(P1)God is the greatest conceivable being.
+Whatever else God is, he is the greatest thing there could be. That claim is the floor, and the case built on it is a detective's case rather than a proof: two pictures of God, weighed by which one better accounts for a God who is love.
(1) "God" names the best that anything could possibly be.
- Anselm, the eleventh-century monk who ended up as archbishop of Canterbury, gave the idea the phrase everyone still uses: God is "that than which nothing greater can be thought" (Proslogion 2). Not the most impressive thing on the shelf, but the best that anything could possibly be.
- Think of the difference this way. The fastest runner at your school is fast, and next year somebody faster may transfer in. The fastest a human body could ever run is a different sort of claim altogether, and only that second one is a ceiling.
- The method has a name worth knowing, perfect being theology: you work out what God is like by asking, over and over, what it would be better to be. If it is better to know than to be ignorant, then God knows. If it is better to keep a promise than to break one, then God keeps his.
- That sentence of Anselm's is also the opening move of the ontological argument, the attempt to reason from what God is to whether God exists at all, and its modern form is called modal, the philosopher's word for talk about what could have been otherwise and what could not.
(2) Both Testaments already talk about God this way.
- "To whom then will you compare me, that I should be like him? says the Holy One" (Isaiah 40:25). The question is rhetorical, and the answer it expects is nobody.
- "Great is the LORD, and greatly to be praised, and his greatness is unsearchable" (Psalm 145:3). Unsearchable is not a compliment about size. It says that people have gone looking for the bottom of the measure and have not found it.
- The biblical writers never put God at the top of a list of impressive beings, the way you might rank mountains. They put him in a class by himself, which is the same move the philosophers make in a different vocabulary.
(3) Jews, Christians and Muslims have all reasoned this way.
- Avicenna, the great Persian philosopher of the Islamic east, Anselm in Normandy, and Maimonides, the Jewish sage of medieval Egypt, all worked this method and came out in very different places with it. That is what a shared method looks like: the tool does not decide the answer.
- Of course, a premise only Christians accept would settle nothing in a conversation with somebody who is not a Christian. This one is not that kind of premise, which is precisely why it can carry weight in a disagreement about the Trinity.
Therefore, the question is not whether God happens to have some admirable qualities but what a being would have to be like to be as great as anything could be.
See also:
NT / Moral and Rational: Modal Ontological (Maximal Greatness)
(P2)Love is a perfection.
+Love is not a bonus feature on God's greatness. It belongs on the short list of qualities that make a being greater for having them.
(1) A perfection is a quality it is better to have than to lack.
- Knowledge is a perfection and ignorance is not. Power is one, and weakness plainly is not. Justice, mercy, faithfulness and wisdom all belong on the list, and they belong there for the same reason: whoever has them is greater for having them.
- Try running the test the other way and listen to how it sounds. "God would be greater if he knew a little less." The sentence falls apart in your mouth before you reach the end of it.
- What the test asks is not what a culture happens to admire this decade. It asks what it would be better to be, which is a different question, and sometimes a more uncomfortable one.
(2) Nobody ranks a loveless being above a loving one.
- Imagine two beings alike in every single respect except one. The first loves and the second does not. Which of them is greater? Almost everybody answers before they have finished hearing the question.
- One famous holdout stands the other way, and it is worth naming. Aristotle's first mover is thought thinking itself, a mind whose only object is its own thinking; it moves the world by being desired and desires nothing outside itself (Metaphysics XII). Hardly anyone since has read that as an improvement on a God who loves.
- This is not a Christian premise smuggled into a Christian argument. Jews and Muslims, who hold that God is one and who reject the Trinity outright, affirm it as loudly as Christians do. The Qur'an names God al-Wadud, the Loving.
- Israel's own word for it is hesed, God's covenant loyalty: a steadfast love that keeps its promises even when the other party has broken every one of his. "His steadfast love endures forever" comes back like a drumbeat in all twenty-six verses of Psalm 136.
(3) Scripture says God is love, not merely that he is loving.
- "Anyone who does not love does not know God, because God is love" (1 John 4:8, and again at 4:16). John does not write that God is loving, the way he might write that God is patient.
- That construction turns up elsewhere in the same circle of writings. The letter says "God is light" (1 John 1:5), and John's Gospel records Jesus saying "God is spirit" (John 4:24). It is the form a writer reaches for when he means to say what something is, never merely how it behaves.
- The difference is the one between "she is kind" and "she is kindness itself." The second sentence is not simply a warmer compliment. It is a claim about what the woman is made of.
Therefore, a being who did not love would fall short of being the greatest conceivable being, and would not be God.
(P3)Love gives itself away to another.
+Love has a direction built into it. It moves toward somebody who is not the lover.
(1) Love has a second party built into it.
- You love someone. The grammar leaves a slot open at the end, and the sentence means nothing at all until somebody has been put in it.
- Think of a man who keeps a photograph in his wallet, the way people did before phones. It is never a photograph of himself. Love points away from the one doing the loving, and it does that so reliably that we notice at once when it does not.
- That pointing away is not a limitation on love. It is the very thing that separates love from every other warm feeling a man can have about his own situation.
(2) We measure love by what it hands over.
- "Greater love has no one than this, that someone lay down his life for his friends" (John 15:13). The measure is what gets handed over.
- "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only Son" (John 3:16). The verb that follows "loved" is "gave," and that pairing is not the accident of one famous verse. It is the shape the New Testament reaches for whenever it wants to show love rather than define it.
- Giving needs somebody on the other end. A wrapped present sitting on the doorstep of a house nobody lives in is not a small gift or a poor gift. It is not a gift at all.
(3) A being who loved only himself would be missing what makes love love.
- Grant the honest exception first, because there is one. There is a healthy self-regard, and Jesus takes it for granted when he tells us to love our neighbors as ourselves (Mark 12:31). Nobody is being asked to despise himself.
- But a man whose love stops at himself and goes no further is the standard picture of a defect. We have words for that man, and not one of them is a compliment.
- Notice too that nobody has ever been moved by the story of a man who loved himself completely. The stories that move people are the ones where somebody hands something over.
(4) Being ready to love is not the same as loving somebody.
- Two different things wear the same word. There is a standing readiness to love, which a man keeps whether or not anybody is in the room with him, and there is love actually given to somebody. Both are real. Only one of them is what perfect love asks of God.
- A country doctor snowed in for a week, with the roads shut and nobody able to reach him, is still a healer, and nobody holds the empty waiting room against him. A doctor who could clear the road any morning he liked, and never does, is a different case entirely.
- So the claim is narrower than a claim about lovers in general. What perfect love asks of God is not a readiness he might never use, but love actually given to somebody who is not himself.
Therefore, perfect love requires somebody to be loved who is not the lover, and God is never in the position of having nobody.
(P4)God's love does not depend on creation.
+Loving belongs to what God is. Creating is something God chose, and the gap between those two decides whom God was loving before there was anybody to make.
(1) God did not have to make anything.
- Creation is free. Jewish, Christian and Muslim theology have all insisted on it, and for the same reason: the alternative empties the word "gift" of its meaning.
- "You created all things, and by your will they existed and were created" (Revelation 4:11). By your will, notice, and not by your nature. "Our God is in the heavens; he does all that he pleases" (Psalm 115:3).
- Think of the difference between a man who hands you a birthday present and a man who hands you the fifty dollars he owed you. From across the room the two transactions look identical. Only one of them is generosity.
(2) Loving is not optional for God in the way creating is.
- Suppose God could have been unloving and simply happened not to be. Then love is a policy God adopted rather than a description of God, and "God is love" (P2) turns out to be an overstatement.
- Philosophers mark this difference with two words worth learning. An essential property is one a thing cannot lose and still be itself: a triangle cannot shed its three sides and go on being a triangle. A contingent property is one it could have lacked: your shirt could have been green instead of blue and it would still be your shirt.
• Creating is contingent for God. Loving is essential. That one difference is the hinge everything else turns on.
(3) There are ways things could have gone with a loving God and no creatures.
- Philosophers call a complete way things could have gone a possible world. It is not a planet out past Neptune. It is a whole scenario, the way "the meeting could have been cancelled" describes a scenario rather than a place.
- Since creating was optional, there is a scenario in which God exists and nothing else does. Since loving is not optional, God is perfectly loving in that scenario too.
- Picture an album holding one photograph of every way things could have turned out. God is in every picture. Creatures are missing from some of them, and the love is in all of them.
(4) Time makes the same point with no philosophy at all.
- Set the scenarios aside for a moment and just look at the clock. On the standard cosmological picture the universe is somewhere around fourteen billion years old, and persons turned up very late in it, which makes it plausible that created persons have not always existed.
- If God's love needed a creature to land on, then before there were creatures God was not yet loving another. Something would have switched on in God at some point that had not been running before.
- A man who becomes generous at forty was not generous at thirty. Say the same about God and you have said that God improved.
Therefore, whoever it is that God has always loved, it is not a creature.
(IC)Therefore, God eternally loves another within himself.
+The beloved cannot be a creature (P4), and cannot be the lover himself (P3). That leaves one place for him to be.
(1) The beloved is someone within God.
- Rule out those two candidates and exactly one position is left standing. The one God loves is inside God, and has been for as long as God has been, which is to say always.
- No fourth candidate is waiting in the wings, because Scripture leaves two categories and no third: "All things were made through him, and without him was not any thing made that was made" (John 1:3).
• Anything neither God nor made by God would be a second uncreated being standing alongside him, which is the one thing monotheism will not say.
• And a God who leaned on such a being for his own perfection would not be the greatest there could be (P1).
- This is not a dodge. It is the move a detective makes when two alibis check out: the evidence now points at whoever is left standing, however unexpected he turns out to be.
(2) "Within God" names a person, not a part or a faculty.
- Not a mood, not an attribute, not a capacity lying dormant. Someone: a who rather than a what, loved and loving in return.
- Jesus says it to the Father in as many words: "you loved me before the foundation of the world" (John 17:24), and "the glory that I had with you before the world existed" (John 17:5). Before the world existed there was already a you and a me.
- Paul's habit of speech points the same way. "His beloved Son" (Colossians 1:13) is, word for word in the Greek, the Son of his love. The love is not something the Father took up toward the Son at some point along the way. It is what the Son is named by.
(3) More than one is not yet three.
- The reasoning arrives at more than one and stops there. Whether God is two or three or more is not a question that love, on its own, can answer.
- Three is a number that comes from the New Testament (C), and nothing so far has been carrying it.
Therefore, the love that makes God perfect is love between persons inside God.
(P5)If God is one person, his love for another depends on creation.
+Set the two pictures of God side by side: one person, or more than one. The question is which of them better accounts for a God who is love.
(1) On a one-person God, loving another is something that started.
- Before creation there was God and nobody else. Whatever love that God has for another began when the world did, because until then there was nothing for it to reach.
- That does not make such a God unloving. It makes his love for another contingent (P4): a fact about him that could have failed to be true, and that was not always true.
- Picture two houses on the same street. One has had people in it for as long as anyone can remember, talking to each other in the kitchen. The other stood empty until a family moved in last spring. Both are homes now. Only one of them has always been a home.
(2) Strip away creation and that God has only himself left to love.
- This follows from the position rather than being pinned on it. If God is essentially loving, and the only others there could ever be are creatures, and creatures were made freely, then the love belonging to God essentially is love of himself. Love of anybody else came later.
- Imagine writing the biography of such a God. Every chapter before creation has exactly one character in it, and the only love there is to report is his own for himself. Take the word love the ordinary way (P3), and that is the one kind of love nobody admires in anybody else.
- Say it as fairly as it can be said. Unitarian monotheists, meaning those who hold that the one God is also one single person, are not cold people, and their devotion is real. The question is not about them at all. It is about what their doctrine says was going on in God before there was anybody else.
- One serious way out remains, and it is the strongest reply anyone has offered. Call that essential love a readiness that never had to be exercised, and the awkwardness seems to dissolve. Then the question comes back from the other side. God could have made somebody to love at any moment he liked. If he never did, in what sense was he not missing something?
(3) On the Christian picture, "God is love" describes what God has always been.
- Father, Son and Spirit give themselves to one another, with no beginning to it and nothing outside God prompting it. Creation adds recipients. It does not add the loving.
- When John writes that God is love, the sentence is then a description of God rather than a report of a policy adopted somewhere along the way.
- Compare saying that a river is wet with saying that a river got wet. Only one of those sentences is telling you what a river is.
Therefore, on one picture God's love for another is something that began, and on the other it never did.
(C)Therefore, more than one person in God is more plausible than a solitary God.
+A God who is more than one person accounts better for perfect love than a God who is only one. That is the whole of it, and it is a smaller thing than it sounds.
(1) The claim is plausibility, not proof.
- Christians did not arrive at the Trinity by philosophy. They hold it because of what the New Testament says about the Father, the Son and the Spirit. The philosophical case comes second, and never as the reason for believing it.
- The charge it answers is that three persons in God is an awkward complication which a cleaner monotheism avoids. The complication earns its keep.
- Explanations get judged the way a mechanic's diagnosis gets judged: by how much of the trouble one account covers, and by how few extra parts it has to invent. A single loose belt that explains the noise, the smell and the warning light beats three unrelated faults. Judged that way, the trinitarian picture does better on three counts.
• It makes "God is love" true of God as he is rather than as he became.
• It leaves creation free, so the world stays a gift rather than an overflow God could not help.
• It invents no machinery for the occasion, since Christians already held the doctrine on other grounds.
(2) The number three comes from the text, not from love.
- Every step so far would be satisfied by two, a Lover and a Beloved, with nothing further required. Joined to the New Testament's count, the reasoning supports the Trinity. On its own it supports plurality and no more.
- The count sits in ordinary church business rather than in speculation: one name belonging to three at baptism (Matthew 28:19), a blessing at the close of a letter that names three (2 Corinthians 13:14), gifts and service and activity distributed among three (1 Corinthians 12:4-6). It never wobbles there, and it is never argued for from love.
(3) What does follow is a God who never needed us.
- If God's love was already full before there was a world, then creation was not a remedy for loneliness. Nothing was missing that we arrived to supply.
- "Nor is he served by human hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself gives to all mankind life and breath and everything" (Acts 17:24-25). A God with a need would be a God whose love for us was partly about him.
- "We love because he first loved us" (1 John 4:19). The order in that sentence is the practical payoff. His love came first, and ours is the echo of it.
(4) What would defeat this.
- If love is not a perfection, P2 fails and nothing else matters.
- If a disposition to love is all that perfection requires, P3 fails. A disposition is a standing readiness to act, the way sugar stays soluble in a sealed jar that no water will ever reach, and on that view a God alone forever would lack nothing. That is the strongest objection in the literature.
- If God could not have refrained from creating, then creatures are available as the eternal beloved, and the beloved need not be inside God at all.
Therefore, the God who is love is plausibly not alone, and the Trinity, whose count comes from the text, is more plausible than any doctrine that leaves God by himself.
See also:
PT / The Trinity: One God in Three Persons
On the argument from love:
Craig, William Lane. Systematic Philosophical Theology: On God: Excursus on Natural Theology, On the Trinity, vol. IIb. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2026.
Swinburne, Richard. The Christian God. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
On perfect being theology:
Morris, Thomas V. Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1991.
On Jewish monotheism:
Bauckham, Richard. Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies on the New Testament's Christology of Divine Identity. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008.
On the doctrine and its models:
Hasker, William. Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
McCall, Thomas H. Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? Philosophical and Systematic Theologians on the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010.
Critic sources engaged:
Leftow, Brian. "Anti Social Trinitarianism." In The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, edited by Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O'Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Tuggy, Dale. "Antiunitarian Arguments from Divine Perfection." Journal of Analytic Theology 9 (2021).
Tuggy, Dale. "Trinity." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ancient and medieval sources:
Anselm, Proslogion 2.
Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 4.11, 4.19, 4.26.
Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.
Augustine, On the Trinity V.16.
Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in Deum VI.
Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed I.50.
Plotinus, Enneads V.1.
Richard of St Victor, De Trinitate III.
Biblical citations:
Numbers 23:19; Psalm 115:3; 136:1; 145:3; Isaiah 40:25; Matthew 28:19; Mark 12:31; John 1:3; 3:16, 35; 4:24; 5:20; 14:11; 15:13; 17:5, 24; Acts 17:24-25; Romans 5:8; 8:38-39; 1 Corinthians 12:4-6; 2 Corinthians 13:14; Colossians 1:13; Titus 1:2; 1 John 1:5; 4:8-10, 16, 19; Revelation 4:11.
+A sailor marooned alone on an island is still a loving man, so being perfectly loving requires only the disposition to love should anyone be there. A solitary God lacks company, not perfection.
1. For creatures, the objection is simply correct.
Nobody thinks the marooned sailor stopped being kind because there is no one on the beach to be kind to. On that much the objection is right, and any answer that pretends otherwise is not worth reading.
The philosopher who presses it hardest is Dale Tuggy, a unitarian, meaning someone who holds that the one God is also one single person, and the author of the entry on the Trinity for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. His version is clean: perfections are normally dispositions rather than performances. A disposition is a standing readiness to act, and a man counts as generous if he would give when giving is called for, even in a year when nobody happens to ask him for anything.
There is a second move in it as well, and it is a good one. The trinitarian's own escape route, that God could always create somebody to love, names a power, and a power is a readiness rather than an act. So the reply can look as though it concedes the very analysis it was meant to defeat.
2. God's solitude, unlike the sailor's, would be chosen.
That is where the comparison breaks down, and the whole reply lives in the break. The sailor is alone because a storm put him there. He has no boat, no radio, and no way whatever to produce a companion, so his readiness to be kind goes unused because reality will not let him act on it.
God is under no such constraint. He can make persons to love whenever he likes and as many as he likes. A God with that power who prefers to remain alone is not a being whose kindness circumstances have blocked. He is a being who is declining.
Now look again at what the power to create is doing, because the objection's second move assumes it is doing something else. The power is not offered as a substitute for the love. It is what removes the excuse.
Take a God who can make persons to love, who declines to, and who is content to stay alone. He fails the objection's own standard rather than escaping through it, because a readiness its owner will not act on when nothing whatever stands in the way is not a readiness in working order. Put the sailor on the island with a working boat and a full tank of fuel, and ask again whether his solitude tells you nothing about him.
3. The objection refutes a wider claim than the one that is needed.
Two claims are easy to run together, and the difference between them decides the case. Read "necessarily" as "in every way things could have gone," the possible worlds of P4:
- Necessarily, any perfectly loving being is actually loving somebody. That is a claim about beings in general, and the marooned sailor refutes it outright.
- Necessarily, a perfectly loving God is actually loving somebody. That is a claim about God, and the sailor leaves it standing.
Only the second is required, and it survives for a simple reason: the sailor cannot conjure a companion out of the sea, and God can.
A unitarian will answer that his God is not idle at all, since God did create and does love us. That is true, and it is beside the point. A property God has essentially has to hold in every way things could have gone, so the test is the scenario where God creates nothing. There the solitary God loves nobody, and on the Christian picture nothing has changed.
4. Carried through, the objection lets a God who never loved anyone count as perfect.
If a disposition is all that perfection requires, then a God who had never actually loved anyone, not one creature, not for one moment in all of eternity, would still be perfectly loving. Read that sentence again slowly.
Almost nobody who raises the sailor is willing to hold it, and the reluctance is itself evidence. Actual love is doing work in our judgments that a bare disposition cannot do on its own.
+Let creation be eternal and necessary. If God has always had creatures to love, then his love was never idle and no second divine person is needed.
1. Everlasting is not the same as necessary.
Suppose God has been making creatures forever, with no first moment anywhere. That gives you a God who always did in fact have somebody to love. It does not give you a God who had to, and only "had to" would help the objection.
As long as creating is something God could have refrained from, there is still a scenario in which he exists alone, and in that scenario his love for another drops back to being a disposition and nothing more. So the objection needs something far stronger than an eternal world. It needs a God who could not have failed to create.
2. A God who cannot refrain from creating cannot give a gift.
Necessary creation is a real position with a real pedigree, and it should be met at full strength. It runs through the Neoplatonists, the ancient philosophers who worked in Plato's line, for whom the world flows out of the One the way light flows off the sun, with no decision anywhere in the process (Plotinus, Enneads V.1). The pedigree is not only pagan. Christian thinkers too have argued that goodness of its very nature pours itself out, so that a perfectly good God would inevitably produce something, and that instinct is why the position keeps coming back.
The instinct is sound, and it already has a Christian answer older than the objection. Bonaventure built a whole theology on that same principle, that the good spills over, and drew from it not a necessary world but a plurality of persons in God: the spilling over is finished before anything is made, Father to Son to Spirit (Itinerarium mentis in Deum VI). A goodness that has already given itself away without limit inside God has no pressure left for a world to relieve.
The price of the other route is paid in the doctrine of grace, and it is enormous:
- If God had to make the world, the world is not a gift, and nothing in it is a gift either.
- Genesis stops being an act and becomes a description of what God cannot help doing.
- Scripture puts creation firmly on the other side of that line. "You created all things, and by your will they existed and were created" (Revelation 4:11): willed, the way a decision is willed, and not poured out the way light is.
That is why the mainstream of Jewish, Christian and Muslim theology has refused the position outright rather than trimmed it.
3. Blur the two and the charge of dependence lands on the objector.
Loving is what God is. Creating is what God did. Run the two together and you have a God who needs the world in order to be himself, which is precisely the accusation unitarian critics bring against the Trinity in the first place.
4. Current cosmology makes the eternal-creature picture harder.
The evidence points to a universe that began a finite time ago, with persons in it much later still. If created persons have not always existed, and God has always loved another, then the one he loved was there before they were.
Even so, this is a supporting consideration rather than a load-bearing one. Grant an eternal universe outright and nothing changes, because an eternal creation would still be a creation God was free to withhold.
See also:
NT / Cosmological: The Kalam Argument
+God loves himself, and that is enough. The classical picture has God eternally knowing and loving his own perfect being, which is the most fitting object of love there could be.
1. Grant it: God does love himself.
God is the best thing there is, so a God who was indifferent to God would have his values badly wrong. This is not a fringe idea, and the objection is right that the tradition holds it.
2. The tradition used divine self-love to arrive at plurality.
This is what the objection misses, and it is decisive. In Aquinas the Word, who is the Son, comes forth from God's act of understanding himself, and the Spirit comes forth from God's act of loving himself. Those two comings-forth, which theologians call processions, are how Aquinas arrives at three persons in the first place (Summa contra gentiles 4.11, 4.19, 4.26).
So the most rigorous defender of divine self-love in the whole Christian tradition treated it as an argument for the Trinity rather than against it. Whatever the objection is drawing on, it is not the classical position.
3. Self-love and love are not one word doing one job.
When we say that a man loves his wife and that a man loves himself, we are not describing a single thing in two settings. The first has a second party in it, somebody who can be addressed as you and given to. The second has no second party at all.
A mirror does not keep you company. And giving is what love does when it is working (P3), which means a being whose only love was self-love would have nobody to give himself to.
Scripture points the same direction every time it shows us what the word means. "God shows his love for us in that while we were still sinners, Christ died for us" (Romans 5:8). There is always somebody else in the picture.
4. Trinitarians press the same complaint against one another.
The complaint comes from inside the house. The philosopher William Hasker, arguing against fellow Christians who model the three persons as a single self, objects that the Father's love for the Son "is cheapened if we regard it as really one person's love for himself," since a God who knows everything would know perfectly well that this was what he was doing.
So the sense that self-love is a lesser thing than love of another is not a talking point Christians reserve for outsiders. It is what they hold one another to.
+Even granting every step, the argument reaches at most a plurality. Two divine persons would satisfy it completely, and nothing in it stops the count at three.
1. That is correct.
The reasoning gets to "more than one." It does not get to three. A Lover and a Beloved would satisfy every step, and pretending otherwise would misrepresent what has been shown.
The number comes from the New Testament, where it turns up in ordinary church business rather than in speculation:
- Disciples are baptized into one name belonging to three (Matthew 28:19).
- The blessing at the close of a letter names three (2 Corinthians 13:14).
- Gifts, service and activity are distributed among three (1 Corinthians 12:4-6).
The count never expands to four and never contracts to two. That is where Christians get three, and no philosophical argument is carrying that weight.
2. Some have argued the further step from two to three.
Richard of St Victor, a twelfth-century theologian at the abbey of Saint Victor in Paris, made the case in the third book of his De Trinitate. Two who love each other perfectly, he argued, will not want to keep the love to themselves. The highest love is not a closed pair delighting in one another but a shared delight in a third, whom he called the condilectus, the co-beloved.
Think of two close friends whose delight in each other opens out to take in a third. Most of us would call that a fuller thing than the pair turned inward, and Richard's point is exactly that: a love which will not admit anyone else is a smaller thing than a love which will.
The same step has been pressed in modern dress from the other end, by asking what reason a perfectly good person would have for bringing about another person at all, and answering that the good of love shared with a third supplies one. Whether any of this succeeds is genuinely disputed. It is a live possibility, not a settled result.
3. The reasoning does not run away to a hundred persons.
A fair worry runs in the other direction. If two is better than one, why is two hundred not better than three?
The answer is that greatness here is not a matter of addition. Nobody thinks a marriage would be improved by becoming a committee, and a perfect friendship does not get better by recruiting.
What the steps claim is that love with nobody to receive it is defective, not that love improves as the count rises. The arguments that do press on to three press on a particular good rather than on a total: two can love each other, and only three can share that love with somebody. On that reasoning, once the sharing is actual a fourth makes no new kind of good possible, which is why the step from two to three is the one people argue about and the step from three to four is not.
4. An argument that goes part of the way has still gone part of the way.
Fingerprints on a glass put a person in the room. They do not say what time he arrived, and nobody treats that as a failure of fingerprinting.
To be a defeater rather than a limit, the objection would need a reason to think plurality is false. Noting that the number is unspecified is not that reason.
See also:
PT / The Trinity: One God in Three PersonsPT / The Trinity: There Are Exactly Three PersonsPT / The Trinity: The Divine Processions
+"The greatest conceivable being" is a blank check. Whatever a culture happens to admire gets written in and called a perfection, and love was written in by Christians.
1. The method is not Christian property.
Perfect being theology was worked hardest by medieval Jewish, Christian and Muslim philosophers arguing in a shared vocabulary, and they reached sharply different conclusions with it. Maimonides argued from God's absolute unity that a man who professes God is one while thinking of him as a plurality has not held the doctrine at all, and he had the Christians expressly in view (Guide for the Perplexed I.50).
A method that hands its users a Christian conclusion did a poor job on the men who used it to deny the Trinity.
2. The objection would bite if love were a contested perfection.
Nobody argues that a being who knows less is greater, or that a being who can do less is greater, or that a crueler being is greater. There are genuinely disputed cases out at the edges. Whether impassibility, the claim that nothing outside God can affect him or move him to feeling, is a perfection or a defect gets argued seriously in every generation.
Love is not one of the disputed cases. It is affirmed as a perfection by the Jewish and Muslim monotheists whose doctrine of God is the one being challenged, which is the opposite of what a Christian import would look like. As for the ancient philosophers who denied that God loves, they denied along with it that God attends to anything at all outside himself, and that is a quarrel about whether God is personal rather than about whether love is a perfection.
3. Denying the premise costs more than it saves.
Run the objection to the end and it says that a God who loves is no greater than a God who does not. Very few people want to hold that, and the ones who raise this objection are usually monotheists who want God to be loving very much indeed.
No complete theory of greatness is needed here. What is needed is one comparison coming out one way, and it is a comparison almost everybody makes already without being asked.
+A God who must love another depends on another, and a dependent being is not the absolute God of monotheism. The Trinity buys warmth at the cost of God's self-sufficiency.
1. Dependence means relying on something outside yourself.
The whole reason the beloved has to be inside God is that a beloved outside God would leave God relying on a creature. The objection has the direction backwards. Putting the beloved inside God is what protects the self-sufficiency it is worried about.
Ask the question that actually matters. Does God rely on anything he made? On the trinitarian picture, no: his life is full without the world, which is what the objector wanted all along.
2. It is the solitary God who ends up needing the world.
Take a one-person God who is essentially loving and ask what he loves. If loving another belongs to what he is, and the only others available are creatures, then he must create, and the world becomes something God cannot do without.
Christian theology has a word for what is at stake here, aseity, from the Latin a se, "from himself": God exists and is what he is on his own, owing nothing to anything else. Aseity is the doctrine this objection is defending, and it is better defended by the picture the objection attacks.
3. The persons are not three needy beings propping one another up.
The Father is not completed by the Son the way a lonely man is completed by a wife. There is one God whose life lacks nothing, and that life has a shape to it: giving and receiving, with no deficiency anywhere in the arrangement.
4. This is exactly why creation can be a gift.
If God was never lonely, he did not make the world to fix anything. "Nor is he served by human hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself gives to all mankind life and breath and everything" (Acts 17:24-25).
So the love that reaches us is all outward. None of it is God making up a shortage of his own.
See also:
PT / The Trinity: Divine Simplicity and the Trinity
+"God is love" comes from a letter about how God has treated us, and the very next verses point to the sending of the Son for our sins. Reading it as a report on God's inner life is overreading.
1. The objection has the context right.1 John 4:9-10 does ground the statement in what God did for us: he sent his Son into the world so that we might live through him. Anyone quoting verse 8 on its own as a proof about God's inner life has skipped a line, and the objection is right to point at it.
2. The sending presupposes what the objection denies.
Look at who is in the sentence before the world is. To send a Son, there has to be a Son already. John's own Gospel says the Father loved him "before the foundation of the world" (John 17:24) and that he had glory with the Father "before the world existed" (John 17:5). Paul calls him "his beloved Son," which in the Greek reads as the Son of his love (Colossians 1:13).
So the sending is not where the love starts. It is where the love arrives somewhere we could see it.
3. The reasoning does not rest on the verse.
Nothing in the steps needs 1 John 4:8. Every one of them runs on what a being would have to be like to be the greatest conceivable being, and they would run exactly the same way if the verse had never been written.
What the verse supplies is confirmation that Scripture describes God the way the reasoning ends up describing him. That is worth having, and it is not load-bearing.
4. That construction is never used for behavior.
The same letter says "God is light" (1 John 1:5), and John's Gospel records Jesus saying "God is spirit" (John 4:24). Neither of those is a report about how God treats anyone. Both say what God is, and the third instance is not likely to be the odd one out.
+If the Father cannot help loving the Son, that is not love, it is mechanism. Love that could not have been withheld is no more praiseworthy than gravity.
1. Being unable to do otherwise is not the same as being forced.
Two very different things get called "cannot." A man in handcuffs cannot leave the room, and something outside him is holding him there. A man who cannot bring himself to abandon his child is not in handcuffs, and his "cannot" is a fact about who he is rather than about what is being done to him.
Nobody thinks the second man loves less because of it. Most of us think that is what love looks like when it has gone all the way down.
2. The objection would take God's goodness with it.
On any traditional account God cannot lie, cannot break a promise, and cannot do evil. "God is not man, that he should lie" (Numbers 23:19); he is the God "who never lies" (Titus 1:2).
If necessity cancels praise, then God's honesty is not praiseworthy either, and neither is his justice or his faithfulness. Practically nobody who presses this objection is willing to accept that whole package.
3. Christian teaching already puts God's love for us in the free column.
The love inside God is necessary. God's love for creatures is not: he did not have to make anybody, and having made them he owed no one rescue. That is what the word grace has always meant.
So even if the objection worked, it would leave untouched the love the Bible spends most of its pages on.
+Love reaches outside itself because creatures are needy. A being who lacks nothing has no reason to reach for anyone, so reading our kind of love back into God is just making God in our own image.
1. Grant the honest part: our love is tangled up with need.
Nobody should pretend otherwise. We love partly because we are lonely, partly because we want to be loved back, partly because being needed feels good, and it can take a lifetime to sort out which strand is which.
2. But need is what love works around, not what love is made of.
The clearest cases of love anyone can name are the ones with the least need in them. A parent of a newborn gets nothing back for months. A woman sits every Thursday with a friend who will not remember she came.
Nobody calls those the weak cases. We call them the strong ones, which tells you that when need drops out of love, love does not go with it. If neediness were the engine, the most desperate person you know would be the most loving one, and that is not how it works.
3. The objection proves too much.
Run it consistently and God is not loving at all, since every reason a creature has for loving has just been declared not to apply to him.
Almost nobody who raises this is willing to land there. Unitarian monotheists in particular insist that God is loving, which means they already need an account of divine love that is not driven by need. Once they have one, the premise the objection was attacking is back on the table.
4. Giving is the part of love that survives when need drops out.
Love hands something over to somebody. That is the feature being ascribed to God, and it is the feature that gets clearer as need drops away rather than dimmer.
+Three persons who love one another are three centers of consciousness, which is a society rather than a monotheism. The argument makes God more attractive by quietly making him three Gods.
1. Gods are counted by beings, not by persons.
Polytheism means many divine beings, each with his own turf, his own will, and his own temple down the road. The doctrine claims exactly one divine being. This objection counts the persons and then reads the total off as a number of Gods, which is a different question and needs an argument of its own.
2. Christians who reject three centers of consciousness still say the persons love one another.
There is a real dispute among Christians here, and it should not be papered over. Some hold that the three are three centers of consciousness, three distinct subjects each able to say "I" to himself and "you" to the others. Others hold that the persons are distinguished by the relations in which they stand, Father to Son and Son to Father, and that one divine mind can carry all three.
Both camps affirm that the Father loved the Son before the foundation of the world (John 17:24). All that is needed here is that the love is real and between the persons, which is common ground, so nothing depends on that dispute being settled either way.
3. Every model of the Trinity pays somewhere.
Give the objection its due. Models that make the persons three centers of consciousness do have to explain why that is not three Gods, and the philosopher Brian Leftow presses exactly that complaint against them. Models that make God one center have to explain the Gospel scenes where the Son prays to the Father, and their critics press exactly that.
No model is itself part of what was revealed. If one of them fails, the doctrine sits where it sat, because what was revealed was the claim rather than the mechanism.
See also:
PT / The Trinity: One God in Three PersonsPT / The Trinity: Anti-Social TrinitarianismPT / The Trinity: Tripersonal Monotheism
+Muslims and Jews call God loving without needing a second person inside him, and they have thought about this for centuries. The argument is a Christian conclusion looking for a premise.
1. Nobody is claiming that unitarian monotheists fail to call God loving.
They call him loving, seriously and devotionally. The Qur'an names God al-Wadud, the Loving, and Psalm 136 comes back to "his Steadfast Love Endures Forever" in every one of its twenty-six verses.
The question was never whether they say it. The question is what makes it true.
2. The disagreement is about whether God's love for another had a beginning.
On strict unitarian monotheism the only others there have ever been are creatures, and creatures were made freely (P4). So God's loving another is something that started when creation did.
That is not an insult. It is what the doctrine implies, and it is the question on the table.
3. The objection is about who found the reasoning, not about whether it holds.
Maybe the conclusion did come first. Arguments are often discovered by people who already believe what they end up defending, and that is true of arguments running in every direction, this objection included.
What settles the matter is whether the steps hold, and there are three of them: love is a perfection, love goes out to another, and creation is free. Each can be examined on its own, and unitarian philosophers have examined them closely, pressing hardest at the point where a disposition to love is said to be enough.
4. The claim being made is smaller than the objection assumes.
Nothing here shows that Muslims and Jews are worshipping nothing, that their prayers go nowhere, or that their theologians have failed to think hard about the question. What it shows is that one picture of God accounts for perfect love better than the other does (C).
See also:
World Religions / Islam: The Islamic DilemmaPT / The Trinity: There Is Exactly One God
+If love needs a beloved, then mercy needs someone to pardon and justice needs someone to judge. Either God has eternal sinners inside him or the reasoning is unsound.
1. The test is the right one to run.
A principle that produces absurdities when it is applied across the board is a bad principle, and anyone offering one should be made to run it across the board. Mercy, justice, patience and generosity all look like perfections, and every one of them looks like it needs somebody on the receiving end. If the pattern really holds, God has an eternal defendant and an eternal beggar inside him, which nobody wants to say.
2. Mercy and justice need something wrong in the other party.
Look at what each one actually requires:
- Mercy needs a wrongdoer, and the word admits as much. Mercy comes from the Latin misericordia, a heart moved by somebody else's wretchedness, and there is nothing for such a heart to do until there is wretchedness in the world.
- Justice needs a case to settle.
- Patience needs somebody trying you.
- Generosity needs somebody short of something.
Every one of them is goodness meeting a world with something wrong in it, which means none of them could have been exercised before anything was wrong.
Love asks for something different: a recipient, and nothing else. A surgeon's skill needs a wound before it can show itself. A father's delight in his daughter needs only the daughter.
3. The division is older than the objection.
Theology has long sorted what God is in himself from what God is toward a world he made, and mercy and justice have always sat on the second list. Augustine drew that line in the fifth century and drew it hard: God is good in himself and always was, but he is not called Lord from eternity, because there was nothing to be Lord over until he made it (On the Trinity V.16). Nobody counts that a defect in God, and nobody should count an eternity with nobody to pardon one either.
The question is which list love belongs on, and Scripture puts it on the first. It says God is love (1 John 4:8). It never says God is mercy or God is justice, however freely it calls him merciful and just.
+One being loving itself in three persons is still one being loving itself. Renaming the parts does not turn self-love into love of another.
1. What makes self-love a defect is having nobody else in view.
Grant where the objection starts, because the doctrine grants it too: there is exactly one divine being, so in one sense the love never leaves God.
Now think about what we actually hold against a self-absorbed man. Nobody complains that he is one organism. The complaint is that there is nobody in the room he cares about, that everything comes back around to him, and that no one else is ever the point. Love is measured between persons rather than by a count of beings, and where somebody else is genuinely the point, the defect is gone, whatever the arithmetic of beings comes to.
2. The love in question has a you in it."You loved me before the foundation of the world" (John 17:24). The you and the me in that sentence are not interchangeable, and no rewriting turns it into a man talking about himself. Self-love has no such grammar. It cannot be said in the second person.
And that holds across the models. Christians who insist hardest on the divine unity, and who make the persons the relations in which God stands rather than three minds, still hold that the Father and the Son are really distinct, so that the Father's love has a genuine other for its object. The real distinction of the persons is not an extra that social models bolted on. It is what every orthodox account was built to protect.
3. The objection is aimed at the doctrine, not at the love.
What it really says is that three persons in one being is a distinction with no difference. That is a challenge to the Trinity itself, and if it succeeds it succeeds wherever the doctrine is stated, love or no love.
Granting the doctrine as it stands, the beloved never had to be a second being. He had to be somebody other than the lover (IC), and the Father is not the Son.
See also:
PT / The Trinity: One God in Three PersonsPT / The Trinity: Anti-Social TrinitarianismPT / The Trinity: Tripersonal Monotheism
+Between persons who share one will and one knowledge, nothing is risked and nothing is given that the other lacks. Calling that love borrows the warmth of the word without the conditions that earn it.
1. Cost is how we measure love, not what love is.
Grant the observation, and grant that P3 leans on it. We really do read love off what it costs, and "greater love has no one than this" puts the highest price on the highest love (John 15:13).
But think about why the price tells us anything at all. It tells us something because our resources run out and our wills are divided, so what the price reads is how much of a limited self was handed over. You cannot take the measure of a man who owns everything by looking at his bank statement, and that is a limit on the instrument rather than a verdict on the man.
Grant the objector his picture too: persons perfectly agreed, with nothing hidden between them and nothing withheld. Not a word of it has to be denied.
2. Giving does not require the receiver to be lacking.
John's Gospel describes the Father's love for the Son as a handing over. The Father "has given all things into his hand" (John 3:35), and he "shows him all that he himself is doing" (John 5:20). Whatever else is going on in those sentences, the love is described as giving and showing rather than as self-regard, and it is placed before the world existed (John 17:24).
Between people the gift is usually a thing, because things are what we have to spare. Between persons who hold everything in common the gift is the self, which is what love was after in the first place. That is how the same Gospel talks: "I am in the Father and the Father is in me" (John 14:11) is not the language of two parties settling accounts.
3. The rule would demote love as it gets better.
Run it consistently and see where it lands. A marriage of forty years in which neither party will ever leave has less at risk in it than a first date, and a promise that cannot be broken would be worth less than one that might be. Nobody grades love that way. We say the settled love is the greater one, which means risk is a condition love works under rather than a part of what love is.
Scripture's own summit is a love that cannot be lost. Nothing in death or life or anything else in all creation "will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Romans 8:38-39). The security is the good news, not a discount on it.
See also:
PT / The Trinity: Anti-Social TrinitarianismPT / The Trinity: Tripersonal Monotheism