Sam kept running, God would have told the prophet something else, and there would never have been a card saying that Sam walks. - A different Saturday is not an altered Saturday. Nobody would have erased the card. It would simply never have been written. - A statement of that shape is a counterfactual, a statement about what would have been the case had things gone differently. Counterfactuals often run backward without anything reaching back. If the cake had been on the table at six, someone would have baked it that afternoon, and nobody thinks the table reached back into the afternoon. 3. The card's words wait on Sunday. A fact is soft when it waits on something still to come, the way a consequence waits on its condition (P3). The card's words are a consequence of Sunday in just that way: they are there because God told the prophet, and God told him what Sam would do. - A guess written on the same card would be different. Its words would come from the guesser and not from God, so its ink would wait on nothing; only whether the words turn out true would wait on Sunday. What makes this card soft is where its words came from. - Which facts about Saturday are soft cannot be told by looking at them. The card looks just as solid either way. 4. Even a fixed card would settle nothing. Suppose the objector were granted everything, and the card were as fixed as the Battle of Hastings. It would still settle nothing, because knowledge and guarantees settle nothing, and a choice that nothing but the chooser settles is free (P3). - A scoreboard that showed the final score before kickoff, and was never wrong, would still not kick a single goal. 5. How a timeless God speaks in time is a question about eternity. A timeless God who tells a prophet something on a Saturday acts with an effect in time, and how eternity does that is a real question for the timeless view (D5). The arguments for God in time press it hard (P8). The two defenders of timelessness who proposed the new kind of simultaneity (D5) gave the prophecy case a whole paper in 1991. However it is answered, it concerns eternity and not freedom. On either view of time, the card's words wait on Sam's choosing. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+ A timeless God cannot depend on anything. Aquinas qualified Origen's formula for exactly this reason: if God's knowledge waited on what creatures do, the eternal God would be acted on by his creatures.
1. This objection comes from the tradition the Boethian answer belongs to. It is not a skeptic's objection. Aquinas quotes Origen's formula (P3) and then qualifies it: from a thing's being future it follows that God knows it, but its being future is not the cause of his knowing. Behind that lies a conviction about God himself. Nothing outside God acts on him, and a God whose knowledge waited on his creatures would seem to be a God they acted on. Thomists, the followers of Aquinas, and many Reformed theologians press the point against any dependence in God, timeless or not. The conviction should be granted in full. Nothing outside God acts on him, adds to him, or reports to him. 2. Dependence in the order of reasons is not being acted on. God knows that Sam walks because Sam walks. That "because" is the ordinary one that ties any truth to what it is about, and nothing travels along it: nothing passes from mile twenty into God, and nothing pushes. - Think of a sentence about the weather in Lisbon, written in Ohio. It is true because of the weather in Lisbon, and nothing has traveled between the two cities. The rain does nothing to the sentence. - That is all (P3) claims. God's knowledge matches Sam's choice, whichever way the choice goes. It is not put there by the choice. - Nothing in the objection turns on time, either. A God in time whom nothing outside acts on faces the same question and gives the same answer. 3. On middle knowledge, God knows from within himself. Molina held that God "saw in his own essence what each such will would do with its innate freedom." Nothing outside God informs him. Yet what he knows answers to the creature's freedom: "If created free choice were going to do the opposite, as indeed it can, then God would have known that very thing through this same type of knowledge and not what he in fact knows." - So the content of God's knowledge follows the creature, and its source is God. Nothing is received, and that is what (P3) means by dependence. 4. Knowledge that waited on nothing would come from the will. If God's knowledge of Sam's choice did not answer to the choice at all, it would have to come from God's will, joined to his knowledge, making the choice go as it goes. That is the decree reading (D10), on which God knows our choices by deciding them, and it is refused because on it something other than the creature settles every choice. - Think of a novelist, who knows what her characters will do because she writes it. That is the knowing the decree reading gives God, and it is why, on that reading, no character settles anything. - Aquinas's readers divide over whether his own account comes to that (P6). Pressed to the end, the objection leads to the decree reading, and the question becomes the one (D10) answers. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Does Not Look Ahead: How Foreknowledge Is Possible Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It

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