Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

Public Theology

Theological Analyses of Societal Issues

Theology of the Family

Where Faith and Family Intersect

Biographies

Notable Works & Great Quotes from Key Figures

The Hellenistic & Roman World

300 BC – 300 AD

Sextus Empiricus c. 160 – c. 210 AD

(●) The Greek physician who wrote down the whole case for doubting everything, and whose books taught the modern world how to doubt. + Imagine two friends arguing over whether the soup is too salty. One says yes, the other says no, and a third person at the table shrugs, sets down his spoon, and says, "I couldn’t tell you, and I find I’m perfectly happy not knowing." Sextus Empiricus built a whole philosophy out of that shrug. He was a Pyrrhonist, a follower of the old Greek skeptic Pyrrho of Elis, and his aim was not to prove that nothing can be known but to stay suspended between every pair of competing claims, and to find peace there. He matters to a Christian apologetics site for two reasons. First, he is the fullest surviving statement of ancient skepticism, so every serious answer to the skeptic, from Augustine’s to Thomas Reid’s to Alvin Plantinga’s, is in some sense an answer to the questions he set down. Second, when his books were printed in Latin in the 1560s, in the middle of the Reformation’s quarrels over who could know what God had said, they lit a fire under European thought that has not gone out. The signature fact about him is how little we know. His books survive, fourteen of them, and almost nothing of the man does. (A "book" in the ancient sense was about a scroll’s worth of writing, closer to a long chapter than to a volume on a shelf.) No ancient writer records where he was born, where he taught, or when he died. The dates in his title are a modern convention, worked out from the teachers before him and the writers after him, and every date in the story of his life is an estimate of the same kind.

(●) c. 160 AD: He was born somewhere in the Greek-speaking world, in a life that left behind no birthplace, family, or date. + Knowing Sextus is a little like knowing a neighbor only from the books on his shelves. You can tell what he read, what he argued about, and what annoyed him, but not his hometown or his mother’s name. He wrote in Greek, he knew the schools of Athens and the doctors of the Roman world, and he tells us almost nothing about himself. Scholars date him by triangulation. He names earlier skeptics, the last of them active in the earlier second century AD; Diogenes Laertius, who compiled his Lives of the Eminent Philosophers probably in the first half of the third century, already knows him as a teacher with a pupil of his own. That places his working life somewhere around AD 180 to 210, and a birth around AD 160 is the convention that follows. The Suda, a Byzantine encyclopedia of the tenth century, calls him a Libyan, but it tangles him up with another Sextus and scholars give it little weight. Cities have been proposed for him, Alexandria, Athens and Rome among them, but the evidence settles none of them, and it is honest to say we simply don’t know.

(●) c. 180 AD: He practiced medicine as an Empiric, one of the doctors who trusted only what they had seen work. + His surname is a job description. Greek medicine in his day was split into rival schools, and the Empirics (from empeiria, "experience") held that a doctor should treat by what has been observed to help, without claiming to know the hidden causes of disease. Think of a grandmother who knows that a certain tea settles a stomach and has no theory at all about why; the Empiric thought that was the right kind of knowledge for a physician to have. Their opponents, the Rationalists, reasoned from theories about the body’s inner workings. Diogenes Laertius calls him Sextus ho empeirikos, "the Empiric," and a medical handbook that came down under the name of Galen, the great physician of the age, lists a Sextus among the leaders of the Empiric school. Sextus himself refers to medical treatises he had written, now lost. Yet in his handbook of skepticism, the Outlines, he says, with characteristic independence, that a true skeptic would fit more comfortably among the Methodists, a third medical school that simply followed the symptoms, than among the Empirics (Outlines I.236–241). It is an odd thing for a man named "the Empiric" to write, and nobody has fully explained it.

(●) c. 180 AD: He learned skepticism from Herodotus of Tarsus, heir to a line of teachers reaching back to Pyrrho. + Diogenes Laertius preserves the school’s family tree, and Sextus stands near the end of it. Pyrrho of Elis, who had marched east with Alexander the Great in the fourth century BC, taught that we should commit ourselves to no belief about how things really are. His follower Timon put it in verse. Then the line goes faint for two centuries, until Aenesidemus, in the first century BC, revived Pyrrhonism and gathered its arguments into the Ten Modes. A "mode" is simply a pattern of argument, a move the skeptic can make again and again, and these were ten standard ways of showing that appearances conflict: the same thing looks or feels different to different creatures, to different people, from different distances, in different conditions. A later teacher named Agrippa added a sharper set of five. Through Menodotus of Nicomedia and others the tradition reached "Herodotus of Tarsus, son of Arieus" (IX.116, in R. D. Hicks’s translation), and from Herodotus it passed to Sextus. A school like this worked something like a relay team. Each runner carried the same baton of arguments, sometimes adding a new one, and Sextus was the runner who wrote down everything the baton had picked up along the way. Many of the arguments he records he openly credits to "the older skeptics" and "the later skeptics" rather than to himself.

(●) c. 190 AD: He wrote the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, a three-book handbook of the skeptic’s whole method. + The Greek title, Pyrrhōneioi hypotypōseis, means something like "Pyrrhonian sketches," and that is what the book is: a field guide. Book I explains what skepticism is, what it aims at, and the stock arguments (the Modes) that produce doubt. Books II and III then walk through the three parts of philosophy as the Stoics had divided it. (The Stoics were one of the great schools of the day, and the skeptics’ favorite sparring partner.) Their three parts were logic, physics and ethics, and Sextus moves through them one at a time, setting argument against argument on every major question: whether there is a test for truth, whether proof is possible, whether causes exist, whether there are gods, whether anything is good by nature. From the first page he is careful about his own voice. He will state things, he says, only "historically as it now appears to us," like a reporter describing his own impressions, never asserting that anything must be so (Outlines I.4). Every sentence in the book is meant to be read with that invisible "so it seems to me" in front of it.

(●) c. 200 AD: In his longer works he took on every learned profession and every school of philosophy in turn. + Picture a man walking down the corridor of a university, knocking on every department’s door, and asking each professor to prove that their subject knows anything at all. That is Against the Professors (in Latin Adversus Mathematicos; the Greek mathēmata means "subjects of learning," not just mathematics). Its six books take on the grammarians, the teachers of rhetoric, the geometers, the arithmeticians, the astrologers and the musicians. A second, longer work came to be printed with the first under the same title, though it was really a separate book. It may even have been written before the Outlines rather than after; scholars disagree. It treats logic, physics and ethics at far greater length than the Outlines does: two books against the logicians, two against the physicists, one against the ethicists. Here Sextus quotes his opponents generously before answering them, and because so much of what he quoted is otherwise lost, he became, without meaning to, one of the great preservers of ancient philosophy. A good deal of what we know of the early Stoics, of Democritus, of Parmenides and of Xenophanes survives because Sextus copied it out in order to argue with it.

(●) c. 210 AD: He handed the school to his pupil Saturninus, and after them ancient Pyrrhonism falls silent. + Diogenes Laertius closes his list of skeptics with Sextus and "Saturninus called Cythenas," another Empiric physician, who studied under him. After that the record is empty. No later Pyrrhonist teacher is known, and no one tells us when or where Sextus died; the date of about AD 210 is only the convention that matches the rest. The books outlived the school. Greek scholars in Byzantium, the Greek-speaking eastern half of the old Roman Empire, kept copying them, but they were little read, and in the Latin West almost no one knew them. A medieval Latin translation of the Outlines survives in only a handful of manuscripts. Sextus had to wait for the printing press, and for an age that was arguing furiously about the grounds of belief, before he found his largest audience.

What He Taught

(T1) Every argument can be met by another of equal weight, so the wise course is to suspend judgment. + Think of an old-fashioned balance scale with a weight in each pan. If the two weights are equal, the beam stays level and the scale tells you nothing about which is heavier. Sextus believed that on every question philosophers argue about, the arguments on each side turn out, when honestly weighed, to balance like that. He gives the method three technical names, and each is worth learning. Isostheneia, "equal strength," is the balance itself: the arguments for and against seem equally convincing. Epochē, "suspension of judgment," is what the mind does when the scale stays level: it neither affirms nor denies. And the whole skill of skepticism, its dynamis or "power," he says, is the ability to set appearances and thoughts against one another "in any way whatever" until that balance appears (Outlines I.8–10). A tower looks round from far off and square up close. One philosopher argues from the order of the heavens that there is a providence, a divine mind caring for the world and guiding it; another argues against it from the sufferings of the good. Set the two side by side, and judgment stops. Notice what he is not saying. He does not claim that knowledge is impossible. That, he says, is what the Academic skeptics claim, and it is a dogmatic claim: a firm assertion about how things really are, which is exactly what a skeptic should not make. (The Academics were the heirs of Plato’s own school in Athens, the Academy, which had turned skeptical within a century of his death.) In announcing that nothing can be known, they had decided too much (Outlines I.1–4). The Pyrrhonist is the one who is still looking. Christians have long found this both useful and incomplete: useful as a cure for intellectual arrogance, incomplete because a search that is designed never to end is not really a search.

(Q) "The fundamental principle of the Sceptical system is especially this, namely, to oppose every argument by one of equal weight, for it seems to us that in this way we finally reach the position where we have no dogmas." + Source: Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.12 (translated by Mary Mills Patrick, 1899). Sextus is explaining how skepticism began. A "dogma" here is not a church teaching but any firm opinion about how things really are beneath the appearances.

(T2) Peace of mind comes not from finding the truth but from ceasing to insist on it. + Sextus tells a story about the painter Apelles. Trying to paint the foam on a horse’s mouth, Apelles failed again and again, and at last in frustration threw at the picture the sponge he had been wiping his brushes with. Where it struck, it left a perfect likeness of foam (Outlines I.28). That, says Sextus, is what happened to the skeptics. They started out hoping to find the truth, because they thought knowing it would give them ataraxia, "freedom from disturbance," the calm of a mind that nothing can shake. They could not find it. The arguments kept balancing. So they gave up and suspended judgment, and calm arrived anyway, by accident, the way the foam arrived from the sponge. His explanation is psychological. The person who believes something is good by nature frets when he lacks it and frets more when he has it, for fear of losing it; the person who holds no such belief "neither seeks nor avoids anything eagerly" (Outlines I.27–28). The skeptic still feels cold and thirst, Sextus admits, but he is spared the second layer of misery that comes from believing those things are terrible. Here is the point where Christian readers sit up: Sextus has seen that much human anxiety is tangled up with what we believe about our goods, and he offers a cure. The gospel offers a different one.

(Q) "The Sceptics likewise hoped to gain ataraxia by forming judgments in regard to the anomaly between phenomena and the things of thought, but they were unable to do this, and so they suspended their judgment; and while their judgment was in suspension ataraxia followed, as if by chance, as the shadow follows a body." + Source: Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.29 (translated by Mary Mills Patrick, 1899; Patrick prints the Greek word in Greek letters, transliterated here). The sentence that follows the Apelles story (T2). "Phenomena" are things as they appear to the senses; "the things of thought" are what reason concludes about them.

(T3) Every attempt to prove something ends in an endless chain, a circle, or an unproved starting point. + A child asks why the sky is blue. You explain light scattering in the air; she asks why light scatters; you explain something about wavelengths; she asks why again. Every parent knows that game, and Sextus turned it into one of the most famous arguments in the history of philosophy. He reports it as the Five Modes of "the later skeptics," usually credited to Agrippa (Outlines I.164–177). Two of the five set the stage. One is the mode from disagreement: people disagree about everything. Another is the mode from relativity: everything appears as it does relative to someone, to this observer, in this light, beside these other things. The other three are the trap, and they work just like the child’s game of "why?" Suppose you offer a proof. Either your proof needs a further proof, and that one another, forever (the infinite regress). Or somewhere the chain loops back and leans on the thing it was meant to prove (circular reasoning). Or it stops at a starting point you simply assume (hypothesis), in which case, says Sextus, your opponent may assume the opposite with equal right. Since every proof must end in one of the three, no proof can settle anything. Modern philosophers call this the regress problem, or Agrippa’s trilemma. A dilemma offers two options and a trilemma offers three, each of them bad, and every argument must take one. It is still a staple of first courses on the theory of knowledge, and it deserves to be taken seriously, because it is a real puzzle about how any belief at all gets its footing. Christian thinkers, Thomas Reid and Alvin Plantinga among them, would later answer it, not by finding an infinite chain, but by asking whether some beliefs need no chain under them.

(Q) "The one based upon the regressus in infinitum is that in which we say that the proof brought forward for the thing set before us calls for another proof, and that one another, and so on to infinity, so that, not having anything from which to begin the reasoning, the suspension of judgment follows." + Source: Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.166 (translated by Mary Mills Patrick, 1899). The second of the Five Modes (T3). Regressus in infinitum is Latin for "a going back without end."

(T4) The skeptic lives by appearances, custom and law, and even worships the gods, while holding no dogmas. + The oldest objection to skepticism is the practical one. If you truly believe nothing, why do you step around the hole in the road instead of into it? Why eat when you are hungry? Sextus had heard it many times, and his answer is subtle. The skeptic, he says, does not doubt appearances. Honey tastes sweet to him, and he says so; what he suspends judgment on is whether honey is sweet "by reason of its essence," in itself, beneath the taste (Outlines I.19–20). And appearances are enough to live by. He follows a fourfold guide: the guidance of nature, which gives him senses and a mind; the pressure of his feelings, as hunger leads to food; the laws and customs of his country; and the teaching of the crafts, so that a skeptical doctor still practices medicine (Outlines I.23–24). Religion falls under custom. In Book III he writes that, following ordinary life without holding opinions, the skeptic says that the gods exist, honors them and says that they are provident, while suspending judgment on every philosophical argument about them (Outlines III.2). It is a remarkable picture: a man at the altar, saying the right words, holding no belief about whether anyone hears. Christians recognize the posture, and it is close to the one Isaiah condemned in Israel, a people who "honor me with their lips, while their hearts are far from me" (Isaiah 29:13). He also had an answer ready for the charge that "I determine nothing" is itself a claim. That phrase is one of the skeptic’s slogans, short formulas he says aloud to report his own state of mind rather than to describe the world. These slogans, he says, cancel themselves along with everything else, the way a laxative flushes itself out of the body together with what it was taken to remove (Outlines I.206). Whether that escape works has been argued ever since.

(Q) "Therefore, as we cannot be entirely inactive as regards the observances of daily life, we live by giving heed to phenomena, and in an unprejudiced way. But this observance of what pertains to the daily life, appears to be of four different kinds. Sometimes it is directed by the guidance of nature, sometimes by the necessity of the feelings, sometimes by the tradition of laws and of customs, and sometimes by the teaching of the arts." + Source: Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.22–23 (translated by Mary Mills Patrick, 1899). His answer to the charge that a skeptic cannot live (T4). By "arts" he means the technai, the skilled crafts a person learns and practices, medicine among them.

(Q) "the intellectual in opposition to the intellectual, when to the one who from the order of the heavens builds a tower of reasoning to prove that a providence exists, we oppose the fact that adversity often falls to the good and prosperity to the evil, and that therefore we draw the conclusion that there is no providence." + Source: Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.32 (translated by Mary Mills Patrick, 1899). His example of setting one argument against another (T1), and it is striking that he chose God. On one side sits the design argument, which reasons from the order of the heavens to a mind behind them. On the other sits the problem of evil, which asks why a caring God would let the good suffer. These are the two great arguments of natural theology, the attempt to reason about God from the world anyone can see, without starting from Scripture, and Sextus sets them in a balance and leaves them there. Christian apologists have been taking the beam off that balance ever since.

What Christian Thinkers Made of Him

(†) The early church met his kind of doubt as a threat to faith and answered it with the certainty of the self and of God. + The church fathers knew the skeptics mostly by reputation, and they did not like what they heard. Gregory of Nazianzus, the fourth-century bishop of Constantinople, complained in a sermon in praise of Athanasius (Oration 21.12) that the arguing styles of Sextus and Pyrrho had crept into the church like a disease, turning theology into a contest of clever objections. The most important Christian answer to ancient skepticism was aimed at its Academic cousins rather than at Sextus himself. Augustine of Hippo, who had once been tempted to despair of finding truth, wrote Against the Academics (AD 386) to climb back out. Years later, in The City of God (XI.26), he gave the reply that has become famous: even if I am deceived, I must exist in order to be deceived. "For if I am deceived, I am" (in Marcus Dods’s translation). Here, at least, the balance does not stay level. There is a quieter debt too. Sextus, by quoting the dogmatists in order to argue with them, preserved some of the oldest arguments for God in Greek philosophy: the Stoic proofs from the order of the cosmos and from the reasoning mind of man, many of which survive in his Against the Physicists, beside the Latin retelling in Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods. The skeptic kept alive, for Christian readers, the very case he meant to neutralize.

(†) Printed in the 1560s, his books gave the Reformation’s quarrels a new weapon and the modern age its starting problem. + In 1562 the French printer and scholar Henri Estienne published a Latin translation of the Outlines, and in 1569 the Catholic humanist Gentian Hervet (a humanist being one of the Renaissance scholars who went back to the Greek and Latin classics in their own languages) published one of Against the Professors. The timing mattered. Catholics and Protestants were locked in an argument about how anyone could know what God had revealed: by the church, by Scripture, by the inner witness of the Spirit. Sextus’s Five Modes seemed made for the quarrel. Each side could show that the other’s test for truth needed a further test, and Hervet said plainly in his preface that he hoped the book would help against the reformers. Some Christians went further and made skepticism a servant of faith. The position was later called fideism (from Latin fides, "faith"), and its reasoning runs like this: if reason can prove nothing, the humble soul suspends judgment and receives the faith on God’s authority. Michel de Montaigne, whose motto became "What do I know?", drew heavily on Sextus in his long essay Apology for Raymond Sebond. Blaise Pascal took the challenge more soberly. "Nature confutes the sceptics, and reason confutes the dogmatists," he wrote in the Pensées (fragment 434, in W. F. Trotter’s translation). He meant that we can neither doubt everything nor prove everything, and that the human condition itself points beyond us to God. René Descartes, for his part, set out in his Meditations to defeat the skeptic on his own ground. Through all three, Sextus’s questions became the opening problem of modern philosophy.

(†) Christian philosophers answered his regress by arguing that some beliefs rightly need no further proof. + When you see a friend across the street and wave, you do not first prove to yourself that your eyes work, that other minds exist, and that the past was real. You simply see her. Thomas Reid, the eighteenth-century Scottish minister and philosopher, built his answer to skepticism on exactly that ordinary fact. The skeptic, Reid argued, trusts his reason while doubting his senses, but both faculties come from the same Maker, and there is no consistent way to trust one while suspending the other. Some beliefs are first principles, the footing every proof stands on, and to demand a proof of them is to misunderstand what proof is. In the twentieth century Alvin Plantinga, building on Reid, argued that belief in God can be "properly basic": rational without being inferred from other beliefs, as memory beliefs and the belief in other minds are. That is a direct answer to Sextus’s trilemma (T3). The chain of reasons does stop, and it stops not at an arbitrary assumption but at faculties working as their designer intended. Whether or not a reader accepts the whole account, it treats the skeptic’s puzzle with the seriousness Sextus earned.

(†) Where the gospel parts company with him: knowledge is possible, peace is a gift, and faith is more than custom. + Sextus is an honest and useful opponent, and a Christian can learn humility from him. But the gospel parts company with what he taught at four points. - Knowledge. Sextus aimed to hold no beliefs about how things really are. The New Testament is written so that its readers may know. Luke wrote so that Theophilus "may have certainty concerning the things you have been taught" (Luke 1:4), and John wrote "that you may know that you have eternal life" (1 John 5:13). The apostles did not ask for belief while the scales stayed level: Jesus "presented himself alive to them after his suffering by many proofs" (Acts 1:3). - The evidence of God. Sextus set the order of the heavens against the suffering of the good and let the beam hang level (I.32). Paul says the balance is not even: God’s "eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made" (Romans 1:20). Suffering is a real question, and Scripture never pretends otherwise, but it is asked inside a relationship with a God already known. - Peace. For Sextus, calm comes when the mind stops insisting on any answer (T2). For Paul, it comes from a person: "the peace of God, which surpasses all understanding, will guard your hearts and your minds in Christ Jesus" (Philippians 4:7). It is not the calm of the shrug but the calm of trust. - Worship. Sextus honored the gods by custom while believing nothing about them (T4). The Christian is told the opposite: to "honor Christ the Lord as holy," and to be "prepared to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you" (1 Peter 3:15). Faith in Scripture is trust that has reasons, and it is meant to be given them. Sextus set down, more fully than anyone before him, what the human mind looks like when it refuses to trust itself. The church kept his books close because the questions are real, and because it believes they have an answer.

Sextus is the only ancient Pyrrhonist whose books survive: fourteen books in all, the three of the Outlines and the eleven printed as Adversus Mathematicos, preserved in Greek manuscripts most of which were copied in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. A medieval Latin translation of the Outlines exists in a few manuscripts, but his real entry into Western thought came with the Latin translations of Henri Estienne (1562) and Gentian Hervet (1569) and the first printed Greek text (1621). Scholars cite the Outlines as PH and the other books as M (for Adversus Mathematicos), numbered I to XI. The handbook: - Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Pyrrhōneioi hypotypōseis, PH), three books: Book I gives the general account of skepticism, its aim of tranquillity, the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus and the Five Modes of Agrippa, the skeptical slogans, and how skepticism differs from neighboring schools (T1–T4). Books II and III argue on both sides of logic, physics and ethics, including the test for truth, proof, causes, the gods, and whether anything is good by nature. The clearest and most read of his works. Against the Professors (Adversus Mathematicos I–VI), six books against the specialists of the liberal arts: - Against the Grammarians (M I): Attacks the claim of grammar to be a science of language and literature; a mine of information about ancient scholarship on Homer. - Against the Rhetoricians (M II): Argues that rhetoric, the art of persuasive speech, is neither a true art nor useful. - Against the Geometers (M III): Questions whether points, lines and surfaces as geometry defines them can exist. - Against the Arithmeticians (M IV): A short attack on number as the Pythagoreans and Platonists conceived it. - Against the Astrologers (M V): Argues that birth-chart astrology cannot work, because the moment of birth cannot be fixed and the stars’ supposed influence cannot be observed; one of the fullest ancient descriptions of the practice. - Against the Musicians (M VI): Challenges music theory and the claims made for music’s moral and spiritual power. Against the Dogmatists (printed as Adversus Mathematicos VII–XI), the longer treatment of the three parts of philosophy, probably the surviving part of a larger work: - Against the Logicians I–II (M VII–VIII): A history of the theories of the criterion of truth from the earliest philosophers to the Stoics, followed by arguments against signs and proof. A principal source for Parmenides, Democritus and Stoic logic. - Against the Physicists I–II (M IX–X): On the gods, causes, bodies, place, motion, time and number. Preserves many of the Stoic arguments for the existence of God. - Against the Ethicists (M XI): Argues that nothing is good or bad by nature and that no art of living can be taught. Lost works he refers to: - Medical Treatises (Iatrika hypomnēmata) and Empirical Treatises (Empeirika hypomnēmata): His writings on medicine, perhaps one work under two names. - On the Soul: A treatise on the soul that he mentions as already written. - Skeptical Treatises (Skeptika hypomnēmata): The name he uses for his longer skeptical work; his cross-references to it point to passages in the surviving M VII–XI, so only its general opening part, the counterpart of PH I, is lost. Diogenes Laertius credits him with "ten books on Scepticism" (IX.116, Hicks). English translations: Thomas Stanley included the first complete English version of the Outlines in his History of Philosophy (1655–1662). Mary Mills Patrick, Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism (1899), translates Book I of the Outlines and is in the public domain and free online. Standard English editions: R. G. Bury, Sextus Empiricus, four volumes (Loeb Classical Library, 1933–1949), the complete works with Greek facing; Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge, 2000).

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