Nobody Chose Their Own Character, and Everyone Is Still Responsible: The Basic Argument
(●)A person answers for what he does without having chosen the character he does it from.
+A young man stands for sentencing after a robbery in which a shopkeeper was hurt. His lawyer does not pretend he is innocent. She tells the court about his father, who drank and hit him, and about the temper he inherited from that father along with his jaw and his hands. She tells them about the street he grew up on and the friends it gave him. "He did not choose any of it," she says. "Nobody does." Then she sits down.
A speech like that moves most people who hear it, and it should. The judge may well shorten the sentence. Yet hardly anyone leaves the courtroom thinking the young man did nothing wrong. The speech lightens the blame. It does not make it disappear.
The British philosopher Galen Strawson has pressed an argument that takes the lawyer's speech all the way down. He first set it out in 1986, gave it its best-known form in 1994, and calls it the Basic Argument. He has stated it in more than one way.
Its short form has three steps. Nothing can be causa sui, Latin for "cause of itself." To be truly morally responsible for your actions, you would have to be causa sui, "at least in certain crucial mental respects." So nobody can be truly morally responsible.
Its longer form is the one anyone can feel:
- You do what you do because of the way you are.
- So to be truly responsible for what you do, you must be truly responsible for the way you are, at least in the ways of thinking and wanting that produced the deed.
- To be truly responsible for the way you are, you must have deliberately made yourself that way.
- But to do that, you must already have been some way, with preferences and values in the light of which you chose how to be. Then you must be responsible for those as well, which means you must have chosen them from some earlier way you were, and so on back.
An endless backward chain like that, in which each step needs another behind it, is called a regress. This one has no first link. So, the argument concludes, nobody is ever truly responsible for anything.
Most people want to answer the way the courtroom did: surely the young man is still to blame. The hard part is saying which step goes wrong.
Strawson also gives the argument a plainer form, the one closest to the lawyer's speech. Each of us is the way he is, to begin with, because of heredity and early experience, and nobody chooses either. Whatever we later do to change ourselves, and however far we succeed, is fixed by the way heredity and experience have already made us. And if some change comes from chance instead, chance makes nobody responsible either.
The responsibility the argument denies is not the everyday kind, where being responsible simply means being the one who did it. It is the kind that makes praise and blame deserved. Strawson explains it with an old story, the story of heaven and hell. True moral responsibility, as he understands it, is the kind that would make sense of the thought that "it could be just to punish some of us with (eternal) torment in hell and reward others with (eternal) bliss in heaven." One need not believe the story, he adds, to see what it measures. He uses it to show how much the word "truly" is carrying.
The argument is aimed at everyone. It makes no difference, Strawson says, whether our choices are determined or not. A choice is determined when it is settled beforehand by prior conditions (the past and the laws of nature, or a decree of God) that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. A row of falling dominoes is determined in this sense: the first push and the laws of motion are enough by themselves to bring down the last one. Determinism is the view that every choice is determined.
If our choices are determined, the argument says, the way we are settles them. If they are not, what is left over is chance. Either way we are not truly responsible.
Its sharpest edge is turned toward the people who believe most in freedom. Philosophers who hold that people make free choices of a kind determinism would rule out are called libertarians, a name that has nothing to do with politics. Libertarians often say that a free person is the ultimate source of what he does, the one it truly begins with. The Basic Argument asks how anyone could be ultimately responsible for anything without first making himself.
Strawson borrows his most memorable line from the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who wrote in 1886: "The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has yet been conceived." To want freedom in the deepest sense, Nietzsche said, is to want "to be precisely this causa sui, and, with more than Munchausen daring, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the slough of nothingness." Baron Munchausen is the storybook boaster who claimed to have pulled himself out of a swamp by his own hair.
Nietzsche was right that nothing can be its own cause (P3). What does not follow is that nobody is truly responsible for anything. Everything in the answer turns on one word.
To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. A friend who knows you well can be sure you will apologize after an argument, and her being sure does not make you apologize. Even if your apology were somehow guaranteed, the guarantee would not say the words for you. You still have to say them yourself.
With that word in hand, freedom takes one sentence to define. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. He is then its source, the one it comes from, and defining freedom this way is called the source view. In the ordinary run of human choices, a free choice also carries an ordinary mark: the person could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was. It is the mark and not the definition, the way a fever is the usual sign of an infection without being what an infection is.
Go back to the apology. If nothing settles it but you, for reasons of your own, the apology is free, and you are its source. On an ordinary evening you could also have held your tongue, with everything before it just as it was. That is its ordinary mark.
Because the source and the mark usually travel together, it is easy to mistake one for the other. God is where they part. He cannot choose to do evil, so no door to evil ever stands open to him, and yet nothing outside him settles what he wills.
Now take the Basic Argument's longer form again. The source view answers it at its first two steps.
The first step says that you do what you do because of the way you are, and that is true in one sense and false in another. The way you are explains what you do, because it supplies the reasons you weigh. But explaining is not settling. If you yourself settle what you do, the way you are does not.
The second step says that to be truly responsible for what you do, you must be truly responsible for the way you are. That step is false. Praise and blame for a choice belong to the one who settled it. Nobody has to have made himself in order to settle a choice. God shows this best of all: he never chose his own nature, and he is praised for the good he wills.
The answer is itself a deductive argument: if its premises, the claims it starts from, are true, its conclusions cannot be false. The premises work like a locked chain: if every link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. No premise has to be beyond all doubt. Each needs only to be more plausible than its denial.
It runs in two chains. The first has the oldest shape in logic, the one behind "every man is mortal, Socrates is a man, so Socrates is mortal": a rule, a case that falls under it, and the verdict. It shows that a person can deserve praise or blame for a choice without having chosen his character (P1, P2, C1). The second works by counterexample, one case that breaks a rule, the way the black swans found in Australia broke the old rule that every swan is white. It shows, from God's own case, that deserving praise has never required choosing one's own nature (P3, P4, C2).
A second worry often travels with this one. It is called the luck objection, and it says that a choice nothing settled beforehand is only a matter of luck, like a coin that happens to land heads. It is a different argument from the Basic Argument, and it has an answer of its own.
Who holds what, on the impossibility of moral responsibility:
- Support: Friedrich Nietzsche called being one's own cause a self-contradiction in 1886, and Galen Strawson defends the Basic Argument today.
- Oppose: Aristotle answered an early form of the worry in the fourth century BC, and Randolph Clarke argues against it today.
The argument that follows holds that a person answers for what he does without having chosen the character he does it from.
(P1)Praise and blame for a choice belong to the one who settled it.
+When people want to know whom to thank or blame for a choice, they ask who made it go the way it went. That question has an answer even when the one who made it never chose his own character.
(1) Praise and blame are first of all for what a person does.
- A charge sheet names a deed: on the night of the third, the defendant took the money from the till. A medal citation names an act: under fire, she carried three wounded men to safety. Either may mention the person's character, but neither is about it.
- The standard reference work on free will sums up one of the leading replies to the Basic Argument in a sentence: "Freedom is principally a feature of our actions, and only derivatively of our characters from which such actions spring."
• Derivatively means secondhand, by way of something else. A character is free, and a person answers for it, by way of the actions that formed it.
- Aristotle drew the same line more than two thousand years ago: "we are masters of our actions from the beginning right to the end, if we know the particular facts, but though we control the beginning of our states of character the gradual progress is not obvious any more than it is in illnesses."
• In plainer words: when we know the facts, we control a deed from start to finish. We control the start of a character, but after that it grows by steps too small to notice, the way an illness does.
(2) Praise and blame go to whoever settled the choice.
- Take the ordinary excuses of force: the shove on the stairs, the seizure at the wheel, the drug slipped into a drink. Each one points away from the person, to someone or something else that did the settling. Where such an excuse holds, the blame moves to whoever did the settling, or else to no one at all.
- The other great excuse, not knowing, works differently. A man who did not know the gun was loaded settled the pull of the trigger, but the killing was nothing he chose. Blame asks what a person knew as well as what he settled.
- Aristotle called a man "a moving principle or begetter of his actions as of children." A moving principle is what sets an act going. A father begets his children, and a man begets his deeds in the same way: they come from him.
• He defined a voluntary act with both halves in view, the source and the knowing: "that of which the moving principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the action." An agent is philosophers' word for the one who acts, the person behind the deed.
- A defender of free will puts the principle in one sentence: "An agent is morally responsible for an action only if nothing prevented the agent from doing otherwise." It is called the principle of non-prevention, and its plain sense is short: nothing prevented him, and he settled it.
• To be prevented is for something to do the stopping, there and then, the way a hand clamped on your wrist stops you from signing your name.
• A shut door is a different thing. Picture a man reading by the fire all evening, glad to be where he is, who never learns that someone has locked the door behind him. He could not have left. Yet the lock never did anything, so nothing prevented him from leaving. A locked door you never try prevents nothing.
- Ask a child who broke the vase. "He pushed me" moves the blame, because it names someone else who did the settling. "I was born clumsy" does not.
(3) Responsibility for what follows can run back to an earlier choice.
- A person is directly responsible for a choice he himself settled when he made it. He is derivatively responsible for what follows from such a choice. That is why a man who drinks at eight answers for the crash at eleven, though by eleven his hands could not keep the car straight.
- Aristotle noticed that the law doubles its penalties for crimes committed drunk, "for the moving principle is in the man himself," since his getting drunk was the cause of the ignorance he acted in.
- The same tracing works for praise. Think of a man who hands his car keys to a friend before a party, because he knows that by midnight he will want to drive home. When he gets home safely in a taxi, the credit runs back to the choice he made at seven, while his head was clear.
- Derivative responsibility does not start a regress. It runs back to a choice the person settled directly, and there it stops.
(4) The principle asks who settled the choice, not who made the chooser.
- Put the pieces together. When nothing prevented a person, and he himself settled the choice, the choice is his to answer for. Nothing in that asks whether he chose his temper, his parents or his century.
- Who made the chooser matters in one kind of case. Suppose a maker installs a person's wants and reasons whole, which means building them into a starting point that, carried forward by the laws of nature or by a decree, is enough by itself to make each of the man's choices go the way it goes. Then the maker settles those choices, and the man does not.
- Being shaped by what one did not choose is something else. A teacher who gives a boy a love of honesty shapes him, and the boy still settles what he does with it.
- A surgeon is praised for a clean operation, and nobody asks whether she chose the steady hands she was born with.
(5) The premise is more plausible than its denial.
- Its denial says that settling a choice, with nothing preventing you, is never enough to deserve praise or blame for it: you would also have to have made yourself. That is what the Basic Argument's second and third steps say together. The premise and its denial cannot both be true, so the question is which is more believable.
- On one side stand the verdicts people reach about real cases every day: the medal citation, the charge sheet, the child and the vase. On the other stands a requirement that nothing could ever meet. The Basic Argument itself insists that nothing can be causa sui, and God is no exception, since he is uncaused rather than self-caused (P3).
- Think of an accountant whose new spreadsheet formula reports that the firm employs minus three people. She does not start laying anyone off. She checks the formula.
Therefore, praise and blame for a choice belong to the one who settled it.
(P2)A person can himself settle a choice that his unchosen character explains.
+Nobody chose the character he started life with, and it explains a great deal of what he does. Explaining a choice, though, is not the same as settling it.
(1) An unchosen character explains a person's choices.
- The Basic Argument's first step says that you do what you do because of the way you are. In one sense that is plainly true. A person's character is his lasting way of seeing, wanting and weighing things, and it supplies the reasons he chooses among.
- It is also true that nobody chose the character he began with. Heredity and early experience came first, long before he was old enough to choose anything.
- Picture a woman whose father never once apologized to anyone. As a grown woman she finds that the words "I was wrong" stick in her throat. Her upbringing explains why apologizing is hard for her.
(2) Explaining a choice is not settling it.
- The same first step can be read a second way, and the Basic Argument's own restatement reads it that way: what you intentionally do, it says, "flows necessarily from how you are." On that reading the way you are settles what you do. That is exactly what the source view denies.
- The standard reference work sums up the reply of the philosophers who hold the agent-causal account. The reply has two halves: "(i) aspects of 'how one is, mentally speaking', fully explain an agent's choice without causally determining it and (ii) the agent himself causes the choice that is made."
• The agent-causal account is so called because on it the agent, the person himself, causes his choice.
- On that reply, the same work adds, "it is not true that there is a sufficient 'ultimate' source of it external to the agent."
• A sufficient source is one that is enough by itself to produce the choice. So the claim is that nothing outside the person, however far back you look, is enough by itself to produce what he chooses.
- A defender of free will says it plainly: "it is you yourself, and not your overall antecedent mental states or character, that brings about your judgments."
• Antecedent means already in place beforehand: the wants, moods and beliefs a person brings to the choice.
- Go back to the woman who finds apologies hard. Her upbringing explains why the words stick. It does not settle whether she says them. Some evenings they stick, and some evenings she says them anyway, and which evening it is depends on her.
(3) He settles it by a power he did not choose to have.
- Philosophers call this agent causation: the person himself, and not merely his desires or brain states, causes his choice. A leading defender of free will puts it this way: "The agent himself is the cause of his actions. His decisions are differentiated from random events by being done by the agent himself for reasons the agent has in mind."
- The power to settle is given, like every other power a creature has. Nobody chooses to have a will. What he chooses is what to do with it.
- The Basic Argument says that responsibility is impossible. Against a claim that strong, it is enough that such a power is possible. That people really have it is a further claim, and there is good evidence that they do (D11).
- A pianist did not choose her ear, her hands or the lessons her mother paid for. The concert she gives tonight is still hers to play well or badly.
(4) Scripture holds a person to mastering what he did not choose.
- When Cain's offering was not accepted, anger rose in him, and God spoke to him about what to do with it: "If you do well, will you not be accepted? And if you do not do well, sin is crouching at the door. Its desire is for you, but you must rule over it" (Genesis 4:7).
- The anger explained what Cain was tempted to do. It did not settle what he did. God put that choice in Cain's hands, and Cain answered for it.
- A doorkeeper does not choose who knocks. He chooses whom to let in.
Therefore, a person can himself settle a choice that his unchosen character explains.
(C1)Therefore, a person can deserve praise or blame for a choice without having chosen his character.
+Praise and blame for a choice belong to the one who settled it (P1), and a person can settle a choice that his unchosen character explains (P2). So he can deserve the praise or blame for that choice without having chosen the character. The Basic Argument's second step says that to be truly responsible for what you do, you must be truly responsible for the way you are. That step is false. A child's first free choices show it most plainly. He answers for them, a little, though he has had no hand yet in the character he makes them from.
(1) The regress never gets started.
- The regress runs backward from the second step: responsibility for the deed needs responsibility for the character, which needs responsibility for an earlier character, and so on. Take away the second step and there is nothing for it to run back from. Whether a person answers for a choice rests on the settling of that choice.
- The libertarian's own test for a free act looks in the same place. A defender of free will states it in one line, as a necessary condition: "an agent, S, performs action, A, freely only if S is not causally determined to A." It asks whether anything determined the act, not how S came to be.
• The letters are placeholders: S is any person, and A is any action.
• A necessary condition is one that must be met, though meeting it may not be enough by itself. Oxygen is necessary for a fire, but a room full of oxygen does not catch fire on its own.
- This condition is not enough by itself, though. A twitch set off by a random event in the nerves would be undetermined, and it would be nobody's doing. So the condition alone cannot show that nothing about a person's origins is required.
- The first premise shows it (P1). When nothing prevented a person, and he himself settled the choice, the choice is his to answer for, however he came to be.
- A prize for the best novel of the year goes to its author, and nobody on the committee asks who taught her to read.
(2) A character is partly the deposit of a person's own choices.
- Aristotle raised the objection himself. Someone may say that a man sees what is good only as his nature lets him, as if he had to be "born with an eye, as it were, by which to judge rightly." Aristotle answered that "we are ourselves somehow partly responsible for our states of character," because "it is activities exercised on particular objects that make the corresponding character."
- His example is the athlete. People training for a contest, he noted, "practise the activity the whole time," and the practice makes them what they become.
- A saying from an address to a gathering of ministers puts the point in modern dress: "We make our decisions and then our decisions turn around and make us."
- So responsibility for a character is derivative: it comes by way of the acts that formed it. Responsibility for those acts is not derivative. The acts come first, and the character is their deposit, what they leave behind.
- Some philosophers add that freedom and responsibility come in degrees and grow over time. In the standard reference work's words, that growth reflects "the fact that 'how one is, mentally speaking' is increasingly shaped by one's own past choices." A child's first honest choices carry a little responsibility, and a grown man's carry more.
- A river cuts its own bed, and then the bed guides the river.
(3) One libertarian account builds a character out of torn choices.
- The most developed event-causal account of free will holds that a free choice is caused by events inside the person, his own reasons and efforts, which cause it without fixing it in advance. The agent-causal account (P2) holds instead that the person himself is the cause.
- The account's author gives a picture of how a character forms. In moments when a person is torn, say between keeping a hard promise and walking away from it, he is making an effort both ways. Whichever effort wins, the choice is his, and it shapes the person he becomes. He calls these self-forming actions.
- Picture a teenager who has dented his father's car. He is torn between owning up and blaming the neighbor's boy. Whichever effort wins, he walks into the kitchen a little more honest, or a little less.
- On this account the regress ends in acts rather than in a self-made self. The first such act was not made from a settled character, since the will was torn.
- He also states a condition for what he calls ultimate responsibility, the responsibility of a person who is the ultimate source of what he does. It "does not require that we could have done otherwise . . . for every act done of our own free wills," he says. "But it does require that we could have done otherwise with respect to some acts in our past life histories by which we formed our present characters."
(4) The source view refuses the second step instead of meeting it.
- The Basic Argument's author noticed that the torn-choice account accepts his second step, that we must in some sense make ourselves in order to be responsible, and then tries to meet it.
- The source view refuses the step. It credits the torn will as the ordinary way a character forms, but it does not adopt that account's condition for ultimate responsibility. It stops the regress at the source, not at an alternative somewhere in the past, because what a person answers for directly is a choice he himself settled.
- God shows that deserving praise does not wait on that condition (C2).
- Think of a traveler told at the border that he needs a visa. He can go and get one, or he can show that no such rule exists. The torn-choice account goes and gets the visa. The source view shows there was never such a rule.
(5) Everyone answers for how he plays the hand he was dealt.
- In the parable of the talents, a master going on a journey entrusted his property to his servants: "To one he gave five talents, to another two, to another one, to each according to his ability" (Matthew 25:15). A talent was a large sum of money, about twenty years' wages for a laborer.
- The servants chose neither the sums nor the abilities the sums were matched to. Each was judged by what he did with what he was given. To one the master said, "Well done, good and faithful servant" (Matthew 25:21). To the one who buried his talent in the ground he said, "You wicked and slothful servant!" (Matthew 25:26).
- Card players say the same thing more briefly: you answer for how you play your cards, not for the cards.
- The parable takes for granted what the source view states. The trading was not dealt along with the talents. It was the servants' own.
Therefore, a person can deserve praise or blame for a choice without having chosen his character.
(P3)God never chose his own nature.
+God has no beginning and no cause, and the goodness at the heart of his nature is not something he picked.
(1) God has no cause at all, himself included.
- Christians have always said that God exists a se, Latin for "from himself," and they call this aseity. It means that he exists from nothing else, not that he produced himself.
- Thomas Aquinas, the great theologian of the 1200s, explained why nothing can produce itself: "There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible."
• An efficient cause is the cause that brings a thing about, the way a potter brings about a pot.
- So God is uncaused, not self-caused. Nietzsche's verdict that the self-caused self is a contradiction is one Christians can accept.
- No one can be his own mother. To give birth to yourself, you would have to exist before you existed.
(2) His goodness is his nature, not a choice he made.
- God did not become good, or decide at some point to be good. "For I the Lord do not change" (Malachi 3:6). With the Father of lights "there is no variation or shadow due to change" (James 1:17). Paul writes that "he cannot deny himself" (2 Timothy 2:13), and Hebrews that "it is impossible for God to lie" (Hebrews 6:18).
- Aquinas put it precisely: "the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily."
• A power's proper object is what it is naturally aimed at, the way sight is aimed at color.
- Aquinas's own comparison is the best picture of it. Nobody ever decided to want to be happy. The wanting was there before any deciding, and every decision is made in its light.
(3) Nothing brought it about that God is the way he is.
- The Basic Argument's condition is that to be truly responsible for the way you are, you must have deliberately brought it about that you are that way. God never did. Nothing brought it about that God is as he is, and he did not either.
- Asking when God decided to be good is like asking what lies north of the North Pole. The question has no answer, because nothing is there for it to find.
Therefore, God never chose his own nature.
(P4)God deserves praise for the good he wills.
+Scripture does not simply admire God. It says he is worthy of praise, and it says why: for what he does by his will.
(1) Scripture calls God worthy of praise.
- "I call upon the Lord, who is worthy to be praised" (Psalm 18:3). "Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised" (Psalm 145:3).
- To be worthy of praise is to deserve it, the way good work deserves its wages.
- Think of a thank-you note after a funeral: "Thank you for driving four hours to be there." It does not thank the friend who drove for his temperament. It thanks him for what he did.
(2) The praise is for what he does by his will.
- Heaven's worship gives its reason: "Worthy are you, our Lord and God, to receive glory and honor and power, for you created all things, and by your will they existed and were created" (Revelation 4:11).
- The psalms say the same: "Praise him for his mighty deeds; praise him according to his excellent greatness!" (Psalm 150:2).
- The Son is praised in the same way. "Worthy is the Lamb who was slain" (Revelation 5:12), who said of his own life, "No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord" (John 10:18).
- God's praise rests where the source view rests all praise. A leading defender of free will writes: "God cannot choose to do evil, yet He freely does the Good because nothing outside Him determines Him to do so."
(3) It is praise deserved, not praise that trains.
- Much human praise does two jobs at once. It honors what was done, and it encourages more of the same. Nobody praises God to encourage him. If any praise answers simply to what is deserved, this does.
- An audience that rises to its feet after a violinist's farewell concert is not encouraging her to play again. It is telling her she earned it.
Therefore, God deserves praise for the good he wills.
(C2)Therefore, deserving praise has never required choosing one's own nature.
+God never chose his own nature (P3), and he deserves praise for the good he wills (P4). So deserving praise does not require choosing one's own nature. If it did, God would deserve none.
(1) The Basic Argument's condition would leave God unworthy of praise.
- The Basic Argument demands that a truly responsible person have deliberately brought it about that he is the way he is. God meets that demand no better than we do. A condition that God cannot meet, and that would leave him unworthy of praise, is not a condition of deserving praise.
- The Basic Argument's author allows that such self-causation might be granted to God, "unintelligibly," while denying it to human beings. But God's aseity is not self-causation (P3). God is not the one exception to the rule that nothing is causa sui. He is the plainest proof that deserving praise never needed it.
- Think of a club whose rules would bar its own founder. When the founder fails the test, it is the rule that has gone wrong.
(2) The condition is the same for God and for us.
- God is praised because nothing outside him settles what he wills. His nature is not something outside him.
- A person answers for a choice when nothing settles it but him. His character, though he did not choose it, is not something outside him either. It takes a choice out of his hands only when it is enough by itself, carried forward by the laws of nature or by a decree, to make the choice go the way it goes (P1).
- What differs is where the nature comes from. God has his from no one, and we have ours from him: "What do you have that you did not receive?" (1 Corinthians 4:7). The gift does not change who settles what is done with it.
- A father may hand his son the family farm, and the planting is still the son's.
(3) The saints in glory are praised, though they cannot sin.
- The redeemed in heaven cannot sin, and they are praised. Nothing settles their goodness but the saints themselves, who do good because they love God.
- They did have alternatives once, on earth. Libertarians who keep the condition of ultimate responsibility (C1) can say that the saints' goodness in heaven rests on those earthly choices. Two philosophers have made exactly that reply. Even the leading Reformed defender of compatibilism grants that the reply hangs together.
• Reformed theology is the branch of Protestantism shaped above all by John Calvin in the 1500s.
• Compatibilism is the view that a choice can be free even if determinism is true.
- So the saints alone do not decide the question. God's case does: no earlier fork ever formed his character, and he is praised.
(4) Responsibility never needed anyone to be causa sui.
- Nietzsche was right that the self-caused self is a contradiction. Christians can accept his premise and still refuse his conclusion. Nothing is causa sui, God included, and so being causa sui was never what responsibility required.
- Nobody needs to lift himself by his own hair in order to stand on his own feet.
Therefore, deserving praise has never required choosing one's own nature.
On the Basic Argument:
Clarke, Randolph. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pages 170-176.
Clarke, Randolph. "On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005): 13-24.
Fischer, John Martin. "The Cards That Are Dealt You." Journal of Ethics 10 (2006): 107-129.
Istvan, Michael Anthony, Jr. "Concerning the Resilience of Galen Strawson's Basic Argument." Philosophical Studies 155 (2011): 399-420.
Kane, Robert. "Libertarianism." In John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom and Manuel Vargas, Four Views on Free Will. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007. Pages 14-15.
Kane, Robert. The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Mele, Alfred R. Aspects of Agency: Decisions, Abilities, Explanations, and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pages 212-216.
Mele, Alfred R. Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pages 221-230.
Mele, Alfred R. Free Will and Luck. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pages 129-134.
O'Connor, Timothy. "Degrees of Freedom." Philosophical Explorations 12 (2009): 119-125.
Pawl, Timothy, and Kevin Timpe. "Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven." Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 4 (2009): 398-419.
Pereboom, Derk. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Smilansky, Saul. Free Will and Illusion. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.
Strawson, Galen. Freedom and Belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Pages 28-30.
Strawson, Galen. "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility." Philosophical Studies 75 (1994): 5-24.
On freedom defined by its source:
Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013.
O'Connor, Timothy, and Christopher Franklin. "Free Will." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2022. Section 3.1.
Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Pages 293, 306-308 and 580, with notes 512, 547 and 555.
Critic sources engaged:
Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018. Pages 36-37, 138-140 and 158-163.
Morriston, Wesley. "Is God 'Significantly Free?'" Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 3 (1985): 257-264.
Sapolsky, Robert M. Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will. New York: Penguin Press, 2023.
Wolf, Susan. "Asymmetrical Freedom." Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 3 (1980): 151-166.
Historical sources:
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae I, question 2, article 3, and I, question 19, article 3. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1920.
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics III.1 and III.5. Translated by W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908.
Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 7a.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. 1886. Translated by Helen Zimmern. London: T. N. Foulis, 1907. Section 21.
Biblical citations:
Genesis 3:5; Genesis 4:6-7; Exodus 20:5; Deuteronomy 24:16; Psalm 18:3; Psalm 51:4-5; Psalm 136:1-16; Psalm 145:3; Psalm 150:2; Jeremiah 17:10; Jeremiah 31:29-30; Ezekiel 18:2-4; Ezekiel 18:14-20; Ezekiel 18:30; Malachi 3:6; Matthew 7:11; Matthew 7:15-20; Matthew 12:33-36; Matthew 25:14-30; Luke 12:47-48; John 10:18; Romans 2:2; Romans 2:6; 1 Corinthians 4:7; 2 Corinthians 5:10; Galatians 6:5; Ephesians 2:3; 2 Timothy 2:13; Hebrews 6:18; James 1:17; Revelation 4:11; Revelation 5:12; Revelation 20:12.
+Kane's self-forming actions only push the regress back one step. The torn will behind the first such choice was not chosen either, so that choice is either random or made from an unchosen state.
This is the Basic Argument's reply to Robert Kane, whose self-forming actions are the most developed libertarian picture of how a character forms (C1). The torn will itself, duty pulling against desire, came from a character the person did not choose. So the choice made from it is either settled by that unchosen state, and then the Basic Argument applies, or settled by nothing at all, and then it is chance. Galen Strawson pressed the point against Kane directly: if my efforts of will shape my character while being shaped by the character I already have, "why am I not merely lucky?" An argument of this shape, two options with the same bad end, is called a dilemma.
1. The dilemma is fair against a view that leaves the settling to states of mind.
If what settles a torn choice is the torn will's own states, together with whatever chance is left over, then something the person did not choose did the settling.
- Think of an old balance scale with a weight in each pan. Whichever way it tips, the weights settled it, or a bump to the table did. The scale itself settled nothing.
- Kane has replies of his own to this, and the luck objection is answered in full on its own terms. Whatever comes of those replies, the source view does not rest its answer to the regress on his account (C1).
2. The dilemma leaves out the one who is torn.
It offers two candidates for what settles the choice: a prior state, or nothing at all. The agent-causal account names a third. The person himself settles the choice, using a power he did not choose to have, about a matter that his unchosen state left unsettled (P2).
- The first free act of a creature is made by a self it did not make, with a power it did not make, about a matter that self had not settled in advance. That is enough to make the act the creature's own.
- A child's responsibility for his first free choices is small, fitted to how little he yet knows and how little of himself he has yet shaped. Still, it is his, because he settled them. What he becomes is built from choices each of which was his to settle.
- Picture a hiker at a fork in the trail at dusk, torn between the short way home and the long way past her sister's house. Her tiredness pulls one way and her love the other. Neither pull takes the step. She does.
3. Demanding that the power itself be chosen is demanding self-creation.
The objection's last move asks whether he chose the power to settle. Nobody chooses to have a will, since to choose it he would already need one. That is the demand to be causa sui once more (P3), and it fails the way every such demand fails. God did not choose his nature either, and he is praised (C2).
- The first row of a sweater is not knitted from an earlier row. It is cast on, by the knitter's own hands.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the ChoicePhilosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation
+Adding a self changes nothing. Whatever the self decides, it decides because of the way it is, or else by chance, so it too would have to be responsible for the way it is, and the regress begins again.
Galen Strawson considered this reply in 1994. Suppose a person's self stands apart from his character, weighs what his character delivers, and decides by a power of its own. Strawson's answer, with S standing for the self, is that "whatever S decides, it decides as it does because of the way it is," or else partly by chance, and "this returns us to where we started." Michael Istvan presses the same point against agent-causal replies: it is absurd, he argues, to hold someone responsible for an act when no factor that contributed to it was up to him.
1. "Because of the way it is" says two different things.
- Read as explanation, it is true. The self decides in the light of reasons that its character supplies (P2).
- Read as settling, it says that the way the self is fixes what it decides. That is the very point in dispute, and Strawson's answer assumes it rather than showing it.
- A recipe explains why there is cinnamon in the cake. The cook still decides whether to follow the recipe tonight.
2. Strawson's answer repeats the second step.
Strawson goes on: "To be a source of true or ultimate responsibility, S must be responsible for being the way it is." That is the Basic Argument's second step, applied to the self. The source view denies the step (C1), and his answer gives no new reason for it.
3. One factor in the act is up to him.
Istvan's charge assumes that no factor in the act is up to the agent. On the agent-causal account one is: his settling of it. His character and his circumstances were not up to him. His settling of the choice was.
- A carpenter did not choose the wood, the tools or the grain of the board. The cut is his.
4. What is left is a cost the view admits.
His character and his reasons explain the choice: they say why he did what he did. What they cannot supply, with everything before the choice as it was, is an answer to "why this rather than that?" that names anything but the chooser. That gap is what the luck objection rests on. The source view pays that price with its eyes open.
- Go back to the woman who finds apologies hard (P2). Her reasons explain why she said the words tonight. Ask why she said them rather than swallowing them, with every reason and mood just as it was, and there is nothing left to point to but her.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation
+The libertarian's way out of the regress is Kane's: real alternatives at some of the choices that formed a character. That condition fails at a person's first sin, and without it the source view has no answer.
The leading Reformed defender of compatibilism has a name for Kane's condition: the principle of alternative possibilities, moved into the past. He argues that it fails at the first sin. The principle of alternative possibilities, as its holders state it, says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Moved into the past, it asks for that ability either at the choice itself or at some earlier choice that formed him.
His argument is a dilemma. Either a sinner could have refrained from his first sin or he could not. If he could not, the condition excuses him, and no one is guilty. If he always could have refrained, then a sinless life was open to him, which the historic faith denies.
He does not run the Basic Argument himself, and he aims his case at the principle, not at the regress. Joined to the Basic Argument, though, it yields this objection: if Kane's condition is the libertarian's way out of the regress, and the condition fails, the libertarian has no way out. The condition even has an ancient ally. Aristotle, whose answer to an early form of the regress the source view borrows (C1), said of the unjust man that "it was open at the beginning not to become men of this kind."
1. The condition is Kane's, not the source view's.
The source view credits the torn will as the ordinary way a character forms (C1), but it does not adopt Kane's condition. It stops the regress at the source, not at an alternative somewhere in the past.
- Think of two bakers who share a kitchen but not a recipe. Even a fair complaint about one baker's recipe would be no complaint about the other's bread.
2. The source view's answer never needed the condition.
What a person answers for directly is a choice he himself settled, when nothing prevented him (P1). That answer does not wait on alternatives at any earlier choice.
- God shows it: no earlier fork ever formed his character, and he is praised (C2). The saints cannot decide it alone, since they had alternatives on earth (C2).
- A judge asks whether the signature on the contract is the defendant's own hand. She does not ask whether he could once have learned to write some other way.
3. Aristotle names the source and the mark together.
At the beginning, Aristotle said, it was open to the unjust man not to become unjust. He also said that the moving principle of what the man did was in the man himself (P1).
- He puts the two in order, too. Speaking of a stone once it has left the hand, he says that "it was in your power to throw it, since the moving principle was in you." The power was yours because the source was.
- That is the order the source view keeps. The source is what made those early acts the man's own. The open door, another way the choice could have gone, there for the taking, was their ordinary mark. In the ordinary run of human choices the two travel together, which is why Aristotle could name them in one breath.
- God's case is where they part: no fork ever formed his character, and nothing outside him settles what he wills (C2).
- Think of a receipt. It is the ordinary sign that you bought the shoes, and it usually comes with them. What makes the shoes yours is that you paid for them.
4. What is left of the first-sin argument is a question about sin.
Aimed at Kane's condition, the argument strikes a principle the source view does not hold. Aimed at the source view's own account of sin, it turns on the difference between sin as an inherited condition and sin as a deed. That challenge gets its full answer in the account of the bondage of the will.
- A man born with a quick temper did not choose the temper. The punch he threw last Saturday is another matter.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free WillPhilosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God
+John Martin Fischer has the better answer: we are responsible for how we play the cards we are dealt, not for the hand. That answer needs no libertarian freedom, so the regress never touched compatibilism.
Compatibilism is the view that a choice can be free even if determinism is true. Fischer's version of it is one of the most developed. He argues that the Basic Argument rests on a demand no one should accept: that to answer for an action, a person must answer for every factor that contributed to it. We do not choose our hands, he replies, and we answer for how we play them.
1. The picture is right.
Responsibility is for the play, not for the deal, and the parable of the talents says as much (C1).
2. On determinism the play is dealt as well.
If determinism is true, how you play your hand was fixed by the deal together with the rules of the game, the laws of nature. Every card you will ever lay down was in the deck's order before the first one was turned over.
- The standard reference work makes the point about every account that locates a person's control in the causal power of his reasons, whether compatibilist or event-causal: on such accounts "a complete distal source of any action may be found external to the agent." A distal source is a distant one, far back along the chain of causes.
- The Basic Argument's author pressed the point on compatibilists directly. On their view, he wrote, a person does what he does entirely because of the way he is, and so their kind of responsibility "famously fails to amount to any sort of true moral responsibility."
- Picture two chess programs playing each other. Each weighs its options, answers the other's moves and "plays its hand," and every move was fixed by its program and the opening position.
3. The picture needs a player who adds something.
The image of the cards works because a player at a real table decides how to play them. Take that away, and nothing is left for him to answer for.
- Fischer's player is no chess program. He deliberates, answers to reasons and owns the way he decides, and that is a real difference. On determinism, though, the deliberating and the owning were dealt with the rest. Whether a play dealt that way can still be his is the question pressed by cases of people secretly programmed to choose as they do.
- Picture a player whose designer arranged the deal and the rules to produce a particular play. He is not the one who settled it (P1).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Wanting What You Want to Want Is Not Enough: The Hierarchical and Reasons-Responsive AccountsPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+Responsibility needs a choice made from one's own God-given character, not a character one chose. God gives it, and giving is not meddling, so the regress stops at God's gift with no need for libertarian freedom.
The principle comes from the leading Reformed defender of compatibilism: "in order for a human choice to be morally responsible, it is necessary that the choice be made on the basis of that person's God-given character and desires." He offers it against the manipulation argument, which says that a determined person is no freer than one secretly programmed by a scientist. A manipulator meddles with those desires. God, who gives them, cannot meddle with his own gift. He offers the principle as a necessary condition, and he suspects that it, or something like it, may come close to a sufficient one, a condition enough by itself.
He does not aim it at the Basic Argument, but it answers the regress readily: the character was given, so responsibility for the act does not need responsibility for the character. And Jesus seems to agree: "A healthy tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a diseased tree bear good fruit" (Matthew 7:18).
1. The principle grants the Basic Argument's point about character.
On this view too, nobody chose his character. It was given. What the principle adds is that responsibility for the act does not need responsibility for the character, and that is the source view's own move (C1). So far the two agree.
2. On compatibilism the act is the character's output.
- If the given character, carried forward by the decree, is enough by itself to make each choice go the way it goes, then the one who gave it settled each choice through it (P1).
- Then the Basic Argument's question comes back with nothing to stop it: why blame the man for what the character he was given went on to do? That was its question for every compatibilist (D4).
- On the source view, the given character does not settle the choice. The person adds something to what he was given: the settling, which the character leaves to him.
- Think of a player piano. Every note it plays comes from its own roll, and nobody touches the roll once it is punched. The tune is still the roll-maker's. A person is no piano, of course: he weighs his reasons and wants what he chooses. On this view, though, the weighing and the wanting were on the roll as well (D4).
3. Giving and meddling differ in who does the settling.
- Grant that when God gives a character, he is not meddling with it.
- Still, the difference between a giver and a meddler is a difference in who does the settling: God in one case, the scientist in the other. It is not a difference in whether the creature does. If the character is enough by itself to make each choice go the way it goes, someone other than the creature settles it either way (P1).
- God's rights over his creatures answer the question "may he?" They do not answer the question "is the creature the source?"
- An author who writes every line a character speaks has not meddled with the character. The lines are still the author's.
4. The tree is known by its fruit.
- The saying about trees teaches how to recognize false prophets: "Thus you will recognize them by their fruits" (Matthew 7:20). It tells how to know a person from his deeds, not who settles them. A life shows what a person is, and the source view grants it: character explains conduct (P2).
- It is not a law that the heart fixes each deed. Seven verses earlier, in the same sermon, Jesus says, "If you then, who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to those who ask him!" (Matthew 7:11). Evil men, he grants, still give good gifts.
- When he takes up the image again, "the tree is known by its fruit" (Matthew 12:33), he ties a man's words to his heart: "How can you speak good, when you are evil? For out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks" (Matthew 12:34). Then he holds the speakers to account for those very words: "on the day of judgment people will give account for every careless word they speak" (Matthew 12:36).
- The heart explains the words, and the speaker still answers for them. What a heart turned from God does to a person's power to turn back is another question, the question of the bondage of the will, and it is answered in its own right.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of SinPhilosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated OnePhilosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free WillPhilosophy / Free Will: Wanting What You Want to Want Is Not Enough: The Hierarchical and Reasons-Responsive Accounts
+Christianity itself confirms the Basic Argument. Everyone is born with a sinful nature he did not choose, so no one chose the character his sins come from.
At first sight the objection has Scripture on its side. David confesses, "Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me" (Psalm 51:5). Paul says that all of us "were by nature children of wrath, like the rest of mankind" (Ephesians 2:3). If a sinful nature is inherited, the Basic Argument's first step seems confirmed from the pulpit. And where the inherited condition is itself counted against every child of Adam, as some traditions teach, a person would seem to answer for a character he never chose.
1. Scripture itself tells the inherited condition from the personal deed.
Israel in exile had a proverb that laid the blame on what a person inherits: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge" (Ezekiel 18:2). God retired it: "As I live, declares the Lord God, this proverb shall no more be used by you in Israel" (Ezekiel 18:3).
In its place he gave the rule: "The soul who sins shall die. The son shall not suffer for the iniquity of the father, nor the father suffer for the iniquity of the son. The righteousness of the righteous shall be upon himself, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon himself" (Ezekiel 18:20). The son of a wicked father, who sees his father's sins and does not do likewise, "shall surely live" (Ezekiel 18:17). Whatever a person inherits, he is judged for what he does, "every one according to his ways" (Ezekiel 18:30).
- The Law says the same: "Each one shall be put to death for his own sin" (Deuteronomy 24:16).
- So does Jeremiah: "But everyone shall die for his own iniquity" (Jeremiah 31:30).
- So does Paul: "For each will have to bear his own load" (Galatians 6:5), and each will "receive what is due for what he has done in the body" (2 Corinthians 5:10).
2. The condition is faced, not denied.
- David confesses his condition, but not as an excuse. He confesses his deed first: "Against you, you only, have I sinned and done what is evil in your sight" (Psalm 51:4).
- The commandment warns that God visits "the iniquity of the fathers on the children to the third and the fourth generation of those who hate me" (Exodus 20:5). It is the hardest of these texts. The rabbis of the Talmud, the great written record of rabbinic teaching and debate, set it beside the Law's rule that children are not put to death for their fathers. They took it to speak of children who hold on to their fathers' deeds. It leaves untouched the son in Ezekiel who sees his father's sins and does not copy them (Ezekiel 18:14-17).
- Two further questions remain: what the inherited condition does to a person's ability to turn to God, and how it is counted against him. Both have a full answer of their own. Every account the church gives traces that blame back to a choice, Adam's or the person's own, and none says that he chose his condition. Whatever the answers, Scripture never lets the condition excuse the deed.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Bondage of the Will Is Not the Denial of Free Will
+God is the exception, and his case shows nothing about us. Even Strawson allows God a kind of self-existence, but creatures get their natures from outside, so the Basic Argument still holds for every one of them.
Galen Strawson leaves room for God himself: "Even if such causal 'aseity' is allowed to belong unintelligibly to God," he writes, it cannot plausibly be supposed of ordinary finite human beings. A creature's nature, unlike God's, came from somewhere else.
The objection can be put more sharply. Drop the demand that a person have chosen his nature, and ask only that nothing outside him be the ultimate source of what he does. God meets that demand, since nothing outside him made him what he is. No creature can, since every creature's nature, its powers included, came from outside it.
1. Aseity is not self-causation.
Aseity means existing from nothing else. It does not mean causing oneself, which nothing does (P3). So God does not meet the Basic Argument's condition in some unintelligible way. He does not meet it at all.
- Think of a man who has never borrowed a penny. He has not paid off his loans by some mysterious method. He never had any loans to pay.
2. An exception for God concedes the point.
If deserving praise required having made oneself, God would deserve none. Carving out an exception for him is an admission that the demand is not what deserving requires (C2).
- A school that says nobody graduates without chemistry, and then hands a diploma to a student who never took it, has shown that chemistry was not what the diploma required.
3. Where a nature comes from decides nothing by itself.
- Creatures do receive their natures from outside, from God. What matters is not where a nature came from but whether anything besides the chooser settles the choice (P1, P2).
- The sharper demand asks where the nature came from, but responsibility asks where the choice came from. A nature that is given, but not installed whole so as to fix each choice, leaves nothing outside the chooser that is enough by itself to produce his choice (P2). The condition is the same for God and creature: nothing outside him settles it.
- A son gets his voice from his father. The words he says with it are his own.
+Nobody can make himself responsible by changing himself. How he tries to change, and how far he succeeds, is fixed by the way he already is, and whatever is not fixed that way is chance.
This is the plainer form of the Basic Argument. Galen Strawson grants that people can change themselves. What they cannot do, he argues, is change themselves into being truly responsible, since the way a person tries to change, and how far he succeeds, "will be determined by how one already is." Random factors, he adds, cannot make anyone responsible either.
Many readers meet the argument today in a scientist's words. The neurobiologist Robert Sapolsky argues that every choice is the product of genes, hormones, upbringing and culture that the chooser never controlled, and that free will does not exist.
1. The step assumes what is in dispute.
"Will be determined by how one already is" is the settling reading of the first step, applied to self-change. On the source view, a person's efforts to change are his own to settle (P2), explained by the way he is without being fixed by it.
- The science shows influence, and a great deal of it. It has not shown that the influences are enough by themselves to fix each choice. The standard reference survey concludes that current science "does not decisively support the idea that everything we do is pre-determined by the past."
- A sleepless night makes a father short with his children. It does not make him snap at them. Plenty of tired fathers bite their tongues.
2. Self-change is ordinary.
- Aristotle's athletes train themselves into what they become (C1).
- A defender of free will lists some of what a person does to shape his own mind over time. He "can freely choose to be open-minded, or to be closed-minded, to focus or not to focus, to be more careful, or not."
- A man who takes up running at forty did not choose the knees he was given. The miles are his.
3. The chance clause belongs to the luck objection.
The source view agrees that chance makes no one responsible. It rests not on chance but on the person settling the choice, which is neither the way he already is nor nothing at all (D2).
- Nobody deserves credit for rolling a six. A player earns it for the move she makes with the six.
4. Responsibility for a character needs no self-creation.
To answer for his character, so far as he does, a person needs only to have settled the acts that helped form it (C1). He does not need to have made himself from nothing. The source view never says he must.
- A gardener answers for the state of her garden, so far as she does, by way of the years of weeding and watering she did or skipped. Nobody asks whether she made the soil.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-CreationPhilosophy / Free Will: The Brain Scans Have Not Found the Decision Before the Decider
+True responsibility is the kind that could make eternal reward and punishment just. No finite person, shaped by what he never chose, could deserve that, so no one is truly responsible.
The objection takes the story of heaven and hell at its word. If true responsibility is the kind that could make eternal torment or eternal bliss just, and nobody made himself, then nobody could deserve either. Galen Strawson puts the conclusion at its sharpest: "It is exactly as just to punish or reward people for their actions as it is to punish or reward them for the (natural) colour of their hair or the (natural) shape of their faces."
1. The story is a measuring stick, not a separate argument.
Strawson uses heaven and hell to show how far the responsibility he denies reaches. The story measures a kind of desert, philosophers' word for what a person deserves (it comes from "deserve" and is said like "dessert"). His conclusion reaches every reward, not only the eternal one: "there is a fundamental sense in which no punishment or reward is ever ultimately just." If the Basic Argument fails (C1, C2), it fails for the small desert and the great alike.
2. A deed is not a hair color.
Nobody settles the natural color of his hair. His genes fixed it before he was born. A choice is different, if the person himself settles it (P2). The comparison holds only on the settling reading of the first step, the reading the source view denies.
- A school that gave prizes for eye color would be absurd. A school that gives a prize for the best essay is not, though no student chose the mind she wrote it with.
3. Scripture's judgment is for deeds.
- "He will render to each one according to his works" (Romans 2:6). The dead are judged "according to what they had done" (Revelation 20:12). God searches the heart "to give every man according to his ways, according to the fruit of his deeds" (Jeremiah 17:10).
- That is direct responsibility for acts (P1), not a verdict on a character that was dealt.
4. It is graded by what each one knew and was given.
- The servant who knew his master's will and did not do it "will receive a severe beating," the one who did not know, "a light beating" (Luke 12:47-48). "Everyone to whom much was given, of him much will be required" (Luke 12:48).
- The Judge sees everything a human court cannot: the inherited temper, the fear learned young, the knowledge a person had and did not have. His verdict can be exactly right where ours are only roughly fair.
5. How much is deserved is a further question.
Whether a given reward or punishment fits a given life is a question about proportion. It is a real question. It is also a different question from whether anyone deserves anything at all.
- Two diners can argue over whether the waiter earned a fifteen percent tip or twenty. Neither thinks the argument shows he earned nothing.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: What Free Will Is, and Why It Matters
+The wish to be ultimately responsible is pride. Nietzsche saw that it is the wish to be one's own cause, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance and society of any share in what one does.
Nietzsche's charge is moral as well as logical. The desire "to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society therefrom," he wrote, is the desire to be causa sui, and "the extravagant pride of man" has tangled itself up in it.
1. Christians agree about the pride.
- The wish to be one's own origin is the oldest temptation there is: "you will be like God, knowing good and evil" (Genesis 3:5).
- Paul asks the question that ends it: "What do you have that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you boast as if you did not receive it?" (1 Corinthians 4:7).
2. Receiving everything and answering for what one does go together.
- The same Paul says that each will "receive what is due for what he has done in the body" (2 Corinthians 5:10). Everything was received, and each still answers for what he did with it.
- The source view absolves no one. God, parents, the world and chance all had a hand in the character a person has. He answers for what he settles with it.
- An heir can thank his parents for everything he inherited and still owe an account of how he spent it.
3. The skeptic's conclusion is not humility.
The humble man says, "Everything I have was given, and what I did with it is mine to answer for." The skeptic says, "Everything I have was given, so nothing I did is mine to answer for." The second absolves far more than the first, and it absolves the one person the first never did: himself.
4. Nietzsche was right about the self-caused self.
Nothing is causa sui, and responsibility never needed it (C2).
- No runner has ever crossed the finish line before the starting gun, and races are still won. Whatever winning takes, it was never that.
+An agent who settles his choice without being settled by anything is a mystery. Calling it agent causation names the mystery without explaining it, and a mystery cannot stop a regress.
1. A mystery is not a contradiction.
- Nietzsche and Aquinas agree that a self-caused thing is a contradiction (P3). Agent causation is not self-causation: the agent causes his choice, not himself.
- Being unable to say how a power works is not the same as showing that it cannot exist. Nobody can yet say how a brain gives rise to a single conscious thought, and people think all day long.
2. Every view stops somewhere.
- Determinism stops at the first state of the world and the laws of nature, or at a decree of God. The Basic Argument's own story stops at heredity and early experience. Explanation always ends somewhere, and the question is where.
- The source view stops it at a person, as Christians stop the chain of causes at God.
3. The experience of choosing is evidence.
Galen Strawson grants that the conviction of being truly free "runs deeper than rational argument," and he calls moments of choice "the experiential rock on which the belief in true moral responsibility is founded." His own example is a man on the steps of a shop on a holiday evening, with his last ten-pound note in his pocket and someone shaking a charity collecting tin: "it seems completely clear to you that it is entirely up to you what you do next."
- He adds that the conviction survives even in someone who believes determinism is true, or who accepts the Basic Argument. That shows the experience does not wait on our theories, which is true of seeing as well. Your eyes go on showing you the room whatever theory of vision you hold, and nobody concludes that sight is evidence of nothing.
- A regress that asks us to disbelieve what seems so clear needs premises more certain than that experience, and its second step is not (P1).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: The Agent, Not Merely the Agent's States, Settles the ChoicePhilosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free
+Even if nobody deserves praise or blame, the belief that people do is too useful to give up. It should be kept as a helpful illusion.
Derk Pereboom argues that we could live well without the belief that anyone deserves praise or blame. Saul Smilansky answers differently. The belief in free will of the deepest kind is an illusion, he argues, but a beneficial one: respect for persons, a sense of justice and self-respect all lean on it, and it should not be dispelled.
1. The belief really is useful.
Smilansky is right that much of what is best in human life leans on the belief that people deserve what they are given: gratitude, justice, self-respect.
- Think of a mother thanking the neighbor who pulled her son out of the pond, a jury refusing to convict a man it believes innocent, and a worker quietly proud of an honest day's work. Each one leans on the belief that people deserve things.
2. A belief kept for its usefulness cannot do what the belief does.
- Gratitude that knows it is a fiction is no longer gratitude. It is a performance.
- A Christian cannot hold the last judgment as a useful fiction: "We know that the judgment of God rightly falls on those who practice such things" (Romans 2:2).
3. The question is whether the belief is true.
The case against it is the Basic Argument, and it fails (C1, C2). Set its second step beside the judgment that a man who tortures a child for fun deserves blame, and the judgment is far more certain than the step (P1).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: An Undetermined Choice Is Not a Lucky One, and Responsibility Does Not Require Self-Creation
+God's case proves nothing about what is deserved. A God who cannot do evil is admired the way a sunset is admired, not thanked the way a rescuer is thanked, so his praise is not the kind the Basic Argument denies.
The objection has serious defenders. Wes Morriston has argued that a God who is good by his very nature is not morally good in the distinctively moral sense, the sense in which a person deserves praise for doing right when he could have done wrong. If that is so, the objection says, God is praised the way a sunset is praised, and admiring is not deserving.
1. Admiring and deserving are different.
The objection is right to keep them apart. We admire a sunset or a diamond, and nobody thinks either one has earned anything. We thank the neighbor who shoveled our driveway before we woke, because he did it.
- The question is which kind of praise God receives.
2. Scripture thanks God for what he does.
- "Give thanks to the Lord, for he is good, for his steadfast love endures forever" (Psalm 136:1). The psalm names the one it thanks, "to him who alone does great wonders" (Psalm 136:4), and then lists what he did, from making the heavens to bringing Israel out of Egypt.
- Heaven's worship gives a deed done by his will as its reason: "for you created all things, and by your will they existed and were created" (Revelation 4:11).
- Nobody thanks a sunset for anything it did.
3. The difference is the source, not an open door.
- A sunset is settled by the weather and the angle of the light. Nothing in it wills anything, so there is nothing in it to thank.
- God wills the good for reasons of his own, and nothing outside him settles what he wills (P4). His nature is not something outside him.
- The objection's condition is an open door: praise, on this view, needs the power to have done wrong. That is the principle of alternative possibilities applied to God, a principle its holders defend and the source view does not hold.
- The source view is not alone in this. The leading Reformed defender of compatibilism, who rejects the source view, grants that God "is not morally responsible for having the nature that he has," and holds all the same that "God is morally responsible for never acting unrighteously: he is praiseworthy for the gloriously righteous actions that he performs." What he concludes from this about creatures is another matter (D5). About God, the two sides agree.
4. At most, the objection would set God's case aside.
The objection's condition is also a different one from the Basic Argument's. The Basic Argument asks for a self-made self, and it counts an open door as mere chance. At most the objection would take God's case off the table (C2) and leave the first chain standing (C1).
- Think of a prosecutor with two independent witnesses. If the judge excuses one of them, the other's testimony still stands.
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Free in Heaven, and the Freedom of God
+God's case covers praise, and blame is where the Basic Argument bites. Blame may ask more of a person than praise does, so God's praise shows nothing about it.
Susan Wolf has argued that praise and blame are asymmetrical, meaning they answer to different conditions. Someone who does right for the right reasons deserves praise even if she could not have done otherwise, Wolf holds, but someone who does wrong deserves blame only if she could have done right. And the Basic Argument's sharpest edge is punishment: the story it measures by is a story of torment as well as bliss. God is never blamed. So even if he deserves praise without having chosen his nature, the objection says, blame may still ask what praise does not.
1. Praise and blame do differ in some ways.
This is a serious view held by serious people. Courts want more proof before they convict than a prize committee wants before it gives an award, and most of us are slower to blame than to thank.
- A teacher will hand out a gold star on a hunch, but she wants to be sure before she sends a note home.
2. The Basic Argument draws no such line.
Its steps speak of true moral responsibility, the kind that would make reward and punishment alike just. Its second step is meant to follow from its first: you do what you do because of the way you are, so to be truly responsible for what you do you must be responsible for the way you are. The first is as true of God as of anyone, and the second is false of him, since he is praised though he never made himself the way he is (C2, D7). So the second step does not follow from the first, for praise or for blame.
- A referee who disallows the visitors' goal because the ball was wet has to disallow the home team's wet-ball goals too.
3. The extra condition for blame is not self-creation.
Wolf's condition for blame is about the act: that the person could have done right. That is the principle of alternative possibilities in its holders' form, a different argument from the Basic Argument, and one with answers of its own. Nothing in it asks that the blamed man have made himself.
- The source view's own principle is non-prevention: nothing prevented him, and he settled it (P1).
- Think of a bank that wants two signatures for a large withdrawal and one for a deposit. The second signature is an extra rule for withdrawals. It is not a rule that the customer must have printed the money.
4. The first chain answers the Basic Argument for blame.
It concerns blame as much as praise, and it does not lean on God's case (C1). Cain answered for the choice his anger explained and did not settle (P2). The child who broke the vase is blamed because he himself settled what he did, and "I was born clumsy" moves nothing (P1).
See also:
Philosophy / Free Will: Wanting What You Want to Want Is Not Enough: The Hierarchical and Reasons-Responsive AccountsPhilosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door