(●)God governs every sin without being the one who settles it, which theological determinism cannot say.
+A defender of free will once put six questions to a well-known Reformed theologian who had criticized Molinism in public. Did God causally determine Satan's rebellion, or was it Satan's own? Did God causally determine Adam and Eve's disobedience? Does he determine which sins an unbeliever commits? When God provides a Christian "the way of escape" from temptation (1 Corinthians 10:13), does he also determine whether it is taken? Does he determine whether you pick up the red Bible or the blue one? And when you reason your way to "Calvinism is true," was the reasoning yours?
The theologian answered each question the same way: the choice was the creature's own. Then he was asked when God knew how those free choices would go. God always knew, he said, and knew it before he decided what world to create. After a pause he said, "Well, if that's what it means to be a Molinist, then I guess I'm a Molinist!" He kept every one of the five points of Calvinism, the five classic Reformed teachings about how God saves.
Molinism, the view he had criticized, is named for Luis de Molina, a sixteenth-century Jesuit. It holds that at least some human choices are free, and that God knows what every creature would freely do in any circumstance, and governs the world by choosing which free creatures to place where. That kind of knowledge is called middle knowledge. God knows what you will say when a friend asks you for a loan next week. He also knows what you would freely have said had she asked a month ago, though she never did.
So the real disagreement is not between Calvinists and everyone else. It is about one thesis, which most Calvinists hold and some do not, and the thesis has a name. Theological determinism is the view that God's decree, his eternal plan for all that happens, settles every choice anyone makes, sins included.
Everything turns on one word in that definition, settle, and an ordinary lunch shows what it means. A friend orders the soup instead of the salad. You have known her for twenty years, and you were sure she would. You may even have chosen the restaurant because you knew that there, of all places, she would order the soup, so that picking it guaranteed her order. Still, neither your knowing nor your guarantee made her order go the way it went. She did that.
To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. You were certain of the soup, and your choice of restaurant guaranteed it, but it was your friend who settled it.
A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. He is then its source, the one it comes from. Your friend is the source of her order, since nothing settled it but her.
A choice is determined when it is settled beforehand by prior conditions (the past and the laws of nature, or else a decree of God) that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. Theological determinism says that every choice is determined in this way, by the decree.
The view has been held by many Christians of deep learning and real holiness:
- Above all they have been found in the Reformed churches, the Protestant churches that trace their teaching to John Calvin, the sixteenth-century Reformer of Geneva. Their members are also called Calvinists, and Presbyterians are among them.
- The same instinct appears in other traditions, Christian and Muslim:
• In the Catholic Church, Domingo Báñez, a Dominican friar, taught that God moves every will from within to the act it performs.
• Also within the Catholic Church, the Jansenists followed Cornelius Jansen's Augustinus (1640), a study of Augustine's teaching on grace (God's unearned help). They pressed a doctrine of grace that cannot fail to take effect, and Blaise Pascal defended them in his Provincial Letters (1656-1657).
• Among Muslim theologians, the school of al-Ashari, al-Ghazali among them, taught that God creates every act and the creature "acquires" it, so that the act is counted as the creature's.
The oldest objection to the view is that it would make God "the author of sin." The Reformed churches' own confessions, the statements of faith they adopted, reject that conclusion. The Westminster Confession (1646), the classic statement of Presbyterian belief, says that God "from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures."
To ordain a thing is to decree that it will happen. The words after "yet so as" are a fence around that decree, meant to keep it from making God the author of sin or forcing anyone's will. The question is whether the fence can hold.
The argument is deductive: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. No premise has to be beyond all doubt; each needs only to be more plausible than its denial. Its form is modus tollens, Latin for "the way that denies": if one thing were so, a second would be; the second is not so; so neither is the first. If it had rained overnight, the driveway would be wet. The driveway is dry. So it did not rain.
Here the same shape carries a heavier load:
- If God's decree settles every choice, then the decree, not the sinner, is the source of every sin.
- But the sinner is the source of his sin, since he answers for his sins, and blame for a sin runs back to a choice the sinner himself settled.
- So the decree does not settle every choice.
What is refused, then, is theological determinism, in its Reformed, Catholic and Islamic forms alike. In its place stands the view that God ordains and governs everything that happens, every sin included, and yet nothing settles a sinner's choice but the sinner.
Who holds what, on theological determinism:
- Support: Jonathan Edwards gave it its classic defense in 1754, and John Feinberg defends it today.
- Oppose: Luis de Molina rejected it in 1588, though he held that God concurs in every act of every creature, acting together with it. William Lane Craig argues against it today.
The argument that follows holds that God governs every sin without settling it, and that theological determinism, which says he settles it, is false.
(P1)Theological determinism holds that God's decree settles every choice, sins included.
+The view deserves to be stated as its best defenders state it, with its texts and its reasons.
(1) Scripture speaks of God working all things by his will.
- Paul calls God the one "who works all things according to the counsel of his will" (Ephesians 1:11).
- Of the cross Peter says that Jesus was "delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God," and in the same breath, "you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men" (Acts 2:23). When the church in Jerusalem prays about the same event, it says that Herod, Pilate and the rest were gathered "to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place" (Acts 4:28).
- Joseph tells his brothers, "As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good" (Genesis 50:20).
- Proverbs says, "The king’s heart is a stream of water in the hand of the Lord; he turns it wherever he will" (Proverbs 21:1).
- When an objector asks, "Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?" Paul answers with the potter: "Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use?" (Romans 9:19, 21).
- Read these as a determinist does, and a pattern appears. The same act is planned by God, done by men, and blamed on the men. That is exactly what determinism says: God settles it, and the sinner still answers for it.
(2) The view has philosophical reasons too.
- Jonathan Edwards, the eighteenth-century American theologian, argued that a will always follows what seems to it the greatest good. A will moved by nothing in particular, he thought, would not be choosing at all.
- He argued too that a God who did not settle every event could not know the future with certainty, or govern it without risk. On his view, such a God would be steering by guesses.
- Picture a novelist, who knows every turn her story will take because she wrote it. The determinist's God is like her. He does more than foresee every choice: he settles every one.
(3) Its defenders state it without softening.
- One Calvinist philosopher defines the view plainly: "They hold that God causes every contingent event, either directly or indirectly." A contingent event is one that did not have to happen, like your choice of shirt this morning.
- Calvin himself refused to take refuge in the word "permission." He called it "a quite frivolous refuge to say that God otiosely permits them," meaning evils, "when Scripture shows Him not only willing, but the author of them." To permit a thing otiosely is to permit it idly, like a bystander who looks on and does nothing.
- He knew what the doctrine would provoke. "I confess that it is impossible to prevent impiety from murmuring and objecting," he wrote. But the murmuring excused no one, he said, because God's ordination is just, with "an equity, indeed, unknown to us, but most certain."
(4) The decree is said to work through the sinner's own desires.
- On this view God does not force anyone. He settles the choice through the chooser's own desires and reasons, which he also arranged, and so the sinner does exactly what he wants to do.
- That is what the Westminster Confession means when it says that by the decree "nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures." A choice that flows from the chooser's own desires counts, on this view, as free.
- Philosophers call this view of freedom compatibilism: freedom and determinism can both be true, so long as the choice comes from the person's own desires without outside force.
- Picture a river channelled by an engineer. The water flows by its own weight down every turn, and every turn was dug by the engineer.
Therefore, theological determinism holds that God's decree settles every choice, sins included, through the chooser's own desires.
(P2)A person whose choice another settled beforehand is not its source.
+This premise is the lesson of the manipulation argument, which reasons from a made-up case in which one person designs another to make a particular choice. Theological determinism has to face that case with the manipulator named, because on that view the one who designs every choice is God.
(1) A person designed to choose as his designer intends is not free.
- Imagine a goddess, Diana, who builds the single fertilized cell, or zygote, that a man named Ernie grows from. She builds it exactly as she does because she wants a certain man dead thirty years later. Her world is a determined one: everything in it is fixed by what came before, so a cell built just so, carried forward by the laws of nature, will grow into a man who kills that man.
- Thirty years later, Ernie kills the man Diana wanted dead. He acts on his own desires. He weighs reasons, and would have acted differently had they been different. No one forces him at the moment he kills.
- Many who meet the case judge that Ernie is not the one responsible in the full sense. Diana settled his choice, through the cell and the laws, before he was born, and he carried it out. That verdict is the evidence, and it comes before any theory of why it is right.
- Even the most thorough modern defender of Reformed determinism grants what he calls "Ernie's exemption," that Ernie is excused. He concedes that, for all he knows, manipulation arguments "might very well be successful" against a determinism with no God in it, and he rests his defense of theological determinism on what makes God different from Diana (D4, D16).
- A clock that strikes twelve because its maker set it to is a small picture of Ernie. The clock is doing what clocks do, and still the striking was settled at the maker's workbench.
(2) A determined choice differs from Ernie's only in its designer.
- On determinism of any kind, every choice is settled beforehand by conditions the chooser never controlled. What sets Ernie's case apart is only that it has a designer who intended the outcome.
- Theological determinism does not remove the designer. It names him. On that view God stands to every sinner as Diana stands to Ernie: he arranged the causes, and the choice follows from them.
- A settling from a higher level is still a settling. That God works through the sinner's own desires, as Diana worked through Ernie's, changes how the choice was settled, not whether (D16).
(3) The designer's rights do not change whose choice it is.
- Suppose Diana had every right over Ernie, perfect knowledge, and only good purposes. She might then be blameless in designing him, but Ernie would be no more the source of his choice than before.
- A right answers the question "may he?", never the question "is the creature the source?" God's authority over his creatures is absolute, and that is not the point in dispute.
- Consider a licensed surgeon and an unlicensed one performing the same operation on a patient under anesthetic. The license decides whether the surgeon may operate. In neither case does the patient perform any part of the operation.
(4) Acting on one's own desires does not answer the question of source.
- Ernie also acted on his own desires, with no violence offered to his will. That did not make him free, because the desires themselves were settled from outside.
- A stage hypnotist's volunteer shows the same thing on a small scale. At a snap of the fingers he finds he wants to sing. He sings because he wants to, and no one forces him, but the wanting was put there from the stage.
- So the Westminster fence, "nor is violence offered to the will," is true of Ernie too. It does not reach the question of source.
Therefore, a person whose choice another settled beforehand is not its source, whoever the other is.
(C1)Therefore, if theological determinism is true, God's decree, not the sinner, is the source of every sin.
+If God's decree settles every choice (P1), and a person whose choice another settled is not its source (P2), then on theological determinism the decree is the source of every sin. Stated exactly, the claim is this: the divine decree is the sufficient condition of the sinful choice itself, so that the sinner is not the ultimate source of his sin.
(1) On determinism the decree is enough by itself to bring about the sinful choice.
- A sufficient condition is one that is enough by itself to bring something about, the way striking a dry match is enough to light it.
- Theological determinism entails this first half of the claim, meaning that anyone who holds the view is committed to it. The most thorough modern defense of the view grants that on it "evil is divinely determined."
(2) So on determinism the sinner is not the ultimate source of his sin.
- Ultimate marks the one thing in dispute. Calvin called the sinner the proximate cause of his sin, the nearest link through which it comes, and God its remote cause, further back in the chain.
- The claim does not deny that a sin passes through the sinner's own will. It says that the sinner is not its source in the sense (P2) gives the word: the one who settled it.
- This second half follows from (P2). Ernie's killing passed through Ernie's own will too, and still Diana was the one who settled it.
(3) The claim is not that God does the sinning.
- God is not said to lie when a liar lies, or to murder when a murderer kills. The sinner still does the sinful act.
- The claim concerns who settled that it would be done. On determinism the answer is the decree, and the sinner carried out what was settled.
- Ernie is the picture again. He did the killing, and Diana did not. But Diana settled that it would be done, and Ernie carried out what she had settled.
(4) On determinism, the decree does the preventing.
- The same contrast can be put in terms of prevention. The principle behind blame is non-prevention: "An agent is morally responsible for an action only if nothing prevented the agent from doing otherwise." To be prevented is for something to do the stopping, there and then.
- A lock on a door you never try to open prevents nothing. A hand that grabs your arm as you reach for the handle does.
- One defender of free will applies the principle to Hitler. On middle knowledge, he writes, "there is nothing that actually exists that prevented Hitler from doing otherwise (that choice was up to Hitler himself)." On exhaustive divine determinism, his name for theological determinism, "God himself prevented Hitler from doing otherwise (by determining Hitler to commit genocide)."
- The decree, in other words, is the hand and not the idle lock. It did the stopping through the causes it arranged, and those causes were at work in Hitler at the moment he chose, as the cell and the laws were at work in Ernie (P2).
Therefore, if theological determinism is true, God's decree, not the sinner, is the source of every sin.
(P3)The sinner, not God, is the source of his sin.
+Scripture holds the sinner answerable for his sin and will not let him blame God for it, and the Reformed confessions agree. Since blame for a sin runs back to a choice the sinner himself settled, the sinner is the source of his sin.
(1) Scripture traces temptation to the sinner's own desire.
- "Let no one say when he is tempted, I am being tempted by God, for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one. But each person is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own desire" (James 1:13-14).
- John says that "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all" (1 John 1:5).
- Picture a son caught stealing who says his father put the idea in his head. James refuses that excuse on God's behalf before anyone can make it.
(2) God judges sinners by their own ways and pleads with them to turn.
- "I will judge you, O house of Israel, every one according to his ways, declares the Lord God" (Ezekiel 18:30). In the next breath comes the plea: "Cast away from you all the transgressions that you have committed, and make yourselves a new heart and a new spirit! Why will you die, O house of Israel? For I have no pleasure in the death of anyone, declares the Lord God; so turn, and live" (Ezekiel 18:31-32).
- A judgment by each man's ways, and a plea like that, are addressed to someone whose answer is his own.
- The determinist reads the plea through God's two wills: the plea belongs to what God commands, and the outcome to what he has decreed (D5). Even so, it would be strange for God to ask "Why will you die?" of a death he himself had settled.
- A doctor begging a patient to take the medicine makes sense only if the answer is the patient's to give.
(3) The Reformed confessions want the same thing.
- The Westminster Confession teaches that God's providence, his care and government of everything that happens, reaches "even to the first fall, and all other sins of angels and men," and "not by a bare permission." Yet it adds, "the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature, and not from God; who, being most holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin."
- So the confession wants what (P3) says: the sin is the creature's, and not God's. The open question is what its words mean.
• A determinist reads them as saying that the sin passes through the creature's own will, and a decree that settles every choice allows that much.
• Read the other way, they say that nothing but the creature settled it, and (P2) says such a decree cannot allow that.
- A birthday card signed "from Grandma" can mean either thing. It may mean only that the card came to you through her hands, or it may mean that nobody but she chose it.
(4) Blame for a sin runs back to a choice the sinner himself settled.
- Usually that is the sinful choice itself, which he settled when he made it. Sometimes it is an earlier choice the sin follows from, the way a drunk driver answers for the crash at eleven through the drink he chose at eight.
- Either way, praise and blame follow the source. Settling the choice, then or earlier, is what it is to be a sin's source, rather than merely the place where it happened.
- The sins in question are the ones a person commits. How anyone comes to answer for the sinful condition he was born with is a further question, which the church's traditions answer in different ways.
- Together with (P2), this is the step every compatibilist denies, and so it is argued on its own ground:
• The Consequence Argument: if determinism is true, nothing is up to us, since every choice would be a consequence of conditions fixed before we were born (a decree, or else the distant past and the laws of nature), and none of these is up to us.
• The manipulation argument: a determined agent is a manipulated one (P2).
• The positive case: several lines of evidence, beginning with the experience of choosing, give us good reason to believe we are free.
- That keeps the reasoning out of the circle one Reformed critic finds in arguments like it, "Calvinism is false because Calvinism is false" (D2). Laid out plainly, it runs this way: theological determinism is false because the sinner answers for his sins, as every party agrees, and because blame for a sin runs back to a choice the sinner himself settled. That second step is argued on grounds that nowhere assume determinism false.
- A detective shows the difference. If he says the butler is guilty because the butler is guilty, he has argued in a circle. If he finds the butler's fingerprints on the knife, he has not.
(5) God causes the act without causing its defect.
- The old doctrine of concurrence says that no creature acts at all unless God sustains its being and power at every instant. In that sense God is the first cause of every act, the cause every other cause depends on.
- Thomas Aquinas explained how God can cause the act without causing its defect: the defect of limping, he wrote, "is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping."
- Reduced to here means traced back to. In plain words, the power to walk accounts for all the walking, and the crooked leg accounts for the limp. God is like the power to walk, and the sinner's will is like the crooked leg.
- The limp alone does not decide the dispute, though. Dominican theologians who taught that God moves each will to the act it performs used the same limp, and a determinist can grant that the defect is the creature's while holding that God settled which act was done (D9).
(6) God can be the first cause of every act without settling any sin.
- Luis de Molina pictured two men dragging a boat. Each moves the whole boat together with the other, though neither is the whole cause of its moving. On his account the whole action is from God and the whole action from free choice, "nonetheless the viciousness and deformity of that action is attributed not to God but to created free choice." Viciousness here means vice, the act's wickedness.
- What Molina added is what makes the difference. On his account God does not first move the will to one act rather than another; he acts together with the will on the act itself.
- His general concurrence supplies the power for an act without choosing which act, the way an engine moves a car wherever the driver steers.
- So God supplies the power and sustains the act, and the creature settles which act it is. On determinism God settles that too.
Therefore, the sinner, not God, is the source of his sin.
(C2)Therefore, theological determinism is false.
+If theological determinism were true, God's decree would be the source of every sin (C1). The sinner is the source of his sin (P3). So theological determinism is false, and since the form is valid, everything rests on the premises.
Every theological determinist denies one step in them: the move from "this choice was settled beforehand" to "then it was not the sinner's own, in the way his blame requires" (P2; P3, point 4).
(1) The conclusion is not a verdict on Reformed Christians.
- It is aimed at one philosophical thesis, not at a communion, a family of churches. A Reformed Christian can accept (C2) and keep the five points of Calvinism, as the theologian with the six questions discovered.
- One defender of free will concludes that "the Five Points of Calvinism and the two essential pillars of mere Molinism are not mutually exclusive." Mere Molinism is Molinism cut down to those two pillars: that at least some human choices are free, and that God has middle knowledge of them.
- Reformed theology itself has room here. One leading historian of Reformed thought, describing what some Reformed theologians call libertarian Calvinism, notes that on it God "does not either determine or cause all things: some human acts are merely foreseen and permitted."
• A libertarian, in the free will debate, holds that we really are free and that a determined choice would not be. The word has nothing to do with politics.
- Two nearby questions do not turn on (P2). The grace that draws a person to God, his unearned help, can be refused, and that rests on Scripture's texts of refusal, such as Jesus' lament over Jerusalem, "you were not willing!" (Matthew 23:37), and not on (P2). Election, God's choosing of those he saves, is a further question, left to the doctrine of salvation.
(2) God still governs every sin.
- Denying determinism does not shrink providence. On middle knowledge God knows what every free creature would do in every circumstance, and he chooses the world in which they do it. He governs every event, every sin included, by knowing and choosing, not by settling each choice himself.
- To predestine is to ensure; to determine is to necessitate. God ensures the way you ensured the soup when you chose the restaurant: by knowing what would be freely chosen there, not by settling it. The God of middle knowledge places his creatures and does not script them.
- Think of a wise father who knows his children so well that he can arrange a family holiday so that everyone ends up where he hoped, without making any of them do anything.
(3) The alternative has been stated in verse.
- In Paradise Lost, John Milton's seventeenth-century poem of the fall, God says of the man he made, "I made him just and right, / Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall."
- That is the picture theological determinism cannot paint, whatever words it uses: a creature made good and able to stand, whose fall nothing settled but himself.
Therefore, theological determinism is false, and God governs every sin without being the one who settles it.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around ItPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated OnePhilosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will
On theological determinism:
Alexander, David E., and Daniel M. Johnson, eds. Calvinism and the Problem of Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2016.
Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018.
Bignon, Guillaume. "A Response to Kevin Timpe's Objections." March 2019.
Feinberg, John S. No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001.
Hart, Matthew J. "Calvinism and the Problem of Hell." In Calvinism and the Problem of Evil, edited by David E. Alexander and Daniel M. Johnson, 248-272. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2016.
Helm, Paul. The Providence of God. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993.
Welty, Greg. "Molinist Gunslingers: God and the Authorship of Sin." In Calvinism and the Problem of Evil, edited by David E. Alexander and Daniel M. Johnson. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2016.
On the Reformed room for freedom:
Crisp, Oliver D. Deviant Calvinism: Broadening Reformed Theology. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014.
Muller, Richard A. Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017.
On freedom defined by its source:
Craig, William Lane. "God Directs All Things." In Four Views on Divine Providence, edited by Dennis Jowers, 79-100. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Academic, 2011.
Stratton, Timothy A. "Has Molinism Been Shot by Bullet Bill? Reassessing Welty's Objection." Free Thinking Ministries, April 9, 2025.
Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026.
Stratton, Timothy A., and J. P. Moreland. "An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument." Religions 13 (2022): 988.
Historical sources:
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae I-II, question 79, articles 1-2. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1920.
Calvin, John. Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God. Translated by J. K. S. Reid. London: James Clarke, 1961.
Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion (1559), 3.23.9. Translated by Henry Beveridge. Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1845.
Edwards, Jonathan. Freedom of the Will. 1754. Parts II and IV. In The Works of Jonathan Edwards, edited by Edward Hickman, vol. 1. London, 1834.
Gloag, Paton J. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles. 2 vols. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1870.
Jansen, Cornelius. Augustinus. Louvain, 1640.
Milton, John. Paradise Lost. 2nd ed. London, 1674. Book III, lines 98-99.
Molina, Luis de. Concordia (1588), part II, disputations 25-26 on concurrence (the boat at disputation 26, section 15), and disputation 32, section 1. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso.
Pascal, Blaise. Les Provinciales (The Provincial Letters). Paris, 1656-1657.
Plumptre, E. H., et al. Ezekiel. Vol. 12 of The Pulpit Commentary, edited by H. D. M. Spence and Joseph S. Exell. London: Funk & Wagnalls, 1884.
The Westminster Confession of Faith (1646), chapters 3.1 and 5.4. In Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3. New York: Harper, 1877.
Biblical citations:
Genesis 45:5, 8; Genesis 50:20; Exodus 4:21; Exodus 5:2; Exodus 7:22; Exodus 8:15, 19, 32; Exodus 9:7, 12, 15-17, 34; Exodus 10:1, 20, 27; 1 Samuel 2:25, 30; 2 Samuel 24:1, 4, 10; 1 Chronicles 21:1; Proverbs 21:1; Isaiah 45:7; Isaiah 53:10; Ezekiel 14:3, 6, 9; Ezekiel 18:30-32; Matthew 23:37; Luke 22:22; John 19:11; Acts 2:23; Acts 4:27-28; Romans 9:18-21; 1 Corinthians 10:13; Ephesians 1:11; 2 Thessalonians 2:10-11; James 1:13-14; 1 John 1:5.
+"Author of sin" is too vague to argue about. As Edwards demanded, the critic must say what the phrase means, and why, in that sense, it would be wrong for God.
1. The demand is fair.
It is also an old one. Edwards wrote that those who charge determinism with making God the author of sin "ought distinctly to explain what they mean by that phrase." Then he drew the line himself, between two senses:
- In the first sense, calling God the author of sin would be blasphemy: "If, by the author of sin, be meant the sinner, the agent, or actor of sin, or the doer of a wicked thing; so it would be a reproach and blasphemy to suppose God to be the author of sin."
- In the second sense, the author of sin is one who permits sin and so arranges events "that sin, if it be permitted, or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow." Edwards did not deny that God is the author of sin in this sense.
The most thorough modern defense of Reformed determinism agrees that the phrase, left undefined, is "simply too ambiguous to even debate," and would discourage its use altogether, "because it is not biblical."
2. (C1) states the claim without the phrase.
Nothing rests on the phrase "author of sin." The claim is stated once, exactly, in (C1), in terms of sufficient conditions and sources, and the word "author" appears nowhere in it. That answers Edwards's challenge in his own terms: the sense meant is that God's decree is the sufficient condition of the sinful choice itself.
A quarrel over whether a dinner guest was "rude" is the same kind of thing. It goes nowhere until someone says what he actually did: he left before the toast.
3. Edwards's second sense is not, as worded, the one in dispute.
- Read as it stands, Edwards's second sense fits the God of middle knowledge too. That God also arranges events knowing that a sin "will most certainly and infallibly follow," and that is no reproach to him either (D7).
- The difference lies in how the arranging works. For Edwards the will always follows the motive that seems strongest to it, and God arranges the motives, so his arranging settles the choice (P1). On middle knowledge the arranging places the chooser and leaves the choice to him, the way choosing the restaurant left the ordering to your friend.
- What is wrong with Edwards's kind of arranging is not that it resembles a father who makes his son rob a bank, a comparison some critics of determinism have drawn (D12). It is what the manipulation argument showed with Ernie: a person whose choice another settled beforehand is not its source (P2).
- So the trouble with authorship in that sense is not, in the first place, what it says about God. It is what it takes from the sinner.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+The argument begs the question. It assumes determinism is false in order to show it false, and any version that does not will prove too much, since Scripture says God creates calamity (Isaiah 45:7).
1. The dilemma is carefully built.
To beg the question is to assume the very thing you set out to prove, and this charge comes with a dilemma that deserves an answer. The strongest Reformed reply puts every objection from evil to a test:
- Name the exact proposition the objection relies on.
- Show that determinism entails it.
- Show that the proposition is false.
Every version, the reply says, falls into a dilemma, a choice between two options with a trap in each:
- The ambitious versions, that God brings about evil in some way, prove too much, meaning they would prove more than the objector himself accepts, since Scripture says God does.
- The timid version, that evil is divinely determined, is one the Calvinist grants. To call it false is to argue "Calvinism is false because Calvinism is false."
2. God brings about evil in some way on every Christian view.
Isaiah says so plainly: "I form light and create darkness, I make well-being and create calamity, I am the Lord, who does all these things" (Isaiah 45:7). That is common ground, and so is the rest of what the ambitious versions say. On middle knowledge, too, God creates a world knowing every sin that will be in it.
Neither (C1) nor (C2) claims that God has nothing to do with evil. Their claim concerns only what settles the sinner's choice.
3. The timid version is argued, not assumed.
The proposition is named once, in (C1). Theological determinism entails its first half, that the decree is the sufficient condition of the sinful choice, and the reply grants as much. The second half, that the sinner is not the ultimate source of his sin, is not assumed. It is argued on independent grounds:
- from the Consequence Argument, that if determinism is true nothing is up to us (P3);
- from the manipulation argument, that a determined agent is a manipulated one (P2);
- from the positive case for freedom.
A student accused of copying an answer from the back of the book replies by showing her working, line by line.
The view that freedom and determinism cannot both be true is called incompatibilism. The dilemma assumes an objector with no independent argument for it, and here that assumption fails. The burden of proof is accepted: each premise is offered as more plausible than its denial, which is all a deductive argument owes.
4. The independent arguments meet their own replies.
- The Reformed have answers to them: the Consequence Argument, they say, begs the question, and the manipulation case proves nothing until a relevant likeness is shown. Those answers are met where each argument is made in full.
- What matters for the dilemma is where the premise gets its support. It comes from a case, a principle and the evidence of experience, not from the conclusion.
- A juror who convicts on the fingerprints is in the same position. The defense may attack the fingerprints, but it cannot say the juror assumed his verdict.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to UsPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated OnePhilosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free
+God is causally responsible for sin but not morally guilty. On a compatibilist account of freedom, the sinner who acts on his own desires remains fully responsible.
1. The distinction between causal and moral responsibility is real.
A drought can be causally responsible for a famine without being guilty of anything. Reformed philosophers argue that God can be the ultimate cause of a sinful act without being morally guilty of it, and they press the point from lesser to greater: if the two come apart even among creatures, how much more for the Creator. Some add that God is even praiseworthy for the whole plan in which the sin plays its part.
Every Christian view gives God causal responsibility of some kind. On middle knowledge, too, he creates the sinner and places him where he knows the sin will follow.
2. The question is the sinner's source, not God's guilt.
(C1) does not claim that God is guilty. It claims that on determinism the sinner is not the source of his sin. The further step, that he would then not answer for his sin in the full sense Scripture's judgments assume, belongs to (P3). So the distinction answers a charge (C1) never made.
A fire inspector knows the difference. Showing that the landlord broke no law does not tell her who started the fire.
3. Ernie passes the compatibilist's tests and is still not free.
The compatibilist says the sinner is responsible because he acts on his own desires and responds to reasons. Ernie did both, and was not free (P2). The accounts that try to say what more is needed include wanting what you want to want (approving of your own desires) and responding to reasons. They have been examined in full, and none of them marks the difference between Ernie and a free man.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Doing What You Want Is Not the Same as Being FreePhilosophy / Free Will: Wanting What You Want to Want Is Not Enough: The Hierarchical and Reasons-Responsive Accounts
+God is not a manipulator. He has rights over his creatures and perfect knowledge that no human designer has, and causing another to sin does not transfer the guilt to the cause.
1. The relevant differences are real.
The strongest Reformed reply names two:
- God has legitimate authority over what he made. A human who designed another person's choices would be accused of "playing God," precisely because it is God's place and not ours.
- He knows everything, including the good that every evil he ordains will serve.
An earlier chapter of the same defense adds a third difference: a responsible choice flows from a God-given character, and a manipulator meddles with a character that is not his to shape.
The reply also says that no one has shown why guilt should pass from a sinner to the one who determined his sin, and that God, the Creator with every perfection, is "as good a candidate as there could be for a non-arbitrary exception" to any such rule.
2. Authority answers a different question.
- All three differences are facts about the maker, so all three answer the question "may God do this?" None of them answers the question "is the creature the source of the choice?"
- Give Diana all three: every right over Ernie, perfect knowledge, and the standing to call his character hers to give. Ernie is no more the source of his choice than before (P2).
- Go back to the licensed surgeon (P2). His license makes the operation lawful. It does not make the patient the one who operated.
3. No transfer of guilt is needed.
- A transfer principle is a rule that guilt passes from the one who does a wrong to the one who determined him to do it. (C1) uses none. It does not say that guilt flows from the sinner to God. It says that the sinner is not the source.
- The reply's own principle has a second half, and that half is contested: when God's actions alone bring about a person's wrong act, the responsibility "remains solely with the human agent." The zygote case isolates exactly that claim, with Diana in God's place, and many who meet it judge that Ernie's responsibility does not remain with him (P2).
- The reply exempts God because of who God is. But who God is answers "may he?", as every right does. It cannot keep the responsibility with a creature whose choice another settled, and that is the very half of the principle the zygote case tests.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+God has two wills. He can decree what he forbids, as when Joseph's brothers meant evil and God meant it for good, and libertarians need two wills too.
1. The two wills are an old and serious doctrine.
Theologians distinguish God's preceptive will, what he commands, from his decretive will, what he decrees will happen. Scripture seems to need both: the cross was a crime and part of God's plan, and "it was the will of the Lord to crush him" (Isaiah 53:10). Many libertarians hold a version of the distinction too.
2. The two wills fit both views.
The distinction is coherent: God can will that something happen, for good reasons, while forbidding it. That much is common ground. A mother may forbid her son to spend his birthday money on candy, then let him do it so that he learns what a stomachache costs. She forbids it, and she chooses to let it happen.
The question is how God wills it:
- On middle knowledge, God wills that a sin occur by choosing to create a world in which he knows a creature will freely commit it.
- On determinism, he wills it by settling the choice.
So the two wills leave the question of source exactly where they found it.
3. Joseph's brothers meant their evil.
Joseph told his brothers, "As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good" (Genesis 50:20). The verse gives two meanings, the brothers' and God's.
- The strongest text in the story comes earlier. Joseph says, "it was not you who sent me here, but God" (Genesis 45:8). Yet in the same speech he says, "you sold me here" (Genesis 45:5). The selling was theirs and the sending was God's.
- On middle knowledge the brothers' meaning was their own, and God meant good through a meaning he did not settle. That reading keeps both meanings. On determinism, the brothers' meaning was itself settled by the decree.
- The words alone do not decide between the two readings. What they do is keep the selling the brothers' own. Whether a selling the decree had settled could still be theirs in that way is the question (P2) answers.
+God permits sin; he does not do it. As a bobsled pilot lets the sled slide and only brakes when he chooses, God only withholds the grace that would stop the sinner.
1. The permission model is coherent.
Reformed philosophers explain permission with pairs of possibilities, one pair for each sin:
- If God were to act, by giving restraining grace, help that holds the sinner back, the sinner would not sin.
- If God does nothing, the sinner will sin, because his fallen nature, human nature as it has been since Adam's first sin, inclines him to it.
To gather speed, a bobsled pilot only has to let the sled slide. He has to act only when he wants to brake. In the same way, on this model, God brings about good by acting and evil by refraining. The model is coherent, and the asymmetry it shows, a real difference in how God brings about good and evil, is granted.
2. The God of middle knowledge permits with the same structure.
- For any sin he permits, it is true that if God stepped in, by a grace he knew would be heeded or by taking the opportunity away, the sinner would not sin, and that if God refrains, the sinner will. Like the bobsled pilot, he too prevents by acting and permits by refraining.
- So the pairs are common ground, and they cannot be what divides the two views. What divides them is what makes the second of each pair true.
3. The asymmetry changes how God brings about a sin, not whose it is.
Its own defender grants that "the sled was initially placed on the track by the very same persons who subsequently piloted it down the track," and that "the point was not to relieve God from his control of evil." He adds that "permission language is not a device to diminish divine control of evil." In his own words, then, the model changes how God brings about a sin. It does not change who settles the sinner's choice.
4. What makes the sinner's sin certain is the whole difference.
- On determinism the sinner will sin if God does nothing because of what God did before: the nature God decreed and the grace he withheld. In the terms of the picture, the pilot also built the hill, set the sled on it and gave it its weight.
- On middle knowledge the sinner will sin because of what he himself would freely do, a truth about him that is not up to God.
- That is why "permitted" cannot mean the same thing on both views. When the one who permits a sin is also the one who necessitated it, the permission is the decree under another name. And it is why, on middle knowledge, nothing prevented the sinner, while on determinism the decree did (C1).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding Objection
+The libertarian's God is no better off. He knowingly places every sinner where the sin will follow, so if determinism makes God the author of sin, middle knowledge does too, as Greg Welty argues.
1. The you-too reply is the strongest answer to middle knowledge.
A tu quoque, Latin for "you too," answers a charge by showing the accuser is guilty of it as well, and this one has real force. On middle knowledge God knows exactly what every creature would do, creates a world with all its sins in view, and could have prevented any of them. Its sharpest form is a thought experiment meant to show that a God who arranges a sin through middle knowledge is no better placed than one who determines it. If determinism makes God the author of sin, the objection runs, so does middle knowledge.
Grant what is true in it. On middle knowledge God must have good reasons for choosing a world with these sins in it, exactly as the determinist's God must (D15). No view gets God out of that question.
2. Knowing is not settling.
Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. God's foreknowledge of a sin leaves the sin as open as it finds it: the sinner still settles it. On middle knowledge God chooses the stage and the actors, and the lines the actors speak are their own. On determinism he writes their lines.
3. The difference is one of kind.
- A condition is necessary for an event when the event cannot happen without it, and sufficient when it is enough by itself to bring the event about. A stage is necessary for a play but not sufficient, since it writes no lines.
- On middle knowledge God is a necessary condition of every human act, since nobody chooses anything in a world God did not create. On determinism he is a necessary and sufficient one. That is the difference between placing a man and making him choose.
- Put in terms of prevention (C1): on middle knowledge nothing that exists prevented Hitler from doing otherwise, and on determinism God himself did. A God who allows a choice he foresees and a God who settles it differ in kind, not degree, because on the first view the sinner is the source of his sin and on the second he is not.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do ItPhilosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around ItPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+Determinism gives suffering meaning. On it every sorrow serves God's good plan, while on libertarianism some evil exists only to make room for freedom.
1. The trade-off is real.
The Reformed state it honestly. Take the problem of evil, the question how a good and all-powerful God can allow evil. The most thorough modern defender of Reformed determinism grants that "the libertarian has a resource against the problem of evil that the compatibilist cannot use." He counts it outweighed only by what he takes to be libertarianism's "being false." He then argues that on determinism "every instance of suffering is specifically intended to play a part in God's good plan," while on libertarianism some evil's "sole purpose was to make room for libertarian free will."
2. God works good through every evil on middle knowledge too.
- The God of middle knowledge weighs every evil he permits and works it into his purposes, as he did with Joseph's brothers (Genesis 50:20). What he does not do is settle the evil choice itself.
- Grant the rest honestly. On this view God need not have intended every evil as a means to some good. Some may be only the cost of a world with free creatures in it, permitted because such a world is worth having, and then turned to good.
- A carpenter who lets his son learn the trade at his bench knows the boy will ruin some good wood along the way. The ruined wood serves nothing in itself. It is the price of a son who learns, and the father can still make each mistake teach him something.
3. The trade is yours to weigh.
- On determinism, every cruelty, every betrayal and every act of violence against a child was specifically settled by God for a purpose.
- On middle knowledge, God permits evils he does not settle, for the sake of a freedom that makes love and responsibility possible, and he works each of them into his purposes as well.
- Both views claim the God of Isaiah 45, who says, "I make well-being and create calamity" (Isaiah 45:7), and both confess that "he himself tempts no one" (James 1:13). You can weigh which of the two is that God.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It MattersPhilosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free
+Concurrence proves too much. If God causes the whole act as a general cause, as the tradition says, then he causes the sinful act, and the libertarian is where the determinist is, with a Latin word for it.
1. The objection is right about the act.
The doctrine of concurrence (in Latin, concursus) says that God, as the general cause behind every act of every creature, causes there to be any act at all, and sustains the agent's power to act at every moment. Molina said as much: "the whole action in question is from God." So the libertarian does hold that God is a cause of the act in which a sin is committed, and the objection is right to say so. That was never denied (D2).
2. The act and its defect have different causes, on every view.
Aquinas answered with the limp: the power to walk causes the whole movement, but the limp comes from the crooked leg. God causes "whatever there is of movement" in the act. The defect, the will's turning away from its proper end (the good it was made to seek), comes from the creature. Molina made the same point: "the viciousness and deformity of that action is attributed not to God but to created free choice."
Grant, too, that the distinction is not the libertarian's alone. Dominican theologians used the same limp to defend a God who moves each will to its act, and Edwards pictured the sun, whose setting is the occasion of darkness without being its cause. On every one of these views the defect is the creature's. So the distinction keeps the sin's wickedness from God, but by itself it says nothing about who settles which act is done.
3. On determinism there is no "which act" left for the creature.
Molina parted from the Dominicans at exactly this point, and in two ways:
- The Dominicans held that God first moves the will, from within, to the one act it will perform. Molina held that God does not act on the will first. He acts together with the will, on the act itself, the way the two men act together on the boat (P3).
- God's help, on Molina's account, is also general: it supplies the power for an act without choosing which act, the way an engine moves a car wherever the driver steers.
So God supplies the power, and the creature settles which act it is. On determinism God settles which act it is too, and the creature has nothing left to settle. That is the whole difference, and it is the difference (C1) is about.
+Denying determinism shrinks God's sovereignty. Scripture says he "works all things according to the counsel of his will" (Ephesians 1:11), and only determinism can take that at its word.
1. The worry is the heart of the Reformed case.
God's sovereignty is his rule over everything that happens. The Reformed are right to press this worry: a God who merely watched history unfold, or who had to adjust his plans to surprises the way a traveler reroutes around a storm, would not be the God of Scripture.
2. Middle knowledge gives meticulous providence without determination.Meticulous providence means that God governs every detail of history, not just its broad outline. God knows what every free creature would do in every circumstance he could create, and he chooses which world to make with all of that in view. So he works all things according to the counsel of his will, every event and every sin included, without settling each choice himself.
To predestine is to ensure; to determine is to necessitate. And he takes no risks: nothing happens that he did not know, before he created anything, would happen, and choose to allow.
A teacher who knows her class well enough can seat each child where he will do his best work. The seating plan is hers, and the work is theirs.
3. Sovereignty is not the same as settling everything.
- The Westminster Confession itself says that by the decree "nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established." Second causes are the creatures God works through, as distinct from God himself, the first cause. The confession wants a sovereignty that leaves the creature's liberty standing.
- The Reformed reply is that a God who governs through truths about his creatures that he did not write is limited by them. But every Christian grants that there are things God cannot do: he cannot lie, and he cannot draw a square circle. "Make a free creature freely do what it would not freely do" is one more thing of that kind, a sentence that names no feat.
- A God who governs free creatures perfectly, without settling their choices, lacks nothing Scripture ascribes to him.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+Scripture shows God hardening, inciting and deceiving: Pharaoh, Eli's sons, David's census, a deceived prophet. These are God determining sins.
1. The texts are real.
Here they are as they stand, unsoftened, beginning with the strongest, Pharaoh's:
- Before the first plague God told Moses, "I will harden his heart, so that he will not let the people go" (Exodus 4:21), and Paul draws the lesson: "he hardens whomever he wills" (Romans 9:18).
- Eli's sons "would not listen to the voice of their father, for it was the will of the Lord to put them to death" (1 Samuel 2:25).
- The Lord "incited David" to take the census (2 Samuel 24:1).
- Of the false prophet God says, "I, the Lord, have deceived that prophet" (Ezekiel 14:9).
A determinist reads all four the same way: God settled the sin, and the sinner answered for it.
2. Pharaoh's hardening is told as his act and as God's.
- Count how the account of the plagues tells it. In the first five plagues, the text says that Pharaoh hardened his heart, or that his heart was hardened (Exodus 7:22; 8:15, 19, 32; 9:7). From the sixth on, it mostly says that the Lord hardened it (Exodus 9:12; 10:20, 27). Neither agency is dropped.
- One hardening is told both ways. When the hail stopped, Pharaoh "sinned yet again and hardened his heart, he and his servants" (Exodus 9:34). A few lines later the Lord tells Moses, "I have hardened his heart and the heart of his servants" (Exodus 10:1).
- Read together, the two verses show what God's part in that hardening was: the respite. He ended the hail knowing what Pharaoh would make of the relief, and what Pharaoh made of it the text calls sin. God placed him, and the hardening was Pharaoh's own.
- A coach who lifts a proud player's suspension early, knowing he will take the mercy as weakness and come back more defiant, can say truly that he hardened him. The defiance is still the player's.
3. The announcement is foreknowledge joined to resolve.
- A determinist takes "I will harden his heart" (Exodus 4:21), spoken before anything happened, as the decree settling Pharaoh's refusals in advance.
- But a God who knows what a man would freely do in any circumstance can announce the outcome before the first meeting, and plan around it. Even when Pharaoh hardened his own heart, it was "as the Lord had said" (Exodus 8:15).
- A mother may say at breakfast, "He'll sulk when I tell him no," and plan the evening around it. She knows her son; she does not make him sulk.
- God told Pharaoh that he could have struck him down already: "But for this purpose I have raised you up, to show you my power" (Exodus 9:15-16). In the same breath he said, "You are still exalting yourself against my people and will not let them go" (Exodus 9:17). God kept him standing, knowing what he would do, and the exalting was Pharaoh's own.
- Paul's "he hardens whomever he wills" says that the hardening is God's choice. Exodus shows what the choosing looked like: a life spared and a respite granted, to a man God knew. Whom God chooses to harden, and why, belongs to the doctrine of election, which (C2) does not decide.
4. The first refusal came before any hardening.
- Before any sign or plague, Pharaoh gave Moses his own answer: "Who is the Lord, that I should obey his voice and let Israel go? I do not know the Lord, and moreover, I will not let Israel go" (Exodus 5:2).
- What the determinist needs is not a hardening laid on a man already refusing. It is a decree that settled the first refusal too, and the text does not say so.
5. Eli's sons and the census follow Pharaoh's pattern.
- Eli's sons had made a practice of their sins, were warned, and would not listen. The oracle that follows, a message from God that a prophet brought to Eli, gives the reason for their end in their own conduct: "those who despise me shall be lightly esteemed" (1 Samuel 2:30). Their death came as judgment after their own long rebellion, not as a decree before it.
- The "for" in 1 Samuel 2:25 stands as written. By then, in judgment on their long rebellion, the Lord had already resolved on their death. On middle knowledge the verse reads like this: having resolved on judgment, the Lord sent them no warning he knew they would heed, and left them to their own way. A resolve like that settles where a man stands, not what he does there. The refusing was still theirs.
- The census is told twice. One account says the Lord "incited David" (2 Samuel 24:1). The other, telling the same event, says "Satan stood against Israel and incited David to number Israel" (1 Chronicles 21:1). Read together, the two say that the Lord's anger against Israel took the form of letting a tempter work on David. And James says that God "himself tempts no one" (James 1:13).
- David was warned by his general, Joab, and overrode him: "the king’s word prevailed against Joab" (2 Samuel 24:4). Afterward he said, "I have sinned greatly in what I have done" (2 Samuel 24:10).
6. God's deceiving of the prophet was a judgment, not a mere permission.
- One nineteenth-century commentator on Ezekiel refused to soften the verse: "The teaching of modern thought is to soften language like this into 'I have permitted him to be deceived.'" He was right to refuse. Ezekiel's God does not say "I permitted." He says "I have deceived."
- The same commentator said what kind of act it was: "the delusion is a righteous punishment." The oracle bears him out. It is addressed to men who have taken their idols into their hearts and yet come to consult a prophet, and of them God asks, "Should I indeed let myself be consulted by them?" (Ezekiel 14:3). In the same oracle he calls them to "Repent and turn away from your idols" (Ezekiel 14:6).
- The New Testament text the commentator set beside it carries its order in its grammar: "because they refused to love the truth and so be saved. Therefore God sends them a strong delusion, so that they may believe what is false" (2 Thessalonians 2:10-11). The refusal comes first, and the delusion is its sentence.
- So the deceiving is God's act, not his permission. It does not settle the idolatry it punishes. The deceived answer for what follows through the refusal that brought it on them.
7. The plan and the crime are both kept.
- Of the cross, Jesus said, "the Son of Man goes as it has been determined, but woe to that man by whom he is betrayed!" (Luke 22:22). A nineteenth-century commentator on Acts, writing about the same event, said that God's determination "must be explained in such a manner as to make it consistent with the free agency of men."
- Middle knowledge offers such an explanation. God planned the cross by choosing to create a world in which he knew Judas would freely betray Jesus, so the plan was God's and the betrayal was Judas's.
- Pilate is the hardest case, and it has the same shape as the case of Eli's sons (point 5). His part fell within what God's hand and plan "had predestined to take place" (Acts 4:27-28), and God may have resolved to place him only where he would freely hand Jesus over. Then, had Pilate been going to let Jesus go in some situation, God would not have put him there.
- In the language of this debate, a door is another way the choice could have gone, there for the taking. If God so resolved, that resolve shut Pilate's door: given the resolve, there was no way left for him to let Jesus go. It was the resolve, not God's knowledge, that shut it, since knowing leaves a door as it finds it (D7).
- But the resolve settled where Pilate stood, not what he did there. Nothing prevented him (C1), and Jesus counts the sin his own: "he who delivered me over to you has the greater sin" (John 19:11), which leaves Pilate a lesser sin of his own.
- God need not arrange things this way, and in the ordinary run of choices the door stands open.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: What the Sovereignty Texts Say, and What They Do NotPhilosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will
+The charge against determinism is rhetoric. To say it "turns God into the devil" is an insult, and analogies to hitmen and manipulating fathers prove nothing.
1. The strongest libertarian charge is sharp.
One prominent defender of middle knowledge has written that a view on which God knows the future because his decree determines it "seems, in effect, to turn God into the devil." Reformed philosophers answer that this is an analogy, not an argument: God's purposes are good, and a human who did what God does would be usurping God's place. They are right that a bare analogy proves nothing. A bare analogy says two cases are alike and leaves it there, without naming the likeness that carries the verdict.
2. The manipulation case is not a bare analogy.
- Nothing rests on God's being like a hitman, or like a father who makes his son rob a bank.
- The manipulation case names the likeness that matters, a choice settled beforehand by someone else, and removes every other feature a critic might blame: there is no force, no lie and no reasoning bypassed (P2). The differences the Reformed name (authority, knowledge and a God-given character) are then answered on their own terms (D4).
- A doctor testing for an allergy works the same way. She takes every other food out of the diet and watches what happens when one is left. The zygote case is built like that.
3. The charge is a conclusion, not a premise.
Whether determinism makes God the source of sin is what (C1) shows, and (C1) neither calls God the devil nor charges him with guilt (D3). Whatever words one uses for that conclusion, it stands or falls with its premises, not with its rhetoric.
When a jury foreman reads out "guilty," the word adds nothing to the case. The verdict stands or falls with the evidence, however loudly it is read.
+Reformed presuppositional apologetics shows that only the Christian God makes reason possible, and it holds that God determines all things. Denying determinism undermines that argument.
1. The transcendental argument is a serious argument.Apologetics is the reasoned defense of the Christian faith, and presuppositional apologetics is a Reformed school of it. Its central move is the transcendental argument, which asks what must be true for something we already do, like reasoning, to be possible at all. A lamp that comes on tells you, without a look at the wiring, that the house has power.
Presuppositional apologists argue that knowledge, logic and morality make sense only if the Christian God exists, so that anyone who reasons at all already relies on him. Many of them hold determinism as part of the same Reformed theology. Some argue that a choice God did not settle would be a brute fact, a fact with no place in God's plan, which is exactly the chance universe the argument exists to refute.
2. The transcendental argument does not need determinism.
- The argument says that reason depends on God. It does not say that God settles every thought. A God who makes reason possible and gives his creatures real power to think for themselves serves the argument just as well.
- Nor is a free choice a brute fact. On middle knowledge God knew every choice before he created anything, and chose the world it is in (C2). A choice he did not settle is still one he planned around.
- A composer may leave a bar open for a soloist whose playing he knows perfectly. The solo is the soloist's, and nothing in the piece falls outside the composer's design.
3. Determinism sits uneasily beside it.
Christians disagree about theology (two believers who differ over baptism cannot both be right), so some of them hold false beliefs. On exhaustive determinism God settled every one of those beliefs, including the false ones held by his own people. One defender of free will argues that this undermines the trust in our reasoning that the transcendental argument is meant to secure.
- A determinist can reply that God may have morally sufficient reasons for settling a false belief (reasons good enough to justify it), as he has, on that view, for every other evil he decrees. That is fair as far as it goes: it defends God's goodness.
- But the argument was never about God's character. It is about how anyone knows. A belief settled by a source that settles false beliefs as surely as true ones has nothing in its origin to vouch for it, and that includes the belief that God determines all things.
- Whether a belief settled from outside can be the believer's own reasoned conclusion is the question of the free-thinking argument, the argument from our responsibility for what we believe, and its answer is no. If it is right, determinism and the transcendental argument cannot be held together, and it is determinism that has to go, since the transcendental argument never needed it (point 2).
See also:
PT / Prolegomena: Meta-Apologetics: PresuppositionalNT / Moral and Rational: Free-Thinking Argument
+Paul met this very objection. "Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?" (Romans 9:19) is the libertarian's complaint, and Paul answered it with a rebuke, not a correction.
1. The inference from Paul's objector is a fair one.
Its strongest form runs like this. Paul expects an objector to say that if God hardens whom he wills, no one can be blamed. Nobody would raise that objection against a teaching that left each sinner's choices to the sinner, so Paul must have taught that God settles them. And Paul does not correct the objector's premise. He rebukes him for answering back to God. Many careful readers of Romans draw exactly this inference, and it is not a cheap one.
It is like hearing someone in the next room cry, "That's not fair!" You can guess a good deal about what was just said.
2. Middle knowledge draws the same objection.
- On middle knowledge God chooses whom to create and where to place them, knowing what each would freely do, and no purpose of his fails. A reader who hears that can ask exactly what Paul's objector asked: if God kept Pharaoh standing, knowing he would refuse, "who can resist his will?"
- An objection that fits both readings cannot tell us which reading is right. It shows that Paul taught a God whose purpose cannot fail, and (C2) grants that in full.
- Picture two suspects who both had a key to the room. An unforced door tells you it was one of them. It does not tell you which.
3. Paul's answer is about God's right.
- Paul answers with the potter: "Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use?" (Romans 9:21).
- A right answers the question "may he?", never the question "is the creature the source?" (P2). So the potter answers whether a creature may put God on trial. It does not say how God's purpose runs through a human will.
4. Election is a further question.
Whom God hardens, whom he has mercy on, and on what basis: that is the doctrine of election, and it belongs to the doctrine of salvation. A Reformed Christian can keep his reading of Romans 9 on that question and still accept (C2), as the theologian with the six questions did.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: What the Sovereignty Texts Say, and What They Do NotPhilosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+Libertarian freedom does not solve the problem of evil. A God who could strike a kidnapper dead before his first crime, and does not, faces the same question on every view.
1. Most of this is right.
The strongest form comes from the most thorough modern defense of Reformed determinism, and it has two halves.
- Freedom is not needed to answer the charge that God and evil cannot both exist. It is enough that God may have "morally sufficient reasons to allow all the evil that takes place," whether or not he tells us what they are.
- Nor is freedom enough to explain all evil. Earthquakes, disease, the suffering of animals and a teenager's failed brakes involve no one's free choice. Suffering of this kind is called natural evil. Even of free wrongdoers the defense observes that God "could righteously strike them dead, or even unconscious," and on any view he often does not.
Grant both halves. Every Christian who faces evil needs God's morally sufficient reasons, and freedom explains only part of what they must cover.
2. (C1) is not an argument from evil.
- (C1) does not say that God lacks good reasons, or that he is guilty of anything (D3). It says that if the decree settles every choice, the sinner is not the source of his sin.
- That holds whatever God's reasons are. A good purpose could make the settling blameless, as Diana's might have been with every right and only good ends (P2), and it would leave the choice exactly as settled.
3. The two views part at the sin itself.
- On the question why God did not stop an evil, whether a tsunami or a kidnapper, the two views stand together: God permits what he could prevent, for reasons of his own.
- In the sinful choice itself they part. On middle knowledge God permits a sin that nothing settles but the sinner, and he could have stopped it. On determinism the sinful choice is itself the decreed means, settled by God so that his purpose would be served.
- That is also why storms and sins are not on a par. The same defense argues for parity, the claim that the two stand on the same footing: if God may determine an earthquake without fault, determining a sin has not been shown to be any different. The difference is the one (P3) turns on.
- A storm answers for nothing, so nothing is taken from it when God determines it. A sinner answers for his sin, and what determination takes from him is the one thing his answering requires: being its source.
4. The parity leaves the libertarian's resource standing.
The same defense grants that "the libertarian has a resource against the problem of evil that the compatibilist cannot use" (D8): some evil comes from choices God did not settle. The parity from natural evil does not take that away. It shows only that freedom does not explain the tsunami, which point 1 already granted.
See also:
CO / PoE: Intellectual PoE: LogicalPhilosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+God is not one more cause beside the creature. His decree works through the will from above time and establishes its freedom, and how the two fit is a mystery Scripture does not explain.
1. This is the church's weightiest answer.
- The Westminster Confession says that the decree does not take away "the liberty or contingency of second causes," but establishes it (D10). On this answer God is the first cause, on whom every other cause depends, and not a rival cause inside the world, as Diana is. He holds every creature in being and works in and through everything it does, so that the whole act is the creature's and the whole act is God's.
- Many who hold it add that Scripture sets the two side by side, "the definite plan and foreknowledge of God" and "the hands of lawless men" (Acts 2:23), without explaining how they fit, and that we should confess both rather than solve them.
This is a serious position held by serious people, and a great deal of the church's thinking stands behind it.
2. A settling from a higher level is still a settling.
- The question is what makes the choice go this way rather than that. If God's decree does, then something other than the chooser settles it, from whatever level the settling comes (P2).
- A novelist is the clearest case. She is not in the story, and she writes every line. Her distance from her characters is exactly what lets her write them all.
3. A mystery is not a contradiction.
- A mystery is something true whose workings we cannot see, like the union of God and man in Christ. A contradiction is a pair of claims that cancel each other, like a square circle.
- Scripture does set God's plan and the creature's deed side by side, and every Christian confesses both. What an appeal to mystery cannot do is make two cancelling claims true together. And if (P2) is true, a decree that settles every choice and a sinner who is the source of his sin do cancel (C1).
- So the appeal must in the end deny (P2), and then it is the first-cause answer again, which the novelist of point 2 has already answered.
4. The first cause can leave the settling to the chooser.
- There is another reading of the first cause, and (P3) holds it: God holds the chooser and his power in being and acts together with him, while the chooser settles which way the choice goes. On it the liberty of second causes really is established rather than taken away.
- Catholic theologians argued over exactly these two readings around 1600, and in 1607 Pope Paul V ended the dispute without deciding it.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One