Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

God Cannot Sin and Is Praised for It: The Impeccability Objection

(●) God deserves praise though he cannot sin, because his goodness is his own, and that is exactly what a determined choice lacks. + Ruth has run the bakery on Front Street for thirty-one years, and every Easter she bakes the bread for the church breakfast. She promised the first pastor she would, and three pastors later she still does. Ask her whether she might let them down this year and she will laugh at you. "Not me," she says, and everyone in the room knows it is simply true. On Easter morning the pastor thanks her from the front, and nobody thinks the thanks misplaced because Ruth could not have let them down. If anything, she is thanked the more for it. Now picture a second baker, the same down to the flour on her apron, except that a brilliant scientist designed her before she was born, so that every promise she ever makes she keeps, exactly as he planned it. Her bread arrives every Easter too. Most people who hear the story feel the thanks catch in their throat. It is not because she could not have failed. Ruth could not have failed either. It is because someone else settled it. Christians say something like Ruth's "not me" about God, without any limit at all. God "cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one" (James 1:13), and "it is impossible for God to lie" (Hebrews 6:18). Being unable to sin has a name, impeccability, from the Latin peccare, "to sin." And God is praised for his goodness on nearly every page of the Psalms: "Oh give thanks to the Lord, for he is good" (Psalm 106:1). Put those two facts side by side, a God who cannot sin and a God who is praised for being good, and one of the oldest objections in the free will debate follows from them. Its classic form comes from Jonathan Edwards, the New England pastor and theologian, who set it out in 1754 in a long book on the freedom of the will. Edwards was writing against the Arminians of his day, Protestants who followed the Dutch theologian Jacob Arminius in holding that God's grace can be refused. Most of them held, as Edwards reported, that there is "nothing to be commended or blamed" without a freedom from necessity, a will not bound to go one way. Yet the same Arminians, he pointed out, "generally acknowledge that God is necessarily holy, and his Will necessarily determined to that which is good." Put the two claims together, he wrote, and the infinitely holy God "has no virtue at all: Virtue, when ascribed to him, is but an empty name." Edwards thought no Christian who knew his Bible could accept that, and he pressed the same point about Christ. The human will of Jesus, he argued, was "infallibly, unalterably and unfrustrably determined to good, and that alone," and yet his obedience was the most praiseworthy thing ever done. Edwards regarded the point as "clearly and absolutely determining the controversy between Calvinists and Arminians." He was a Calvinist himself, a Protestant in the tradition of John Calvin, the sixteenth-century Reformer of Geneva, and like many of them he held that God's decree, his choice from eternity about what shall be, settles every choice. The objection has a leading defender today, and he states it in three steps. - God always chooses and acts righteously, and lacks the ability to do otherwise than act righteously. - God is praiseworthy for his righteous choices and actions. - So "Moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise." • Moral responsibility is being answerable for a choice, so that praise or blame for it can be deserved. He gives it a single test case: "Could God fail to keep his promises to Abraham? No. Was God praiseworthy for keeping them? Certainly." Then he takes one more step, and it is the one that carries the argument from praise to determinism. - Determinism is the view that every choice is settled beforehand by prior conditions (the past and the laws of nature, or a decree of God) that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. A row of dominoes is the picture: the first push and the spacing of the row are enough by themselves to bring the last one down. - Freedom of a kind that cannot live with determinism is called libertarian freedom: a choice settled beforehand by prior conditions would not have it. The word has nothing to do with politics. The step is this. Libertarian freedom, he argues, always comes with the ability to do otherwise. So once that ability turns out not to be needed for praise, nothing is left to keep a determined person from being praised or blamed. The impeccable God, on this argument, proves determinism harmless. That makes the objection an argument for compatibilism, the view that freedom, with the praise and blame that go with it, survives determinism. The view that it does not is incompatibilism. The three steps hold, and God's case really does show that praise can do without the ability to do otherwise. It is the one step after them that fails. Seeing why turns on a single word, settle. Go back to Ruth. Everyone in her church could tell you in advance that the bread will come on Easter morning, and their knowing is not what bakes it. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. Nothing settles Ruth's faithfulness but Ruth. The designed baker's faithfulness is every bit as certain, and the scientist settled it before she was born. That is the difference freedom turns on. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. He is then its source, the one it comes from, and defining freedom this way is called the source view. In the ordinary run of human choices a free choice carries a second feature as well: the person could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was. That is freedom's ordinary mark. It is the mark and not the definition, the way a uniform is the usual sign of a police officer and not what makes someone one. Where we speak of an open door, we mean another way a choice could have gone, there for the taking, like the tea a woman passes over when she orders coffee. The source view is not the principle of alternative possibilities, the rule that a person is free, or deserves praise or blame, only if he could have done otherwise. That rule is held by others, and God's own case refutes it. The source view says something different: a choice is free, and its maker answerable for it, when nothing but he settled it. So the source view grants Edwards everything he proved and denies the step he took after it. God's goodness shows that praise does not need an open door. It does not show that praise survives being settled from outside. Think of the two bakers again. Neither could have failed, and only one of them is the source of her faithfulness. God is the source of his goodness without any limit at all, and a determined creature is not the source of his. The argument is deductive: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. The premises work like a locked chain: if every link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. No premise has to be beyond all doubt; each needs only to be more plausible than its denial. It runs in three short chains and draws them together at the end. - The first grants what Edwards saw: God cannot sin and deserves praise for his goodness, so praise does not need the ability to do otherwise (P1, P2, C1). - The second shows that God's goodness is free: nothing settles it but God himself (P3, P4, C2). - The third shows that God's goodness is not determined, since it is settled by none of the things determinism names (P5, C3). - Together they show that a will can be free, and undetermined, though it cannot do otherwise (C4). That is the claim the objection's last step denies. Who holds what, on whether God's praised goodness shows that a determined choice can be free: - Support: Jonathan Edwards argued in 1754 that since God's holiness is necessary and praised, necessity takes nothing from praise, and John Feinberg defends compatibilism today. - Oppose: Anselm of Canterbury answered in the 1090s that God is to be praised because whatever good he has, he has from himself, and William Lane Craig holds today that God freely does good because nothing outside him determines him. The argument that follows holds that God is praised for a goodness nothing outside him settles, and that such a goodness, free and undetermined, needs no open door.

(P1) God cannot sin. + Scripture says so, reason confirms it, and the church has held it across its divisions. Even most of those who think freedom needs the power to do otherwise grant it. (1) Scripture says that God cannot do evil. - Most texts say what God does not do. He is "A God of faithfulness and without iniquity, just and upright is he" (Deuteronomy 32:4), and "there is no unrighteousness in him" (Psalm 92:15). - A few go further and say what God cannot do. "God cannot be tempted with evil" (James 1:13), and "it is impossible for God to lie" (Hebrews 6:18). "God is not man, that he should lie" (Numbers 23:19). - One of them gives the reason. Christ stays faithful even when we are faithless, "for he cannot deny himself" (2 Timothy 2:13). Lying would be God turning against who he is, and so would every other sin. - Think of a man whose word is so good that his friends would sign a contract on his handshake. The better they know him, the less his promise feels like a bet. With God the point runs all the way down: a God who could lie would not be this God. (2) A God who could sin would be less than the greatest being. - Anselm of Canterbury, the eleventh-century archbishop and philosopher, taught the church to think of God as the greatest being there could be. A being who could turn to evil, even one who never does, is less than one who could not. - Nor does being unable to sin take anything from God's power. Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth-century Dominican theologian, put it plainly: "to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence." • Omnipotence is being all-powerful, and repugnant to is the old way of saying "contrary to." The Dominicans are a Catholic order of preaching friars. - Nobody counts it a strength in a bridge that it could collapse. A bridge that cannot fall is the better bridge. (3) Christians on every side of the free will debate grant it. - Edwards built his argument on it, and he could do so because his opponents granted it: they "generally acknowledge that God is necessarily holy." - The point reaches even the open theists, who hold that God does not know what free creatures will do and who press for as much freedom as any Christians do. One of their leading philosophers writes that if God's moral perfection is essential to him, an action such as "being unfaithful to his promises is absolutely impossible for God." - The few who question it do so to keep either a freedom defined by the open door or a power to do evil, and both are answered (D1). - When the lawyers on both sides of a trial agree on a fact, the jury can treat it as common ground and save its attention for what is really in dispute. God's inability to sin is very nearly common ground of that kind. Therefore, God cannot sin.

(P2) God deserves praise for his goodness. + Scripture commands it on nearly every page of the Psalms, and the reason it gives for the praise is God's goodness itself. (1) Scripture praises God because he is good. - "Oh give thanks to the Lord, for he is good" (Psalm 106:1). "Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised" (Psalm 48:1). "You are good and do good" (Psalm 119:68). - In heaven the praise goes on: "Worthy are you, our Lord and God, to receive glory and honor and power" (Revelation 4:11), and "Just and true are your ways, O King of the nations!" (Revelation 15:3). - The praise is not for God's power alone. It is for his justice, his faithfulness and his goodness, the very things he cannot fail in. (2) He is praised for keeping his word. - When John the Baptist was born, his father Zechariah blessed God for having come "to remember his holy covenant, the oath that he swore to our father Abraham" (Luke 1:72-73). Mary praised God for his mercy "as he spoke to our fathers, to Abraham and to his offspring forever" (Luke 1:55). - God could not have broken that oath, and both of them thank him for keeping it. The New Testament's praise rests on the very faithfulness that cannot fail: "he who promised is faithful" (Hebrews 10:23). - Think of Ruth's pastor. He thanks her for the Easter bread knowing perfectly well she would never have let the church down. He thanks her because of who she is, not in spite of it. (3) The praise is the real thing, not admiration. - People admire a sunset, and they do not thank it. Edwards drew the same line. On the view he was answering, God's holiness would be no more praiseworthy than "the brightness of the sun, and the fertility of the earth," which "are good, but not virtuous." - Christians have never praised God the way they admire weather. They thank him, love him and honor him, the way one honors a person of integrity, only more, and Scripture tells them to. - The difference between the sun and God is not that the sun cannot stop shining. It is that the sun does not shine for reasons of its own. God is good, and does good, as a person. Therefore, God deserves praise for his goodness.

(C1) Therefore, deserving praise does not require the ability to do otherwise. + God cannot do otherwise than good (P1), and he deserves praise for his goodness (P2). So deserving praise does not require the ability to do otherwise. A rule that says "every praiseworthy agent could have done otherwise" falls to a single case where the rule fails, the way one black swan was enough to refute the old saying that all swans are white. Such a case is called a counterexample. (1) The principle of alternative possibilities falls. - Many Christians have said that praise and blame need an open door. One popular author puts it in a sentence: "praise and blame make no real sense unless those praised or blamed were free to do otherwise." - God's case refutes that. He is praised, and no door stands open to him toward evil. - The source view grants this gladly. It never rested praise on the open door, and it has nothing to lose when the open door turns out not to be needed. (2) Restating the principle does not save it. - Some who hold the principle have tried to rescue it. One rescue says that God is praised only for which good thing he picks, so that he still has an alternative where it counts (D3). Another applies the principle only to particular acts, like keeping this promise on this day, and not to whole kinds of act, like doing good (D4). The objection's defender argues that both rescues fail. They do, and the source view needs neither. - The promise to Abraham shows why. Once God had sworn, the question before him was whether to keep the oath or break it, and he could not break it. Whatever freedom he had over how and when to keep it, Zechariah does not bless him for choosing one way of keeping it over another. He blesses him for keeping it, and on that question no second good was there to pick. - Think of a neighbor who brings your lost dog home. You thank him for bringing the dog back, and it would never occur to you to thank him for carrying it rather than walking it on a leash. (3) The question was never whether the door was open. - Ruth could not have let the church down, and neither could the designed baker. Only one of them is rightly thanked. - So whatever makes the difference between them, it is not an open door. Something else separates praise that is deserved from praise that is not, and the source view names it (P3, P4). (4) Christ's case points the same way. - Jesus "in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sin" (Hebrews 4:15), and he is praised for his obedience: "Worthy is the Lamb who was slain" (Revelation 5:12). - The church's main tradition holds that he could not have sinned, and some Christians have held that he could have and did not. The conclusion rests on God's case and does not wait on that question (D14). Therefore, deserving praise does not require the ability to do otherwise, and God's goodness is the clearest case of it.

(P3) A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. + This is freedom at its core: being the source of what one chooses. The ability to have chosen otherwise usually comes with it, but it is freedom's mark rather than its meaning. (1) A choice is free when it comes from the chooser. - Ask what makes a choice someone's own, and the first answer that holds up is that it came from him. Nobody forced it, nobody designed it, and nothing in his past or his surroundings made it go the way it went. He did. - He settles it for reasons of his own, and that is what separates a choice from a twitch. A knee that jerks when the doctor taps it has nothing to say for itself. Ruth can tell you exactly why she bakes the bread. - The idea is an old one. Anselm defined freedom of choice as the power to keep uprightness of will for its own sake: to keep one's will set on what is right, because it is right. There is no power to do wrong anywhere in that definition. - One of the standard reference works in philosophy reports a proposal that puts the same idea in modern terms: that the core of freedom is "being the ultimate source, or originator, of one's choices." (2) The ability to choose otherwise is the ordinary mark, not the definition. - In everyday life the quickest test of whether a choice was really a person's own is to ask whether he could have gone the other way. When a friend misses your wedding, the first thing you want to know is whether he could have come. - The test usually works, because in the ordinary run of choices the two features travel together. If a man could have refused with everything before the choice held fixed, then nothing before it settled the choice for him. - But the test only works in one direction. An open door shows that nothing before the choice settled it. A shut door does not show that something did, and philosophers have a famous case that pulls the two features apart. A neurosurgeon has planted a device in a voter's brain, ready to force his vote if he shows any sign of leaning the wrong way. As it happens, the voter makes up his mind the way the surgeon wanted, all by himself. The device never acts, so it settles nothing, and the vote is his, though he could not have carried the other vote through. • In the case as told, the voter could still have begun to lean the other way before the device stepped in. Philosophers call that thin remaining alternative a flicker of freedom. Whether it survives makes no difference to whose vote it was. • God's case needs no device and leaves no flicker: no door toward evil stands open to him at all, and his goodness is still his own (P4). - A leading defender of free will draws exactly this line: "[W]hat is essential to libertarian freedom is not the possibility of choosing otherwise but rather the absence of causal constraints outside oneself that determine how one chooses." - Another, speaking first of the ability to choose otherwise and then of the source, writes: "The former is sufficient for libertarian freedom, while the latter is necessary." • A thing is sufficient when it does the job on its own, and necessary when the job cannot be done without it. A ticket is sufficient to get you into the stadium but not necessary, since a pass from a friend will get you in too. Coming through the gate is necessary, since nobody gets in any other way. In the quotation, the ability to choose otherwise is the ticket, and the source is the gate. (3) Freedom is lost when something else settles the choice. - The plainest way to see what freedom needs is to look at a case where it is missing. The designed baker weighs her reasons, keeps her promise and feels it as her own, and most people still judge that she is not the source of it. The reason is that the scientist, not she, settled it. - A choice can be taken from a person in two ways. Something before it can settle it, or someone else can settle it through him. Either way it is no longer his, whatever doors stood open or shut. - Think of a puppet. Its strings may let it move in a hundred directions, and it is still not free, because whatever it does, the hand above it does. (4) The condition is the same for every chooser. - The source view asks one thing of God and creature alike: that nothing outside the chooser settle the choice. In one defender's words, "what is critical to free will is not the ability to choose differently in identical circumstances but rather not being caused to do something by causes other than oneself." - It also asks that the chooser act for reasons, which is what makes a choice more than a random event. The same defender writes that free decisions "are differentiated from random events by being done by the agent himself for reasons the agent has in mind." - A creature meets that condition in a different way from God, because a creature has an outside: a past, a body, a world that shaped him. God has none (P4). The condition itself does not change. - Think of the rule at a polling station that nobody marks a ballot but the voter. A woman who brings her husband and her pastor along meets it by keeping both of them out of the booth. A woman who comes alone meets it too. It is one rule either way. (5) Compatibilists grant that a choice settled by nothing but the chooser is free. - The argument needs only half of this premise. On the way to (C2) it uses one direction and no more: if nothing but the chooser settles a choice, the choice is free. - Compatibilists of the objection's kind grant that much. Edwards defined liberty as the power to do as one pleases, with nothing hindering one from doing as one wills. A person who acts unhindered on a choice that nothing but he settled has every part of that. The objection's defender grants that God, whose goodness nothing outside him settles, is praiseworthy for it. - Those who deny that direction mostly write an open door into the definition of freedom, and (C1) has already shown that praise, at least, does not need the door. - What compatibilists deny is the other direction: that a choice settled by something outside the chooser is not free. That is the real dispute, and it has to be argued from the creature's own case (C4). - Two jurors can argue for a week over whether a confession was forced and still agree that a confession given freely counts. Therefore, a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own, and the ability to have chosen otherwise, precious as it is in ordinary life, is freedom's mark and not its meaning.

(P4) Nothing settles God's goodness but God himself, for reasons of his own. + God's goodness, in the sense that earns praise, is his willing of the good: every choice he makes is a good one. He cannot sin, and yet nothing outside him is even partly the origin of what he wills. His goodness is not a fence built around his will. It is simply what his will is like. (1) Nothing gave God his nature. - Every created thing has its existence on loan. Ask where your patience came from and you will name a grandmother, a coach, a hard year. Ask where God's patience came from and there is no one to name. - Paul told the Athenians that God is not "served by human hands, as though he needed anything" (Acts 17:25), and he told the Romans where everything else comes from: "For from him and through him and to him are all things" (Romans 11:36). • Theologians call this aseity, from the Latin a se, "from himself": God has his existence and his nature from himself and from nothing else. - A standard philosophical reference work, setting out the account that comes from Anselm, puts the consequence carefully. Even if God's character rules certain actions out altogether, it says, "this will not imply that some external factor is in any way a partial origin of His willings." Since "God's nature owes its existence to nothing," God "would be the sole and ultimate source of His will even if He couldn't will otherwise." (2) God swore his promise by himself. - The objection's defender picked his test case well: the promise to Abraham, where the only question is whether God keeps his word. Look at how Hebrews describes it: "since he had no one greater by whom to swear, he swore by himself" (Hebrews 6:13). At Mount Moriah the Lord said, "By myself I have sworn" (Genesis 22:16). - Hebrews draws the contrast on purpose: "people swear by something greater than themselves" (Hebrews 6:16). A witness in court swears on a Bible, a king by his crown. Whatever holds them to their word stands outside them. God has nothing outside him to swear by, so what holds him to his word is himself. - So even in this case, where God cannot do otherwise, nothing outside him settles what he does. The promise that binds him is one he freely made, and the faithfulness that keeps it is his own character. The one earlier fact that bears on the keeping is the oath itself, and the oath is God's own act. "Once for all I have sworn by my holiness; I will not lie to David" (Psalm 89:35). - The oath was given for our sake, "so that by two unchangeable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we who have fled for refuge might have strong encouragement to hold fast to the hope set before us" (Hebrews 6:18). The two unchangeable things are God's word and God's oath, and both are his. (3) God's nature is not something outside him. - A determined man's character, however much it feels like his, was handed to him by things that came before him, the way a grandfather's watch comes down to a grandson. God's nature was not handed to him by anything. It is not prior to God, since he never existed without it, and nobody decreed it. It is his own being, what it is to be God. - A philosopher who defends the source view puts it in one sentence: the story of why God always does right "can be told without relying on anything external to God." - Nor is God's nature a second thing inside him that pushes his will, the way a man's bad mood produces his outburst. God's acts are not caused by a state of God. God himself wills the good, being who he is. Ruth's faithfulness explains why the bread comes every Easter, and still nobody thinks her faithfulness does the baking while Ruth stands by. - None of this needs the strong form of divine simplicity, the doctrine that God has no parts or distinctions of any kind, so that his goodness and God himself are one and the same. Christians hold that doctrine in stronger and weaker forms, and some set it aside. The point needs only what every Christian account of God holds: that God could not be without his nature, and that nothing gave it to him. (4) God is good for reasons of his own. - What God wills, he wills for reasons drawn from his own goodness and love, which nobody gave him. "God cannot choose to do evil," as a leading defender of free will puts it, "yet He freely does the Good because nothing outside Him determines Him to do so." - Anselm saw the same thing nine hundred years ago. In his book on why God became man, he wrote that "whatever God has he has perfectly of himself," and called God's inability to sin no necessity in the ordinary sense at all, since "that is improperly called necessity which involves neither compulsion nor restraint." - A promise kept because a contract binds you is different from a promise kept because you are the kind of person who keeps promises. Only the first has something outside you holding you to it. Therefore, nothing settles God's goodness but God himself, for reasons of his own: his faithfulness is his own, all the way down.

(C2) Therefore, God's goodness is free, though he cannot do otherwise. + If a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own (P3), and nothing settles God's goodness but God himself, for reasons of his own (P4), then God's goodness is free. The step is called modus ponens, Latin for "the way that affirms": if the kettle is on, the water will boil; the kettle is on; so the water will boil. (1) God is praised for a goodness that is free. - Anselm drew the line between God's praise and God's freedom in the same chapter. God, he wrote, "is most of all to be praised for the good things which he possesses and maintains not by any necessity, but, as before said, by his own infinite unchangeableness." - What Anselm denied God was necessity in the sense of compulsion. What he gave him was unchangeableness, a goodness that does not waver because nothing could make it waver, God himself least of all. - Ruth's "not me" is the freest thing about her, because nothing outside her is its source. God's "cannot" is that, without any limit at all. (2) One account of freedom covers both of God's cases. - Sometimes God has more than one good thing to do. He could have created a world or refrained, and Scripture says he created "by your will" (Revelation 4:11). A leading defender of free will describes that case: God "does decide in the sense that his will inclines toward one alternative rather than another and does so freely. It is up to God what he does; he could have willed otherwise. This is the strongest sense of libertarian freedom of the will." - Sometimes God has only one good thing to do, as with the oath to Abraham. Then there is no second option, and his keeping of the oath is just as free. - The open door is present in the first case and absent in the second. God is free in both because nothing outside him settles either. - Aquinas states God's freedom among goods this way: "it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites." That freedom among goods is a further fact about God: true, and worth knowing, but not what makes him free. (3) God's case refutes one of the two rules and confirms the other. - If God is free and yet cannot do otherwise than good (P1), then the rule that freedom requires the ability to do otherwise is false. That was never the rule (P3) states, and nothing in (P3) is lost with it. - What God's case confirms is the source. He is free because nothing outside him settles what he wills. - A cellist who plucks a whole piece without ever lifting her bow refutes the rule that a cello needs a bow to make music. The same performance confirms that it needs someone to play it. Therefore, God's goodness is free, though he cannot do otherwise.

(P5) A determined choice is settled beforehand by the past and the laws of nature, or by a decree. + This is what determinism says, in the words of those who hold it and of those who deny it alike, the objection's own defender among them. (1) Determinism is a claim about prior conditions. - The objection's defender defines determinism as the thesis "that everything that comes to pass is determined, or necessitated by prior conditions." He names the two kinds of prior condition he means: the state of the universe together with the laws of nature, or God's providential decree. Philosophers who reject determinism define it the same way: given the past and the laws of nature, there is only one way the future can go. - The dominoes are the picture again. Once the first one is pushed and the row is set, the last one's fall is settled before it happens. Nothing about the last domino has any say. - To be determined, then, is to be settled beforehand by prior conditions that are enough by themselves to make a choice go the way it goes. (2) It comes in two forms that differ only in what does the settling. - Natural determinism says the past and the laws of nature settle every choice. A man's choice this morning was fixed by his brain's state a moment before, which was fixed by the state before that, back to the first moment of the universe. - Theological determinism says God's decree settles every choice. The Westminster Confession of 1646, the classic statement of Presbyterian belief, says that God "from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass" (3.1), and those who read that as a decree that settles every choice are theological determinists. - A decree made from all eternity does not come before a choice on the calendar. It comes first in the order of dependence: the choice depends on the decree, and the decree does not depend on the choice. That kind of "before" is enough, since what matters is which way the dependence runs. • Think of a foot pressed into wet sand. The footprint is there the instant the foot is, and still the print depends on the foot, not the foot on the print. - Either way, the choice is settled before the chooser makes it, by something that was in place before he chose. (3) Traced back, those conditions lie outside the chooser. - A determined man's choice may pass through his own desires and character. But his character was itself settled by what came before it: his genes, his upbringing, the history that produced them, and finally either the first moment of the universe or a decree. - So the short list of what does the settling (the past and the laws of nature, or a decree) leaves nothing out. Even a creature's own character, as it stands the moment before he chooses, belongs to the past, and under determinism the past and the laws, or a decree, put it there. - The past before he was born is not his, the laws of nature were not made by him, and a decree is another's will. That is why determinism threatens freedom: on it, something other than the chooser settles every choice. - Think of a relay race. The last runner carries the baton across the line, and the race is still not hers alone. The baton was in other hands before it came to hers, and the course was set before she started running. Therefore, a determined choice is settled beforehand by the past and the laws of nature, or by a decree.

(C3) Therefore, God's goodness is not determined. + If God's goodness were determined, the past and the laws of nature, or a decree, would settle it (P5). Nothing settles it but God himself (P4), and God himself is none of those things: he is not an event in the past, not a law of nature, and not a decree, and he never decreed his own goodness. So it is not determined. This step is called modus tollens, Latin for "the way that denies": if it had rained, the street would be wet; the street is dry; so it did not rain. (1) God's nature is not the past. - The past is a series of events, and God's nature is not an event. Nothing happened to make God good, and there was no moment before which he was something else. - A man's character has a history, and the history comes first. His honesty may trace to the afternoon his father marched him back to the store to return a stolen candy bar. God's goodness has no history before it, and so nothing in a history could have settled it. - One past event does bear on the oath to Abraham: the swearing of it. That event is God's own act, freely done (P4). A man who keeps this year a promise he made last year is held by his own word, and nobody says his past settled the keeping from outside. (2) God's nature is not a law of nature. - The laws of nature describe how created things behave: how planets move, how chemicals combine, how brains fire. God made the things the laws describe. He is not one more thing they govern. - A chess set obeys the rules of chess, and the person who invented the game does not. (3) Nobody decreed God's nature. - A decree is a choice of a will about what shall be. No decree made God good. He did not decree his own nature, since he never chose it; he is good by being God. And not choosing one's nature is not the same as having it chosen by someone else (D9). - The designed baker had her faithfulness chosen for her. God had his chosen by no one. The first is manipulation, one person settling another's choices for her. The second is simply who God is. (4) "Necessary" is not "determined." - Edwards called God's will "necessarily determined to that which is good," using "determined" in its older sense: fixed, set in one direction. In that sense God's goodness is determined, and the source view grants it gladly. - The determinism in dispute is something else, a settling by prior conditions. Edwards himself kept the two apart. He argued that God's necessity is no bar to thanks, and he contrasted it with goodness done "from mere compulsion, or extrinsical necessity," which everyone agrees earns no thanks (D8). • Extrinsical means coming from outside. (5) Coming first is not settling from outside. - A determinist has a sharper reply, and it deserves a straight answer. God's nature comes first in the order of dependence, as a decree does (P5): his acts depend on it, and it does not depend on them. So, he says, God's nature is a prior condition that makes his acts necessary, and his goodness is determined after all, from within. - Grant what is true in it. God wills the good because he is good, and given who he is he cannot fail to will it. His goodness explains his willing, and not the other way round. - Now think of a player piano. Its tune is fixed before the first note, by a roll someone else punched. A pianist who would never play a wrong note at her daughter's wedding is fixed in one direction too, and nothing punched her. Both tunes were certain before the first note, and only one of them was settled by someone else. - That is the difference that matters. Coming first, even with necessity attached, is not what makes the conditions in (P5) a threat to freedom. What makes them a threat is that each is something other than the chooser. The past was over before he existed, the laws of nature are not his, and a decree is another's will. Any of them is enough by itself to make his choice go the way it goes. - God's nature is not another's will, and it is not a separate state of God that produces his acts the way one domino tips the next. God himself wills the good, being who he is (P4). - Anselm drew exactly this line. There is a necessity that goes before a thing and causes it, the kind by which "the force of its own nature makes the heaven revolve." That is not what we mean when we say God must tell the truth, he wrote. We mean only that his disposition to keep it is so unwavering "that of necessity nothing can avail to make him deviate from the truth." Of God's choosing he added that "no necessity or impossibility exists before his choice or refusal," though "his choice and action are immutable." - If someone still wants to call God's goodness "determined from within," the source view will not quarrel over the word. It is still not determinism, the thesis that the past and the laws, or a decree, settle every choice (D11). Therefore, God's goodness is not determined: it is fixed in one direction, and fixed by nothing but God.

(C4) Therefore, a will can be free and undetermined though it cannot do otherwise. + A will can be free, and undetermined, and still unable to do otherwise, and God's will is the case that shows it. His goodness is free (C2) and not determined (C3), and he cannot do otherwise than good (P1). So freedom of the kind that cannot live with determinism does not need an open door, and that is exactly what the objection's last step denies. (1) God has libertarian freedom with no door open to evil. - Libertarian freedom, again, is freedom of a kind that cannot live with determinism. God's freedom is of that kind: neither the past and the laws nor any decree settles his goodness, and nothing outside him settles it at all. - One leading defender of free will holds that the possibility of choosing otherwise is not essential to libertarian freedom (P3). On the same page he says what that view buys: "This understanding of libertarian freedom has the advantage that it enables us to ascribe libertarian freedom to God himself and to Christ in resisting temptation." - God has it without any way to do evil. So libertarian freedom, rightly understood, never needed the ability to do evil, or the ability to do otherwise, as part of what it is. - What it needs is the source: that nothing outside the chooser settle the choice (P3). God meets that condition without limit, since he has no outside at all (P4). - Think of the oath to Abraham again. Nothing but God settled his keeping of it, and no door stood open to breaking it. (2) The objection's last step needs the opposite. - To get from God's case to compatibilism, the objection needs a premise its defender states in a sentence: "The exercise of a libertarian free will entails the ability to do otherwise than one does." - God is the counterexample to that premise. He exercises a free will that nothing outside him settles, and he cannot do otherwise than keep his oath to Abraham. The objection's own rule, that a single counterexample refutes a universal claim, applies to its own premise. - So the objection gives up the principle of alternative possibilities in its first three steps, and then, in its last, claims that libertarian freedom cannot do without the very ability that principle demanded. That last step is exactly where the road from the impeccable God to compatibilism is closed. (3) A will that cannot do otherwise is not thereby a determined will. - A will can be fixed in one direction in two quite different ways. It can be fixed by what it is, as Ruth's faithfulness is, and God's without any limit. Or it can be fixed by something outside it, as the designed baker's is. - The impeccable God is the clearest case there is of the first, and the objection treats him as though he were a case of the second. - A ship that holds its course because the captain has set it is not the same as a ship held on course by a tow line, though an observer on shore sees the same straight wake behind both. (4) The live question is about creatures settled from outside. - God's case decides nothing about whether a creature whose every choice is settled from outside can be free. That question turns on the past and the laws of nature, on what manipulation shows, and on the decree, and it has arguments of its own. - Whether the designed baker is free, for instance, has to be argued from her own case, not from God's. - What God's case does decide is that nothing about freedom requires the power to do wrong, and that praise follows the source. Therefore, a will can be free and undetermined though it cannot do otherwise, and God, who cannot sin, is praised for a goodness that is free because it is his own.

On freedom defined by its source: Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013. Craig, William Lane. "Response to Gregory A. Boyd." In Four Views on Divine Providence, edited by Dennis W. Jowers, 224-230. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011. As quoted in Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 124-125. Frankfurt, Harry G. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (1969): 829-839. O'Connor, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. "Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2022. Sections 2.3 and 4.2. Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Pages 38-39 and 605. Stump, Eleonore. "Moral Responsibility without Alternative Possibilities." In Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, edited by David Widerker and Michael McKenna, 139-158. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. Page 152, as quoted in Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 125 n. 215. Timpe, Kevin. Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives. 2nd ed. New York: Bloomsbury, 2013. Page 158, as quoted in Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 126 n. 219. On God's goodness and freedom: Bergmann, Michael, and J. A. Cover. "Divine Responsibility without Divine Freedom." Faith and Philosophy 23, no. 4 (2006): 381-408. Page 392 as quoted in Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 129, and pages 393 and 398 as quoted in Timpe, "The Best Thing in Life Is Free." Craig, William Lane. Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, On God: Attributes of God. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2025. Section 7.3.1. Franks, W. Paul. "Divine Freedom and Free Will Defenses." Heythrop Journal 56, no. 1 (2015): 108-119. As quoted in Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 130. Hill, Daniel J. Divinity and Maximal Greatness. London: Routledge, 2005. As quoted in Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 117. Timpe, Kevin. "The Best Thing in Life Is Free: The Compatibility of God's Freedom and His Essential Moral Perfection." In Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology, edited by Hugh J. McCann, 133-151. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. On the free will defense: Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. New York: Harper and Row, 1974. On Christ's sinlessness: Hodge, Charles. Systematic Theology. Vol. 2. New York: Scribner, 1872. Page 457. Shedd, William G. T. Dogmatic Theology. Vol. 2. New York: Scribner, 1888. Page 330. Critic sources engaged: Bignon, Guillaume. "A Response to Kevin Timpe's Objections." March 2019. Pages 11-19. Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018. Pages 4-5, 104-133. Couenhoven, Jesse. "The Necessities of Perfect Freedom." International Journal of Systematic Theology 14, no. 4 (2012): 396-419. As quoted in Timpe, "The Best Thing in Life Is Free." Edwards, Jonathan. A Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of That Freedom of Will. 1754. Part I, section 5, and Part III, sections 1-2. In The Works of President Edwards, vol. 5. Worcester: Isaiah Thomas, 1808. Part III at 156-172. Feinberg, John S. No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001. Geisler, Norman. Chosen But Free: A Balanced View of God's Sovereignty and Free Will. 3rd ed. Minneapolis: Bethany House, 2010. Page 43. As quoted in Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 104. Hasker, William. "A Philosophical Perspective." In Clark Pinnock et al., The Openness of God, 126-154. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1994. Pages 135-136. As quoted in Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 106. Mackie, J. L. "Evil and Omnipotence." Mind 64, no. 254 (1955): 200-212. Morriston, Wesley. "Is God 'Significantly Free'?" Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 3 (1985): 257-264. Morriston, Wesley. "What Is So Good about Moral Freedom?" Philosophical Quarterly 50, no. 200 (2000): 344-358. Pages 344, 350 and 353 as quoted in Timpe, "The Best Thing in Life Is Free." Morriston, Wesley. "Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection: Are They Compatible?" Religious Studies 37, no. 2 (2001): 143-160. Pruss, Alexander R. "The Essential Divine-Perfection Objection to the Free-Will Defence." Religious Studies 44, no. 4 (2008): 433-444. As discussed in Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 130. Rasmussen, Joshua. "On the Value of Freedom to Do Evil." Faith and Philosophy 30, no. 4 (2013): 418-428. As discussed in Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God, 131. Twain, Mark. Lecture reported in the Chicago Tribune, December 20, 1871, 4. Whitby, Daniel. A Discourse on the Five Points, 14. As quoted in Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Part III, section 1. Historical sources: Anselm of Canterbury. Cur Deus Homo (Why God Became Man), book 2, chapter 10, and the chapter Deane numbers 18 (a), "How, with God there is neither necessity nor impossibility." In St. Anselm: Proslogium; Monologium; An Appendix in Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilon; and Cur Deus Homo, translated by Sidney Norton Deane. Chicago: Open Court, 1903. Anselm of Canterbury. De libertate arbitrii (On Freedom of Choice), chapters 1 and 3. Anselm of Canterbury. Proslogion, chapter 7. Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae I, question 19, article 10; I, question 25, article 3; and III, question 18, article 4. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 2nd ed. London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1920. The Westminster Confession of Faith 3.1. 1646. In Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1877. Biblical citations: Genesis 22:16; Numbers 23:19; Deuteronomy 32:4; Psalm 48:1; Psalm 89:35; Psalm 92:15; Psalm 106:1; Psalm 119:68; Isaiah 42:1; Isaiah 50:4-7; Matthew 4:1-11; Matthew 26:39; Luke 1:55; Luke 1:72-73; Luke 22:61-62; John 10:17-18; John 19:11; Acts 5:1-11; Acts 17:25; Romans 11:36; Philippians 2:8-9; 2 Timothy 2:13; Hebrews 4:15; Hebrews 6:13-18; Hebrews 9:14; Hebrews 10:23; James 1:13; Revelation 4:11; Revelation 5:12; Revelation 15:3.
+ A God who cannot do evil is not all-powerful, and lacks the freedom that makes goodness moral. Better to say that God could do evil and never will.
The strongest form of this objection is Wes Morriston's. In 1985 he argued that a God who is good by his very nature is not significantly free, free to choose between right and wrong on a matter where right and wrong are at stake, and so lacks the freedom that makes a creature's goodness moral goodness. In 2001 he added that an all-powerful being must have the power to do evil, even if he never uses it, so that a God who cannot do evil is not all-powerful; he suggested that a being less than all-powerful might still be the greatest possible being. He weighed two ways out. One, which he credited to the philosopher Nelson Pike, keeps God all-powerful and grants that God is good in this world without being good in every possible one: God could do evil and never will. The other keeps God's goodness necessary and gives him as much power as that goodness allows. 1. Scripture says what God cannot do. The dissent from God's impeccability has to read Scripture's strongest words as weaker than they are. That it is impossible for God to lie (P1) is not a prediction that God never will. The reason Scripture gives is about God's being, not his track record: lying would be God denying himself. And Hebrews builds the believer's hope on exactly that impossibility, since the oath to Abraham was given to make the hope sure (P4). A God who could lie would give us a good promise. A God who cannot gives us ground to stand on. 2. The power to do evil is not a power. Being able to fall short is a weakness, not a strength. Aquinas put it this way: "to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence." Anselm made the same point: being able to lie or to be corrupted is not a power over anything, but a liability to being overcome. - A surgeon whose hand can slip is not more skilled than one whose hand cannot. The slip is not one more thing the first surgeon can do. It is one more thing that can happen to her. 3. A God whose goodness could fail is not the greatest being. A being whose goodness is secure in every possible circumstance is greater than one whose goodness could have failed. One defender of free will states the rule that governs the whole question in a sentence: "Anything is better than affirming that God is not a maximally great being." - A maximally great being is the greatest being there could be, which is how Anselm taught the church to think of God (P1). - A friend whose loyalty would hold in any circumstance you could name is a better friend than one who has never betrayed you but might have. - Even some who press hardest for the freedom of creatures grant God's impeccability, open theists among them (P1). 4. Nothing in the source view needs the dissent. Morriston's first argument starts from a freedom defined by the open door, the freedom to choose between right and wrong. The source view does not define freedom that way, so it has no reason to take the dissent. It holds that God is free, and praised, because nothing outside him settles his goodness (C2), and it can therefore hold God's impeccability with the whole tradition at no cost. His second argument is about power, and point 2 answers it. The second of his own two ways out keeps everything (P1) claims: a God who is good in every possible world, and as powerful as perfect goodness allows. - A judge who cannot be bribed has not lost a power that a bribable judge has. Nobody counts a price tag among a judge's powers. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God
+ There is no credit in doing what you cannot help. If God cannot help being good, his goodness is like the sun's brightness: good to have, and no reason for thanks.
The objection is old. Edwards answered it in the form the English theologian Daniel Whitby gave it: "who can blame a person for doing only what he could not help, or judge that he deserveth praise only for what he could not avoid?" 1. Taken seriously, it would leave God without praise. Edwards saw at once where Whitby's principle leads. On it, God "has no virtue at all: Virtue, when ascribed to him, is but an empty name." The virtuous man who chooses goodness with an open door would deserve praise that God could claim no more than "a precious stone, which cannot avoid being hard and beautiful." Edwards thought no Christian could accept that conclusion, and he was right. Scripture tells us to give thanks to the Lord "for he is good" (Psalm 106:1), and it praises his faithfulness in keeping the oath he could not break (Luke 1:72-73). 2. The sun and the stone are not persons. What makes the sun's brightness unpraiseworthy is not that the sun cannot stop shining. It is that the sun does not shine for reasons, and nothing it does comes from a will. God's goodness is the goodness of a person, willed for reasons of his own (P4). Praise follows the source, and a sun has no source in that sense. - Compare a waterfall with a host who never fails to welcome a stranger. Both are reliable. Only one is gracious. 3. "Could not help it" usually means something else did it. When we say a man "could not help" what he did, we usually mean that something outside him overpowered him: a seizure, a shove, a threat. In that sense God can "help" everything he does, since nothing outside him moves him at all. His "cannot" means that doing evil would go against who he is, which is the opposite of being overpowered (C3). - Mark Twain made Whitby's principle a joke. A Chicago paper reported him telling an audience in 1871, "I am different from Washington; I have a higher and grander standard of principle. Washington could not lie. I can lie, but I won't." The joke works because everyone hears the boast as absurd. 4. Edwards drew the wrong lesson from the right point. Edwards was right that necessity, in God's case, takes nothing from praise. He was wrong to conclude that a creature's choices can be necessitated from outside and still be praiseworthy in the same way. His own argument drew a line between God's necessity and goodness done "from mere compulsion, or extrinsical necessity" (C3). Where a determined creature falls on that line is the point on which Edwards and the source view part (D8). Traced back, a determined creature's goodness is necessitated from outside him (P5), and God's is not. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God
+ God always has more than one good thing he could do. He is praised for which good he chooses, so praise still needs an alternative, and the principle of alternative possibilities survives.
This is the first of two ways some libertarians have tried to keep the principle of alternative possibilities in the face of God's goodness. God cannot choose evil, they say, but among the good things he can do he always has a choice, and his praise attaches to that choice. 1. God is praised for being good, not for which good he picked. Scripture praises God because he is good as opposed to evil, not because he chose this good over that one (P2). The objection's defender presses this point, and he is right to. A philosopher who has written a book on God's greatness says the same thing: the believer wants God praised "for refraining from evil, keeping promises, not lying etc., even though no divine being could have a choice about these matters." 2. The promise to Abraham leaves no second good to pick. Once God had sworn his oath to Abraham, the question before him was keep it or break it, and he could not break it. Whatever latitude he had over how and when to keep it, he is not praised for picking one way of keeping it over another. He is praised for keeping it (Luke 1:72-73; Hebrews 6:13-18), and on that question no second good was open. One such case is enough to sink the rescue, and the objection's defender adds that if any doubt remained about an actual case, a single possible case would do just as well. - A man who has promised to be at his daughter's wedding does not earn his welcome by choosing which door of the church to walk through. 3. God's choices among goods are a further fact. None of this denies that God chooses among goods. He does, as when he chose to create (C2), and that freedom among goods is real and worth knowing. But it is a further fact about God's freedom rather than its ground, and his praise does not hang on it. The source view has no need of the rescue, since it never rested praise on an open door in the first place (C1).
+ If alternatives are not needed for doing good in general, they are not needed for any particular good act either. Applying the principle to one level of description and not another is special pleading.
The strongest form of this objection comes from the objection's defender himself, and it is a careful argument. It starts from the fact that any act can be described more or less finely. Ananias and Sapphira (Acts 5:1-11) can be blamed for telling one particular lie about the price of a field, or for lying to the Holy Spirit, or for lying, or for sinning. Each of those is a level of description, and how fine or coarse a description is, philosophers call its granularity. If the principle of alternative possibilities is true, he argues, its warrant, the reason for believing it, "would seem to equally support each level of granularity indiscriminately." So a libertarian cannot say that God needs no alternative to "doing good" while every particular act needs one. - If the principle holds at the lowest level, it holds at every level. - God's case shows it fails at the higher levels. - So it fails at the lowest. To apply it at one level and not another would be special pleading, a rule with an exception made for one's own case, like a club that fines every member for coming late except the treasurer who wrote the rule. 1. The argument is fair against those who restrict the principle. This is a fair argument against anyone who holds the principle of alternative possibilities and tries to save it by restricting it to particular acts. The objection's defender grants that such a restriction "would be a coherent response," and then shows why it looks ad hoc, Latin for "for this": made up for the occasion, only to save the view. Those who take that route must answer him. The source view does not take it. 2. The source principle is not tied to a level of description. The source view says that a choice is free, and its maker answerable for it, when nothing settles it but the one who makes it (P3). That condition does not change with how finely the act is described. God's keeping of his oath is settled by nothing outside him whether it is described as "keeping this promise to Abraham in this way," as "keeping his promises," or as "acting righteously." There is no level at which the source view says God needs an open door. - A signature is the signer's own whether you look at one letter of it, the whole name, or the whole signed letter. 3. The same goes for creatures. The source view does not hold that creatures need an alternative for each particular act and God for none. It holds the same condition for both (D7). A man's lie is his because nothing but he settled it, however the lie is described. 4. The argument against blame for sinning is a separate one. The objection's defender presses the same step about levels of description in a second case: fallen human beings, who cannot live without sin and are still blamed for their sins. If blame for sinning in general needs no alternative, he argues, then neither does blame for any particular sin. That is a different argument about a different case, and it has an answer of its own. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will
+ Libertarians themselves say that God "could not" do certain things, such as act as Calvinists say he does, and still praise him. Their own rhetoric concedes the point.
The objection's defender gathers examples of Arminian writers who say that a God of holy love "could not" create a world in which many are lost, or "cannot" love only some people, and he asks: if it is impossible for God to act otherwise, is he not praised for his love all the same? Edwards made the same observation in 1754: "Arminians suppose, that God is necessarily a good and gracious Being," and build arguments on it. 1. The concession is granted, and gladly. The source view already holds that God cannot do evil and is praised for his goodness (P1, P2), and that deserving praise does not require the ability to do otherwise (C1). So the irony has nothing to catch it out in. Show a libertarian granting God's impeccability, and you have shown him agreeing with the source view. 2. What would be inconsistent is a principle the source view does not hold. The irony bites anyone who says both that praise needs an open door and that God cannot do certain things. It does not bite a view that rests praise on the source. - A man who says "my brother could never steal" and also "nobody deserves credit for honesty unless he could steal" has contradicted himself. A man who says only the first has not. 3. The answer starts from what God is. Whether God's goodness rules out the decree that many Calvinists describe is a separate question, with arguments of its own. The answer to the impeccability objection starts from what God is, a being whose goodness has no outside, and not from a list of things he cannot do. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin
+ God is responsible for his goodness but not free. Freedom requires alternatives, God has none toward evil, and responsibility can do without freedom.
The strongest form of this view is Michael Bergmann and Jan Cover's. They take seriously the argument that God's essential goodness keeps his good acts from being free, and they answer it by holding that God can be responsible, and deserve thanks, even if he is not free. They are incompatibilists about both freedom and responsibility. What responsibility needs, on their view, is that the agent be the front end of the causal chain: "the causal buck for A stops with S." - In the quotation, A is the act and S is the agent. The phrase borrows the old saying about passing the buck: the chain of causes behind the act goes back as far as the agent and stops there. 1. Their condition for responsibility is the source. Bergmann and Cover place responsibility exactly where the source view places freedom: in the agent's being the one with whom the causal buck stops. Their condition for an agent's causing his own act is strict. Nothing distinct from him, not even his own character, may cause him to exert his power, and on their account God is responsible for his good acts. That is the source condition (P3). It also suggests something worth noticing: even philosophers prepared to grant that God is not free need not think his nature drives his will the way one event drives another (C3). So the disagreement with the source view is mostly about which word to use. 2. Freedom is the word the tradition used for that condition. Anselm praised God as the one who has of himself whatever good he has, holy by his own unchangeableness and by no necessity laid on him (C2). Defenders of free will today say the same in their own words (P4). One of them has argued at length that God is free in just this sense, and that seeing it removes the main reason for denying God's freedom. On that account God's essential goodness is not a limit on his freedom but a part of perfected freedom. - If two maps agree on every road and differ only on whether to call one town a city, the travelers have no quarrel about the route. 3. Calling God unfree has a cost the source view need not pay. To deny that God is free is to say that the most perfect being lacks a perfection that his creatures have. Scripture speaks of God's will as his own: "by your will they existed and were created" (Revelation 4:11). The source view keeps responsibility where Bergmann and Cover keep it and keeps freedom with it.
+ Asking only that God be the source, while asking creatures for alternatives, is the very special pleading the objection charged. A principle of responsibility that changes with the agent is no principle at all.
The strongest form of this objection says that the source view, pressed, always asks more of a creature than of God. The objection's defender puts the result in a formula: moral responsibility requires "being un-created, or being created and having leeway." Leeway is the philosophers' word for an open door. And the source view's own patron seems to agree with him. Anselm held that the angels who can no longer sin have their holiness of themselves because, when they could have fallen, they refused, and he added that "the creature cannot have it of himself in any other way." 1. One principle, stated once. The source view has a single principle and applies it to everyone: an agent is responsible for an act only if he is its source, with nothing outside him settling it (P3). It is the same for God and for creatures, and it does not change with the agent. 2. The source view does not require alternatives of creatures. A created agent can be free without the open door. In the neurosurgeon's case the voter's vote is his own, though he could not have carried the other vote through, and it would be his whether or not a flicker of leaning the other way survived (P3). A leading defender of free will gives a case with no door open at all. Suppose God knew that Pontius Pilate, placed where he was, would send Jesus to the cross, and that had Pilate been going to release him, God would not have placed him there. Then "Pilate did not under the circumstances have the ability to let Jesus go. Yet he freely sent Jesus to the cross, since nothing determined him to do so." What shuts Pilate's door is God's resolve, not his knowledge, and the resolve settles where Pilate stands, not what he does there. Scripture still counts the sin Pilate's own (John 19:11). The source view does not adopt the formula that responsibility requires "being un-created, or being created and having leeway," which would write the open door back in for creatures. 3. Anselm's road for creatures is his, not the source view's condition. Anselm did not rest the angels' praise on the door they once had. He said outright that they are praised not because they could sin but because their holiness is owing to themselves (D14). The ground of praise is the source. The open door enters only in his answer to a narrower question: how a creature, whose goodness is first God's gift, comes to hold that goodness of itself, as the angels do and as the saints in glory will. His answer was that whoever does not take a thing away when he can is said to give it, so an angel who could have abandoned holiness and did not gave it to himself. Most of the saints come to glory by a road of the same general kind, under grace and after many falls: a goodness formed through choices made while they could still go wrong. The source view honors that road (D16). It does not make an earlier open door the condition of a creature's freedom. Nothing settled Pilate's choice but Pilate, and no door stood open to him (point 2). - What Anselm and the source view share is the main thing. Praise goes to the one from whom the good comes, and God has his from himself without limit (C2). - Most people who own a house came to own it through years of payments. That is the usual road, and it is not what owning is. 4. What differs is where an outside could come from. A creature has an outside: a past before his birth, a body, a world, a Creator. So for a creature the condition means that nothing outside him settles the act, whether directly or through a character that something else settled. God has no outside at all. In the ordinary run of human choices the condition shows itself as an open door, which is why the ordinary mark is so useful a test. - Special pleading is a rule with an exception made for one's own case. This is one rule applied to two kinds of being, like a rule that every building needs a foundation, applied both to a house and to a bridge. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door
+ God's will is "necessarily determined" to good, as Edwards said. So God's goodness is a case of determinism, and a praiseworthy one.
The strongest modern form of this objection belongs to Christian thinkers who follow Augustine of Hippo, the great North African bishop of the early church, on freedom. Jesse Couenhoven, a compatibilist, argues that Christians who praise God and the sinless Christ have reason to accept a freedom in which "certain kinds of necessity are not merely compatible with perfect freedom but intrinsic to it," and that libertarian accounts, focused as they are on contingent choices (choices that could have gone another way), cannot celebrate God's freedom with respect to his own nature. For the Augustinian, he writes, God's freedom "is not at odds with the necessities of perfect love but fulfilled by it." 1. The necessity of perfect love belongs to perfect freedom. Grant the heart of this. God's goodness is necessary, and it is the most perfect freedom there is (C2). The source view never said that freedom is at odds with every necessity. It says that freedom is at odds with being settled from outside. When a love cannot fail because of what the lover is, that love has been finished, not lost. 2. Edwards's "determined" meant fixed, not settled by prior conditions. When Edwards wrote that God's will is "necessarily determined to that which is good," he meant that it is fixed in one direction. In that sense the source view grants that God's will is determined. The determinism in dispute is a different claim: that every choice is settled beforehand by prior conditions, the past and the laws of nature or a decree (P5). God's goodness is settled by none of these (C3). - A compass needle "determined" to point north and a weathervane "determined" by every gust both point somewhere. Only one of them is pointing by its own nature. 3. Edwards kept the two apart himself. Edwards argued that we thank God for his necessary goodness, and he contrasted that goodness with goodness done "from mere compulsion, or extrinsical necessity," which nobody thanks. His own argument depends on the difference between a necessity from within and a necessity from outside. Edwards did not count a determined creature's necessity as "extrinsical," since on his account it works through the creature's own desires. But the source view asks where those desires came from, and on determinism they trace back to the past and the laws of nature, or to a decree, which lie outside the creature (P5). Whatever name is given to that necessity, it comes from outside. 4. Libertarian accounts need not focus on contingency. The charge fits libertarian accounts that define freedom by the open door. It does not fit the source view, which defines freedom by the source and treats the open door as its ordinary mark. On the source view God's freedom with respect to his own nature is the paradigm case, not an embarrassment.
+ God never chose his nature, and his nature guarantees that he never does wrong. By the incompatibilist's own reasoning, then, God never chose to do right, and is not praiseworthy for it.
The strongest form of this objection is a chain the objection's defender builds on purpose to mirror the incompatibilist's favorite argument. - God never chose to have the nature that he has. - God never chose the fact that, if he has such a nature, he cannot act unrighteously. - So God never chose to never act unrighteously, "and hence isn't praiseworthy for that feat." Incompatibilists argue in the same way that a determined man has no say in his acts, since he never chose the remote past or the laws of nature, which together guarantee what he does. That argument is called the Consequence Argument, and the objection's defender points out that it banks everything on this kind of fixity. - Incompatibilists hold that freedom and determinism cannot both be true. What God and a determined man share, he says, is "the most important and striking fact: they did not choose to have the natures that they have," and that fact holds whether or not God is identical with his nature, and whether a nature is "created or uncreated." So the incompatibilist who says that the source matters and fixity does not "must at the very least give up the consequence argument or reject divine praiseworthiness." 1. Part of the chain is simply true. God never chose his nature, and nothing he could do would so much as risk his doing wrong. In that sense he has no say in whether he does wrong, and the chain carries that lack of say through to its conclusion correctly. The source view grants all of it. God's freedom never consisted in choosing his nature, or in a door toward evil (C4). - The chain runs on the same rule as the Consequence Argument: if you have no say in one fact, and no say in the fact that it guarantees a second, then you have no say in the second either. Applied to God, that rule starts from truths and arrives at a truth, and no rule is refuted by doing that. - Think of the oath to Abraham. Nothing God could do would put it at risk, and Hebrews makes that very impossibility the ground of "strong encouragement" (Hebrews 6:18). 2. The last step is the principle of alternative possibilities. The chain's final words, "and hence isn't praiseworthy for that feat," take one step more: from having no say in whether one does wrong to deserving no praise for doing right. That step is the principle of alternative possibilities under another name, and God's case refutes it (C1). The objection's defender rejects that principle himself. So the chain catches only those who hold it, and the source view is not among them. - Suppose a man keeps his word while a device stands ready to make him keep it, though it never has to act. He had no say in the device and, with it in place, no say in whether he would keep his word. The keeping is still to his credit, because he, and nothing else, settled it. 3. "Never chose" means two different things. "God never chose to never act unrighteously" is true if it means that God never picked righteousness from a menu with wickedness on it. It is false if it means that God's righteousness does not come from his willing. Every righteous thing God does, he wills, for reasons of his own (P4). The chain needs the second meaning to take away God's praise, and only the first is true. - Ruth never chose, from a list of possible characters, to be a woman who keeps her word. She still chooses, every Easter, to bake the bread. 4. Fixity was never the threat by itself. The past is fixed for everyone, and nobody thinks that alone takes a choice away. What makes determinism a threat is that the fixed facts lie outside the chooser and produce his choice: the remote past before his birth and the laws of nature, or a decree, bring it about through every step he takes (P5). God's nature lies neither before him nor outside him, and it produces nothing in him that he does not do himself (C3). - Go back to the designed baker. She never chose her character, and someone else chose it for her. God never chose his nature either, but nobody chose it for him. "Never chose" is not "had it chosen by another," and only the second takes a choice from the one who makes it. - So the dilemma, give up the Consequence Argument or give up God's praise, has a third way out, and the incompatibilist of the source view takes it by keeping both. He keeps the Consequence Argument, whose rule about having a say he never needed to give up. And he keeps God's praise, which never depended on God's having a say in his nature. What ties the Consequence Argument to praise and blame was always the source, because on determinism the same past and laws that guarantee a choice also produce it. 5. The objection's defender grants that this answer may stand. He acknowledges that God's case and the determined creature's differ in exactly this way: "That distinction between God and humans certainly holds true." He calls the reply "a rather effective defensive move, and a prima facie coherent position to take," and he grants that he may never dislodge it: "that may be the final defensive position out of which I am unable to dislodge them, though I hope to have shown that this move, if not incoherent, is at least unattractive." - Prima facie is Latin for "at first sight": a position that holds up on its face, unless something defeats it. He offers the chain itself "without claiming that this is a rebutting defeater," that is, without claiming that it shows the source view false. What he claims for it is that it shaves off "any motivation to adopt this view." In a later reply to a critic he grants more: the impeccability argument cannot touch the source view, because God meets its condition. - Some defenders of God's freedom answer the chain another way, with divine simplicity: if God simply is his nature, then what his nature secures, he secures. The objection's defender replies that the fact he means holds whether or not God is identical with his nature. The source view does not lean on simplicity. Its point is not that God and his nature are one thing, but that nothing outside God settles what he wills. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to Us Philosophy / Free Will: Nobody Chose Their Own Character, and Everyone Is Still Responsible: The Basic Argument Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God
+ Fixity, not source, is what matters. A person who was never created, whose nature fixed every choice, would deserve no more praise than a created one with the same nature.
Wes Morriston and Joshua Rasmussen have pressed this point with thought experiments, and the objection's defender calls the case "rather convincing." Morriston asks us to picture two groups of finite persons, "naturally good, good in a way that makes it impossible for them to choose evil." Those in the first group were made by something outside themselves, "a favourable heredity and environment, a benevolent God, or whatever." Those in the second "were not made by anything at all" and "simply happened to come into existence." He thinks it plainly unreasonable to praise the second group and not the first, and he asks: "Does the presence or absence of a creator who made me with this good nature make a difference to whether I am morally responsible for the good deeds that flow from it? I do not see that it does." If so, where a nature came from makes no difference. What matters is only whether it is fixed, and God's nature is as fixed as any determined creature's. 1. Being created is not what counts. The source view agrees with Morriston that being created makes no difference by itself. What counts is whether anything other than the chooser settles his choices. A created person whose choices nothing outside him settled would be praised as rightly as an uncreated one, and that is what the source view says of the saints in glory. Christ's human will is created too, and it is praised on the same ground: nothing outside the Son's own person settled his obedience (D14). 2. God is in neither group. Morriston's first group had their goodness made for them, and his second had it happen to them. God's goodness was not made for him, and it did not happen to him. It is not an accident that befell a being who might have been otherwise. It is what it is to be God, and nothing gave it to him (P4). One defender of God's freedom, answering this very thought experiment, puts it in two clauses: God is not "made to have his moral character," and neither is his character "something that He just happens to have." - So whatever verdict the two groups deserve, nothing follows about God. - Ask whether a boy who was handed a fortune and a boy who found one in the street deserve the same credit for it. Whatever you answer, you have learned nothing about a fortune that was neither handed to anyone nor found. 3. The thought experiment hides the question that matters. Everything turns on how each group's goodness is secured. - If nothing settles their choices but the persons themselves, and their nature only closes the door to evil, the two groups are alike in the respect that matters, and both are praiseworthy. - If instead their nature makes each choice go the way it goes, something other than the persons themselves settles their goodness. In the first group it is the one who made them, as the scientist settled the designed baker's. In the second it is a nature that simply happened to them and does the settling in their place, the way one domino tips the next (C3). Then neither group is the source of its goodness, and the source view says so plainly: neither deserves praise for it. Either way the two groups deserve the same verdict, as Morriston says, and the source decides which verdict it is. Fixity does not. - Two letters may say exactly the same words. One was written by the sender, and the other dictated to her at gunpoint. Nobody reading them side by side can tell them apart, and only one of them is hers. 4. Admiring goodness is not crediting it. The thought experiment asks us to look at good beings and feel that they are equally admirable, and they are. Goodness is lovely wherever it is found. But admiring goodness is not the same as crediting a person with it. Ask who deserves thanks for a goodness built into someone, and the answer turns toward the builder, as it turns toward the scientist in the designed baker's case, where most people's verdict is plain. Ask it of a goodness that simply happened, and there is no one to thank at all. Ask it of God, and the answer is God, whose goodness was neither built into him nor happened to him (point 2). - A watch that never loses a second is admired, and its maker is the one congratulated. 5. The objection's defender concedes the burden. He grants that because the burden of proof is on the compatibilist, "I don't think it's strictly possible to block this incompatibilist escape route altogether": at some point the argument must move from God to human beings, and a relevant difference can always be claimed. The source view does not merely claim one. It names it: in God's case nothing outside him settles his goodness, and in the determined creature's something does.
+ God's nature comes before his acts and makes them necessary, so his goodness is determined from within. If that is compatible with praise, being determined is not the problem, and the debate over compatibilism has been surrendered.
The objection's defender puts the charge in a sentence: "being determined isn't the problem; it's how one is determined that counts. The debate on compatibilism itself has been surrendered." His reason is that God's case is a determination of its own kind. Some determinations, he writes, "can arise internally (and in fact do so in the case of God)." A determinist can press the point harder. A decree from eternity comes before nothing on the calendar, and still it counts as a prior condition, because the choice depends on it (P5). God's nature comes before his acts in exactly that way, and it makes them necessary. So, the charge runs, (P5) has listed every determiner except the one God's case contains, and (C3) is true only because the list was drawn to leave God's nature off it. 1. Grant the word in its loose sense. If "determined" means only "fixed in one direction," then God's goodness is determined, and the source view says so (C3). God wills the good because he is good, and given who he is he cannot fail to will it. The tradition counted that a necessity only loosely: Anselm said "that is improperly called necessity which involves neither compulsion nor restraint." The source view never held that freedom is at odds with every necessity. It holds that freedom is at odds with being settled by something other than the chooser. - A mother who says she could never abandon her child is fixed in one direction. Nobody concludes that something has taken her love out of her hands. 2. His own definition says what determinism is. He defines determinism as the thesis "that everything that comes to pass is determined, or necessitated by prior conditions," and he names the conditions he means: the state of the universe with the laws of nature, or God's providential decree (P5). God's nature is neither. When he later calls God's goodness determined internally, he is using the word in the loose sense of point 1 (C3). Compatibilism is the thesis that freedom survives determinism as his definition states it, and nothing about that thesis has been conceded. 3. What makes a prior condition a determiner is that it is something other than the chooser. The list in (P5) was not drawn to spare God. Each item on it is there for the same reason: - the past was over before the chooser existed, and he had no hand in it; - the laws of nature are not his; - a decree is another's will, enough by itself to make his choice go the way it goes; - and a creature's own character counts only because, under determinism, the past and the laws or a decree put it there (P5). God's nature has none of these marks. Nothing gave it to him, and it is not a state of God that produces his willing the way one event produces the next. God himself wills the good, being who he is (C3). Even philosophers prepared to grant that God is not free give an account of his responsibility on which nothing distinct from an agent, not even his own character, may cause his act (D6). - A train keeps to one route because someone else laid the rails. A hiker keeps to one trail because she loves where it leads. Both are held to a single path, and only the train is held there by something else. 4. The objection's defender grants that God-determined human choices still fail. He acknowledges that those who hold the source view "still find fault with Calvinist determinism, because human choices that are determined by God do not pass even the revised, more modest source incompatibilist criterion for moral responsibility: they are determined by factors outside themselves." That is the determinism in dispute, and the source view rejects it. - A source incompatibilist is someone who holds the source view and denies that freedom can live with determinism. 5. What the debate was always about. Incompatibilists never argued that freedom fails whenever a will is fixed in one direction. Their arguments have always been about being settled by the past and the laws of nature, or by another's decree. The objection's defender says as much when he grants that the question left standing is "whether being determined by something or someone outside oneself removes moral responsibility," which he takes to be the problem of manipulation. That was the question all along, and it is untouched. - It is like the difference between a promise kept because a contract binds you and one kept because of who you are. Nobody concludes that honesty is a kind of contract. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+ Freedom of the libertarian kind means the choice could have been other than it is, given everything before it. So incompatibilism needs the principle of alternative possibilities, and with that principle refuted, compatibilism is true.
The strongest form of this objection is a chain of eleven steps, and it is valid: if its premises are true, its conclusion must be. In outline: - Incompatibilism says that responsibility cannot exist with determinism, so if anyone is responsible, determinism is false. - The indeterminism that matters is in the will, so if anyone is responsible, someone has libertarian freedom. • Indeterminism is simply the denial of determinism: not everything is settled beforehand by prior conditions. - "The exercise of a libertarian free will entails the ability to do otherwise than one does." - So incompatibilism entails the principle of alternative possibilities. - That principle is false, as God's case shows, so incompatibilism is false and compatibilism is true. Its defender supports the third step this way. However modestly libertarian freedom is defined, it is at least undetermined, and that means its choices are not "determined, or necessitated by prior conditions, inside or outside the agent": "the totality of prior facts about the world does not suffice to determine the agent's choice." Then, he argues, given all those facts "the free choice could have been other than it is," since otherwise those facts did determine it. "This means that if the choice was undetermined, it entailed that the agent could have done otherwise." - He adds that a leading defender of the source view concedes part of the point: the source view carries with it some condition about alternatives, "even if it is a very weak one." - And he answers the neurosurgeon's case in advance. The voter still has a flicker of an alternative, he says, so the case shows no undetermined choice without one. 1. The third step is false, and God shows it. God's goodness is free and undetermined, and he cannot do otherwise than good (C4). So the exercise of a libertarian free will does not always carry the ability to do otherwise. The objection's own rule, that one counterexample refutes a universal claim, applies to its own premise. 2. The defense of the third step changes what "undetermined" means. The word "undetermined" does two different jobs in this chain, and everything turns on keeping them apart. - In the narrow sense, a choice is undetermined when determinism is false of it: it is not settled beforehand by the past and the laws of nature, or by a decree (P5). That is all the chain's first steps deliver. If anyone is responsible, his choices are undetermined in this sense. - In the wide sense, a choice is undetermined only when it is made necessary by no prior condition at all, "inside or outside the agent." That is how the defense of the third step reads the word, and it is a much stronger claim. - Sliding between two senses of one word inside a single argument is what logicians call equivocation, and it makes the steps look joined when they are not. - A theater's sign that says "No outside food" does not forbid the popcorn the theater sells. Read it as "No food," and you have a different rule, one nobody posted. Now run the chain on each sense in turn. - Take libertarian freedom to mean undetermined in the narrow sense, the sense the chain's early steps earn, and the third step is false. God's goodness is settled by nothing outside him and by no decree, and he cannot do otherwise than good (C4). - Take it in the wide sense, and the chain still breaks, whichever way God's nature is counted. • Count God's nature as a condition within him that makes his goodness necessary, as the objection's defender does (D11). Then God is praised (C1) without being undetermined in the wide sense, so a responsible agent need not be undetermined in that sense, and the second step fails. That determinism is false never showed that a responsible choice is made necessary by nothing within the chooser. • Count it as no determining condition at all, as (C3) argues. Then God's goodness is undetermined even in the wide sense, he still cannot do otherwise than good, and the third step fails. Pilate shows the same for a creature (point 3). - Either way the chain breaks, and it breaks at the joint where the word changed its meaning. 3. Even for a creature the step fails. On a case a leading defender of free will gives, nothing determined Pontius Pilate to send Jesus to the cross, and yet under the circumstances he could not have let Jesus go (D7). Nothing in that case waits for a sign of how Pilate is leaning, so it leaves no flicker for the reply about the neurosurgeon to find. - The voter in the neurosurgeon's case does keep a flicker in the case as told, as the objection's defender says, and the source view grants it (P3). It rests nothing on him. 4. The ordinary mark is what the defense rightly sees. In the ordinary run of human choices a free choice carries the ordinary mark: the person could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was. The source view prizes that mark and expects to find it nearly everywhere in human life. One defender of the source view holds, further, that the view carries with it some very weak condition about alternatives, no more than the falsity of determinism already brings. That condition is his. The source view does not take it, since God has no door toward evil and Pilate had none (point 3). - Most letters arrive with a stamp on them. A letter handed to you at the door is still a letter. 5. Leading defenders of free will deny the third step in so many words. One of them writes: "What is essential to libertarian freedom is not the possibility of choosing otherwise but rather the absence of causal constraints outside oneself that determine how one chooses." Another, a leading interpreter of Aquinas, says that what libertarian freedom and moral responsibility require "is not that the agent could have done otherwise, but that the ultimate cause of the agent's act lie in the agent's own intellect and will, so that the agent himself is the ultimate source of what he does." The objection's defender knows this view and the philosophers who hold it, whom one critic has called "Frankfurt libertarians," after Harry Frankfurt, whose 1969 paper began the family of neurosurgeon cases (P3). His charge that their position is incoherent rests on that change of meaning (point 2). 6. So the chain stops at its third step. Incompatibilism entails that the responsible agent's choice is not settled by prior conditions outside him: the past and the laws of nature, or a decree. It does not entail the principle of alternative possibilities, and the refutation of that principle leaves incompatibilism standing. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It Matters
+ If God's case shows that compatibilism is even possibly true, then it is true, since a thesis like compatibilism is true in every possible world if it is true in any.
The objection's defender adds this step in reply to his critics. A self-existent being whose acts are fixed by his own nature meets the source condition, he says, so compatibilism is at least possible. Philosophical theses about what responsibility requires are necessarily true if true at all. So compatibilism is necessarily true, here as everywhere, and libertarianism is necessarily false. - A possible world is a complete way things could have been. A thesis true in every one of them is necessarily true, the way two and two make four however else history had gone. 1. God's case does not show compatibilism possible. Compatibilism is the claim that freedom and responsibility survive determinism. For God's case to show even that this is possible, God's goodness would have to be determined, and it is not (C3). All his case shows is that freedom survives the absence of an open door, and incompatibilists of the source view already hold that. Calling God's necessity a determination "from within" changes the word and leaves the case exactly where it was (D11). 2. The modal step cuts both ways. The step is a piece of modal reasoning, reasoning about what is possible and what is necessary. If a thesis about what responsibility requires is necessarily true whenever it is possibly true, then the same reasoning gives incompatibilism wherever incompatibilism is possible. So the step decides nothing by itself. Everything goes back to the question whether God's case is a case of determinism, and it is not. - Two lawyers who agree that the verdict, once reached, can never be appealed have not agreed on the verdict. 3. Its own author does not rest much on it. He grants that this step does little as a refutation. He rests his case against the source view on a different argument, about fallen human beings who cannot live without sin and are blamed for their sins, which has an answer of its own. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will
+ Christ was a man who could not sin, and he is praised for his obedience. So a created human will can be praiseworthy without alternatives, and nothing stops a determined creature from being the same.
The objection's defender adds the incarnate Son to God's case, and Edwards gave a whole section to it. Christ, being God, could not have failed to do his Father's will and give his life as a ransom for many, he argues, and his sacrifice is praiseworthy beyond any other. So whatever a created human will needs in order to be praised, it is not the ability to do otherwise. Edwards added that if Christ's obedience earned no praise because it was necessary, the one Scripture sets above all creatures would be "no more worthy than a clock or mere machine, that is purely passive, and moved by natural necessity." 1. Christ's obedience is praised, and the source view says why. Scripture praises it without reserve: "he humbled himself by becoming obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross. Therefore God has highly exalted him" (Philippians 2:8-9). Jesus himself said, "For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life" (John 10:17). His obedience is praised because it was his own. "No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord" (John 10:18). Nothing outside him settled it. 2. Anselm asked this question first, and answered it. In Anselm's dialogue on why God became man, his pupil Boso put the objection exactly: if Christ cannot sin, "he maintains holiness of necessity," and "What thanks, then, will he deserve for his holiness?" Anselm's answer runs from the angels, through God, to Christ. - "All power follows the will." Christ could have said the words of a lie, so in that sense he "could lie, so long as we understand, if he chose to do so. And, since he could not lie unwillingly and could not wish to lie, none the less can it be said that he could not lie." - The angels who can no longer sin "are not to be praised for their holiness because they could sin, but because it is owing to themselves, in a certain sense, that now they cannot sin," since they refused to fall when they could. That is Anselm's account of how a creature comes to hold its goodness of itself, and it is his, not the source view's condition (D7). - God is praised for a goodness he has of himself, and so is Christ: "since every good thing which he possesses comes from himself," he "will be holy not of necessity but voluntarily, and, therefore, will deserve praise." - Christ's human nature is not a separate person whose goodness someone else secured: "though human nature will have what it has from the Divine nature, yet it will likewise have it from itself, since the two natures will be united in one person." 3. Whatever kept him from sin lay in his own person. A leading defender of free will draws the parallel with the neurosurgeon's case: "Jesus, being divine, was impeccable (could not sin). Therefore, there was no possibility of his yielding to Satan's temptations in the wilderness. Yet he resisted sin freely because nothing external to him determined his choices. Like the man with the electrodes implanted in his brain, Jesus could not have chosen to sin, but he freely resisted sin." - On that picture whatever would have kept the incarnate Son from sin lay in the divine person, who is the Son himself, and it never had to act against his human will. The obedience was his in every step he actually took. - That is the opposite of a determined creature, whose every choice is settled by something outside the person who makes it. In Christ there is nothing outside the person to do the settling. - Aquinas made a related point. Christ's will, "though determined to good, is not determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even as to the blessed, to choose with a free-will confirmed in good." The choice among goods is a further fact. What makes the obedience free is that it was his. 4. Whether he could have sinned is the tradition's own unfinished question. The church's main tradition holds that Christ could not have sinned. Some Christian theologians have held that he could have and did not, precisely so that his temptation would be real. In the nineteenth century Charles Hodge of Princeton wrote, "If He was a true man He must have been capable of sinning," and his fellow Presbyterian W. G. T. Shedd took the other side: "He was not only able to overcome temptation, but he was unable to be overcome by it." The source view holds Christ's impeccability with the main tradition, and its argument does not need it. God's case alone carries (C1) and (C4), and either way Christ's obedience was his own. 5. Edwards's clock cuts the other way. A clock is moved by natural necessity from outside: its maker wound it and set its springs. Edwards was right that Christ is no clock, and the reason is that nothing outside him moved him. Edwards would answer that a determined creature is no clock either, since he acts from his own motives and is not passive. But on Edwards's account every motive, and every motion of the creature's will, traces back to something set in place before him by another (P5). In the one respect that makes a clock's keeping time no credit to the clock, a determined creature is like it, and Christ is not. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God
+ Christ's obedience was secured by the Father's promises and upheld by the Spirit. So something outside his human will did settle it, and he was praised anyway.
The strongest form of this objection is Edwards's. God promised so solemnly that the Messiah would succeed, he argued, that Christ's holiness could not fail: "Behold my servant, whom I uphold" (Isaiah 42:1). God's absolute promise makes the thing promised necessary, and the Spirit upheld the Son in every temptation. Edwards cited the Servant's own words as well: "The Lord God has opened my ear, and I was not rebellious" (Isaiah 50:5), which he read as God inclining the Servant's heart to obedience. If the guarantee came from the Father's promise and the Spirit's upholding, then something besides Christ's human will settled his obedience. 1. A promise makes an outcome certain without settling it. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. God's promises made Christ's obedience certain the way God's knowledge makes every future free act certain: by being sure of it, not by doing it. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. - A father who promises his friends that his daughter will finish the race has staked his word on her. He has not run a step of it. 2. Help is not settling. The Spirit upheld the Son, and Hebrews says that Christ "through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish to God" (Hebrews 9:14). The one doing the offering is Christ: he offered himself. To help is to give what is needed to act. To settle is to be what makes the act go the way it goes. The Servant in Isaiah speaks of the Lord's help and of his own resolve in one breath. "But the Lord God helps me" (Isaiah 50:7), he says, and in the same verse, "therefore I have set my face like a flint" (Isaiah 50:7). The help and the resolve are both real, and the resolve is his. - Edwards read the opened ear as an inclined heart. The chapter itself suggests a teacher's work: "Morning by morning he awakens; he awakens my ear to hear as those who are taught" (Isaiah 50:4). God teaches, and the Servant, taught, is "not rebellious" (Isaiah 50:5). Even on Edwards's reading, the hand on the Servant's heart is not a stranger's (point 3). - A runner whose coach has trained her for years runs on the coach's work in every stride, and she is the one running. 3. The Father and the Spirit are not outside the Son as a stranger is outside a man. A designer who builds a creature's will stands outside it. The Father, the Son and the Spirit are one God, and Christians hold that their willing can never be severed, whether they describe it as one will shared by three persons or as three persons who never will apart. The Son's human will belongs to the Son's own person, and the Son as God wills whatever the Father and the Spirit will. So whatever upheld that human will, the Son himself was among those upholding it (D14). - When Jesus prays in Gethsemane, "not as I will, but as you will" (Matthew 26:39), his human will yields to the Father's will, which the Son as God wills too. What happens in Gethsemane is a struggle, and an obedience, within one person. 4. A foretold act is certain, not settled by the foretelling. The necessity Edwards found in the promises is the kind every true prophecy brings. Jesus foretold Peter's denial, and the denial was certain. But when the rooster crowed, Peter did not blame the prophecy. He went out and wept bitterly over a denial Jesus had foretold (Luke 22:61-62), because it was his own. Nobody thinks the prediction is what made Peter deny his Lord. In the same way the promises were God's word about what the Son would freely do, not a mechanism that did it for him. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+ If freedom never needed the power to do wrong, God could have made us free and unable to sin from the start, as he is. Then the evil of this world was never the price of freedom.
The strongest form of this objection runs straight from (C4), and it is older than it looks. Anselm's pupil put it to him in the eleventh century: since God could make a man unable to sin and yet praiseworthy, as Christ is, why did he not create the angels and our first parents "so as to be incapable of sin, and yet praiseworthy for their holiness?" The modern form presses on the free will defense, which answers the problem of evil by saying that God allows wrongdoing because a world of free creatures is worth the risk that they will do wrong. J. L. Mackie asked in 1955: if God could make people who sometimes freely choose the good, why could he not make people who always freely choose it? God's own case seems to sharpen it. If a will can be free with no door open to evil, God could have made free creatures with no door open to evil, and spared the world its sin. Wes Morriston puts the challenge in two questions, using moral freedom for the freedom to choose between good and evil: "If moral freedom is such a great good in human beings, why is it not a grave defect in God that he lacks it? And if the lack of moral freedom does not detract in any way from God's greatness, would it not have been better for us not to have it?" 1. Free creatures unable to sin are possible. Grant the first step. Nothing about being created stands in the way: a creature unable to sin would be free, so long as nothing outside him settled his choices. The saints in glory will be exactly that, and the source view says so gladly (C4). - A singer who could never hit a wrong note would still be the one singing. 2. God cannot build a creature's goodness into it and leave it the creature's own. Everything turns on how such a creature's sinlessness would be secured. - Had God built into him a nature that made each choice go the way it goes, God would have settled his goodness, and the creature would be good the way a well-made thing is good (D10). A goodness that is a creature's own has to come from choices that nothing outside him settles. - Had God only shut the door to evil and left the creature's choices to him, the creature would be free, as Pilate was free though God's resolve had shut his door (D7). But a door like that stays shut without ever acting on him only if he would freely do good wherever God placed him. Whether he would is the question of point 3. - Anselm's answer to his pupil was that "it was neither possible nor right for any one of them to be the same with God," as the man who is also God is. On his account a creature has its goodness of itself only by refusing to fall when it could. That road is his, and not the source view's condition (D7). The source view needs only the narrower point: a goodness another installed is to the installer's credit. - A music box plays the tune its maker pinned into it. Nobody can pin the singing into a singer. 3. What free creatures would do is not God's to decide. God can choose where to place free creatures, and he knows what each would freely do wherever he placed it. He cannot choose what they would freely do there, since then he, and not they, would settle it. A leading defender of the free will defense answered Mackie on exactly this point: it may be that in every world God could make, every free creature he could make would go wrong at least once. If so, that is a fact about what those creatures would freely do, not a limit on God's power. And a world of creatures free and unable to sin from their first moment may be one God could not make, since he could shut their door to evil without settling their choices only if they would freely do good from the first. - A friend may know two people so well that she is sure they would fall in love if they met, and so she seats them side by side at dinner. She can seat them. She cannot do their falling in love for them. 4. The rest belongs to the problem of evil. Why God made this world, with this history, rather than another, and whether its goods are worth what they cost, are questions with answers of their own. What God's case decides is narrower: freedom does not need the power to do wrong. It does not follow that God could have made a creature's goodness its own by installing it. - Some goods come only by a road. A jeweler can make a medal that looks exactly like an Olympic gold. He cannot make one that was won. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It CO / PoE: Intellectual PoE: Logical

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