Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

Was God Free to Create, and Free to Create This World?

(●) God created freely, because nothing but God settled it, and he did not have to create at all, or to create this world. + Walter spent forty years as a carpenter, and when his granddaughter told him she was expecting her first baby, he went out to the shed and built a rocking chair. Nobody asked him to. The baby would have been rocked in a store-bought chair, or in nobody's chair, and been just as loved. He could have built it in oak or in cherry, with a high back or a low one, and there is surely some better rocking chair somewhere that a better carpenter could have made. When the chair arrived on the porch, nobody said that Walter had been forced to build it, or that he should have built the best chair possible, or that since he could have built a different one, his choice of this one was a coin toss. They said thank you. The chair was a gift, and part of what made it a gift is that nobody was owed it. Christians say that the world is something like Walter's chair, without any of Walter's limits. God made it, and he made it as a gift. Scripture puts it in the mouth of heaven itself: "Worthy are you, our Lord and God, to receive glory and honor and power, for you created all things, and by your will they existed and were created" (Revelation 4:11). Elsewhere it adds that God did not need the world at all: he is not "served by human hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself gives to all mankind life and breath and everything" (Acts 17:25). Calling the world a gift raises three questions. The most basic is whether God's choice to create was free at all, and it has to be answered before the other two, because it decides what kind of freedom is in dispute in them. Everything turns on one word, settle, and Walter shows what it means. - To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. Walter's daughter could have told you a month before that her father would build something, and she would have been right, but her knowing did not build it. - A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. He is then its source, the one it comes from, and defining freedom this way is called the source view. Nothing settled the rocking chair but Walter, and he can tell you exactly why he built it. - In the ordinary run of human choices a free choice carries a second feature: the person could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was. That is freedom's ordinary mark. It is the mark and not the definition, the way a uniform is the usual sign of a police officer and not what makes someone one. The other two are old questions. - One is whether God could have refrained from creating at all. Some philosophers, starting from the ancient principle that goodness by its nature spreads itself, have argued that a perfectly good God could not have kept his goodness to himself. - The other is whether, given that he created, God could have created a world other than this one. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the German philosopher and mathematician, argued in 1710 that a God of perfect wisdom and goodness "cannot but have chosen the best" of all possible worlds, so that his wisdom left him only one world to choose. Neither of them asks whether God is free. On the source view God is free in everything he does, because nothing outside him settles what he wills. He is free even where he has no alternative, as in doing the good he cannot fail to do. So the answers to the old questions, that God could have refrained and could have created another world, are each a further fact about his freedom: true, and worth knowing, but not what makes him free. Walter's chair makes the difference plain. He was free in building it because nothing but Walter settled it. That he could have left the wood in the shed, or built in oak, is something more we know about his freedom, and he would have built the chair just as freely if the lumberyard had stocked nothing but cherry. In the same way, the two old questions are about how wide God's freedom is, not whether he has it. They are also separate from each other. A God who had to make something might still have been free to choose which world to make, and a God who was free to make nothing might still, once he made anything, have been bound to make the best. The two questions have different arguments behind them, different critics and different answers, and an answer to one is no answer to the other, so each is answered on its own (P3, P4, C2; P5, P6, C3). The argument is deductive: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. Think of the premises as a locked chain. If every link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. No premise has to be beyond all doubt; each needs only to be more plausible than its denial. It runs in three short chains, one for each question. - The first shows that God created freely, since nothing but God settled it (P1, P2, C1). - The second shows that God could have refrained from creating, since his goodness lacks nothing without a world (P3, P4, C2). - The third shows that God could have created a world other than this one, since several were open to him and neither his goodness nor his wisdom required any one of them (P5, P6, C3). Who holds what, on whether God had to create, and had to create the best: - Support: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz argued in 1710 that God's wisdom and goodness bound him to create the best of all possible worlds, and Norman Kretzmann argued in 1991 that a perfectly good God must create something. - Oppose: Thomas Aquinas taught in the thirteenth century that God wills things other than himself without necessity, and Robert Adams argued in 1972 that God need not create the best world he could. In short: God created freely, he could have refrained, and he could have created otherwise. The last two are further facts about a freedom that rests on nothing outside him.

(P1) A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. + This is freedom at its core: being the source of what one chooses. The ability to have chosen otherwise usually comes with it, but it is freedom's mark rather than its meaning. (1) A choice is free when it comes from the chooser. - Ask what makes a choice someone's own, and the first answer that holds up is that it came from him. Nobody forced it, nobody designed it, and nothing in his past or his surroundings made it go the way it went. He did. - He settles it for reasons of his own, and that is what separates a choice from a twitch. A knee that jerks when the doctor taps it has nothing to say for itself. Walter can tell you exactly why he built the chair. - One of the standard reference works in philosophy reports a proposal that puts the idea in modern terms: that the core of freedom is "being the ultimate source, or originator, of one's choices." (2) The ability to choose otherwise is the ordinary mark, not the definition. - In everyday life the quickest test of whether a choice was really a person's own is to ask whether he could have gone the other way. In the ordinary run of choices the test works. If a man could have refused with everything before the choice held fixed, then nothing before it settled the choice for him. - But the test only runs in one direction. A choice that nothing but the chooser settled need not have had another road open. A leading defender of free will draws exactly this line: "God cannot choose to do evil, yet He freely does the Good because nothing outside Him determines Him to do so." - Think of a man who keeps his promise to visit his mother every Sunday. Whether or not he could bring himself to break it, the visits are his, because nothing but he settles them. (3) Freedom is lost when something else settles the choice. - Picture a puppet. Its strings may let it move in a hundred directions, and it is still not free, because whatever it does, the hand above it does. - When prior conditions that are enough by themselves to make a choice go the way it goes have settled it beforehand, the choice is called determined. The conditions might be the past and the laws of nature, or someone else's decree. Either way a determined choice has its source somewhere else, as the puppet's movements have theirs in the hand. • The view that every choice is determined in this way is called determinism. A row of dominoes is the picture: the first push and the spacing of the row are enough by themselves to bring the last one down. Therefore, a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own, and the ability to have chosen otherwise is freedom's ordinary mark and not its meaning.

(P2) Nothing settled God's choice to create but God himself, for reasons of his own. + Before creation there was nothing but God, so there was nothing else to settle his choice. And the reasons he created for were his own. (1) There was nothing outside God to settle it. - A man's choice can be settled by his past, his surroundings or another man's will. Before creation God had no past that was not his own, no surroundings and no rival. "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth" (Genesis 1:1), and everything else is on the far side of that sentence. - Isaiah asks the question with its answer built in: "Whom did he consult, and who made him understand?" (Isaiah 40:14). - Picture an architect drawing a house on a blank sheet, with no client, no budget and no building code. Whatever the house turns out to be, nothing but the architect decided it. (2) Scripture puts creation down to God's own will. - In heaven the elders sing to God that "you created all things, and by your will they existed and were created" (Revelation 4:11). The Psalms say it twice over: "Our God is in the heavens; he does all that he pleases" (Psalm 115:3), and "Whatever the Lord pleases, he does, in heaven and on earth, in the seas and all deeps" (Psalm 135:6). - He "works all things according to the counsel of his will" (Ephesians 1:11). Counsel in this verse means deliberate purpose: a will that acts for reasons, not a force that runs downhill. - The Reformed churches, which trace their teaching to John Calvin, the sixteenth-century Reformer of Geneva, confess the same in the Westminster Confession, a statement of faith drawn up in England in 1646: "It pleased God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, for the manifestation of the glory of his eternal power, wisdom, and goodness, in the beginning, to create or make of nothing the world, and all things therein." Notice the first words. It pleased God: the choice was his. (3) His reasons were his own. - Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth-century Dominican theologian (the Dominicans are a Catholic order of preaching friars), put the point carefully. God wills other things for the sake of his own goodness, but "it does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness." And again: "The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation." In plain words, God's will decides for itself to will things it is not bound to will. - God's reasons for creating are the ones the Confession names, to show the glory of his power, wisdom and goodness. Scripture adds his delight in what he makes, praying that "the Lord rejoice in his works" (Psalm 104:31). Nobody handed him those reasons. - Walter built the chair because he loved his granddaughter and wanted to make something for her child. Those reasons explain the chair, and nobody thinks they were imposed on him. Therefore, nothing settled God's choice to create but God himself, for reasons of his own.

(C1) Therefore, God created freely. + If a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own (P1), and nothing settled God's choice to create but God himself, for reasons of his own (P2), then God created freely. The step is called modus ponens, Latin for "the way that affirms": if the kettle is on, the water will boil; the kettle is on; so the water will boil. (1) God's freedom in creating rests on nothing outside him. - God created freely for the same reason he does good freely: nothing outside him settled it. - Walter's chair came from Walter in the same way. His love and his skill went into it, and nothing outside him settled that it would be built. - A standard reference work on God's freedom draws the consequence for the hardest case. Suppose there were a single best world and God chose it. Even then, on accounts of freedom like the source view, it says, "in choosing the best world, God is maximally responsive to reasons, is not constrained by anything external, and is the ultimate source of his action." (2) Even if God had to create, he would create freely. - Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Leibniz was right and God's wisdom bound him to create the best world. Or suppose the critics who say goodness must spread itself were right, and God had to create something. Either way, nothing would settle what he did but God himself, being as wise and good as he is. - His wisdom and goodness are not something outside him. Nor are they a state of God that produces his willing the way one event produces the next, as a spark sets off a fire. They are what he is. - So whether God could have refrained (C2), or made another world (C3), is not a question about whether he created freely. It is a question about whether he could have done otherwise among goods. That is a further fact about his freedom, and it is worth defending on its own. - A violinist who plays a piece exactly as she judges it should be played, note for note, is free in her playing, whether or not another interpretation was open to her. Whether one was open is a further question about her art. (3) Leibniz himself put the ground of God's choice in God. - Even the philosopher who held that God had to create the best agreed that nothing outside God bound him. What Leibniz called God's "happy necessity" was, he wrote, "nothing but God's own nature, his own understanding, which furnishes the rules for his wisdom and his goodness." - The disagreement with Leibniz, then, is not over whether God created freely. It is over whether his wisdom left him only one world to create (P6). Therefore, God created freely: nothing but God settled his choice to create, whatever else is true about what was open to him.

(P3) God's goodness is complete without any creature. + God did not create because he lacked something. His goodness, his love and his joy were whole before there was a world, and they would be whole if there had never been one. (1) Scripture says God needs nothing. - He is not "served by human hands, as though he needed anything" (Acts 17:25). And Paul asks a question that has only one answer: "who has given a gift to him that he might be repaid?" (Romans 11:35). - God says it of himself in the Psalms: "For every beast of the forest is mine, the cattle on a thousand hills" (Psalm 50:10). "If I were hungry, I would not tell you, for the world and its fullness are mine" (Psalm 50:12). - Think of the richest man in town handing out gifts at Christmas. The gifts make the town richer. They do not make him richer, and he did not give them because he was short of anything. (2) God's love was complete before the world. - Christians confess that God is three persons in one God (Father, Son and Holy Spirit), and that "God is love" (1 John 4:8). So love was going on before there was anyone else to love. On the night before he died, Jesus prayed to the Father, who "loved me before the foundation of the world" (John 17:24). - God did not create in order to have someone to love, then, as though his love were waiting for an object. The love that made the world was already full. - A family whose home is full of love may still adopt a child. Nobody thinks they did it because they had no one to love. (3) Nothing a creature has can add to God. - Aquinas put it plainly: "the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them." - Every good a creature has, it received. Paul asks believers, "What do you have that you did not receive?" (1 Corinthians 4:7). A world made entirely of received goods cannot pay its maker back with something he lacked. - Think of a small child who asks her father for money to buy him a birthday present. The present is real, and he is glad of it, but he is not a penny richer. Therefore, God's goodness is complete without any creature.

(P4) Whatever God's goodness is complete without, God does not will of necessity. + A will is bound to want something for the sake of a goal only when the goal cannot be reached without it. God's goal is his own goodness, and his goodness can be had without a world. (1) We are bound to a means only when the end requires it. - An end is the goal something is done for, and a means is a way of reaching it. If you need to cross the sea, the far shore is the end and the ship is the means. - Aquinas gave the everyday version. We do necessarily will what an end cannot be reached without, as one wills a ship to cross the sea. "But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one." - So a man who rides to town on a horse when he could have walked has not done anything his journey forced on him. He chose the horse. (2) God wills his own goodness of necessity and other things freely. - Aquinas drew the line in the same article. God "wills His own goodness necessarily," as we necessarily want our own happiness. But "God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end," and since his goodness "can exist without other things," his "willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary." • To will something of necessity is to be bound to will it, and a will can be bound in two ways. It can be bound by what it is: nobody can make himself stop wanting to be happy, and philosophers call this metaphysical necessity. Or it can be bound by what goodness requires of it, as an honest man is bound to keep his word, and that is moral necessity. • An honest man could break his word, though he will not. God's goodness never fails, so in God either kind of binding would leave no other way open. (P4) covers both kinds: whatever God's goodness is complete without, it binds him to in neither way. - That is no defect in God's will, Aquinas adds. If God does not necessarily will some of the things he wills, it comes from "a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it." - He also answers the objection that whatever belongs to God's nature must be necessary. Creating is not something God does by nature, he says, "and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary." (3) What God wills of creatures, he wills unchangeably, and still not of necessity. - Some have reasoned that since God's will never changes, whatever he wills he must will. - Think of a man who has signed a contract in ink. Given that he signed, the signature cannot be unsigned. That does not mean he had to sign. - Aquinas drew the same line, with a distinction that has served ever since. A thing can be necessary absolutely, in itself, or necessary by supposition, on the condition that something else is so. God's willing a world is not necessary in itself. "Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change." (4) A world adds good things without adding to God's goodness. - You might think: surely God and a world full of creatures who love him is better than God alone, and a perfectly good God always does the better thing. - The creatures' goods would be real, and good for them. But nothing would be added to God, since "no perfection can accrue to Him from them" (P3). Nor is anyone wronged by not being made, because before creation there is no one there to wrong (P6). - As for "always do the better thing," it cannot be what perfect goodness requires of a maker, because there is no end of better things to make. Whatever God made, he could have added to it (P6). A rule that no maker could ever finish keeping is not one God's goodness breaks by refraining (D15). - Think of a host who has fed every guest at his table. He has done well, though he could always have invited one more. "Invite one more" is a rule no host could ever finish obeying. Therefore, whatever God's goodness is complete without, God does not will of necessity.

(C2) Therefore, God could have refrained from creating. + God's goodness is complete without any creature (P3), and whatever God's goodness is complete without, he does not will of necessity (P4). So God did not will a world of necessity, and he could have refrained from creating. This is the first of the two further facts, and the main tradition of the church has held it. (1) The main tradition holds it. - A standard reference work states the history: "The majority view in the history of philosophical theology is that He indeed could have. He might have chosen not to create anything at all." - The Reformed confession uses the tradition's own word for it. God ordained whatsoever comes to pass "freely and unchangeably" (Westminster Confession 3.1). Read in the sense the earlier tradition gave it, freely means that what God decreed, he was not bound to decree. Some Reformed theologians, Jonathan Edwards among them, have held instead that God's choices are free and yet made necessary by his own nature (D7). - A leading defender of free will writes: "According to the Christian doctrine of creation, God's decision to create a universe was a freely-willed decision from which God could have refrained." (2) Refraining would itself have been a choice. - Had God created nothing, he would not simply have lacked an intention to create. The same defender draws the line with a picture: "God's willing to refrain from creation should not be confused with the mere absence of the intention to create. A stone is characterized by the absence of any intention to create but cannot be said to will to refrain from creating." - That is the difference between a God who could have refrained and a God who simply never got round to it. Refraining would have been an act of his will, as free as creating. - A man who sits through a whole concert without moving a muscle, because he has chosen to stay still, is not the same as a coat left on the seat. (3) Denying it has a price. - Start with the plainest cost. If God had to create, and had to create exactly as he did, then the world would be as necessary as God. Another defender of free will spells it out: if God "must create and create exactly as he did create," then "humanity exists necessarily. It could not have been otherwise," and, "Assuming the objective reality of evil, this sort of theological fatalism makes evil necessary as well." • Theological fatalism, in this sense, is the view that everything God does, he does of necessity, so that nothing could ever have been otherwise. - He quotes another theologian on the first consequence: "If [God] had to create, then in some ways he is dependent upon the creation. Under theological fatalism, we all become necessary beings of sorts." • A necessary being is one that could not have failed to exist. - You might reply that the necessity would only be moral, the honest man's kind, and not metaphysical (D2). That does not lower the price. God's goodness cannot fail, so whatever it binds him to do, he does however else things might have gone. A world his goodness required could no more have failed to exist than God could. - Scripture speaks against that picture on nearly every page. It says God made the world by his will (Revelation 4:11), not that the world flowed from him the way light flows from a lamp. (4) The freedom to refrain is a further fact. - None of this is why God is free. He is free because nothing outside him settles what he wills (C1). - That he could have refrained is what his freedom looks like in this case: a choice among goods, creating or not creating, made with no necessity on either side. It is a further fact, and a precious one. It means the world is not an outflow of God's nature, like heat from a fire, but something he willed when nothing bound him to. - Go back to Walter. He was free in building the chair because nothing but Walter settled it. His family thanks him because the chair came from him, and came as a gift: nobody was owed it, and he made it out of love. That he could just as well have left the wood in the shed is neither what made him free nor what earns their thanks. What it does tell them is one thing more: the chair is on the porch because Walter wanted it there, not because anything required it. Therefore, God could have refrained from creating, and the world exists because he willed it, not because it had to.

(P5) God could have made more than one world. + God's power was not limited to this world. Still, the worlds open to him are not every world that is possible, because what free creatures would do is not his to decide. (1) God can do other things than he has done. - Aquinas rejected the view that "from the divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that which now is." His conclusion is plain: "we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done." - Jesus said as much on the night he was arrested. In Gethsemane he told Peter to put away his sword: "Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and he will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels?" (Matthew 26:53). John the Baptist said it of Abraham's children: "God is able from these stones to raise up children for Abraham" (Matthew 3:9). - Aquinas also pictured a better world. God, he wrote, "could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe." (2) Not every possible world was open to God. - A possible world, in this sense, is a complete way things could have gone, from beginning to end. Not every possible world is one God could make. He cannot make a world with a square circle in it. Nor can he make a world in which his free creatures freely do what they would not in fact do in the circumstances he places them in. - A leading defender of free will puts it with a famous example: it was not open to God "to make a world containing square circles or a world in which Peter, if placed in precisely the same circumstances he was placed in, would not deny Christ." What Peter would freely do there is up to Peter. • This assumes that God knows what every creature would freely do in any circumstance. That knowledge is called middle knowledge, and it has a full defense of its own. • God's having more than one world to choose from does not wait on it, though. Middle knowledge is the view on which the fewest worlds are open to him, and even on it they are many. Those who deny God this knowledge leave him no fewer worlds to choose from, and those who hold that God settles every choice leave him more, since then what a creature would do is his to decide. - The worlds God could make are sometimes called the feasible worlds. Think of a restaurant menu. The kitchen could in principle cook almost anything, but tonight's menu is what it can make from what it has. The menu is still long. (3) The feasible worlds are many. - Whatever free creatures would do, God had countless choices that did not wait on them: how many stars, which creatures, how long the ages, where and when to place each person. Worlds that differ in those ways are still feasible. - The plainest case is a world with no free creatures in it at all, a universe of stars and seas and nothing that chooses. Such a world waits on no one's choice, and God could have made any number of them. - So God's options were not one. They were many, and he chose among them. Therefore, God could have made more than one world, though not every world that is possible.

(P6) Neither God's goodness nor his wisdom required him to make any one of those worlds. + No world God could make is so good that his goodness had to choose it, or fits his purpose so exactly that his wisdom had to. However the worlds are ranked, the gift of a world is owed to no one. (1) No world is proportionate to God's goodness. - Something is proportionate to a goal when it matches it in measure, the way one key fits one lock. - Aquinas met this question head-on. Some in his day held that God's wisdom and justice tied him to the present order of things. He answered that a wise maker is tied to one plan only when his goal is matched by one plan. "But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could happen." - God's goal in making is to show his goodness, and every world shows it without exhausting it. So the goal never singles out one world as the one that reaches it, and wisdom has many good ways to serve it. - Think of a painter trying to paint the ocean. No canvas captures the whole sea, so the sea does not tell him which canvas to paint. It leaves him a thousand good ones. (2) There may be no single best world at all. - Leibniz assumed there is one best of all possible worlds. A standard reference work on God's freedom reports that the opposite view, that every world could be bettered, "appears to be the dominant view in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion." - On that view, for any world God could make there would be a better one, as there is a larger number for any number. Aquinas held as much long before, when he said that God can always make something better than what he made. If so, the demand to make the best world is a demand that nothing could meet. - Or several worlds may be tied for best, or be too different in kind to rank. A defender of free will quotes another theologian on the consequence: "There could be several equally good options which are the best way for God to achieve his desired ends." - Suppose a parent is told to buy her son the best bicycle in the shop, and two bicycles tie for best. The rule still leaves her a choice. (3) Creating less than the best need wrong no one. - No creature has a claim on God before it exists, since there is no one there to have it. Aquinas said it plainly: "God is bound to nobody but Himself." - Suppose, though, that there were a best world. One philosopher argued in 1972 that God would wrong no one by creating another, so long as three things hold of it: • none of its creatures would exist in the best world; • none would have been better off never existing; • each is at least as well off as it could have been in any other world where it could exist. - Each condition closes off a complaint. No one in such a world can say "I was kept out of the best world," because none of them would have been in it. No one can say "I would have been better off never made." And no one can say "You could have made me better off somewhere else." So nobody there can complain that God did them an injustice by making them rather than someone else. - The same philosopher added that choosing such a world can express grace, which he defined as love that does not depend on the merit of the one loved. A gift to someone who has no claim on you is not made unjust by the existence of a better gift you could have given to someone else. - A teacher could have taught a prodigy, and instead she takes on a struggling pupil. Nobody says she has wronged the pupil by choosing him. (4) God's way of making cannot be bettered. - Aquinas drew a distinction that answers a great deal. God can always make a better thing. But he cannot make anything in a better way, "because He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness." Whatever God makes, he makes with all the wisdom and goodness there is. - So even when the world God makes could be bettered, the making could not. Walter's chair is not the best chair possible, and still nothing was missing from the love he made it with. (5) The denial needs two things at once. - To deny (P6), one must hold both of these: • that there is exactly one best world God could make; • that perfect goodness must always make the best, even where making less wrongs no one. - The first runs against what a standard reference work calls the dominant view (point 2). The second is contested even among those who think there is a best world. The answer from grace (point 3) has drawn many critics and some defenders. Its critics reply that goodness can do more than duty asks, so that a God who wrongs no one might still be bound by his goodness to the best, and that reply is a serious one (D3, D5). - It is like a lock with two dials. The denial opens only if both numbers come up right, and each is in doubt. - So (P6) is more plausible than its denial, though not beyond dispute. And suppose both claims did hold. What would fall then is (C3), God's freedom to make another world. His freedom itself would stand, since it rests on nothing outside him (C1). Therefore, neither God's goodness nor his wisdom required him to make any one of the worlds he could make.

(C3) Therefore, God could have created a world other than this one. + God could have made more than one world (P5), and neither his goodness nor his wisdom required him to make any one of them (P6). Nor did anything outside him tie him to this one, since before creation no one had a claim on him and nothing but God settled his choice (P2). He had the power to make another world, then, and nothing in him or outside him bound him to this one. So God could have created a world other than this one, and that is the second of the two further facts. (1) This world is a choice, not a necessity. - The philosopher Baruch Spinoza drew the opposite conclusion in 1677: "Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained." Christian teaching has always refused it. On Spinoza's view the world is not a gift at all, because no one gives it. It is God's nature spilling over, the way a cup overflows when it is full. - Scripture speaks of God's works as made in wisdom: "O Lord, how manifold are your works! In wisdom have you made them all" (Psalm 104:24). Wisdom is the skill of fitting a work to its purpose, and a work made in wisdom is designed, not spilled. Spinoza's overflowing cup has no say in where the water goes. (2) God chose this world with reasons and without necessity. - To say that God could have made another world is not to say that he chose this one for no reason. He chose it for reasons of his own, his glory and his goodness and his joy in what he makes, and those reasons explain the choice without forcing it. - A leading defender of free will describes God's choice in the case where alternatives exist: God "does decide in the sense that his will inclines toward one alternative rather than another and does so freely. It is up to God what he does; he could have willed otherwise. This is the strongest sense of libertarian freedom of the will." • Libertarian freedom is freedom of a kind that cannot live with determinism. The word has nothing to do with politics. - Walter chose cherry over oak because he liked the color with the porch. He could tell you why, and he could have chosen oak. (3) The freedom among worlds is a further fact. - God is not free because he could have made another world. He is free because nothing outside him settles what he wills (C1). Where his nature excludes an option, as with evil, he is free still. - That he could have made another world shows how wide his freedom in creating is: many worlds were open to him, and he chose among them. That freedom among goods is a further fact about God. It is also the room in which providence, God's guiding of the world toward his purposes, does its work. - Walter would have built the chair just as freely if the lumberyard had stocked nothing but cherry. The oak he passed over made his choice wider, not freer. Therefore, God could have created a world other than this one, and he created this one freely, for reasons of his own.

On God's freedom: Adams, Robert Merrihew. "Must God Create the Best?" Philosophical Review 81, no. 3 (1972): 317-332. Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013. Craig, William Lane. Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, On God: Attributes of God. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2025. Sections 6.4.3.2 and 7.3.1. Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Frances Howard-Snyder. "How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a Surpassable World." Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994): 260-268. Kraay, Klaas J. "Divine Freedom." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman. Sections 1.2 and 2.2-2.5. Kraay, Klaas J. "Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse." Philosophical Studies 147, no. 3 (2010): 355-368. Langtry, Bruce. God, the Best, and Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Morris, Thomas V. "Perfection and Creation." In Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, edited by Eleonore Stump. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. O'Connor, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. "Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2022. Section 4.2. Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974. Chapter 9. Pruss, Alexander R. "Divine Creative Freedom." Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 7 (2016): 213-238. Pruss, Alexander R. The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Sokolowski, Robert. The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Pages 39, 454-457 (quoting John D. Laing at 456). Tucker, Chris. "Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion)." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2016): 127-143. Critic sources engaged: Bignon, Guillaume. "A Critical Review and Fairly Comprehensive Refutation of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism." December 2020. Page 45. Edwards, Jonathan. A Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of That Freedom of Will. 1754. Part IV, section 7. In The Works of President Edwards, vol. 5, 262-270. Worcester: Isaiah Thomas, 1808. Kraay, Klaas J. "Is Motivated Submaximization Good Enough for God?" Religious Studies 57 (2021): 403-417. Kretzmann, Norman. "A General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at All?" In Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, edited by Scott MacDonald, 208-228. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil. 1710. Translated by E. M. Huggard. Part I, sections 7-8; Part II, sections 175 and 191. Mackie, J. L. "Evil and Omnipotence." Mind 64, no. 254 (1955): 200-212. Mason, David R. "Can God Be Both Perfect and Free?" Religious Studies 18 (1982): 191-200. Page 196, as quoted in Kraay, "Divine Freedom." Mullins, R. T. "Simply Impossible: A Case Against Divine Simplicity." Journal of Reformed Theology 7 (2013): 181-203. Rowe, William L. Can God Be Free? Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. Rowe, William L. "The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom." In Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, edited by Eleonore Stump, 223-233. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. Page 228, as quoted in Kraay, "Divine Freedom." Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics. 1677. Part I, propositions 16 and 33. Translated by R. H. M. Elwes. London: George Bell and Sons, 1883. Van Inwagen, Peter. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. Wielenberg, Erik J. "A Morally Unsurpassable God Must Create the Best." Religious Studies 40, no. 1 (2004): 43-62. Historical sources: Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae I, question 5, article 4; I, question 13, article 7; I, question 19, articles 2-4; I, question 25, articles 5-6. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 2nd ed. London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1920. Bonaventure. Itinerarium mentis in Deum (The Journey of the Mind into God). 1259. Chapter 6, section 2. The Westminster Confession of Faith 2.2, 3.1 and 4.1. 1646. In Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1877. Biblical citations: Genesis 1:1; Genesis 1:31; Deuteronomy 7:7; Psalm 19:1; Psalm 50:10-12; Psalm 104:24; Psalm 104:31; Psalm 115:3; Psalm 135:6; Isaiah 40:14; Matthew 3:9; Matthew 26:53; John 17:24; Acts 17:25; Romans 11:35; 1 Corinthians 1:27-28; 1 Corinthians 4:7; Ephesians 1:11; 1 John 4:8; Revelation 4:11.
+ Goodness by its nature spreads itself. A perfectly good God could not have kept his goodness to himself, so he had to create something.
The strongest form of this objection is Norman Kretzmann's. It starts from a principle Christians themselves have long held: that goodness is "diffusive of itself," as the medieval saying put it, overflowing to others the way a spring overflows its banks. Aquinas himself wrote that it belongs to the nature of the will "to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will," and that it belongs all the more to God's will "to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible." Kretzmann argued in 1991 that if Aquinas meant this, a perfectly good God must create something, though perhaps not any particular world. Read strictly, "as much as possible" would point further still, toward the most God could make. Kretzmann himself claimed only the weaker conclusion. 1. Aquinas read the principle as drawing, not forcing. Aquinas knew the saying and explained what it means: "Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move." An end, remember, is a goal (P4), and a goal moves us by drawing us toward it. So a good attracts, the way a feast draws guests. It does not push itself outward the way water pushes over a dam. - The same article that speaks of giving good "as much as possible" draws its conclusion in a milder word. God wills other things to be, Aquinas says, "inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein." Befits is not must, and the very next article denies that God's willing of creatures is "absolutely necessary" (P4). - A host who loves to share his table will throw dinners. Nobody concludes that he cannot help it. 2. "As much as possible" cannot be a quota. Aquinas also held that God can always make something better than whatever he has made (P6). Read as a requirement to give the most good there could be, "as much as possible" would demand what no world could supply, since every world could be added to. Read the way Aquinas's own next article reads it, the phrase describes the generosity of God's will, the direction it leans. It is not a measure creation has to fill. - A grandmother who "gives as much as she possibly can" to her grandchildren is not breaking her own rule each Christmas she could have given a little more. The phrase tells you what kind of giver she is. 3. God's goodness was already shared within God. The principle's deepest truth is that goodness loves to give itself, and Christians answer that God's goodness always has. The Father loved the Son "before the foundation of the world" (John 17:24), and the life of God is the shared love of Father, Son and Holy Spirit (P3). - Bonaventure, a Franciscan friar who taught at Paris in Aquinas's day (the Franciscans are the order founded by Francis of Assisi), took the principle at full strength and found it met there. The highest good must give itself in the highest way, he argued, and only the Father's giving of the whole divine being to the Son and the Spirit is that high. Set beside it, the creation of the world is no more than a single point against the immensity of God's eternal goodness. So no world could be the giving the principle demands, and the giving it demands was never missing. - This does not by itself meet the principle as Aquinas words it, which concerns giving good "by likeness" to others, that is, to creatures. Points 1 and 2 answer that wording. 4. A goodness that had to issue in a world would need one. If goodness must, by its nature, issue in creatures, then a God with no world would fall short of what his own goodness is, and his perfection would wait on something other than himself. That is a denial of (P3), and Scripture denies it in turn: God is not served "as though he needed anything" (Acts 17:25), and "who has given a gift to him that he might be repaid?" (Romans 11:35). - A singer who cannot be at her best unless someone is listening needs an audience. God's goodness needs none. 5. God would create freely even so. Even if Kretzmann were right, nothing would settle God's creating but God himself, being who he is, and his goodness is not something outside him (C1). What would be lost is the further fact, his freedom to refrain (C2). His freedom itself would not be. - Walter would have built the chair just as freely if he were the kind of grandfather who could never let a grandchild arrive without one.
+ A God of perfect wisdom and goodness must choose the best. If he could choose a lesser world, there would be something in his choice to correct.
The strongest form of this objection is Leibniz's, in the book he wrote to defend God's goodness. "Now this supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less infinite, cannot but have chosen the best. For as a lesser evil is a kind of good, even so a lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the way of a greater good; and there would be something to correct in the actions of God if it were possible to do better." He went further: if there were no best of all possible worlds, "God would not have produced any." Leibniz insisted that this left God free, because the necessity was moral, not metaphysical: "just as metaphysical necessity is preposterous in relation to God's actions ad extra, so moral necessity is worthy of him. It is a happy necessity which obliges wisdom to do good." - A moral necessity is the kind that binds an honest man to his word: he could break it, and he will not. A metaphysical necessity is the kind that makes a triangle three-sided, where nothing else is possible at all. - Ad extra is Latin for "toward the outside": God's actions on things other than himself, such as creating. 1. Leibniz was right about where the necessity lies. Leibniz located God's "happy necessity" in "God's own nature, his own understanding." On that point he agrees with the source view. Nothing outside God settles his choice, so God creates freely even on Leibniz's account (C1). The dispute is only over the further fact. 2. There may be no best world to choose. Leibniz's argument needs a single best of all possible worlds. If for every world there is a better, or if several are tied or too different to rank, the demand to choose the best leaves God many options or none. The view that every world could be bettered is the one a standard reference work calls dominant (P6). - Leibniz saw the threat and met it with a rule: if there were no best, "God would not have produced any." Since God did create, he concluded, there must be a best. - The rule is the weak link. It says that a perfectly wise being, offered an endless line of good worlds, would make none of them, because none was the last. That is Buridan's donkey, the animal in the old puzzle that starved between two bales of hay because neither was better than the other (D4). It is not what wisdom does. - And the best of all possible worlds, if there were one, need not be a world God could make. If its goodness depends on what its free creatures would freely do, God can make it only if they would freely do those things in the places he would put them, and that is theirs to decide (P5). Leibniz took for granted that an all-powerful God could make any possible world he pleased. The assumption has since been given a name: Leibniz's lapse. 3. A lesser good stands in the way of no one. Leibniz's line is true in the cases that make it sound obvious. A lesser good is "a kind of evil if it stands in the way of a greater good," as when a doctor gives a patient a weaker medicine than the one at hand. But a world is not a good kept back from anyone. - Those who would have lived only in a better world never exist, and so lose nothing. And creatures who would never have been in the better world are not robbed of it by being made in this one (P6). - God gains nothing from any world (P3). Whether perfect goodness must still do the most, even when no one is wronged, is the question William Rowe pressed (D3). 4. No world is proportionate to God's goodness. Every world shows God's goodness and none exhausts it, so his purpose never singles out one world as the one that reaches it, and his wisdom is not tied to any of them (P6). As Aquinas put it, "the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could happen." - No canvas captures the whole sea, so the sea does not tell the painter which canvas to paint (P6). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God
+ If there is a best world, a perfect God must create it and is not free. If there is none, any world he creates could be bettered, so no creator could be perfectly good.
The strongest form of this objection is William Rowe's, and it is a dilemma aimed at the existence of God. A dilemma is an argument with two horns: two possibilities, each said to lead to the same unwelcome end. - The first horn: if there is a best world, a perfectly good being must create it, and then he could not have done otherwise, so he is not free and does not deserve thanks for creating. - The second horn: if there is no best world, then whatever world a being creates, a better one was possible, and a being who creates a better world would be better still. So no creator could be unsurpassably good, good in a way no being could outdo. Either way, Rowe concludes, there is no perfectly good and free creator. He also replies to Robert Adams, the philosopher who argued in 1972 that God need not create the best world he could (P6). Adams's arguments show at best, Rowe argues, "that God's moral perfection imposes no moral obligation on God to [actualize] the best world he can" (to actualize a world is to make it the real one). They do not show, he says, that God's perfect goodness allows less than the best. Put plainly, his point is that a God who wrongs no one might still fall short of all that perfect goodness would do. 1. The first horn assumes the wrong account of freedom. The first horn says that a God who must create the best is not free. That is true only if freedom requires the ability to do otherwise. - On the source view, a God who created the best because he is good would be free, since nothing would settle his choice but God himself, just as he is free in doing the good he cannot fail to do (C1). A standard reference work on God's freedom says the same: on such accounts, "in choosing the best world, God is maximally responsive to reasons, is not constrained by anything external, and is the ultimate source of his action." - And praise follows the source: God would deserve thanks for a creation nothing but he settled, as he deserves praise for the goodness he cannot fail in. - A mother who could never let her child go hungry is thanked for every meal, and nobody first asks whether she was able to let it go hungry. So even if the first horn held, God would still be free. What it would cost is only further facts about his freedom: his freedom to make another world (C3), and, if the best world must be better than none, his freedom to refrain (C2), which has its own defense (D15). 2. The second horn measures a maker by the rank of what he makes. Its key step is that if a better world was possible, a better creator was possible. But where every world has a better, that measure fails every possible maker. It fails any rival imagined to outdo God too, since he could be outdone in turn. - A standard that no possible maker could meet finds no flaw in any maker. It shows that the standard is the wrong one. - Aquinas had already named the right one. God can always make a better thing, but he cannot make anything in a better way, "because He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness" (P6). Measured by the wisdom and goodness he makes with, a God who makes a good world with all the wisdom and goodness there is cannot be surpassed. - Think of a benefactor whose fortune never runs out, deciding how many orphans' school fees to pay. Whatever number she chooses, she could have chosen one more, and so could any benefactor who could ever exist. That cannot be a flaw in her generosity, because no number would escape it. Rowe draws the opposite conclusion: if there is no best world, a perfectly good creator is impossible. So the choice is between two claims. One is that a perfectly good God cannot exist. The other is that a measure no possible maker could meet is the wrong measure. The second is far easier to believe. 3. Other answers point the same way. Christian philosophers have answered the second horn from other sides too: - Some argue that an unsurpassable being can create a surpassable world, provided the world is good enough, since no maker faced with an endless series of better options can be faulted for not reaching an end that does not exist. - Some argue that where there is no best, a good agent may rightly choose an option that is good enough, the way a person told to pick a large number can pick a large one without failing, though a larger one always exists. - Some argue that God might create a multiverse, a vast collection of universes, containing every universe worth creating, so that there is a best world after all. That answers the second horn by turning it into the first (point 1). 4. Whether goodness must go beyond duty depends on how the worlds rank. Rowe grants, for the sake of argument, that Adams showed God does no wrong in making a lesser world, and asks whether perfect goodness requires the best anyway. That is a fair question. Goodness can do more than duty asks, and a goodness that only avoided wrongs would not be the most a goodness can be. How the question comes out turns on how the worlds are ranked: - If there is no best, nobody could make it, and point 2 applies. - If several worlds tie at the top, or are too different to rank, even a goodness bound to the best has several to choose from, and (C3) stands. The parent told to buy the best bicycle, when two tie for best, still has a choice (P6). - Only if there is exactly one best world God could make does the question bite. There Adams's answer from grace meets it: loving creatures who are not the most excellent is itself a perfection of goodness, not a shortfall (P6, D5). That answer has its critics. And if Rowe were right in that last case, what would fall is the further fact (C3). God's freedom would not (C1). See also: CO / PoE: Intellectual PoE: Logical Philosophy / Free Will: God Cannot Sin and Is Praised for It: The Impeccability Objection
+ Choosing among tied worlds, or among worlds that are good enough, is a coin toss. A perfect being would not choose arbitrarily, and "free among ties" makes his freedom matter only when nothing matters.
David Mason called such a choice "not so much a free decision as something like the toss of a coin or sheer capriciousness." Others have objected that on this account God would be free only where nothing much is at stake. 1. The answer does not rest on ties. Ties are one reason God's goodness did not require one world (P6), but not the only one, and not the main one. The main ones are that no world is proportionate to God's goodness and that creation is a gift owed to no one (P6). God's freedom among worlds would stand even if no two worlds were exactly equal. 2. A reason that does not force is still a reason. The charge assumes that a choice is arbitrary unless its reasons settle it, so that any choice not fixed by reasons is a coin toss. That is the luck objection against human freedom, turned against God. The luck objection is the charge that a choice nothing settled beforehand is a matter of mere chance, and it fails against God for the same reason it fails against us: a free choice made for reasons is explained by them without being fixed by them. - "Why did God make this world?" has an answer: for his glory, his goodness and his joy in it (P2). Philosophers call that a noncontrastive explanation, one that says why he did what he did. - "Why this world rather than its exact equal?" may have no answer that names anything beyond God and his choosing. That would be a contrastive explanation, one that says why this rather than that, and a free choice can lack it without being made for no reason. - Caprice is choosing without reasons, or against them. A choice among equals, made for the best reasons there are, is neither. - A father who chooses one good name for his daughter from a dozen good names has not tossed a coin. He can tell you why he chose it, though not why it beat every other good name, and he does not need to. 3. Refusing to choose would be the real failure. The old picture of a will that cannot choose among equals is Buridan's donkey, named after a medieval philosopher. It stood exactly between two equal bales of hay and starved, having no reason to prefer either. Nobody thinks the donkey's starving was wisdom. A God who would make nothing unless one world topped every other, as Leibniz held (D2), would be wise only in the donkey's way. 4. God's preferences are not blind. Some Christian philosophers add that God's choice among good options may express his own character, the way an artist's choice among good designs expresses her style. One argues that where worlds are good in different ways, God's being taken with particular features of one can even explain why he chose it over the others. That is not caprice. It is personality, and the psalmist prays that "the Lord rejoice in his works" (Psalm 104:31). 5. God's freedom does not matter only when nothing matters. God is free in everything he does, because nothing outside him settles it (C1). The freedom among worlds is a further fact on top of that. So it is not true that on this account God is free only when nothing is at stake. He is free when everything is at stake, and he has room among goods besides. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation
+ Choosing a lesser world when a better was available shows a flaw in character. A perfectly good being pursues the good in proportion to its value.
The strongest form of this objection is Erik Wielenberg's. He grants that God might show grace in making a lesser world. But God would also show, he argues, the absence of another virtue: the disposition to pursue good things in proportion to their value, so that the better is always preferred to the worse. So a God who made less than the best would still fall short. 1. The virtue is real where one person's good is at stake. When the same person can be given a greater good or a lesser one, and nothing else is at stake, choosing the lesser is a defect, even where no one is wronged. Wielenberg's virtue belongs there, and that much is granted. - A father who could give his son either of two birthday presents, and gives him the one he will like less for no reason at all, has broken no rule. Still, something is missing in his care. 2. A better world is not better for these creatures. In the case that matters, creating is not like the father's choice, because the better world is not better for the same creatures. In a world chosen as (P6) describes, each creature is at least as well off as it could have been in any other world where it could exist. So the better world is better because of what it has besides them, or in their place. - If other creatures would exist in place of these, to prefer that world is to prefer that these people never be made. - If more would exist besides them, no one is deprived when those others are not made (D15). And where every world could be added to, point 3 applies. - A disposition always to bring the most excellent beings into existence is not plainly a virtue. It is exactly what grace refuses, and Scripture's God is above all gracious. He chose Israel, "not because you were more in number than any other people" (Deuteronomy 7:7), and he chooses the lowly and the weak (1 Corinthians 1:27-28). - Parents who adopt do not search the world for the most gifted child available, and nobody faults their love for it. 3. Where there is no best, no maker could have the virtue in that form. If every world has a better, a disposition always to prefer the better can never be satisfied by any choice, God's or anyone's. A virtue no possible maker could exercise is not one God lacks (D3). - Asked to pick a number, a man who must always prefer the larger can never pick at all. Whether grace and proportional pursuit pull apart in God's choice, and which should give way if they do, is still argued. One recent defense holds that a good agent may choose less than the most when moved by a good reason of another kind, and that grace is such a reason. Critics have answered that defense in turn. Suppose Wielenberg were right in the case where there is a single best world. What would fall then is (C3), God's freedom to make another world. His freedom would not fall, and neither would his goodness, since a God bound to the best would make it freely (C1).
+ God's nature determined him to create, and his nature is not outside him. So it does not follow that God's choice was undetermined, and nothing about our freedom follows from his.
Defenders of libertarian freedom sometimes point to creation as a case of it: God chose to create, and nothing outside him made him. This objection comes from a Reformed critic of libertarian freedom, who answers that argument in two steps. - A God determined to create by "his self-existing, necessarily good nature" is not caused from outside, so it does not follow that his choice was undetermined. - Even if God has such freedom, it does not follow that human beings do. 1. Nothing about human freedom follows from God's. The second step is right, and it is granted outright. Human freedom is argued on its own grounds, never from God's freedom to ours. 2. God would be free even so. A God who created because of what he is would still create freely, since nothing would settle it but God himself, being who he is (C1). His nature is not something outside him. Nor is it a state of God that produces his willing the way one event produces the next. So the answer to the first step is not that such a God would be unfree. He would not be. - A hiker who keeps to one trail because she loves where it leads is held to it by nothing but herself. 3. God's nature did not make his creating necessary. What the source view denies is the premise that God's nature made his creating necessary. If it did, creation would be as necessary as God. And if his nature fixed this world, every creature and every evil in it would be necessary too (C2). Aquinas denied it: God "does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things." The Reformed confession uses the tradition's word: God ordained what comes to pass "freely" (Westminster Confession 3.1). 4. "Determined" without necessity means only "explained." Someone might hold that God's nature determined creation without making it necessary. But then "determined" no longer means what determinism means, which is settled beforehand by conditions enough by themselves to make the choice go the way it goes. It means only that God's reasons explain his choice, and the source view grants that (C3). A choice can be explained by its reasons and still be one the chooser could have made otherwise. - "She married him because she loved him" explains a wedding. Nobody hears it as saying she had no choice. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Cannot Sin and Is Praised for It: The Impeccability Objection Philosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free
+ God's will is necessarily determined to whatever is wisest and best, and that is no dishonor to him. Freedom of the libertarian kind is nonsense even in God.
The strongest form of this objection is Jonathan Edwards's. The New England pastor and theologian was answering critics who said his view left God bound by fate, and he replied: "It is no disadvantage or dishonor to a being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy manner, from the necessary perfection of his own nature." A small number of Reformed thinkers since have gone further and said that freedom of the libertarian kind is incoherent even for God. 1. Edwards was right that necessity from one's own nature is no dishonor. The source view agrees with Edwards's sentence as it stands. God's goodness is necessary, and his willing of it is as free as willing can be, because nothing settles it but God himself (C1). Where God cannot do otherwise, as with evil, he is free still. - A friend who could never bring himself to betray you is not the worse friend for it. Nobody thinks less of him because he cannot. 2. The question is whether God's nature leaves only one world. Edwards's claim that God's will is necessarily determined to the best becomes a claim about creation only if there is a single best world and God's goodness binds him to it. That is Leibniz's argument (D2), and it meets the same answers: there may be no best world, and no world is proportionate to God's goodness (P6). And where it would succeed, it would cost the further fact (C3). It would not cost God's freedom (C1). - A cook who always serves the best dish she can make is tied to one dish only if one dish is best. Give her a dozen dishes, each excellent in its own way, and the same rule still leaves her a choice. 3. Libertarian freedom is not nonsense in God. Freedom of the libertarian kind is freedom that cannot live with determinism, since a determined choice is settled beforehand by something other than the chooser. God has it in the most perfect degree, because nothing settles what he wills but God himself. - Think again of the architect drawing a house on a blank sheet, with no client, no budget and no building code (P2). Nothing but the architect decides what the house will be, and there is nothing incoherent in that. - Most Christians have also held, with Aquinas, that God could have refrained from creating or created otherwise (C2, C3). To deny it, one must hold that the world, and every evil in it, exists of necessity. That is the price the main tradition has always refused.
+ Everything follows from God's nature by necessity. Things could not have been produced by God in any other way or order.
This is Spinoza's view, and it is the end of the road that makes God's creating necessary. He wrote, in 1677: "Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained." For Spinoza, the world flows from God the way the properties of a triangle flow from its definition. 1. Spinoza's God is not the God of Scripture. Spinoza's God has no will in the ordinary sense, no purposes and no love for his creatures. Scripture's God creates "by your will" (Revelation 4:11), works "according to the counsel of his will" (Ephesians 1:11), and rejoices in his works (Psalm 104:31). A God like that chooses. A definition does not. 2. Spinoza's necessity makes every evil necessary. If Spinoza were right, every sin and every sorrow would be as necessary as the truths of geometry, and nothing could ever have been otherwise (C2). Christian teaching has always refused that, because it makes evil an expression of God's nature rather than a departure from his will. 3. Spinoza's proof rests on the point in dispute. Spinoza's proof starts from an earlier proposition: "All things necessarily follow from the nature of God." He argued for that by likening God to a definition, from which "the intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily follow therefrom." But whether God causes the way a definition yields its properties, or the way a person acts, by will, is the very question. - Aquinas had given his reasons for the second answer centuries before. A thing that acts by its nature alone yields what that nature fixes, as fire yields heat. If God acted by nature alone, what came from him would have to be as unlimited as he is, and no creature can be that. So limited things, each one this way and not another, come from God "according to the determination of His will and intellect." - And since God's goodness is complete without them, they do not follow from it of necessity (P3, P4). - The definition of a triangle cannot help yielding three angles. An architect drawing a house could have drawn another.
+ If God is simple, his act of creating is identical with his necessary essence. Then creation is as necessary as God, and he could not have refrained.
Divine simplicity is the doctrine that God has no parts or distinctions of any kind, so that his will, his knowledge and his being are one and the same. The strong form of the doctrine faces a problem. If God's act of willing this world simply is God's essence (what God is), and God's essence is necessary, then his willing this world is necessary, and so is the world. The problem is called modal collapse, and critics of the strong doctrine have pressed it in recent years. Its defenders have answered. - Modal concerns what is possible and what is necessary. A collapse means that everything possible collapses into the actual, so that nothing could have been otherwise. 1. The case for free creation does not depend on the strong form of simplicity. Christians hold the doctrine of simplicity in stronger and weaker forms, and some set it aside. The conclusion that God could have refrained (C2) needs only what every Christian account of God holds: that God's goodness is complete without a world (P3). If a particular form of simplicity made creation necessary, that would count against that form of the doctrine, not against the freedom of creation, which the church has drawn from Scripture's "by your will they existed and were created" (Revelation 4:11). 2. Defenders of the strong form have answers. Those who hold the strong form draw on Aquinas's teaching that the relation between God and his creatures is real in the creatures and not in God. They answer that God would have been the same God had he willed a different world, or none. - A relation that is real in the creatures and not in God is one that changes them and not him. Aquinas's own picture is a stone column and an animal walking past it. The column comes to be on the animal's right side, but only because the animal moved. The column did not change at all. Whether that answer succeeds is a question for the doctrine of God. 3. The tradition that taught simplicity also taught free creation. Aquinas, the doctrine's greatest teacher, held both that God is simple and that God's "willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary" (P4). Whatever the right account of simplicity, it has to make room for the freedom of creation, which the tradition never gave up. See also: PT / Theology Proper: Divine Simplicity (Classical / Strong) PT / Theology Proper: Divine Simplicity (Weak)
+ If what free creatures would do limits the worlds God can make, then something outside God constrains him. By the source view's own definition, God is not free.
1. A limit on options is not a settling of the choice. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes. Some worlds are not open to God: the world with a square circle, or the world in which Peter, placed as he was, would not deny Christ (P5). That limits the menu. It does not choose from the menu. Within the worlds open to him, nothing but God settles which one he creates (P2). - A painter who cannot paint a round square has not had her painting settled by geometry. Geometry tells her what is not a painting. The objection can be pressed harder. It says that the counterfacts, the truths about what each creature would freely do in a given circumstance, do more than trim the menu, since they are among the reasons God chooses as he does. But a reason that informs a choice is not what makes it go the way it goes. God takes into account what Peter would do, as a general takes the terrain into account. The terrain shapes his plan. It does not choose it. 2. The counterfacts are not rivals to God. A counterfact holds whether or not God ever places the creature in that circumstance. What Peter would freely do in a circumstance is not a force pushing on God's will. It is a truth about Peter, and God's knowing it is part of his wisdom. - That such truths limit what God can make is no defect in his power. To make a free creature freely do what he would not do in the place he is put is no more a task than drawing a square circle. - A standard reference work on God's freedom reports a recent defense of it that reaches the same verdict about the truths of logic, even on the supposition that they lie outside God: they "should not be deemed genuine constraints; they instead mark where possibilities run out." 3. The source view never said God's freedom needs every option. God is free because nothing outside him settles what he wills, not because every possible world is open to him (C1). Where his options run out, his freedom among goods runs out with them, as it does at the edge of logic. His freedom itself stays where it was. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+ A God outside time cannot choose to create. Choosing is passing from several possibilities to one, and passing takes time.
1. Choosing is a will's inclining, not a passage through time. A timeless God is one whose life has no before and after. Such a God does not move from not knowing what he will do to deciding. But neither does a God in time who knows everything, since he has always known what he will do. God decides in the sense that his will inclines freely toward one option rather than another, and that needs no period of indecision (C3). - Think of a woman who has been sure for years whom she will marry. When she says "I do," she is choosing, and there was never a stretch of time in which she was undecided. 2. Refraining would be a timeless act of will. In a world where God created nothing, he would timelessly will to refrain. A leading defender of free will draws the line with the stone: a stone lacks any intention to create "but cannot be said to will to refrain from creating" (C2). - A changeless will can hold a choice as surely as a changing one. The man who sits through the whole concert without moving, because he has chosen to stay still, changes nothing for two hours, and his stillness is his choice all the same (C2). 3. God's freedom to create does not wait on the debate over time. Whether God is timeless, and how a timeless God relates to a world in time, are questions with full answers of their own. Nothing in God's freedom to create waits on them. - Two historians can agree that a treaty was signed freely while they still argue over the day it was signed. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God Philosophy / Free Will: Does God See All Times at Once? Eternity and the Boethian Answer
+ God's will never changes, and whatever he wills, he wills from eternity. So he could not have willed anything else.
This is an old objection, and Aquinas put it first among the reasons someone might give for thinking God wills everything of necessity: "everything eternal is necessary," and God wills from eternity whatever he wills. 1. Unchangeable is not the same as necessary. Aquinas answered with the distinction between what is necessary in itself and what is necessary given something else (P4). God's willing this world is necessary on the supposition that he wills it, since his will does not change. It is not necessary in itself. "From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition." - A promise made once and kept forever is unchanging. It was still a promise someone chose to make. 2. The Reformed confession joins the two words. The Westminster Confession says God ordained what comes to pass "freely and unchangeably" (3.1). The two words are not rivals. God's choices do not waver, and they were not forced. - A judge's ruling stands once she has given it, and nobody concludes from that that she was forced to give it.
+ If God had no need of the world, creating it was pointless. And if he created it for his glory, he needed it after all.
1. Creating for his glory is showing it, not gaining it. The Westminster Confession says God created "for the manifestation of the glory of his eternal power, wisdom, and goodness." Manifestation means showing, and the confession's chapter on God draws the line itself: God is "not standing in need of any creatures which he hath made, nor deriving any glory from them, but only manifesting his own glory in, by, unto, and upon them" (2.2). - A glory that is shown is not a glory that was missing. "The heavens declare the glory of God" (Psalm 19:1); they do not supply it. - A great singer who sings at a friend's wedding shows her gift. She does not need the wedding to have it. 2. A gift has a point without being needed. The objection assumes that an act without a need behind it has no point. But the best acts people do are often the ones nobody needed: a gift, a song, a child welcomed into a family. - God made a world to show his glory (P2) and, as Aquinas put it, because "it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein." That is a point, though it supplied no lack in him. - A grandmother who knits a scarf for her grandson needs nothing from it. The scarf still has a point: a warm boy, and a boy who knows he is loved. 3. God's delight in what he makes is real. Scripture says God saw what he had made, "and behold, it was very good" (Genesis 1:31), and prays that he will "rejoice in his works" (Psalm 104:31). Joy in a work is not the same as need of it. - Walter delights in the chair on the porch, and he was not short of anything before he built it.
+ If God could have made any of many worlds, he could have made one with free creatures who never sin. Choosing this one makes him responsible for its evil.
The strongest form of this objection is J. L. Mackie's. In 1955 he argued that if a person can freely choose the good on one occasion, nothing makes it impossible for him to freely choose it on every occasion, so God could have made beings who are free and always do right. Turned on (C3), the objection says that God had many worlds to choose from, a sinless one among them, and chose this one. 1. Not every possible world was open to God. Mackie is right that a world in which everyone freely always does right is possible. But God cannot make a world in which his free creatures freely do what they would not in fact do in the circumstances he places them in (P5). Whether a sinless world was one God could make depends on what free creatures would freely do, which is not God's to decide. - A matchmaker who knows her friends well can seat them side by side at dinner. She cannot make them fall in love. 2. Choosing a world is not settling the sins in it. God chooses which free creatures to place where, knowing what each would do. What each does there is settled by nothing but that creature. God places and does not script: he ensures what will happen by what he knows, without necessitating it. So the sins in the world he chose are the sinners' own, and God is not their author. - A coach who knows his players picks the team and sets the lineup. When one of them fouls, the foul is the player's. 3. Which world to make, and why this one, is the problem of evil. The problem of evil is the old question of how a good and all-powerful God can allow evil. God knowingly permits what he permits, and he has his reasons. Why he made a world with this history, rather than another, and whether its goods are worth what they cost, are questions with answers of their own. What God's freedom to create shows is narrower: the world is God's free choice, made for reasons of his own, and its evils are not necessary truths about God (C2). See also: CO / PoE: Intellectual PoE: Logical Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+ A world full of creatures who flourish is better than no world at all. A perfectly good God does the better thing when he can, so he could not have refrained from creating.
This objection does not lean on Kretzmann's principle that goodness spills over (D1). Its strongest form is the plainer thought that goodness aims at the best outcome, and that a world with creatures who know and love God is a better outcome than God alone. Nobody needs to be wronged by God's refraining for it to be a failure, the objection says. A perfectly good being does not stop short of the better when it is his to give. 1. God alone is not a poorer state of things. The objection counts a world's goods as additions to a sum, so that God and a world come to more than God. But after creation there are more good things, not more goodness. God's goodness is not one amount among others, waiting for a world to top it up. It is complete without any creature, since "no perfection can accrue to Him from them" (P3). And every good a creature could have would be received from him: "What do you have that you did not receive?" (1 Corinthians 4:7). - The creatures' goods would be real, and good for them. But before they are given there is no one who lacks them. - The child who asks her father for money to buy him a birthday present gives him something real, and he is not a penny richer (P3). 2. Nobody is wronged or deprived by not being made. A creature that never exists has no claim and suffers no loss. Aquinas's "God is bound to nobody but Himself" is the plain truth of the matter, and the objection grants it when it rests its case on goodness rather than on anyone's rights (P6). - An empty chair at a dinner nobody was invited to is not a guest turned away. 3. "Do the better thing" has no stopping place. Applied to creating, the rule condemns every choice God could make, since whatever he made he could have added to: "God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe" (P6). A rule that condemns every option is not a rule perfect goodness keeps. It is the endless series of better worlds again, and the answer is the same (D3). A milder rule, "make something good rather than nothing," fares no better, because it needs refraining to be a loss, and it is not (points 1 and 2). - "Invite one more" is a rule no host could ever finish obeying, though every host who keeps a full table has done well (P4). 4. God would create freely even so. Even if the objection succeeded, nothing would settle God's creating but God himself, being who he is (C1). What would be lost is the further fact, his freedom to refrain (C2). His freedom itself would not be. - Walter would be no less the maker of the chair if he were a grandfather who could never let a grandchild arrive without one. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God
+ If God's reasons did not make him create this world, nothing explains why it exists rather than another. Either the principle of sufficient reason fails, or God's reasons made the world necessary.
The strongest form of this objection is Peter van Inwagen's argument against the principle of sufficient reason, the principle that everything has an explanation. Gather every contingent truth, every truth that could have been false, into one long statement. If that statement has an explanation, the explanation is one of two kinds. - If it is necessary, it makes the whole statement necessary. - If it is contingent, it is itself one of the contingent truths, so it is already part of the statement it was meant to explain. That is like a witness called to vouch for himself. So, he concluded, a principle demanding that every truth have a sufficient explanation makes everything necessary. Turned on creation, the argument becomes a dilemma. If God's reasons explain this world, they make it necessary. If they do not, the world has no explanation. 1. An explanation need not make its result necessary. The argument works only if every explanation guarantees what it explains, so that given the reason, nothing else could follow. Free choices are explained another way, by an agent and his reasons, which explain what he does without forcing it (D4). "Why is there a world?" has a true answer: God willed it, for reasons of his own (P2). That is an explanation, and it does not make the world necessary. - Ask why the house on the corner is painted blue, and "the owner chose blue because she loves it" is a true and full answer. It makes nothing necessary: she might have chosen green and loved that too. 2. What the argument refutes is the strong principle. Van Inwagen's argument shows that a principle demanding necessitating explanations for everything collapses into necessity. That is a reason to reject that strong form, and no Christian account of creation needs it. The argument for God from the world's contingency needs only the modest principle that every contingent thing has an explanation of its existence, and a free act of will meets that demand. The world is explained because God chose it, and it stays contingent because nothing made his choice necessary (C2, C3). - A detective needs every death to have a cause. He does not need every cause to have been unavoidable. 3. The only alternative is the price already refused. If God's reasons had to make the world necessary, every creature and every evil in it would be as necessary as God (C2). The objection offers a choice between a modest principle and that price, and the choice is not hard. See also: NT / Cosmological: Leibniz' Contingency Argument Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation

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