Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Epistemology

Study of Knowledge

Infinitism

(●) Infinitism holds that the chain of reasons behind a justified belief never has to end. + Sam's aunt phones one evening to tell him the old bridge on Route 9 is closed. Sam, who has a stubborn streak, asks how she knows. Her neighbor told her, she says. And how does the neighbor know? It turns out the neighbor heard it from a man at the hardware store, who read it in the county newsletter, which got it from the highway department. Most of us would stop asking somewhere around the hardware store. But suppose Sam never stopped. Would there always be another answer? And would the answers ever have to come to an end? That ordinary string of "How do you know?" questions is one of the oldest puzzles in the theory of knowledge. - Epistemology, from the Greek word for knowledge, is the part of philosophy that studies knowledge and justification. Justification is the good standing a belief needs, besides being true, to count as knowledge. If you believe it will rain because you read the forecast, your belief is justified. If you believe it because you flipped a coin, it is not, even if it rains. - The regress problem is the puzzle of where reasons stop. If every belief needs a reason, and every reason is another belief that needs a reason of its own, the chain seems to go on forever. - There seem to be three ways out of the puzzle. • The chain may stop at beliefs that need no further reason. That is foundationalism, and Sam's chain might end with the highway worker who watched the barricades go up. • It may loop back and support itself as a whole, which is coherentism. • Or it may go on forever, which is infinitism. Infinitism takes the third road. It holds that a belief is justified by a chain of reasons that never ends, in which no reason is final and no reason repeats. On this view Sam could keep asking forever, and there would always be a fresh answer, one that had not been given before. The road is old, but for most of history almost no one defended it as the right answer. - Aristotle considered it in his writings on proof. He agreed that if every proof needed a prior proof, nothing could ever be proved. His conclusion was that some knowledge does not come by proof at all: the first starting points are known directly. - The ancient skeptics, philosophers who doubted that anything could be known, used the endless chain as one of their weapons. Their arguments survive in the writings of Sextus Empiricus (about AD 200). - In 1868 the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce argued that no cognition (no act of knowing or perceiving) is absolutely first. Every cognition, he said, is determined by cognitions that came before it. His view is often counted as an early relative of infinitism.

(●) Infinitism's defenders argue that every alternative is either circular or arbitrary. + For most of its history, then, the endless chain was mainly a skeptic's weapon. That changed in the late 1990s, when the American philosopher Peter Klein, in a series of papers, made infinitism a serious position again. His argument rests on two principles, which he calls the principle of avoiding circularity and the principle of avoiding arbitrariness. - No circles. A belief cannot turn up in its own chain of support. If A is supported by B, and B by A, nothing has been shown. Think of two job applicants who list each other as their only reference. - No arbitrary stopping points. For any reason that supports a belief, there must be a further reason available for it. To stop the chain at a belief with nothing behind it is, Klein argues, to stop it arbitrarily, like a parent who ends a child's long string of "But why?" with "Because I said so." - If both principles hold, the chain cannot loop and it cannot stop. So it must go on. You may already be thinking that no human mind could hold infinitely many reasons. Klein saw that objection coming, and his answer is the idea of an available reason. - On his view, a reason must be available in two ways. It must really be a good reason for the belief, and the believer must be able to call it up when needed, whether or not she has ever actually thought it. - Think of it this way: you have never once thought "1,000,003 is larger than 1,000,002," yet you would agree the moment someone asked. The infinitist's claim is that reasons can be in your possession in that ready-to-hand way, and that an endless supply of them can be too. - Klein also holds that justification comes in degrees. A belief becomes better justified as the chain of reasons behind it is extended, and the chain is never finished. Knowledge, on his view, requires only that a person reason far enough for the setting she is in, which means farther in a courtroom, say, than in a chat over the backyard fence. Others have since joined him. Scott Aikin (2011) defended infinitism at book length, and John Turri and Klein edited a collection of essays on it in 2014. Two philosophers in the Netherlands, David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, brought in mathematics. - Each link in their chains is a conditional probability, the chance that one belief is true given the next one down. The chance that the street is wet, given that it rained, is a conditional probability. - They showed that certain endless chains of this kind settle on a definite value for the belief at the top. Think of adding a half, plus a quarter, plus an eighth, and so on forever. The sum never stops growing, yet it never passes one, and it settles on exactly one. - They also showed that links far down the chain matter less and less, the way the thousandth fraction in that sum barely changes the total. They called this result fading foundations (2017).

(●) Classical foundationalism answers that reasons a person cannot have cannot justify anything. + Classical foundationalism is the view that knowledge rests on foundations that are certain. The foundations are of two kinds: a person's awareness of their own present experience, like the throb of a headache, and truths seen to be true just by understanding them, like two plus two making four. Everything else is reached by reasoning from those foundations, and the reasoning yields probability. It answers infinitism in two ways. - The chain is not the believer's. Justification is the standing a belief has given what the believer has to go on. An endless chain of reasons, most of which no human being could ever think, is not something any believer has. - The stopping point is not arbitrary. The chain stops at what is certain, and certainty is the opposite of arbitrary. Ask "How do you know you have a headache?" while it throbs, and the answer is the headache itself. Behind the second answer stands a famous line from the American philosopher C. I. Lewis (not to be confused with C. S. Lewis), written in 1946: "if anything is to be probable, then something must be certain." - The thought behind the line is that a belief is always probable on something, some body of evidence. If that evidence were itself only probable, and its evidence too, all the way down, nothing would ever get started. It would be like a stack of IOUs with no money behind any of them. - Hans Reichenbach, a German-born philosopher of science, disputed the line, most famously in a 1952 exchange with Lewis. Atkinson and Peijnenburg have since taken up Reichenbach's side with new mathematics, and the exchange is still one of the live questions in the debate (D2, D3). The first answer, that the chain is not the believer's, can be set out as a deductive argument. Its premises, the statements it reasons from, work like a locked chain: if each link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. Each premise need only be more plausible than its denial, not certain beyond all doubt.

(P1) A belief is justified only by reasons the believer actually has. + Justification is the standing a belief has given what the believer has to go on, and so the reasons that justify it must be ones she actually has. (1) A reason has to be the believer's own. - A belief is justified when the person holding it has good reason to hold it. A good reason that exists somewhere in the world, but not in the believer's mind, does nothing to make her belief reasonable. - Think of a student who writes the right answer on an exam by guessing. As it happens, there is a proof of that answer in the back of the textbook. The proof is a perfectly good reason, but it is not hers, and it does nothing to turn her lucky guess into a reasoned answer. (2) Infinitists themselves agree that the reasons must be hers. - Infinitism is not a view on which reasons can lie outside the mind. Its leading defender insists that the reasons in the chain must be available to the believer: things she could call up and use, not proofs in a textbook she has never opened. - So the two sides do not disagree about whether the reasons must be hers. They disagree about what counts as having them, and about whether an endless chain of them can be had. (3) Having a reason is more than being able to form one. - You actually have many beliefs you are not thinking about right now: your phone number, say, or the name of your first school. These are stored beliefs, and they count. - A belief you would form if someone asked is a different thing. Philosophers mark the difference with two names that are, unhelpfully, almost the same. Dispositional beliefs are beliefs held in storage. Mere dispositions to believe are a readiness to form a belief you do not yet hold. • Your phone number is a dispositional belief, stored and waiting. That your phone number has fewer than forty digits is, for most people, only a disposition to believe: you would agree at once, but until a moment ago you had never actually believed it. - The difference matters for justification, because a belief can rest only on what is already there. A reason she has not yet formed is not yet anything her belief can stand on. - Think of a library book on the shelf versus a book the library could order. The first is in the collection. The second is not, even if it would arrive by Tuesday. Therefore, a belief is justified only by reasons the believer actually has, held in mind or in storage, and not by reasons she would merely be able to form.

(P2) No finite believer has an infinite chain of reasons. + A human mind holds only finitely many reasons. Worse for infinitism, an endless chain of reasons that never repeat would outgrow even what a mind could call up. (1) A finite mind holds finitely many reasons. - A human being lives for some decades and thinks a finite number of thoughts. Her stored beliefs, however many there are, are finite too. - Put a number on it. Someone who lived ninety years and took on a brand-new belief every second, awake or asleep, would end with fewer than three billion. That is a great many beliefs, and it is exactly as far from infinity as the number one. - It can seem that a finite mind has endlessly many beliefs about numbers, one for every pair it could compare. But those are not stored one by one. They come from a rule a person has learned and can apply to any case, and a rule is a disposition to believe, not a store of infinitely many beliefs (P1, D1). (2) An endless chain without repeats outgrows any mind. - The chain may not loop, so no reason in it may repeat an earlier one. Every link has to be a new thought. - Think of license plates. A state that issues seven-character plates will one day run out, because only so many different strings fit in seven characters. To give every new car a plate never used before, forever, the state would have to keep making the plates longer, until one day no plate fit on a car. - Thoughts are in the same position. A human mind builds them from a limited stock of ideas, and from a limited stock only so many different thoughts of any given length can be built. So an endless chain of new thoughts must sooner or later contain thoughts longer than any given length, and in the end longer than any human mind can take in. - An infinitist will answer that no reason has to be more complex than the one before it. That is true of any single step, but not of the whole chain. With repeats forbidden, it fails even the infinitist's own test for having a reason, which is being able to call it up. • Shorthand does not escape the count. You might hope to pack a long thought into a short label, the way the word "googolplex" names a number whose digits could never all be written down. But the label is itself built from the same limited stock of ideas, so labels run out just as plates do. Shorthand only moves the limit. • Nor does taking a thought in piece by piece. A thought she never takes in whole is not one she can see supports anything, the way no one can judge a sentence whose beginning she has forgotten by the time she reaches its end. (3) Infinitists concede that no one reasons through the whole chain. - Infinitism's leading defender holds that justification grows as the chain is extended and that the chain is never finished. - So the part of the chain a believer has actually reasoned through is always finite. Past it, a link or two may already be stored beliefs, but most of the further reasons are ones she could form and has not. Those are at best available, and availability is not having (P1). - Think of a road crew paving a highway that is planned to run forever. However long they work, the road you can actually drive on stops at the last mile they laid. Therefore, no finite believer has an infinite chain of reasons, whether "having" means holding the reasons or being able to call them up.

(C) Therefore, no human belief is justified by an infinite chain of reasons. + No human belief is justified by an infinite chain of reasons, and that means infinitism, the view that justification comes from such a chain, is false. The case for this is short to state. Justification comes only from reasons the believer actually has (P1). Every human being is a finite believer. And no finite believer has an infinite chain of reasons (P2). The reasoning is a syllogism, an argument from two premises to a conclusion, and it is valid, which means true premises guarantee a true conclusion. It has the same shape as "Every dog is a mammal; no fish is a mammal; so no fish is a dog." Here it runs: every chain that justifies a belief is one its believer has; no infinite chain is one a human believer has; so no infinite chain justifies a human belief. One word carries the weight in both premises, and it has to mean the same thing in each, or the reasoning would prove nothing. That word is "has," and it keeps the meaning (P1) gives it, a reason held in mind or in storage, all the way through. (P2) holds even on the looser meaning infinitists prefer, which is being able to call a reason up. (1) The chain must stop somewhere. - Since every believer's chain is finite, it ends. The question left over is where it ends, and whether the place it ends is a good one or an arbitrary one. (2) The stopping point need not be arbitrary. - This is a further claim, not part of what the syllogism proves. (P1) and (P2) show only that every believer's chain ends; the case that it can end well is made in answer to the arbitrariness objection (D4). - Infinitism was driven by the worry that every stopping point is arbitrary. But a chain that stops at what the believer is directly aware of, or at what she sees to be true by understanding it, stops at something that needs no further reason, because it is present to her mind. - Think of the throb of a headache, or of seeing that two plus two makes four. Neither is a place where the reasons simply gave out. In each case the believer has reached something she can see for herself. (3) Infinitism still leaves a lesson worth keeping. - Infinitists are right that a good reasoner should always be willing to give another reason when asked, and that there is no point at which inquiry is finished forever. That humility survives the failure of the view. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism Philosophy / Epistemology: Coherentism Philosophy / Epistemology: Internalism Philosophy / Epistemology: Skepticism

On infinitism: Aikin, Scott F. Epistemology and the Regress Problem. New York: Routledge, 2011. Aikin, Scott F. "Meta-epistemology and the Varieties of Epistemic Infinitism." Synthese 163 (2008): 175-185. Atkinson, David, and Jeanne Peijnenburg. Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem. Cham: Springer, 2017. Klein, Peter D. "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons." Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 297-325. Klein, Peter D. "Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem." In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa, 131-140. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005. Klein, Peter D. "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning." Philosophical Studies 134 (2007): 1-17. Peijnenburg, Jeanne. "Infinitism Regained." Mind 116 (2007): 597-602. Peijnenburg, Jeanne, and David Atkinson. "Grounds and Limits: Reichenbach and Foundationalist Epistemology." Synthese 181 (2011): 113-124. Peirce, Charles S. "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man." Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2 (1868): 103-114. Turri, John, and Peter D. Klein, eds. Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. On the regress and foundations: Audi, Robert. The Structure of Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Audi, Robert. "Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe." Noûs 28 (1994): 419-434. Bergmann, Michael. "Is Klein an Infinitist about Doxastic Justification?" Philosophical Studies 134 (2007): 19-24. Fumerton, Richard. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. Ginet, Carl. "Infinitism Is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem." In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa, 140-149. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005. Lewis, C. I. An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1946. Lewis, C. I. "The Given Element in Empirical Knowledge." Philosophical Review 61 (1952): 168-175. McGrew, Timothy J. The Foundations of Knowledge. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. McGrew, Timothy, and Lydia McGrew. Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason. London: Routledge, 2007. Reichenbach, Hans. "Are Phenomenal Reports Absolutely Certain?" Philosophical Review 61 (1952): 147-159. Sosa, Ernest. "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980): 3-25. Historical sources: Aristotle. Posterior Analytics. Book 1, chapter 3. Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. About AD 200. Biblical citations: Acts 2:32; 1 Peter 3:15. Scripture quotations are from the English Standard Version.
+ Availability is a real way of having a reason, and drawing the line at stored beliefs simply assumes infinitism is false. A finite mind can have endlessly many available reasons, the way it has endlessly many beliefs about numbers.
1. Availability is the heart of the infinitist reply. The strongest form of this objection says that (P1) begs the question. In philosophy that phrase means assuming the very point in dispute, and the charge is that by drawing the line at stored beliefs, (P1) has ruled infinitism out before the argument even starts. Klein's answer to the finite-mind objection is that a reason need only be available: it really is a good reason, and the believer can call it up when the question arises. A thought she would form on the spot, from concepts and habits of reasoning she already has, is hers in every way that matters. Part of this should be granted. Availability is a real relation between a person and a reason. And the line between a stored belief and a ready disposition to believe is not always sharp. Where, exactly, does a belief you could produce in half a second stop being stored? 2. A blurry line still has clear cases on each side. Dusk makes it hard to say exactly when day ends, but noon is still day and midnight is still night. The same holds here. - Your own phone number, dialed a hundred times, is stored. - A claim about a number with a billion digits, which you have never met and could not read in a lifetime, is not stored. You could not call it up either. - An endless chain needs infinitely many reasons of the second kind, not just a few from the blurry middle. 3. Number beliefs come from a rule, not a store. You can answer "Is 1,000,003 larger than 1,000,002?" instantly because you know a rule for comparing numbers. The rule is one thing you have. The infinitely many answers it could give are not separately stored. - Think of a calculator. It can give the square root of any number you type in, because it has one method for finding square roots. That does not mean it has infinitely many square roots stored inside it. - Whatever support a rule-made reason gives comes from the rule and the case it is applied to, and she has both. The endless list of answers adds nothing the rule did not already hold. 4. Availability runs out too. Suppose we grant availability as the test of having a reason. The chain still fails the test. Its links can never repeat, so they must grow without limit, and before long they are thoughts no human mind can take in, let alone call up (P2). So the conclusion does not hang on exactly where (P1) draws its line. Even by the infinitist's own measure, no finite believer has the whole chain. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Internalism
+ Atkinson and Peijnenburg proved that an infinite chain of probabilities can settle on a definite value. So justification can come from an endless chain after all.
1. The mathematics is correct. Atkinson and Peijnenburg showed that for certain chains, the probability of the belief at the top can be calculated from an endless series of conditional probabilities, each giving the chance of one link given the next (a wet street, given rain). The series settles on a definite value, and the far-off links matter less and less. This is real mathematics, and it refutes one well-known version of the regress argument: the claim that probabilities in an endless chain must shrink to zero (D3). 2. The calculation needs the conditional probabilities. The value at the top is fixed by the conditional probabilities along the chain, so everything turns on where those come from. The strongest reply on the infinitist's side is that they can be plain facts about the world, like the rate at which one generation of bacteria passes a trait to the next. Facts like that need no believer's reasons behind them. - Grant that the chances are facts. Even so, a person is justified in believing the conclusion only if she has reason to think the chances are what they are, and that knowledge is itself learned from evidence. So the regress comes back one level up, as the question of what justifies her beliefs about the chances. - Think of a recipe that turns out perfectly every time. Its reliability is a fact about the recipe. But a cook who has never tried it, and never heard from anyone who has, has no reason yet to trust it. 3. Fading foundations still need a believer. Defenders of fading foundations draw a further lesson. Since far-off links barely matter, a finite stretch of the chain fixes the top value as closely as anyone could wish, so a finite mind need not grasp the whole. The mathematics bears that out, and it should be granted. - But notice what is now doing the justifying. It is the finite stretch she has, together with the conditional probabilities along it, and she still needs reasons for those. - That stretch has a far end, and the belief sitting there counts for little in the sum, but not for nothing. She either has a reason for it or she takes it as given. Either way, her support ends inside the part of the chain she holds, and whether it ends somewhere good is the very question foundationalism sets out to answer. - The mathematics describes how probabilities behave. It does not hand a reason to someone who has not got hold of it. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism
+ Hans Reichenbach answered C. I. Lewis in 1952: probabilities can rest on other probabilities without any certainty at the bottom. Lewis's slogan that something must be certain is simply false.
1. The exchange is a real one. Lewis argued that if a belief is only probable, its probability rests on something else, and unless the chain ends in something certain, nothing is probable at all. Reichenbach, who called that demand "a remnant of rationalism," held that probabilities can support one another without any certain base. Lewis's last move was a challenge: show how an endless regress of mere probabilities could leave the first claim with any probability other than zero. Reichenbach never took the challenge up. Decades later Peijnenburg and Atkinson took up Lewis's challenge on Reichenbach's behalf, and their mathematics meets it as Lewis posed it: for many such chains, an endless regress gives the first claim a definite probability above zero. That much should be granted plainly. What the result shows about justification, though, is a separate question. 2. A probability is always a probability for someone. What the mathematics fixes is a number, given the conditional probabilities along the chain. Justification asks something else: what makes it reasonable for this particular person to hold the belief that strongly? Her answer can only come from evidence she has, and what she has is finite (P2). - Think of a set of directions in which each step is half as long as the last. A mathematician can show that the endless list points at one exact spot. A traveler, though, can follow only the directions she has actually been handed. 3. The philosophical dispute is still open. Whether every probability must rest on something certain is a question philosophers still debate, and the classical foundationalist case for it rests on more than Lewis's arithmetic. But the conclusion (C) does not need Lewis's slogan. It needs only (P1) and (P2). Whatever an endless chain does in the mathematics, it does not give a believer a reason she can have. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism
+ Every foundation is arbitrary. Either the believer has a reason to think beliefs of that kind are likely true, and then it is not a foundation, or she has none, and then stopping there is just giving up.
1. The worry drives the whole view. Klein's principle of avoiding arbitrariness says that for every reason there must be a further reason available. The strongest form of the objection is a dilemma, an argument that offers two options and shows that each one leads to trouble. - A foundationalist says some beliefs are basic, meaning they are justified without resting on any further belief. They are basic, she says, because they have a special feature, such as being about present experience. - Either the believer has a reason to think beliefs with that feature are likely true, and then that reason is one more link, so the belief was not basic after all. - Or she has no such reason, and then, from where she stands, holding the belief is arbitrary. 2. Some starting points answer the question by themselves. Ask a person with a throbbing headache, "Why believe you have a headache?" She does not need a further reason. The headache itself is present to her, and her belief that it hurts is fixed by the pain. That is not stopping for no reason. It is reaching the thing the reasons were about all along. - Think of a surveyor asked how she knows the stake is where it is. She can cite her maps and measurements for a while, but eventually she simply points to the stake. 3. The foundation contains what makes it true. The dilemma assumes that a basic belief can be reasonable only by way of a general premise, something like "beliefs of this kind are usually true." The classical foundation needs no such premise. When she attends to the ache, the thought she forms is not a report about headaches in general. It is closer to pointing: "this is like this." The "this" picks out the ache itself, so the ache is part of what the belief says. - She is not trusting a kind of belief. She is aware of the very fact that makes this one true. And a belief built around that fact cannot be false, for a simple reason: without the ache, the "this" would point at nothing, and the belief would say nothing at all. - Ask her for a further reason, and you are asking for a reason to think the ache she is feeling is there. Nothing she could add would be better evidence than the ache. - An infinitist can reply that a further reason is still available, such as "I am aware of the ache." That may be so, and it does no harm. Her belief does not rest on it. 4. Truths seen to be true are not arbitrary either. "Why believe two plus two makes four?" can be answered only by looking at what the words mean, and when you do, you see that it must be so. That is the opposite of arbitrary. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism
+ Coherentism is circular and foundationalism is arbitrary, so infinitism is the only option left. Ruling out the alternatives is the argument.
1. The argument by elimination is clean. If the chain of reasons must either stop, loop, or go on, and stopping and looping both fail, then going on wins by default. Klein's case for infinitism has this shape, and the form is a good one. If only three people could have taken the cash box and two of them have alibis, the third took it. 2. One of the eliminations fails. Stopping fails only if every stopping point is arbitrary, and some are not (D4). So the elimination leaves two live options standing: foundations, and an endless chain. The question then becomes which of the two a believer can actually have, and only the first passes (P2). 3. The circle was rightly ruled out. Classical foundationalism agrees with Klein that circular support is no support. So the disagreement is narrower than it first looks. Both reject the circle, and they part ways only over whether the chain can stop well. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Coherentism
+ Klein's view is that knowledge needs only enough reasoning for the context. In ordinary life we stop when no one has a further question, and that is all knowledge requires.
1. This is a sensible point about practice. Klein holds that the chain of reasons can be extended as far as needed, and that in any setting there is a point at which further questions become unreasonable. A person who knows her car is in the driveway does not need to answer questions about whether the driveway exists. 2. The stopping point does the work of a foundation. The infinitist will say that the last belief reached is not unsupported, because further reasons are still available for it. Grant that. But the believer has not reasoned through those further reasons, and so what her belief actually rests on ends at the last belief she reached. For the most part, the further reasons are not even beliefs she holds in storage, only reasons she could form if asked, and those are not reasons she has (P1). Look at what that means in any one setting. The reasoning she has actually done ends at a belief she holds without further reasoning, and everything above it borrows its standing from that belief. That last belief is a foundation. What made it the foundation was the setting, not anything in the belief's own nature. - Reasoning passes support along from one belief to the next. It does not create support out of nothing, so the reasoning she has done is only as good as the place where it ends. - Think of a ladder propped on whatever happens to be under it that day: a step stool on Monday, a cardboard box on Tuesday. It always rests on something, and it is only as steady as that something. 3. The setting supplies none of the support. How far is far enough really can depend on the setting: more is asked in a courtroom than over a backyard fence. But the setting only decides how much support is needed. It supplies none of the support itself. - Think of a high-jump bar. Officials can set it at four feet or at six, and setting it lifts no one over it. - What the believer has for clearing the bar is the finite stretch of reasoning she has done, and that stretch is only as good as the belief it ends at. Classical foundationalism says where a good ending is found: in what the reasons were about (D4).
+ Infinitism is the most honest view. It admits that no belief is ever beyond question, while foundationalists pretend to a certainty no one has.
1. Intellectual humility is a virtue. No belief about the world is beyond question, and a good reasoner should always be ready to hear another objection. Infinitism builds that humility right into its account of justification. 2. Classical foundationalism claims certainty only where it is real. On classical foundationalism, beliefs about the world, the past, and other minds are not certain. They are probable, and open to revision. Certainty is claimed only for a person's awareness of her own present experience and for truths seen to be true by understanding them. That is a modest claim, and most people find it obviously correct when they think of a headache while it throbs. 3. Humility does not require an endless chain. A person can hold every belief about the world open to revision while still reasoning from a starting point she has. Humility is about how we hold our conclusions. It is not about whether reasoning has a beginning. - A good juror keeps an open mind about the verdict until the end, but she still starts from the evidence actually laid before her.
+ Peirce showed there are no first cognitions. Every thought is shaped by earlier thoughts, so there is no bottom layer of knowledge to stand on.
1. Peirce's point about thought is often right. Peirce argued in 1868 that every cognition is determined by earlier ones. About how we understand what we see, he has a point, because our understanding is shaped by what we already know. A doctor sees a shadow on an X-ray as a fracture where a layperson sees only a blur. 2. Shaping is not justifying. That earlier thoughts influence how we interpret experience does not mean the experience itself is a conclusion drawn from them. The ache in your tooth is there whether or not you have a word for it. What earlier thought shapes is the interpretation, and the interpretation is the part that can be wrong. 3. The foundation is the experience, not the interpretation. Classical foundationalism places certainty at the level of what is present to the mind, not at the level of what we make of it. Go back to the X-ray. The doctor's reading of the shadow as a fracture could be mistaken, but her experience of a pale shape in front of her is not something she is guessing at. So the fact that interpretation is always shaped by earlier thought leaves the foundation where it was. 4. Endless stages are not endless reasons. Peirce saw the obvious reply coming: a series of cognitions with no first one seems to need infinitely many thoughts before any thought could start. He answered that cognition is continuous, so that infinitely many stages can pass in a finite time. Picture a triangle lowered point-first into water. There is no first line where the surface meets it, since below any line you name there is another, closer to the tip. Yet the dipping began at a definite moment. - Grant the picture. The stages of one continuous act of perceiving are slices of a single event. They are not a chain of separate reasons, each saying something new in support of the one before. - Cutting a second into ever smaller instants does not give anyone infinitely many arguments. It leaves the count of reasons a person holds exactly where (P2) found it.
+ Michael Bergmann's objection actually helps infinitism. If Klein's view collapses into foundationalism about how beliefs are held, infinitism is still right about what makes a belief justifiable.
1. The distinction is real. Philosophers distinguish propositional justification, whether there are good reasons for a claim, from doxastic justification, whether a person's belief is actually held for good reasons. An engineer's report may give excellent reasons to think a bridge is safe. But a man who trusts the bridge because he likes its color is not believing for those reasons. Bergmann argued that Klein's account of doxastic justification is not really infinitist. His argument runs like this. - Every chain of reasoning a person actually carries out is finite. - Either the last belief in it is justified without being reasoned to from a further belief, which is just what foundationalism says. - Or it is not justified, and then it has no justification to pass up the chain. Defenders of infinitism reply that the view is mainly about propositional justification: for a justified belief there is an endless chain of good reasons, each available to the believer, whether or not she has yet reasoned through them. 2. Propositional justification still has to be had. On the infinitist's own terms, propositional justification is not a matter of reasons in the abstract. Each reason must be available to this believer. So it inherits the trouble of (P2): an endless chain with no repeats must outgrow what any human mind can take in, and a reason no one could take in is not available to anyone. - And where the reasons are available but not yet reasoned through, the question is still what the believer has to go on now (P1). - Think of an unopened safe full of evidence. The evidence may support the case, but the jury cannot convict on what it has not seen. 3. A finite chain must still end well. Suppose good reasons for a claim never run out. Even so, every believer works with a finite chain, and Bergmann's dilemma applies to it: the belief at its end carries the rest. Where that chain ends, and whether it ends well, is the question foundationalism answers.
+ Scripture tells believers always to be ready to give a reason. Infinitism fits that command better: a Christian should never claim to have reached the end of the reasons.
1. The command is real and important. Peter tells believers to honor Christ in their hearts, "always being prepared to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you" (1 Peter 3:15). Christians should never stop giving reasons, and infinitism honors that. 2. The command asks for a reason, not an endless chain. Peter does not ask believers to supply infinitely many reasons. He asks them to be ready with a reason, and his own sermon at Pentecost shows what that looked like in practice. He argued from the prophets and the Psalms, and when he reached the resurrection itself, he pointed to what the apostles had seen: "This Jesus God raised up, and of that we all are witnesses" (Acts 2:32). His case ran back to things his hearers could check, Scripture they knew and witnesses standing in front of them, and he offered it as a reason others could weigh. 3. Reasons that begin somewhere can be shared. A reason that ends in what someone saw, or in what anyone can see to be true, can be laid out for a skeptic to examine. An endless chain cannot be laid out at all. So the command to give a reason is best served by reasons that begin somewhere. Scripture does not teach a theory of knowledge, of course, and a Christian infinitist can obey the same command. The point is that the command is fully met by reasons a person can actually give. See also: Philosophy / Epistemology: Evidentialism
+ Scott Aikin's mixed infinitism grants that some beliefs have support of their own. Full justification, the kind that can meet every challenge, still needs an endless chain, so infinitism survives alongside foundations.
1. Mixed infinitism concedes a great deal. Aikin has defended a mixed version of infinitism, which he calls impure infinitism. On it, an endless chain of reasons is needed for a belief to be fully justified, but the chain is not enough on its own: it must also be anchored in other sources, such as experience, which supply some support without further reasons behind them. This is a careful view. It no longer says every stopping point is arbitrary, and that should be welcomed. The disagreement has narrowed to the top of the scale: full justification. 2. Full justification would then belong to no one. If full justification needs the endless chain, and no finite believer has that chain (P2), then no human being is fully justified in anything. - That is not a level of justification people reach. It is a horizon they walk toward and never arrive at. - Think of a race with no finish line. You can run it well, and some run it better than others, but no one ever finishes. - So the mixed view, stated honestly, agrees with the conclusion: no human belief is justified by an infinite chain of reasons. What remains of infinitism is an ideal, not an account of the justification anyone has. 3. Readiness for the next challenge belongs to inquiry. What the mixed view protects is a real good: the willingness to give one more reason when one more question comes (C). That willingness belongs to how a believer holds and tests her beliefs over time. It is not a condition her belief has to meet today in order to be reasonable. - A good doctor keeps listening for new symptoms after she makes a diagnosis. Her diagnosis was still well founded on the day she made it.

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