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Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

Read This First: Thesis

(●) Thesis: we have free will of the kind philosophers call libertarian. + Stand at the top of the stairs for a moment before you decide whether to go down. Nothing has happened yet. You are not watching a decision arrive; you are about to make one. Every argument that follows is about whether that moment is what it seems to be, and the answer, all the way through, is yes. (1) The whole thesis fits in one sentence. - A choice is free when it is up to the person who makes it: when nothing that came before it was enough by itself to settle which way it would go (no prior state of the brain or the world, and no decree from outside), and the person himself, for reasons of his own, is what settled it. - That is the view philosophers call libertarian free will. The word has nothing to do with politics. It comes from liberty, and it names the claim that a free choice really comes from the one who makes it: in the ordinary case, a real fork in the road, not a road that only looked forked from the driver's seat. (2) What makes a choice free is its source. - In the ordinary case, that fork is the mark of a free choice: the person could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice just as it was. Call that ability an open door, another way the choice could have gone, there for the taking. Most of the arguments will point to it. - But the open door is the usual mark of a free choice, not its definition. What defines a free choice is its source: nothing caused the choice but the one who made it. - Why insist on the difference? Because God cannot sin, and yet he does good freely. The saints in heaven will have no door open to sin, and yet they will be freer than they have ever been. Freedom defined by its source has room for both. - The source is also what separates a free choice from a random event. A random event is caused by no one. A free choice is made by someone, for reasons he has in mind. (3) The question matters because responsibility hangs on it. - We praise, blame, thank, forgive, and punish, and every one of those acts assumes that the deed was up to the person: that he, and not something else, settled it. Nobody blames a rock for falling. - The Bible speaks to people the same way. Moses put the choice to Israel in so many words: "I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life" (Deuteronomy 30:19). Joshua told Israel to "choose this day whom you will serve" (Joshua 24:15). A command to choose is addressed to someone who can choose. - If nothing is ever up to us, then the courtroom, the confession, and the whole idea of a person answering for a life are performances with no one behind them. That is a heavy price. The arguments will ask whether anything actually forces us to pay it. (4) The road runs in two stretches. - Every argument in the sequence does one of three jobs. It shows that we have that freedom, or it defends that freedom against a rival account of what freedom is, or it keeps that freedom intact under a God who knows the future and governs the world. - The first stretch is philosophy, and it stands on its own. It asks what a free choice is, and why the accounts that try to fit freedom inside a fully determined world do not deliver what anyone wanted from the word. Then it asks why the arguments that freedom is impossible fail, and, at the end, why it is reasonable to believe that we are free. A reader who stops there can answer three people in his own words: the determinist who says nothing is up to us, the compatibilist who says we are free even if the past fixes everything we do, and the neuroscientist who says the brain decided before we did. - The second stretch is theology. It is for the reader who arrives carrying the harder question: how can a will be really free if God already knows what it will do, and rules over everything it does? The answer built there has two halves. God's knowledge does not make anything happen. And God plans the world through what free creatures would do, without determining a single one of their choices. Therefore, the claim to keep in view from the first step is a short one: our choices are up to us, and God is no less God for it.

(●) The words: the whole debate runs on six terms worth meeting before you start. + Every argument teaches its own terms as it goes. But six of them come up so often that it helps to meet them first, at a kitchen table, before they show up in a syllogism (an argument laid out as numbered premises that lead to a conclusion). (1) Determinism says the past and the laws of nature fix everything that happens. - Determinism is the claim that the way the world was a moment ago, together with the laws that govern it, was enough by itself to produce the next moment exactly as it came. Picture a row of dominoes. Once the first one falls, every later fall is settled, and a mind that knew the setup could read off the whole sequence in advance. - On determinism, your decision at the top of the stairs was as fixed as the tenth domino. It felt open. It was not. (2) Compatibilism says you can be free even if determinism is true. - Compatibilism holds that freedom and determinism are compatible, which is where the name comes from. A choice is free, on this view, as long as it came from you, from your own wants and your own reasoning, without a gun to your head. Whether those wants were themselves fixed by the past does not matter to the compatibilist. - The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes and the American theologian Jonathan Edwards held this view, and so do most of the philosophers who write about free will today. It deserves its best hearing, and it gets one. The arguments answer it by asking whether "it came from you" means anything when the "you" it came from was assembled entirely from outside. (3) Libertarianism says freedom requires that determinism be false, at least where choices are made. - Libertarian free will is the thesis of the whole sequence: a free choice is settled by nothing but the person who makes it. Its ordinary mark is that he could have done otherwise in the very same circumstances. - Aristotle, the church fathers before Augustine, the medieval theologian Duns Scotus, the Jesuit Luis de Molina, the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, and a great many Christians since have held some version of it. - You might be thinking, "But if nothing settled the choice, isn't it just random?" That is exactly the right question. Notice, though, that someone did settle it: the person who made it, for reasons of his own. The view does not say that choices are random, and the arguments spend real time on the difference between "not settled in advance" and "a coin toss." (4) Theological determinism says God, not the laws of nature, settles every choice. - Theological determinism is the claim that God's decree, his eternal plan, settles everything that comes to pass, every human choice included. On this view, his will, not the chooser, is what makes each choice go the way it goes. It is the view of Jonathan Edwards and of most Reformed theologians today. • Reformed names the branch of Protestantism that runs back to the Swiss Reformation and John Calvin, which is why its members are often called Calvinists. • Edwards turns up under compatibilism as well, and for a good reason. Most theological determinists are also compatibilists: they hold that a choice God's decree settles is still free, so long as it flows from the chooser's own wants. - Here is the place for an honest sentence: the arguments that follow reject this view. They hold that God governs the world through free choices he knows in full, rather than by settling them. That puts them on the other side from the determinism most Calvinists hold. - The arguments also take one step into salvation, and they take it openly. Grace comes first; nobody turns to God without it. But the will God draws can still refuse him, and Scripture shows it happening: • Stephen, to the council that was about to stone him: "you always resist the Holy Spirit" (Acts 7:51). • Jesus, lamenting over Jerusalem: "you were not willing" (Matthew 23:37). • Luke, of the religious leaders who would not be baptized by John: "the Pharisees and the lawyers rejected the purpose of God for themselves" (Luke 7:30). - Those texts show that the response to grace can go the other way: grace can be resisted. Freedom of the libertarian kind is part of that response. The Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminius held this, and so did John Wesley, the founder of Methodism. The Catholic Church held it too, at the Council of Trent. Most Molinists, the followers of Luis de Molina, hold it today, though a Molinist can hold that grace is irresistible, and a few do. It is not the Reformed view. - Two questions stay open, because the thesis does not reach them. One is how election, God's choosing of a people, should be understood. The other is whether the saved can fall away. Both belong to the doctrine of salvation, and they are left there. A person can hold that our ordinary choices are free and still hold any of the historic views on either question, and some Reformed philosophers do exactly that. (5) Open theism says God does not know the future free choices of creatures. - Open theism keeps libertarian freedom and pays for it with God's foreknowledge. Since a free choice is not settled in advance, the reasoning goes, there is nothing there yet to know, so God knows the future only as a set of possibilities and takes risks like the rest of us. - The arguments refuse the trade. God is the one "declaring the end from the beginning" (Isaiah 46:10), and the whole second stretch of the road exists to show that he can know a free choice without making it. (6) Middle knowledge says God knows what every creature would freely do in any situation. - Middle knowledge is the sixteenth-century proposal of Luis de Molina, revived in our own day by Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig. Before God decides anything about creation, he already knows what any possible person would freely choose in any possible circumstance. Knowing that, he chooses which people to create and where to place them, and his plan is carried out through choices that remain entirely theirs. • It is called "middle" because it sits between two kinds of knowledge the Christian tradition has long granted God: God's knowledge of everything that could happen, and his knowledge of everything that will happen. In between lies what would happen, if. - David once asked God whether the men of Keilah would hand him over to Saul if he stayed in their town, and God said they would. So David left, and they never did (1 Samuel 23:11-12). God knew what free men would do in a situation that never came about. That is the picture the whole second stretch builds on. Therefore, the arguments ahead defend libertarian freedom against determinism and compatibilism, refuse both theological determinism and open theism, and arrive at middle knowledge as the account that keeps a free creature under a sovereign God.

(●) The first stretch: twelve arguments establish that we are free against everyone who says we are not. + Read them in order, because each one assumes the ones before it. The stretch climbs steadily, from what the words mean to the reasons for believing that we are free. (1) Three arguments pin down what freedom is. - The first lays down the definitions, what a free choice is and why praise and blame depend on it, so that nothing later has to be defined twice. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It Matters - The second takes up the oldest compatibilist answer: you were free so long as you could have done otherwise had you wanted to. Philosophers call it the conditional analysis, because it turns "could have done otherwise" into a condition about what you would have done if you had wanted something else. The trouble comes with a man whose wants were fixed for him. He passes the conditional test with ease, since he could have done otherwise had he wanted to, and yet he was never free for a moment. Doing what you want, it turns out, is not the same thing as being free. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: Doing What You Want Is Not the Same as Being Free - The third is the Consequence Argument, the strongest reason in modern philosophy to think that freedom and determinism cannot both be true. If determinism holds, everything we do follows from the distant past together with the laws of nature. Neither of those is up to us: nobody can change what happened before he was born, or bend the law of gravity. So, the argument concludes, neither is anything we do. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to Us (2) Three arguments answer the modern compatibilists at their strongest. - Next comes the thought experiment Harry Frankfurt made famous. A neurosurgeon named Black has fitted a device in Jones's brain, ready to make him vote the way Black wants. As it happens, Black never has to use it, because Jones votes that way on his own. • The compatibilist says this shows that the ability to do otherwise never mattered, since Jones could not have voted otherwise and is responsible all the same. So, the compatibilist concludes, determinism, which takes that ability away, takes nothing that responsibility needs. • The answer grants the first half. Black never acts, so the choice is still Jones's own, which is why freedom is defined by its source and not by the open door. • It denies the second half. The case can show a free choice only where nothing but Jones settled it, and that is the very thing determinism takes away. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door - After that come the two best modern accounts of what makes a choice "your own." One asks whether you want the wants you act on, which an addict who hates his craving does not. The other asks whether you respond to reasons. Both get a fair hearing, and both turn out to share a weakness. Either one could be installed in a person whole, from outside, the right wants and the right responsiveness to reasons included, and nobody would call that person free. So neither account can be what freedom is. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: Wanting What You Want to Want Is Not Enough: The Hierarchical and Reasons-Responsive Accounts - Then the manipulation argument. A person built to order by a scientist, so that he will choose exactly as designed, is not free, and many who meet the case agree. A fully determined world differs from the scientist's laboratory in only one respect: nobody is at the controls. The argument asks why that difference should be the one that matters. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One (3) Three arguments meet the claim that freedom is impossible. - The first builds the positive account, which philosophers call agent causation: a free choice is caused by the person, not merely by states inside the person such as a desire or a brain event. That is exactly why it is neither fixed in advance nor random. Something caused it, and the something was you. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the Choice - The second answers the luck objection. The objection says that a choice nothing settled in advance is just a coin toss, and it asks how a coin toss could be anyone's responsibility. • Along the way it introduces the regress argument of the philosopher Galen Strawson, which he calls the Basic Argument. To be responsible for a choice, he argues, you would have to be responsible for the character that produced it. To be responsible for that character, you would have to be responsible for whatever produced it, and so on all the way down. And nobody chose his own character all the way down. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation - The third takes that regress and gives it the full hearing it deserves. It is the hardest argument against everyone, since it is aimed at compatibilists and libertarians alike. An argument that would sink every account of responsibility is not answered in a paragraph. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: Nobody Chose Their Own Character, and Everyone Is Still Responsible: The Basic Argument (4) Three arguments give the reasons to believe we are free. - The first clears the ground by answering the brain-scan experiments that claim to find the decision in the brain before the person is aware of deciding. In the best known of them, volunteers flexed a wrist whenever they felt like it, and a build-up of brain activity began a fraction of a second before they reported the urge to move. The argument says what those experiments actually measured. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: The Brain Scans Have Not Found the Decision Before the Decider - The second collects the positive case, and there is more of it than most people expect. • There is the experience of choosing itself. • There is the fact that freedom is the best explanation of that experience, which everyone has and nobody can stop acting on. • There is the fact that we know we are responsible more surely than we know any philosophical premise that could be turned against it. • And there is the way Scripture addresses people who could answer either way. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free - The third runs the deliberation argument on its own. Nobody can deliberate about an outcome he believes is already settled; you do not weigh whether to catch a train that has already left. And everybody deliberates, including the determinist deciding whether to be one. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: You Cannot Deliberate About What You Believe Is Settled: The Deliberation Argument Therefore, a reader who stops at the end of the first stretch can say what a free choice is, answer the determinist, the compatibilist, and the neuroscientist, and give reasons of his own for believing that the moment at the top of the stairs is real.

(●) The second stretch: thirteen arguments keep that freedom under a God who knows everything and governs everything. + The Christian reader arrives with a further question, and it is a harder one. If God knows what I will do before I do it, and if he rules everything that happens, in what sense is anything up to me? (1) Four arguments engage the Reformed case at full strength. - The first separates the two things "free will" has meant in the church, because a good deal of the quarrel is two sides using one phrase for two different things. • When the Reformers of the sixteenth century, Luther and Calvin among them, said the will is in bondage, they meant that nobody turns to God without grace. About that they were right. The Second Council of Orange had said it in 529, a thousand years before them, and Arminius and Wesley said it after them. • But the bondage is a claim about the power of the fallen will, the will as sin has left it, toward God. It is not a denial that ordinary choices are up to us. Luther himself granted free choice in what he called the things beneath a man, the everyday business of life, and kept his denial for the things above him, meaning the will's power toward God. • The argument then adds the step the Reformers did not take: the will God draws can still refuse him, so freedom reaches into the response to grace itself. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will - The second takes up the old maxim that "ought implies can," the principle that a command presupposes the ability to obey it, and asks what a command really presupposes. That is where the Reformed objection comes in. We are commanded to live without sin, and we cannot; so, the objection runs, "ought" cannot imply "can." The answer uses the distinction the first argument drew, between what a fallen will can do toward God and what an ordinary will can do at the top of the stairs. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: Ought Implies Can: What a Command Presupposes - The third argues against theological determinism directly. The Reformed case comes first, at full strength. Then comes the question the whole dispute turns on: if God decreed a sin, who is its author? • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin - The fourth reads the sovereignty texts, the passages cited for God's rule over human choices, one at a time, and asks of each what it says and what it does not. • Pharaoh's hardened heart. • Joseph's brothers, who "meant evil" while "God meant it for good" (Genesis 50:20). • The cross, "delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God" and carried out "by the hands of lawless men" (Acts 2:23). • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: What the Sovereignty Texts Say, and What They Do Not (2) Four arguments answer the foreknowledge worry from every side. - The first shows that God's knowing what you will do does not make you do it. • Start with something ordinary. If I know you are in the kitchen, then you are in the kitchen, since nobody can know what is false. But my knowing it does not pin you there. You could have gone out to the garden, and then I would have known that instead. • The argument that foreknowledge forces your hand misses that difference, and the mistake has a name: the modal fallacy, named for modal logic, the logic of what must be and what might be. It slides the word "necessarily" from where it belongs (necessarily, if God knows a thing, that thing happens) to where it does not (if God knows a thing, that thing necessarily happens). • The plain answer is as old as Origen, the third-century Christian teacher. A thing is not going to happen because God foreknows it; God foreknows it because it is going to happen. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It - The second answers open theism, which drops foreknowledge to keep freedom, and shows that the Bible and reason both refuse the trade. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: The Future Is Not Open to God: Answering Open Theism - The third asks how foreknowledge of a free choice is even possible, given that the choice has not been made yet. The answer is that God does not learn the future by looking ahead, as if it were a road he could see from a tower. His knowledge is not acquired at all; he has never had to find anything out. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: God Does Not Look Ahead: How Foreknowledge Is Possible - The fourth asks whether it makes any difference if God is timeless, outside time and seeing every moment at once, or everlasting, in time with us and without beginning or end. Freedom, it shows, stands either way. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: Does God See All Times at Once? Eternity and the Boethian Answer (3) Two arguments build the account that holds it all together. - The first builds middle knowledge, God's knowledge of what every creature would freely do in every circumstance, and shows how a God with that knowledge can plan the world in detail without determining a single choice in it. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It - The second answers the hardest objection to it, the one philosophers call the grounding objection. A free choice that has not been made yet, the objection runs, has nothing to make any claim about it true, so what could God's knowledge of it be knowledge of? Think of the men of Keilah. They never did hand David over, so what makes it true that they would have? • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding Objection (4) Three arguments finish on the freedom of God and of the saints. - The first meets the best theological argument for the compatibilist, and it is a good one. God cannot sin, and he is praised for his goodness; so praise, it seems, does not require the ability to do otherwise. • The answer grants it. God does good freely because nothing outside him settles what he does. And on the historic view, Christ could not sin (theologians call this his impeccability), yet he resisted temptation freely. • What does not follow is that a choice settled from outside can be free. Nothing outside God gave him his character. • Ours was shaped by parents, places, and a thousand things we never chose. But shaping a person is not settling his choice, and that difference is what the argument works out. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: God Cannot Sin and Is Praised for It: The Impeccability Objection - The second asks whether God was free to create at all, and free to create this world rather than a better one. • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: Was God Free to Create, and Free to Create This World? - The third closes on heaven, where the saints cannot sin and are freer than they have ever been. They are free because nothing settles their goodness but the saints themselves, who do good because they love God. It closes, too, on the freedom of God himself, so that the reader sees at the end what freedom was for all along. "So if the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed" (John 8:36). • Read it: Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God Therefore, the second stretch ends where it began, with a will that is really free, and adds what only theology can add: that it is free under a God who knew every choice it would make and made a world in which it would make them.

(●) Where it lands: a freedom that is real in us now and finished only in heaven. + A road should say where it ends before you set out on it. Here is the end. (1) The destination is a definite position. - Our choices are up to us. Nothing before a free choice settles it; the person does, and that is why praise and blame have someone to land on. In the ordinary case he could also have chosen otherwise, which is the usual mark of a free choice. - God knows every choice that will ever be made. He also knows every choice that would be made in circumstances that never come about, as he did at Keilah. His knowing changes nothing about whose choice it is. - God governs the world by choosing which free creatures to create and where to place them, knowing what they would do. His purposes are carried out through their choices, and the choices remain entirely theirs. - And freedom is not finished here. It is finished only in heaven, in a will that cannot sin and does not want to. (2) Every opponent gets his best case stated first. - The strongest case against this position in the church today is the Reformed one. Every argument that refuses it states that case first, in its best form and from its best defenders, before answering. A reader who holds the Reformed view will find his own position described in words he would sign, and only then find out where the disagreement really sits. - The same courtesy goes to the compatibilist philosopher, the hard determinist (who accepts determinism and concludes that nobody is free), the open theist, and the neuroscientist. Hold each of their cases in mind the way the arguments hold it, at full strength. An argument that wins by weakening its opponent has not won. (3) The position stops short in three places. - Scripture does not state a theory of the will. It addresses people as accountable, and it confesses God as sovereign. The position is a way of holding both of those at once, not a doctrine the Bible spells out. - Middle knowledge is a model of how foreknowledge, freedom, and providence (God's governing of the world) fit together. If it fell, the answer about foreknowledge (that knowing a choice is not causing it) would still stand, and freedom would still be real. God's providence would only reach less far than the model says. - Other questions are left where they belong, in the doctrines of God and of salvation: whether God is timeless or everlasting in time, how election should be read, and whether the saved can fall away. On salvation the arguments take one step, and they take it openly: grace comes first, and grace can be refused. Therefore, read in order, the arguments arrive at a freedom that is real in us now, known in full by God, governed by him without ever ceasing to be ours, and finished only in heaven, in a will that cannot sin and does not want to.

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