(●)A will that cannot sin has lost no freedom, because freedom is being the source of one's choices, not having the power to do wrong.
+Ask a mother whether she would sell her little boy for a million dollars, and she will not stop to think about it. "I couldn't," she says, and she means it. Nobody who hears her concludes that she is less free than a woman who would need a night to decide. Her "couldn't" is not a chain someone else put on her. It is the plainest thing about who she is.
Christians say something like that about God, and about the redeemed in heaven, the people Christ has saved. God "cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one" (James 1:13), and "it is impossible for God to lie" (Hebrews 6:18). Being unable to sin has a name, impeccability, from the Latin peccare, "to sin." The redeemed, whom theologians call the saints in glory, will share it. Of the city they enter Scripture says that "nothing unclean will ever enter it" (Revelation 21:27), and of the people themselves, "we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is" (1 John 3:2).
That raises a question most people ask sooner or later. If nobody in heaven can do wrong, has anybody in heaven got a choice? Or will the saints be something like very happy robots?
Philosophers press the same question from two sides.
- Some hold that freedom needs the power to do wrong, so that a will that cannot sin is less free, or not free at all. The idea goes back at least to Julian of Eclanum, a fifth-century bishop, and it has able defenders today.
- Others grant that God and the saints are free without that power, and draw the opposite lesson. If a being can be free, and praised, when it cannot do otherwise, they say, then freedom does not need the ability to do otherwise at all. And whatever freedom does need, they add, a creature can have even when forces outside him settle every choice he makes. The New England pastor and theologian Jonathan Edwards pressed this in 1754, and it is still one of the leading theological arguments of those who hold that freedom is compatible with determinism.
• Determinism is the view that every choice is settled beforehand by prior conditions (the past and the laws of nature, or a decree of God) that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. A row of dominoes is the picture: the first push and the spacing of the row are enough by themselves to bring the last one down. The view that freedom survives determinism is called compatibilism.
Everything turns on one word, settle, and the mother shows what it means. Everyone who knows her could tell you in advance what she will say, and their knowing is not what makes her say it. The money does not decide it, and neither does anyone else. She does.
To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. He is then its source, the one it comes from. Nothing settles the mother's refusal but her, and she is its source.
In the ordinary run of human choices a free choice carries a second feature, and it is the one people usually check first: the person could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was. That is freedom's ordinary mark. It is the mark and not the definition, the way a fever is the usual sign of an infection without being what an infection is. Usually the source and the mark travel together. God and the saints are where they come apart.
So what matters is the source, and defining freedom by the one a choice comes from is called the source view. It is not the principle of alternative possibilities, the rule that a person is free, or deserves praise or blame, only if he could have done otherwise. That rule is held by others, not by the source view, and God's own case refutes it.
God and the saints in glory are free, though they cannot sin, because nothing outside them settles what they will. The power to sin is no part of freedom.
That one fact about where a choice comes from answers both sides. To the first, the answer is plain: a will that cannot sin has lost no freedom. The second gets its first step right and its second step wrong. God's case does show that freedom does not need an open door, another way the choice could have gone, there for the taking, like the coffee a woman passes over when she orders tea. What it does not show is that freedom survives being settled from outside. A creature determined in every choice has something outside him settling each one, and God and the saints do not (D1, D2).
The argument is deductive: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. The premises work like a locked chain: if every link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. No premise has to be beyond all doubt; each needs only to be more plausible than its denial. It runs in three short chains. The first shows that God wills freely (P1, P2, C1). The second shows the same of the saints in glory (P3, C2). The third puts both beside the fact that neither can sin (P4, C3).
Who holds what, on whether freedom needs the power to sin:
- Support: in the 420s Julian of Eclanum defined free choice as the possibility of committing sin or abstaining from it, and Wes Morriston has argued that a God who could never do wrong would lack the freedom that makes goodness moral.
- Oppose: Anselm of Canterbury answered in the 1080s that the power to sin is no part of freedom, and William Lane Craig holds today that God freely does good though he cannot do evil.
The argument that follows holds that a will that cannot sin has lost no freedom, and that heaven, where no one can sin, is where freedom is finished.
(P1)A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own.
+This is freedom at its core: being the source of what one chooses. The ability to have chosen otherwise usually comes with it, but it is freedom's mark rather than its meaning.
(1) A choice is free when it comes from the chooser.
- Ask what makes a choice someone's own, and the first answer that holds up is that it came from him. Nobody forced it, nobody designed it, and nothing in his past or his surroundings made it go the way it went. He did.
- He settles it for reasons of his own, and that is what separates a choice from a twitch. A knee that jerks when the doctor taps it has nothing to say for itself. A man who stands up to leave a meeting can tell you why.
- The idea is an old one. Anselm of Canterbury, the eleventh-century archbishop and philosopher, defined freedom of choice as the power to keep uprightness of will for its own sake: to keep one's will set on what is right, because it is right. There is no power to do wrong anywhere in that definition, and in the same short work he argued that the power to sin is no part of freedom, which is where (C3) arrives.
- One of the standard reference works in philosophy reports a proposal that puts the same idea in modern terms: that the core of freedom is "being the ultimate source, or originator, of one's choices."
- Go back to the mother. What makes her refusal hers is not that she might have taken the money. It is that nothing but her settled it.
(2) The ability to choose otherwise is the ordinary mark, not the definition.
- In everyday life the quickest test of whether a choice was really a person's own is to ask whether he could have gone the other way. When a friend misses your wedding, the first thing you want to know is whether he could have come.
- The test usually works, because in the ordinary run of choices the two features travel together. If a man could have refused with everything before the choice held fixed, then nothing before it settled the choice for him.
- The inference runs one way only, though. A choice that nothing settled but the chooser need not have had another road open, and philosophers have a famous case that shows it. A neurosurgeon has planted a device in a voter's brain. It watches for a sign of how he is leaning, ready to force his vote if he starts to lean the wrong way. As it happens, the voter makes up his mind the way the surgeon wanted, all by himself. The device never has to act, and the vote is his, though he could not have carried the other vote through.
- A leading defender of free will draws exactly this line: "[W]hat is essential to libertarian freedom is not the possibility of choosing otherwise but rather the absence of causal constraints outside oneself that determine how one chooses."
• Libertarian freedom is freedom of a kind that cannot live with determinism: a choice settled beforehand by prior conditions would not have it. The word has nothing to do with politics.
- Another defender, speaking first of the ability to choose otherwise and then of the source, writes: "The former is sufficient for libertarian freedom, while the latter is necessary."
• A thing is sufficient when it does the job on its own, and necessary when the job cannot be done without it. Rain is sufficient to wet the lawn but not necessary, since a sprinkler will do it too. Water is necessary, since nothing wets the lawn without it. In the quotation, the ability to choose otherwise plays the part of the rain, and the source plays the part of the water.
- A fever works the same way. A doctor checks for one first, because it is the usual sign of infection, but an infection without a fever is still an infection.
(3) Freedom is lost when something else settles the choice.
- The plainest way to see what freedom needs is to look at a case where it is missing. Picture a man designed from before his birth by a brilliant scientist, so that every choice he will ever make goes the way she planned. He weighs his options, he chooses, and each choice feels like his own. Most people who hear the story judge that he is not free, and so do many who think freedom compatible with determinism. The reason is that she, not he, settled what he chose.
- A choice can be taken from a person in two ways. Something before it can settle it, or someone else can settle it through him. Either way it is no longer his, whatever doors stood open or shut.
• A choice settled beforehand by prior conditions that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes is called determined.
- Or take a puppet. Its strings may let it move in a hundred directions, and it is still not free, because whatever it does, the hand above it does.
Therefore, a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own, and the ability to have chosen otherwise, precious as it is in ordinary life, is freedom's mark and not its meaning.
(P2)Nothing settles what God wills but God himself, for reasons of his own.
+God cannot sin, and yet nothing outside him is even partly the origin of what he wills. His goodness is not a fence built around his will. It is what his will is like.
(1) God cannot do evil because of who he is.
- Scripture says so plainly. "God cannot be tempted with evil" (James 1:13), "it is impossible for God to lie" (Hebrews 6:18), and he is the God "who never lies" (Titus 1:2).
- It also says why. Christ remains faithful even when we are faithless, "for he cannot deny himself" (2 Timothy 2:13). Lying would be a denial of who God is, and so would every other sin.
- Most Christian thinkers on every side of the free will debate grant this, including many of those who hold that freedom needs the ability to do otherwise. The minority who question it mostly do so to protect that very principle (D11).
- You may have a friend whose word is so good that you would stake your house on it. The better you know him, the less his promise feels like a gamble. With God the point runs all the way down: his word is as sure as he is.
(2) God's nature was not given to him by anything.
- Every created thing has its existence on loan. Your life came from your parents, your body from the food you have eaten, your character partly from a thousand things you never chose.
- God has nothing on loan. Paul told the Athenians that God is not "served by human hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself gives to all mankind life and breath and everything" (Acts 17:25). To the Romans he put it as a question, "who has given a gift to him that he might be repaid?" and gave the answer: "from him and through him and to him are all things" (Romans 11:35-36).
• Theologians call this aseity, from the Latin a se, "from himself": God has his existence and his nature from himself and from nothing else.
- It is like tracing a river upstream. Follow any creature's character back far enough and you leave the creature behind: you reach his parents, his upbringing, the world that made him. Follow God's character back and you reach God, and there is nowhere further to go.
(3) So nothing outside God is even partly the origin of his willing.
- A standard philosophical reference work sets out the account that comes from Anselm. Even if God's character rules certain actions out altogether, it says, "this will not imply that some external factor is in any way a partial origin of His willings."
- It goes on: since "God's nature owes its existence to nothing," God "would be the sole and ultimate source of His will even if He couldn't will otherwise."
- A leading defender of free will puts it in one sentence: "God cannot choose to do evil, yet He freely does the Good because nothing outside Him determines Him to do so."
- And what God wills, he wills for reasons of his own, drawn from his own goodness and love, which nobody gave him.
- A thermostat can hold a room at exactly seventy degrees, day and night, and its constancy is not freedom, because someone else chose the setting. God's constancy has no one behind it but God.
(4) God's goodness is not determinism by another name.
- A determined choice is settled beforehand by prior conditions (the past and the laws of nature, or a decree) that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. Traced back far enough, such conditions lie outside the chooser: they were in place before he existed, or were decreed for him (D2).
- God's nature is not a condition like that. It is not prior to God, since he never existed without it, and nobody decreed it. Nor is it outside him. It is his own being, what it is to be God, not a rule laid on him or a part added to him.
- None of this needs the strong form of divine simplicity, the doctrine that God has no parts or distinctions of any kind, so that his goodness, his power and God himself are one and the same. Christians hold that doctrine in stronger and weaker forms, and some set it aside. The point needs only what every Christian account of God holds: that God could not be without his nature, and that nothing gave it to him.
- So the strongest case there is of a will that cannot do otherwise is not a case of determinism at all.
- A promise kept because a contract binds you is different from a promise kept because you are the kind of person who keeps promises. Only the first has something outside you holding you to it.
Therefore, nothing settles what God wills but God himself, for reasons of his own: his goodness is his own, all the way down.
(C1)Therefore, God wills freely.
+If a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own (P1), and nothing outside God settles what God wills, which he wills for reasons of his own (P2), then God wills freely. The step is called modus ponens, Latin for "the way that affirms": if the kettle is on, the water will boil; the kettle is on; so the water will boil.
(1) God is freer than any creature, though he cannot sin.
- The church's great teachers have said so for centuries. Augustine, bishop of Hippo in North Africa around AD 400, met the fear that a heaven without sin would be a heaven without freedom with a question: "Are we to say that God Himself is not free because He cannot sin?"
- Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth-century Dominican theologian, came across a passage in Jerome, the fourth-century scholar who translated the Bible into Latin, that seemed to deny God free will. Aquinas answered that "Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin."
• The Dominicans are a Catholic order of preaching friars.
- Freedom is the same thing in God as in a creature: nothing outside the chooser settles the choice. God has it without limit, because nothing outside him is even partly the origin of his willing, while every creature has its existence, and much that shapes it, from outside.
- The mother's "I couldn't" is the freest thing about her, because nothing outside her is its source. God's "cannot" is that, without limit.
(2) God's freedom among goods is a further fact.
- God's freedom does not stop at his goodness. Aquinas goes on: "it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be."
• That freedom among goods is a further fact about God: true, and worth knowing, but not what makes him free. What makes him free is that nothing outside him settles what he wills (P2).
- Scripture speaks of creation in just those terms: "you created all things, and by your will they existed and were created" (Revelation 4:11), and "Our God is in the heavens; he does all that he pleases" (Psalm 115:3).
- The majority view in the history of Christian thought is that God could have created nothing at all, and could have created a different world. A defender of free will spells out what follows otherwise: if God had to create, and create exactly as he did, then humanity "exists necessarily," that is, could not have failed to exist, and so, if evil is real, does evil.
• Even God's options have limits, set by what is already true before he chooses. He could not make a square circle. And if he knows what every creature would freely do, he could not make a world in which Peter, placed exactly where he was on the night Jesus was arrested, would not deny Christ, because what Peter would freely do there is not God's to decide (D4).
- It is like a host deciding what to cook for his guests. That he would never poison them is no limit on his hospitality, and which dinner he serves is up to him.
- That God could have done otherwise among goods is a further fact, and it is not what makes him free. Were there only one good thing to do, he would do it freely, because nothing outside him would settle it. Whether God had to create the best world he could is a question of its own (D9).
(3) God's case refutes the principle of alternative possibilities, not the source.
- If God is free and cannot do otherwise than good, then the rule that freedom requires the ability to do otherwise is false. That rule was never the one (P1) states.
- What God's case confirms is the source. He is free because nothing outside him settles what he wills, which is exactly what a determined creature lacks (D1, D2).
- A single penguin is enough to refute the rule that every bird can fly, and the same penguin, feathers and all, confirms the rule that every bird has feathers.
Therefore, God wills freely, though he cannot sin.
(P3)Nothing settles the goodness of the saints in glory but the saints themselves, for reasons of their own.
+The redeemed will not be able to sin in heaven, and their goodness will still be their own. They will do good because they love God, and nothing will settle it but them.
(1) Their goodness grew from their own choices.
- The saints do not arrive in heaven as blank slates. On earth they chose, day after day, whether to trust God or not, whether to forgive or not, and in the ordinary run of those choices nothing but they settled them. They could have chosen otherwise, which is freedom's ordinary mark, and often they did, doubting where they might have trusted and holding grudges they might have let go.
- The character they carry into glory is the one those choices built, under grace, the love and help God gives that no one earns. There it is made perfect (Hebrews 12:23).
- The fullest recent account of heavenly freedom holds that this is why they cannot sin in glory. With God's grace at work in the forming, the redeemed freely formed the characters that now rule sin out, and so their inability to sin is a freedom derived from their own earlier choices.
- A man who has told his wife the truth every day for fifty years cannot, by now, bring himself to lie to her, even when a lie would spare her a hard hour. That "cannot" was built by him, one honest day at a time.
- Not everyone in glory walked that road for long. A thief crucified beside Jesus was promised paradise with, so far as the Gospels tell, a few hours of faith behind him (Luke 23:43), and most Christians hold, or at least hope, that children who die in infancy are with Christ. Their freedom in glory does not rest on a history they never had (D12).
(2) Grace perfects their love rather than replacing it.
- None of this happens without God. Nobody turns to God without his grace, and the grace that drew the saints could have been refused. They received it, and God finishes what he began: "he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus Christ" (Philippians 1:6).
- Augustine called the saints' inability to sin a gift: "God by nature cannot sin, but the partaker of God receives this inability from God." A partaker of God is one who has been given a share in God's life. A gift received completes the one who receives it. It does not replace him.
- A teacher may work with a student for years until she speaks French without effort. Her fluency is the teacher's gift and still her own, and nobody else is speaking when she speaks.
(3) They do good because they love God.
- In heaven the saints see God as he is. "For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face" (1 Corinthians 13:12). The church's main tradition has held that nothing in that sight gives anyone a reason to turn away from it. Aquinas put it this way: "the will of him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God."
• By God's essence Aquinas means what God is in himself. Whoever sees that, he says, will of necessity love everything else under God, with God first.
- His "of necessity" is about the order of the saint's love: whatever he loves, he loves under God. It shuts the door on a love turned against God. It does not do the saint's loving for him.
- So when a saint does good in glory, what he acts from is his own love of God. Nothing settles his goodness but him, and he does good because he loves God.
- A woman who adores her husband does not need anyone to make her kiss him goodbye in the morning, and nobody watching thinks she is less free for wanting to.
(4) The condition is the same for God and for the saints.
- Freedom asks one thing of God and creature alike: that nothing outside the chooser settle the choice. God meets it because nothing outside him is even partly the origin of his willing (P2).
- The saints meet it because nothing outside them settles what they do in glory. The character they act from is their own, grace heals it without replacing it, and the sight of God gives them every reason to love him without doing their loving for them.
- Shaping a person is not settling his choice. The saints were shaped, as everyone is, by parents, places, grace and a thousand things they never chose, and none of that settled the choices that made them who they are.
- Most of the saints did have alternatives once, on earth, and some philosophers rest their heavenly freedom on those. What makes them free in glory, though, is not a door that stood open long ago. It is that nothing settles their goodness but themselves.
- A violinist who has played for forty years lifts her bow, and the music comes from years of her own practice. It is hers now, not a memory of past effort.
Therefore, nothing settles the goodness of the saints in glory but the saints themselves, for reasons of their own: they do good because they love God.
(C2)Therefore, the saints in glory do good freely.
+If a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own (P1), and nothing settles the saints' goodness but the saints themselves, who do good because they love God (P3), then the saints do good freely. It is the same step as in (C1), modus ponens.
(1) Their freedom is finished, not lost.
- Augustine drew the whole Christian story of freedom in one sentence: "the first liberty of the will was to be able not to sin, the last will be much greater, not to be able to sin" (On Rebuke and Grace 12.33).
- He also answered the fear that heaven would take something away: "Neither are we to suppose that because sin shall have no power to delight them, free will must be withdrawn. It will, on the contrary, be all the more truly free, because set free from delight in sinning to take unfailing delight in not sinning."
- Paul speaks of the glory to come as a release, the day when creation itself "will be set free from its bondage to corruption and obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God" (Romans 8:21).
- The Reformed churches, which part from Augustine's Catholic heirs on much, confess the same thing: "The will of man is made perfectly and immutably free to good alone, in the state of glory only" (Westminster Confession 9.5).
• The Reformed churches are the Protestant churches that trace their teaching to John Calvin, and the Westminster Confession of 1646 is their best-known statement of faith in English. Immutably means unchangeably.
- A runner who has crossed the finish line of a marathon no longer has the option of quitting at mile twenty, and nobody says she has lost something.
(2) Choices among goods plausibly remain in heaven.
- Heaven is not a single frozen moment of worship. Scripture pictures a city with gates and a river and nations walking by its light, where God's servants "will reign forever and ever" (Revelation 22:5), and in a parable Jesus pictures the faithful servant given "authority over ten cities" (Luke 19:17). Philosophers who have looked closely at heaven's life argue that the redeemed will go on choosing among goods, and nothing in Scripture rules it out.
- At a feast where every dish on the table is good, you still choose which to take.
- That is a further fact about heaven's life, and a happy one. It is not what makes the saints free. They are free because nothing settles their goodness but themselves.
Therefore, the saints in glory do good freely, and their freedom is finished, not lost.
(P4)Neither God nor the saints in glory can sin.
+Scripture says it of God and promises a heaven without sin, and the church's main tradition has held both. Its best-known dissent is narrower than it sounds.
(1) God cannot sin.
- Scripture says so plainly (P2): God "cannot be tempted with evil" (James 1:13), "it is impossible for God to lie" (Hebrews 6:18), and "he cannot deny himself" (2 Timothy 2:13).
- Reason says the same. God is the greatest being there could be, as Anselm taught the church to think of him, and a being who could turn to evil would be less than one who could not.
- Nor does being unable to sin make God less powerful. Anselm pointed out that the ability to lie, or to be corrupted, is not a power at all but a weakness. The more a being can do such things, the more what is bad for him has power over him.
- Christ, God the Son made man, "in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sin" (Hebrews 4:15). He could not have sinned, as the church's main tradition has held, though some Christians have held that he could have and did not. Nothing in the argument turns on that question (D7).
- Take two judges. One could be bribed and never has been. The other could not be bribed at all, because he is not that kind of man. Nobody thinks the second is the lesser judge.
(2) The saints in glory cannot sin.
- Of the new Jerusalem, the city of God that Revelation pictures coming down from heaven, Scripture says that "nothing unclean will ever enter it" (Revelation 21:27) and that "No longer will there be anything accursed" (Revelation 22:3). Its people are "the spirits of the righteous made perfect" (Hebrews 12:23).
- Scripture promises a heaven without sin, and from that promise the church's teachers have drawn the conclusion that the saints cannot sin there, agreeing across the church's divisions. Augustine said the last liberty is "not to be able to sin," Aquinas that the will of one who sees God "of necessity" loves in subordination to God, and the Westminster Confession that the glorified will is "immutably free to good alone."
- In some towns nobody locks a door. The reason is not a policeman on every corner. It is that nobody who lives there would steal.
(3) One great medieval voice put the guarantee somewhere else.
- John Duns Scotus, a Franciscan friar who died in 1308 and one of the stoutest medieval defenders of the will's freedom, held that the sight of God does not by itself fix the will: even seeing God face to face, the will can refrain from willing him.
• The Franciscans are the order of friars founded by Francis of Assisi.
- The blessed, as the saints in heaven are also called, keep a remote power to sin, he taught: the will still has that power in itself, but it never comes into use. They never sin, he held, because God's own will keeps them.
- So the tradition agrees that the saints cannot sin and disagrees about why, and nothing is gained by pretending otherwise. For Aquinas the sight of God secures it; for Scotus, God's keeping does.
- Think of a climber roped to a guide she trusts completely. Whether it is the rope or her own footing that makes a fall impossible, she is not going to fall.
- In any case, the conclusion (C3) does not rest on the saints. God's case alone would carry it.
Therefore, neither God nor the saints in glory can sin.
(C3)Therefore, freedom does not require the power to sin.
+God wills freely (C1), the saints in glory do good freely (C2), and neither can sin (P4). If freedom required the power to sin, neither would be free, so freedom does not require it. The step is called modus tollens, Latin for "the way that denies": if it had rained, the street would be wet; the street is dry; so it did not rain.
- God's case alone would carry the conclusion, laid out the same way: if freedom required the power to sin, God, who cannot sin, would not be free; God is free; so freedom does not require the power to sin. The saints show that the same is true of creatures.
- "Free" keeps the meaning (P1) gives it, all the way through. "Cannot sin" means that no way to sin lies open to them, and Scotus's remote power to sin is not such a way, since God's will keeps it from ever coming into use (D6).
- Freedom does not need the power to sin. That is not to say that nothing good comes with that power to creatures still on the way (D4, D11).
(1) The power to sin is no part of freedom.
- Anselm went further than the conclusion needs. If the power to sin were freedom, or any part of it, then God and the good angels, who lack that power, would lack freedom or some part of it, and they are the freest of all. So the power to sin is neither freedom nor any piece of it.
- He was answering a view the church had already met. Julian of Eclanum defined free choice as the possibility of committing sin or abstaining from it, and wrote that being able to do evil is the proof of freedom. Augustine answered that on that reckoning God is not free, since Scripture says of him that "he cannot deny himself" (2 Timothy 2:13), and he reminded Julian that Julian himself granted that God cannot be anything but just.
• Julian, the deposed bishop of Eclanum in southern Italy, argued with Augustine through the 420s and was the ablest defender of Pelagius, the British monk who taught that people can live without sin by their own powers. The church rejected Pelagius's teaching at a council in Carthage in 418 and at the Council of Ephesus in 431.
- Consider a man who has been sober for thirty years. That the bottle has lost its pull on him is not a loss of freedom. It is the freedom he fought for.
(2) Heaven is the release from sin's slavery.
- Jesus put it bluntly: "everyone who practices sin is a slave to sin" (John 8:34). Paul writes to believers that "now that you have been set free from sin and have become slaves of God, the fruit you get leads to sanctification and its end, eternal life" (Romans 6:22).
• Sanctification is the work of being made holy.
- On that picture the power to sin was never the heart of freedom. It was the door through which freedom could be lost.
- When a prisoner is released after twenty years, the cell door that stays shut behind him is not a new restriction. It is the release.
(3) Determinism gains nothing from a will that cannot sin.
- What freedom needs is its source, and every case confirms it. God is free because nothing outside him settles what he wills, the saints because nothing settles their goodness but themselves.
- A creature determined in every choice has something outside him settling each one, and nothing in God's case or the saints' makes him free (D1, D2).
- Nor does the conclusion take the ordinary mark from ordinary life. In this life a free choice can ordinarily go either way, and the ability to have done otherwise is still the right thing to check.
- A witness of perfect integrity cannot bring herself to lie under oath, and that does not mean someone else is holding her tongue.
(4) A will that cannot sin is freedom finished.
- A freedom that ends in a will that cannot sin, and does not want to, is not a lesser freedom. It is the finished one.
- That is what heaven promises. Choosing does not end there; the pull toward what destroys us does. The saints will be free the way God is free, as creatures and by grace, with nothing outside them settling what they love.
- Remember the mother. Her "I couldn't" is not where her freedom runs out. It is where her love has come into its own.
Therefore, freedom does not require the power to sin, and a will that cannot sin and does not want to is freedom finished: "So if the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed" (John 8:36).
On freedom defined by its source:
Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013.
Craig, William Lane. "Response to Gregory A. Boyd." In Four Views on Divine Providence, edited by Dennis W. Jowers, 224-230. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011. As quoted in Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 124-125.
O'Connor, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. "Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2022. Sections 1.1, 2.3, 4.1 and 4.2.
Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Pages 38-40, 160, 307-308, 454-457, 496-497, 529-535 and 605.
Timpe, Kevin. Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives. 2nd ed. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
On heaven and the freedom of the saints:
Pawl, Timothy, and Kevin Timpe. "Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven." Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 4 (2009): 398-419.
Tamburro, Richard. "The Possibility and Scope of Significant Heavenly Freedom." In Paradise Understood: New Philosophical Essays about Heaven, edited by T. Ryan Byerly and Eric J. Silverman, 308-326. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
On God's freedom and his choice of a world:
Adams, Robert Merrihew. "Must God Create the Best?" Philosophical Review 81, no. 3 (1972): 317-332. Reprinted in The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology, 51-64. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Craig, William Lane. Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, On God: Attributes of God. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2025. Sections 6.3.2.1.2, 6.4.3.2, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.4 and 7.5.
Craig, William Lane. "No Trouble." Theologica 5, no. 1 (2021). A reply to Wielenberg.
Craig, William Lane. Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001.
Kretzmann, Norman. The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa contra gentiles I. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Pages 220-225.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. The Monadology 53-55. In The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings, translated by Robert Latta. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil. 1710. Abridgement of the Argument, reply to the eighth objection.
O'Connor, Timothy. "Why The One Did Not Remain Within Itself." In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, vol. 10, edited by Lara Buchak and Dean W. Zimmerman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.
Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974. Chapter 9.
Pruss, Alexander R. "Divine Creative Freedom." In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, vol. 7, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, 213-238. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
On hiddenness:
Murray, Michael J. "Coercion and the Hiddenness of God." American Philosophical Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1993): 27-38.
Murray, Michael J. "Deus Absconditus." In Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, 62-82. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Pascal, Blaise. Pensées 430. Translated by W. F. Trotter. Brunschvicg numbering.
Critic sources engaged:
Bignon, Guillaume. "A Response to Kevin Timpe's Objections." March 2019. Pages 11-19.
Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018. Pages 4 and 104-140.
Edwards, Jonathan. Freedom of the Will. 1754. Part III, section 1.
Martin, Michael. "Problems with Heaven." The Secular Web, 1997.
Morriston, Wesley. "Is God 'Significantly Free?'" Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 3 (1985): 257-264.
Rowe, William L. Can God Be Free? Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004.
Whitby, Daniel. A Discourse on the Five Points, 14. As quoted in Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Part III, section 1.
Wielenberg, Erik J. "Craig's God Cannot Create a Temporal Universe." Philosophia Christi 23, no. 2 (2021): 329-340.
Historical sources:
Anselm of Canterbury. De libertate arbitrii (On Freedom of Choice), chapters 1 and 3.
Anselm of Canterbury. Proslogion, chapter 7.
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae I, question 19, article 10, and I-II, question 4, article 4. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1920.
Augustine. The City of God 22.30. Translated by Marcus Dods. In Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 2. Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1887.
Augustine. On Rebuke and Grace 12.33. In Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 5. New York: Christian Literature, 1887.
Augustine. Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum (Unfinished Work against Julian) 1.78 and 1.81-82, quoting Julian of Eclanum.
Duns Scotus, John. Ordinatio IV, distinction 49, question 6, nn. 341-352. Translated by Peter L. P. Simpson.
Duns Scotus, John. Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle IX, question 15.
Hodge, Charles. Systematic Theology. Vol. 2. New York: Scribner, 1872. Page 457.
Lewis, C. S. Mere Christianity. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1952. Book 3, chapter 11.
Shedd, William G. T. Dogmatic Theology. Vol. 2. New York: Scribner, 1888. Pages 330-349.
Twain, Mark. Lecture reported in the Chicago Tribune, December 20, 1871, 4.
The Westminster Confession of Faith 9.5 and 10.3. 1646. In Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1877.
Biblical citations:
Psalm 106:1; Psalm 115:3; Isaiah 45:15; Luke 19:17; Luke 23:43; John 8:34-36; John 20:29; Acts 17:24-27; Romans 6:22; Romans 8:21; Romans 11:35-36; 1 Corinthians 13:12; Philippians 1:6; Philippians 2:12-13; 2 Timothy 2:13; Titus 1:2; Hebrews 2:18; Hebrews 4:15; Hebrews 6:18; Hebrews 12:23; James 1:13; 1 John 3:2; Revelation 4:11; Revelation 21:27; Revelation 22:3-5.
+God cannot sin, and he is praised for his goodness. So praise and freedom do not need the ability to do otherwise, and whatever freedom does need, a creature determined in every choice can have.
The strongest form of this objection is Jonathan Edwards's, and it is still among the leading theological arguments for compatibilism. God always acts righteously and cannot do otherwise; God is praiseworthy for his righteous acts; so praise, and the freedom it presupposes, do not require the ability to do otherwise.
A leading defender of the argument today gives it a single test case: "Could God fail to keep his promises to Abraham? No. Was God praiseworthy for keeping them? Certainly." Since libertarians usually say that an undetermined choice could have gone otherwise, he argues, libertarian freedom falls with the ability to do otherwise, and compatibilism is what is left.
1. It refutes a principle the source view never held.
Edwards's argument is a good refutation of the principle of alternative possibilities, and the principle deserves to fall. But the source view never held it. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own (P1), and God's case is the clearest confirmation of that principle there is (C1).
- A referee who rules a goal out for offside has disallowed that goal. He has not ended the match.
2. God meets the source condition, as the objection's defender concedes.
The source condition is the one (P1) states: nothing settles the choice but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. The argument's modern defender takes up exactly this reply: God's inability to sin comes from within, from his own nature, while a determined creature's choices come from without. He grants that "That distinction between God and humans certainly holds true," and calls the reply "a rather effective defensive move, and a prima facie coherent position to take."
- Prima facie is Latin for "at first sight": a position that holds up on its face, unless something defeats it.
- He grants, too, that he may never dislodge it: "that may be the final defensive position out of which I am unable to dislodge them, though I hope to have shown that this move, if not incoherent, is at least unattractive."
3. A nature he did not choose is not a nature someone else chose for him.
The objection's best remaining reply runs as a chain. God never chose his nature, and his nature guarantees that he never acts unrighteously, so God never chose never to act unrighteously. By the rule incompatibilists use to carry a lack of responsibility down a chain of guarantees, he then deserves no praise for it, just as a determined man deserves none for what his fixed past guaranteed.
- Incompatibilists hold that freedom and determinism cannot both be true. The rule in question says that if nobody is responsible for one fact, and nobody is responsible for that fact's guaranteeing a second, then nobody is responsible for the second either. Nobody is to blame for a storm, or for a storm like that flooding the low road, so, by the rule, nobody is to blame for the flood.
Part of the chain is simply true. God never had an open door to wrongdoing, so he never chose between doing wrong and not doing it. But the rule that carries praise away along guarantees fails.
- Suppose a man keeps his word while a device stands ready to make him keep it, though it never has to act. He had no say in the device, and the keeping is still to his credit.
- Nor does the incompatibilist's standard argument need that rule. The Consequence Argument carries something else down its chain, a lack of say rather than a lack of praise. It reasons that if determinism is true, our acts are consequences of the laws of nature and of events in the remote past, neither of which was ever up to us, and so our acts are not up to us either. Carried to God, it only repeats the part of the chain already granted: he never had an open door to wrongdoing.
And being fixed was never the point. What makes determinism a threat is that the fixed facts lie outside the chooser: the remote past and the laws of nature, or a decree. God's nature lies neither before him nor outside him.
- Go back to the man designed by a scientist (P1). He never chose his character, and she chose it for him. God never chose his nature either, but nobody chose it for him. The first is manipulation. The second is simply who God is.
- Some press the point with a thought experiment. Picture two impeccable human beings, one created and one who was never created at all. Surely, they say, the second deserves no more praise than the first. The source view agrees that being created is not what counts. What counts is whether anything outside him settles his choices, and a created person whose choices nothing outside him settled would be praised as rightly as the other (D4).
4. Nothing has been surrendered to compatibilism.
The objection's last move is that the source view has given the game away. Its modern defender puts it in a sentence: "being determined isn't the problem; it's how one is determined that counts." But on his own definition, determinism is the idea "that everything that comes to pass is determined, or necessitated by prior conditions." God's nature is not a condition prior to God, so a will whose goodness comes from its own uncaused nature is not a determined will under a kinder name (P2).
He also grants that a human choice determined by God still fails the source condition, since it is determined from outside. Determinism from outside, by the past or by a decree, is the only kind in dispute.
- It is the difference between a promise kept because a contract binds you and one kept because of who you are (P2). Nobody concludes that honesty is a kind of contract.
5. The fight that matters is about human beings.
God's case decides nothing about whether a creature whose every choice is settled from outside can be free. That question turns on fallen human beings, people as sin has left them, who cannot live without sin by their own strength and are still blamed for their sins. It has an argument of its own.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God Cannot Sin and Is Praised for It: The Impeccability ObjectionPhilosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to UsPhilosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will
+If being the source is all freedom needs, the compatibilist wins. A determined man whose choices flow from his own character is their source too.
1. The source means nothing outside him settled the choice.
A choice flows from a man's character in the determinist's picture, but the character itself was settled by something else. On determinism every choice is settled beforehand by prior conditions that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes, and traced back far enough, those conditions lie outside him: before he was born, or in a decree.
- Recall the man designed from before birth by a scientist (P1). His choices flow from his own character, and most people who hear the story judge that he is not free, because she settled that character, and through it, every choice.
2. Trace a determined creature back and you leave him.
Follow a determined man's choice back through his character, his upbringing, his genes and the history that produced them, and you arrive at the Big Bang, or at a decree of God. At no point do you reach a choice he made that nothing else settled.
- A settling that starts higher up the chain is still a settling. That the chain passes through his desires does not make him its source, any more than a letter becomes the postman's because it passed through his hands.
3. The condition is the same for God and creature.
The source view gives creatures no harder test than God. The condition is one and the same, that nothing outside the chooser settle the choice.
- God meets it. Nothing outside him gave him his nature, and nothing outside him is even partly the origin of his willing (P2).
- The saints meet it, since nothing settles their goodness but the saints themselves (P3). The character they act from explains what they do without settling it, and for most of them it grew out of choices that nothing outside them settled.
- A created person made unable to sin from his first moment would meet it too, so long as nothing outside him settled his choices (D4).
- The determined creature fails it, since prior conditions that trace back outside him settle every choice he makes.
That is why Anselm could say of God that nothing outside him is the source of his willing, why the same can be said of the saints in glory, and why it can be said of no one whose every choice was settled beforehand.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated OnePhilosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin
+If the saints cannot sin, heaven is full of robots. Take away the choice to do wrong and you take away the freedom that made love worth anything.
1. A robot's behavior is settled by its maker.
What makes a robot a robot is not that it cannot do wrong. Many robots can do plenty of damage. It is that whatever it does, its programmer settled. The saints are the opposite case: nothing settles their goodness but themselves (P3).
- A machine that sorts mail perfectly never makes a mistake, and nobody calls it good the way a person is good, because nothing it does comes from it.
2. Love that cannot turn back is love come of age.
The worry assumes that a love is real only while it can still be withdrawn. Nobody believes that about the loves they most admire. A husband of fifty years who could not imagine betraying his wife does not love her less than a newlywed who still feels the pull. He loves her more fully.
- Most of the saints first gave their love where it could have been refused (D4), and in glory it has grown past the point where refusing is anything they could want.
3. Heaven's life is plausibly full of choices.
The saints will plausibly go on choosing among goods: whom to serve, what to make, which of a thousand good things to love next (C2). What they will not do is choose what destroys them.
- Picture a great chef in a kitchen stocked with the finest ingredients and no poison in the building. She is not less free for that. She is free to cook.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It Matters
+If God can make free creatures who cannot sin, he should have made us that way from the start. Heaven shows that the evil of this world was never needed for freedom.
The strongest form of this objection says: the saints in glory are free and cannot sin, so free creatures who cannot sin are possible. Then God could have created such creatures at the start and spared the world its sin and suffering. If he could have, and did not, the defense that evil is the price of freedom collapses. The atheist philosopher Michael Martin pressed it in 1997, and it is older than that. Philosophers call it the problem of heavenly freedom.
1. Free creatures who cannot sin are possible.
Grant the first step; the answer lies somewhere else. Nothing about being created stands in the way: a created person made unable to sin from his first moment would be free, so long as nothing outside him settled his choices. Everything turns on how his sinlessness was secured.
- Had God built into him a nature that made each of his choices go the way it goes, God would have settled his goodness, as the scientist settled the designed man's (P1). He would be good the way a well-made machine is good.
- Had God only shut the door to evil and left his choices to him, he would be free, as God is free and as the saints in glory are.
- On the church's main tradition, Christ's human will was unable to sin from its first moment, and his obedience was still his own (D7).
- Compare a music box with a singer. The music box plays the tune its maker pinned into it. A singer who could never hit a wrong note would still be the one singing.
2. Some goods come only by a road.
What no maker can give a creature at its first moment is a goodness it came to by its own road: trust kept before it could see, a love given where it could have been withheld, a character grown out of its own choices under grace (P3). That is the goodness most of the saints carry into glory, and it is a good of its own kind. Heaven does not show that such goods can be had without the road. It shows where the road leads.
- A jeweler can make a medal that looks exactly like an Olympic gold. He cannot make one that was won.
- The fullest recent account of heavenly freedom goes further. Its authors argue that a creature can freely hold a character that rules out sin only if it earlier formed that character freely, with alternatives open to it at some point along the way. That condition is theirs. The source view does not need it, since nothing settles the saints' goodness in glory but the saints themselves (P3), and it prizes the road for what the road gives, not as the price of freedom.
3. God may keep his distance for a time so that the first answer is ours.
Pascal, the seventeenth-century French mathematician and apologist (a defender of the faith by argument), argued that God has hidden himself on purpose: "There is enough light for those who only desire to see, and enough obscurity for those who have a contrary disposition."
A Christian philosopher writing in his wake adds a reason. A threat weighs on a choice according to how great it is and how near it seems, and no threat is greater than God's judgment. If God's existence, and the judgment he warns of, were overwhelmingly plain from the first, the threat would press on every choice the way a gun at one's head does, and a creature's answer to God could be extracted by fear rather than given.
A good God might keep what is called epistemic distance, a distance in what we know: for a time he leaves his existence less than overwhelmingly plain, so that the first response of love is ours.
- Scripture speaks the same way. "Truly, you are a God who hides himself, O God of Israel, the Savior" (Isaiah 45:15). God placed people where "they should seek God, and perhaps feel their way toward him and find him. Yet he is actually not far from each one of us" (Acts 17:27). "Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed" (John 20:29).
- None of this says that a love with no option to refuse is unfree. The saints love God face to face with no option to refuse, and they are free. The point is about the first response, not the last. Love given under overwhelming evidence and plain threat would be hard to tell from fear's answer, and what God wants from a creature he is still forming is love.
4. What a creature would freely love is not up to God.
If God knows what every creature would freely do in every circumstance, he can bring about a world in which those who come to love him will freely go on loving him forever. A defender of that view calls it the perseverance of free saints: God "actualized a world in which he knows what persons will freely choose to love God and persevere into the infinite future." He ensures it by knowledge, not by power, and what he knows he does not decide. Who would freely come to love him, and after what history, is a fact God works with, not one he makes.
- A world, in this sense, is a complete way things could have gone, from beginning to end. To actualize one is to make it the real one, out of all the worlds God could have made.
- A world can be possible, with nothing contradictory in it, and still not be one God could make, because what its free creatures would do is not his to decide. A world in which Peter, placed where he was, would not deny Christ is one of those (C1).
- A world of creatures free and unable to sin from their first moment may be another. Such creatures would be free only if whatever shut the door to evil never had to act against their wills. And whether any creature so made would freely love him from the first is not up to God.
- The same defender suggests that the history may be part of what that love needs. Adam and Eve, and the angels who fell, arguably began in a perfect state and took it for granted. A creature who has come through a world of suffering has learned not to.
- A friend may know two people so well that she is sure they would fall in love if they met, and so she seats them side by side at dinner. She has made sure of their love by knowing them, not by working on their hearts. The love is theirs.
5. The rest belongs to the problem of evil.
The problem of evil is the question of why a good and all-powerful God allows evil at all. Whether the goods of the road are worth what this world's history has cost, why he permits its particular evils, and why he stays hidden from some who seek him are separate questions, each with answers of its own. Heaven does not show that this world's history was pointless. It shows what the history is for.
See also:
CO / PoE: Intellectual PoE: LogicalCO / Miscellaneous: What About Those Who've Never Heard of Jesus?Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+If grace makes the saints unable to sin, then grace, not the saints, settles their goodness. By the account's own definition they are not free.
1. Augustine grants the gift and denies the loss.
Augustine is plain that the saints' inability to sin is God's gift: "God by nature cannot sin, but the partaker of God receives this inability from God." And he is just as plain that it makes them "all the more truly free, because set free from delight in sinning to take unfailing delight in not sinning." A gift that completes a person is not a hand that moves him.
2. The saints received the grace that drew them.
Nobody comes to God without grace, and the grace that draws a person can be refused. The saints did not refuse it. Most of them had years in which their characters were formed by their own choices as they received it, day after day, and in glory God finishes what they welcomed (Philippians 1:6).
- When a doctor sets a broken leg, the healing is her work, and it is also the patient's body mending. When he walks again, it is he who walks.
3. Help is not settling.
To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes. Grace gives the saints what they need to love God and heals what sin broke, and the love they then give is theirs.
The objection's best-known text is Paul's, that God works in believers "both to will and to work," read as God settling the willing itself. Paul does say that God works the willing, and in the same breath he tells them to work: "work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who works in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure" (Philippians 2:12-13). God's working is given as the reason for theirs, not as a rival to it. Nothing settles their goodness but the saints themselves, who do good because they love God.
- A student who learned to read with a patient tutor depends on that help in every sentence she reads now, and she is the one reading.
4. A guarantee that never has to act settles nothing.
However God ensures that the saints never fall, whether by knowing who would freely love him forever or by a keeping that never has to act against their will, what he ensures is their own continued love. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing.
- A guardrail on a mountain road that a careful driver never touches makes sure she will not go over the edge, and every turn of the wheel is still hers.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free WillPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+Duns Scotus held that seeing God does not fix the will, and that the saints keep a remote power to sin from which God alone keeps them. So heaven's freedom is the old freedom after all, with God guarding the door.
1. Scotus genuinely dissents about why the saints cannot sin, not whether.
Scotus held that nothing but the will is the whole cause of its own act, so even the sight of God does not force it. Faced with what it sees as wholly good, the will cannot positively reject it, but it can refrain from willing it. It is the difference between saying no and simply not saying yes.
He taught that the blessed keep a remote power to sin, and that their happiness lasts because God's will keeps them. He did not doubt that the saints will never sin. He placed the guarantee in God's keeping rather than in their sight of God.
2. On his account too, the saints are free and cannot sin.
If Scotus is right, the saints still cannot sin, since God's keeping rules it out. They also have one more power than the main tradition allowed, the remote power to sin. That power is not a way to sin open to them, because God's will keeps it from ever coming into use, and so it takes nothing from the conclusion (C3). It is a further fact about their freedom, like their choices among goods (C2).
If God's keeping is a guard that never has to act against their will, it settles nothing (D5). They are free because nothing settles their goodness but themselves.
- A lifeguard may watch a strong swimmer all afternoon and never have to go in. The swimmer's every stroke is his own.
3. Nothing that matters waits on the dispute.
- That freedom does not require the power to sin would stand on God's case alone, and there Scotus agrees with everyone that God cannot sin (C3).
- The tradition's great voices do not all say the same thing about heaven, but they share the claim that matters: that the redeemed will be free and will not fall.
+If Jesus could not sin, his temptation was a show. A man who cannot fall is not really tempted, and his obedience is not really his.
1. Temptation is a real pull, not a real chance of falling.
To be tempted is to feel the draw of something wrong, and Jesus felt it: he "in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sin" (Hebrews 4:15). The hunger of his forty days in the wilderness was real hunger, and the dread in Gethsemane, the garden where he prayed on the night of his arrest, was real dread. Feeling the pull does not require a chance of giving in to it.
- If anything, the one who never gives in feels temptation at its heaviest. A man who gives in after five minutes never learns what the next hour would have been like; only the one who holds out to the end feels all of it. Hebrews draws its comfort from exactly there: "because he himself has suffered when tempted, he is able to help those who are being tempted" (Hebrews 2:18).
- Suppose a strong swimmer is caught in a riptide, with a line tied to his waist and held from the shore by a friend who never has to pull. He feels every ounce of the current. He swims out of it himself, and he was never going to drown.
2. His obedience was his, because nothing outside him settled it.
A leading defender of free will draws the parallel with the neurosurgeon's case (P1): "Like the man with the electrodes implanted in his brain, Jesus could not have chosen to sin, but he freely resisted sin." Whatever would have kept him from sin was never needed. He resisted every temptation himself, and nothing outside him settled his choices.
- On that picture, whatever would have prevented sin lay in the divine person of the Son, who never had to act against his own human will.
3. Whether he could have sinned is the tradition's own unfinished question.
The church's main tradition has held that Christ could not have sinned, and some Christian theologians have held that he could have and did not, precisely so that his temptation would be real. In nineteenth-century Princeton, Charles Hodge wrote that "If He was a true man He must have been capable of sinning," and his contemporary W. G. T. Shedd took the other side: "He was not only able to overcome temptation, but he was unable to be overcome by it." The argument does not turn on it. Either way, his obedience was his own, and God's case alone carries the conclusion (C3).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open DoorPhilosophy / Free Will: God Cannot Sin and Is Praised for It: The Impeccability Objection
+A timeless God cannot choose at all. Choosing is passing from several possibilities to one, and passing takes time, so a God outside time could not have chosen to create.
A graduate student once put this objection to a Christian philosopher as a syllogism, an argument set out step by step from premises to a conclusion:
- A choice is a progression from several possibilities to one actuality, the one that becomes real.
- A progression from one state to another is time.
- So a choice needs time.
- There was no time before creation.
- So creation was not a choice, and God either did not create or had no control over it.
The philosopher Erik Wielenberg has pressed a sharper form in print, against the view that God is timeless without creation and in time from creation on. He charges it with two contradictions.
- First, God must be in time at the first moment, since the universe exists then, and yet timeless at that moment, in order to have the power to create the universe.
- Second, God's act of creating would be an event in time that comes causally before time begins, which would make time a condition of its own beginning.
1. The objection borrows a human picture of choosing.
A timeless God is one whose own life has no before and after at all, the way the truths of arithmetic do not happen in order. When we choose, we move from not knowing what we will do to deciding, often after weighing and hesitating. That picture is ruled out for God, not by timelessness, but by his knowing everything. An all-knowing being cannot literally deliberate, since he already knows every conclusion; the same is true of a God in time.
2. God decides by his will's free inclining, with no period of indecision.
God still decides, in the sense that matters. His will inclines toward one alternative rather than another, and does so freely. A leading defender of divine freedom writes that "It is up to God what he does; he could have willed otherwise. This is the strongest sense of libertarian freedom of the will," and adds that God's free decisions are not "preceded by a period of ignorance and indecision."
- Another puts the point in a phrase: "His choice is not the result of time, but the cause of it."
- The ability to have willed otherwise, in that quotation, is the further fact about God's freedom among goods (C1). What makes his choice free is still that nothing outside him settles it.
3. Willing to refrain is not the same as lacking a will.
Suppose God had created nothing. He would not simply lack an intention to create, the way a stone lacks one. He would will to refrain, and that willing would be a free act. A timeless state can hold a free act of will, changelessly.
- Picture a man who sits perfectly still through a whole concert because he has chosen to. He never moves a muscle, and his stillness is a choice from beginning to end.
4. If God is timeless without creation, creating is a free decision to enter time.
On one careful view, God exists without time apart from creation and in time since creation. A leading defender of that view puts the point this way: "even if God is timeless without creation, his free decision to create a temporal world also constitutes a free decision on his part to exist temporally." Time begins with the world, and it begins because God freely willed that it should.
- Temporal means in time, with a before and an after.
- The same defender has answered both charges in print. In outline, his answers are these:
• To the first: God need not be timeless at the first moment to have the power to create. He has that power even in a world where he never creates and there is no time at all, since having a power is not the same as using it. He uses it at the first moment, as the world begins, and from then on he is in time.
• To the second: the charge assumes that moments of time exist first and events happen at them. If instead time is simply the order of events, the first event does not wait on a time already there; time begins with it. So God's act of creating does not come after time or before it. Time comes into being with the world he makes.
See also:
NT / Cosmological: The Kalam Argument
+A perfectly good God must do the best he can. If there is a best world, he had no choice but to make it, and if there is none, no creator could be perfectly good.
1. God's freedom does not rest on this question.
God is free because nothing outside him settles what he wills (C1). Even if he had to create the best world, he would create it freely, since nothing outside him would settle the choice. What this objection threatens is the further fact, God's freedom among goods.
2. Leibniz held that God must create the best, and freely.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the German philosopher who coined the word theodicy (a defense of God's goodness in the face of evil), argued that God's wisdom shows him the best of all possible worlds, his goodness makes him choose it, and his power makes it real. He insisted this left God free, because the necessity was moral, not metaphysical: God could do otherwise but would not.
- A moral necessity is the kind that binds an honest man to his word: he could break it, and he will not. A metaphysical necessity is the kind that makes a triangle three-sided, where nothing else is possible at all.
- Many readers think his own principles take that freedom back. The disagreement with Leibniz is over whether God must create the best. It is not over whether freedom needs an open door, since a God who had to create the best would still create it freely (C1).
3. There may be no single best world.
- Several worlds may be tied for best, so that the duty to do the best leaves more than one option. Some worlds may be too different in kind to rank at all, and there may be no top to the scale, every world having a better one.
- Suppose a parent is told to buy her son the best bicycle in the shop, and two bicycles tie for best. The rule still leaves her a choice.
4. Creating less than the best need wrong no one.
- The philosopher Robert Adams answered Leibniz that God wrongs no one by creating creatures other than the best he could have made, so long as none of them would have been better off never existing and each is at least as well off as it would have been in any other world it could have existed in. Choosing them, he added, can express grace, which he defines as love that does not depend on the merit of the one loved.
- William Rowe replied that if every world has a better one, a creator who stops at any of them could be surpassed by a better creator, so that no creator could be perfectly good. Philosophers have answered him in turn, and the exchange has not closed.
- A teacher could have taught a prodigy and takes on a struggling pupil instead. Nobody says she has wronged the pupil by choosing him.
5. Some argue that goodness must create something, if not any one thing.
- Norman Kretzmann pressed a point drawn from Aquinas: goodness by its nature spreads itself, so that God must create something, though perhaps not any particular thing. Others have doubted the argument, and it has its defenders.
- A spring cannot help overflowing, though which way the water runs is not fixed by the spring.
- Even if Kretzmann is right, what God creates would still be his free choice among goods, and his freedom would still rest on nothing outside him settling what he wills.
6. The majority view stands: God could have created nothing, or something else.
The main Christian tradition has held that creation is a free act from which God could have refrained: "you created all things, and by your will they existed and were created" (Revelation 4:11). If God had to create exactly this world, then humanity would exist as necessarily as God, and so, if evil is real, would evil. The majority view is the one to hold, and it is a further fact about God's freedom, not its ground.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Was God Free to Create, and Free to Create This World?
+There is no credit in doing what you cannot help. If God cannot do evil, his goodness earns no thanks, and the saints' goodness in heaven will earn none either.
The objection has a long history. The English theologian Daniel Whitby put it in the form Jonathan Edwards set out to answer: "who can blame a person for doing only what he could not help, or judge that he deserveth praise only for what he could not avoid?"
1. Taken seriously, it would make God's goodness unpraiseworthy.
Jonathan Edwards saw at once where the principle leads. On it the infinitely holy God "has no virtue at all; virtue, when ascribed to him, is but an empty name; and he is deserving of no commendation or praise; because he is under necessity, he cannot avoid being holy and good as he is; therefore no thanks to him for it." Edwards thought that conclusion refuted the principle, and he was right about that.
- Scripture praises God because he is good: "Oh give thanks to the Lord, for he is good" (Psalm 106:1).
2. Praise follows the source.
What we cannot credit a person for is what something else settled. A man pushed into a river who happens to save a drowning child earns no medal, because he did not settle the rescue. God's goodness and the saints' are settled by nothing but God and the saints, and so they are praiseworthy all the way down.
- The mother's "I couldn't" earns her more honor, not less.
- Mark Twain made the objector's principle a joke. A Chicago paper reported him telling an audience in 1871, "I am different from Washington; I have a higher and grander standard of principle. Washington could not lie. I can lie, but I won't." The joke works because everyone hears the boast as absurd.
3. The principle confuses two kinds of "could not help."
"He could not help it" usually means that something outside a man overpowered him: a seizure, a threat, a compulsion. In that sense God can "help" everything he does, since nothing outside him moves him at all. His "cannot" means that doing evil would contradict who he is, which is the opposite of being overpowered.
4. Edwards drew the wrong lesson from the right point.
Edwards thought that since God's holiness is necessary and praiseworthy, a creature's choices can be necessitated by outside causes and still be praiseworthy. The step does not follow. God's necessity comes from within, and a determined creature's necessity comes from without (D1, D2).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God Cannot Sin and Is Praised for It: The Impeccability Objection
+A God who cannot do wrong lacks the freedom the free will defense prizes. If freedom to choose between right and wrong is worth this world's evils, God lacks a great good, and his goodness is not moral goodness at all.
The strongest form of this objection is Wes Morriston's. The free will defense answers the problem of evil by saying that God allows wrongdoing because creatures free to do right or wrong, on matters where right and wrong are at stake, are worth the risk. The defense calls such creatures significantly free: a man deciding whether to hand back a wallet he found is significantly free if he can do either.
Morriston argued in 1985 that a God who is good by his very nature is neither significantly free nor morally good in the distinctively moral sense, the sense in which a person deserves praise for doing right when he could have done wrong. Either way the believer in God loses something: either that freedom is not the great good the defense needs, or God lacks a great good. Morriston suggested that a believer who wants to keep the defense should deny that God is morally perfect in every possible world.
- A possible world is a complete way things could have been. To be morally perfect in every possible world is to be good however things might have gone.
1. God is none the poorer for lacking significant freedom.
Grant the premise. God cannot do wrong, so he is not significantly free in the defense's sense. The term was built for creatures, and it names a real good in them.
What makes it a good in creatures, though, is not the power to do wrong itself. It is what that power opens to a creature still being made: a goodness that grows out of its own choices, a love given where it could have been withheld (D4). God is not being made. His goodness had no beginning to grow from, and nothing outside him settles it (P2).
The good that significant freedom serves in us, a goodness that is truly one's own, God has already and without limit. Nor does the defense say otherwise. It says that a world with significantly free creatures can be worth what it costs, not that such freedom is better than God's.
- A ladder is worth a great deal to someone climbing to a roof. A bird that lives on the roof is not the poorer for owning none.
2. Moral goodness in the narrow sense is a creature's virtue.
Grant this too. God's goodness is not the hard-won virtue of someone who does right against a pull to do wrong. Some excellences belong to creatures because they are creatures. Courage is one: only someone who can be put in danger can face danger. God in his own nature cannot be put in danger, so he cannot be brave in that sense, and nobody thinks him the lesser for it.
- The narrow sense is real, and it is ours. God's goodness is the goodness ours is a likeness of, and praise follows the source (D10).
3. The remedy costs more than the problem.
Morriston's remedy, a God who is good but might not have been, sits badly with what Scripture offers as the ground of hope. God swore an oath to Abraham, Hebrews says, "so that by two unchangeable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we who have fled for refuge might have strong encouragement to hold fast to the hope set before us" (Hebrews 6:18). The encouragement rests on the impossibility. And a being whose goodness could have failed is less great than one whose goodness could not (P4).
- Compare a promise from someone who could break it with a promise from someone who cannot. The first is a good promise. The second is ground to stand on.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God Cannot Sin and Is Praised for It: The Impeccability ObjectionCO / PoE: Intellectual PoE: Logical
+Infants who die, and believers who die half-formed, never build a character that rules out sin, so God must finish it for them. Then either they are not free in heaven, or God could have made all of us that way from the start.
The strongest form of this objection presses (P3) where its story is thinnest. Most believers die far from holy, and Scripture speaks of "the spirits of the righteous made perfect" (Hebrews 12:23): made perfect, not self-perfected. Some had almost no road at all. Most Christians today hold, or at least hope, that children who die in infancy are with Christ, though those children never chose anything. For all of them the character that rules out sin in glory is God's finishing work, not their own forming.
Even a compatibilist who grants that the formed-character account is coherent asks what exactly happens at death. Either those saints are not free in glory, since God settled their goodness, or a created person can be free and unable to sin with no road behind him, and then God could have made everyone that way at the start (D4).
1. The objection is right about the road.
Grant it. The story of a character formed by one's own choices under grace (P3) is the fullest story for most of the redeemed, and it cannot be the whole story for all of them. Christians differ over how God deals with those who die in infancy, and over which of them are saved. The Westminster Confession, for one, speaks of elect infants dying in infancy (10.3), the elect being those God has chosen for salvation. Those differences can stand, because the question is what their freedom would be, if they are there.
- Remember the thief crucified beside Jesus. His faith, so far as the Gospels tell, was hours old and was lived out nailed to a cross, and Jesus told him, "today you will be with me in Paradise" (Luke 23:43).
2. Their freedom never rested on the road.
What makes a saint free in glory is that nothing settles his goodness but himself, who does good because he loves God (P3). A history of one's own choices is the ordinary way a character becomes one's own, and it is a great good (D4). It was never the condition of freedom. The condition that asks for alternatives somewhere in a creature's past is held by others, not by the source view. God's own goodness had no history at all, and he is free (C1).
- A child adopted as a baby into a loving home did nothing to earn her place at the table, and when she grows up and loves her parents, the love is hers.
3. Finishing a person is not settling his choices.
When God makes the saints perfect, he heals what sin broke and shuts the door to sin. He does not do their loving for them. John ties the change to a sight: "we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is" (1 John 3:2). A sight gives a person every reason to love and none to turn away, and the loving is still his. That holds for the thief, for the child and for the believer who died half-formed (D5).
- A surgeon who removes a cataract gives a man his sight back, and every face he looks at now, he looks at himself.
- How God brings to glory those who never grew up in this life, Scripture does not say, and we simply do not know.
4. Glory given without a road does not make the road needless.
If God can finish a person in a moment, why not make everyone finished from the start? Because a creature made finished would lack what the road gives: trust kept before it could see, a love given where it could have been withheld, a character grown from its own choices (D4). That God brings to glory some who walked almost no road shows his mercy. It does not show that a world where nobody walked any road would hold the goods the road gives everyone else. Whether those goods are worth this world's cost is the problem of evil's question (D4).
- At a harvest feast the youngest child, too small to help bring the harvest in, eats at the table as fully as anyone, and nobody concludes that the harvest was needless.
See also:
CO / Miscellaneous: What About Those Who've Never Heard of Jesus?Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation
Philosophical Theology
Analytical Analyses of Christian Systematic Theology