Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the Choice

(●) The best account of a free choice is that the person himself, not merely his desires and beliefs, causes it. + It is two in the morning and you are lying awake. A worry drifts into your mind about a bill you forgot to pay. You did not summon it; it simply arrived, the way a song arrives in your head. Then you decide to get up and write the email you have been putting off for a week. That one you did. You weighed it, you made up your mind, and you swung your feet onto the cold floor. Everyone knows the difference between a thought that happens to you and one you take up. The first is something you undergo; the second is something you do. And when a choice is free, you are the one who settles which way it goes. The question is what that means. Begin with the two words doing the work. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Your mother may be sure you will call on her birthday. Her being sure settles nothing, and you still make the call. The person who settles a choice is its source, the one it comes from, and defining freedom this way is called the source view. Put that way, a free choice has two halves. Nothing before the choice settled it, and the chooser did. Some philosophers hold that we really are free, and that a free choice is not determined: not settled beforehand by earlier conditions that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. They are called libertarians, a name that has nothing to do with politics. The view they reject, that every choice is determined, is called determinism. Libertarians agree on the first half: nothing before a free choice settled it. They disagree about the second half, about what it is for the chooser himself to settle it. Three answers are on the table, and each is named for what it says does the causing. - On the non-causal view, a free choice is not caused at all. It is simply an act of yours, and your reasons explain it without causing it. - On the event-causal view, your reasons and desires cause the choice, but without fixing it in advance: with everything before it exactly the same, they might have caused a different choice. Your desires, beliefs and brain activity at a given moment are your states, and a state's arising (a desire flaring up, a belief taking shape) is an event. That is where the name comes from. - On the agent-causal view, you yourself cause the choice. Not merely your desires, not merely a brain state, but you, the person, the one who has the desires and weighs them. Agent is simply the philosopher's word for someone who acts. The source of a free choice, on this view, is the person himself, and not merely the desires and beliefs he has. The argument is abductive, which means it reasons to the best explanation, the way a detective does. A detective cannot deduce the culprit like a proof in geometry. He lays out what has to be explained, looks at every suspect who might explain it, and names the one who explains it best. Here the fact to be explained is the one you met at two in the morning: when you choose freely, you settle what you do (P1). The suspects are the three accounts. The non-causal account leaves nothing to make the choice go the way it goes (P2). The event-causal account keeps the choice caused, but it leaves the choice settled by nothing at all, if a person's part in his choice is only the part his states play (P3). The agent-causal account takes the fact at its word. The person himself settled it (P4). Determinism's own account, on which the settling was finished before you arrived, is not among the suspects. It denies the first half of the fact. The case against it is made separately, by the Consequence Argument (if determinism is true, nobody has any say in what he chooses) and the manipulation argument (a determined choice is no freer than one designed by someone else). Who holds what, on agent causation: - Support: Thomas Reid argued for it in 1788, and Roderick Chisholm (1964), Richard Taylor (1966) and Timothy O'Connor (2000) restored it to modern philosophy. - Oppose: Robert Kane holds that a person's own efforts, causing a choice without fixing it, need no further kind of cause. Carl Ginet and Hugh McCann hold that a free choice needs no cause at all. Derk Pereboom grants that agent causation makes sense but doubts that we have it. Peter van Inwagen, himself a libertarian, argues that agent causation leaves the problem of luck, the worry that an undetermined choice is a matter of chance, where it was (2000). The argument that follows defends it.

(P1) When you choose freely, you yourself settle what you do. + This is the fact every account of free will has to explain: in a free choice, the person who makes it is the one who makes it go the way it goes. (1) Settling your own choice is what freedom is. - A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. The ability to have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was, usually goes along with that. But it is freedom's ordinary mark, not its definition. - One of today's leading defenders of free will puts it in a sentence: "It is up to me how I choose, and nothing determines my choice." - Think of signing a letter. The pen moved, the ink flowed and the muscles in your hand contracted, and none of them signed it. You did. (2) You know the difference from the inside. - Philosophers use the word phenomenological for how an experience seems from the inside. A philosopher who has written for years on the soul uses it to describe exactly this difference: "Most of us are quite aware of the different what-it-is-like, the different phenomenological texture in having a passive thought (e.g., when someone is talking to me) and an active thought (one to which I exercise my active power and choose to attend)." His "what-it-is-like" points at the same thing. - Deliberating has the same feel. When you weigh a decision, you are aware that you yourself are doing the weighing, that you are attending to some reasons and setting others aside, and that you are aiming at a conclusion. Sometimes you are aware of steering away from the conclusion you know is right, which is its own kind of evidence that the steering is yours. - Think of the difference between a tune that plays itself over and over in your head and a tune you decide to hum. You undergo the first. You do the second. (3) Praise and blame assume it. - The Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid put the link plainly in 1788. He argued that the determination of the will (the will's coming down on one side) is an effect, and that its cause "must be either the person himself, whose will it is, or some other being." If the person caused it, "he was free in that action, and it is justly imputed to him, whether it be good or bad." To impute an act to someone is to count it as his, to his credit or to his blame. - We hold people to account for what they settle, not for what merely happens in them. A man is blamed for the lie he chose to tell, not for the sneeze that interrupted it. (4) Every libertarian starts from this fact. - Philosophers call a starting fact like this a datum: something given, which every account has to explain. - The three libertarian accounts agree that a free choice must not be fixed in advance by what came before, and that the chooser must be its source. What divides them is the account of how. - Compatibilists, who hold that a choice can be free even if it was determined, accept the second half too: on their view your own deliberation settles what you do. What they deny is the first half. - You might suspect a trick here, as though "you yourself settle what you do" were the conclusion smuggled in at the start. It is not (D13). It is the fact the rival accounts are competing to explain, the way a detective and the suspects all agree that the window was broken and argue only about who broke it. Therefore, when you choose freely, you yourself settle what you do.

(P2) A choice that nothing causes is not one you settle. + The non-causal view keeps the choice undetermined by leaving it uncaused altogether. Its defenders say the choice is still yours, because by its very nature it is something you do. The trouble is that nothing then makes it go the way it goes. (1) On the non-causal view, a choice needs no cause to be yours. - Its defenders hold that a choice is intrinsically an action: an action by its very nature, the way a circle is round by its very nature. - Your reasons, on this view, explain the choice the way a purpose explains an action. You chose the job because you wanted to live near your mother, and that "because" names a goal, not a cause. - There is something right here. A choice really is an act and not a mere happening, and reasons really do explain by pointing to what the chooser was aiming at. (2) Settling is a kind of causing. - To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes. That is a relation between the chooser and his choice: he is what makes it go. If nothing causes the choice, then nothing stands in that relation to it, not even the chooser himself. - The standard reference survey of the debate, a scholarly encyclopedia article that philosophers themselves rely on, reports that the non-causal view has won little support among libertarians for just this reason. For many, self-determination, a person's settling of his own choice, seems to be an essentially causal notion, an idea with causing at its very core. - Think of a door that swings open in an empty room. Nobody pushed it, no draft moved it, nothing caused it at all. However gracefully it opened, nobody opened it. (3) The feeling of doing needs a real doing behind it. - One careful version of the view says what makes a decision an act is how it seems from the inside: it seems to the one deciding that he himself directly produces it. - If that seeming is accurate, he does produce his decision, and producing a decision is causing it. The view then has agent causation in everything but name. - If it is not accurate, the decision is his in where it happens and how it feels. It is his in nothing that made it go the way it went. And a feeling of doing can come apart from any doing, as experiments on the feeling of will suggest (D12). - Think of a recording of applause played in an empty hall. It sounds exactly like people clapping, and nobody is clapping. (4) Explaining a choice is not the same as settling it. - A reason tells you what the chooser was after. It does not tell you who or what made the choice go the way it went, since he had reasons on both sides. - The man who took the job to be near his mother also had reasons to stay, and he knew them. That he had a reason for going does not tell us what made him go. Therefore, a choice that nothing causes is not one you settle.

(P3) A choice that only your desires, beliefs and efforts cause, without fixing it, is settled by nobody. + The event-causal view keeps the causing and gives it to the chooser's states alone. Those states leave the choice open, as the view requires, and on its account nothing else is there to close it. (1) The event-causal view is a serious libertarian account. - Its defenders hold that a free choice is caused by the chooser's own reasons and desires, but nondeterministically: with the whole past exactly as it was, those reasons might have caused a different choice. - Take the man deciding whether to move for the job near his mother. On this view, his wish to be near her really does cause his decision to go. Yet with the whole past exactly as it was, his reasons for staying might have caused him to stay. - On this view nothing before the choice fixes it, and it is still caused by the person's own mental life. That is a genuine libertarian position, and it has many defenders among philosophers who believe in free will. (2) Its most developed version gives the agent real work to do. - Its leading defender focuses on the hard cases, where a person is torn: between keeping a promise and walking away, between telling the truth and saving his skin. In these moments, he argues, the person is trying to make both choices at once, and the outcome is genuinely undetermined. Whichever effort succeeds, the choice is his, made for his reasons and by his effort. - Picture a woman who promised to help a friend move on Saturday, and who has just been offered a day on the lake instead. On this account she is not simply leaning one way. She is making a real effort to keep her word and a real effort to go, both at once, and nothing fixes which effort will win. - He calls torn choices like hers self-forming actions, because they form the character from which later choices flow: a man who keeps a hard promise becomes, a little more, a man who keeps his promises. The account is subtle and serious. It is also one of the best resources a libertarian has against the charge that nobody can be responsible for the character he acts from. - The credit for the account is his, and so is a further condition he attaches to it. To be ultimately responsible is to be responsible all the way down: for the character a person acts from, and not only for the act. He holds that a person is ultimately responsible only if there were real alternatives at some of the choices that formed his character. That condition is his own. The source view does not need it, since a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. (3) On this view, nothing settles which effort wins. - The sharpest objection to the event-causal view comes from a philosopher who concludes that nobody has the freedom that makes blame deserved. Take a case, he says, where a person's motives pull equally hard both ways. His states "do not settle whether the decision will occur, but only render the occurrence of the decision about 50% probable. In fact, because no occurrence of antecedent events settles whether the decision will occur, and only antecedent events are causally relevant, nothing settles whether the decision will occur." Antecedent events are simply the ones that came before the choice. - On the event-causal view, the person's contribution to his choice just is the contribution of his states. His states leave the choice open. So the person, whose whole part is played by his states, does not close it either. - You might answer, "But those states are him. When they cause the choice, he has settled it." That is exactly the reply the view's defenders give (D5). - The trouble is that the very same states were there whichever way the choice went. Go back to the man and the job: his wish to be near his mother and his reasons for staying were all in place, exactly as they were, whether he went or stayed. So whatever made the difference between going and staying, it was nothing in his states. It can only be that one causal connection held rather than another, and nothing made that connection hold. A connection that holds with nothing making it hold is not anybody's doing. - Think of a pair of dice that are truly random, so that nothing about the throw fixes how they land. They come up seven. The dice were real, the throw was real, and the dice caused the seven. But nothing settled that it would be seven rather than eight. (4) The event-causal view is the libertarian's fallback. - The event-causal account secures the first half of the fact: nothing before the choice settled it. That half is essential, because it is where every libertarian parts company with the determinist. - Its defenders claim the other half too. They deny (P3), and hold that a person's own reasons and efforts, causing his choice without fixing it, are his settling it (D5). That reply is serious. (P3) is a judgment against it, not a proof. - So the account is a fallback. If agent causation failed (D1, D4), a libertarian would stand here, relying on that reply. Determinism would gain nothing either way, since the case against determinism never rested on agent causation. - Think of a spare tire. You would not choose to drive across the country on it, but it is a real tire, and a car with one in the trunk is not stranded. Therefore, a choice that only your desires, beliefs and efforts cause, without fixing it, is settled by nobody.

(P4) A person can himself cause his choice, for reasons of his own. + The agent-causal view says what the first two accounts leave out. The person, a single someone who endures through time, is himself the cause of his choice. And his causing is not just his states' causing under another name. (1) The view has a long and careful history. - Reid held it in 1788. In the twentieth century it was given a careful modern form, and it has been developed and defended since. - One of its modern restorers drew the picture in a single sentence: "each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved." A prime mover is a first cause, one that starts a chain of causes without being moved by an earlier one. Think of a child tipping the first domino in a long row: she starts the chain, and no domino pushed her. - A leading Christian defender of free will says the same thing in plainer words: "The agent himself is the cause of his actions. His decisions are differentiated from random events by being done by the agent himself for reasons the agent has in mind." (2) It takes (P1) at its word. - (P1) says that in a free choice the person himself settles what he does. The rival accounts accept the words and then give them another reading: an uncaused act that is his by its nature (P2), or his states causing the choice without fixing it (P3). The agent-causal view reads them straight. The person himself makes the choice go the way it goes. - So the view is not a strange new idea. It is the ordinary one, stated with care. A defender of free will writes that on it "it is you yourself, and not your overall antecedent mental states or character, that brings about your judgments." - Another of its modern defenders put into words the sense behind it. If something other than me caused my behavior, whether an event outside me or even "a nerve impulse, volition, or whatnot" inside me, "then I cannot regard the behavior as being an act of mine, unless I further believed that I was the cause of that external or internal event." A volition is an act of the will. (3) Causation by a thing is no strange idea. - The old charge was that agent causation is a strange extra kind of causing that only persons do. A number of philosophers answer that all causing is done by things exercising their powers, their abilities to act and be acted on. A magnet attracts iron. Water dissolves salt. A baseball breaks a window. - On that picture, a person causing his choice is not an oddity in kind. The cause is a thing, the person, and not an event, which is true of the magnet too. - The doubt that remains lies in a real difference between them. A magnet's power is passive: it has to be set off, and it goes off whenever iron comes near. A person's power to choose is active: nothing sets it off, and he uses it, for reasons. - For just this reason, some philosophers doubt that the general picture helps the agent-causal view. What the picture does do is clear away one charge, that causation by a thing is unheard of. The case that persons have an active power of their own kind rests on other evidence: the difference between a thought that happens to you and one you take up. A philosopher of the soul (P1) calls that difference "self-evident to introspective awareness," which is to say evident simply by looking inward. - Think of a cue ball striking the eight ball. We say the cue ball sank the eight, and nobody finds that mysterious, though the cue ball did nothing until the cue struck it. We say the player sank it too, and nothing struck the player. He took the shot. (4) A chain of passed-along causes needs a starter. - In a determined chain, every link is a caused cause: it passes along what it received, the way each domino passes along the push. Two philosophers of free will argue that nothing is passed down such a chain unless something at its head is able to start it, and that such a starter is a free agent, able to begin a chain without being pushed. - A cousin of that reasoning runs through the Kalam argument, the old argument that the universe began to exist and so has a cause. It concludes that the best explanation of that beginning is a personal agent able to bring about a new effect without any change in himself, the way a man who has been sitting still freely decides to stand. - If that is right, causation by an agent is not an oddity invented to rescue human freedom. It is the kind of causing that stands at the head of everything. (5) A creature made in God's image may share his kind of causing. - Scripture says that God made man in his image: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them" (Genesis 1:27). - The verse does not list what the image includes, and Christians have given more than one answer: rule over creation on God's behalf, relationship with him, reason and will. Many in the church's tradition have put free choice in it. Thomas Aquinas, following John of Damascus, taught that man bears God's image in being, like God, the source of his own actions, with free choice and control over what he does. - If God is that kind of cause, a creature made in his image may be a small cause of the same kind. Therefore, a person can himself cause his choice, for reasons of his own.

(C) Therefore, the best account of a free choice is that the person himself, not merely his states, settles it. + When you choose freely, the best account of what happens is that you yourself, and not merely your desires and beliefs, make the choice go the way it goes. Of the three accounts on offer, the agent-causal account alone explains the fact every libertarian starts from (P1) without reading it as something else. And nothing in it is invented just to save it. (1) It explains the whole fact. - The fact to be explained has two halves: nothing before the choice settled it, and the chooser did. Here is how the three accounts fare with it. • The non-causal account keeps the first half and cannot say who made the choice go its way (P2). • The event-causal account keeps the first half too, but it leaves the second to nobody, if a person's part in his choice is only the part his states play (P3). • The agent-causal account keeps both (P4). - Think of a detective weighing three stories. The first leaves nobody at the scene. The second puts someone there whose part does not explain what happened. The third puts someone there, able to do it, who fits every clue. That is the story he takes to the jury. (2) It is not ad hoc. - An explanation is ad hoc (Latin for "for this") when it invents something just to save itself, the way a student with no homework suddenly remembers a dog that ate it. - To posit something is to add it to your list of what is real, and agent causation does posit something. It is not a new kind of thing, since persons are already on everyone's list. What it posits is a power in persons to settle their own choices, and the posit was not invented to rescue the account. It is what the datum describes (P1), and it is the kind of power the case for a first cause already needs (P4). - Its real cost is that it does not fit a picture of the world on which only events cause events. Ontology is the philosopher's word for the inventory of what exists, and a philosopher who defends a naturalistic account of action, one that works within the picture of the world the natural sciences give, said so plainly: "Agent-causal relations do not belong to the ontology of the natural perspective." - That picture is a philosophical thesis, not the finding of any experiment (D4). So the mismatch counts against whichever of the two has the weaker claim on us. And a person's settling his own choices (P1) has at least as strong a claim as the picture does. (3) It fits what Christians already believe about God. - God's own freedom is agent causation in its highest form. God is free because nothing outside him settles what he wills, and he freely brought about a world that had not existed (P4). The same kind of power, given in small measure to creatures made in his image, is what many in the church have long taken that image to include. - The case for agent causation does not rest on that. It stands on the fact of free choice (P1) and the failures of the rival accounts (P2, P3). - Still, it would be strange if the power that explains creation had no likeness at all in the creatures God made in his image. A child is not his father, but a child with nothing of his father in him would be a surprise. (4) The best explanation is not a proof. - An abductive argument concludes to the best explanation, not to a proof. The detective who names the culprit has not watched the crime. He has found the account that best fits the clues. - Three findings would overturn the verdict: • a showing that causation by a person makes no sense (D1, D8); • evidence that it cannot fit the physical world (D4); • or a showing that a person's own reasons and efforts, causing a choice without fixing it, are his settling it after all (D5). - The last of these would put the event-causal account first, and it would leave freedom standing where it was (P3). - Short of those, agent causation explains the whole fact, and explains it better than its rivals do. Therefore, the best account of a free choice is that the person himself, not merely his states, settles it.

On agent causation and causation by substances: Chisholm, Roderick M. "Freedom and Action." In Freedom and Determinism, edited by Keith Lehrer, 11-40. New York: Random House, 1966. Chisholm, Roderick M. Human Freedom and the Self. The Lindley Lecture. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1964. Clarke, Randolph. "Are We Free to Obey the Laws?" American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2010): 389-401. Clarke, Randolph. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Griffith, Meghan. "Why Agent-Caused Actions Are Not Lucky." American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2010): 43-56. Lowe, E. J. Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. O'Connor, Timothy. "Agent-Causal Power." In Dispositions and Causes, edited by Toby Handfield, 189-214. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009. O'Connor, Timothy. "Agent-Causal Theories of Freedom." In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed., edited by Robert Kane, 309-328. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. O'Connor, Timothy. "Free Will in a Network of Interacting Causes." In Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Theology of Nature, edited by William M. R. Simpson, Robert C. Koons and James Orr. London: Routledge, 2021. O'Connor, Timothy. Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. O'Connor, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. "Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2022. Steward, Helen. A Metaphysics for Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Swinburne, Richard. Mind, Brain, and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Taylor, Richard. Action and Purpose. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966. Taylor, Richard. Metaphysics. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974. On event-causal and non-causal accounts: Ginet, Carl. On Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Goetz, Stewart. Freedom, Teleology, and Evil. London: T&T Clark, 2009. Kane, Robert. "Rethinking Free Will: New Perspectives on an Ancient Problem." In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed., edited by Robert Kane, 381-404. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Kane, Robert. The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. McCann, Hugh J. The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. Pereboom, Derk. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. On freedom defined by its source: Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013. Craig, William Lane. Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, On God: Attributes of God. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2025. Moreland, J. P. "Theism, Robust Naturalism, and Robust Libertarian Free Will." In The Naturalness of Belief: New Essays on Theism's Rationality, edited by Paul Copan and Charles Taliaferro, 213-238. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2018. Moreland, J. P., and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. 2nd ed. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2017. Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Critic sources engaged: Bishop, John. Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Broad, C. D. "Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism." In Ethics and the History of Philosophy: Selected Essays. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952. Helm, Paul. Reforming Free Will: A Conversation on the History of Reformed Views on Compatibilism (1500-1800). Fearn: Christian Focus, 2020. van Inwagen, Peter. "Free Will Remains a Mystery." Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 1-19. Wegner, Daniel M. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002. Historical sources: Aquinas, Thomas. De malo, question 6, reply to objection 15. Aquinas, Thomas. De veritate, question 24, article 4. Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae I.22.3 and I-II, prologue. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 2nd rev. ed. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1920. Astrain, Antonio. "Congregatio de Auxiliis." In The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 4. New York: Robert Appleton, 1908. Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 1748. Section VII, "Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion," and section VIII, "Of Liberty and Necessity." Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902. Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. 1739-1740. Book 1, part 4, section 6, "Of Personal Identity." John of Damascus. An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith II.12. Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. 1788. Edited by Baruch Brody. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969. Essay I, and Essay IV, chapter 1. Biblical citations: Genesis 1:27.
+ Agent causation is obscure. "The person did it" names the problem instead of solving it, since nobody can say what it is for a person, as distinct from anything happening in him, to cause something.
1. The charge has lost much of its force. The strongest form of this objection does not call agent causation a contradiction. It calls it empty: "the person himself caused it" adds nothing to "it happened in him," because nobody can say what the person's causing consists in. For a long time the standard objection went further and said that the very idea of causation by an agent, causation that cannot be boiled down to causation by his states, made no sense. The standard reference survey of the debate reports that the objection "has become less common," and it credits the change to pioneering work by the view's modern defenders. Two real questions remain (D3, D4). They are questions about how agent causation works, not proofs that it is incoherent. 2. We understand causation by things every day. A magnet attracts a nail. Acid eats through a coin. The sun warms a stone. In each case we name a thing and say it did something, and we are not confused (P4). - What is hard to understand is the opposite picture, on which only events cause events and no thing ever does anything. - The survey notes that some philosophers now regard that picture not as a discovery but as a legacy of the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume. Hume doubted that there are lasting things, substances, behind the qualities we perceive (a substance is a thing that lasts through its changes, like a stone or a person), and he held that all we ever observe of causation is one event followed by another. 3. Causation by events is no clearer at bottom. Hume's own point cuts both ways. When one billiard ball strikes another, he observed, we see the first move and then the second, and never the power by which the one moves the other. - Every account of causing ends in a relation it cannot build out of anything simpler. The event-causal theorist has no clearer grip on how one event produces another than the agent-causal theorist has on how a person produces his choice. - So "nobody can say what it consists in" is true of every causal relation at the bottom of its account. A relation that cannot be analyzed further is basic, which is not the same as empty. 4. The idea is no more obscure than the experience it describes. Everyone knows what it is to take up a thought rather than undergo it (P1). The agent-causal view takes that experience at its word; it does not invent it. Thomas Reid went further. Our very idea of a cause, he argued, probably comes from this experience, from our own exertions in making things happen. If he was right, causation by an agent is not the obscure case at all; it is the one kind of causing we know from the inside. Whether the experience can be trusted is a separate question (D12). - Think of trying to define "red" to someone. You cannot do it without pointing at red things. That makes red basic, not obscure. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It Matters
+ An enduring person is the same before, during and after a choice. If he is the cause, nothing explains why the choice happens at one moment rather than another.
1. The objection is a classic. The British philosopher C. D. Broad pressed it in 1952. An event happens at a moment. If its cause is a person, who has existed for years and was just as present a minute earlier, what makes the choice happen now rather than then? A cause that is always present seems to explain nothing about timing. 2. The person's causing happens at a time. The agent-causal view does not say that the person's existence causes the choice. It says that the person causes it, and his causing is itself something that happens at a moment. He exercises his power now, and the choice is made now. His exercising it is not a further event that needs a cause of its own (D8). - Think of a musician who has known a piece for years and begins to play it at eight o'clock. His knowing the piece did not start the music. His beginning to play did, and that happened at eight. 3. The timing has reasons. People usually choose when they have finished weighing, when the moment to act has come, or when something forces the question. Those reasons explain why the choice came now, and they do it without settling which way it went. - Think of ordering at a restaurant. You may have hovered between the soup and the salad for ten minutes, but you decide when the waiter arrives. His arriving explains the timing. It does not pick between the soup and the salad for you. See also: Natural Theology: The Kalam Argument
+ Reasons and agent causation cannot both be at work. Either the agent's causing ignores his reasons, and the choice is arbitrary, or the reasons do the causing, and the agent adds nothing.
1. This is one of the two live questions the view faces. The standard survey states it sharply: if the agent causes his decision and his reasons cause decisions too, is it not possible that the agent causes one decision while his reasons cause an incompatible one? Agent-causal philosophers have given two serious answers. 2. On one answer, the agent and his reasons act together. On the most detailed recent defense of the view, a free decision is caused both by the agent and by his reasons. His reasons make some choices likely; the agent settles which one is made. - That answers the survey's worry directly. On this view, when a decision is free, the reasons do not cause it by themselves. They cause only the decision the agent makes, together with him, so they cannot cause one decision while he causes another. - Think of a key and the hand that turns it. The cut of the key decides which locks it can open. It opens nothing until a hand turns it, and it cannot open one door while the hand is opening another. 3. On the other answer, reasons enter as what the agent is aiming at. On another leading defense, the agent causes his intention to act, and the reason he acts for is part of what that intention is about. The reason explains the choice because the choice was made for it. Nothing competes, because the reason is not a second cause standing beside the agent. It is what he was after. - Think of a woman who walks to the pharmacy to buy medicine for her sick son. Her reason does not push her down the street like a wind at her back. Getting him well is what she is walking for. 4. Either way, the choice is neither arbitrary nor handed to the reasons. The agent-causal view says a free choice is made by the person for reasons he has in mind (P4). That is exactly what separates it from a random event on one side and a mechanism on the other. - Think of a coin that lands heads, and a vending machine that drops whatever snack its button calls for. The coin had no reasons, and the machine had no say. A person choosing for his reasons is neither.
+ No science will ever find an agent-cause. The brain is a physical system, and physics leaves no room for a person to step in and cause anything.
1. This is the other live question. The standard survey names it as the second: whether agent causation is consistent with what the sciences tell us. Derk Pereboom has pressed the sharpest version. Some laws of physics are statistical: they fix only the odds, the way a law can say that half of a lump of radioactive material will decay within a set time without saying which atoms will. The objection built on them is a dilemma, an argument that offers two options and finds trouble in both. - If agent-caused choices always fell in line with the statistical laws of physics, that would be a wild coincidence, since nothing would make them do so. - If they did not fall in line, physics would be violated. 2. Physics has not shown that there is no room. "No room" would mean that every event in the brain is fixed by earlier physical events, and physics has not shown that. - Quantum mechanics, the physics of atoms and what they are made of, is indeterministic in its textbook formulation. Other interpretations, rival readings of what the same equations say about the world, are fully deterministic, and no experiment has yet told them apart. - None of that puts freedom in quantum chance. A choice left to chance would be a choice nothing settles, which is the luck picture this view rejects (D6). The point is only that "no room" is a philosophical claim about physics, not a finding of it. - Go back to the lump of radioactive material. The law fixes how much of it will decay within the hour. On the textbook reading, nothing at all fixes which atom goes first. 3. Steady numbers do not mean that nobody chose. The dilemma assumes that if agent-caused choices matched the statistics, the match would have to be an accident. Agent-causal philosophers have given two replies. - One asks why free choices should be expected to depart from the statistical laws at all. Nothing in freedom calls for breaking a law of physics. - The other argues that a person's power to choose, belonging to the living whole, could itself be governed by laws of this kind, so that choices matching the statistics would be no coincidence. - Think of an insurer's tables, which say year after year, and very accurately, how many of its drivers will crash. The numbers are steady. Nobody concludes that the drivers are not driving, or that it is a wild coincidence that the way they choose to drive keeps matching the tables. These replies are contested. 4. The view is not a claim about gaps in physics. Agent causation does not say that a person pushes on atoms from outside. It says that the person, a living whole with powers, is a cause of what his body does. - The answer is not settled by the fact that brain scans show brain activity when people choose. Of course they do. A person who chooses has a working brain. - Think of a pianist. Her fingers move by muscle and nerve every time she plays, and nobody concludes from a scan of her hands that she is not the one playing. Whether the sciences have found, or could find, that our choices are fixed before we make them is argued in full, with the famous brain-scan experiments and Pereboom's objection at full strength. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: The Brain Scans Have Not Found the Decision Before the Decider
+ Kane's event-causal account already gives the agent all the control he needs: the effort is his, the reasons are his, and whichever effort wins, the choice is his. Adding a special kind of cause is superfluous.
1. Kane's account deserves its due. It is the most developed event-causal account, and on the question of how a person comes to have the character he acts from, it is one of the best resources a libertarian has (P3). The strongest form of this objection answers the charge that the agent disappears from his own choice (P3) in two ways. - The agent is not a bystander to his states. His efforts, reasons and deliberation are him, acting, so when they cause his choice, he causes it. - "Settle" is doing double duty. If it means "fix beforehand," then nothing settles a free choice on any libertarian view, since the agent-causal person does not fix his choice before he makes it either. If it means "bring about in the choosing," then the effort that succeeds brings the choice about, and the effort is his. Either way, agent causation gains nothing. 2. The question is what settles which effort wins. Grant that both efforts are the person's. The choice goes one way. On the event-causal view, what makes it go that way rather than the other is nothing: the efforts leave it open, and the outcome falls out of an undetermined process. The person was involved in both efforts, and nothing about him settled which one succeeded. - Think of a tug-of-war in which you are pulling on both ends of the rope at once. Whichever end wins, you were pulling on it. But nothing you did settled which end would win. 3. Settling happens in the choosing, on both views. The second reply is right about one thing: on the agent-causal view too, nothing fixes the choice beforehand. The person settles it in making it. The question is what the making is. Go back to the man deciding whether to move for the job near his mother (P3), and suppose he goes. - On agent causation, his settling is his use of his power toward going. That use is something he does. Had he stayed, it would not have occurred, and a different use of the same power would have occurred instead. - On the event-causal view, everything that caused the going (his reasons, his efforts, his whole state of mind) was there, exactly the same, in the case where he stayed. So their causing the going, rather than the staying, was not anything they did, and not anything he did through them. One causal connection held rather than another, and nothing held it. - Think of an umpire who watches a close play and calls the runner out. Now think of a machine fed the same video, which prints "out" or "safe" at random, weighted by what it saw. Both calls are caused by what was seen. Only one of them was made by anyone. 4. Agent causation adds exactly what is missing. Take the undetermined outcome out of Kane's account for a moment. What is left is the same kind of control a compatibilist account gives a person: his reasons and efforts causing his choice. Put the undetermined outcome back, and the only change is that those causes no longer fix the choice. Taking away the fixing gives the person no more say over it. It opens a door without putting anyone at it. - Think of a thermostat that turns on the heat whenever the room drops below sixty-eight degrees. Wire a random delay into its switch and you have made it harder to predict. You have not given it any more say over the heat. - The agent-causal view keeps everything Kane's account gives: the reasons, the efforts, the undetermined outcome. It adds only the missing piece, that the person himself settles which way the choice goes. If that addition is needed to meet (P1), it is not superfluous. 5. Kane's account remains the libertarian's fallback. (P3) is a judgment against it, not a proof, and its defenders contest it. If agent causation failed, Kane's account would be the libertarian's fallback, resting on their replies, and determinism would gain nothing (P3). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation
+ Agent causation does not escape luck. Replay the moment of choice a hundred times with everything the same, and the person sometimes causes the honest choice and sometimes the lie, so which he causes is still a matter of chance.
1. This is the sharpest objection in the field. It is called the luck objection, and it is aimed at every libertarian account. Its sharpest form is the rollback argument, and one of its best-known champions, Peter van Inwagen, is himself a libertarian. - Imagine that God could roll the world back to the moment before a woman decides whether to lie to a friend, and replay it with everything exactly as it was. Suppose she tells the truth in about seventy replays out of a hundred and lies in about thirty. - Nothing about her before the choice differs between the replays. So, the objection says, what she does in any one replay is a matter of chance. - Van Inwagen argued that bringing in agent causation does not change the result: whether she causes the truth or the lie is left as much to chance as before. He still holds that we are free, and says that how we are free remains a mystery. This is where the view is pressed hardest, and it deserves a straight answer. 2. The replays do not show that nobody chose. Grant what the replays show. In the ordinary case she could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was: there was an open door, another way her choice could have gone, there for the taking. That is freedom's ordinary mark, and the replays put it on display. - What they do not show is that nobody did the choosing. In every replay she weighs her reasons and settles the matter herself. The truth told in one replay is hers, and so is the lie told in another. - Luck, in the ordinary sense, is what happens to a person when something other than him decides the outcome: the ball that drops in a lottery, the gust of wind that carries an arrow off course. Nothing drops or gusts in her decision. She makes it. 3. Asking for more is asking for someone else to settle it. The objection asks what, apart from her settling it for her reasons, made her tell the truth rather than lie. Any answer would name something other than her that settled the choice, and then she would not have settled it. - Her reasons still explain the choice. She told the truth because she wanted to be someone her friend could trust. What is missing is only an explanation of why she chose that rather than the lie, and on this view nothing but she supplies it. - Think of a tennis player who could have hit to either corner and hit the left one because her opponent was leaning right. Nobody calls the shot random because the right corner was open. - A defender of free will draws the line: our free choices are held to account "because they are not the result of random brain events but are undertaken for reasons which we weigh and act upon." 4. The view's price is the lowest on offer. Agent causation gives no answer to "why this rather than that?" beyond the person and her reasons, and that is a real cost. The alternatives cost more. Determinism answers the question by taking the choice from her, and the event-causal view leaves no one to answer it (P3). Whether an undetermined choice can be anything but luck is argued at length, along with the related claim that nobody can be responsible unless he created himself. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation
+ The will always follows the mind's last judgment of what is best. Once the practical intellect has judged, the will follows necessarily, so the freedom is in the deliberating, and a will that could go either way is a myth.
1. The intellectualist objection has a long history. It is called intellectualist because it puts the deciding step in the practical intellect, the mind as it judges what to do, rather than in the will. Some Reformed theologians, in the Protestant tradition that runs back to John Calvin, press it as the historic view of their tradition, and they claim the medieval philosophers, Thomas Aquinas above all, for it. On this view there is no need for a person to settle anything beyond his judgment: once he has judged what is best, the will goes where the judgment points. 2. A will that follows its judgment is not thereby unfree. God's will follows his perfect judgment of the good, and God is free, because nothing outside him settles what he wills. So the question is not whether the will follows a judgment. It is what settled the judgment. On the agent-causal view the person did. As one defender of free will puts it, "it is you yourself, and not your overall antecedent mental states or character, that brings about your judgments." - Think of a juror who deliberates, reaches a verdict and then votes for it. His vote follows his judgment. That does not make the verdict any less his. 3. Aquinas describes the ordinary human case differently. In the ordinary run of human choices, Aquinas taught that the will is not a passive follower. It "can interfere with the process," he wrote, and it does so "either by refusing to consider what attracts it to will or by considering its opposite." And he described free choice as something "open to opposites and by no means determined to one of them." - These are Aquinas's words about the ordinary human case. They give his account of it, not the definition of freedom. Whether Aquinas was a libertarian is contested among his interpreters. That his texts give the intellectualist no free pass is not. - Anyone who has deliberated knows the steering he describes. You can see where your reasoning is heading and decline to follow it, looking away from the evidence you would rather not weigh (P1). The judgment the will is said to follow is partly the person's own work. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Cannot Sin and Is Praised for It: The Impeccability Objection Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation
+ If the agent causes his choice, what causes the agent to cause it? Either something does, and the choice was settled by that, or nothing does, and the agent's causing is random.
1. The view's defenders faced this themselves. The strongest form of this objection is a dilemma: it offers two options and says the view is defeated either way. Each option is called a horn, as though the view were caught between the two horns of a bull. On the first horn it is defeated by a regress, and on the second by randomness. A regress is a chain of questions that runs backward without end: if something caused the agent's causing, what caused that, and what caused that in turn? The objection is as old as the view. One of its modern restorers raised it in the same lecture where he called agents prime movers: if an event in the brain is caused by the agent and by no other event, then the agent does not seem to have undergone any change that brought it about. So what did the causing consist in? 2. The agent's causing is not a further effect. When the person causes his choice, his causing is not a second event that needs its own cause. It is simply his exercising his power. A magnet's attracting a nail is not something else the magnet causes; it is the magnet at work. - The two powers differ: the magnet's is passive and goes off whenever iron comes near, while the person's is active, his to use, and he uses it for reasons (P4). But the difference does not bring the regress back. In both cases the exercise of the power is the thing acting, not one more effect waiting in line for a cause. 3. "Not caused by anything else" is not "random." A random event is one that nothing settles. A free choice is settled by the person, and his settling it is not a second thing waiting for a settler of its own. The regress only begins if the person's own causing has to be caused by something other than the person, and that is exactly what the view denies. - The objection's first horn does not touch the view either. If something outside the person caused his causing, that thing would settle the choice and he would not, so the view never says it. - Think of a woman who decides to forgive her brother. Nothing outside her made her do it, and nobody would call her forgiveness random.
+ A person is just a brain and body in a certain state. There is no persisting self over and above those states to do any causing.
1. The view does not require a soul. The agent-causal view needs only that a person is a persisting thing with powers, the kind of thing that endures through changes and acts, the way you are the same person who once learned to ride a bicycle. It fits a soul well, though. Some agent-causal philosophers are dualists, who hold that a person has an immaterial soul. Others are not. Whether a person has a soul is a separate question, and agent causation does not wait on the answer. 2. The naturalist agrees about what his picture excludes. A naturalist philosopher of action grants the point in so many words (C). On his picture, "All natural causal relations have first members in the category of event or state of affairs": wherever one thing causes another in nature, the cause is an event or a state of affairs, never a person. - So the objection is not a finding about brains. It is that picture of the world, stated as a premise. - If the fact of free choice (P1) is real, that is a reason to doubt the picture, not the fact. 3. We treat people as persisting agents in everything we do. We make promises that a future self must keep. We blame a man for what he did last year. We thank the same friend for years of kindness. None of that makes sense if there is no one there who endures and acts.
+ If every free creature is a prime mover unmoved, God is no longer the first cause of everything. Agent causation makes creatures rivals of their Creator.
1. The view's defenders saw the comparison. One of them wrote that if we are responsible, "then we have a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved." A prerogative is a power or right that belongs to someone alone. A Christian should notice that. The strongest form of the objection comes from the classical teaching that God is the first cause of all that is. Everything real has its being from God, the teaching says, including every act of every creature. A choice's going this way rather than that is something real. So if the creature alone settles which way it goes, there is one thing in the world whose being does not come from God. 2. The power is given and held in dependence. A creature's power to settle his choices is not a patch of ground God withdrew from. God holds every creature in being at every moment and acts together with it in whatever it does, the working together theologians call concurrence. The creature settles which way his choice goes. God gives and sustains the power by which he does it, and the act has its being from both. - Think of a singer and the breath God gives her. Without it there would be no song, and still the song is hers. 3. A settling from a higher level is still a settling. If God's causing reached as far as making the choice go this way rather than that, then something other than the chooser would settle it, and the choice would not be free. That holds whether the settling comes from a neighbor or from the first cause. Putting God's causing on a higher level explains how he would settle the choice. It does not make him any less the one settling it. - Think of a novelist. She is not a character in her story, and she writes every line. - Catholic theologians argued over exactly this around 1600: whether God's moving of the will settles which way it goes, or holds the chooser and his power in being while the chooser settles it. In 1607 Pope Paul V ended the dispute without deciding it. The source view takes the second reading. 4. God makes causes, not only effects. It honors a maker more to make things that can do things. A world of real causes, some of them free, displays God's power more than a world in which only he acts. And many in the church's tradition have held that the image of God in human beings includes the power to act for reasons (P4). - Thomas Aquinas asked why God governs the world through creatures when he could do everything himself. It is not for any lack of power, he answered, but from the abundance of his goodness, so that he gives creatures too the dignity of being causes. - Think of a teacher. She is honored more by students who can think for themselves than by students who can only repeat her. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+ A choice does not need a cause to be yours: it is an action by its nature, and your reasons explain it by what you were aiming at. Adding causation by the agent is superfluous.
1. The non-causal view gets something right. A choice really is an action and not something that happens to you, and reasons really do explain choices by pointing to their aims (P2). Carl Ginet, Hugh McCann and Stewart Goetz have defended this view with care. The strongest form of the objection turns the tables. Agent causation, it says, also ends in something nobody causes: the person's own exercise of his power (D8). If an uncaused exercise can be his, so can an uncaused decision, and the talk of causing adds a word and nothing more. 2. Being an act does not say who made it go. Grant that the choice is intrinsically an act. The question that matters (P1) is what made it go the way it went. If nothing caused it, nothing made it go, and the act's being an act does not change that. - The two careful versions of the view meet the same fork (P2). If the choice is an act because it seems to the chooser that he produces it, then either he does produce it, which is causing it, or the seeming is all there is. If it is an act because it is intentional by its very nature, being aimed at something describes the choice without saying that anyone made it happen. - Think of a sentence that appears on a sheet of paper with no one having written it. It may be grammatical and meaningful. It is still no one's sentence. 3. Agent causation ends at a person, not at an event nobody made. Both views stop somewhere, and the objection is right about that. They stop in different places. - On the non-causal view, the decision is an event that nothing brings about. - On the agent-causal view, the decision is brought about, by the person. His exercising his power is not a further event awaiting a cause (D8). It is the person acting, and a person is not the kind of thing that simply happens. - Think of two answers to "Who broke the vase?" "It just broke" ends the questions at an event. "Tom knocked it over" ends them at someone, and nobody thinks Tom needs a cause of his own before the answer counts. 4. A reason explains without settling. Take the man who took the job to be near his mother (P2). He had reasons on both sides. His reason for going explains why going made sense to him. It does not explain what made him go, since his reason for staying made just as much sense of staying.
+ The feeling of settling our choices is an illusion. Psychologists have shown that people feel they chose even when they did not, so the datum of this argument proves nothing.
1. Experiments show that the feeling of choosing can mislead. Some experiments have led people to feel they caused an event they did not cause, and others to feel they did not cause one they did. The psychologist Daniel Wegner argued from such cases that the feeling of willing is a construction of the mind rather than a direct view of what it does. - Think of a Ouija board, where players often feel the pointer moving on its own while their own hands are pushing it. 2. An experience that can be fooled is still evidence. Our eyes can be fooled by optical illusions, and nobody concludes that we never see anything. The fact that the feeling of settling can be produced where no settling happened does not show that it never tracks a real settling. 3. The datum is not only a feeling. (P1) rests on more than how choosing feels. - It rests on the difference between doing and undergoing, which we rely on whenever we praise, blame, promise or deliberate. We blame a man for the lie he chose to tell, not for the sneeze that interrupted it (P1). - It also rests on the fact that every libertarian account, and every compatibilist account too, is trying to say what it is for a person to be the source of what he does. 4. An illusion of settling would favor no rival account. Suppose the objection won, and nobody ever settled a choice. Then no account of free choice would describe anything real, the event-causal and non-causal ones included. The objection asks whether anyone is free. The comparison of accounts (P2, P3, P4) asks what freedom is, and the objection leaves that question where it found it. - Think of two engineers arguing over how a bridge carries its load. A man who says the bridge is a mirage has not joined their argument. If he is right, both are wrong. If he is wrong, their argument is exactly where it was. Whether the sciences have shown that our choices are made before we are aware of making them is argued at length. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: The Brain Scans Have Not Found the Decision Before the Decider Philosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free
+ The datum is loaded. "You yourself settle what you do" is agent causation in everyday words, so the comparison was decided before it began.
1. The charge would be fatal if it were true. An argument is circular when it assumes what it sets out to prove, the way a man vouches for his honesty by assuring you that he never lies. If (P1) meant "you, and not your desires and beliefs, settle it," it would assume the conclusion, and nothing weighed against it afterwards would count. 2. Every rival affirms (P1). (P1) does not say how you settle your choice. It says only that you do, and none of the rivals denies it. - Event-causal defenders say the choice is the person's, made by his own effort for his own reasons (P3). - Non-causal defenders say it is his act by its very nature (P2). - Even compatibilists say that your own deliberation settles what you do. They add, though, that the deliberation may itself have been settled beforehand with no loss of freedom, and that addition takes back the first half of the fact (P1). A choice settled beforehand is not one that nothing but the chooser settles. That is why determinism's account was never one of the suspects. - Think of a detective and his suspects, who all agree that the window was broken. Agreeing on that convicts nobody. 3. The rivals fall on their own accounts. (P2) and (P3) argue from what each rival says the settling is, not from the wording of (P1). The non-causal view leaves the choice with nothing making it go. The event-causal view leaves it with states that were there whichever way it went. - If the event-causal reply succeeded (D5), (P1) would count for the event-causal account exactly as it now counts for agent causation. The datum is neutral, and the eliminations do the work. - Think of the suspects again. None of them is cleared or caught by the report that the window was broken. Each stands or falls by his own story of the night. 4. Fitting the datum best is a strength, not a trick. One account can state the fact it explains without translating it into something else, and the others cannot (P4). That is part of what it means for an explanation to have explanatory power: the fact is just what you would expect if the account were true. - Think of a map that shows the river exactly where the river runs. It has not cheated by copying the river. That is what a good map does.
+ An act that does not flow from a man's character cannot be held against him. If nothing about who he is fixed the choice, it reflects nothing about him, and there is nothing to blame.
1. Hume's objection is serious. David Hume argued that actions are passing things. An action that does not come from some lasting cause in a man's character and disposition, he held, can bring him neither honor if it is good nor disgrace if it is evil. On his view, blame needs the very necessity libertarians deny: only an act that flows from character by necessity tells us anything about the man. - The objection has force because we do judge people by their characters. A man known for his honesty who returns a lost wallet is acting like himself, and we see him in what he did. 2. The act comes from something lasting: the person. On the agent-causal view a free choice does come from a lasting cause, the person himself, who endures through all his changes (D9). Hume could not find that cause, because he doubted that a self is anything more than a bundle of passing perceptions. - Think of a signature on a check. It counts against the account holder because he signed it, not because his handwriting made the signing inevitable. 3. Character shapes a choice without settling it. A person's reasons come out of his character, and they explain his choice (P4). They make it intelligible, and often they make it predictable. They do not settle it, and they do not need to for the choice to reflect him. - Think of a patient man who, once in twenty years, loses his temper and says something cruel to his son. It was out of character, and it was still his, and he knows it. Blame does not wait for an act to have been inevitable. - A choice made in character reflects a man twice over: he made it, and it fits who he has become. His character is also partly the deposit of his own earlier choices (P3). 4. Hume's alternative hands the blame upstream. If an act reflects on a man only because it flows by necessity from his character, and his character flows by necessity from what came before him, then the act reflects in the end on whatever settled his character. The manipulation argument follows that trail to its source. - Think of a clock that strikes thirteen because of how it was built. It is faulty, and the fault is the clockmaker's. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One Philosophy / Free Will: Nobody Chose Their Own Character, and Everyone Is Still Responsible: The Basic Argument

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