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1960 AD – present

Thomas Nagel of Belgrade b. 1937 AD

(●) The atheist philosopher who argued that the mind cannot be squeezed into matter, and that the materialist picture of nature is almost certainly false. + Materialism is the view that the world is nothing but particles in motion, so that a thought or a memory or a feeling of grief is, in the end, only chemistry. Most people who doubt it are religious believers, and so their doubts are easy to wave away: of course the Christian thinks there is more to a person than a brain. Thomas Nagel is harder to wave away. He does not believe in God, he has said in print that he hopes there is no God, and for half a century he has been one of the most respected philosophers in the English-speaking world. He also thinks the standard materialist story about mind, meaning and life is very probably wrong, and he has said that in print too. That combination is why he sits on a Christian apologetics site. Christian philosophers did not have to argue Nagel into his doubts about materialism; he arrived at them himself, by following the problem of consciousness wherever it led. When a believer says that a human being is more than chemistry, Nagel is the witness from the other side of the courtroom who agrees. The signature fact a reader will remember is a single question, the title of a paper he published in 1974: "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Generations of students have been taught the philosophy of mind starting from those eight words.

(●) 1937 AD: Born in Belgrade to German Jewish refugees, he reached New York as a small child. + Thomas Nagel was born on July 4, 1937, in Belgrade, then the capital of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. His parents, Walter Nagel and Carolyn Baer Nagel, were German Jews who had left Germany as the Nazi regime tightened its grip, and Belgrade was a stop on the way rather than a home. In 1939, the year the war began, the family crossed to the United States and settled in New York. So the philosopher who would spend his life asking what it is like to be someone else began his own life as a refugee, carried out of Europe by parents who had already learned how quickly a settled world can come apart. He grew up American and became a citizen, and New York, where he would teach for more than three decades, was home from then on.

(●) 1958 AD: Cornell, Oxford and Harvard trained him, and John Rawls supervised his doctorate. + Nagel took his bachelor’s degree in philosophy at Cornell University in 1958, then crossed the Atlantic on a Fulbright scholarship (the American government’s program for sending students to study abroad) to Oxford, where he earned the BPhil, Oxford’s graduate degree in philosophy, in 1960. Oxford at the end of the 1950s was the capital of "ordinary language philosophy," a school that tried to settle old puzzles by paying close attention to how we actually use words, and Nagel learned its habits of precision there even though he later wanted philosophy to go deeper than language. He finished his doctorate at Harvard in 1963. His supervisor was John Rawls, who would publish A Theory of Justice in 1971 and change political philosophy for a generation. Like his teacher, Nagel would treat moral questions as real questions, with better and worse answers, rather than expressions of taste.

(●) 1970 AD: Teaching at Princeton, he published his first book, arguing that reasons to help others are as real as reasons to help ourselves. + After three years as an assistant professor at the University of California, Berkeley (1963 to 1966), Nagel moved to Princeton, where he rose to full professor and stayed until 1980. His first book, The Possibility of Altruism (1970), took on a cynical idea that sounds like common sense: that in the end everyone acts only for themselves. Think of a stranger on the sidewalk who drops a wallet. Nagel argued that the reason you have to hand it back does not depend on what you will get out of it; it depends on seeing yourself as one person among others, each of whose interests is as real as your own. The 1970s brought the essays that made his name. "The Absurd" (1971), "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (1974) and "Moral Luck" (1976) all date from these years, and in 1979 he gathered them with others into Mortal Questions, still one of the most widely read collections in modern philosophy. In the same year he married the art historian Anne Hollander; they were together until her death in 2014. An earlier marriage, to Doris Blum, had ended in divorce in 1973.

(●) 1974 AD: A single question about bats made him famous and reopened the problem of consciousness. + In October 1974 the journal The Philosophical Review printed a short paper with an odd title: "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Bats find their way by sonar, sending out shrieks and reading the echoes, a sense no human has. A scientist could, in principle, learn everything about how a bat’s brain processes those echoes, Nagel argued, and still not know what it is like, from the inside, to perceive the world that way. The paper landed at a moment when many philosophers believed the mind had nearly been explained. A pain, on the popular views of the day, simply was a certain firing of nerve cells, or else it was whatever job that firing does, such as making you pull your hand off the stove; either way, the remaining puzzles were details. Nagel did not deny that the mind depends on the brain. He denied that the physical description, however complete, says everything there is to say. Half a century later the paper is among the most cited in its field. In the 1990s the Australian philosopher David Chalmers gave its question a name that stuck, the "hard problem of consciousness": not how the brain sorts signals and steers behavior, which is hard enough, but why any of that activity should feel like anything at all from the inside. The problem is still argued in Nagel’s terms.

(●) 1980 AD: He moved to New York University and wrote The View from Nowhere, his account of the two standpoints every person lives between. + In 1980 Nagel joined the philosophy department at New York University, which he chaired from 1981 to 1986 and helped build into one of the strongest in the world. From 1986 he held a joint appointment in philosophy and law, and from 2002 the rank of University Professor, the university’s highest. He taught there until his retirement, after which he became University Professor Emeritus. His central book, The View from Nowhere, appeared in 1986. Its title has become a phrase people use without knowing where it came from. It gathered the themes of his essays into one picture of the human situation, a creature with a point of view who can also, in thought, step outside it (T2). Shorter books followed: What Does It All Mean? (1987), a small introduction to philosophy written for beginners, and Equality and Partiality (1991), on why fairness to everyone and love for one’s own pull against each other.

(●) 1997 AD: Defending reason against relativism, he confessed in print that he hopes there is no God. + By the 1990s a fashionable view in the universities held that logic, science and morality were finally just products of culture, psychology or power. Philosophers call this relativism: the idea that what counts as true or reasonable is relative to a culture or a person, the way the side of the road you drive on is relative to the country you are in. Nagel’s answer was The Last Word (1997): you cannot argue that reason is merely a cultural habit without using reason to make the argument, and so reason always gets the last word (T3). Near the end of that book, discussing why so many intellectuals are drawn to explanations that shrink the mind, he did something philosophers rarely do. He told his readers about himself. He wanted atheism to be true, he wrote; it was not only that he did not believe in God but that he hoped there was none. He suspected that this "fear of religion," as he called it, was common among his colleagues and was quietly shaping their theories. Christians have quoted the passage ever since, usually with respect, because it is so unusually honest.

(●) 2012 AD: Mind and Cosmos argued that materialist Darwinism is almost certainly false, and the reaction was furious. + The 2000s brought Nagel the profession’s highest honors, among them the Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy and the Balzan Prize for moral philosophy, both in 2008. They also brought the first signs of trouble with his colleagues. In a 2008 essay he argued that intelligent design, the claim that some features of living things are best explained by a designing mind, ought not to be dismissed as unscientific merely because it brings in a designer; and in 2009 he named Stephen Meyer’s Signature in the Cell, a book arguing for design from the information in DNA, among his books of the year in the Times Literary Supplement. Letters of protest followed. Then in 2012 came a short book with a long subtitle: Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. Neo-Darwinism is Darwin’s theory of natural selection joined to modern genetics: random changes in genes arise, and the ones that help a creature survive and reproduce get passed on. Calling it "materialist" adds the further claim that nothing else is needed, that particles, accidents and selection explain everything about living things, minds included. A senior atheist philosopher was saying, in plain words, that the picture of the world most of his colleagues took for granted could not account for consciousness, thought or value (T4). Reviewers in leading journals and magazines attacked it, a few of them scornfully; others, including philosophers who disagreed, praised him for refusing to accept a consensus he thought had not earned its confidence. He did not retract, and he did not become a theist. In 2023, at eighty-six, he published two more books: Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress and the essay collection Analytic Philosophy and Human Life.

What He Taught

(T1) Consciousness is something it is like to be, and no purely physical description can capture it. + Picture a neuroscientist who has never tasted coffee. She has read every paper on the chemistry of the bean, the receptors on the tongue and the firing of the taste centers in the brain. Then someone hands her a cup. When she drinks it, she learns something, and what she learns is not one more fact about receptors. It is what coffee tastes like. That is the heart of Nagel’s bat paper. A creature is conscious, he said, if there is "something it is like" to be that creature: something it is like for the bat to fly through the dark by echoes, for you to see red or to feel a toothache. That inner side of experience is what Nagel called its subjective character, meaning how things seem from the point of view of the one having the experience. Physical science, by contrast, works by stepping away from every particular point of view to describe things as they are for anyone. So the more completely physics describes the brain, the more completely it leaves out the very thing in question. Nagel was careful not to claim more than this. He did not say that the mind is a soul, or that physicalism (the view that everything real is physical) is false. He said that at present we cannot even understand how it could be true. Christian philosophers have built on the paper ever since, in the argument from consciousness: if mind cannot be produced by matter alone, its existence points toward a Mind behind matter. Nagel did not draw that conclusion himself (T4).

(Q) "But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism." + Source: Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (October 1974), p. 436; reprinted in Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 166. The definition that the whole later debate starts from. The original sentence continues past the point quoted, adding that it must be something it is like for the organism itself.

(T2) Every person can step back from their own life, and from that distance it can look absurd. + You are worrying about a deadline at work, and then you look up at the night sky and remember how large the universe is and how short a life is. For a moment the deadline looks ridiculous. A moment later you are worrying about it again. Nagel thought that ordinary experience reveals something deep about us. We each live from a particular standpoint, the view from here, with our own body, history and cares. But we can also think about ourselves from outside, as one creature among billions in a vast universe, which is the standpoint he later called "the view from nowhere." He meant by it the most objective view we can reach: the one that depends least on who and where we happen to be. Neither standpoint can be dropped, and neither can be folded into the other. In his 1971 essay "The Absurd" he located life’s absurdity exactly in the clash between the two: we take our lives with total seriousness, and we are able to see that from far enough away nothing about them seems to matter. His advice was not despair and not heroic defiance but a kind of irony. Christian readers recognize the experience, which Ecclesiastes describes on every page, and answer it differently: the view from the farthest distance is not nowhere but God’s, and from there a human life is not trivial but known and loved (Psalm 8:3–5).

(Q) "If sub specie aeternitatis there is no reason to believe that anything matters, then that does not matter either, and we can approach our absurd lives with irony instead of heroism or despair." + Source: Thomas Nagel, "The Absurd," The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 20 (October 21, 1971), p. 727; reprinted in Mortal Questions (1979), p. 23. The closing sentence of the essay. Sub specie aeternitatis is Latin for "under the aspect of eternity," the view of things from the standpoint of the whole, a phrase made famous by the philosopher Spinoza.

(T3) Reason cannot be explained away, because every attempt to explain it away has to use it. + Imagine someone telling you that all arguments are just disguised bids for power. You might fairly ask whether that argument is one too. If it is, you have no reason to accept it; if it is not, then at least one argument is more than a bid for power, and the claim is false. That is the shape of The Last Word. Nagel took on the many ways his contemporaries tried to "go outside" reason and explain it from below: as a product of culture, of evolution, of psychology, or of "language games" (Ludwig Wittgenstein’s phrase for the idea that words get their meaning from the rule-bound activities they belong to, the way "check" means one thing over a chessboard and another at a bank). In each case, he argued, the explanation quietly relies on the very reasoning it claims to debunk. Some thoughts, such as the basic rules of logic and arithmetic, are ones we cannot get behind; we can only think them. They have the last word. Christian philosophers will find this familiar. C. S. Lewis made a related argument in Miracles (1947), and Alvin Plantinga made another in his evolutionary argument against naturalism: if our minds were shaped only for survival, why trust them on questions survival never tested? Their answer is that reason can be trusted because it was made by a Mind that is itself rational, the way you trust a ruler because someone took care to mark it true. Nagel accepts the problem and refuses that theistic answer, and he is candid that temperament, not only argument, stands behind the refusal.

(Q) "I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that." + Source: Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 130. Nagel is explaining what he calls the fear of religion, and he offers himself as a case of it. He goes on to suggest that this "cosmic authority problem" is common, and that it drives much of the scientism and reductionism of the age: scientism being the belief that science is the only road to knowledge, and reductionism the habit of explaining higher things wholly in terms of lower ones.

(T4) Materialism cannot explain mind, meaning or value, so the order of nature must be richer than physics describes. + Suppose a friend tells you that a lightning strike in a junkyard happened to assemble a working computer, which then wrote a sonnet. You would not need a degree in physics to doubt it. Nagel thought something like that ordinary incredulity was a reasonable response to the standard account of where minds came from: physical accidents plus natural selection, with no further explanation. In Mind and Cosmos (2012) he argued that this account, which he called materialist neo-Darwinism (natural selection acting on random genetic change, with nothing else in the picture), has three things it cannot explain. The first is consciousness (T1). The second is reason: our ability to grasp truths of logic and mathematics, which is more than useful behavior. The third is value: real moral truths that we recognize rather than invent. Since all three exist, the universe must be the kind of place that produces them, and a full account of nature has to say why. Nagel considered two answers. One is theism: a Mind made the world, and minds within it make sense as reflections of that Mind. He took that answer seriously and treated it fairly, but he did not accept it. His own tentative proposal was natural teleology: the idea that nature itself has a built-in tendency toward life, mind and value, a direction written into the laws, without any designer behind them. (Teleology comes from the Greek telos, "end" or "goal"; it means explanation by what something is heading toward, the way an acorn is explained by the oak it is on its way to becoming.) Few philosophers have followed him there, and many rejected his diagnosis as well, though some readers on both sides of the God question judged that he had put a hard problem more plainly than his critics answered it.

(Q) "It is prima facie highly implausible that life as we know it is the result of a sequence of physical accidents together with the mechanism of natural selection." + Source: Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 6. Prima facie is Latin for "at first sight." Nagel says in the same passage that he wants to defend the untutored incredulity many people feel at the reductionist story, and the sentence is that incredulity put into a philosopher’s words.

What Christian Thinkers Made of Him

(†) Christian philosophers welcomed him as an honest witness that materialism has not explained the mind. + The argument from consciousness, made in its modern form by Richard Swinburne and J. P. Moreland, begins where Nagel’s bat paper ends: conscious experience is real, and physical description leaves it out. Defenders of that argument cite Nagel constantly, not because he agrees with their conclusion but because he does not. When a philosopher with no stake in theism says that consciousness resists every materialist explanation on offer, the believer cannot be accused of special pleading, which is the fault of bending the rules of evidence in favor of the answer you already wanted, like a parent who calls the other team’s tackle a foul and his own son’s identical tackle fair play. Mind and Cosmos widened the welcome. Alvin Plantinga, among the leading Christian philosophers of the age, had argued that naturalism (the view that nature is all there is, with no God or anything else beyond it) undercuts our trust in our own reasoning. Nagel granted much of the force of the problem while faulting the form of Plantinga’s argument, and in a 2012 review of Plantinga’s Where the Conflict Really Lies in The New York Review of Books he engaged the case for theism with evident respect. Christians noticed that an atheist critic of materialism this serious treated their position as a real alternative to be weighed, not a superstition to be mocked.

(†) His fairness to believers set him apart from the New Atheists of his generation. + The New Atheists were the popular writers, Richard Dawkins the best known of them, who in best-selling books of the mid-2000s argued that religion is not only false but harmful, and that it had been shown far more respect than it deserved. When Dawkins published The God Delusion in 2006, Nagel reviewed it in The New Republic under the title "The Fear of Religion." He shared Dawkins’s unbelief but judged his arguments against God philosophically weak, and he said so. Two years later he defended a hearing for intelligent design in public debate, and the next year he praised Stephen Meyer’s book. None of this was because he had changed sides. It was because he thought an argument should be met on its merits rather than ruled out by its source. For Christians, that habit made Nagel an unusually useful conversation partner. His writing shows a believer what an intelligent, fair-minded unbeliever finds persuasive and what he does not, and it shows an unbeliever that one can reject the faith without pretending its arguments are stupid.

(†) Where the gospel parts company with him: a universe that aims at mind but has no Mind behind it. + Nagel goes a long way with Christian thought and then stops, and he says where and why. The disagreement is at three points. - Mind from Mind. Nagel concludes that nature must be the kind of place that gives rise to minds, and then proposes a direction written into nature itself, with no one doing the directing. Scripture gives the simpler answer to his own question: the world bears the marks of mind because a Mind made it, and human beings can reason because they are made in the image of the One who reasons (Genesis 1:27; John 1:1–4). Paul says that what can be known about God is plain in the things that have been made (Romans 1:19–20). - The view from nowhere. For Nagel the most objective view is a view from no one in particular. For the Christian the widest view of all is not impersonal; it belongs to God, who sees every life from outside and also from within, and to whom no human life is absurd (Psalm 139:1–6; Matthew 10:29–31). - The wish. Nagel was candid that he does not want there to be a God, and that he suspects the same wish shapes much of modern thought. Scripture treats that unwillingness not as an intellectual quirk but as part of the human condition every person shares, and it does not leave anyone there: the light came into the world, and the invitation to come to it stands (John 3:19–21). He has followed the argument further than most of his peers dared, and that is exactly why Christians keep reading him.

Nagel is a living author, and almost all of his work is still in print with its original publishers, chiefly Oxford University Press. He has written books, but he is above all an essayist, and several of his most influential pieces first appeared as journal articles and were later gathered into collections. Books: - The Possibility of Altruism (Clarendon Press, 1970; Princeton University Press, 1978): His first book. Argues that reasons to act for others are as objective as reasons to act for oneself, grounded in recognizing oneself as one person among many. - Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979): Fourteen essays on death, the absurd, moral luck, sexual perversion, war, equality and the mind, including "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (T1) and "The Absurd" (T2). His most widely read book. - The View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press, 1986): His central work. The clash between the personal and the objective standpoints traced through mind, knowledge, freedom, value and the meaning of life (T2). - What Does It All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1987): Nine short chapters for beginners on knowledge, other minds, the mind and the brain, the meaning of words, free will, right and wrong, justice, death and the meaning of life. Still a common first book in philosophy classes. - Equality and Partiality (Oxford University Press, 1991): Why impartial concern for everyone and special loyalty to oneself and one’s own pull against each other, and what that means for political fairness. - Other Minds: Critical Essays 1969–1994 (Oxford University Press, 1995): Essays and reviews on other philosophers, from Aristotle and Wittgenstein to his contemporaries. - The Last Word (Oxford University Press, 1997): Against relativism and subjectivism: logic, science and ethics cannot be explained away from outside, because the explanation must use them. Contains the confession about the fear of religion (T3). - The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice, with Liam Murphy (Oxford University Press, 2002): Argues that property rights are not prior to the tax system that defines them, so fairness in taxation cannot be judged from pre-tax income. - Concealment and Exposure and Other Essays (Oxford University Press, 2002): Essays on privacy, public life, and philosophy of mind and ethics. - Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament: Essays 2002–2008 (Oxford University Press, 2010): Includes the title essay on what a secular thinker should do with the religious question of how a life fits the universe as a whole, his essay on intelligent design and public education, and his review of Dawkins. - Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (Oxford University Press, 2012): The case that materialism cannot explain consciousness, reason or value, and the tentative proposal of natural teleology (T4). - Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress (Oxford University Press, 2023): Two essays, one on the part gut feelings and intuitions play in moral knowledge, and one, new to the book, arguing that moral truth has a history, so that only some moral progress is the discovery of what was true all along. - Analytic Philosophy and Human Life (Oxford University Press, 2023): Later essays and reviews on mind, ethics, political philosophy and other philosophers. Selected essays and reviews: - "The Absurd," The Journal of Philosophy (1971): The clash between seriousness and the outside view as the source of life’s absurdity (T2). - "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", The Philosophical Review (1974): The founding statement of the modern problem of consciousness (T1). - "Moral Luck," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume (1976): How much of what we are blamed or praised for depends on things outside our control. - "The Fear of Religion," The New Republic (2006): A review of Dawkins’s The God Delusion. - "Public Education and Intelligent Design," Philosophy & Public Affairs (2008): Argues that intelligent design is not unscientific merely because it posits a designer. - "A Philosopher Defends Religion," The New York Review of Books (2012): A review of Plantinga’s Where the Conflict Really Lies. Edited: - John Rawls, A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith, with "On My Religion" (Harvard University Press, 2009): Rawls’s 1942 undergraduate thesis, written when he was a believing Christian, published with his late statement on why he lost his faith. Nagel edited the volume and wrote its introduction with Joshua Cohen. Standard editions: his books are in print with Oxford University Press (Cambridge University Press for Mortal Questions). No complete or collected edition exists.
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