God Does Not Look Ahead: How Foreknowledge Is Possible
(●)God knows what you will freely do without looking ahead to see it.
+On the drive home from church, Ellie, who is eight, leans forward from the back seat with a question her father cannot dodge. Her Sunday school teacher had said that God knows everything, even what you will do tomorrow. "But I haven't decided what I'm doing tomorrow," Ellie says. "So how can God know? Does he have a telescope that looks into next week?"
Her father starts to say that God can see the future, and stops halfway through the sentence. See what, exactly? Tomorrow has not happened yet, and Ellie has not made up her mind. If God knows by looking, he is looking at something that is not there.
Ellie has stumbled onto one of the oldest questions anyone has asked about God, and it is worth being clear about which question it is. She is not asking whether God's knowing her choice would take its freedom away. That is a different worry, with a full answer of its own, and (D1) gives the heart of it. Ellie's question is how God could know the choice at all.
Her question only has teeth if her choice is free, so it helps to say what that means, and Tuesday's lunch makes a good example. Ellie's father may be quite sure that she will choose the grilled cheese, since she nearly always does. But his being sure will do none of the choosing. When Tuesday comes, Ellie will do that herself, and she will be the choice's source, the one it comes from.
Put in general terms, a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of her own. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. Being sure how a choice will go is not making it go that way, and neither is making sure of it (C3, D16).
In the ordinary run of human choices, a free choice also carries an ordinary mark: the person could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was. On Tuesday, with everything up to that moment just as it was, Ellie could still ask for the soup. It is the mark and not the definition. A signature is the usual sign that someone agreed to a contract, but it is not what agreeing is.
Now the difficulty comes into focus. If nothing settles Ellie's choice until she settles it, then on Monday there is nothing to work it out from. No cause is already in place that will make it go one way, and no trace of it exists anywhere in the world. Foreknowledge is knowledge of what will happen before it happens, and its basis is whatever that knowledge rests on. So the old objection, which can be called the objection from the basis, does not say that God's knowing would spoil Ellie's choice. It says there is nothing for the knowing to rest on.
The objection is older than the church. The Roman statesman Cicero reports that Carneades, a Greek skeptic of the second century BC, held that not even the god Apollo could foretell anything except what its causes made necessary. Take a certain Marcellus, who would one day drown at sea. That he would, Carneades allowed, "was indeed true from all eternity, but it had no efficient cause." An efficient cause is whatever makes a thing happen, the way a struck match makes a fire. As Carneades saw it, nothing was yet at work to make Marcellus drown, and so there was nothing for the god to behold.
Nearly two thousand years later, Jonathan Edwards, the eighteenth-century American theologian, gave the objection its sharpest Christian form: "no understanding, created or uncreated, can see evidence where there is none."
Look at the verbs: behold, see. Nearly every version of the objection pictures knowing as a kind of seeing. Call that the perceptualist picture of God's knowledge: God knows the way you know the weather, by looking out of the window. The other picture is the conceptualist one. On it, God knows the way a mind knows what belongs to it by its very nature, without looking at anything at all. Nobody asks through what window God sees that two and two make four.
The argument is deductive: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. The premises work like a locked chain: if every link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. No premise has to be beyond all doubt. Each needs only to be more plausible than its denial.
It runs in three short chains. The first shows that a knower who never has to find anything out needs nothing present to go on (P1, P2, C1). The second shows that God knows what people will freely do, and knows it without looking ahead (P3, P4, C2). The third says more about what that knowledge rests on, still with no route to it: God knows what every creature would freely do in any circumstance, and he knows what he has decided to create (P5, P6, C3).
One familiar answer is set aside from the start. Most Christians carry a picture of God's knowledge without ever naming it: simple foreknowledge, which says that God simply foresees what will happen. As it is usually pictured, it leans on the very looking the objection doubts. Its critics also argue, with good reason, that it gives God nothing to plan with (C3, D15). The answer to Ellie's question is a different one.
The answer of the Reformed, Protestants in the tradition of John Calvin, is set aside as well. They hold that God's decree, his eternal plan for all that happens, settles every choice, and that God knows the future because he has decreed it. On one point they agree with the answer to Ellie: God does not learn the future by looking at it. Where they part company is over what his knowledge rests on instead (C3).
Who holds what, on what God's knowledge of a free choice rests on:
- On nothing, so that there is no such knowledge to be had: Carneades argued so of Apollo, the logician Arthur Prior pressed the objection in 1962, and the open theist William Hasker argues that God does not know in advance what free creatures will do.
• Open theists are Christians who hold that the future is open, even to God: what free creatures will do cannot be known before they do it.
- On God's decree: John Calvin wrote in 1559 that God "foresees the things which are to happen, simply because he has decreed that they are so to happen," and today John Feinberg defends theological determinism, the view that God's decree settles every choice.
- On what God knows of what creatures would do, and of his own decision: Luis de Molina set out this account in 1588, and William Lane Craig defends it today.
The argument that follows holds that God knows what you will freely do without looking ahead to see it.
(P1)Knowledge needs something present to go on only when it is acquired.
+Knowledge is acquired when it reaches the knower by some route: seeing, hearing, feeling, working it out, being told. Every such route starts from something present. Only knowledge that travels one needs anything present to start from.
(1) Every human route to the future starts from something present.
- Think of the people who tell us what is coming. A weather forecaster reads today's pressure charts. An astronomer predicts next year's eclipse from where the moon and the sun are now, and the laws they move by. A grandmother who says her grandson will come round by summer is reading his character as it stands today.
- Each of them has something present to go on: a cause already at work, a sign, a pattern. Take that away and the forecast has nothing left to stand on.
- Carneades built his case on exactly this. As Cicero reports him, "it is only by an acquaintance with efficient causes that we can foreknow the particular events which result from them."
(2) The objection asks for the route.
- Ask a witness how he knows, and he says, "I saw it." Ask a detective, and she points to the mud on the butler's boots. "How do you know?" is a question about the road the knowledge came by.
- The best statements of the objection give their picture away in their verbs. One logician complained that a prediction of a free choice has "no present ground for the guess's correctness which a specially penetrating person might perceive." Edwards held that to know a thing certainly is to see evidence of it, and that no mind can see evidence that is not there.
- Perceive, see. What the objection demands, in the end, is something present that a sharp enough eye could make out.
(3) Some knowledge travels no route at all.
- It is natural to assume that all knowledge has to come from somewhere. But you know that two and two make four, and nobody asks what you were looking at when you knew it. Nothing present in your kitchen or out in the street makes the sum come out four.
- Philosophers have long described some knowledge as innate: belonging to a mind by its very nature, rather than coming to it from outside. Whatever one makes of innate ideas in human beings, the description fits a mind that never had to learn anything.
- Nor is route-free knowledge only of truths that could not have been otherwise. That God made this world, and not another world or none, is a truth that could have been otherwise. Yet nobody thinks God found out what he had decided by looking, or worked it out from evidence. He knows it as the one who decided.
- One defender of God's foreknowledge describes God's knowledge as "more like a mind's knowledge of innate ideas." There is no route, and so there is nothing present for a route to start from.
(4) A missing route limits the finder, not the truth.
- How many hairs were on Julius Caesar's head on the morning he was killed? Nobody will ever find out. No trace of the number survives, and no route to it is left. But there was a number, and anyone who named it would have said something true.
- Carneades granted the parallel himself. Past events that left no signs or traces, he held, could not be known even to Apollo. Nobody concludes that those events never happened.
- So "there is nothing present to go on" shows that a finder, a knower who has to find things out, cannot find something out. It does not show that there is nothing to know, or that no knower could know it.
Therefore, the demand for something present to go on binds a knower who has to find things out, and only such a knower.
(P2)God's knowledge is not acquired.
+God never has to find anything out. Nothing he knows reached him by a route from outside himself.
(1) Scripture denies that anyone has ever taught God anything.
- Isaiah puts it as a string of challenges: "Who has measured the Spirit of the Lord, or what man shows him his counsel? Whom did he consult, and who made him understand? Who taught him the path of justice, and taught him knowledge, and showed him the way of understanding?" (Isaiah 40:13-14). The expected answer to every one of them is: nobody.
- Paul borrows the challenge to close the longest argument in Romans: "For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?" (Romans 11:34). Job asks it in a single line: "Will any teach God knowledge, seeing that he judges those who are on high?" (Job 21:22).
- Think how much of what you know you were told: your own birthday, the shape of the earth, the town your grandparents came from. Strip away everything that reached you through teachers, books and other people, and a great deal would go with it. Strip it away from God and nothing is lost, because nobody ever told him anything.
(2) A God who had to find things out would wait on what he found.
- Every finder spends some time not knowing. A general who learns of the enemy's movements from scouts knows nothing about them until the riders come back, and even then he knows only what they managed to see.
- Scripture's words for God's knowledge have no such gaps in them: "his understanding is beyond measure" (Psalm 147:5), and "he knows everything" (1 John 3:20).
- A God who waited on reports would depend on something outside himself for what he knows. That is a limit, and a perfect being has none.
(3) Scripture's language of sight says how far God's knowledge reaches.
- Scripture often speaks of God seeing, searching and looking down. Yet the same Scripture asks: "He who planted the ear, does he not hear? He who formed the eye, does he not see?" (Psalm 94:9). The God who made eyes does not need any.
- Psalm 139 opens with "O Lord, you have searched me and known me!" and three verses later says, "Even before a word is on my tongue, behold, O Lord, you know it altogether" (Psalm 139:1, 4). Then David confesses, "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high; I cannot attain it" (Psalm 139:6). The language of searching is there to say that nothing escapes God. It is not describing a method.
- A mother who says, "I have eyes in the back of my head," is not reporting extra eyes. She means that nothing in the room gets past her.
(4) The church's teachers agreed that God's knowledge does not come from things.
- Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth-century theologian, taught that God knows everything else by knowing himself, the source of all things, and not by receiving anything from them.
- John Duns Scotus, a Franciscan of the next generation who disagreed with Aquinas on much else, held that making God depend on created things for what he knows would demean the divine mind.
- The two disagreed sharply about what God's knowledge of the future does rest on. Aquinas looked to eternity, in which every time is present to God (D14). Scotus looked to the decision of God's own will (C3). He later granted that God knows truths about creatures' sins that his will does not choose, though he never said how. Yet both agreed that God's knowledge is not gathered from the world.
Therefore, God's knowledge is not acquired: none of it reached him by any route from the world.
(C1)Therefore, God's knowledge needs nothing present to go on.
+The conclusion follows from (P1) and (P2) by a pattern of reasoning called modus tollens: if one thing is true, a second is true too; the second is not; so the first is not either.
(1) The chain is short.
- If knowledge needs something present to go on, it is acquired (P1). God's knowledge is not acquired (P2). So God's knowledge does not need something present to go on.
- The pattern is an everyday one. If the bread had been in the oven for an hour, it would be golden. It is still pale, so it has not been in for an hour.
(2) It takes away the objection's support.
- The objection said there is nothing yet for God's knowledge to rest on. For anything God would have to look at, or work the answer out from, that is right: there is nothing there yet. (P1) grants every word of it.
- What the objection shows is that no finder could know tomorrow's free choice in advance. But God is not a finder.
- Scripture says as much of David's life: "in your book were written, every one of them, the days that were formed for me, when as yet there was none of them" (Psalm 139:16). Nothing was there yet, and the book was already written.
- A locked door keeps out everyone who has to come in through it. It does nothing about someone who was in the room all along.
(3) What it does not claim.
- It does not say that a statement about tomorrow has nothing that makes it true. What makes it true is what will happen (P4). (C1) is about how God knows, which is a different question from what makes the thing known true (D10). Think of a friend's birthday. How you know it is one question: she told you, or you saw it on her driver's license. What makes it her birthday is another: the day she was born.
- Nor does it say that God's knowledge floats free of the facts. Had the choice gone the other way, God would always have known that it would (D3).
- Nor does it say that God's knowledge of the future rests on nothing at all. The fuller account traces it to what God knows of his creatures and to his own decision (C3). What (C1) rules out is anything in the world for him to read the future from.
- And it takes no side on how God is related to time. It holds whether he is timeless, outside time altogether, or everlasting, in time with no beginning and no end (D14).
Therefore, nothing God knows has to be there yet for him to know it.
(P3)God knows every truth.
+God's knowledge leaves no truth out. That is what Christians mean when they call him omniscient.
(1) Scripture says it without qualification.
- John writes that "he knows everything" (1 John 3:20), and Hebrews that "no creature is hidden from his sight" (Hebrews 4:13). After the resurrection Peter says to Jesus, "Lord, you know everything; you know that I love you" (John 21:17).
- Verses this broad do not, taken alone, say whether tomorrow's free choices are among the truths there are. That is why (P4) is a premise of its own.
(2) A perfect being knows every truth.
- The reasoning is old, and short. God is the greatest being there could possibly be, which is what Anselm meant by calling him that than which nothing greater can be conceived. And a being who knows every truth is greater than one who does not.
- An atlas that leaves out a town is not made better by the excuse that the town was hard to reach.
(3) Omniscience says how much God knows, not how he knows it.
- "Every truth" is a claim about extent. It says nothing about routes.
- A census that counts everyone in the country tells you how many people there are. It does not tell you whether the counters went door to door.
- That is why (P3) and (C1) sit together without strain. The extent is complete, and no route is needed.
(4) Open theists keep the word and change its meaning.
- Open theists, the Christians who hold that the future is open even to God, agree that God knows every truth that can be known. But they add that what free creatures will do cannot be known before they do it.
- Their reason is one of two arguments. The first is the fatalist's argument: that God's knowing a choice in advance would take its freedom away. It has an answer of its own (D1). The second is the objection from the basis, which (C1) answers.
- With both reasons answered, "every truth that can be known" comes to the same thing as "every truth." One defender of foreknowledge asks for an example of a statement that could be true and yet impossible to know. The only ones he finds are statements like "Nothing exists." If that were true, there would be nobody to know it, but it cannot be true if God exists.
Therefore, God knows every truth there is.
(P4)There are truths about what people will freely do.
+Statements about what free people will do are true or false before they do it, and some of them are true.
(1) Scripture treats such statements as true when they are spoken.
- "Truly, I tell you, this very night, before the rooster crows, you will deny me three times" (Matthew 26:34). Jesus said it before Peter ever stood in the courtyard. If it was not true when he said it, it was not a true prophecy.
- He told the disciples of the betrayal ahead of time "that when it does take place you may believe that I am he" (John 13:19). A prediction offered as evidence has to have been true when it was made.
- Ordinary speech works the same way. "She'll say yes," says the friend before the proposal, and afterward everyone agrees that he was right all along, not that he became right when she answered.
- The principle that every statement is either true or false is called bivalence. Some philosophers deny it for statements about free choices, and (D2) answers them.
(2) A truth about tomorrow needs nothing present to make it true now.
- A statement is true when things are as it says. "Ellie will choose the grilled cheese on Tuesday" says only that on Tuesday Ellie chooses the grilled cheese. It is true if, when Tuesday comes, "Ellie is choosing the grilled cheese" is true.
- To call it true on Monday is not to say that anyone on Monday can know it, or that anything on Monday makes her choose it. It says only that on Tuesday things will turn out as the statement says.
- The ordinary view of truth, called correspondence, says that a statement is true when it matches how things are. One defender of foreknowledge, who holds that only the present exists, says that a statement about the future is true if matters turn out as it predicts, and that this is "all that the notion of truth as correspondence requires."
(3) People not yet born can be named in true statements.
- One logician argued that a statement about someone who does not yet exist cannot be true, because there is nobody for it to be about. His example was "William Willis will be president in 3000."
- But God knows every person he could create, and which of them he has chosen to create. He can pick out the William Willis of the world he made without waiting for him to be born.
- Even we can do it in a small way. "My first great-grandchild" picks out someone who does not yet exist, and "my first great-grandchild will be born in a leap year" will turn out true or false.
(4) Once the truths are granted, they are hard to keep from God.
- Those who deny foreknowledge agree that God knows every truth about the present. Now suppose that at noon, "Peter will deny his Lord tonight" is already true. Then its being true is itself a fact about noon, a truth about the present, and to know that fact is to know what Peter will do.
- Even a God who knew only by looking would know it, if the truth of a statement is among the things he can see.
- So whoever grants the truths and still denies that God knows them must make an exception, and say that some truths about the present are hidden even from God. The other road is to deny the truths themselves, and (P4) refuses it.
- Some who deny foreknowledge accept the cost of that exception. They grant the truths about tomorrow and deny that God knows them, because they think knowing such truths would take the freedom away. That is the fatalist's argument (D1). It and the objection from the basis are the reasons on offer, and (D1) and (C1) answer them. Apart from those two, no one has found a truth that God could not know (P3).
Therefore, there are truths about what people will freely do, and what makes them true is what will happen, not anything present now.
(C2)Therefore, God knows what people will freely do without looking ahead.
+(P3) and (P4) give the first half: God knows every truth, and some truths are about what people will freely do. (P2) and (C1) give the second: none of his knowledge comes by looking, and none of it needs anything present to go on.
(1) "But how?" asks for a route that is not there.
- The natural reply is: but how does he do it? There is no answer of the kind the question wants, and that is the point. The question asks for a route, and to call God's knowledge unacquired is to deny that there is any process by which he gets it.
- One defender of foreknowledge compares the question to asking "How can God be omnipotent?" or "How can God be eternal?" There is no machinery behind God's power, and there is none behind his knowledge. "He just is that way, and nothing more needs to be said."
- A child who asks how the sea got salty deserves an answer about rivers and rocks. A child who asks how God got so wise deserves a different answer: he never got wise.
(2) Certainty does nothing to the choice it is about.
- God's knowing is certain, and Ellie's choice is still hers. "Certainty is an epistemic property, not a causal force," as one defender of free will puts it. Epistemic means having to do with knowledge. Certainty is a fact about the knower, not a push on the thing known.
- To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes. Knowledge settles nothing, and God's knowledge of a choice rests on no settling cause either, so it is no threat to freedom. It is exactly the kind of knowledge a free choice leaves room for.
- You can be certain your sister will come to your wedding without having anything to do with her coming.
(3) The old pictures of sight are not needed.
- The church's great writers often pictured God's knowledge as sight from a height. Boethius, the sixth-century Roman Christian, said that God's outlook "embraces all things as from some lofty height." Aquinas pictured a man on a watchtower who "embraces in a single glance a whole caravan of passing travelers."
- Those pictures are beautiful, but they need the future to be there to be seen, the way a watchtower is no use unless the caravan is on the road (D14). (C2) needs nothing of the kind.
(4) What it does not claim.
- It does not say that God's knowledge is any use for planning. That is a further question, and (C3) takes it up.
- Nor does it say that anything settles the choice beforehand. Nothing settles it but the chooser. When Tuesday comes, nobody settles Ellie's choice of lunch but Ellie.
- Nor does it say whether God is in time or outside it.
Therefore, God knows what you will freely do tomorrow, and he knows it without looking ahead to see it.
(P5)God knows what every creature would freely do in any circumstance.
+God knows more than what will happen. He knows what every free creature he could make would freely do in any situation he might place it in.
(1) This is called middle knowledge.
- Luis de Molina, a sixteenth-century Jesuit, distinguished three kinds of knowledge in God, ordered by reasons rather than by time:
• Natural knowledge: everything that could be and everything that must be, such as every person God could make and the fact that two and two make four. Its content could not have been different, which is why it is called natural.
• Middle knowledge: what every creature would freely do in any circumstance, such as that if Peter were in that courtyard, he would deny his Lord. It sits in the middle because it shares something with each of the others. Like natural knowledge, it comes before God's decision to create anything. Like free knowledge, its content could have been different, since it depends on what the creatures would freely choose.
• Free knowledge: what will in fact happen, such as that Peter will deny his Lord. It depends on what God freely decides to create.
- An order of reasons is not a timetable. God never had a moment of not yet knowing. "First" means first in the order of explanation, the way a foundation comes first in a house that stands all at once.
- None of the three is acquired. They differ in whether their content could have been different and in whether it waits on God's decision, not in any route by which they reach him.
- Think of a teacher who has had a class for a whole year. She knows which student would raise a hand at the hard question and which would stare at the desk. Her knowledge is partial and sometimes wrong. God's has no gaps.
(2) Scripture shows God knowing what would happen.
- At Keilah, David asks whether Saul will come down and whether the men of the city will hand him over. "And the Lord said, He will come down" (1 Samuel 23:11). Of the men of Keilah he answers, "They will surrender you" (1 Samuel 23:12). David leaves, and neither thing happens. The answers were about what would happen if he stayed.
- Some read those answers as a forecast from what Saul and the townsmen were already planning. But the answers are God's, and God does not guess. A forecast from plans already made could have proved wrong. These answers could not.
- Jesus says of two Galilean towns that "if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes" (Matthew 11:21). Some readers, defenders of middle knowledge among them, take the saying as deliberate overstatement about the hard heart of Chorazin, one of the two towns. Even so, it compares how two peoples would respond.
- What Scripture shows is that God knows what would happen. It does not say whether that knowledge comes before or after his decision to create, and that is where the dispute lies. The reason for placing it before is a matter of freedom, not of exegesis (the close reading of a text).
(3) Middle knowledge travels no route either.
- What a creature who may never exist would freely do is not there to be looked at. If God knows it, he knows it the way (P2) says he knows everything: by his nature, with no route.
- No camera, however good, could photograph what a child who was never born would have said on her first day of school. There is nothing in front of the lens.
- So middle knowledge is not a second answer competing with the first. It is the same answer, with more said about what God knows.
- Whether there are such truths at all is a separate question. The grounding objection presses it: what could make a statement about what someone would freely do true, in a situation that may never arise? It has a full answer of its own (D10, D11).
(4) This knowledge cannot come from the decree.
- Suppose God knew what Peter would do in the courtyard only because he had decreed it. Then the decree would be what made the denial go the way it went, and Peter would not have settled it. What God knew would not be what Peter would freely do.
- So if there are truths about what creatures would freely do, God knows them logically before his decree: first in the order of reasons, though not in time. That is just what the name middle knowledge claims.
- A novelist knows what her heroine would say in any scene because she writes the heroine's lines. A mother may know what her grown son would say, and he still says it himself. Only knowledge that writes nothing leaves the words the speaker's own.
Therefore, God knows what every creature he could make would freely do, wherever he might place it, and he knows it logically before he decides what to create.
(P6)God knows which creatures he has decided to create, and where.
+God knows his own decision about which world to make: which people, in which times and places, facing which choices.
(1) God's decree places people without scripting them.
- On the middle-knowledge account, God's decree is his decision about which creatures to make and which circumstances to set them in.
- Think of a host planning the seating at a wedding dinner. She decides who sits beside whom. She does not decide what they will say.
- God's resolve settles where each person stands, not what each person does. A choice made where God placed a person is still settled by nobody but that person.
(2) Knowing one's own decision needs no looking.
- You know what you have decided to cook tonight without checking the kitchen.
- Scripture sets God's purpose beside his foretelling: "declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my purpose" (Isaiah 46:10). Peter preached that Jesus was "delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God" (Acts 2:23), and in the same sentence laid the killing on the men who did it.
(3) The Reformed use the same word for something else.
- In Reformed theology, God's decree settles every choice, so that God knows what people will do because he has settled what they will do.
- On the middle-knowledge account, the decree settles which creatures exist and where they stand, and it settles no one's choice.
- The word works like "plan" at that wedding dinner. To one host it means a seating chart; to another, a script for every toast.
- The same word names two different things. Keeping them apart is half the work of (C3).
Therefore, God knows his own decision about which creatures to make and where to place them.
(C3)Therefore, God's foreknowledge rests on what creatures would freely do and on what he has decided.
+Put (P5) and (P6) together, and God's knowledge of what will happen follows from them. To say that it rests on them is to say just that: in the order of reasons it comes after his knowledge of what creatures would freely do and of his own decision, and it depends on both.
(1) Foreknowledge follows without a look at the world.
- If Peter would deny his Lord in that courtyard, and God has decided to create Peter and let him stand in that courtyard on that night, then Peter will deny his Lord. Knowing the first two, God knows the third. The pattern is modus ponens, the simplest in logic: if this, then that; this; so that.
- This is not God working something out. He never knows the first two without the third. The third depends on them the way a roof depends on its walls in a house that stands all at once (P5).
- The whole of history is known this way, layer upon layer: what God sets up himself, what his creatures would freely do there, and what their choices set up in turn. Peter came to that fire through his own choices and other people's, and God knew each of them the same way.
- One defender of middle knowledge puts it in a sentence: "Given divine middle knowledge and the divine decree, foreknowledge follows immediately without any perception of the created world."
- The wedding host knows that her shy niece would talk all evening if she were seated beside her old school friend. She seats them together. Without looking into the hall, she knows the niece will talk all evening, and the talking is still the niece's.
(2) This is not simple foreknowledge.
- Simple foreknowledge, put precisely, is foreknowledge without middle knowledge: God knows what will happen, but not what free creatures would do if things went otherwise.
- It need not be pictured as sight. Someone who holds it can take the conceptualist answer of (C2), and then it has the basis (C2) gives: God knows every truth by his nature. Held that way, its trouble is not a missing basis. What it lacks, if its critics are right, is a use.
- Its critics argue, largely rightly, that it gives God nothing to plan with. What will happen already includes everything God himself does, so his knowledge of it comes too late to help him decide what to do. Some of its defenders dispute even that (D15).
- Suppose a man were handed tomorrow's newspaper, and on page three it reported what he himself did today. He could not use the paper to decide what to do, because whatever he decides is already in print.
- Reformed critics put a fair demand to anyone who says that God does not determine what people do: give a model of how God governs a world of free choices, where nothing settles a choice but the one who makes it. Freedom of that kind is called libertarian freedom. Simple foreknowledge is sometimes offered as such a model. Given the argument about planning, it cannot meet the demand. That is why the fuller account rests on middle knowledge, and not on simple foreknowledge.
(3) Middle knowledge and the decree give both a basis and a use.
- The perceptualist picture has no basis. If the future is not there to see, a God who knows by looking has nothing to look at (P1).
- Simple foreknowledge, however it is pictured, gives God little or nothing to plan with (D15).
- The account in (P5) and (P6) has a basis that needs no looking, and it has a use. God chooses where to place each person in light of what each would freely do, and so governs the world without settling anyone's choice.
- Think of the teacher again (P5). Knowing which student would raise a hand at the hard question, she can decide whom to call on, and each answer is still the student's own.
(4) The Reformed answer buys a basis at the price of freedom.
- Calvin put it plainly: "since he foresees the things which are to happen, simply because he has decreed that they are so to happen, it is vain to debate about prescience" (Institutes 3.23.6). Prescience is an older word for foreknowledge.
- That answer has a basis: God knows his own decree. But a decree that settles what a person chooses is what makes the choice go the way it goes. Then the person did not settle it, and a choice its chooser did not settle is not free.
- No one needs to pay that price for a basis. "Certainty is an epistemic property, not a causal force" (C2): it is a fact about the knower, not a push on the thing known, so knowledge needs no settling cause beneath it. Calvin himself granted, in the same section, that "mere prescience lays no necessity on the creatures."
- The most thorough modern defense of Reformed determinism also gives God knowledge of what people would do in any circumstance, a view some Calvinists have called "Calvinist middle knowledge." It leaves open whether that knowledge comes before God's decree or after it.
- Either way, the choices it is about are determined ones, free only in the sense of "free" that allows a choice to be determined. That is the sense compatibilists use: they hold that a choice can be both free and determined. On that view, what a person would do is settled by his nature, his circumstances and the influences on him, God's among them. And in the world God actually makes, the decree sets all of those.
(5) So the choice is between two grounds.
- Either God's foreknowledge rests on what creatures would freely do, together with his decision where to place them, or it rests on his decree alone.
- Each answer has a burden to carry. The first needs statements about what creatures would freely do to be true (D10, D11), and it must show that such truths, in place before the chooser exists, do not take the choice from him (D17). The second needs a choice settled by the decree to remain the chooser's own (D6).
- A host who seats her guests and a host who writes their lines can both know how the evening will go. Only the first host's guests settle what they say.
- Both sides agree that God's foreknowledge does not rest on looking. The decree alone keeps the basis and gives up the freedom. Middle knowledge keeps both.
Therefore, God's foreknowledge rests on what every creature would freely do and on what God has decided to create, and it needs no look at the world.
On the basis of foreknowledge:
Alston, William P. "Does God Have Beliefs?" Religious Studies 22 (1986): 287-306.
Craig, William Lane. Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, On God: Attributes of God. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2025. Sections 6.2.1, 6.2.3 (notes 36-38), 6.3.1 (notes 40, 43 and 45-46), 6.3.2 (opening), 6.3.2.1.4, 6.3.2.2 (notes 83-85), 6.4.1 (notes 100-105), 6.4.2.1, 6.4.2.2, 6.4.3.1 (note 136), 6.4.3.2 (notes 158-161) and 7.2.2 (notes 24-28).
Craig, William Lane. The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination. Synthese Library 294. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000.
Goldman, Alvin I. "A Causal Theory of Knowing." Journal of Philosophy 64, no. 12 (1967): 357-372.
Hunt, David, and Linda Zagzebski. "Foreknowledge and Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman. Substantive revision, February 17, 2026. Sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.6 and 3.
Khamara, Edward J. "Eternity and Omniscience." Philosophical Quarterly 24, no. 96 (1974): 212-218.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. The Possibility of an All-Knowing God. New York: St. Martin's, 1986.
O'Connor, Timothy. "The Impossibility of Middle Knowledge." Philosophical Studies 66 (1992): 139-166.
Prior, Arthur N. "The Formalities of Omniscience." Philosophy 37, no. 140 (1962): 114-129. Reprinted in Papers on Time and Tense, 26-44. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. Page 36, as quoted in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 6.3.2.2, note 85.
Prior, Arthur N. "Identifiable Individuals." In Papers on Time and Tense, 66-77. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.
Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Pages 469-470 and 595-596.
On middle knowledge and providence:
Adams, Robert Merrihew. "An Anti-Molinist Argument." Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 343-353.
Craig, William Lane. "Robert Adams' New Anti-Molinist Argument." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, no. 4 (1994): 857-861.
Flint, Thomas P. "Molinism." In The Oxford Handbook of Topics in Philosophy. Online ed. Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2014. Paragraph 18, as quoted in Stratton, Mere Molinism, 470.
Hasker, William. God, Time, and Knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989. Chapter 3.
Hasker, William. "Why Simple Foreknowledge Is Still Useless (In Spite of David Hunt and Alex Pruss)." Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 52, no. 3 (2009): 537-544.
Hunt, David P. "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge." Faith and Philosophy 10, no. 3 (1993): 394-414.
Hunt, David P. "Two Problems with Knowing the Future." American Philosophical Quarterly 34, no. 2 (1997): 273-285.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. Review of Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, edited by Ken Perszyk. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, November 30, 2012. As quoted in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 6.4.1, note 102.
Molina, Luis de. On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the Concordia). Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988. Disputations 49.11 and 50.15, as cited in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 6.4.1, notes 100-104.
Sanders, John. The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998.
Suárez, Francisco. De scientia Dei futurorum contingentium 2.5, and Tractatus de gratia Dei 11.8.1. As cited in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 6.4.1, note 105.
On the Reformed alternative:
Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018. Pages 218 and 226-228.
Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Translated by Henry Beveridge. Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1845. Book 3, chapter 23, section 6.
Edwards, Jonathan. Freedom of the Will. 1754. Part II, section 12. In The Works of President Edwards, vol. 2, 110-111. New York: G. & C. & H. Carvill, 1830.
Feinberg, John S. No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001.
Helm, Paul. Eternal God: A Study of God without Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. Pages 26 and 129-130.
Helm, Paul. The Providence of God. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994. Pages 39-68.
Historical sources:
Anselm. Proslogion 2. Translated by Sidney Norton Deane. Chicago: Open Court, 1903.
Aquinas, Thomas. Compendium of Theology. Translated by Cyril Vollert. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947. Chapter 133.
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1920-1922. Part I, question 14, articles 5, 8 and 13.
Augustine. On the Trinity 15.13. Translated by Arthur West Haddan. In Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 3. Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1887.
Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. Translated by H. R. James. London: Elliot Stock, 1897. Book V, prose 6.
Cicero. On Fate 32-33 (chapter 14). In The Treatises of M. T. Cicero, translated by C. D. Yonge, 277. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853.
Duns Scotus, John. Ordinatio I, distinctions 38-39, questions 1-5; Lectura I, distinction 39; Reportatio Parisiensis I, distinction 46, question 2. As reported in Knuuttila and Frost, "Medieval Theories of Future Contingents."
Knuuttila, Simo, and Gloria Frost. "Medieval Theories of Future Contingents." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published June 15, 2006; substantive revision April 9, 2025.
Ockham, William of. Predestination, God's Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents. Translated by Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983. Question 2, article 4, page 48, as quoted in Knuuttila and Frost, "Medieval Theories of Future Contingents."
Biblical citations:
Genesis 18:21; 1 Samuel 23:11-12; 2 Chronicles 16:9; Job 21:22; Psalm 14:2; Psalm 33:13-15; Psalm 94:9; Psalm 139:1, 4, 6, 16; Psalm 147:5; Isaiah 40:13-14; Isaiah 41:23; Isaiah 42:9; Isaiah 44:28; Isaiah 46:10; Isaiah 48:5; Matthew 11:21; Matthew 26:34; John 13:19; John 21:17; Acts 2:23; Romans 11:34; Hebrews 4:13; 1 John 3:20.
+If God already knows what I will do tomorrow, then I cannot do anything else, and a choice I cannot avoid is not free. Explaining how he knows does not touch that.
1. Whether knowing takes away freedom is a separate question.
Christians have pressed two worries about foreknowledge for as long as they have believed in it. One asks how God could know a free choice. The other asks whether his knowing would take the choice's freedom away. This objection is the second one, the worry called theological fatalism: the claim that whatever God foreknows happens by necessity.
The heart of the answer is short. God's knowing a choice settles nothing. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, and knowledge makes nothing go any way at all. Even a belief granted to be fixed would leave free a choice that nothing but the chooser settles.
Grant, for argument's sake, that God's belief about your choice were as fixed as yesterday's sunset. It would still not be what makes your choice go the way it goes. You would be.
2. In the ordinary case you could still have chosen otherwise.
That is the ordinary mark of a free choice, and foreknowledge does not remove it. If you were going to choose otherwise, God would always have known that instead. His knowledge waits on your choice, not the other way round, which is why it is not among the fixed facts of the past that nobody can now change.
Think of a friend who is sure you will come to the reunion. If you stay home, her certainty turns out to have been mistaken. God's cannot be mistaken, so had you stayed home, he would always have known that you would.
3. How God knows makes the answer easier to see.
God's knowledge is not a cause, and it is not a route that starts in the present. It is a perfect knower's knowledge of what will be. Its certainty is a fact about the knower, and nothing in it reaches out and pushes (C2).
A forecaster can be sure of tomorrow's storm only because today's weather is already bringing it. God's certainty about your choice needs no such cause, and nothing settles the choice but you.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+The future does not exist yet. There is nothing there to see, so not even God can see it.
1. This is right about seeing.
It is the oldest form of the objection. Carneades asked what Apollo could have beheld that would let him foretell a death that had no cause yet in the world. In the Middle Ages, John Duns Scotus pressed a version of the same point against those who said that the future stands present before God's eternity: what does not yet exist cannot be present to anything.
Grant it at once. A knower who knows by seeing needs something there to see, and if only the present exists, the future is not there.
2. God does not know by seeing.
That is the whole of (P2). Scripture speaks of God's eyes the way it speaks of his arm and his hand, and the same Scripture says that no one ever taught him anything (Isaiah 40:13-14). A knower who never finds anything out needs nothing to be there first (C1).
3. Statements about tomorrow are already true or false.
What the objection needs, if it is to reach God at all, is that there is nothing there to know: no truth about tomorrow yet. That is a different claim. A statement about tomorrow is true now if tomorrow things turn out as it says, and nothing has to exist today to make that so (P4).
Some go further and say that a statement about a free choice is neither true nor false until the choice is made. Two things tell against it.
- On the plainest form of that view, even "Peter will deny his Lord tonight, or he will not" would not have been true the evening before. Yet nothing could be more certain than that. Subtler forms of the view keep the whole sentence true while denying truth to both halves, so that "he will deny his Lord, or he will not" is true and yet neither "he will deny his Lord" nor "he will not" is. That is harder to believe than the plain thought that one half was true.
- The denial at the fire that made "Peter denied his Lord" true the next morning is the same fact that made "Peter will deny his Lord" true the night before. The fact stays put; only the tense moves.
Yesterday's breakfast no longer exists, and "I had toast for breakfast" is still true. In the same way, many who hold that only the present exists, a view called presentism, still hold that statements about the future are true or false. One of the most careful defenders of foreknowledge is a presentist himself.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Future Is Not Open to God: Answering Open Theism
+Without anything present to go on, a true belief about tomorrow's free choice is only a lucky guess, however often it comes out right. Arthur Prior pressed exactly this point.
1. Prior's objection is a serious one.
Arthur Prior was the New Zealand logician who founded the modern logic of tense, the study of how "was," "is" and "will be" work in reasoning. He pressed this objection after granting a good deal of the case for foreknowledge. He was willing to allow that a past truth about the future could depend on what is still to come. What he would not allow was that anyone could know it. A prediction of a free choice, he said, has "no present ground for the guess's correctness which a specially penetrating person might perceive." Without such a ground, the belief is a guess that happens to come off.
2. What makes a guess lucky is that it could easily have been wrong.
A man who bets on red and wins was lucky. Had black come up, he would still have bet on red, and he would have lost. His bet did not follow the wheel; the wheel happened to match his bet.
That is the mark of luck: a belief that would have been the same however the facts had gone.
3. God's knowledge follows the facts in every possible case.
Had Peter stood by his Lord that night, God would always have known that he would. His belief does not merely happen to match the choice. It could not fail to match it, whichever way the choice went, and that is exactly the connection that separates knowledge from luck.
Philosophers sometimes put the test this way: would the believer have believed it if it had been false? Of the gambler, yes. Of God, never.
None of this proves on its own that God knows tomorrow; that is the work of (P3) and (P4). Prior claimed something stronger: that knowing a free choice in advance could never be more than correct guessing. A knower whose belief follows the facts in every possible case shows that it can be more.
4. The demand for a present ground is a demand for a route.
Prior's word "perceive" gives his picture away. A present ground is something a sharp enough eye could make out, and the need for one belongs to a knower who has to find things out (P1). God does not have to find anything out (P2).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+To know a fact, you have to be connected to it by a chain of causes. A choice that has not been made cannot cause anything now, so nothing could connect God to it.
1. Something like this is true of knowledge by the senses.
You know the kettle is boiling because its steam reaches your eyes and its whistle your ears. Some philosophers have built a whole theory of knowledge on that model: to know a fact, the fact must stand at the start of a chain of causes that ends in your belief.
For knowledge by the senses, that is a plausible picture. Its best-known form was in fact offered only for knowledge of the world gained through experience.
2. Taken as a rule for every knower, it proves too much.
Numbers cause nothing. If every piece of knowledge needed a chain of causes running from the thing known, nobody would know that two and two make four. Many philosophers take that as a reason to doubt the rule rather than their arithmetic.
3. Narrowed to facts that could have been otherwise, it describes a finder.
You know the sun will rise tomorrow, though tomorrow's sunrise causes nothing today. What connects you to it is a present cause, the turning earth, which will also bring the sunrise about, together with a piece of reasoning. That is a route, and routes are what God does not need (P2). The theory tells how a mind standing outside the facts gets hooked up to them. God's knowledge is not hooked up to anything.
4. God's knowledge is connected to the choice, but not by causes.
God knows a choice because it will be made, and not the other way round. That because is a dependence in the order of reasons: had the choice gone otherwise, God's knowledge would have been different. Nothing travels from the choice to God, and nothing travels from God's knowing to the choice.
- Peter's denial sent no signal back to God, and God's knowing gave Peter no push.
- A chain of causes would be worse, whichever way it ran. A choice that caused God's knowledge would have to reach backward in time. Knowledge that caused the choice would settle it, and then the choice would not be free. God's knowledge needs neither.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+Scripture itself pictures God knowing by looking. He looks down from heaven to see (Psalm 14:2), his eyes run to and fro through the earth (2 Chronicles 16:9), and he goes down to see Sodom (Genesis 18:21).
1. The texts are many and vivid."The Lord looks down from heaven on the children of man, to see if there are any who understand, who seek after God" (Psalm 14:2). "For the eyes of the Lord run to and fro throughout the whole earth" (2 Chronicles 16:9). Before judging Sodom the Lord says, "I will go down to see whether they have done altogether according to the outcry that has come to me. And if not, I will know" (Genesis 18:21).
Nobody should pretend that these verses are not there. Read with nothing else in view, they sound like a God who finds things out by inspection.
2. Scripture speaks of God's eyes the way it speaks of his arm.
The same psalms that give God eyes deny that he needs any: "He who planted the ear, does he not hear? He who formed the eye, does he not see?" (Psalm 94:9). God has no arm, and yet Scripture tells of his outstretched arm. The language of the body shows what God does. It does not describe the machinery by which he does it.
Psalm 33 joins the two in a single breath: "The Lord looks down from heaven; he sees all the children of man; from where he sits enthroned he looks out on all the inhabitants of the earth, he who fashions the hearts of them all and observes all their deeds" (Psalm 33:13-15). The one who looks is the one who made every heart he looks at. That is not a stranger finding things out.
3. The looking is about judgment from full knowledge.
At Sodom the Lord goes down the way a judge visits the scene before passing sentence, so that nobody can say the verdict rested on hearsay. Whether such texts show a God who learns is a question with a full answer of its own. What they plainly show is a judge who acts on complete knowledge.
4. Where Scripture speaks of the future, God speaks ahead rather than looking ahead.
The credential Isaiah demands of the idols is an announcement: "Tell us what is to come hereafter, that we may know that you are gods" (Isaiah 41:23). God's claim is to have made one: "before they came to pass I announced them to you, lest you should say, My idol did them" (Isaiah 48:5). Nowhere is God pictured straining to see the road ahead. He declares it.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Future Is Not Open to God: Answering Open Theism
+A choice that nothing settles beforehand cannot be known infallibly by anyone. If God knows it infallibly, something must have settled it, and the only candidate is God's decree.
1. Edwards made this argument with great care.
Jonathan Edwards argued that nothing can be certainly known without evidence, and that evidence comes in only two kinds: a thing is evident in itself, or it is evident through its connection with something else. A future choice that nothing yet makes necessary has neither. So it cannot be known by anyone, and greater powers of sight would not help. "If the sight be infinitely strong, and the capacity of discerning infinitely great, it will enable to see all that there is." It will still not see what is not there.
Reformed theologians draw the conclusion that God's foreknowledge rests on his decree. A leading Reformed philosopher of providence (God's care and government of the world) distinguishes knowing what will happen from knowing it "as a result of ordaining or effectively willing or otherwise ensuring" it, and finds the second kind in Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas and Calvin.
2. Edwards's two kinds of evidence are the two routes a finder can take.
A thing evident in itself is seen in the thing now, in its present existence or in a nature that makes it necessary. That is inspection, like a doctor looking at a rash. A thing evident through its connection with something else is reached from what is seen. That is inference, like the same doctor reading a blood test and drawing the diagnosis. Between them, these are the ways a mind comes to know what it did not know (P1).
- Edwards counts the uncreated understanding in, and there his argument assumes what it needs to prove: that God, too, must come to know by inspecting or inferring. That is exactly what (P2) denies.
- Edwards tied evidence to sight in so many words: for a thing to be evident to a mind "is the same thing, as for that understanding to see evidence of it." An infinitely strong eye cannot see what is not there, and God's knowledge is not an eye.
3. The step from "known" to "settled" runs the wrong way.
The argument treats knowledge as if it needed a settling cause beneath it, so that if God knows a choice, something must have fixed the choice for him to know. But certainty is a fact about the knower, not a push on the thing known (C2). A truth about tomorrow needs nothing beneath it but what will happen. And God's knowledge of that truth needs no settling cause beneath it, and nothing present to go on (C1).
Calvin himself granted half of this. "I, for my part, am willing to admit, that mere prescience lays no necessity on the creatures," he wrote, before resting God's foreknowledge on the decree all the same (Institutes 3.23.6).
4. The decree buys its basis with the chooser's freedom.
If God knows Peter's denial because he decreed it, then the decree is what made the denial go the way it went. Peter did not settle it, and a choice its chooser did not settle is not free. That does not solve the puzzle about foreknowledge and freedom. It gives up the freedom the puzzle was about.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of SinPhilosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+Scripture grounds God's foreknowledge in his purpose: he declares the end from the beginning because "My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my purpose" (Isaiah 46:10). God knows the future because he plans it.
1. Isaiah does join knowing and purposing.
The verse sets them side by side: "declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my purpose" (Isaiah 46:10). Much of what God foretells in those chapters is what he himself will do. He names Cyrus and says of him, "He is my shepherd, and he shall fulfill all my purpose" (Isaiah 44:28). And knowing his own purpose needs no looking (P6).
2. The verse does not say how God knows every free act.
Isaiah says that God's purpose stands. It does not say that God knows each free choice by having settled it. God accomplishes his purpose through choices he knew would be freely made, placing people where their free choices serve it (C3). That is a purpose that stands, and a counsel nobody overturns.
3. The New Testament's clearest case keeps both halves.
Peter preached that Jesus was "delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God," and in the same sentence held his hearers guilty: "you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men" (Acts 2:23). A plan that runs through free acts, known before they were done, keeps both halves of that sentence at full strength.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: What the Sovereignty Texts Say, and What They Do NotPhilosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+Either God's knowledge makes things so, or things make it so. If it makes them so, it is a decree; if they make it so, God depends on his creatures and is acted on by them.
1. This is an old dilemma with serious defenders.
Augustine wrote that God does not know his creatures because they exist; they exist because he knows them. Aquinas taught that God's knowledge is the cause of things, as a builder's plan is the cause of a house. Later Thomists (followers of Aquinas) and many Reformed theologians press the dilemma hard: either God determines what his creatures do, or they determine something in him, and the second is unworthy of God.
Grant this much. If knowing had to stand at one end of a chain of causes, those would be the only two options. The two options of a dilemma are called its horns, as if it were a bull that could catch you on either one.
2. Knowing is neither causing nor being caused.
God knows a choice because it will be made: that is a dependence in the order of reasons, not a push (D4). The choice does nothing to God. Nothing reaches into him to put the knowledge there, and his knowing reaches into nothing to make the choice.
If "it is raining" is true, it is true because it is raining. The rain does nothing to the sentence.
3. Depending in that sense is not a lack.
What would make God less than perfect is needing something outside himself in order to exist or to be good, or having to wait on reports in order to know. His knowledge matching every free choice, whichever way the choice goes, is not a need. It is what knowing everything means.
4. The first horn is the decree.
If God's knowledge makes each free choice go the way it goes, then the choice is settled by something other than its chooser, and it is not free (D6). The dilemma forces a choice between the decree and a dependent God only if knowing must cause or be caused, and it need not.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+"God just knows" is not an answer. A model that explains how God knows the future by saying that he knows it has explained nothing.
1. There is no mechanism to give.
That is the claim, not an evasion of it. To call God's knowledge unacquired is to deny that there is any process by which he gets it (C2). Asking for the process is asking for the very thing the account says does not exist. Nobody asks for one behind his other perfections. How is God almighty? Through no machinery. How is he eternal? By no process. A God whose every perfection had to be explained by some mechanism behind it would make the mechanism the real God.
2. The open theist already says it of the present.
The choice you are making at this moment, coffee or tea, is a fact about you, not about God, and it could have gone otherwise. The open theist holds that God knows it all the same. He cannot say by what mechanism God knows it, and he does not think God needs one.
So "he just knows" was not invented to rescue foreknowledge. It is how the open theist already describes God's knowledge of the present. On this point, the only question left between him and the defender of foreknowledge is whether there is a truth about the future to be known, and (P4) answers it.
Those who hold that God settles every choice can say that he knows our choices by knowing his decree, and they pay for that answer with the freedom (D6).
3. The match between God's knowledge and the facts is no accident.
On this the objection has a point worth granting. Power makes things so, but knowledge has to match how things are, and a skeptic may fairly ask what keeps the match from being a coincidence.
- Think of two clocks that have always agreed. If nothing connects them, the agreement is a coincidence that has gone on too long.
- God's knowing is connected to the choice by the direction of its dependence. He knows a choice because it will be made, and not the other way round (D4). Had the choice gone otherwise, he would always have known that it would (D3).
- That dependence is no gear or wire, but it is not nothing. It belongs to God's nature to know whatever is true (D12), so his knowing cannot drift from the facts, any more than "It is raining" can drift from the rain that makes it true (D8).
4. Christians have confessed it this way for centuries.
A future contingent is something that will happen and could have failed to. William of Ockham, the fourteenth-century Franciscan, wrote that it "must be held beyond question that God knows with certainty all future contingents," and admitted, "It is difficult, however, to see how He knows this." Ockham's difficulty was the basis objection itself: neither side of a future choice, he observed, is any more determined to truth than the other. Yet he did not take the difficulty of saying how as a reason to doubt that God knows.
5. The fuller account does say more.
Anyone who wants more than "he knows by his nature" can have it: God's knowledge of what will happen follows from what he knows of what creatures would do and of what he has decided (C3).
Ask the wedding host why she was sure her niece would talk all evening, and she can tell you. She knew what her niece would do beside her old school friend, and she seated her there (C3).
+Asked what makes counterfactuals of freedom true, defenders of middle knowledge give an answer; asked how God knows the future, they say "he just does." Granting the demand for grounds in one place and refusing it in the other is a double standard.
1. The two questions are different in kind.Counterfactuals of freedom are statements about what a free creature would do in a situation that may never arise: "If Peter were in that courtyard, he would deny his Lord."
One question is about the statement, and the other is about God:
- The grounding objection (P5) asks what makes such a statement true. The answer is that it matches how things are: Peter is such that, in that courtyard, he would freely deny his Lord. Its truth rests on the creature it describes and the choice he would make.
- The objection from the basis asks a different question: how God comes to know a truth. The conceptualist answer is that he does not come to know anything. He knows it by his nature.
Both questions get answers. The answers differ because the questions do.
2. Nobody asks what process brought God his arithmetic.
His knowledge that two and two make four has no such story behind it, and nobody thinks the missing answer is a mystery. The demand for a process is the perceptualist picture asking to be let back in.
3. One standard, applied twice.
What anyone may fairly ask of a truth is that it match how things are, and the truths in question do. What nobody may ask is that a truth rest on something present, a structure or a cause, before it can count as true. And the objection from the basis may not ask that of knowledge either. Truth and knowledge are held to the same standard.
- "Ellie will choose the grilled cheese on Tuesday" is true if, on Tuesday, she does. Nobody asks it to rest on anything in Monday's kitchen (P4).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding Objection
+Middle knowledge only moves the problem back: how could God know what a person who never exists would freely do? Its defenders have merely assumed that he does.
1. Kvanvig's complaint is a fair one to raise.
The philosopher Jonathan Kvanvig put it bluntly: "Molinists have not explained how God is capable, prior to creation, of having middle knowledge; they have merely posited that he does." Molinists are defenders of middle knowledge, named for Molina. If the account of foreknowledge leans on middle knowledge, the question of how God has middle knowledge cannot be waved away.
2. The answer is the same as before.
Middle knowledge is not acquired either (P5). What a creature who may never exist would freely do is not there to be looked at, and God does not look. One defender of middle knowledge answers Kvanvig directly: there is no more difficulty in holding that God has it without explaining how than in holding that God is almighty without explaining how.
Whether statements about what a person would freely do can be true at all is a different question, the grounding objection (D10).
3. Its first defenders offered explanations anyway.
- Molina held that God's mind so far surpasses any created free will that he understands it completely, and knows not only what it could choose in any circumstance but what it would choose. He called this supercomprehension.
• The standard objection is that knowing a will through and through would show what it would choose only if its nature settled the choice, and then the choice would not be free.
• Molina's modern defenders answer that what a free creature would do is a fact about that creature which its nature does not settle, and which God discerns all the same.
- Francisco Suárez, his fellow Jesuit, argued more simply that whatever is true can be known, since truth is what a mind is made to grasp, and God knows all that can be known. His answer needs no insight into the will at all. It is the answer of (C2) in his own terms.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding ObjectionPhilosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+Innate knowledge can only be of necessary truths. A truth about what a free person will choose can be known only through contact with what makes it true, and tomorrow's choice is not yet there to be in contact with.
1. The objection presses fairly on the comparison.
Innate ideas, as philosophers have usually described them, are of necessary truths, things that could not have been otherwise: that two and two make four, that nothing is red all over and green all over at once. Truths about free choices are not like that. Peter would deny his Lord, but nothing made that necessary, and it might not have been true. So how could such a truth belong to a knower by nature?
Its sharpest published form adds a principle. A contingent truth, one that could have been false, cannot be seen to be true by any insight into the statement itself. A mind can know it only by acquaintance with what makes it true: direct contact with the thing itself, the way you know a friend's voice by hearing it.
2. The comparison was about the route, not the subject matter.
God's knowledge is "more like" a mind's knowledge of innate ideas in one respect: it does not come from outside. Nothing in the comparison says that everything God knows is necessary.
- Nor is route-free knowledge confined to necessary truths. God knows what he himself decided in making this world, a truth that could have been otherwise, and he never found it out (P1).
3. Acquaintance is how a finder knows.
To know a contingent thing by contact with what makes it true is to know it by a route (P1), like the witness who was there or the taster who tasted. For a finder, the principle is right.
- Made a rule for God, it would turn all his knowledge of what creatures do into something received from them, which is what (P2) denies.
- It would also make every prophecy of a free act a guess. When Jesus told Peter that he would deny him three times (P4), the denial was not yet there to be in contact with.
- And even on its own terms, the principle does not reach the case. Suppose "Peter will deny his Lord" was true that night. Then its being true was itself a fact about that night, there to be in contact with like any other present fact (P4). Whoever grants such truths, and holds that God knows every truth about the present, cannot consistently keep that one from him.
4. What is God's by nature is knowing every truth, not which truths there are.
It is God's nature to know whatever is true. Which things are true about free choices depends on how the choices will go. So the content of God's knowledge could have been different, while its completeness could not.
- A perfectly honest witness says whatever happened. What he says depends on what happened. That he tells the truth does not.
- Had Peter stood by his Lord, God would always have known that he would (D3). His knowledge would have been different, and it would still have been his by nature.
+God has no beliefs at all, only one undivided, direct awareness of reality. Talk of "truths" God knows misdescribes him, and direct awareness of tomorrow needs a tomorrow to be aware of.
1. William Alston's model is a serious one.
The philosopher William Alston argued that God grasps reality whole, without carving it into separate statements, and that his knowledge is immediate awareness of the facts: direct, with nothing in between. On this view God has no beliefs at all, since a belief, as Alston understood it, is the kind of state that could be false, and God's knowledge could not be.
2. Alston's model can be granted.
If God's knowledge is one undivided awareness, then the description of it in terms of truths, God knowing this truth and that one, is how finite minds have to state it. It captures how far his knowledge reaches and that it cannot be wrong, though not the way he has it. As one defender of foreknowledge puts it, the definition in terms of truths then "expresses the human point of view."
- Think of describing a friend's face to someone who has never seen her. You go feature by feature, the eyes, then the nose, then the smile, because words come one at a time. The description can be complete and accurate, though nobody ever saw her face as a list.
3. Direct awareness can be had with no route.
Alston's case against divine beliefs turns on how God's knowledge is held, whole and unable to be wrong, not on where it comes from. And "direct" can mean two different things:
- A route with no go-between, the way you see a tree without first seeing a picture of it. Awareness of that kind needs its object to be there, as all seeing does (D2).
- No route at all, which is the conceptualist's claim (C1).
Nothing in Alston's reasons for denying beliefs requires the first meaning rather than the second.
Suppose, though, that "direct" did mean the first. There would still be something to take in, if statements about tomorrow are true today. That such a statement is true is a fact about today (P4), and a God aware of every present fact is aware of that one. And if God is timeless, every time is present to his awareness in any case (D14).
4. Denying beliefs does not help against the fatalist either.
The model is sometimes offered as an escape from the fatalist's argument, since there would be no ancient belief sitting in the past to be fixed. But if God is in time, there would still be his awareness, long ago, of what you will do tomorrow, and the fatalist can run his argument on that just as well. The answer to him lies elsewhere (D1).
+God is outside time and sees all of history at once, as from a watchtower. He does not foreknow anything; he simply sees it, so there is no question about a basis to answer.
1. This is one of the church's oldest and finest answers.
Boethius, writing in prison in the sixth century, said that God's knowledge should be called "not foreknowledge as of something future, but knowledge of a moment that never passes." Its name, he said, is "not prevision, but providence, because, since utterly removed in nature from things mean and trivial, its outlook embraces all things as from some lofty height." Aquinas pictured "a person standing on top of a watchtower" who "embraces in a single glance a whole caravan of passing travelers."
2. A picture of sight needs something there to see.
The watchtower works because the caravan is on the road. For eternity to see tomorrow, tomorrow must in some way be there to be seen, and defenders of timelessness have given that two different meanings:
- Some hold that all times are equally real, a view called the tenseless theory of time, on which past, present and future all exist, the way every town on a map exists at once. Then there is something for eternity to see. The tenseless theory has able defenders. It also comes at a high price, philosophical and theological, in the judgment of one defender of foreknowledge who has written a book weighing it.
- Others, following Aquinas, hold that every time is present to God because he is its cause, the way a builder's plan stands behind the house (D8). Then what does the work is no longer sight but God's causing, and whether that leaves a creature's choice his own is the question of the decree (D6).
If only the present is real, and God's causing does not settle what free creatures do, it is hard to say what eternity sees when it sees tomorrow. That is the point Scotus pressed (D2).
3. God's relation to time can be left open.
Whether God is timeless or everlasting is a question for the doctrine of God, and Christians of every tradition are found on both sides of it. The conceptualist answer works either way. A timeless God who knows by his nature needs no caravan on the road, and an everlasting God who knows by his nature needs no telescope.
4. Even the timeless knower is not a finder.
A leading Reformed philosopher of providence, who holds that God is timeless, describes God's knowledge not as sight but as insight: God knows "at a glance the whole of his temporally ordered creation in rather the way in which a crossword clue may be solved in a flash." Taken that way, as a picture of how complete his knowledge is rather than of a route by which it reaches him, the watchtower is a true picture.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Does God See All Times at Once? Eternity and the Boethian AnswerPhilosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+Foreknowledge is useless to God. Knowing what will happen, he cannot use it to decide what to do, because what will happen already includes what he does.
1. The argument is strong against simple foreknowledge.
William Hasker, an open theist, has pressed this argument for decades. At full strength it says more than that foreknowledge comes late. If all God knows is what will happen, then everything he will do is already part of what he knows. He cannot use his knowledge that something will happen to decide whether to bring it about or prevent it, because his decision is already included in the very thing he knows. So, Hasker concludes, knowledge of that kind is useless for governing the world.
- A traveler handed a photograph of himself arriving in Rome cannot use it to choose his road. Whatever road he chooses is already in the picture.
2. Its best-known critic has a reply.
The philosopher David Hunt answers that the argument runs together two different problems:
- One is a loop: God's knowledge of an event leading him to act in a way that brings that very event about, so that the event explains the knowledge and the knowledge explains the event. Hunt describes cases in which knowing what will happen guides God without any such loop.
- The other is the claim that nobody can decide what he already knows he will do. Hunt argues that this rests on a principle that is false.
Hasker has answered that simple foreknowledge is useless still. The dispute continues, and no premise depends on how it ends.
3. Middle knowledge gives God what planning needs.
Simple foreknowledge keeps God's knowledge of what will happen and, if that argument is right, gives him nothing to plan with. That is why the fuller account rests on middle knowledge instead. It gives God what planning needs: what each person would freely do in each circumstance he might create (C3).
A chess player who could see only the final position of the game could not use it to choose a move. A player who knew how his opponent would answer every move he might make could.
4. Even on middle knowledge, foreknowledge is the result and not the tool.
God's knowledge of what will actually happen comes, in the order of reasons, after his decision to create. So the objection is right that God does not plan by consulting his foreknowledge. He plans with middle knowledge, and foreknowledge follows.
The chess player plans with what he knows of his opponent's replies. How the game will end follows from those replies and the moves he chooses; it is not something he consults in order to choose them.
5. Foreknowledge is still far from idle.
It is the credential God claims over the idols: "Behold, the former things have come to pass, and new things I now declare; before they spring forth I tell you of them" (Isaiah 42:9). It is what Jesus offers as a ground of faith: "I am telling you this now, before it takes place, that when it does take place you may believe that I am he" (John 13:19).
Even the decision to announce a thing is made, like all of God's decisions, with middle knowledge in view. What the announcement displays is that he knows what will come. Knowledge that guides no decision can still be the knowledge that tells the true God from the false.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+Simple foreknowledge does not take the risk out of creating free creatures. Only a God who decrees everything takes no risks, so foreknowledge without the decree leaves God gambling.
1. Granted, for simple foreknowledge.
A God who knew only what will happen, and nothing of what would happen otherwise, would have decided to create without knowing how the decision would turn out. His knowledge of what will happen comes only after the decision, in the order of reasons. Reformed theologians press this, and against that view they are right. Open theists press the same point from the other side and conclude that God does take risks.
- Such a God would be like a coach who has to name her penalty taker without knowing how any of her players would take the kick.
2. Middle knowledge removes the risk without settling any choice.
"The Molinist God is not a risk taker," one defender of middle knowledge writes. "He never has to deal with acting in situations where he knows only what probably would result from his actions." God decides where to place each person knowing what each would freely do there, so nothing takes him by surprise and every purpose of his stands.
What middle knowledge does not give God is control over what each person would freely do. He works with those truths and does not write them, and that is what making creatures whose choices are their own involves.
That is no lack of power. God does not make married bachelors either, because there is nothing there to make: the words cancel each other out. In the same way, to make a creature freely do what it would not freely do in that place is no task at all.
3. Only one of the two ways to remove risk keeps freedom.
The Reformed God removes risk by settling every choice. The God of middle knowledge removes it by knowing what every creature would freely do and placing each one accordingly. To ensure an outcome is to make sure that it comes about. To necessitate it is to settle it beforehand, by conditions that are enough by themselves to make it go that way. God ensures without necessitating.
- A coach who knows exactly how each of her players would take a penalty can choose who takes it without kicking the ball herself.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around ItPhilosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin
+Middle knowledge gives up the freedom as surely as the decree does. If it was true before Peter existed that he would deny his Lord in that courtyard, then that truth, not Peter, made the denial go the way it went.
1. Outside the grounding objection, this is the sharpest objection to middle knowledge.
The philosopher Robert Adams published it in 1991, and it has been defended through several rounds of reply since. At full strength it runs a chain of explanations:
- The truth about what Peter would do is one of God's reasons for placing him in the courtyard.
- God's placing him there explains his being there.
- His being there explains his denial.
So, the objection concludes, a truth in place before Peter existed explains his denial, and a choice explained by what was true before the chooser existed was never his to settle. The question has a full answer of its own, and the heart of it is short.
2. "Explains" does three different jobs in the chain.
The truth is one of God's reasons for a decision. The decision is a cause of Peter's being in the courtyard. And Peter's being there gives him a choice to make; it produces nothing about which way he makes it. Three different links do not add up to one chain that reaches the choice as its cause.
- Think of the wedding host again (C3). What she knows of her niece is her reason for the seating plan, and the plan puts the niece beside her old school friend. Neither the knowledge nor the plan does the niece's talking.
3. Even one sense of "explains" need not pass along a chain.
Suppose a single sense of "explains" could be found that fits all three links. The objection would still need it to pass from one link to the next, and nothing guarantees that it does. Take John and Mary. John wants to go to the party because Mary is going, and Mary wants to go because John is. Each explains the other. If explanation always passed along a chain, then since Mary's going explains John's, and John's explains Mary's, Mary's going would end up explaining itself.
4. The truth answers to Peter, not Peter to the truth.
Had Peter stood by his Lord in that courtyard, a different statement about what he would do there would have been true all along, and God would have known that one instead. Which statement is true depends on how Peter would freely choose.
- A true statement settles nothing. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, and a statement, however true, makes nothing go. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing, and truths are no different.
- It is the same answer given to the fatalist about God's beliefs (D1). Whoever accepts it for a belief needs a reason to refuse it for an if-then statement, like "If Peter were in that courtyard, he would deny his Lord."
- A true biography written before its subject was born, if there could be one, would follow his life. His life would not follow it.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding ObjectionPhilosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It