Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation

(●) A choice that nothing settled beforehand is not thereby a matter of luck, and a person can answer for what he does without having made himself. + A man finds a wallet on a bus seat, thick with cash, and nobody saw him pick it up. He turns it over in his hands for a long minute. He thinks about his rent, which is late. He thinks about whoever is going to reach into a pocket tonight and feel sick. Then he walks to the front and hands it to the driver. Two worries about that moment come from opposite directions. The first says his honest choice was too little determined to be his. If nothing before the choice fixed which way it would go, then with everything exactly as it was he might just as well have kept the wallet. And if so, was it not simply luck that the honest choice came out this time? The second says his character was too much given to be his. He did not choose the parents who taught him not to steal, or the temperament that made the owner's panic vivid to him. If he acted from a character he never made, how can he really answer for the act? Philosophers call the first worry the luck objection and the second the Basic Argument. They come at him from opposite sides, and yet both are answered the same way, by the man himself settling what he does. Both answers turn on one word. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. A friend who knows the man well might be quite sure he will hand the wallet in, but her being sure settles nothing: he still has to walk it to the front himself. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. In those terms, a choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. The one who settles a choice is its source, the one it comes from. Defining freedom this way, by the one a choice comes from, is called the source view. The first worry is about whether anything fixed the man's choice in advance. A choice is determined when it is settled beforehand by prior conditions (the past together with the laws of nature, or else a decree of God) that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. A choice is undetermined when nothing before it was enough to do that. Philosophers who hold that our free choices are undetermined, and that we really are free, are called libertarians, a name that has nothing to do with politics. The view they reject, that every choice is determined, is called determinism. The argument is deductive: if its premises are true, its conclusions cannot be false. It runs as two short chains, and both take a form you use all the time without knowing its name. If it had rained overnight, the driveway would be wet; the driveway is dry; so it did not rain. That form is called modus tollens, Latin for "the way that denies": if one thing were so, a second would be; the second is not so; so neither is the first. The first chain runs: if undetermined choices were a matter of luck, no one could control them; but a person can control them; so they need not be a matter of luck (P1, P2, C1). The second runs: if being responsible required having made oneself, no one would be responsible; but people are responsible; so it does not (P3, P4, C2). Each premise needs only to be more plausible than its denial, not beyond all doubt. And the two chains stand separately, so someone who rejects one answer can still keep the other. Who holds what, on the luck objection: - Support: In 2000 Peter van Inwagen gave the objection its best-known form, the rollback, in which the moment of choice is replayed again and again with everything the same. He himself, though, still believes we are free. Ishtiyaque Haji (2001) and Seth Shabo (2011) press the objection against libertarians. Alfred Mele (2006) sharpened it, though he takes no side between libertarians and their rivals. Neil Levy (2011) joins it to the luck that shapes a character. - Oppose: Robert Kane (1999), Randolph Clarke (2005), Timothy O'Connor (2007), Meghan Griffith (2010) and Christopher Franklin (2011) answer it. Who holds what, on the Basic Argument: - Support: Galen Strawson, its author (1986, 1994). Derk Pereboom (2001) reaches the same verdict, that nobody deserves blame in the full sense, by another road. - Oppose: Alfred Mele (1995), Robert Kane (1996), Randolph Clarke (2003) and Timothy O'Connor (2009).

(P1) If every undetermined choice were a matter of luck, no one could control one. + Luck and control rule each other out: whatever is a matter of luck is, for that very reason, out of its chooser's control. (1) Luck is an outcome its chooser did not settle. - A ball drops in a lottery machine, or a gust of wind carries an arrow off course: something other than the person decided the outcome. Or nothing decided it at all, the way nothing fixes the moment a radioactive atom breaks apart, on the standard reading of physics. Either way, the person it happened to did not settle it. - That is the sense of "luck" the objection needs, and the sense used throughout. It does not mean a happy accident, like finding money in an old coat. It means an outcome the chooser did not settle, and the luck objection says an undetermined choice is luck in just that sense: like the atom, settled by nothing at all. - The standard reference survey of the debate, a scholarly encyclopedia article that philosophers themselves rely on, adds a warning: words like "luck" and "chance" are borrowed from other settings, and the real questions they stand for are about control and about explanation. Did the chooser control his choice, and can it be explained? Both questions have answers (P2). The control lies in the choosing, and the explanation lies in the chooser's reasons. (2) The objection and its answer agree on this premise. - Everyone in the dispute grants that a matter of pure luck is out of the chooser's control. The quarrel is over what the objection adds: that every undetermined choice is such a matter. - That added claim, not this premise, is what (C1) denies, on the strength of (P2). - Think of a man who says he did not choose his lottery numbers at all; the machine picked them. Nobody would praise him for the numbers, and nobody would call them his decision. (3) The stakes are high. - If every undetermined choice were luck, then libertarian freedom would give with one hand and take with the other. It would free a choice from being fixed in advance, only to leave it to chance. - Ancient philosophers saw the danger. Around 300 BC the Greek philosopher Epicurus tried to make room for freedom by letting atoms, the tiny particles he believed everything was made of, swerve at no fixed time and place. His critics answered that a swerve is not a choice (D4). Therefore, if every undetermined choice were a matter of luck, no one could control one.

(P2) A person can control an undetermined choice by settling it himself. + Even if nothing before the man's choice fixed it, he could still control what he did, because he himself made it go the way it went. (1) Control is exercised in the choosing, not before it. - The luck objection looks for control in what happened before the choice, in some earlier state that fixed it, and finds none. But that is the wrong place to look. - Libertarian philosophers answer that control is not exercised beforehand. In the words of the same reference survey, it is exercised "at the time of the choice," in "the very act of bringing it about." - Think of a driver taking a turn. Her control over the car is not in what the car was doing a minute before. It is in her hands on the wheel as she turns. (2) "Nothing earlier settled it" does not mean "nobody settled it." - The rollback picture (the moment of choice replayed with everything the same) moves from "nothing before the choice settled it" to "nobody settled it." That step holds only if the chooser's part in his choice is just the part played by his earlier states: his desires, beliefs and brain activity in the moments before he chose. - On the agent-causal account of free choice, the person himself causes his choice, for reasons. Agent is simply the philosopher's word for someone who acts, and the point is that the cause is the man, not merely his desires or his brain. On that account the step fails. Something did settle the choice, and it was him. - A leading defender of free will says a free choice is distinguished from a random event by being "done by the agent himself for reasons the agent has in mind." Another defines a free choice as one "neither random nor determined by something or someone else." - Think of the wallet. Suppose nothing earlier fixed what the man would do. Even so, the wallet did not walk itself to the front of the bus. He carried it. (3) A possible case is enough to answer "never." - The luck objection makes a very strong claim: that no undetermined choice could ever be controlled. Against a claim that strong, it is enough that the agent-causal account is possible. - Think of someone who insists that no bridge could ever span a certain river. An engineer does not have to build the bridge to answer him. A sound design is enough. - Even philosophers who doubt that anyone has such a power grant that the account makes sense, and that a person who had it would control choices that nothing before them settled. - Whether persons really are causes of this kind is a further question, with evidence of its own. Above all there is the difference, known from the inside, between a thought that happens to you, like a tune stuck in your head, and one you take up, like a sum you decide to work out. (4) Only a choice settled beforehand could pass the objection's test. - The objection asks what, apart from his own settling of the matter, made the man hand the wallet in rather than keep it. Any answer would name something other than him (a desire, a brain state, an earlier event) that settled the choice before he did. The choice would then belong to that thing, not to him. - So the test counts as control only what something earlier could supply. No undetermined choice could ever pass it. That is not because the choice failed to be his. It is because passing would require it to have been settled before he made it. - The luck objection, then, has not found a flaw in undetermined control. It has assumed that only what is settled beforehand can be controlled, which is the very point in dispute. - Think of someone who will believe a man walked home on his own two feet only if you can tell him who carried him. No answer could satisfy him, and his doubt tells you nothing about the man's legs. (5) The replays show another way open, not a missing chooser. - Imagine the moment replayed many times with everything the same, and the man sometimes keeping the wallet and sometimes handing it in. The replays show that another way was open to him. Call it an open door: another way the choice could have gone, there for the taking. - An open door is freedom's ordinary mark, its usual sign in everyday life, and not its definition. Think of a police officer's badge. It is the usual sign that he is an officer, but it is not what makes him one. - The replays do not show that nobody chose. In every replay he weighs his reasons and makes up his mind. The honest act in one replay is his, and so is the theft in another. - What makes a choice free survives even where no door is open. It survives as long as the choice is settled, in the actual course of events, by the one who makes it. Philosophers call the actual course of events the actual sequence, and one defender of free will names what survives "agent-causal sourcehood in the actual sequence." (6) His reasons explain what he did. - Ask why he handed the wallet in, and there is an answer: he did not want a stranger to lose a week's wages, and he did not want to be a man who would keep them. That is a real explanation, and it names his own reasons. - What is missing is an answer to "why that, rather than keeping it?" that names anything beyond him and his reasons. - Philosophers have names for the two kinds of answer. A noncontrastive explanation says why he did what he did. A contrastive explanation says why he did this rather than that. An undetermined choice can have the first without the second, and the first is what shows it was done for reasons. - Think of a tennis player who could have hit to either corner and hit the left one because her opponent was leaning right. Nobody calls the shot random because the right corner was open. Therefore, a person can control an undetermined choice by settling it himself.

(C1) Therefore, an undetermined choice need not be a matter of luck. + Being undetermined does not, by itself, make a choice a matter of luck. The first chain gets there by modus tollens: if every undetermined choice were a matter of luck, no one could control one (P1); but a person can control an undetermined choice, by settling it himself (P2); so not every undetermined choice is a matter of luck. Whether anyone's choices are in fact undetermined is a separate question, with evidence of its own. (1) Undetermined is not the same as uncontrolled. - Not every undetermined event is controlled. A radioactive atom that breaks apart at an undetermined moment is controlled by no one (P1). - But a choice a person settles is not luck merely because nothing before it settled it. - Think of a Geiger counter (the device that clicks when radiation passes through it) clicking at moments nothing fixed, and a sailor turning her boat at the moment she judges right. Neither moment was fixed a minute before. Only one was somebody's doing. (2) The rival views cost more than the source view does. - Agent causation gives no answer to "why this rather than that?" beyond the person and his reasons. That is a real cost, and nobody should pretend otherwise. - On determinism, every choice was settled before the chooser arrived, by conditions he never touched. On the view that nobody is free at all, nobody has ever settled anything. Either way, what is given up is that anyone is ever the one who settles what he does (D7). - Think of a buyer choosing between a house with a creaky stair and a house with no foundation. He does not pretend the stair is silent. He buys the house that stands. (3) The chooser, not an open door, keeps a choice from being luck. - In the replays of the wallet case an open door is on display, another way the choice could have gone. But that is not what keeps the honest act from being luck. - What keeps it from being luck is that the man settled it himself, when he walked the wallet to the front. - The same fact is what lets him answer for the act (P4). Therefore, an undetermined choice need not be a matter of luck.

(P3) If responsibility required creating oneself, no one would be responsible for anything. + No one can make himself, so a condition that required it would rule out responsibility for everyone. (1) Nothing can be the cause of itself. - To make yourself, you would have to exist before you existed, in order to do the making. - What the Basic Argument cares about is making yourself the way you are, and that is no easier. To choose how you are, you would already have to be some way in order to do the choosing, and that earlier way would need making too. - Philosophers call a being that caused itself causa sui, Latin for "cause of itself." Nothing is causa sui, and God is no exception. Christians have long held that he has no cause at all, which is different from causing himself. So a demand for self-creation is one that no one could meet, creature or Creator. - Think of the old tale of Baron Munchausen, who lifted himself out of a swamp by pulling on his own hair. It is a good joke precisely because everyone sees it cannot be done. (2) The Basic Argument says responsibility requires exactly that. - It runs like this: • You do what you do because of how you are, mentally speaking. • To be responsible for what you do, you must be responsible for how you are. • To be responsible for how you are, you must have chosen to be that way, for reasons. • But then you must be responsible for being moved by those reasons, which requires choosing to be that way too, and so on, backward, without end. - An endless backward chain like that is called a regress. So, the argument concludes, true responsibility would require an impossible chain of choices behind every choice. It would require making oneself. - Apply it to the man with the wallet. On this argument, he answers for handing it in only if he chose the honesty he acted from, and he answers for that choice only if he chose the reasons behind it, and so on, back to the day he was born. - The responsibility it has in view is the full kind: truly deserving praise or blame for what one did, the kind that could make a final judgment just. The argument does not deny that people go on thanking and blaming one another. It denies that anyone ever deserves it. (3) The Basic Argument gets its if-then right. - If responsibility really did require self-creation, the Basic Argument's conclusion would follow: no one would be responsible for anything, free or determined. - The dispute is not over this premise. It is over whether responsibility requires self-creation at all, which (C2) denies on the strength of (P4). - Think of two fans who agree that a goal counts if the ball crossed the line, and argue only about whether it did. Granting the if-then is not granting the goal. Therefore, if responsibility required creating oneself, no one would be responsible for anything.

(P4) Some people are responsible for what they do. + Some people really deserve the thanks or blame they receive, in the full sense the Basic Argument denies (P3). We have far better reason to believe this than to believe that deserving anything requires having made oneself. (1) Responsibility runs through ordinary life. - We thank people, blame them, forgive them, and expect apologies from them. We keep promises and hold others to theirs. None of that makes sense, as we mean it, if no one ever answers for anything (D10). - Think of the man with the wallet. The owner, getting it back, does not thank his luck, or the man's parents, or the Big Bang. He thanks the man. - And the thanks is not a tool for training him. The owner is not rewarding the man so that he will return more wallets. He thinks the man has earned his thanks. (2) Scripture holds each person to account. - "For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each one may receive what is due for what he has done in the body, whether good or evil" (2 Corinthians 5:10). - To receive what is due for what one has done is responsibility in the full sense the Basic Argument denies: getting what one deserves for one's own deeds. - The prophets insisted that the reckoning is personal: "The soul who sins shall die. The son shall not suffer for the iniquity of the father, nor the father suffer for the iniquity of the son" (Ezekiel 18:20). (3) What responsibility requires is the source, not self-creation. - A person is directly responsible for a choice he himself settled when he made it. He is derivatively responsible for what follows from such a choice, the way a man who drinks at eight answers for the crash at eleven. - One defender of free will states the principle: "An agent is morally responsible for an action only if nothing prevented the agent from doing otherwise." - The word to watch is "prevented." To be prevented is for something to do the stopping, there and then, the way a hand clamped on your wrist stops you from signing your name. A lock on a door you never try prevents nothing. - The man at the front of the bus settled his choice, and nothing prevented him from choosing otherwise. Nothing in the principle asks him to have made himself. It asks only that he settled the choice and that nothing stopped him. (4) The premise is more believable than its rival. - Like every premise, this one needs only to be more plausible than its denial. Its denial is that no one has ever deserved thanks or blame for anything, the man with the wallet and the man who kept it alike. - Think of weighing a clever proof that motion is impossible, like the ones the Greek philosopher Zeno devised, against the fact that you walked to the kitchen this morning. The walk wins, and you go looking for the flaw in the proof. Therefore, some people are responsible for what they do.

(C2) Therefore, responsibility does not require creating oneself. + Responsibility does not require self-creation, and the Basic Argument has a false premise somewhere. The second chain is modus tollens too: if responsibility required self-creation, no one would be responsible (P3); but some people are (P4); so it does not. The answer to the Basic Argument does not lean on the answer to the luck objection (C1). Someone who thinks every undetermined choice would be luck can still accept (P3) and (P4). And compatibilists, who hold that a determined choice can be free, reject the Basic Argument on grounds of their own. The source view also says where it goes wrong. (1) The regress starts in the wrong place. - The Basic Argument treats freedom as first of all a feature of character, so that a free act needs a freely chosen character behind it. - But freedom is first of all a feature of actions, and of characters only as they are formed by actions. - Think of judging a pianist by her playing tonight. You do not first ask whether she chose to have long fingers. (2) How you are explains a choice without settling it. - The Basic Argument's first step, "you do what you do because of how you are," is true in one sense and false in another. How you are explains your choice: it gives the reasons you had. It does not settle your choice, if you yourself do the settling. - One philosopher who has worked out the agent-causal account in detail makes exactly this reply: the agent's condition explains the choice without causally determining it, and the agent himself causes the choice. On that reply, nothing outside him is a sufficient source of the choice, a source enough by itself to produce it. - The man with the wallet had an honest upbringing, and it shaped the reasons he weighed. It did not make the choice. He did. (3) Freedom grows by degrees. - Several philosophers answer that freedom and responsibility come in degrees and grow over time, as a person's own past choices shape how he is. A child's first honest choices carry some responsibility. A grown man's carry more, because by then he has had a hand in the character he acts from. - Scripture counts even a child's conduct as his own: "Even a child makes himself known by his acts, by whether his conduct is pure and upright" (Proverbs 20:11). - A line from an address to a gathering of ministers puts it well: "We make our decisions and then our decisions turn around and make us." - The most developed event-causal account adds a picture of where the growing starts. In moments when a person is torn, say between keeping a promise and walking away, he is making an effort both ways. Whichever effort wins, the choice is his, and it shapes the man he becomes. Its author calls these self-forming actions, and the picture is his. • An event-causal account differs from the agent-causal one (P2) over what causes a free choice. On the agent-causal account, the cause is the person himself. On an event-causal account, the causes are events inside him, his own reasons and efforts, which cause his choice without fixing it in advance. - The same author's condition for ultimate responsibility, being responsible not only for a choice but for the character it came from, is that there were real alternatives at some of those forming choices. The source view does not adopt that condition (D9). - Think of an oak. It did not choose its acorn, and it is still the tree that grew, ring by ring, through every season it stood. (4) God is praised though he never made himself. - Heaven's worship gives the reason for its praise: "Worthy are you, our Lord and God, to receive glory and honor and power, for you created all things, and by your will they existed and were created" (Revelation 4:11). - God did not make himself (P3). Still the creating was his, to be praised for, because nothing outside him settles what he wills. Deserving praise never required self-creation, not even for God. (5) The two answers meet in the chooser. - The luck objection says an undetermined choice was settled by nothing. The Basic Argument says a choice made from a given character was settled by the character. Both are answered the same way: the person himself settled it. - He does not have to have made himself to be the source of what he does. He has to have done it. - Think of the man on the bus one last time. He did not make himself, and he did not leave the wallet to chance. He carried it to the front. Therefore, responsibility does not require creating oneself.

On luck and control: Clarke, Randolph. "Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2005): 408-421. Clarke, Randolph. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Clarke, Randolph, Justin Capes and Philip Swenson. "Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2021. Franklin, Christopher Evan. "Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument." Philosophical Studies 156 (2011): 199-230. Griffith, Meghan. "Why Agent-Caused Actions Are Not Lucky." American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2010): 43-56. Haji, Ishtiyaque. "Control Conundrums: Modest Libertarianism, Responsibility, and Explanation." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2001): 178-200. Haji, Ishtiyaque. "Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action." Philosophical Explorations 7 (2004): 131-148. Kane, Robert. "Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism." Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 217-240. Kane, Robert. The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Mele, Alfred R. Free Will and Luck. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. O'Connor, Timothy. "Is It All Just a Matter of Luck?" Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007): 157-161. O'Connor, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. "Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2022. Shabo, Seth. "Free Will and Mystery: Looking Past the Mind Argument." Philosophical Studies 162 (2013): 291-307. Shabo, Seth. "Why Free Will Remains a Mystery." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2011): 105-125. van Inwagen, Peter. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. van Inwagen, Peter. "Free Will Remains a Mystery." Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 1-19. On the Basic Argument: Levy, Neil. Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Mele, Alfred R. Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. O'Connor, Timothy. "Degrees of Freedom." Philosophical Explorations 12 (2009): 119-125. Strawson, Galen. Freedom and Belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Strawson, Galen. "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility." Philosophical Studies 75 (1994): 5-24. On freedom defined by its source: Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013. Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Critic sources engaged: Harris, Sam. Free Will. New York: Free Press, 2012. Helm, Paul. Reforming Free Will: A Conversation on the History of Reformed Views on Compatibilism (1500-1800). Fearn: Christian Focus, 2020. Pereboom, Derk. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Historical sources: Aquinas, Thomas. De malo, question 6, reply to objection 15. Cicero, De fato 22-25. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things II.216-293. Translated by H. A. J. Munro. Biblical citations: Deuteronomy 1:39; Proverbs 20:11; Ezekiel 18:20; Luke 12:48; 2 Corinthians 5:10; Revelation 4:11.
+ Roll the world back to the moment of choice a thousand times, with everything exactly the same. If the man sometimes keeps the wallet and sometimes hands it in, then what he does on any one replay is a matter of chance.
1. This is the best-known form of the luck objection. It is called the rollback argument. The philosopher who made it famous, Peter van Inwagen, is himself a libertarian. - His own example is a woman deciding whether to tell a lie. Imagine that God could roll the world back to the moment before she decides, and replay it with everything as it was. Suppose she sometimes tells the truth and sometimes lies. - As the replays pile up, the proportion of truths to lies draws closer and closer to a steady figure. Nothing about her before the choice differs between the replays. So, the argument says, what she does on the next replay is as much a matter of chance as the roll of a loaded die. - Van Inwagen argued that bringing in agent causation does not change the result. His conclusion, though, was not that we are unfree. It was that how we are free remains a mystery. 2. The replays show an open door. What they show is that another way was open to her, with everything before the choice as it was. That is freedom's ordinary mark, its usual sign rather than its definition, and the replays put it on display. - Think of a wedding ring. It is the usual sign that a man is married, but it is not what makes him married. 3. The replays do not show that nobody chose. In every replay she weighs her reasons and settles the matter herself. The truth told in one replay is hers, and so is the lie in another (P2). - Luck is an outcome its chooser did not settle, because something else settled it or nothing did (P1). In no replay does something else decide, and in none is the outcome left to nothing. She decides. 4. A steady proportion is not a missing chooser. The figure says how often she tells the truth when everything is just so. It does not say who does the telling. A steady figure is just what you would expect of a woman whose reasons pull harder one way than the other, and who settles, each time, which way she goes. - Think of a waiter who knows that about a third of his tables order dessert, month after month. The figure is steady and useful, and every dessert was still somebody's order. 5. Asking for more is asking for something other than her to settle it. The rollback argument wants to know what, apart from her settling it, made her tell the truth this time. Any answer would name something other than her that settled the choice, and then she would not have settled it (P2). The question has no answer only because the choice was hers. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the Choice
+ Agent causation only moves the luck. If nothing about the agent explains why he exercised his power toward the honest act rather than the theft, then the exercise itself is the lucky event.
1. This is the sharpest published form of the objection. Ishtiyaque Haji, Alfred Mele and Seth Shabo have pressed it. It is also the point at which van Inwagen himself stopped and called free will a mystery. This is a serious objection from serious philosophers, and it should not be waved away. - Its strongest form runs like this. In one replay the man exercises his power toward the honest act, and in another toward the theft. Everything about him (his reasons, his character, his power itself) is the same in both. So the difference lies only in the exercise, and nothing about him accounts for it. 2. The demand is for something other than the agent to settle the choice. The objection asks for a fact about the agent, apart from his settling it, that made him settle it this way rather than that. But a fact that made him settle it this way would be a fact that settled the choice before he did. Then he would not have settled it. - So the demand for an explanation of every free choice in terms of something other than the choosing is, in the end, a demand for determinism under another name. - Think of asking why a judge ruled as she did, and refusing every answer that mentions her judgment. There is nothing left to say, and the silence is no evidence that the ruling was random. 3. Control does not need a controller behind it. The objection presses one step further: he did not control which way he exercised his power, since nothing about him settled that. But to control his exercise of control, he would need a further exercise behind it, and another behind that, without end. - Control stops somewhere on every view. On determinism it stops in conditions before the chooser was born. On the source view it stops in the person acting. His exercising his power is not one more event waiting for a cause; it is him, choosing. - Think of asking who flies the pilot. Nobody does, and the question could have an answer only if the pilot were not really flying. 4. Explanation does not require fixing. An event can be explained without being fixed in advance. - The man's honest act is explained by his reasons (a stranger's lost wages, and the kind of man he wanted to be), which he had and acted on (P2). - What it lacks is a contrastive explanation beyond the agent: an answer to "why this rather than that?" that names anything but him. - That lack is the price of the view, and it is lower than the price of denying that anyone ever really chooses, that anyone is ever the one who settles what he does (C1). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the Choice
+ If there is no answer to "why this rather than that?", the choice is arbitrary. A choice with no contrastive explanation is irrational, and no one deserves credit or blame for an irrational choice.
1. The objection confuses two kinds of explanation. A contrastive explanation says why this happened rather than that. A noncontrastive explanation says why this happened. An undetermined choice can lack the first and still have the second, which names the chooser's reasons (P2). - Think of a woman offered two good jobs, one near her aging father and one with twice the pay. She takes the one near her father, because she wants to be there for him. That is a full reason. It is not made irrational by the fact that she also had good reasons to take the other job. 2. Torn choices can be rational either way. The most developed event-causal account adds a further point. When a person is torn between two goods, he has reasons for each and is making an effort toward each. Whichever way he chooses, he chooses for reasons he has and by an effort that is his. - The woman with the two job offers is torn in just this way. Had she taken the one with twice the pay, she would have taken it for reasons she really had, and by an effort that was hers. 3. A choice between good reasons is not arbitrary. An arbitrary choice is one made for no reason at all, like picking a card blindfolded. A choice made for good reasons, where other good reasons pulled the other way, is the ordinary stuff of a serious life. 4. The objection would make God's choice to create arbitrary. Christians have long held that God created freely, with nothing requiring it of him. Ask why he created rather than not, and the answer names his goodness and his purposes. They explain the creating without forcing it, and there is no further answer that names anything but God. - If a choice without that further answer were arbitrary, creation itself would be arbitrary, and heaven would have no reason to call God worthy "for you created all things" (Revelation 4:11; C2). No Christian thinks so. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Was God Free to Create, and Free to Create This World?
+ Epicurus tried to rescue freedom with a random swerve of atoms and got only chance. Every event is either determined or random, and an undetermined choice is just a swerve in the brain.
1. The criticism of the swerve is fair. Epicurus held that atoms occasionally swerve from their paths. In the words of his Roman follower Lucretius, writing in the first century BC: "When bodies are borne downwards sheer through void by their own weights, at quite uncertain times and uncertain spots they push themselves a little from their course: you just and only just can call it a change of inclination." Epicurus wanted the swerve to break the chain of fate. His critics answered that a random jog in an atom is not a person deciding. That criticism is right. Swapping fate for chance does not by itself hand anybody the freedom to choose. 2. The source view does not put freedom in a swerve. A free choice, on the source view, is not an uncaused jog somewhere in the brain. It is a choice the person himself makes, for reasons (P2). The undetermined outcome is not what makes it free; the one who settles it is. - Think of the difference between a car that lurches because its steering is loose and a car that turns because the driver turns it. Neither turn was mapped out by the road. Only one has a driver. 3. Determined and random are not the only options. The objection's modern form is a dilemma, an argument that offers two options and finds trouble in both. Sam Harris states it in one sentence: "Either our wills are determined by prior causes and we are not responsible for them, or they are the product of chance and we are not responsible for them." - The dilemma treats "not determined" as if it meant "produced by chance." But a choice can escape the first option without landing on the second. It can be settled by nothing before it and still not be left to chance, because the person settles it (P2). - Think of a form asking whether a man went into the pool because he was pushed or because he slipped. If he dived, neither box is true. 4. An ancient critic saw the better answer. Carneades, who headed Plato's Academy in the second century BC, told the Epicureans they had no need of the swerve at all, as the Roman statesman Cicero reports in his book on fate. They could have said instead that the mind's voluntary motion needs no outside cause, because its own nature is its cause (Cicero, De fato 22-25). That is close to the source view's answer: the person himself is the cause of his choice.
+ A choice that could go either way under exactly the same conditions would be a will breaking away from its own best judgment for no reason. That is not freedom; it is a defect.
1. This is the intellectualist form of the objection. It is called intellectualist because it puts the deciding step in the intellect, the mind as it judges what is best, rather than in the will. Some Reformed theologians, in the Protestant tradition that runs back to John Calvin, press it against libertarian freedom. Once a person has judged what is best, they say, the will follows that judgment. On their view, a will that could equally have chosen otherwise under exactly the same conditions would be breaking from the judgment for no reason at all. 2. The ability to have chosen otherwise is not the definition. The objection targets the ability to choose otherwise under exactly the same conditions. That is freedom's ordinary mark, not its definition. A defender of free will compares the two (the ability to choose otherwise, and being the source of one's choice) in one sentence: "The former is sufficient for libertarian freedom, while the latter is necessary." In his sentence the former is the ability to choose otherwise, and the latter is being the source. Sufficient means enough by itself, and necessary means required. - God's will always follows his perfect judgment of the good, and he is free, because nothing outside him settles what he wills. So a free will need not be a will that breaks from its judgment. 3. In the ordinary human case, judgment itself is often unsettled. When a person is torn between two goods, his judgment is not fixed on one of them. He has reasons both ways, and he settles the matter by choosing. He breaks from nothing, because there was no single verdict to break from. - Think of a doctor choosing between two good treatments for a patient, each with its own risks. Her judgment does not name one as best. She does, by deciding. 4. The judgment is partly the person's own work. Thomas Aquinas, whom intellectualists often claim for their side, taught that the will can steer the mind's judging: it can decline to consider what draws it, or turn to consider the opposite. Whether Aquinas was a libertarian is disputed among his readers. His account of the ordinary case still gives the objection no free pass, because the judgment the will is said to follow is partly the will's own doing. - Think of a man who leaves the letter from the bank unopened on the counter for a week. His judgment about his money is not formed in spite of him. He is steering it. 5. Having the power to go against a judgment is not the same as using it. - When a person's judgment is settled and he follows it, his choice is as reasonable as a choice can be. That another choice stood open to him does not make the one he made unreasonable. - When he does go against his judgment, he still acts for reasons, weaker ones he prefers in the moment. Anyone who has taken a second slice of cake after deciding not to knows how that goes. The choice is a defect, and it is his. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the Choice
+ Luck goes all the way down: nobody chose his genes, his parents or his century, and those shaped every choice he has ever made. Whether the choice was determined or not, luck made the man who made it.
1. The shaping is real. Every person is shaped by a great deal he did not choose. Some philosophers, Neil Levy among them, argue that this constitutive luck, luck in how one is made, undermines responsibility for everyone. - Think of two boys born the same night in the same town, one to parents who read to him every evening and one to parents who were rarely home. Neither chose his house, and both will carry it with them all their lives. 2. Being shaped is not being settled. What a person did not choose shapes the reasons he weighs. It does not make his choice for him, if he himself settles it (C2). - A defender of free will draws the line: "it is an error to conflate a mere influence with a causally determining factor," that is, to treat the two as the same thing. - Think of a runner who did not choose the hill she was born near. The hill made her legs strong. It did not run her races. 3. Responsibility grows with a life. Constitutive luck is heaviest at the start of a life and lighter as a person's own choices shape how he is. That is why a child's responsibility is less than a grown man's, and why both are real (C2). - Scripture weighs what each person was given: "Everyone to whom much was given, of him much will be required" (Luke 12:48). What a person was dealt changes how much is asked of him. It does not make him someone of whom nothing is asked. - The objection's last move is to ask whether the choices that shape a life are themselves only luck (D11).
+ Determinism has no luck problem. Everything that happens has a cause that explains why it happened rather than something else, so determinism is the rational view.
1. Determinism does answer "why this rather than that?" On determinism every choice has a contrastive explanation: the chooser's earlier states, together with the laws, fixed it. That is a real advantage, and it should be granted. - The claim that everything has such a cause is not something science has shown, though. On the standard reading of quantum mechanics, the physics of the very small, nothing fixes the moment a radioactive atom breaks apart (P1). 2. The answer runs back past the chooser. Ask why his earlier states were as they were, and the answer lies earlier still, and then earlier, back before he was born. The explanation is complete, and it never stops at him. On determinism the settling was finished before he arrived. - Think of a message passed down a line of a hundred people. You can explain exactly why the last one said what he said, and the explanation is perfect. It is still not his message. 3. Determinism has its own luck problem. On determinism, everything about a person was fixed by causes he never chose, and that includes what he believes. Take two jurors who hear the same evidence, one who comes to believe the truth and one who comes to believe something false. Each was fixed to believe what he does. That the causes pointed one man at the truth and the other at error is, for each of them, luck. - The determinist may answer that a sound mind is reliable, so a true belief formed by it is no accident. But nobody chooses the mind he is given, on any view (D6). So whatever keeps a true belief from being luck lies in how that mind is used. - On determinism, whether a man weighs the evidence or looks away from it was fixed for him too. On the source view the mind is a gift and the careful weighing is his, so the truth he reaches by it comes by effort rather than luck. 4. Every view pays somewhere. A defender of free will puts it honestly: "we can find luck problems for any view. Some luck problems are worse than others." The libertarian's price is that nothing apart from the chooser answers "why this rather than that?" (C1). The determinist's is that every choice was settled before the chooser came, so that no one is ever the one who settles what he does. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to Us Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+ The first free choice restarts the regress. A child's first choices come from a character he did not form, so he is not responsible for them, and nothing built on them can be his responsibility either.
1. Responsibility for the first choices does not need a formed character. The child's first honest choice is his if he settles it, whether or not he chose the nature he made it from (C2). His responsibility for it is small, fitted to how little of himself he has yet shaped, but it is real. - Think of a four-year-old who hands back the truck he grabbed from his little sister. His parents taught him to share, yet it is him they thank, with a small fuss rather than a big one. 2. Growth builds on real starts. What a person becomes is built from choices each of which was his to settle. Nothing in that requires a first choice made from a self-made character, any more than a house requires a first brick that laid itself. 3. Scripture recognizes the beginnings. When Israel refused to enter the land, God barred that generation but brought in "your children, who today have no knowledge of good or evil" (Deuteronomy 1:39). The children were not held to their parents' refusal. And the word "today" looks ahead to a day when they would know. Scripture marks a time before a child knows good from evil, and so a time when that knowledge, and the answering that goes with it, begins.
+ Kane himself says ultimate responsibility needs real alternatives at some of the choices that formed your character. The source view ignores that condition, so it has no answer to the Basic Argument.
1. Kane's account deserves its due. Robert Kane's self-forming actions, the torn choices in which a person is making an effort both ways, are the most developed libertarian picture of how a character forms. They are also one of the best resources any libertarian has against the Basic Argument (C2). - Think of a young man torn between owning up to a mistake at work and letting a coworker take the blame. He is trying both ways at once, and whichever effort wins, he goes home that evening a little more honest, or a little less. 2. His condition is his own. Kane holds that a person is ultimately responsible only if there were real alternatives at some of the choices that formed his character. That condition is his. The source view's condition is different: a person answers for a choice he himself settled, when nothing prevented him (P4). - The ability to have chosen otherwise usually goes along with that, as its ordinary mark. It is not what the source view requires. - Kane's condition is meant to protect this: that nothing outside the person settled the choices that formed him. The source view keeps that too. It simply does not make alternatives the test of it. - Think of two doctors who both want to know whether a heart is sound. One insists on seeing the patient run a mile; the other listens to the heart. They want the same thing and use different tests. 3. The source view answers the regress without the condition. The Basic Argument fails because how a person is explains his choices without settling them, and because he himself settles them (C2). That answer does not wait on alternatives at any earlier choice. - God shows the difference. A defender of free will writes: "God cannot choose to do evil, yet He freely does the Good because nothing outside Him determines Him to do so." Nothing ever formed God's character, and no choice ever put his goodness at risk. He is praised all the same (C2). - The saints in glory (the redeemed in heaven) cannot sin either. Nothing settles their goodness but the saints themselves, who do good because they love God. They did have alternatives once, on earth, and Kane's followers can say that their goodness in heaven rests on those. God's case needs no such story. That case is enough to show that deserving praise does not wait on alternatives somewhere in the past. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Nobody Chose Their Own Character, and Everyone Is Still Responsible: The Basic Argument
+ Nobody truly deserves praise or blame, and the Basic Argument shows it. Thanking and blaming can be kept for their good effects, so insisting that some people are responsible simply assumes what the argument disproves.
1. Free will skepticism is a serious position. Free will skepticism is the view that nobody deserves praise or blame in the full sense (P3). Galen Strawson, the Basic Argument's author, accepts that verdict. Derk Pereboom reaches it by another road. Neither thinks ordinary life collapses. Pereboom argues that we can still protect people from the dangerous, warn, teach, forgive and be reconciled, all for the good these things do. - Grant this much: a great deal of ordinary practice could be kept that way. The skeptic is not asking anyone to stop locking the doors. 2. Our practices do not work that way from the inside. - The owner of the wallet thanks the man because he thinks the man has earned it, not merely because he is glad to have it back, and not to train him (P4). - When a man tortures a child for fun, nobody's outrage is a calculation about deterring the next torturer. People think he deserves blame for what he did. - The skeptic can keep the actions. What he cannot keep is what they mean to the people doing them, and that meaning is exactly what (P4) affirms. 3. Weighing is not begging the question. To beg the question is to assume what you set out to prove. (P4) is not assumed. It is weighed against the Basic Argument's premises, and an argument is only as believable as its least believable premise. - Set the argument's second step (P3), that to be responsible for what you do you must be responsible for how you are, beside the judgment that the man who tortured a child for fun deserves blame. The second is far more certain than the first. - That is how the clever proof that motion is impossible fares against your walk to the kitchen (P4). The walk is not assumed. It is simply better known. 4. The skeptic's verdict reaches every possible being. If deserving praise required making oneself, no being that could ever exist would deserve anything, God included (P3, C2). A demand that nothing could meet, in any world, tells against the demand before it tells against responsibility. - Think of a law that made it a crime to be born. When every citizen turned out guilty, nobody would conclude that crime was everywhere. They would conclude that the law was bad. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Nobody Chose Their Own Character, and Everyone Is Still Responsible: The Basic Argument Philosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free
+ The two answers pull against each other. If how a person is settles his choice, the luck that made him settles it; if it does not, the choice is left to the luck of the moment.
1. The dilemma is real. Neil Levy presses it. An act settled by how a person is carries all the luck that made him that way. An act that how he is leaves open looks like a coin toss at the moment of choice. Each answer, the objection says, walks straight into the other problem. - Each option in a dilemma is called a horn, as though the view were caught between the two horns of a bull. - An honest libertarian has to face both horns at once, and should not pretend the second is not there. 2. The dilemma leaves out the one who has the character. It offers two candidates for what settles the choice: how he is, and nothing at all. The source view names a third: the person himself settles the choice (P2), in light of the reasons his character gives him (C2). - Explaining and settling are different things. How he is explains his choice by giving him reasons, which shows what he was after. It does not make the choice go, which is what settling is. - Think of a driver and her map. The map explains why she took the river road: it showed her the road and her reasons to take it. It did not turn the wheel. 3. A given power can still be his to use. The objection presses on: he never chose to be someone with a power to settle things, so his settling is luck too. That is the demand to be causa sui, the cause of oneself, over again (P3). - He uses a power he did not give himself. Nobody chooses to have a will, and God did not choose his nature either. What responsibility asks is that he settled the act himself and that nothing prevented him (P4). - Think of a young man given the vote at eighteen. He did not choose the country that gave it or the birthday that brought it. How he casts it is his. 4. What remains is a cost the view admits. Both horns assume that something other than the person settles the choice: the luck that made him on one horn, nothing at all on the other. The source view denies both. What it cannot supply is an answer to "why this rather than that?" that names anything but him (C1), and that is the price it pays. - Think of the buyer with the creaky stair (C1). He knows the stair creaks, and he still buys the house that stands. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the Choice Philosophy / Free Will: Nobody Chose Their Own Character, and Everyone Is Still Responsible: The Basic Argument

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