Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding Objection
(●)A statement about what a free creature would do can be true, and its truth takes nothing from the choice it describes.
+A friend of yours is applying for a job, and she has put you down as a reference. Nobody from the company has called yet, and perhaps nobody ever will. Still, one thing is true about you right now: if they called, you would tell them she is the most honest person you know. That is true of you today, though no one has asked, and it is true because of how you would freely answer.
Statements like that are called counterfactuals: if-then statements about what would happen under conditions that may never come. Any if-then statement is a conditional, and a counterfactual is the kind whose "if" may run counter to the facts, as yours does for as long as the phone stays silent. A counterfactual of freedom is one about what a free creature would freely choose. Jesus spoke one about the pagan cities of Tyre and Sidon, to Galilean towns that had seen his miracles and not repented: "if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes" (Matthew 11:21).
These statements matter because of middle knowledge, the doctrine that God knows every such truth, what every creature he could make would freely do in every circumstance, and knows it before he decides what to create. With that knowledge he can govern every event, every free choice included, without settling any free choice himself, that is, without being the one who makes it go the way it goes. The doctrine's classic statement came from Luis de Molina, a Spanish Jesuit of the sixteenth century, so the view is called Molinism and its defenders Molinists.
The hardest objection to the doctrine is called the grounding objection, because it asks what grounds such a statement: what makes it true, the way the ground beneath a house holds it up. Ask it of your reference. What, right now, makes it true that you would vouch for your friend? The philosopher Robert Adams put the question in 1977, and at full strength it runs like this. What could make a counterfactual of freedom true?
- Not God's will, because then the creature would not be choosing freely.
- Not the creature's actual choice, because the conditional is about circumstances that may never come, and on middle knowledge it is true before the creature even exists.
- Not the creature's character, because character can at most make a free choice likely. If it fixed the choice, the choice would not be free.
So nothing makes it true, Adams concluded, and a statement that nothing makes true is not true. At most a free creature might do one thing and might do another; there is no fact about what he would do.
The philosopher William Hasker later sharpened the point. If such conditionals were true before the creature existed, and not by God's will, they would be up to no one, and the creature would act under truths he had no hand in making true.
Everything turns on one word, settle, and your reference shows what it means. Suppose the company knew for certain, before anyone picked up the phone, exactly what you would say about your friend. Their knowing would not be what made you say it. Nothing would settle that but you.
To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. He is then its source, the one it comes from, as you would be the source of what you said about your friend.
What is defended, then, is that some counterfactuals of freedom are true, because things are as they say, and that their truth leaves each choice to the one who makes it. What is refused is the grounding objection, in the forms it has taken from the Dominican friars who opposed Molina (members of a Catholic order, as Molina's Jesuits were) down to Adams and Hasker in our own time. It is the best objection to middle knowledge anyone has published, and it does not succeed. Its demand for something that makes these statements true either assumes a contested theory of truth that many philosophers reject, or it is met by the facts the conditionals state. It still has serious defenders, and the answer to it has a price (C2).
The argument is deductive: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. The premises work like a locked chain: if every link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. No premise has to be beyond all doubt; each needs only to be more plausible than its denial. It runs in two short chains. The first shows that such conditionals can be true, and that some are (P1, P2, C1). The second shows that their truth takes nothing from freedom (P3, P4, C2).
Who holds what, on the grounding objection:
- Support: the Dominican theologian Domingo Báñez held against Molina in the 1590s that God knows such conditionals only in his own decree, by knowing what he himself has decreed. That was an early form of the objection, and Robert Adams gave it its modern form in 1977.
• A decree of God is his firm decision that something will be, like a king's decree that a road will be built.
- Oppose: Luis de Molina defended middle knowledge against the Dominicans in the 1590s, and Thomas Flint defends it against the modern objection today.
The argument that follows holds that counterfactuals of freedom can be true, because things can be as they say, and that their truth leaves every choice to the one who makes it.
(P1)A statement is true when things are as it says they are.
+The simplest account of what makes a statement true is the one everybody already uses: things are as the statement says they are.
(1) Ordinary truths are made true by the facts they report.
- "Snow is white" is true because snow is white. "It is raining in Leeds" is true because it is raining in Leeds.
- Philosophers call whatever makes a statement true its truthmaker, and the plainest truthmaker is the fact the statement reports.
- Think of a weather report read out on the radio. What makes it right is not the announcer, the radio or the paper he reads from. It is the rain.
(2) Many truths are not made true by any existing object.
- "Socrates no longer exists" is true, and Socrates is not there to make it so. "It will rain in Spain exactly ten years from today" may be true now, though the rain is not yet falling. "Unicorns have never existed and never will" is true, and no unicorn makes it true.
- One defender of middle knowledge lists more: "Dinosaurs are extinct today," "Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo," and a true counterfactual about the aether, the substance nineteenth-century physicists believed filled space, though no aether ever existed. He concludes: "The idea that the truthmakers of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom must be literal people or any sort of concrete object is extraordinary."
• A concrete object, in philosophers' usage, is an actual thing in the world, like a person, a rock or a star, as opposed to an abstract one like a number.
- Think of a museum label that says "extinct." The truth of the label is not held up by the animal. The animal is exactly what is missing.
(3) Facts, not objects, do the grounding.
- Try to state the objector's principle, and it has to keep growing. First, a truth is made true by some existing object. Then, to cover Socrates, by some existing or past object. Then, to cover the rain in Spain, by some existing, past or future object. Then, to cover the unicorns, by the existence or nonexistence of objects.
- By that point what is doing the work is plainly facts, not objects. The Molinist's version of the principle adds just one more clause: a contingent truth is true "in virtue of the fact that some concrete objects exist, did exist, will exist, do not exist, or would exist under specific conditions."
• A contingent truth is one that happens to be true but could have been false, like "It is raining in Leeds." Its opposite is a necessary truth, which could not have been false, like 7 + 5 = 12.
- The new clause is the last one, "or would exist under specific conditions." Unless the objector can show that it is less plausible than the clauses he has already had to add himself, his principle gives him no reason to exclude counterfactuals, and nobody has yet shown it (D3, D4).
(4) Truthmaking is not causing.
- Nothing causes a statement to be true. One of the leading truthmaker theorists put it plainly: "Making to be the case is of course not causal."
- The rain does not push the weather report into truth. The report is true because it matches the rain.
- So the question "who or what causes a counterfactual of freedom to be true?" has the same answer as "who causes 'Socrates no longer exists' to be true?" Nobody does, and nothing needs to.
(5) Some philosophers deny that truths need truthmakers at all.
- On this view, a statement is true when things are as it says, and that is the whole story. No further thing has to stand behind the truth.
- Think of a friend who opens the fridge and says, "There is no milk." She is right because there is no milk, and nobody goes hunting in the fridge for some extra thing, a lack of milk, to make her right.
- So either way, truth asks nothing more of a statement than that things be as it says. If truths have truthmakers, the fact that things are as the statement says is its truthmaker. If they need none, this one needs none either. Neither view asks for an object or a cause standing behind the truth.
Therefore, a statement is true when things are as it says they are, and nothing more is required of it.
(P2)Some statements about what a free creature would do state facts.
+Scripture makes such statements, ordinary life depends on them, and we are surer of some of them than of any theory that would deny them all.
(1) Scripture states counterfactuals of freedom.
- Start with Keilah. When David asked whether King Saul, who was hunting him, would come down to the town of Keilah, and whether its men would hand him over, "the Lord said, He will come down," and "They will surrender you" (1 Samuel 23:11-12). David left, and neither thing happened. What the Lord told him, then, was what the men of Keilah would have done had he stayed.
- Think of how those answers were given. David asked two plain questions and got two plain answers, with no "might" in either. He took his men, about six hundred of them, out of Keilah on the strength of those answers.
- Jesus says of Tyre and Sidon that "they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes" (Matthew 11:21), and of Sodom that "it would have remained until this day" (Matthew 11:23). Readers take the first saying in two ways. Some, a leading defender of middle knowledge among them, take it as vivid rhetoric about the hard heart of Chorazin, one of the Galilean towns Jesus was rebuking, rather than as a report of what those cities would in fact have done. Others take it as it stands, since Jesus is weighing one town's judgment against another's, and the weighing needs the comparison to be true.
- Paul says that the rulers of this age did not understand God's hidden wisdom, and adds, "if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory" (1 Corinthians 2:8). Keilah and Paul's rulers carry the point however the Tyre and Sidon saying is read.
- What these texts show is that God counts some would-statements about human choices true. That the choices they describe were free is argued from what people are, not from these verses, and a reader who holds that God decrees every choice reads the same verses as decreed (D10).
(2) Ordinary life depends on them.
- A parent knows how her son would take the news if she told him tonight, and so she waits until morning. A manager knows that his most reliable employee would cover an extra shift if asked.
- Think of the reference you would give for your friend. It is true now, though nobody has asked, and your friend is counting on its being true.
(3) We are surer of some of these than of any theory that denies them.
- One of the most influential Christian philosophers of the last century answered the objection this way: "It seems to me much clearer that some counterfactuals of freedom are at least possibly true than that the truth of propositions must, in general, be grounded in this way."
• A proposition is simply what a statement says, the claim itself: "It is raining" and the Spanish "Está lloviendo" are two sentences stating one proposition.
- Notice how modest the claim is. It is not that some of these statements are true, only that some could be, and even that is enough to sink a principle on which none could be.
- A theory of truth that would make every one of these statements false, or empty, has to be more certain than the statements themselves before it can overturn them. Nobody has shown that it is.
- Think of a clever argument that you cannot really know your own phone number. However tight it looks, you will doubt the argument long before you doubt the number.
- This reply sets the demand for a ground aside rather than meeting it. What meets the demand is something else: the fact each statement states.
(4) The facts they state are called counterfacts.
- Take Peter on the night Jesus was arrested, warming himself at a fire in the high priest's courtyard. What makes "If Peter were at that fire, he would deny his Lord" true is the fact that if Peter were at that fire, he would deny his Lord.
- If that sounds like saying the same thing twice, it follows the same pattern as "Snow is white," which is made true by the fact that snow is white (P1). Nobody complains that the snow case merely restates the sentence (D3).
- Defenders of middle knowledge call such a fact a counterfact: the would-be state of affairs that the would-statement reports. A state of affairs is simply a way things are, or would be: that snow is white, that Peter denies his Lord.
- Just as there are facts about the past, though the people and events in them are gone, there are counterfacts, though the people and circumstances they are about may never exist.
- Some defenders add that these truths rest on the essences of the creatures God could make. An essence, in this sense, is a creature's individual nature, what makes Peter this person and no other, and God understands each one perfectly. It is not the third candidate the objection ruled out, a character that settles the choice in advance. It is the creature himself, known completely, how he would freely respond included.
- Others hold that the counterfacts need nothing beneath them. Either way, the counterfact is the truthmaker.
Therefore, some statements about what a free creature would do state facts.
(C1)Therefore, some counterfactuals of freedom are true.
+A statement is true when things are as it says they are (P1). Some counterfactuals of freedom state facts, so that things are as they say (P2). So those counterfactuals are true. The step is the simplest in logic, called modus ponens, Latin for "the way that affirms": if the alarm is set, it will ring; it is set; so it will ring. And if truths do need truthmakers, these counterfactuals have theirs: the facts they state.
(1) The trilemma had a fourth branch.
- The objection offered three candidates for the truthmaker (God's will, the creature's actual choice, the creature's character) and shut each in turn. An argument of that shape, a three-way fork, is called a trilemma. But a fork refutes only if its branches are all the branches there are.
- Think of a detective who names three suspects, clears all three, and announces that nobody committed the crime. All he has shown is that his list was too short.
- The fourth branch is the counterfact itself: that this creature, in these circumstances, would freely do this. It is not God's will, not an actual choice and not a character that fixes the choice. It is how things would be.
(2) The claim is about truth, not about who knows it.
- That some counterfactuals of freedom are true is one question, and it is the first thing middle knowledge needs. Which ones are true is another question, and nobody but God knows them all. That they are true before God's decree, and that he can know them, are further claims (D6, D11).
- Think of an exam result sealed in an envelope. That there is a result inside is one question; who has read it is another.
- Nor does it follow that God has middle knowledge. That is a model, a proposed account of how God governs free creatures, with a case of its own. What does follow is that the model is not about nothing, which is what the objection charged.
Therefore, some counterfactuals of freedom are true, because things are as they say.
(P3)A true statement about a choice does nothing to bring the choice about.
+Truth describes; it does not act. That holds for statements about what will happen and about what would happen alike.
(1) Facts about choices are not causes of them.
- A true statement is not a force or a mechanism, and neither is the counterfact it states.
- That Peter would deny his Lord at that fire is not some event that happens before the denial and produces it. It is how that choice would go, and a way a choice would go does nothing to make it go that way.
- Think of a biography written before its subject's birth, perfectly accurate in every line. The book would describe the life. It would not live it.
(2) Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing.
- God's knowing what a creature would freely do settles nothing about the choice. He can use that knowledge to decide where to place the creature, but the choice there is still the creature's to make.
- One defender of free will distinguishes two ways God could ensure an outcome. By power, he could force the choice, and that would destroy the freedom. By knowledge, he can choose to create a world in which he knows the creature would freely choose it. The second ensures without determining.
• A choice is determined when it is settled beforehand by prior conditions (the past and the laws of nature, or a decree of God) that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. A row of falling dominoes is determined in this sense: the first push and the laws of motion are enough by themselves to bring down the last one. Determinism is the view that every choice is determined.
- Think of a matchmaker who seats two people together at dinner because she knows they would hit it off. She has arranged the evening. She has not made them like each other.
(3) The same is true of statements about the future.
- "Tomorrow you will choose the soup" may be true today, and God may know it, without the soup being settled by anything but you when tomorrow comes.
- Counterfactuals of freedom are in the same position. A truth about what you would do settles no more than a truth about what you will do, and that settles nothing.
Therefore, a true statement about a choice does nothing to bring the choice about.
(P4)Which counterfactual of freedom is true depends on how the creature would freely choose.
+The truth answers to the chooser, not the chooser to the truth. The statement is true because that is how he would choose; it is not because the statement is true that he would choose that way.
(1) Had he been going to choose otherwise, a different counterfactual would have been true.
- Suppose Peter, at that fire, had been going to confess his Lord instead of denying him. Then "If Peter were at that fire, he would confess his Lord" would have been the true counterfactual all along.
- As it happens, the point is stated exactly in a Molinist account of original sin, the Christian teaching that Adam's first sin affects every human being after him: "for any counterfactual of freedom C that is true of [a person] P, P has the power to prevent C from being (or having been) true of her." In plain words, whatever would-statement is true of a person, it is in her power to keep it from being true of her.
- Even a critic of middle knowledge from the Reformed tradition, the Protestant churches that trace their teaching to John Calvin, records the principle without disputing that it makes sense.
- Think of the reference again. If you were the sort of person who would lie about your friend, a different statement would be true of you. What would be true depends on you.
(2) Nothing beyond the creature fixes which counterfacts obtain.
- A counterfact obtains when it actually holds, when that really is how the creature would choose.
- Ask why a free creature would choose one way, and the answer names the creature and his reasons. Ask for something beyond him that makes it so, and anything that answered would be something other than the creature settling the choice.
- Think of a juror asked why she voted to acquit. She gives her reasons, and that is a full answer. Ask what further thing, beyond her and her reasons, made her vote that way, and you have stopped asking about her. You are asking what else settled it.
- One defender of middle knowledge, calling such a counterfact F, puts the point about that further question sharply: "To seek an answer to the question 'Why is F a fact?' or 'What makes F a fact?' is implicitly to deny libertarian freedom." It is simply how that creature would freely choose.
• Libertarian freedom is the philosophers' name for the freedom of a choice that nothing settles but the one who makes it. The word has nothing to do with politics.
(3) The dependence holds even where a door is shut.
- An open door is another way the choice could have gone, there for the taking. In the ordinary run of choices the door stands open, and a counterfactual never shuts it. Where a door is shut, something other than the counterfactual shuts it.
- Take Pilate. Suppose God resolved to place Pilate in the judgment seat only if Pilate would send Jesus to the cross. Then, standing there, Pilate could not have let Jesus go, but only in one sense: God's resolve and his letting Jesus go could not both have happened.
- Notice what the resolve did and did not do. It settled where Pilate stood, not what he did. Nothing stopped him, and nothing took away his power to let Jesus go. God need not arrange things this way.
- Which counterfactual was true of Pilate still answered to Pilate. It was true because that is what he would freely do, and Jesus still counts the sin as his (John 19:11).
- Nor would a shut door take the choice from him. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. The ability to do otherwise is freedom's ordinary mark, not its definition, and God shows the difference: he is free, though he cannot do evil. A free choice does not need a second road. It needs a source.
Therefore, which counterfactual of freedom is true depends on how the creature would freely choose.
(C2)Therefore, the truth of a counterfactual of freedom leaves the choice to the one who makes it.
+A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it. So a true counterfactual of freedom could take a choice from its chooser in only two ways: by settling the choice itself, or by resting on something other than him that settles it. It does neither. Its truth does nothing to bring the choice about (P3), and which counterfactual is true depends on how he himself would freely choose (P4). So its truth leaves the settling of the choice where it was, with the chooser.
The step is called modus tollens, Latin for "the way that denies": if the alarm had rung, someone would have heard it; nobody heard it; so it did not ring. Laid out the same way: if a counterfactual's truth took the choice from its chooser, it would either settle the choice or rest on something other than him that settles it; it does neither; so it does not take the choice from him.
(1) The counterfactuals answer to the creature.
- The worry was that counterfactuals true before a creature exists, and not by God's will, would be up to no one. But which counterfactual is true of a creature is up to that creature, in the sense that matters for his freedom. It answers to how he would freely choose.
- Think of a portrait that is a perfect likeness. The portrait answers to the face; the face does not answer to the portrait.
(2) God governs by knowing and choosing.
- Knowing every counterfactual of freedom, God chooses which creatures to make, which circumstances to place them in, and so which world to bring about. He achieves every purpose he has without settling any free choice. "My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my purpose" (Isaiah 46:10).
- The account remains a model, an explanation of how God's sovereignty (his rule over everything that happens) and human freedom can both be true, not a claim to have seen how God does it.
(3) The answer to the best objection comes at a price.
- The grounding objection is the best objection to middle knowledge anyone has published, and it has had three kinds of answer:
• The first sets its demand aside, as resting on an unproven theory of truth (P2).
• The second meets the demand on its own terms, with facts and counterfacts (P1, P2).
• The third also meets it on its own terms, by showing that the objection's "might" form rests on a disputed piece of logic (D5).
- The price is what the answer asks a reader to accept: facts, true before anyone exists, about what each person God could make would freely do, with nothing beneath them but the person they are about (D12). Serious philosophers judge that price too high. And the argument that there are only "might" counterfactuals, no "would" ones, still has serious defenders (D5).
- Think of the other accounts of providence, God's governing of all that happens, each with a price of its own. Theological determinism, on which God's decree settles every choice, sins included, pays with the authorship of sin. Open theism, on which God does not know what free creatures will do until they do it, pays with God's knowledge of the future. Middle knowledge pays here, with truths about what never happens. Its price is paid in logic and the theory of truth, not in God's goodness or his knowledge.
- The doctrine's sharpest critic answered the replies in print by declaring his argument undefeated, and the doctrine's leading defender has answered him in turn (D7). That defender grants that the critics will not fall silent. All the same, he judges that after centuries of discussion no argument showing the doctrine incoherent (that is, self-contradictory) will be forthcoming: "So let the theological application proceed!" That is a judgment about a long argument, not a proof, and the exchange has not closed.
Therefore, the truth of a counterfactual of freedom leaves the choice to the one who makes it.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around ItPhilosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do ItPhilosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin
On the grounding objection:
Adams, Robert Merrihew. "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil." American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977): 109-117.
Adams, Robert Merrihew. "Plantinga on the Problem of Evil." In Alvin Plantinga, edited by James E. Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen, 225-255. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985.
Adams, Robert Merrihew. "An Anti-Molinist Argument." Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 343-353.
Hasker, William. "A Refutation of Middle Knowledge." Noûs 20 (1986): 545-557.
Hasker, William. God, Time, and Knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.
Hasker, William. "Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited." Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995): 223-236.
Hasker, William. "Explanatory Priority: Transitive and Unequivocal, A Reply to William Craig." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, no. 2 (1997): 389-393.
Hasker, William. "Anti-Molinism Is Undefeated!" Faith and Philosophy 17 (2000): 126-131.
Hasker, William. "The (Non-)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals." In Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, edited by Ken Perszyk. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Kenny, Anthony. The God of the Philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
O'Connor, Timothy. "The Impossibility of Middle Knowledge." Philosophical Studies 66 (1992): 139-166.
Perszyk, Ken, ed. Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
On the replies:
Craig, William Lane. The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987.
Craig, William Lane. "Robert Adams' New Anti-Molinist Argument." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, no. 4 (1994): 857-861.
Craig, William Lane. "On Hasker's Defense of Anti-Molinism." Faith and Philosophy 15, no. 2 (1998): 236-240.
Craig, William Lane. "Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the 'Grounding Objection.'" Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001): 337-352.
Craig, William Lane. Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, On God: Attributes of God. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2025. Sections 6.4.1-6.4.4.
Flint, Thomas P. Divine Providence: The Molinist Account. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
Freddoso, Alfred J. "Introduction." In Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the "Concordia"), translated by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988.
MacGregor, Kirk R. A Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007.
Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.
Plantinga, Alvin. "Replies to My Colleagues." In Alvin Plantinga, edited by James E. Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen, 313-396. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985. The reply to Robert Adams.
Rea, Michael C. "The Metaphysics of Original Sin." In Persons: Divine and Human, edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman, 319-356. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026.
Suárez, Francisco. De scientia Dei futurorum contingentium 2.5.
Suárez, Francisco. Tractatus de gratia Dei 11.8.1.
On truth and truthmakers:
Armstrong, D. M. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Lewis, David. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973.
Merricks, Trenton. Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Stalnaker, Robert C. "A Theory of Conditionals." In Studies in Logical Theory, edited by Nicholas Rescher, 98-112. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968.
Tallant, Jonathan. Truth and the World: An Explanationist Theory. New York: Routledge, 2018.
Critic sources engaged:
Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018.
Bignon, Guillaume. "A Critical Review and Fairly Comprehensive Refutation of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism." December 2020.
Climenhaga, Nevin, and Daniel Rubio. "Molinism: Explaining Our Freedom Away." Mind 131 (2022): 459-485.
Helm, Paul. "A Review of a Book on Molinism." Helm's Deep (blog), October 2019.
Helm, Paul. ".....And More on Molinism." Helm's Deep (blog), November 2019.
Biblical citations:
1 Samuel 23:11-13; Isaiah 46:10; Matthew 11:21-23; John 19:11; 1 Corinthians 2:8.
+Who or what causes a counterfactual of freedom to be true? Not God, or the choice is not free, and not the creature, who may never exist; so nothing causes it to be true, and it is not true.
1. The objection was first put in terms of causes.
Adams asked of counterfactuals of freedom: "Who or what does cause them to be true?" Hasker asked what it is "that brings it about that these propositions are true." Even defenders of middle knowledge have reported the objection in these causal terms, because that is how its critics state it.
2. Nothing causes any statement to be true.
Truthmaking is not causing (P1). Nothing causes "Socrates no longer exists" to be true, and nothing causes "7 + 5 = 12" to be true. One defender of middle knowledge calls the demand for a cause of a statement's truth "inept," unless the objector has a special causal theory of truthmakers. If he has one, he owes the rest of us the theory, with a defense of why it beats the usual ones.
3. Nothing but its chooser settles a free choice.
Grant the causal demand its best sense. An actual free choice is caused by the person who makes it, and nothing but him settles it: "Peter denied his Lord" reports what Peter did. A would-choice would be settled the same way, by Peter and nothing else, and the counterfact reports exactly that: Peter would do it.
What the demand wants in addition is some cause at work now, making it true that Peter would deny. Anything that could do that job would be fixing in advance which way Peter would choose, and that is something other than Peter settling his choice (P4). So the demand goes unmet, and it should, because meeting it would take the choice from him.
+There is nothing "there" in the world to make a counterfactual of freedom true. The person may never exist and the circumstance may never come, so there is no thing for the truth to rest on.
1. The objection pictures truthmakers as things.
Timothy O'Connor put it bluntly: there is "not anything 'there' in the world" to ground such truths. On this picture a truth needs some existing object standing behind it.
2. That picture fails for truths everyone accepts.
Each of these is true, though what it is about is not around now to make it so (P1):
- Negative truths: "Dinosaurs are extinct today."
- Past truths: "Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo."
- Future truths: "It will rain in Spain ten years from today."
- Universal truths: "Anyone who runs a mile in under two minutes breaks the world record," which is true though no one ever has.
A principle that would exclude counterfactuals of freedom excludes these too.
3. Facts are there.
The fact that Socrates no longer exists is as real as any fact, and so is the counterfact that Peter, at that fire, would deny his Lord. The objection has to show that counterfacts are less respectable than tensed facts, the facts about the past and the future, like the one about Socrates. That is the argument it owes, and nobody has yet made it good (D3, D4).
4. The objector's own account of the future allows truth with nothing "there" yet.
Take "It will rain tomorrow." O'Connor holds that a statement about the future has no ground of its own. On his view it is true today exactly when its present-tense counterpart, "It is raining," will be grounded by real rain tomorrow. Today there is no rain for it to rest on, so even on his own account a statement can be true with nothing "there" in the world yet.
He also grants, reluctantly, that the parallel account of counterfactuals is coherent. His quarrel is with truths that will never have grounds of that kind, and that quarrel is answered in (D3) and (D4).
+Every truth needs a truthmaker, and a "counterfact" is no truthmaker at all, just the counterfactual restated. Saying it is true because it is a fact explains nothing.
1. The demand that every truth have a truthmaker is contested.
The view that every truth, without exception, has a truthmaker is called truthmaker maximalism. On it, even "There are no unicorns" needs some thing in the world to make it true. Many philosophers who accept truthmakers reject maximalism, and some reject truthmakers altogether (P1). No one has shown that counterfactuals of freedom must be among the truths that need them.
2. Disquotation is how truthmakers ordinarily work.
"Snow is white" is made true by the fact that snow is white. Take the quotation marks off the sentence and you have named the fact that makes it true, which is why this is called disquotation. Nobody complains that it merely restates the sentence. Among those who hold that truths need truthmakers, the standard view has long been a disquotation principle: a statement's truthmaker is the fact it states. Counterfactuals of freedom get the same treatment as every other truth.
3. A truthmaker is not an explanation of why the fact holds.
The objection says that "true because it is a fact" explains nothing. But it explains exactly what a truthmaker is there to explain, which is why the statement is true. What it does not explain is why the fact holds, and a truthmaker was never meant to. "Snow is white" is made true by snow's being white; why snow is white is a question for physics.
The counterfact says what a would-statement answers to. Why the creature would choose that way is a different question, and for a free choice its answer names him and his reasons and nothing beneath him (P4, D12).
- Think of a court record that says the jury acquitted. The acquittal is what makes the record true. Why they acquitted is found in the jurors' reasons, not in the record.
4. The same move is made for the future.
Defenders of middle knowledge have long pointed out that statements about the future are in the same position. What makes "it will rain tomorrow" true today is the fact that it will rain tomorrow. If the future does not yet exist, as most people and many philosophers take it, nothing that exists today makes that true.
- The objector has a reply: tomorrow will come and the rain will be real, while the circumstances of a counterfactual may never come at all. But the rain's being real tomorrow is exactly what "it will rain tomorrow" says, and it does nothing today. "Will be" and "would be" are both ways things are not now, and an objector who lets the first make a statement true today owes a reason why the second cannot.
- Anyone who holds that God knows tomorrow's free choices already holds that there are truths about free choices nobody has yet made. The counterfactual carries the same thing over from the choices people will make to the choices they would make.
+What would be the case must rest on what is the case. A glass's shattering if struck rests on its structure, but a free choice has no structure behind it, so a counterfactual of freedom rests on nothing.
1. Hasker's demand is the objection at its strongest.
Hasker holds that "In order for a (contingent) conditional state of affairs to obtain, its obtaining must be grounded in some categorical state of affairs." A categorical state of affairs is one that simply holds now, with no "if" attached. In plain words, whatever would be so must rest on something that is so. Think of a glass. It would shatter if struck because of its molecular structure, which is there now. What would a free creature's choice rest on?
2. The demand changes what "ground" means.
In its first form, the objection asked what makes a counterfactual of freedom true, and the counterfact answers it: the statement is true because that is how the creature would choose. This version asks something else, what makes the counterfact itself obtain. That is a demand for a ground beneath the ground. A fact is already what makes a statement true (P1), and it is not made to obtain, in that same sense, by some further fact.
- Think of a receipt. What makes it accurate is the purchase. What made the shopper buy is a new question, about the shopper and not about the receipt.
3. Even the glass rests on counterfacts.
The glass's fragility is what makes "if struck, it would shatter" true, and fragility is itself a disposition: a tendency to behave a certain way if something happens, the way sugar tends to dissolve in water. Its whole content is what the glass would do.
The molecular structure yields the fragility only given the laws of nature, and a law of nature is equivalent to counterfactuals, statements about what would happen under given conditions. So even the glass's counterfactual rests on counterfacts, not on purely categorical facts.
4. With a free choice, the demand is a demand for determinism.
Anything categorical standing behind a free choice the way structure stands behind a shattering would be a prior condition settling the choice. That is the character branch of the original fork. With a free creature, there is nothing further, and there should not be: "To seek an answer to the question 'Why is F a fact?' or 'What makes F a fact?' is implicitly to deny libertarian freedom" (P4).
+There are no true "would" counterfactuals of freedom, only "might" ones. A free creature in a given circumstance might do one thing and might do another, and nothing makes it true that he would do either.
1. This is a serious argument with serious defenders.
Adams and Hasker press it, and Hasker pressed it again in a major collection of essays on the debate published in 2011. Its strongest form runs through the leading account of how would-statements work.
- On that account, "if she were offered the job, she would take it" is true when, among the possible worlds where she is offered it, the ones most like ours are all worlds where she takes it. A possible world is a complete way things could have gone, down to the last detail.
- Now make the choice free, so that nothing before it settles it. The worlds where she takes the job and the worlds where she turns it down can match ours in every detail up to the moment she decides. Neither kind is closer, so neither "would" statement is true. All that survives is that she might take it and might not.
- The argument denies what logicians call conditional excluded middle: the principle that for any circumstance, either "he would do A" or "he would not do A" is true.
• The name comes from an older rule of logic, the law of excluded middle: either it is raining or it is not, and there is no third option in the middle. The conditional version applies the same rule to would-statements. If your friend were offered the job, either she would take it or she would not.
2. The leading rival account keeps the principle.
There are two leading accounts of how counterfactuals work, worked out in the same years:
- On the first, conditional excluded middle fails, and "might" statements can be true where no "would" statement is. It can be true that your friend might take the job and might not, with no fact about what she would do.
- On the second, conditional excluded middle holds, so for any circumstance, either "he would do A" or "he would not do A" is true.
Defenders of middle knowledge have argued that the second account is at least as good, and the debate between the two has not been won. The everyday "she might, she might not" fits the second account too, as a report of what the speaker does not know.
- Think of a colleague who has met your friend twice. He says she might take the job and might not. Her mother says she would take it. Both can be speaking truly: he says what he cannot rule out, and she says what her daughter would do.
3. The logic hands the question back to the grounding objection.
Grant the objector his best point. An account that keeps conditional excluded middle still has to say what makes one kind of world, rather than the other, the closest when nothing before the choice decides it, and that is the grounding question again. So the "might" argument is not a second objection standing beside the first. It is the first, restated in the logic of conditionals, and it stands or falls with the answer to it (P1, P2).
- On that answer, the counterfact itself breaks the tie. Part of what makes a world close to ours is whether the people in it would freely do what they would in fact freely do.
- Critics call that circular. It would be, if the account of closeness were a method for finding out which would-statements are true, or an explanation of why they are. It is neither. It says what it is for a would-statement to be true.
- The would-statements at issue also leave nothing out. Their if-part is the whole situation, the entire history of the world up to the moment of choice. The classic cases where no "would" seems true are ones where the if-part leaves too much open. Verdi was Italian and Bizet French: had they been compatriots, from the same country, would both have been Italian, or both French? Nothing in the if-part says which. A would-statement about a free choice in a fully described situation has no such slack.
4. Scripture speaks in "would."
Paul did not say the rulers might have spared the Lord of glory. He said "they would not have crucified the Lord of glory" (1 Corinthians 2:8). The Lord did not tell David that Saul might come down. He said "He will come down" (1 Samuel 23:11), and David left the city on the strength of it. Jesus said Tyre and Sidon "would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes" (Matthew 11:21), though some read that saying as rhetoric about hard hearts.
A "might" theorist can reread all of these as confident forecasts, or "would" as "would very probably." None of them is hedged, though, and the answers at Keilah came from God in reply to a direct question. He said "will," and a God who knows everything and cannot lie has no need to say "will" when he means "probably."
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+Counterfactuals come true too late. They are true only relative to an actual world, and before God decides which world to create there is no actual world, so they cannot guide his decision.
1. The objection has a precise form.
It is a subtle objection. Adams said that "the truth of the crucial conditionals cannot be settled soon enough to be of use to God," and Anthony Kenny put the argument precisely. By "settled" Adams means fixed as true or false.
The argument turns on possible worlds, the complete ways things could have gone (D5), and on the actual world, the one way things do go. On the standard account, a counterfactual is true if its then-part (logicians call it the consequent) holds in the worlds most like the actual world in which its if-part (the antecedent) holds. So "If the match had been struck, it would have lit" is true if, among the worlds where the match is struck, the ones most like ours are worlds where it lights.
Before God's decision there is no actual world to measure likeness from, so the counterfactuals are not yet true. After it, they are true too late to help.
2. Parts of the actual world obtain before the decision.
Think of God's knowledge in three logical moments. They are not moments of time. They mark what depends on what, the way the conclusion of a proof depends on its premises, though the whole proof is written out at once.
- First, the necessary truths: 7 + 5 = 12 was never up to anyone.
- Second, the counterfactuals of freedom: that if a person were placed in certain circumstances, he would freely do a certain thing.
- Third, after God's decision, everything else.
The second moment sits between the other two, which is why this knowledge is called middle knowledge. At the second moment, the counterfactual states of affairs already obtain. It was never open to God to make a world in which Peter, placed in exactly those circumstances, would not deny Christ.
3. So the counterfactuals are true in time to guide the decision.
Those aspects of the actual world that do not depend on God's will obtain before his decision, and they are enough to make the counterfactuals true. Kenny's argument assumes that nothing of the actual world obtains at that point, and that assumption fails.
- Think of a builder deciding what house to put on a plot of land. The house is not there yet, but the land is, and the measurements he takes of it are true before a single brick is laid, in time to shape his plans.
A defender of middle knowledge could also decline this account of would-statements for these cases, since it was never written with middle knowledge in view. He does not need to. On the account as it stands, the counterfactuals are measured against the part of the actual world already in place.
+If the counterfactual's truth explains God's decree, and God's decree explains my existence and circumstances, then the counterfactual's truth explains my choice. A choice explained by what was true before I existed is not free.
1. The argument is Adams's.
Hasker has defended it through several rounds of reply. It turns on explanatory priority: one thing is explanatorily prior to another when the second is so because the first is so. The rain is prior to the wet driveway, since the driveway is wet because it rained. The argument runs a chain of such priorities through God's decree, his decision about which world to create:
- The truth of the counterfactual is prior to God's decision.
- The decision is prior to my existence.
- My existence is prior to my choice.
- So the counterfactual's truth is prior to my choice.
Then it adds a claim about freedom:
- If I choose freely, nothing prior to my choice can rule out my refraining.
- But "if I were in these circumstances, I would do this" rules out my being in them and refraining.
- So on middle knowledge the counterfactual's truth is prior to my free choice, and yet, since it rules out my refraining, it cannot be prior to a free choice. The doctrine collapses.
2. "Explanatory priority" is used in more than one sense.
The counterfactual's truth gives God a reason for his decision. The decision is a cause of my existence. Those are different kinds of priority, and the third link is different again: my existence gives me a choice to make and produces nothing about which way I make it. A chain of reasons, causes and preconditions does not add up to the counterfactual causing my choice.
Think of the matchmaker again (P3). Her knowledge is her reason for the seating plan, and the seating plan is a cause of the two guests sitting side by side. Neither her knowledge nor her plan made them like each other.
3. Even one kind of priority need not pass along a chain.
John wants to go to the party because Mary is going, and Mary wants to go because John is going. Each explains the other. If explanation always passed along a chain, Mary's going would end up explaining itself, which is absurd. So explanatory relations do not always behave the way the argument needs them to. The objector must show that the relation he needs passes along the chain, and he has not.
4. The claim about freedom asks for an open door.
The argument's last step says that nothing prior to a free choice may rule out refraining. That is a demand that the door stand open, and freedom does not consist in an open door. What would take my choice from me is something that settles it, and a truth prior to my choice, in whatever sense, settles nothing (P3). The doctrine's leading defender answers the same way: nobody has shown that being able to refrain is required for acting freely.
- In the ordinary run of choices the door is open anyway. Had I been going to refrain, a different counterfactual would have been true all along (P4), just as God would always have believed otherwise. A truth that answers to how I would choose does not shut me out of the choice.
- Think of the neurosurgeon's case, a well-known thought experiment. A neurosurgeon has planted a device in a voter's brain, set to act only if he leans the other way. It never acts, and the vote is his. A true if-then does even less than an idle device.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door
+If counterfactuals of freedom are true before a person exists and not by God's will, they are up to no one. The person acts under truths he had no hand in making true, which is the fatalism that foreknowledge was supposed to escape.
1. Hasker's sharpening is the objection's hardest edge.
A person does not make the counterfactuals true; they were true before he existed. God did not make them true, on the doctrine itself. So, the objection runs, they are up to no one, and a person whose choice is fixed by a truth up to no one is not free.
The fear is fatalism: the view that whatever happens had to happen, so that nothing anyone chooses could have made it go another way.
2. A truth up to no one settles nothing.
The objection needs the conditional to do something to the choice, and it does nothing (P3). A truth about what a person would do could take his choice from him only by settling that choice, and nothing settles it but him. That holds however old the truth is, and whoever did or did not make it true.
- Think of breakfast. A thousand years ago it was already true that you would have eggs this morning. Nobody made that true, and it did not reach across the centuries and put the eggs on your plate. You reached for them.
3. Which counterfactual is true answers to the person.
Had he been going to choose otherwise, a different counterfactual would have been true (P4). The truth answers to his choice, not his choice to the truth. This is the same answer given to the argument that God's foreknowledge makes our choices unavoidable: God's belief about tomorrow waits on tomorrow's choice.
So the conditional leaves freedom's ordinary mark as it finds it. In the ordinary run of choices he could have done otherwise, and the truth would have followed his choice.
- Think of the portrait again (C2). It answers to the face, and the face does not answer to it.
4. A shut door would still leave the choice his.
Suppose, with the objector, that a person in those circumstances could not have refrained. It would not follow that he was not free, since the choice would still be settled by nothing but him. The doctrine's leading defender answers in just this way: nobody has shown that being able to refrain is required for acting freely. The plainest cases of freedom without an open door are God, who cannot do evil, and the saints in glory (the redeemed in heaven), who cannot sin and whose goodness nothing settles but the saints themselves.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do ItPhilosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door
+Molinism explains our freedom away. On it, God's decree and the counterfactuals fully explain every choice, and a choice fully explained by facts not up to the chooser is not free.
1. This is the newest form of the objection.
Nevin Climenhaga and Daniel Rubio argued in 2022, in one of philosophy's leading journals, that on Molinism some set of facts, including God's decree and the true counterfactuals, fully explains every human choice, and that a choice fully explained by such facts is not free. Their example is Eve: if Molinism is true, facts not up to her fully explain her sin, so she does not sin freely.
- Their argument does not say that truths push anyone. It is about explanation. The decree and the counterfactuals are explanatorily prior to Eve's sin, and together they entail it: given them, it cannot fail to happen. A set of prior facts that entails the act, they say, leaves nothing for Eve to contribute.
- They press it against the source view too, on which a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it. A libertarian who stops resting freedom on an open door and rests it on the source has lost the source as well, they argue, since on Molinism the source is already fixed by prior facts.
2. Entailment by a prior truth is not settling.
The argument calls "explanatorily prior and entails" full explanation and counts it as determination, and that is where determinism enters: by definition, not by discovery. A defender of middle knowledge presses exactly this point. A choice is determined when prior conditions are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes, and a prior truth that entails a choice makes nothing go. Counterfactuals of freedom, like every truth, cause nothing (P3). They explain a choice the way an accurate description does, not the way a cause does.
- Every true statement about the future does what the counterfactuals are said to do. It was true yesterday that you would eat lunch today, and that truth entails that you eat it. If a prior truth that entails an act made it unfree, every true statement about the future would, and even an undetermined coin toss would count as determined, because there was already a truth about how it would land.
3. One of the explaining facts is Eve's own.
The set said to explain her sin includes the counterfact that Eve, in those circumstances, would freely sin. That fact is not something outside Eve. It is how she would freely choose, and which counterfactual is true of her answers to her (P4). Take it out of the set and the set entails nothing about what she does. Leave it in and the set includes Eve.
- The same answers the charge against the source view. A fact about how she would choose fixes nothing about who does the choosing. When she sins, she is the one who settles it, and the counterfact was true because that is what she would do.
4. God ensures by knowledge, not by power.
Their paper also tells a story about a man named Cuthbert. In it, God guarantees that Cuthbert will buy an iguana, either by Cuthbert's own free decision or by a backup mechanism. The story mixes two ways of ensuring an outcome. A mechanism that would force the choice ensures by power. Middle knowledge ensures by knowledge: God places Cuthbert where he knows Cuthbert would freely buy the iguana, and no mechanism is needed or present.
+The decree, not the creature, grounds the counterfactuals. What would happen is true only because God decreed it, and a God who must work around facts he did not create is less than the God of Isaiah 46.
1. This is the Reformed critic's real answer to the grounding question.
A leading Reformed philosopher holds that "what grounds the truth is not a state of affairs that exists apart from the decree of God, but only what is decreed." He calls it "quite unacceptable" that there should be states of affairs "made true or false only by acts of creaturely freedom." He also reports that "no one now gets excited over the grounding objection."
Another Reformed critic says he does not know whether the objection is sound, and that it is "not a significant reason" he rejects Molinism. For them, the center of the case is the decree.
2. A counterfactual made true by decree is a choice settled by God.
The manipulation argument pictures a man designed in advance by someone else, so that each of his choices goes the way she intends. He is not free, because she, not he, settled what he chose.
Now suppose God's decree makes it true that Peter would deny Christ. Then the decree settles Peter's denial, and Peter is not its source. That is the manipulation argument with the manipulator named.
The Reformed critic answers that the decree works through Peter's own desires, so that Peter denies because he wants to, and is responsible. That is compatibilism, the view that a choice settled beforehand can still be free. But the designed man also chose what he wanted, and wanted what she arranged. A settling from a higher level is still a settling.
3. God is limited only by what cannot be done.
That there are things God cannot do is common ground: he cannot make a married bachelor. Nor can he make a free creature freely do what it would not freely do, which is the same impossibility in a longer sentence.
Which worlds that impossibility rules out, though, is contingent: it could have been otherwise. It rules out a world where Peter freely confesses at that fire only because Peter would in fact deny, and he might have been such that he would confess. That is the critic's real complaint, and it is a fair one. But anyone who holds that Peter settled his own denial already holds that God does not settle every choice, and so that some contingent truths are not of God's making. The counterfactuals carry the same thing over from the choices people make to the choices they would make.
What is up to God is which creatures to make, which circumstances to place them in, and which world to bring about, and with that he accomplishes every purpose: "My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my purpose" (Isaiah 46:10). His knowledge of these truths waits on no creature's existing. It belongs to his omniscience, his knowing all that is true, and he knows what each creature he could make would freely do before he makes any.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of SinPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+Even if counterfactuals of freedom were true, God could not know them. To know a contingent truth is to be acquainted with what makes it true, and there is nothing there to be acquainted with.
1. The retreat from truth to knowledge is O'Connor's.
Timothy O'Connor argues that God's knowledge of a contingent truth consists in immediate acquaintance with its grounds, and that "One cannot, after all, discern the truth of a contingent proposition by having a specially penetrating insight into the nature of the proposition itself."
Acquaintance here means direct contact with the thing known, the way you know the taste of coffee by tasting it rather than by being told about it.
2. The principle would strip God of much of his knowledge.
On this principle God would be ignorant of every contingent truth that has no truthmaker. Its stated reason, that no insight into a proposition itself can reveal its truth, would reach many necessary truths as well: those that cannot be seen to be true from their meaning alone. On standard truthmaker theory, those have no truthmakers of their own either. That is incompatible with classical theism, the mainstream teaching about God through the church's history, which ascribes to God omniscience, knowledge of every truth.
- The older answer is Suárez's. Francisco Suárez, Molina's fellow Jesuit, argued that whatever is true is knowable, since truth is the proper object of the intellect, what a mind is made to grasp, and that God, who knows all that is knowable, knows these conditionals if they are true. The whole dispute, on his view, comes down to whether they are true (C1).
3. The objection is incoherent for anyone who grants the truths.
Anyone who grants that these statements are true, and that God knows every present truth, must grant that God knows that they are true. "This counterfactual is true" is a present truth about the counterfactual, with its own evident truthmaker. So God knows it, and so he knows what the counterfactual says.
- Take "If Peter were at that fire, he would deny his Lord." If that is true, then "that statement is true" is true right now, and a God who knows every present truth knows it. To know that the statement is true is to know that Peter would deny his Lord.
+Calling it a "counterfact" only renames the problem. If nothing makes it true that he would do this rather than that, which one holds is a brute fact, and a brute fact about someone who does not exist is no doing of his.
1. This is where the objection lands after the replies.
The strongest form of this objection says: grant everything so far. No object, no cause and no categorical state has to stand behind a counterfactual of freedom. Then the counterfact that Peter would deny his Lord has nothing beneath it at all, which is what the objection said from the start, and calling it a fact adds only a word. Nothing about Peter makes it the case that he would deny rather than confess, so which of the two holds is simply how things happen to be. It is a brute fact, and a fact that just happens to hold is not Peter's doing.
- A brute fact is one that simply holds, with nothing further that makes it hold. Some philosophers say the existence of the universe is like that: ask why there is a universe at all, and on their view nothing explains it; it is simply there.
- The objection's first step, that no object, no cause and no categorical state has to stand behind a counterfactual of freedom, is the doctrine's own position, fairly stated. One defender of middle knowledge says of such a fact: "It is simply a fact that that is how that agent would freely choose to act under those circumstances." Its next step, that nothing about Peter makes it so, is where it goes wrong: the fact is how Peter himself would freely choose, and the only thing beneath it is the chooser it is about.
- Where defenders say the counterfacts rest on the creature's essence, that essence is the creature himself, known completely (P2). The ground they name is the chooser, with nothing beneath him.
2. Every free choice ends at the chooser.
An actual free choice is in the same position. Ask why Peter denied his Lord rather than confessed him, and every true answer names Peter: his fear, his reasons, his decision. No answer names something beneath Peter that made him deny. That lack of a further answer is the price of any account on which Peter settled it, and several of the objection's leading defenders hold this kind of freedom and pay that price for every actual choice.
- The counterfact is the would-version of the same fact. If "nothing beneath the chooser" is acceptable for what Peter did, it is acceptable for what Peter would do.
- Think of a woman who forgives her brother rather than cutting him off. Ask why, and she gives her reasons: her mother's last wish, the years they shared, the sister she wants to be. Press for something under all that which made her forgive, and you are no longer asking about her.
3. A would-truth needs no present doer.
The objector answers that an actual choice has someone doing it, while the counterfact has nobody doing anything. But truthmaking is not doing (P1). What makes a statement about a choice true is how the choice goes, or will go, or would go, and nobody has to be doing anything at the moment the statement is true. "Tomorrow he will choose the soup" is true today, and nobody is choosing anything yet.
When the choice comes, he makes it himself, and the counterfact was true of him because that is what he would do (P4).
4. Brute is not the same as lucky.
A lucky outcome is one its chooser did not settle, because something else settled it or nothing did. Neither is true here. The counterfact is that he would settle it, and nothing settles it in his place: no coin, no character, no decree. The fact has nothing beneath it but him, and the choice it describes is still his.
- Think of a coin toss and a marriage proposal. What lands a coin heads is the spin and the air, and nobody says the coin decided. When a woman says yes to a proposal, the only answer to "why yes?" is her and her reasons, and that is a decision, not a toss.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-CreationPhilosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the Choice