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Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

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Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

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Biographies

Notable Works & Great Quotes from Key Figures

Classical Greece

600 BC – 300 BC

Gorgias of Leontini c. 483 – c. 375 BC

(●) The Sicilian master of persuasion who taught Greece that words can move a soul whether or not they are true. + Think of the last time a speech changed your mind before you had decided whether it was right. A courtroom closing, a sermon, a well-made advertisement: the words reached you first, and the reasons, if there were any, came along afterward. Gorgias of Leontini was among the first in the West to study that power on purpose and to teach it for money, and he said out loud what it could do. He was a sophist, one of the traveling professional teachers of the fifth century BC who sold instruction in speaking and success to the sons of the wealthy. Among them he was the great stylist, and his showpiece speech, the Encomium of Helen, is a bravura argument that the most blamed woman in Greek legend was blameless, partly because no one can resist a skilled enough speaker. He also wrote a treatise arguing, whether in earnest or in play, that nothing exists at all. He belongs on a Christian apologetics site because the questions he raised never went away. Is persuasion just a kind of force? Can truth be known, and if known, can it be told? Plato wrote one of his greatest dialogues against him, and Christian preachers, who also live by the spoken word, have had to decide ever since whether they are doing what Gorgias did. One signature fact makes him hard to forget: by the most widely repeated ancient report, he lived to be a hundred and nine.

(●) c. 483 BC: Born at Leontini, a Greek city in Sicily living in the shadow of mighty Syracuse. + Leontini sat on the fertile plain of eastern Sicily, a few hours’ ride from Syracuse, the strongest Greek city in the West and a neighbor that Leontini spent much of its history trying to survive. Gorgias was born there around 483 BC; the year is reckoned backward from the great age the ancient writers gave him at death, so it is a convention rather than a record. His father was named Charmantides, and he had a brother, Herodicus, who was a physician. Sicily in his youth was a laboratory for speech. When the island’s tyrants fell, citizens flooded the new courts to reclaim confiscated land, and a person who could argue well kept his farm. Tradition credits two Sicilians, Corax and Tisias, with the first handbooks of rhetoric, the craft of persuasive speaking, and makes Gorgias their younger contemporary. A later report, passed on by Diogenes Laertius, the ancient biographer of the philosophers, says he studied under the philosopher Empedocles of Acragas, the poet of the four elements; the story is plausible, since both were Sicilian, but it is a tradition and not a certainty.

(●) c. 444 BC: He wrote On Not Being, a treatise arguing that nothing exists, and philosophy has argued about it ever since. + The philosophers of his day had pushed reasoning about "being" (whatever is, simply because it is) to dizzying places. Parmenides and his followers, called the Eleatics after their home city of Elea in southern Italy, argued that being is one, unchanging, and eternal, so that all change, and every appearance of many separate things, is an illusion. Gorgias took their methods and turned them inside out, the way a chess player might study an opponent’s favorite opening and then use it to beat him. His treatise, which went under the titles On Not Being and On Nature, claimed to prove three things in turn: nothing exists; if anything did exist, no one could know it; and if anyone could know it, he could not tell it to anyone else (T3). The date comes from a late report, by the sixth-century AD commentator Olympiodorus, that the book appeared in the 84th Olympiad, the four-year span from 444 to 441 BC, and scholars treat it with caution. The book itself is lost. We know its argument only from two later summaries, and whether Gorgias meant it as serious philosophy, as a parody of the Eleatics, or as a demonstration that clever argument can prove anything is one of the oldest open questions about him.

(●) 427 BC: Sent to Athens to plead for his city, he dazzled the Assembly with a kind of prose no one had heard before. + In 427 BC Syracuse was pressing Leontini hard, and the city sent an embassy to Athens to ask for help. Gorgias led it, and he spoke before the Assembly, the open-air meeting where the citizens of Athens debated and voted on war and peace. The historian Diodorus of Sicily, writing four centuries later, says the Athenians, who loved fine speaking, were astonished by him. His prose moved like poetry: clauses set in exact balance, opposites paired against each other (antithesis, as in "the victor and the victim"), phrases of matching length, endings that rhymed. Imagine a lawyer delivering a closing argument in couplets, and you have something of the effect. It worked. Athens voted to send ships to Sicily, a commitment that would grow, a dozen years later, into the disastrous Sicilian Expedition of 415 to 413 BC. Plato has a character remark in the Hippias Major that Gorgias came to Athens on public business, won a great name in the Assembly, and while he was there earned a great deal of money giving private lessons. The ambassador had found a second career.

(●) From 427 BC: He became the most celebrated paid teacher of speaking in the Greek world. + For the next half century Gorgias traveled from city to city, giving display speeches and teaching for fees. He would invite an audience to call out any subject at all and then speak on it without preparation, a party trick that was also an advertisement. In Plato’s Apology, Socrates names him alongside Prodicus and Hippias as men who could go into any city and persuade the young to leave the company of their fellow citizens, who would have taught them for nothing, pay them instead, and be grateful besides. His pupils give a sense of his reach. Isocrates, who became the most influential teacher of rhetoric in fourth-century Athens, was his student; so, by ancient report, were Polus of Acragas, Alcidamas, and Proxenus of Boeotia, whom Xenophon says paid Gorgias for lessons. In Thessaly the aristocratic families of Larissa took to him so eagerly that Plato’s Socrates jokes, at the start of the Meno, that wisdom seems to have emigrated from Athens to the north.

(●) c. 408 BC: At Olympia he urged the quarreling Greeks to unite, and at Delphi he set up a gilded statue of himself. + The Olympic Games gathered Greeks from every city, which made them the best stage in the world for a speaker with something to say to all of them. Gorgias used it to plead for concord: the Greeks should stop fighting one another and turn their strength against the barbarians instead. (To a Greek, a barbarian was simply anyone who did not speak Greek, and the barbarians who mattered most were the Persians to the east.) Only scraps of the Olympic Oration survive, and its date is uncertain; 408 BC is the usual guess, but some scholars place it later. Plutarch tells a sharp little story about it: a man named Melanthius remarked that a man who urged concord on all Greece could not keep concord in his own house among himself, his wife, and a maidservant. He spoke at Delphi too, and a statue of Gorgias stood in the sanctuary there; the travel writer Pausanias saw it, gilded, and says Gorgias dedicated it himself. Fame of that kind was rare for a private man, and rarer still for a teacher of words.

(●) c. 387 BC: Plato named a dialogue after him and put rhetoric itself on trial. + Gorgias was by now a very old man, and Plato, around forty, was writing the dialogues that would make him the most read philosopher in history. In the Gorgias he imagines the great sophist visiting Athens and being questioned by Socrates about what exactly his craft is. Gorgias answers with dignity and some courtesy; it is his pupil Polus and the ruthless young politician Callicles who carry his principles to their ugly ends, that power is the good and that the strong should take what they can. Socrates answers that it is better to suffer wrong than to do it, and that a speaker who flatters crowds without knowing what is just is a cook pretending to be a doctor. Put the two before a jury of children, he says, and the cook with his sweets will win every time. The cook gives people what pleases them; the doctor gives them what heals them, and only one of the two has to know anything about health. How far Plato’s portrait is fair is a question that cannot now be settled. One later anecdote, preserved by the writer Athenaeus, has Gorgias reading the dialogue and remarking how well Plato knew how to satirize; it is a good story, and only a story.

(●) c. 375 BC: He died in Thessaly past the age of a hundred, still at work. + The ancient writers agree that Gorgias lived an astonishingly long time, though they do not agree on the number: the figure most often given is a hundred and nine, Cicero says a hundred and seven, and other reports give a hundred and five or a hundred and eight. That is why both ends of his life carry a "c." His last years seem to have been spent in Thessaly, and Larissa is the city most often suggested as the place of his death, though no early source records it. Cicero, writing his dialogue On Old Age, held him up as a model: a man who never slackened his work and, asked why he was willing to stay alive so long, answered that he had no complaint against old age (Q). At Olympia, a statue of him was set up by Eumolpus, the grandson of his sister, and in 1876 German excavators found its inscribed base, which still praises him for discovering the finest art for training the soul for contests of excellence.

(Q) "I have no fault," said he, "to find with old age." + Source: Cicero, On Old Age (Cato Maior) V.13 (Shuckburgh translation, 1900). Cicero’s spokesman, the elder Cato, is praising old men who kept working to the end, and calls this reply of Gorgias "a noble answer, and worthy of a scholar."

What He Taught

(T1) Speech is a mighty power that works on the soul the way drugs work on the body. + Every Greek knew the story of Helen of Sparta, the most beautiful woman in the world, who left her husband for the Trojan prince Paris and so started the Trojan War. Every Greek knew she was to blame. Gorgias wrote a speech in her praise, an encomium, to prove she was not. His method is a tidy piece of logic. Helen went to Troy for one of four reasons: the gods willed it, she was taken by force, she was persuaded by words, or she was overcome by love. In every case, he argues, she is innocent, because in every case something stronger than she was moved her. The startling step is the third. Speech, he says, is a powerful lord: with a tiny, invisible body it can calm fear, take away grief, and kindle joy and pity. A little later in the speech (section 14) he makes the comparison that has made the work famous: words act on the state of the soul as drugs act on the body, some bringing grief, some delight, some terror, and some drugging and bewitching the soul with an evil persuasion. Here is the uncomfortable thought underneath. If a skilled speaker can move a mind the way a drug moves a body, then the persuaded listener is not really choosing, and persuasion is just force wearing nicer clothes. Christian thought would agree with Gorgias that words are powerful, and part company with him over whether the person who yields to them is therefore free of blame (see the final reception row).

(Q) "[Logos] is a powerful potentate, who with frailest, feeblest frame works wonders. For it can put an end to fear and make vexation vanish; it can inspire exultation and increase compassion." + Source: Gorgias, Encomium of Helen 8 (Van Hook translation, The Classical Weekly 6, 1913). Van Hook leaves the Greek word logos untranslated, printed in Greek letters; here it means "speech" or "the spoken word." His rhyming English ("vexation," "exultation") is a deliberate attempt to imitate Gorgias’s chiming style in the original.

(T2) Rhetoric is the craft of persuasion, and the man who has it can rule those who have only knowledge. + Picture a sick man who will not take his medicine. His doctor reasons with him and gets nowhere; then the doctor’s brother, who knows nothing of medicine but knows how to talk, walks in and talks him into it. Plato’s Gorgias tells exactly this story about his own brother Herodicus, the physician, and draws the lesson: put a speaker and a doctor before a crowd to choose a city’s physician, and the speaker wins. That is the claim at the heart of Gorgias’s profession. Rhetoric, as he describes it in Plato’s dialogue, is the art that produces persuasion about justice and injustice in courts and assemblies, and it is the greatest of goods because it gives its owner power over everyone else. Notice what is missing. The speaker does not need to know what is true about medicine, or about justice; he needs only to be believed. In Plato’s Philebus a young man recalls hearing Gorgias say that the art of persuasion is far above all others, because it makes all things its slaves by their own consent, not by force. The portrait is Plato’s, written by Gorgias’s most formidable critic, and should be read that way. But the speeches that survive in Gorgias’s own name say much the same thing in their own voice (T1).

(Q) "What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?" + Source: Plato, Gorgias 452e (Jowett translation). Socrates has asked what the greatest good is that rhetoric produces, and this is Gorgias’s answer in Plato’s dialogue. He goes on to say that the man who has this power will make the physician and the trainer his slaves.

(T3) Nothing exists; if anything did, it could not be known; if it could be known, it could not be told. + Most of us have watched a clever arguer back someone into a corner where every step seemed fine and the conclusion was absurd. Gorgias’s treatise On Not Being is that experience written down as a book, and the three steps are worth taking one at a time. - Nothing is. Using the very arguments the Eleatic philosophers (Parmenides and his followers) had used about being, he argues that "what is" can be neither eternal nor created, neither one nor many, and so cannot be at all. The move is like a detective who checks every room in a house, finds each one empty, and announces that no one is home: each option, Gorgias claims, ends in a contradiction, and since there are no other options, "what is" has nowhere left to be. - If something were, it could not be known. We think of chariots racing on the sea and of winged men, and those thoughts are not real things; so what we think is not the same as what is, and nothing guarantees that a thought reaches reality. - If it could be known, it could not be told. We speak in words, and a word is not a thing: you cannot hand someone a color through his ears. So knowledge could never pass from one mind to another. Whatever Gorgias intended, a joke, a parody, or a serious position, the book is one of the earliest sustained arguments in Western philosophy for a thoroughgoing skepticism: the view that we cannot know or share the truth about reality. It also fits his profession uncomfortably well. If no one can know or tell the truth, then all that is left is persuasion, and the persuader is king (T2). That is exactly the conclusion Plato, and later Christian thought, refused.

(Q) "Gorgias declares that nothing exists; and if anything exists it is unknowable; and if it exists and is knowable, yet it cannot be indicated to others." + Source: Pseudo-Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias 5, 979a12–13 (Loveday and Forster translation, Oxford, 1913). This little treatise came down among the works of Aristotle but was written by a later member of his school. With the longer summary by the Greek skeptic philosopher Sextus Empiricus, in Against the Logicians I.65–87, it is one of the only two places Gorgias’s argument survives; the words are the summarizer’s, not Gorgias’s own.

(T4) He promised to make men powerful speakers, never to make them good. + A driving instructor teaches you to handle the car; where you drive it is your business. Gorgias understood his own work the same way, and in a sense it was an honest position. Other sophists, Protagoras above all, advertised that they could teach virtue, the excellence that makes a person a good citizen and a good man. Gorgias, by his pupil Meno’s report, laughed at such promises. He taught speaking. In Plato’s Gorgias he adds a defense: if a student who has learned boxing goes home and beats his father, you do not blame the boxing teacher, and if a student uses rhetoric unjustly, you should not blame the teacher of rhetoric. The craft, he says, is neutral, and the blame falls on the one who misuses it. That defense is stronger than it first looks, and Augustine would later make something very like it (see the second reception row). Its weakness is the one Socrates presses, and it comes out of Gorgias’s own mouth. Socrates asks whether his pupils learn from him what is just, and Gorgias, perhaps too proud to say no, answers that if they do not already know it, he will teach them that too. Now look at what that does to the boxing defense. If the teacher of rhetoric also teaches justice, then a pupil who uses rhetoric unjustly is not simply a bad apple; he is a pupil the teacher has failed. A teacher who hands young men the most powerful tool in the city cannot stay neutral about justice. Either he teaches it, and answers for the result, or he has simply left it out.

(Q) "I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to teach virtue: and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them; but he thinks that men should be taught to speak." + Source: Plato, Meno 95c (Jowett translation). Meno, Gorgias’s pupil from Thessaly, is answering Socrates’ question whether the sophists are teachers of virtue. The words are Meno’s report of his teacher, set down by Plato.

(Q) "I have essayed to dispose of the injustice of defamation and the folly of allegation; I have prayed to compose a lucubration for Helen’s adulation and my own delectation." + Source: Gorgias, Encomium of Helen 21 (Van Hook translation, The Classical Weekly 6, 1913). The last words of the speech. Van Hook keeps the chiming rhymes going to the very end, which is why the English sounds so ornate: "essayed" means tried, and a "lucubration" is a piece of writing worked over late by lamplight. In the Greek, Gorgias calls the whole thing a paignion, a plaything, which leaves the reader to wonder how seriously to take its argument (T1). A speech that can acquit Helen as a game raises the question every later Christian preacher had to answer: is eloquence a servant of truth, or only a very good toy?

What Christian Thinkers Made of Him

(†) Paul came to Corinth refusing the persuader’s craft, so that faith would rest on the power of God. + Gorgias never appears in the New Testament, but the profession he did more than anyone to create was flourishing four and a half centuries later in the Greek cities Paul visited. Traveling orators still drew crowds and fees, and audiences still judged a speaker by his polish. Corinth, a rich and status-conscious city, prized that kind of performance. Paul’s account of his own preaching there reads like a deliberate refusal of it. He came, he says, not "with lofty speech or wisdom," and "my speech and my message were not in plausible words of wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power, so that your faith might not rest in the wisdom of men but in the power of God" (1 Corinthians 2:1, 4–5). Paul was no stranger to argument: Acts shows him reasoning in synagogues and in the marketplace of Athens (Acts 17:17). What he refused was persuasion as technique, a faith produced by the speaker’s skill, which would last only as long as the speaker’s spell.

(†) Augustine, a converted teacher of rhetoric, ruled that truth must not go into battle unarmed. + Augustine of Hippo spent his young manhood doing exactly what Gorgias had done: teaching rhetoric for pay. In the Confessions he looks back on it with regret, saying that in those years he "made sale of a loquacity to overcome by" (Confessions IV.2, Pusey translation), which in plainer words means he sold young men the gift of talk that would win their cases for them. Yet when he came to write a handbook for Christian teachers, On Christian Doctrine, he did not throw the art away. Its fourth book argues that since eloquence can serve either truth or falsehood, it would be folly to leave all the skill on the side of error. That is Gorgias’s own defense of his craft (T4), now set to work for the gospel, with the one thing Gorgias left out restored: the speaker must first know and love what is true. The church’s preachers also inherited, often without knowing its source, the style Gorgias made famous. Ancient critics gave his favorite devices a name, the "Gorgianic figures": the balanced clauses, the paired opposites, the chiming endings that so astonished the Athenians in 427 BC. You can hear them in early Christian sermons such as Melito of Sardis’s second-century homily (a sermon on a passage of Scripture) on the Passover, which builds whole paragraphs out of matched antitheses.

(Q) "Since, then, the faculty of eloquence is available for both sides, and is of very great service in the enforcing either of wrong or right, why do not good men study to engage it on the side of truth, when bad men use it to obtain the triumph of wicked and worthless causes, and to further injustice and error?" + Source: Augustine, On Christian Doctrine IV.2.3 (Shaw translation, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. 2). The chapter is titled "It is Lawful for a Christian Teacher to Use the Art of Rhetoric," and it opens by asking who would dare say that truth should stand unarmed against falsehood.

(†) Where the gospel parts company with him: the persuaded are still answerable, and the truth can be known and told. + Gorgias called his Helen a plaything, and no one knows how seriously he meant On Not Being. Still, the arguments survive in his name, and the gospel answers them at two points. - Persuasion does not cancel responsibility. The Helen argues that a person moved by words is no more to blame than a person carried off by force (T1). Scripture’s first story of persuasion answers otherwise. When God asks the woman in the garden what she has done, she says, "The serpent deceived me, and I ate" (Genesis 3:13), and the deception is real, yet she is still asked to answer for what she did. Words can tempt, mislead, and wound, but the one who hears them still chooses. - Truth can be known and passed on. On Not Being concludes that nothing could be known, and that if it were, it could not be told (T3). The gospel stakes everything on the opposite. Luke writes his orderly account "that you may have certainty concerning the things you have been taught" (Luke 1:4); John says the Word, God’s own speech, "became flesh and dwelt among us" (John 1:14); and Jesus tells Pilate that he came into the world "to bear witness to the truth" (John 18:37). A faith built on testimony requires that what was seen can be truly said. Gorgias was right that words are powerful, perhaps more right than anyone before him. The Christian answer is that their power is meant to carry truth from one person to another, which is exactly what he doubted it could do.

Only two of Gorgias’s works survive whole, both short display speeches; they came down through medieval manuscripts of the Attic orators. Everything else is known from summaries, quotations, and reports in later writers. The standard collection is Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, chapter 82, where the reports are numbered A1 onward and the fragments B1 onward. Surviving speeches: - Encomium of Helen: A speech in praise of Helen of Troy, arguing that whether she went by the will of the gods, by force, by persuasion, or by love, she was blameless. Contains the famous passages on speech as a "powerful lord" and on words acting on the soul like drugs on the body (T1), and closes by calling itself a plaything. - Defense of Palamedes: A model courtroom speech for the legendary hero Palamedes, falsely accused of treason by Odysseus. A tour of argument from probability, reasoning from what a sensible man would or would not be likely to do: Palamedes shows, step by step, that he had neither motive nor means nor opportunity to betray the Greeks. Philosophical treatise, known from summaries: - On Not Being, also called On Nature: The argument that nothing exists, that if it did it could not be known, and that if known it could not be communicated (T3). Lost; summarized in Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians I.65–87, and in the pseudo-Aristotelian On Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias, chapters 5–6. Speeches known from fragments and reports: - Olympic Oration: Delivered at the Olympic Games, urging the Greeks to stop warring with one another and unite against the barbarians. A few lines survive, quoted by Aristotle in the Rhetoric and by Clement of Alexandria in the Stromata, and Philostratus describes its theme. - Pythian Oration: Delivered at Delphi; Philostratus mentions it, and nothing of the text survives. - Funeral Oration (Epitaphios): A speech for Athenians fallen in war, probably never delivered in Athens itself. One long passage survives, preserved by the Byzantine scholar Maximus Planudes from Dionysius of Halicarnassus; it is the best surviving specimen of the Gorgianic style at full stretch. - Encomium of the Eleans: A speech praising the people of Elis, the city that ran the Olympic Games. Aristotle quotes its opening words in the Rhetoric (III.14), and nothing more survives. Lost writings on the art of speaking: - Art (Technē): A handbook of rhetoric attributed to him in antiquity. Aristotle, in Sophistical Refutations 34, complains that Gorgias taught by having students memorize ready-made speeches rather than by teaching principles. - On the right moment (kairos): Dionysius of Halicarnassus says Gorgias was the first to write about choosing the fitting moment in speech, but admits he wrote nothing worth mentioning on it. The title, if there was a separate work, is unknown. Sayings and short fragments: Scattered remarks are preserved by Aristotle (that one should spoil an opponent’s seriousness with laughter and his laughter with seriousness, Rhetoric III.18), by Plutarch (that tragedy is a deception in which the deceiver is more just than the one who does not deceive), and by others; they are collected as DK 82 B12–B27. The ancient witnesses to his life and teaching: - Plato, Gorgias: The dialogue named for him, in which Socrates questions Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles about rhetoric and justice (T2, T4). Plato’s portrait, not Gorgias’s words. - Plato, Meno: Opens in Thessaly’s debt to Gorgias and preserves his pupil’s report that he taught speaking, not virtue (T4). - Plato, Philebus 58a–b, Hippias Major 282b, and Apology 19e: Shorter mentions of his claims for rhetoric, his embassy and earnings at Athens, and his fees. - Diodorus of Sicily, Library of History XII.53: The embassy of 427 BC and the effect of his style on the Athenians. - Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists I.9: A third-century AD sketch of his career and his great festival speeches. - Cicero, On Old Age 13, and Pausanias, Description of Greece VI.17 and X.18: His long life, and his statues at Olympia and Delphi. Standard English editions: Rosamond Kent Sprague, ed., The Older Sophists (University of South Carolina Press, 1972), with complete translations of the surviving speeches and fragments; John Dillon and Tania Gergel, The Greek Sophists (Penguin, 2003). LaRue Van Hook’s partial translation of the Helen (1913) is in the public domain.

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