Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

Public Theology

Theological Analyses of Societal Issues

Theology of the Family

Where Faith and Family Intersect

Biographies

Notable Works & Great Quotes from Key Figures

Contemporary Voices

1960 AD – present

William Alston of Shreveport 1921 – 2009 AD

(●) The American philosopher who argued that Christians can perceive God, and that trusting that experience is as rational as trusting their eyes. + Suppose you are walking a trail and you see a bear behind the bushes ahead. You do not reason your way to the bear. You do not first collect evidence that your eyes are working and then infer that a bear is probably there. You simply see it, and unless a friend tells you it is a burned stump, you are perfectly reasonable to believe your eyes. William Alston spent the second half of his long career asking a question that sounds strange until you sit with it: what if some people stand toward God the way you stand toward that bear? He was one of the most respected philosophers in America in the second half of the twentieth century, a careful, technical thinker about language, knowledge and truth whose colleagues trusted him because he never hurried an argument. He was also, for about fifteen years of his adult life, a man who had quietly given up on God. He came back in his fifties, through a choir, a country walk, a parish priest and a prayer group, and he spent the rest of his life showing that a believer who trusts what he has experienced of God is not being careless with his mind. Christians have two reasons to remember him. His book Perceiving God (1991) is widely judged the most thorough defense yet written of the idea that religious experience can be a kind of perception. And he did as much as anyone to give Christian philosophers somewhere to stand: he conceived the Society of Christian Philosophers, served as its first president, and became the founding editor of its journal.

(●) 1921 AD: Born in Shreveport, Louisiana, he was raised a Methodist and left the church in early adolescence. + William Payne Alston was born on 29 November 1921 in Shreveport, in the northwest corner of Louisiana, to Eunice Schoolfield and William Alston. He was a quick boy, finished high school at fifteen, and went on to Centenary College in his home town to study music. He majored in piano and took his Bachelor of Music in 1942. Church was part of the furniture of a Southern childhood, and the Alstons were Methodists. Looking back half a century later, he remembered that church as "perfunctory and lacking in warmth of conviction," and he was honest enough to add that a good deal was probably going on there that simply was not getting through to him. Years later he learned, with some surprise, that John Wesley had set great store by personal experience of God, and he wondered aloud whether his life's work on religious experience grew from seeds planted in those pews. At the time, though, nothing took. In early adolescence he met the arguments and the attitudes of atheism, decided he had reached the age of reason, and, in his own phrase, "readily abandoned ship."

(●) 1942 AD: Playing in an Army band during the Second World War, the young pianist taught himself philosophy. + The war put him in uniform and in Northern California from 1942 to 1946, playing clarinet and bass drum in an Army band and piano in a dance band. Somewhere in those years he read W. Somerset Maugham’s novel The Razor’s Edge, the story of a young American veteran who walks away from a comfortable future to search for the meaning of life. It lit a fire. Maugham’s hero has a guru; Alston had a library card. In a library at Berkeley he came across a book called An Introduction to Philosophy by the French Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain, and on the strength of it he became, for a while, a Thomist, a follower of the thirteenth-century theologian Thomas Aquinas. Then, taking the advice of Mortimer Adler’s How to Read a Book to go straight to the original sources, he worked through Aristotle’s logic, Bacon, Mill, several of Plato’s dialogues, Descartes, Spinoza and Locke, entirely on his own. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, by his own later account, finally curbed his appetite. He had never taken a single class in philosophy. Even so, toward the end of the war he so impressed Charner Perry, who chaired the philosophy department at the University of Chicago, that he was let into the doctoral program anyway. A man who walked in as a bandsman walked out a philosopher.

(●) 1949 AD: At the University of Michigan he made his name as a philosopher of language, and joined the Episcopal Church only to leave it again. + At Chicago he studied under Richard McKeon and Charles Hartshorne, and wrote his dissertation under Hartshorne’s direction on the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead (metaphysics is the part of philosophy that asks what is ultimately real, and Whitehead had built a vast picture of the world as a flowing web of events rather than of solid things). The doctorate came in 1951. By then he was already teaching at the University of Michigan, where he stayed twenty-two years, from 1949 to 1971. At Michigan he met the new analytic philosophy coming out of Britain, and it remade him. Analytic philosophy is the style that tries to solve philosophical problems by paying close attention to how words actually work: before asking whether the mind is separate from the body, for instance, it asks what we mean when we say someone "has a mind." His Philosophy of Language (1964) became a standard textbook. Two of the graduate students who passed through in those years would matter to him for the rest of his life. Alvin Plantinga would become the leading Christian philosopher of his generation, and William Rowe the author of the most discussed modern argument from evil. In 1950, his first year out of graduate school, a memorial service for a colleague drew him into the local Episcopal church. He was confirmed, sang in the choir at St. Andrew’s in Ann Arbor, and made a real effort to live a Christian life. Looking back, he judged the whole thing severely. He had been "seeking to use the church and the Christian faith as a refuge from life," a way of escaping his problems rather than facing them, trying to love God while making no serious attempt to love his neighbor. He reached for John’s first letter to explain why that could never work: "If anyone says, I love God, and hates his brother, he is a liar; for he who does not love his brother whom he has seen cannot love God whom he has not seen" (1 John 4:20). In the late 1950s he saw the situation for what it was and left again. He later said he could not believe it had been the wrong decision. For about fifteen years he lived what looked like a purely secular life.

(●) 1974 AD: On leave in Oxford, in his early fifties, he stopped fearing that faith was childish and found his way back to God. + What kept him away all those years was not the failure of some argument for God. It was a feeling planted by Sigmund Freud: that religious faith is wishful thinking, a grown man clinging to a heavenly father because he cannot face the world as an adult. He had studied the theory carefully (his essay "Psychoanalytic Theory and Theistic Belief" appeared in 1964), and he had, in his own words, been "psyched into feeling" that seeking God would be a betrayal of his adulthood. In 1974 to 1975 he spent a year of leave, most of it in Oxford, and early in that year he went for an afternoon walk in the country outside the city, wrestling with the problem. Somewhere on that walk he asked himself why he should let himself be confined by "these Freudian ghosts," whom he was trying to impress, and why he should hold back from a transcendent reality, if there was one, just for fear of being called childish. The questions, he said, answered themselves as soon as they were squarely put. He credited the grace of God with giving him the courage to look the specter in the face and tell it to go away. Then his daughter Ellen, who had drifted from the church and was now drifting back, came to visit and suggested that he and his wife Valerie go to a service at Christ Church, the Oxford college whose chapel is also the city’s cathedral and has a famous choir. It was the first service, weddings and funerals apart, that he had attended in about fifteen years. Something happened there that he could never quite put his finger on, and he and Valerie began attending regularly. Plantinga, who knew him well, remembered it as a powerful religious experience at evensong, the sung evening service of prayer, psalms and Scripture readings that English cathedrals have kept up for centuries.

(●) 1975 AD: A parish in Princeton and a charismatic prayer group taught him to love his neighbor, and made him a Christian. + He came home in the fall of 1975 still teaching at Rutgers, where he had moved in 1971, and still a long way from thinking of himself as a full-blooded believer. He half expected to settle for a watered-down Christianity, joining in the worship while treating the doctrines as symbols of something beyond words. But the most striking change was one he could check with someone else. For the first time in his life he began, as he put it, "to get a glimmer of what love means," and when he asked Valerie whether he was imagining it, she assured him he was quite different. The second commandment, the very thing missing from his first try at faith, had arrived first. In January 1976 the couple wandered into All Saints, an Episcopal church on the edge of Princeton, whose rector (the priest in charge of the parish), Orley Swartzentruber, was the son of a Mennonite missionary in South America and preached, Alston said, in a way he had rarely heard anywhere. "Insofar as I have become, or am becoming, a Christian," he wrote, "I credit it to Orley, or to God working through Orley." He also joined the parish’s small, very proper charismatic prayer group. "Charismatic" comes from the Greek word for a gift, and a charismatic group is one that prays expecting the gifts of the Holy Spirit described in the New Testament, such as healing, prophecy and speaking in tongues, to be at work among ordinary believers today. He was put off at first, especially by people thanking God for finding them a parking place, but he kept going out of sheer doggedness, and slowly he saw that these people lived with God as a continual presence. In August 1976 the Alstons moved to Urbana, where he had taken a post at the University of Illinois. There he joined an ecumenical charismatic prayer group at the Catholic student center, ecumenical meaning that Catholics and Protestants prayed in it side by side. He completed its eight-week preparation for what it called baptism in the Spirit, a fresh and conscious yielding to the Holy Spirit that many charismatic Christians seek after their conversion. At the closing session he received the gift of tongues, prayer in speech the speaker has never learned, and a vivid sense of the Spirit’s presence that, he said, never really left him.

(●) 1978 AD: He conceived the Society of Christian Philosophers, served as its first president, and became the founding editor of its journal, Faith and Philosophy. + After his return Alston prayed, again and again, for the Lord to show him how to spend the rest of his life, and he came to believe the answer was the philosophy of religion, a subject he had until then touched only fitfully. The Society of Christian Philosophers began with a letter he wrote to Plantinga early in 1977, and in 1978 close to a hundred people came to its organizing meeting. Five others were involved at the start, but Plantinga was clear that "it was Bill’s idea," and Alston became its first president. In 1979 his colleagues elected him president of the Western Division (now the Central Division) of the American Philosophical Association, the main professional body of philosophers in the United States, which tells you how the profession regarded him. Michael Peterson urged that the Society needed a journal, and in December 1981 its executive committee voted to launch one, with Alston as editor ("dragooned," he said) and Peterson as managing editor. The first issue of Faith and Philosophy appeared in January 1984. Think of an editor as the person who reads every paper a journal receives and decides what is good enough. Alston did that and more: he made it his mission to help the people who sent him papers, especially the young ones, and spent long hours helping them rewrite and improve their work. Plantinga said he set the pattern for every editor after him.

(●) 1980 AD: At Syracuse University he wrote the books that made his name in the philosophy of religion, and kept teaching long after retiring. + In 1980 he moved to Syracuse University in upstate New York, and he and Valerie joined the congregation of St. Paul’s Cathedral, where he became, as he wryly put it, "God help me," increasingly involved in the affairs of the parish and the diocese. The great books came in a run: Epistemic Justification and Divine Nature and Human Language in 1989, Perceiving God in 1991, The Reliability of Sense Perception in 1993, A Realist Conception of Truth in 1996. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1990, and for eight years took part in a project sponsored by the Vatican Observatory on how God acts in the world in the light of modern science. He retired in 1992 and simply kept working. He taught at Syracuse until 2000, gave reading courses in the summers, carried on an enormous philosophical correspondence and lectured across the United States and abroad. Plantinga said he made the rest of them look like sluggards.

(●) 2009 AD: He died at eighty-seven, and on the day before, friends gathered at a Eucharist for him heard Isaiah’s words about a servant whose ear the Lord had opened. + William Alston died on 13 September 2009, at a residential care home in Jamesville, New York, at the age of eighty-seven. He left Valerie, his wife of forty-six years, his daughter Ellen, by then an Episcopal priest, and three stepchildren and their families. The memorial service was held at St. Paul’s Cathedral in Syracuse on 2 November. The day before he died, a Eucharist (a service of Holy Communion) was held for him at St. James Episcopal Church in Mishawaka, Indiana, and his longtime friend Peter van Inwagen read from the fiftieth chapter of Isaiah. Plantinga thought the fifth verse splendidly fitting for a man who had come back to God so late and served him so hard: "The Lord God has opened my ear, and I was not rebellious; I turned not backward" (Isaiah 50:5).

What He Taught

(T1) God can be perceived, and a belief formed by perceiving him can be justified the way a belief formed by seeing a tree is. + Go back to the bear on the trail. Philosophers have a name for the kind of belief you form there: it is directly justified, which simply means it is reasonable to hold because of what you experience, not because you argued for it from other beliefs. You believe the wall is white because it looks white. Nearly everyone accepts that this is how ordinary perception works, and that our knowledge of the physical world would never get started without it. Alston’s proposal was that many believers stand toward God in the same way. A woman praying in distress becomes aware of God comforting her; a man is aware of being forgiven, or guided, or simply held in being. She does not infer God from a feeling, the way a doctor infers a fever from a thermometer. It seems to her that God himself is present and acting toward her. Alston called the beliefs that come from such experiences M-beliefs, "M" for manifestation: beliefs that God is doing something toward me right now, or that he is good, or powerful, or loving, as he shows himself. "Oh, taste and see that the Lord is good!" (Psalm 34:8) is, on this picture, very nearly a description of how such knowledge works. Two things keep this from being naive. First, a perception can be overturned. If friends tell you the bear is a stump, you should stop believing in the bear, and the same goes for an experience of God that contradicts what God has revealed of himself. The justification is real, but it can be defeated. Second, Alston claimed only that these beliefs are justified, reasonable to hold, not that they are beyond all doubt. That modesty is part of what made the argument so hard to dismiss.

(Q) "I want to explore and defend the idea that the experience, or, as I shall say, the perception, of God plays an epistemic role with respect to beliefs about God importantly analogous to that played by sense perception with respect to beliefs about the physical world." + Source: William P. Alston, "Perceiving God," The Journal of Philosophy 83, number 11 (1986), page 655. The opening sentence of a paper he read at the American Philosophical Association in December 1986, a compact sketch of the case he would build out five years later in the book of the same name. "Epistemic" means having to do with knowledge and justified belief (T1).

(T2) No basic way of forming beliefs can prove itself reliable without relying on itself, so it is a double standard to demand that Christian experience do so. + You might think, "Fine, but we know our eyes are reliable and we don’t know that about religious experience." So ask how you know your eyes are reliable. You could check them against other people’s reports, against photographs, against what you learned in school about light and the retina. Every one of those checks comes to you through the senses. To prove that sense perception is trustworthy you have to use sense perception. Alston called this epistemic circularity, and in The Reliability of Sense Perception (1993) he argued that every attempt to prove the senses reliable runs into it, as does every attempt to prove memory or reasoning reliable. It is like trying to check whether a ruler is accurate by measuring it with itself. That is what makes the senses, memory and reasoning basic ways of forming beliefs: there is nothing deeper underneath them to check them against. None of this makes it irrational to trust our senses. It means we trust them for other reasons: because they are our only access to the physical world, because what they tell us hangs together, and because nothing shows them to be unreliable. Alston needed a name for the thing being trusted, and he chose doxastic practice ("doxastic" comes from the Greek for belief). A doxastic practice is any settled, socially shared way of forming beliefs from a certain kind of input. Reading the world off our sense experience is one: you see the bus coming and believe it is coming. Remembering is another: you recall locking the door and believe you locked it. Each comes with its own built-in checks, the way you might glance back at the door if you have a habit of forgetting. Forming beliefs about God from experience of God, within the Christian community, is another practice of the same kind, and it has checks of its own. An experience is tested against Scripture and against the church’s long tradition of spiritual discernment, its accumulated wisdom in telling a genuine sense of God from wishful thinking. Alston called it Christian mystical practice. He used "mystical" in a broad sense for any direct awareness of God, not only the visions of famous saints, so the woman praying in distress (T1) is as much a part of it as Teresa of Avila. His conclusion was that it is rational to engage in that practice for the same reasons it is rational to trust the senses. To demand that Christian experience prove its reliability without relying on itself, while excusing the senses from the same test, is what he called, in his 1986 paper, "arbitrarily imposing a double standard."

(Q) "My main thesis in this chapter, and indeed in the whole book, is that CMP is rationally engaged in since it is a socially established doxastic practice that is not demonstrably unreliable or otherwise disqualified for rational acceptance." + Source: William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Cornell University Press, 1991), page 194; the sentence is quoted at the opening of Alvin Plantinga’s discussion of the book in Warranted Christian Belief (2000). "CMP" is his abbreviation for Christian mystical practice (T2). The sentence is the whole argument of the book in miniature: the practice is established, it is shared, and nobody has shown it to be unreliable.

(T3) God is real independently of us, and human words can speak truly and literally about him. + When a child says "Grandma made a cake," she is not speaking in symbols. Grandma really made it. Much twentieth-century theology held that talk about God could never be like that. For some, such as the theologian Paul Tillich, every statement about God was a symbol; for others, influenced by the philosopher A. J. Ayer, sentences about God were not statements of fact at all, since nothing you could see or touch would ever test them. Alston thought both views did violence to what believers actually mean. Take the second view first. Ayer’s test of meaning, usually called the verification principle, said that a sentence means something only if some possible experience could show it to be true or false. Alston pointed out that the test fails by its own standard. No experience could ever show the verification principle itself to be true or false, so by its own rule it means nothing. The first view took more patience. Alston argued that a metaphor always points to some real likeness. When the psalmist says "The Lord is my shepherd" (Psalm 23:1), he has some definite resemblance in mind, care and guidance and protection, and whatever you can have in mind you can in principle say plainly. So talk about God cannot be metaphor all the way down; somewhere underneath there has to be a plain claim the picture is a picture of. That plain claim can be literal, meaning the words are used in their ordinary, proper sense. Words like "makes," "commands," "guides" and "forgives" carry bodily details when we use them of people: a baker makes bread with her hands, in a kitchen, over an hour. Strip those details away and what remains can be said of God literally. To make something is to bring it into being, however that is done. Underneath all of this was a conviction he called alethic realism, from the Greek word for truth: a statement is true when what it is about is as it says, whether or not anyone believes it. For a Christian, he argued, the stakes could not be higher. If God is only our way of imagining things, there is no one there to pray to.

(Q) "God is taken to be a real presence in the world, a supreme personal being with whom we can enter into personal relationships, a being Who, to understate it, enjoys a reality in His own right, independently of us and our cognitive doings." + Source: William P. Alston, "Realism and the Christian Faith," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 38 (1995), pages 37 to 60; the sentence is on page 45. He is describing what is fundamental to Jewish and Christian faith, as the ground for his claim that any view making God depend on human thought is subversive of that faith (T3).

(T4) Our failure to see God’s reason for permitting a horror is no evidence that he has none. + His former student William Rowe asked the world to look at a fawn trapped in a forest fire, badly burned and suffering for days before it dies, with no one to see it. So far as we can tell, Rowe said, no good comes of that suffering that God could not have had without it; so it is reasonable to think there is no such good; so it is reasonable to think there is no God. Rowe’s was an inductive argument: it reasons from the goods we know of to a conclusion about all the goods there are, and claims to make that conclusion probable rather than certain, the way a long run of sunny Julys makes it probable that next July will be sunny too. Alston’s reply, set out in "The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition" (1991), was to grant the first step for the sake of argument and deny the second. Picture someone who took one year of university physics trying to judge a new theory about quantum particles. He cannot make heads or tails of it, but it would be absurd for him to conclude that it is probably nonsense. The gap between what we can see and what an all-knowing God can see is far wider than that. We might not know every good there is; we might not know what some good we do know requires; and the whole history of human learning suggests that what we know now is a small fraction of what there is to know. Inferring "there is no reason" from "I see no reason" assumes we would see it if it were there, and that is exactly what we have no right to assume. The view came to be called skeptical theism, a mildly confusing name, since the skepticism is only about our ability to read God’s reasons, not about God. Its biblical ancestor is the voice from the whirlwind: "Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? Tell me, if you have understanding" (Job 38:4).

(Q) "This creates a presumption that with respect to values, as well as the conditions of their realization, there is much that lies beyond our present grasp." + Source: William P. Alston, "Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil," in The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder (Indiana University Press, 1996), page 320. "This" is the steady growth of human knowledge across history, in moral understanding as in everything else: if we have learned so much in a few thousand years, we should expect that a great deal is still beyond us (T4).

(Q) "I found God as a reality in my life through finding a community of faith and being drawn into it." + Source: William P. Alston, "A Philosopher’s Way Back to the Faith," in God and the Philosophers: The Reconciliation of Faith and Reason, edited by Thomas V. Morris (Oxford University Press, 1994), pages 19 to 30. The philosopher of religious experience is describing his own. He insisted he had not reasoned himself into faith; philosophy, he wrote, has a crucial role in clarifying and defending the faith, but it rarely produces it. Coming to faith gave him new data for his reasoning, the way learning to hear a piece of music gives a listener something new to think about.

What Christian Thinkers Made of Him

(†) He did as much as anyone to bring the philosophy of religion back to life, and gave Christian philosophers a society and a journal. + When Alston entered philosophy in the 1940s, the philosophy of religion in the English-speaking world was close to its deathbed. The fashionable view was that talk about God was not even false, only meaningless, and a serious philosopher was not expected to spend his career on it. By the time he died, it was one of the liveliest fields in the discipline, with Christians doing much of the work. Daniel Howard-Snyder, who compiled his bibliography, ventured that no single person had done more to bring about that change. Part of the reason was the work itself, which was simply too careful to wave away. Part was the institutions. The Society of Christian Philosophers grew into one of the largest single-interest groups in American philosophy, and Faith and Philosophy became a leading journal in its field. Part was the man: dozens of younger philosophers learned what a good paper looks like because he rewrote theirs with them. Plantinga called Perceiving God "surely an unexcelled landmark in the last 100 years of Christian philosophy and philosophy of religion."

(†) With Plantinga and Wolterstorff he showed that a Christian may believe without first winning an argument, though he never cared for the name the movement was given. + In the early 1980s Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff argued that belief in God can be reasonable even for someone who has no argument for it, just as belief in other minds or in the past is reasonable without one. Alston’s essay "Christian Experience and Christian Belief" appeared beside theirs in Faith and Rationality (1983), the book that launched the movement, and Perceiving God gave it its most detailed account of how experience can ground belief. The movement became known as Reformed epistemology. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies knowledge and asks what makes a belief reasonable, and "Reformed" came from the Reformed (Calvinist) tradition Plantinga and Wolterstorff came from. Alston, an Episcopalian, never fully endorsed the label. The book drew the widest possible attention. Three journals ran symposia on it in 1994 and 1995 (a symposium, in a journal, is a set of essays by several critics on one book, followed by the author’s reply), with critics such as Richard Gale and John Schellenberg and sympathetic readers who still pressed him hard, such as Plantinga, Norman Kretzmann and Robert Audi, and Alston answered each in turn. William Hasker predicted that it would set the standard for the discussion of its subject for years to come, and it did. Ordinary Christians, who had always assumed they could know God and not merely know about him, found a first-rate philosopher saying they had not been foolish to think so.

(†) His hardest critics pressed the fact of other religions, and he granted that it lowers, though it does not remove, the justification Christian experience gives. + The sharpest objection to Perceiving God was religious diversity. Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims also form beliefs from experience of what they take to be ultimate, and their beliefs often conflict with Christian ones. Sense perception has no real rival of that kind; there is no culture that reads the physical world off its experience in a way that contradicts ours. So, the critics asked, does the existence of rival mystical practices not show that at most one of them can be reliable, and give each believer reason to doubt his own? Alston took the objection more seriously than any other in the book. He argued that much of what it is supposed to show does not follow. To judge the rival practices against one another you would need a neutral standpoint, some place to stand that belongs to none of them, and no one has one. In that position, he said, a believer can reasonably go on with the practice that keeps proving its worth in his own life. Think of a traveler holding the only map he has, one that has never yet led him wrong; the fact that other travelers carry different maps is a reason to be careful, not a reason to throw his away. But he also conceded, in plain terms, that the diversity reduces the degree of justification Christian experience confers below what it would otherwise be. Christian readers have differed over whether he gave away too much. What is not in doubt is that he answered the objection at full strength and did not pretend it away, which is the habit of mind he taught a generation of Christian philosophers.

Alston published most of his books with Cornell University Press, and all of them remain in print or in libraries. Alongside them stand more than one hundred and fifty articles; the essays below are the ones that matter most for his thought about God, with the early technical papers that made his name. Daniel Howard-Snyder compiled a full bibliography of his writings. Books written: - Philosophy of Language (Prentice-Hall, 1964): a short textbook in the Foundations of Philosophy series on meaning, reference and the verification theory of meaning, used in classrooms for a generation. - Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Cornell, 1989): his papers on what makes a belief justified, defending a modest foundationalism, the view that some beliefs are justified directly by experience and support the rest. - Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Cornell, 1989): his essays on whether human words can apply literally to God, on how God can act and know, and on divine command ethics, the view that our moral duties rest on what God commands (T3). - Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Cornell, 1991): his masterpiece, arguing that the direct awareness of God many believers report is a form of perception, and that Christian mystical practice is rationally engaged in (T1, T2). - The Reliability of Sense Perception (Cornell, 1993): a short book showing that every argument for the reliability of the senses is epistemically circular, the companion piece to Perceiving God (T2). - A Realist Conception of Truth (Cornell, 1996): a defense of alethic realism, the view that a statement is true when what it is about is as it says, against theories that make truth depend on what we can know or justify (T3). - Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning (Cornell, 2000): the culmination of nearly fifty years of work on what it is for a sentence to mean something, built on the acts we perform in speaking, such as asserting, promising and commanding. - A Sensible Metaphysical Realism (Marquette University Press, 2001): his Aquinas Lecture, steering between the view that all of reality is relative to our concepts and the view that none of it is. - Beyond "Justification": Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation (Cornell, 2005): his late argument that there is no single thing called justification, only a cluster of different ways a belief can be good. Books edited: - Religious Belief and Philosophical Thought: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963): an anthology of classic and modern readings, assembled during the years he stood outside the church. - Readings in Twentieth-Century Philosophy (Free Press, 1963), with George Nakhnikian: a survey anthology of the main movements of the century. - The Problems of Philosophy: Introductory Readings (Allyn and Bacon, 1967), with Richard B. Brandt: a long-lived introductory reader. - Realism and Antirealism (Cornell, 2002): essays by several hands on the debate he had entered in A Realist Conception of Truth. Essays on God and Christian faith: - "Psychoanalytic Theory and Theistic Belief," in Faith and the Philosophers, edited by John Hick (1964): his careful assessment of Freud’s claim that belief in God is wish fulfillment, the theory that kept him from faith for years. - "Can We Speak Literally of God?" in Is God GOD?, edited by Axel Steuer and James McClendon (1981): the essay that opened his case for literal theological language (T3); reprinted in Divine Nature and Human Language. - "Religious Experience and Religious Belief," Noûs 16 (1982): an early statement of the parallel between religious and sense experience. - "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," in Faith and Rationality, edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (1983): his contribution to the founding volume of Reformed epistemology. - "Perceiving God," The Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): a short paper that sets out the whole case in brief, answering objections one after another as double standards (T1). - "The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit," in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, edited by Thomas V. Morris (1988): a philosopher’s account of what it means for the Spirit to live in a believer. - "The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition," Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): his reply to William Rowe, a founding text of skeptical theism (T4); reprinted in The Evidential Argument from Evil (1996). - "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 31 (1992): why religious experience should be judged by its own appropriate standards rather than those of sense perception. - "A Philosopher’s Way Back to the Faith," in God and the Philosophers, edited by Thomas V. Morris (1994): his autobiographical account of leaving the church twice and coming back for good. - "Realism and the Christian Faith," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 38 (1995): why making God depend on human thought would undo the faith it claims to interpret (T3). - "Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith," in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, edited by Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996): his argument that the mental side of faith can be acceptance, a chosen commitment to a claim, and not only belief, which no one can simply choose. - "Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil," in The Evidential Argument from Evil (1996): his last word in the exchange with Rowe and others (T4). - "Religious Language and Verificationism," in The Rationality of Theism, edited by Paul Copan and Paul Moser (2003): a late summing up of why the verification theory never ruled out talk about God. - "Does Religious Experience Justify Religious Belief?" with Evan Fales, in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, edited by Michael Peterson and Raymond VanArragon (2004): a debate with an atheist philosopher, a good short entry point. Early papers in philosophy of language and knowledge: - "Are Positivists Metaphysicians?" The Philosophical Review 63 (1954): an early argument that the verification theory of meaning is itself a piece of the metaphysics it set out to abolish. - "Two Types of Foundationalism," The Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): a much-cited distinction between beliefs that are justified and beliefs we are justified in believing are justified. - "Yes, Virginia, There Is a Real World," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 52 (1979): his presidential address, a defense of realism against those who make reality depend on our concepts. - "Epistemic Circularity," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1986): the technical groundwork for T2. Books about him: The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith: Essays in Honor of William P. Alston, edited by Thomas D. Senor (Cornell, 1995); Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston, edited by Heather Battaly and Michael Lynch (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). Where to start: the 1986 paper "Perceiving God" is short and clear; Perceiving God (Cornell paperback, 1993) is the full case.
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Justified True Belief