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John Hick of Scarborough 1922 – 2012 AD
(●) The evangelical convert turned Presbyterian minister who became one of the church’s most influential internal critics, defending faith as reasonable while arguing that no religion stands at the center. In the middle of the twentieth century, belief in God was on the defensive in the English-speaking universities. A school of philosophers called the logical positivists had declared that any sentence you could not check by observation was not false but meaningless, and "God loves us" seemed to be exactly that kind of sentence. John Hick was one of the young philosophers who refused to accept the verdict. His first book argued that faith is a way of knowing, not a leap in the dark, and his work on the problem of evil gave Christians a theodicy (a reasoned answer to the question of why a good God permits suffering) that is still taught in nearly every introductory course. Then he kept moving. The same man who had been converted on a bus in Hull ended his life arguing that Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism are equally valid responses to one ultimate Reality, and that the Incarnation (the Christian teaching that God the Son became a man in Jesus) is a beautiful metaphor rather than a literal truth. He belongs on a Christian apologetics site twice over: as a defender whose arguments for the rationality of faith are still used, and as the critic from inside whose challenges a generation of Christian philosophers, some of them his own students, wrote their best work to answer. One fact a reader will remember: he wrote his own obituary. He closed his autobiography with an epilogue called "Write Your Own Pre-Obituary," and in it, speaking of himself as "he," he recorded that he had been attacked as anti-Christian and as too narrowly Christian, as an atheist and as a polytheist (Q, after T5).
(●) 1922 AD: Born in Scarborough, the son of a solicitor, he was reading Kant by seventeen. John Harwood Hick was born in January 1922 in Scarborough, the seaside town on the Yorkshire coast, the middle child of Mark and Aileen Hick. His father ran a small law firm, and the family expected John to join it. He was a shy boy who was unhappy at his first school and much happier at Bootham, a Quaker boarding school in York, where he spent 1937 and 1938. The Quakers (the Religious Society of Friends) worship in silence, without clergy or creed, and the school left a mark on him that resurfaced at the very end of his life. The family was not especially religious, though his mother and grandmother tried a good many spiritual paths. By seventeen John was reading the great philosophers on his own, and the one who gripped him was Immanuel Kant, the eighteenth-century German who argued that the mind does not simply receive the world but actively shapes how it appears to us. Think of it like wearing tinted glasses you can never take off: everything you see is real, but everything arrives colored by the lenses. That idea would sit at the center of nearly everything Hick wrote. So, as expected, he began work as a clerk in his father’s office and commuted to law lectures at University College, Hull. In his spare hours he read Shaw, Wells and Russell, the clever, irreverent writers a bright young skeptic of the 1930s would reach for, and by his own account he was not friendly to Christianity at all.
(●) c. 1940 AD: At eighteen, a law student on the top deck of a Hull bus, he was converted to evangelical faith. As the war began, some fellow students from the Inter-Varsity Fellowship, the evangelical student movement, drew him into reading the New Testament. What followed, he said, was several days of turmoil as he felt a higher reality pressing on him, unwelcome at first, then irresistibly attractive. One moment stayed with him for the rest of his life. Riding on the top deck of a bus in the middle of Hull, he felt as though the skies opened and light poured down, and he could not stop smiling, "smiling back, as it were, at God," while the other passengers must have thought him a lunatic grinning at nothing (An Autobiography, pages 33 to 34). He took it with complete seriousness. He left the law and set out to train for the Christian ministry, and for some years he held the conservative evangelical faith of the friends who had led him to it. Much later he looked back on those years as something of an exception in his life. But he never disowned the experience on the bus. To the end he regarded it as a genuine encounter with a transcendent goodness, and his whole philosophy of religion can be read as an attempt to explain how such an encounter can be real knowledge.
(●) 1941 AD: He began at Edinburgh, served the war as a conscientious objector with the Friends Ambulance Unit, and finished with an Oxford doctorate. Hick enrolled at the University of Edinburgh in 1941 and studied philosophy under Norman Kemp Smith, the great translator of Kant. The war soon interrupted him. He registered as a conscientious objector, someone who refuses military service on grounds of conscience, much to his father’s dismay, and served instead with the Friends Ambulance Unit, the Quaker relief service, in Egypt, Italy and Greece. After the war he came home, finished his Edinburgh degree in 1948, and went on to Oriel College, Oxford, to write a doctorate under the philosopher H. H. Price. That thesis would become his first book (T1). Then, from 1950 to 1953, he trained for the Presbyterian ministry at Westminster College, Cambridge, under the theologian H. H. Farmer, and it was there that he met Joan Hazel Bowers, always called Hazel.
(●) 1953 AD: He became minister of a village church in Northumberland, then crossed to Cornell and published Faith and Knowledge. In August 1953 Hick was inducted (formally installed) as minister of the Presbyterian church in Belford, a small market town in Northumberland near the Scottish border, and later that same month he and Hazel were married there. He spent two and a half years as a country pastor, preaching, visiting and burying, and their first daughter, Eleanor, was born in Belford in 1955. In 1956 he moved to the United States to teach philosophy at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, then a stronghold of philosophers who followed the later Wittgenstein. Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Austrian-born philosopher who taught at Cambridge, had come in his later work to think that a word means whatever it does in the way people actually use it, the way "check" means one thing over a chessboard and another at a restaurant table. A room full of his followers was a demanding place to argue that religious language says something true about the world. In 1957 Cornell University Press published Faith and Knowledge, the book drawn from his Oxford thesis, which argued that religious faith has the same basic structure as all human knowing (T1, T2). Two sons, Mark and Peter, were born during the Cornell years.
(●) 1959 AD: At Princeton Seminary he would not affirm the virgin birth as literal fact, and the church’s court let him stay. In the autumn of 1959 Hick took the Stuart chair of Christian philosophy at Princeton Theological Seminary. When he sought to transfer his ministerial membership to the local presbytery (the regional body of ministers and elders that governs a Presbyterian church), he was questioned on his beliefs, and he declined to affirm that the virgin birth of Jesus was a literal biological fact, though he did not deny it either. The Presbytery of New Brunswick received him anyway, but conservative members complained, and the Synod of New Jersey, the next church court up, overturned the decision. The case drew national attention. In 1962 the Permanent Judicial Commission of the United Presbyterian Church’s General Assembly, the denomination’s highest court, ruled in his favor on constitutional grounds, meaning under the rules of the church’s own constitution, and he kept his post. It was the first public sign of the direction his thinking would take. He wrote his introductory textbook Philosophy of Religion during the Princeton years. In 1963 a Guggenheim Fellowship, a prestigious American research grant, took him to Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, to write a book on evil, and when a lectureship in the philosophy of religion opened at Cambridge, he took it. Evil and the God of Love appeared in 1966 (T3).
(●) 1967 AD: In multi-faith Birmingham he worked against racism beside Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus, and turned toward religious pluralism. In 1967 Hick became H. G. Wood Professor of Theology at the University of Birmingham, an industrial city that by then was home to large Muslim, Sikh, Hindu and Jewish communities as well as its churches. These were the years of the National Front, a far-right party campaigning against immigrants, and Hick threw himself into opposing it. He was a founder and the first chair of All Faiths for One Race, a group of religious leaders who worked together on civil rights in the city. The work changed him. He spent time in mosques, synagogues, gurdwaras (Sikh temples) and Hindu temples as well as churches, and he came to think that beneath all the differences of language and ritual the same thing was happening in each: men and women opening themselves "upwards" toward a higher divine reality that made a claim on how they lived (An Autobiography, page 160). He traveled to India, the Punjab and Sri Lanka to study Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism, and the books of the 1970s show the turn: God and the Universe of Faiths (1973), with its call for a "Copernican revolution" that would put God rather than Christianity at the center of the religions, and Death and Eternal Life (1976). In 1977 he edited The Myth of God Incarnate, essays by seven British theologians arguing that the Incarnation should be read as myth (T5), "myth" in the theologian’s sense: a story that carries a truth without being literally true. He admitted the title was chosen to provoke, and it worked: the book sold some thirty thousand copies in its first six months. During the Birmingham years the Hicks’ youngest son, Mike, was born; he was killed in a climbing accident in the French Alps at the age of twenty-four.
(●) 1979 AD: At Claremont in California he gave his system its final form in the Gifford Lectures, An Interpretation of Religion. In 1979 Hick became Danforth Professor of the Philosophy of Religion at Claremont Graduate School near Los Angeles. For a few years he divided each year between California and Birmingham, two homes an ocean and a continent apart, and from 1982 he lived at Claremont full time. Conversations with Buddhist philosophers there, among them his colleague Masao Abe, pushed his thinking further from personal theism, the belief that the ultimate reality is one God who is a person: someone who knows, chooses and loves, the way a friend does. That is the background to the crowning work of his career. He delivered the Gifford Lectures, the most famous lecture series in natural theology (what can be learned about God by reason and experience alone, without appealing to revelation), at Edinburgh in 1986 and 1987. He published them in 1989 as An Interpretation of Religion, which won the Grawemeyer Award in religion, a major international prize, in 1991 (T4).
(●) 2012 AD: Back in Birmingham, a widower who had joined the Quakers, he died weeks after his ninetieth birthday. Hick retired from Claremont in 1992, at seventy, and went home to Birmingham. In 1996 Hazel died suddenly of a stroke while he was recovering from spinal surgery. He kept writing: The Fifth Dimension in 1999, an autobiography in 2002, and a book on religious experience and neuroscience in 2006. After many years in the United Reformed Church, the denomination his Presbyterian church had joined in 1972, he was received into membership of the Quakers in Britain in 2009, back among the silent worshippers of his schooldays. In 2011 the University of Birmingham opened the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion and gave him an honorary doctorate of divinity. He died at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Birmingham on 9 February 2012, a few weeks after turning ninety.
What He Taught
(T1) Faith is not a guess beyond the evidence but a way of experiencing the world, the same act of interpretation that underlies all knowing. Picture two people looking at the same drawing: one sees a duck, the other a rabbit. Nothing on the paper is different; what differs is how each of them takes it in. Hick called this "experiencing-as," and he argued that it is not a curiosity of puzzle pictures but the way we meet everything. We do not first see colored shapes and then infer a table; we simply see a table. We do not first observe a body and then infer a person in distress; we experience the scene as a friend in need, and feel the claim it makes on us. In Faith and Knowledge (1957) he applied this to religion. The believer does not reach God by a chain of arguments, and does not simply guess. The believer experiences life itself, its events, its moral demands, its moments of joy and grief, as a meeting with God. That interpreting response is what Hick meant by faith. Its pattern, Hick argued, is the pattern of all our knowing: at the natural level, the moral level and the religious level alike, the mind must interpret before it can know, so faith is no less rational than trusting your senses. He added a second idea that runs through all his later work: the world is religiously ambiguous. It can be honestly experienced either way, as God’s world or as nature alone, and God leaves it so on purpose, so that our response can be free. Christian philosophers who disagreed with Hick about much else took this account of religious experience seriously; William Alston credited Faith and Knowledge as an influence on his own defense of perceiving God.
(Q) "It is, putatively, an apprehension of the divine presence within the believer’s human experience. It is not an inference to a general truth, but a 'divine-human encounter,' a mediated meeting with the living God." Source: John Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 2nd edition (Cornell University Press, 1966), page 115. "It" is what Hick calls the primary religious perception, the basic act of religious interpretation, which he has just said is neither a reasoned conclusion nor an unreasoned hunch that there is a God. "Putatively" means "as it presents itself to the believer." And "mediated" means that God is met through something else, the events and people and duties of an ordinary life, rather than seen face to face.
(T2) Talk of God is genuinely factual, because it will be confirmed or refuted at the end of the road. The logical positivists had a simple test for meaning, called the verification principle: a statement means something only if some observation could show it true or false. "There is milk in the fridge" passes; you open the door and look. "God loves the world" seemed to fail, because believers held it no matter what happened. The atheist philosopher Antony Flew pressed the point in 1950: a claim hedged until nothing could ever count against it is "killed by inches, the death by a thousand qualifications." Hick’s reply, first set out in Faith and Knowledge (1957) and sharpened in the article "Theology and Verification" (1960), was a parable. Two travelers walk the same road. One believes it leads to the Celestial City (the name John Bunyan gave heaven in The Pilgrim’s Progress); the other believes it leads nowhere. Along the way they meet the same pleasant stretches and the same hard ones, and neither can prove the other wrong. But when they turn the last corner, one of them will turn out to have been right all along. Hick called this eschatological verification ("eschatological" means having to do with the last things, what comes at the end): Christian belief makes a claim that experience after death could confirm, and so it is a factual claim, true or false, not empty words. The argument became one of the most widely discussed replies to the positivists. Of course, critics noticed its limits as well. If the believer is right, he will one day find out; but if the atheist is right, he will not be around to discover it. A claim that can be confirmed but never refuted is an odd sort of fact, and Hick conceded the asymmetry, the lopsidedness between the two travelers’ prospects.
(Q) "And yet when they do turn the last corner it will be apparent that one of them has been right all the time and the other wrong. Thus, although the issue between them has not been experimental, it has nevertheless from the start been a real issue. They have not merely felt differently about the road; for one was feeling appropriately and the other inappropriately in relation to the actual state of affairs." Source: John Hick, Faith and Knowledge, 2nd edition (Cornell University Press, 1966), pages 177 to 178. The close of the parable of the two travelers. "Not experimental" means that no test along the road could settle their disagreement; only the destination can.
(T3) God made the world a place of soul-making, where people grow through real struggle toward the likeness of God. Think of what a loving parent wants for a child. Not a life of constant comfort with every obstacle removed, but a grown person: brave, honest, kind, able to love. And no parent can hand a child those things ready-made. They are built slowly, by meeting difficulty and choosing well. In Evil and the God of Love (1966) Hick set out two families of Christian answers to the problem of evil. The one that dominated the West he called Augustinian: God made humanity perfect, humanity fell, and suffering entered the world as sin and its penalty. Hick found that hard to square with what we know of human origins, and hard to make sense of in itself, since a creature living in the full light of God would have no intelligible reason to rebel. The other he named after Irenaeus, the second-century bishop of Lyons, who pictured Adam and Eve as created immature, like children, needing to grow into the likeness of God. On this Irenaean view the world was never meant to be a paradise. It is, in a phrase Hick borrowed from the poet John Keats, a "vale of soul-making," and its hardships are the conditions under which real goodness can be formed. Two more pieces complete the picture. God made us at an "epistemic distance" (a distance in knowledge, not in space): close enough to be found, hidden enough that faith is a free response rather than a compelled one (T1). And because so many lives end with the work unfinished, Hick held that soul-making must continue beyond death, and hoped that God would finally win every person, a hope known as universalism. Christian readers have found much to agree with here, for Scripture too speaks of suffering that produces character (Romans 5:3–4) and of painful discipline that yields "the peaceful fruit of righteousness" (Hebrews 12:11). The hardest objection is the evil that crushes rather than builds, the child who dies before any soul could be made, and Hick answered it only by appeal to the life to come.
(Q) "Men are not to be thought of on the analogy of animal pets, whose life is to be made as agreeable as possible, but rather on the analogy of human children, who are to grow to adulthood in an environment whose primary and overriding purpose is not immediate pleasure but the realizing of the most valuable potentialities of human personality." Source: John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 2nd edition (Macmillan, 1977), page 258. Hick is answering the skeptic’s complaint that a loving God would have made a world without pain. A world built for pets, he replies, would be a world in which no one could grow up.
(T4) The great religions are different human responses to one ultimate Reality that lies beyond all of their descriptions. The old story of the blind men and the elephant is the easiest way in: one feels the trunk and says "a snake," another the leg and says "a tree," another the side and says "a wall." Each is touching something real, and each describes it through the limits of his own experience. In God and the Universe of Faiths (1973) Hick called for a "Copernican revolution" in theology. Just as Copernicus moved the earth from the center of the heavens and put the sun there, Christians should stop placing their own faith at the center with the other religions circling it, and place God at the center with all the religions, Christianity included, circling him. In An Interpretation of Religion (1989) he gave the idea its full philosophical form, and here Kant’s tinted glasses return. Kant had distinguished the world as it appears to us from the world as it is in itself (an sich, in German). Hick distinguished the ultimate Reality as it is in itself, which he called the Real, from the Real as different cultures experience it: as the personal God of Israel, the Holy Trinity, Allah, Vishnu (worshiped by many Hindus as the supreme God), or as the impersonal Brahman (in much Hindu thought, the one reality underlying everything) or the Buddhist Dharmakaya (the "truth body," ultimate reality in Mahayana Buddhism). The Real in itself, he argued, cannot be called personal or impersonal, one or many, or even good, since our concepts do not reach it. How then can one judge between religions? By their fruit, he answered: each great tradition turns people from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness, and each has produced its saints, so none can claim to be uniquely true. This is religious pluralism, as distinct from exclusivism (salvation only through explicit faith in Christ) and inclusivism (salvation only through Christ, but possibly for some who never knew his name).
(Q) "These traditions are accordingly to be regarded as alternative soteriological 'spaces' within which, or 'ways' along which, men and women can find salvation/liberation/ultimate fulfilment." Source: John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent, 2nd edition (Yale University Press, 2004; first published 1989), page 240. "Soteriological" means "having to do with salvation." The slashes are Hick’s: he would not privilege the Christian word salvation over the Buddhist liberation or any other tradition’s name for the goal.
(T5) The Incarnation is a metaphor for Jesus’ openness to God, not a literal truth that God became a man. When a friend says "she’s been a rock to me," nobody pictures granite. The words are true, but they are true as poetry is true: they express a reality by borrowing an image. Hick argued that "Son of God" and "God incarnate" work the same way. In his essay "Jesus and the World Religions," published in The Myth of God Incarnate (1977), he proposed that the earliest disciples knew Jesus as a man intensely and overwhelmingly conscious of the reality of God, and gave him the honorific titles of their culture, as the ancient world called kings sons of God. Over time, he argued, the metaphorical son of God became a metaphysical God the Son (a literal statement about what Jesus is, not a title of honor), formalized at the councils of Nicaea (AD 325) and Chalcedon (AD 451), which defined Christ as one person in two complete natures, truly God and truly man. Hick held that this definition was one optional way of expressing Jesus’ lordship, that taken literally it had no clear meaning, and that it had to give way if Christians were to see the other faiths as equal paths to the Real (T4). He developed the case at book length in The Metaphor of God Incarnate (1993). This is the teaching that separated him most sharply from the faith he had once preached, and the church across its branches answered it (†).
(Q) "For to say, without explanation, that the historical Jesus of Nazareth was also God is as devoid of meaning as to say that this circle drawn with a pencil on paper is also a square." Source: John Hick, "Jesus and the World Religions," in The Myth of God Incarnate, edited by John Hick (Westminster Press, 1977), page 178. Perhaps the most quoted sentence in the book. Note the qualifier "without explanation": Hick’s charge was that no one had ever given the two-natures doctrine a coherent content, which is exactly the charge Christian philosophers set out to answer.
(Q) "His work on religious pluralism in particular was highly controversial and he was attacked from different quarters as anti-Christian, as too narrowly Christian, as an atheist, a polytheist, a postmodernist, and as not postmodernist enough!" Source: John Hick, John Hick: An Autobiography (Oneworld, 2002), "Epilogue: Write Your Own Pre-Obituary," page 321. Hick ended his autobiography by drafting his own obituary, written about himself in the third person, and in it he lists the charges laid against him from every side, with evident good humor. The list is a fair map of how his work was received.
What Christian Thinkers Made of Him
(†) He helped bring the philosophy of religion back to life, and his students became some of the faith’s strongest defenders. In the 1950s, when Hick began, many philosophers regarded religion as a closed question. By the time he retired, the philosophy of religion was one of the liveliest fields in the discipline, and Christian philosophers were among its leaders. Hick did not do that alone, but he did a great deal of it: he took the tools of analytic philosophy, the careful, argument-by-argument style of the English-speaking universities, and used them to show that belief in God could be defended in that style. His textbook Philosophy of Religion and his anthologies taught the subject to generations of students. Some of those students went on to defend the orthodoxy he had left. William Lane Craig wrote his Birmingham doctorate on the cosmological argument, which reasons from the existence of the universe to a cause beyond it, under Hick’s supervision; Harold Netland, later a leading evangelical writer on religious diversity, studied under him at Claremont. His account of religious experience (T1) fed into William Alston’s Perceiving God, and his soul-making theodicy (T3) remains a standard starting point for Christian discussions of natural evil (the suffering no human being chose, from earthquakes to childhood cancer), adopted in part and corrected in part by thinkers who reject his universalism.
(†) His pluralism and his Christology provoked a generation of answers, and the answers are among the best Christian philosophy of the age. Start with Christology, the branch of theology that asks who Christ is. The response to The Myth of God Incarnate came within months: The Truth of God Incarnate (1977), edited by the evangelical Anglican Michael Green. Over the following decade, Christian philosophers took up Hick’s charge that the two-natures doctrine was as meaningless as a square circle (T5). Thomas V. Morris’s The Logic of God Incarnate (1986) argued that the doctrine is coherent once one distinguishes being fully human (having every property essential to humanity) from being merely human (having, in addition, human limitations no man can escape). A circle cannot also be a square, but nothing in being human rules out also being divine. His pluralism (T4) drew equally serious replies. Craig’s "No Other Name" (1989) argued that God’s middle knowledge, his knowledge of how every person would freely respond to the gospel in any circumstances he might place them in, can reconcile the uniqueness of Christ with God’s love for those who never hear the gospel. Alvin Plantinga’s "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism" (1995) argued that a believer who holds her faith to be true, while aware of thoughtful people who disagree, breaks no rule of reason. There was a deeper puzzle too. Plantinga and others pressed a philosophical problem at the heart of the system: if the Real cannot be called good or personal, it cannot explain why the religions that respond to it make people better rather than worse, and if the gods of the religions are only the Real’s appearances, it is hard to see how believers in any of them are not simply mistaken about what they worship. Hick answered his critics openly, and their exchanges are collected in his Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion (2001).
(†) Where the gospel parts company with him: the Word made flesh, the personal God who is love, and the one name given for salvation. Hick was an ordained Christian minister who came to teach things the church across its branches, Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant, confesses to be false. Honesty requires naming them. - The Incarnation. Hick taught that Jesus was God incarnate only as a metaphor (T5). The apostles meant it literally: "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us" (John 1:14), and "in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily" (Colossians 2:9). The Nicene Creed, the one confession shared by nearly every Christian body, calls him "true God from true God." Hick did not merely reinterpret a dispensable image; he set aside the center of the faith. - The God who is personal. Hick’s Real lies beyond personal and impersonal, beyond even good and evil (T4). The God of Scripture speaks, acts, makes covenants and loves, and the apostle says simply that "God is love" (1 John 4:8). A Christian cannot treat that as one culture’s mask over a nameless Reality. - The one name. Christians disagree in good faith about what happens to those who never hear the gospel, and some, like C. S. Lewis, have hoped that Christ saves some who never knew his name. But they agree that whoever is saved is saved through him: "there is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved" (Acts 4:12; compare John 14:6). Hick’s pluralism denied exactly that. - The hope he held too confidently. Hick taught that God would finally win every soul. Christians have prayed for that and some have hoped it, but the church at large has never taught it as certain, and Jesus’ own warnings stand against treating it as a doctrine (Matthew 25:46). None of this cancels what he got right. He defended the reasonableness of faith when it was unfashionable, he gave Christians a way to speak about suffering that many still find true, and he stood against racism in his city when it cost something. His is the life of a man who took both reason and religious experience with total seriousness, and followed his arguments further than the faith that first gave him his experience could go.