Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

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Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

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Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

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Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

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Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

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Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

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Biographies

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Contemporary Voices

1960 AD – present

Alasdair MacIntyre of Glasgow 1929 – 2025 AD

(●) The Scottish philosopher who diagnosed modern moral argument as broken, and walked from Marx back through Aristotle to Aquinas and the Catholic Church. + Listen to almost any argument about right and wrong on the evening news. One side appeals to rights, the other to consequences, a third to fairness, and nobody ever seems to win, because nobody shares a starting point. Alasdair MacIntyre spent his life asking why that is, and his answer, set out in After Virtue (1981), is one of the most widely read books of moral philosophy written in English in the twentieth century. Our moral words, he argued, are leftovers from an older way of thinking that has been forgotten, and they no longer fit together. He belongs on a Christian apologetics site for two reasons. The first is the argument itself: he showed that the modern attempt to build morality on reason alone, cut loose from any account of what human beings are for, was bound to fail, and he pointed back to the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas as the way out. The second is the life. Raised a Presbyterian, he spent his twenties trying to be both a Christian and a Marxist, drifted away from both, and then, in his fifties, became a Catholic because the arguments of Aquinas would not let him go. The signature fact is the last sentence of his most famous book. After two hundred and sixty pages of philosophy, MacIntyre ended by saying that what the West was waiting for was not Godot, the figure in Samuel Beckett’s play who never comes, but another Saint Benedict, the sixth-century monk whose communities carried learning and faith through the collapse of Rome.

(●) 1929 AD: Born in Glasgow to two Gaelic-speaking Presbyterian doctors, he grew up between an old storytelling culture and a modern one. + Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre was born in Glasgow on 12 January 1929. Both his parents, Eneas and Greta MacIntyre, were doctors, and both came from Gaelic-speaking families of Irish and Scottish descent; his father belonged to the first generation of the family whose first language was English. The boy learned to read Irish and could still do it well into middle age. Those who have written about his life, drawing on interviews he gave, describe him as a child of two worlds. One was the older Gaelic world of farmers, fishermen and storytellers, where a person learned who he was by learning the stories of his people. The other was the modern, liberal English culture of his schooling, which ran on theories rather than stories. It is hard to read his mature work without hearing that childhood in it: the claim that a human life makes sense only as a story, inside a community that hands the stories down, is the claim of a man who had seen such a community from close up.

(●) 1953 AD: A young lecturer at Manchester, he published his first book as someone trying to be both a Christian and a Marxist. + MacIntyre studied classics at Queen Mary College in London and then went to the University of Manchester for graduate work in philosophy under Dorothy Emmet. There, in 1949, he met a fellow student named John McCabe, just about to enter the Dominican order (the Catholic order of preachers founded by Saint Dominic) and take the name Herbert. The friendship lasted until McCabe’s death in 2001, and it would matter more than either of them could have guessed. MacIntyre began teaching at Manchester in 1951. His first book, Marxism: An Interpretation (1953), was written when he was twenty-three. Looking back fifteen years later, he said that he had then aspired to be both a Christian and a Marxist, or as much of each as was compatible with allegiance to the other. That was not an idle hope. He belonged for a time to the Communist Party of Great Britain, and left it only in 1956, the year Soviet tanks crushed the uprising in Hungary. Even then he did not give up on Marx. He went on working with small Trotskyist groups, Marxists who followed Leon Trotsky in his quarrel with Stalin and who believed the revolution had been betrayed rather than proved wrong. The Christian half of him was busy in the same years. With Antony Flew he co-edited New Essays in Philosophical Theology (1955), a book that set the terms for how British philosophers argued about God for a generation. And he wrote Difficulties in Christian Belief (1959), not for scholars but for ordinary church readers wrestling with the usual objections.

(●) 1968 AD: He reissued that first book confessing doubts about both creeds, and soon left Britain for America. + From the late 1950s MacIntyre moved from post to post: Leeds, Oxford, and then the new University of Essex. He wrote quickly and widely, including A Short History of Ethics (1966), a lively tour of moral philosophy from Homer to the twentieth century that is still in print. But the two allegiances of his twenties were slipping. When he revised his first book as Marxism and Christianity in 1968, he wrote that he now had doubts about both, while still holding that neither could simply be discarded without losing truths available nowhere else. For a while he lived without either. Around 1970 he crossed the Atlantic, and he never really settled again. Brandeis, Boston University, Wellesley, Vanderbilt, Notre Dame, Duke: over the next quarter century he held posts at more American universities than most scholars visit. Through those years he wrote as an analytic philosopher (one who works on precise, separate problems through careful argument) tackling one puzzle at a time, and the larger question of where his own life was heading stayed open.

(●) 1981 AD: At fifty-two he published After Virtue, and moral philosophy has been arguing with it ever since. + The book began with a false start. MacIntyre had a manuscript under way in the usual piecemeal style when his reading in the history and philosophy of science, especially Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos on how whole scientific outlooks rise and fall, convinced him that he was asking the wrong kind of question. He abandoned it and started again, this time looking at modern morality from the outside, from the standpoint of the older Aristotelian way of life it had replaced. After Virtue opens with a thought experiment that readers rarely forget (T1). It then sets out the case that the Enlightenment’s effort to justify morality by reason alone had to fail (T2). The Enlightenment was the movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that set out to rebuild knowledge, morals and politics on reason alone, without leaning on church or tradition. Finally the book rebuilds an account of the virtues out of practices, the story of a life, and tradition (T3, T4). It poses the choice at its center as a stark one: Nietzsche or Aristotle. Friedrich Nietzsche, the German philosopher who attacked Christian morality in the 1880s, had argued that moral talk is a disguise for the will to power, the drive to master, overcome and impose one’s own will. So either morality is that kind of mask, or the older tradition of the virtues was right after all. The book made him famous well beyond philosophy departments, and its last sentence, about waiting for another Saint Benedict, became one of the most quoted lines in modern philosophy.

(●) 1983 AD: Convinced by Aquinas while trying to teach him, he was received into the Catholic Church. + When he wrote After Virtue, MacIntyre was already an Aristotelian, but by his own account not yet a Thomist (a follower of Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth-century theologian who joined Aristotle’s philosophy to Christian faith). That changed within a couple of years. He later said that he became convinced Aquinas was in some respects a better Aristotelian than Aristotle: not only a fine reader of Aristotle’s texts, but a thinker who had carried both his metaphysics and his ethics further than Aristotle could. A magazine profile late in his life told the story that he was won over to Thomism while trying to show his students it was mistaken. The philosophy came with a faith. In 1983, in his mid-fifties, the boy raised Presbyterian, who had passed through Anglicanism (the Church of England), Marxism and unbelief, was received into the Catholic Church. It was a long road, and he did not walk it alone. His old friend Herbert McCabe, the Dominican he had met at Manchester thirty years earlier, played a key part, as MacIntyre himself told McCabe’s editor. Afterward he described his work as an Augustinian Thomist approach to moral philosophy: Aquinas read alongside Augustine, the fifth-century bishop who wrote more searchingly than anyone about grace and about a will bent by sin.

(●) 1988 AD: He gave the Gifford Lectures and settled at Notre Dame, where he spent three decades building on Aquinas. + The year 1988 brought two milestones. He published Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, which asks why rival cultures cannot even agree on what counts as a good reason, and he delivered the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh, among the most celebrated lecture series in philosophy and theology, given since 1888 by figures from William James to Karl Barth. The lectures became Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990). Apart from a few years at Duke in the late 1990s, the University of Notre Dame in Indiana was his home from then on. The later books filled in what After Virtue had left thin. Dependent Rational Animals (1999) began from the plain fact that every one of us starts life helpless and most of us will end it the same way, and drew from Aquinas what MacIntyre called the virtues of acknowledged dependence: the habits of giving and receiving care without keeping score. Think of a grown daughter feeding her father the way he once fed her, and neither of them counting the spoonfuls. The books kept coming. He wrote a study of Edith Stein (2006), the Jewish philosopher who became a Carmelite nun (a member of an enclosed order of contemplative prayer) and died at Auschwitz. He wrote a history of the Catholic philosophical tradition, God, Philosophy, Universities (2009). And at eighty-seven he produced one more large book, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity (2016).

(●) 2025 AD: He died in South Bend at ninety-six, still keeping an office and still arguing. + MacIntyre retired from teaching in 2010 but did not stop working. He kept an office at Notre Dame’s de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture, and went on writing and lecturing into his late eighties. He was married three times, last to the philosopher Lynn Joy, who survived him, and he had four children. He died at a care home in South Bend, Indiana, on 21 May 2025, at the age of ninety-six. The obituaries struggled to file him: Marxist and Catholic, analytic philosopher and critic of analytic philosophy, a Scot of Irish descent who spent more than half his life in America. He would probably have said that the difficulty was the point, and that a life only makes sense when you know the whole story it belongs to.

What He Taught

(T1) Modern moral language is a heap of fragments left over from a way of thinking we have forgotten. + After Virtue opens with a story. Imagine that the natural sciences suffered a catastrophe: the public blames scientists for a series of disasters, laboratories are burned, physicists are lynched, books and instruments destroyed. Generations later, people try to revive science from what is left: half a chapter here, a few pages of an article there, instruments whose use nobody remembers. They recite the periodic table and argue about relativity, but the words have come loose from the experiments and theories that once gave them meaning. They are using the vocabulary of science without possessing science. That, MacIntyre said, is where our moral language stands. We still use words like "good," "duty," "virtue" and "rights," but the framework that once held them together has been lost, so they no longer fit. That is why moral debates on abortion, war or justice go on forever: each side argues validly from its own premises, and there is no shared way to weigh one premise against another. The dominant theory of the age, which he called emotivism, has simply accepted the result. Emotivism is the view that a moral judgment is nothing more than an expression of feeling, a sophisticated way of saying "Hooray for this!" or "Boo to that!" MacIntyre thought emotivism false as a theory of what moral words mean, but a fair description of how they are now used. For Christian readers the diagnosis is a gift. It explains why the culture’s moral arguments sound like shouting, and it suggests that the fragments are not worthless. They are pieces of something real that can be recovered.

(Q) "What we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions." + Source: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd edition (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), chapter 1, "A Disquieting Suggestion," page 2. The sentence comes straight after the thought experiment about the ruined sciences. A simulacrum is a copy that looks like the real thing without being it, like a wax apple in a fruit bowl.

(T2) Morality only makes sense once we know what human beings are for, and the Enlightenment threw that knowledge away. + Think of a watch. Calling it a good watch is not a matter of opinion: a watch is for keeping time, so a watch that keeps time well is a good one. MacIntyre’s point is that the older moral tradition thought about human beings the same way. Aristotle taught that human beings have a telos, Greek for an end or purpose, a fully flourishing life that our nature is aimed at. Ethics was the practical science of getting from the person you happen to be to the person you could be if you reached that end. The virtues (courage, justice, temperance or self-control, practical wisdom) were the qualities that carry you there, and the moral rules were directions for the journey. Christianity and Judaism took this scheme over and enriched it, adding that the end is God and that his law guides us toward him. Then, from the seventeenth century on, philosophers and scientists dropped the idea that human nature has any built-in purpose. What remained were the old rules, now cut off from their reason, and human nature as it happens to be, which the rules were meant to correct. The great thinkers of the Enlightenment (Hume, Kant, and later the utilitarians, who judged actions by their results in happiness) each tried to rebuild a justification for the rules from what was left: feeling, pure reason, or usefulness. MacIntyre called this "the Enlightenment project," and argued that it was bound to fail, because rules designed to move us toward an end cannot be justified once the end has been abolished. Nietzsche saw the failure clearly and concluded that morality was a mask. MacIntyre agreed about the failure and drew the opposite conclusion: go back and recover the end.

(Q) "Within that teleological scheme there is a fundamental contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature. Ethics is the science which is to enable men to understand how they make the transition from the former state to the latter." + Source: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd edition (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), chapter 5, "Why the Enlightenment Project of Justifying Morality Had to Fail," page 52. A teleological scheme is one organized around a telos, an end (T2). MacIntyre is describing the moral outlook that dominated the European Middle Ages, which he traces back to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.

(T3) The virtues are learned in shared practices, and a human life is a story whose meaning depends on the larger story it belongs to. + Suppose you bribe a child with candy to learn chess. At first the child plays only for the candy, and might cheat to get it. But if all goes well, the child comes to love the game itself: the beauty of a combination, the particular kind of thinking chess demands. The candy is what MacIntyre called an external good, a reward that can be had in many other ways. The delight in chess is an internal good, one that can only be had by playing chess, and playing it well. He used the word practice for a shared, demanding activity like chess, farming, medicine, architecture or raising a family, which has its own standards of excellence and its own internal goods. The virtues, in the first place, are the qualities you need to achieve those goods: honesty to admit what you do not know, courage to take risks for the work, justice to give others their due. Then he widened the frame. A whole human life is a narrative, a story with a beginning, a middle and an end, and a person lives it well by pursuing, through all its chapters, the question of what the good life is. And no one starts that story alone. We are born into families, cities and peoples, already characters in stories we did not write, which is why he thought the question "What should I do?" always comes second.

(Q) "I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’" + Source: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd edition (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), chapter 15, "The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition," page 216. MacIntyre goes on to say that children learn who they are through stories of wicked stepmothers, lost children and prodigal sons, and that children deprived of stories are left, in his words, "unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions as in their words."

(T4) All reasoning goes on inside a tradition, and a tradition proves itself by solving problems its rivals cannot. + Picture two doctors arguing over a patient. They can argue usefully because they share a whole inheritance: anatomy, a history of cases, an idea of what health is. Now picture a doctor arguing with a faith healer. They do not disagree about one fact; they disagree about what would even count as evidence. MacIntyre’s claim is that every serious moral argument is more like the second case than we admit, because every person reasons from inside some tradition, an inheritance of questions, texts, examples and standards handed down and argued over through generations. The modern ideal of reason was meant to escape this: a neutral standpoint, belonging to no tradition, from which any rational person could settle any question. MacIntyre argued in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) that there is no such place, and that liberalism, the modern creed that set out to be that neutral ground, has itself become one more tradition with its own assumptions. But he denied that this leaves us in relativism, the view that no tradition is truer than another. A tradition can fall into what he called an epistemological crisis, a breakdown in which its own resources can no longer answer its own questions. The old earth-centered astronomy is the classic case: to make the planets come out where they were actually seen, astronomers had to explain their motions with small circles riding on larger circles (epicycles) and other devices, until Copernicus complained that the result looked less like a system than a monster pieced together from mismatched parts. When a rival tradition can explain both the problem and why the first tradition could not solve it, the rival has shown itself superior on terms the first can recognize. That, he argued in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990), is how Aquinas’s tradition had outlasted its rivals before, and could again.

(Q) "A living tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition." + Source: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd edition (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), chapter 15, "The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition," page 222. The definition rejects the idea that a tradition is something dead and fixed. A living tradition is an argument that has gone on for centuries among people who share enough to disagree well (T4).

(Q) "What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us." + Source: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd edition (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), chapter 18, "After Virtue: Nietzsche or Aristotle, Trotsky and St. Benedict," page 263. These are the closing lines of the book. MacIntyre recalls that when the Roman empire declined, men and women of good will stopped propping it up and built new communities instead, and a few sentences later he ends with the line about waiting for another Saint Benedict. In the prologue to the third edition he explained that Benedict’s greatness lay in creating a new kind of institution, the monastery of prayer, learning and labor, in which communities could not only survive but flourish in a dark age.

What Christian Thinkers Made of Him

(†) Catholic and Protestant thinkers alike took up his account of virtue, practice and narrative, and Christian ethics returned to character. + For much of the twentieth century, academic ethics asked one question: which rule tells me what to do in this situation? MacIntyre was among the few thinkers, along with the British Catholic philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe, who made the older question respectable again: what kind of person should I become? The movement that followed is called virtue ethics, the approach that puts character first and treats right action as what a person of good character does. He did not much like the label for himself, but he did as much as anyone to bring the movement about. Christian thinkers recognized the question as their own. Catholic moral theologians found in him a philosopher who made Aquinas speak to the present, and a whole school of Thomist ethics at Notre Dame and beyond grew up around his work. Protestants listened too. The Methodist theologian Stanley Hauerwas, his friend and for a time his colleague at Duke, with whom he co-edited Revisions (1983), drew on his ideas of practice and narrative to describe the church as a community of character, a people formed by the story of Israel and Jesus into the kind of people who can live it. Christian schools, seminaries and congregations borrowed his vocabulary of practices and internal goods to think about how faith is actually learned: not mainly from lectures, but by doing things together, over years, under people who already do them well.

(†) Apologists used his work to answer the charge that faith is the only position that rests on an inheritance. + A common challenge to Christians runs like this: "You believe what you believe because you were raised in it; I simply follow reason." MacIntyre’s work takes the ground out from under that contrast. Everyone reasons from within an inheritance, the secular liberal included (T4), so the honest question is not who has a tradition but whose tradition best explains the world, including the failures of its rivals. Christian philosophers have used that framework both to show that faith is no less rational than its alternatives and to show how traditions can actually be compared, which is what apologetics sets out to do. His closing call for local communities that keep the moral and intellectual life alive (Q, closing) found a second career outside philosophy. The American writer Rod Dreher drew on that closing image for the title of The Benedict Option (2017), urging Christians to build strong churches, schools and households of their own, and the book started a lively debate among Catholics, Protestants and Orthodox about how the church should live in a culture that no longer shares its story. And MacIntyre’s own path, from the Presbyterian church of his childhood through Marxism and unbelief to the Catholic faith, argued on the merits at every step, has itself been read by many as a picture of the patient, honest inquiry his books describe.

(†) He once judged Christian ethics incoherent, and later withdrew the verdict in print. + In A Short History of Ethics (1966), written in his years of doubt, MacIntyre gave Christianity ten pages between the Greeks and the Renaissance, and argued that Christian ethics carried a paradox it could not resolve. It tried, he said, to turn teaching meant for small communities awaiting an imminent Second Coming into a code for a whole society, and the Second Coming, he added, did not in fact occur. Thirty-two years later, in the preface to the book’s second edition (1998), he called that verdict an absurdity and said the account needed to be radically revised. What he had failed to see, he wrote, was that the paradox had already been resolved within the New Testament itself, in Paul’s teaching on the church and its mission to the world, which defines a life lived both in hope of Christ’s return and in active work in this world. Paul joins the two himself at the close of his chapter on the resurrection (1 Corinthians 15:58). He traced his mistake to having been overimpressed by biblical critics who claimed to find an incoherent patchwork in the New Testament, and said a larger knowledge of that same scholarship, especially the work of the German Catholic scholar Heinrich Schlier, had corrected him. So the one fault worth recording is one he recorded himself: a claim about the New Testament he made, judged mistaken, and corrected in print. Beyond it, the primary sources give little to record against him. His Marxist decades belong to the story of his life (1953 AD, 1968 AD), and he spent the rest of that life arguing his way out of them on the merits.

MacIntyre wrote more than twenty books and some two hundred articles over seven decades. The books are listed below by period, each with a short annotation; the most important of the essays, many of them gathered in his selected essays, follow. Page references in the quotation rows are to the third edition of After Virtue (2007), whose main text keeps the pagination of the second edition (1984) and adds a new prologue. Early works: the Christian Marxist and the analytic philosopher (1953–1959) - Marxism: An Interpretation (SCM Press, 1953): His first book, written at twenty-three by a young man who hoped to be both Christian and Marxist, reading Marxism as a secularized form of the Christian hope of redemption. Revised in 1968 as Marxism and Christianity. - New Essays in Philosophical Theology (SCM Press, 1955), edited with Antony Flew: The collection that brought the philosophy of religion into the age of linguistic analysis, including Flew’s famous "Theology and Falsification." For a generation it set the terms in which British philosophers argued about whether talk of God means anything. - "The Logical Status of Religious Belief," in Stephen Toulmin, Ronald Hepburn and Alasdair MacIntyre, Metaphysical Beliefs (SCM Press, 1957): A long essay on what kind of claim a religious belief is, written from inside the faith. - The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958; 2nd edition 2004): A careful examination of what Freud’s concept of the unconscious can and cannot explain. - "Notes from the Moral Wilderness" (The New Reasoner, 1958–1959): A two-part essay arguing that neither Stalinist Marxism nor liberalism could give an account of why anything is worth doing; an early seed of After Virtue. - Difficulties in Christian Belief (SCM Press, 1959): A short book for church readers taking up the standard objections to Christianity, written in the last years of his early faith. The years of doubt (1964–1977) - Hume’s Ethical Writings (Collier, 1965), editor: A selection of David Hume’s moral philosophy with an introduction. - A Short History of Ethics (Macmillan, 1966; 2nd edition, Routledge, 1998): A brisk survey of moral philosophy from Homer to the twentieth century. The 1998 preface corrects, among other things, his early chapter on Christianity (see the final reception row). - Secularization and Moral Change (Oxford University Press, 1967): The Riddell Memorial Lectures given at Newcastle in 1964, arguing that the decline of religion in England followed the breakup of shared moral communities rather than causing it. - Marxism and Christianity (Schocken, 1968; 2nd edition, Duckworth, 1995): The revision of his first book, with a new preface confessing doubts about both creeds. - The Religious Significance of Atheism (Columbia University Press, 1969), with Paul Ricoeur: Two lectures on what modern unbelief means for faith; MacIntyre’s lecture is the work of a man then outside the church. - Marcuse (Fontana Modern Masters, 1970; published in the United States as Herbert Marcuse: An Exposition and a Polemic): A sharp critique of the philosopher then idolized by the New Left. - Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis (Macmillan, 1970), edited with Dorothy Emmet: Essays on the philosophy of the social sciences, co-edited with his old Manchester teacher. - Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy (Duckworth, 1971): Collected essays on Marxism, religion, the social sciences and moral philosophy, including his farewells to several of the creeds of his youth. - Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays (Doubleday, 1972), editor: An anthology that helped revive serious interest in Hegel among English-speaking philosophers. - "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science" (The Monist, 1977): The essay in which he first worked out how a tradition can break down and be rescued or replaced (T4). The trilogy and its aftermath (1981–1990) - After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Duckworth and University of Notre Dame Press, 1981; 2nd edition 1984; 3rd edition 2007): His masterpiece. The diagnosis of modern moral language as fragments (T1), the failure of the Enlightenment project (T2), and the rebuilding of the virtues through practices, narrative and tradition (T3, T4), ending with the call for a new Saint Benedict. The second edition adds a postscript answering critics; the third a prologue explaining how he became a Thomist. - Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy (University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), edited with Stanley Hauerwas: A collection of essays by several hands challenging the rule-centered, history-blind moral philosophy of the day and calling for attention to character, community and the history of ethics. - "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" (The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, 1984): A provocative lecture arguing that patriotism is a genuine virtue on his account and a vice on the liberal one. - Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (University of Notre Dame Press, 1988): Traces four traditions (Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, the Scottish Enlightenment, and modern liberalism) to show that each has its own idea of justice and of rationality (T4). - Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (University of Notre Dame Press, 1990): His Gifford Lectures of 1988, setting the Enlightenment encyclopedia, Nietzsche’s genealogy and Aquinas’s tradition side by side and arguing for the third, with proposals for how universities might host real disagreement. - First Principles, Final Ends, and Contemporary Philosophical Issues (Marquette University Press, 1990): The Aquinas Lecture at Marquette, defending Aquinas’s idea of first principles against modern doubts. The Thomist years (1998–2016) - The MacIntyre Reader (University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), edited by Kelvin Knight: A selection from across his career, including interviews in which he talks about his own life. - Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (Open Court, 1999): The Paul Carus Lectures, grounding the virtues in our animal nature and our dependence on others, and naming the virtues of acknowledged dependence. - Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue, 1913–1922 (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006): A study of the philosopher, convert and Carmelite martyr, focused on the years before her conversion. - The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, Volume 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2006): Essays on truth, rationality and the relation of philosophy to faith, including "Philosophy Recalled to Its Tasks" and "Truth as a Good." - Ethics and Politics: Selected Essays, Volume 2 (Cambridge University Press, 2006): Essays on Aquinas and the natural law, political community and moral dilemmas. - Alasdair MacIntyre’s Engagement with Marxism: Selected Writings 1953–1974 (Brill, 2008; Haymarket, 2009), edited by Paul Blackledge and Neil Davidson: His early political writings, gathered for the first time. - God, Philosophy, Universities: A Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009): A short history of Catholic philosophy from Augustine to John Paul II, with a plea for universities in which philosophy and theology talk to each other. - Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative (Cambridge University Press, 2016): His last large book, written at eighty-seven, defending a Thomist account of the human good against modern rivals through the lives of real people. Standard editions: After Virtue, 3rd edition (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), and The MacIntyre Reader, edited by Kelvin Knight (University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), are the best places to start.
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Justified True Belief