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Chrysippus of Soli c. 279 – c. 206 BC
(●) Chrysippus, a former runner from Cilicia, built Stoicism into a system, and the church spent centuries answering his arguments about fate, evil, and providence. The ancients had a saying about him: "But for Chrysippus, there had been no Porch." The Porch is the Stoa, the painted colonnade in Athens where Zeno of Citium first taught, and the school took its name from the place: Stoicism is simply the philosophy of the Stoa. The line means that Zeno founded the school but Chrysippus made it last. He took a handful of striking convictions (that a divine Reason runs through the world, that virtue is the only true good, that everything happens by fate) and wrote them out, argued them through, and defended them against every critic, until Stoicism was one of the most complete philosophies of the ancient world. That is why he matters on a Christian site. When the apostles went out into the Greek-speaking world, the Stoicism they met was largely his Stoicism. Paul argued with Stoic philosophers in Athens (Acts 17:18), and he had been born in Tarsus, a city that produced Stoic teachers. The church fathers, the Christian writers of the first centuries after the apostles, quoted him, admired his care for troubled souls, and argued hard against his doctrine of fate. Many of the questions they had to settle (how God can govern everything without making us puppets, why a good God permits evil) are questions Chrysippus put on the table in the form they would keep. We do not know his dates exactly. Diogenes Laertius, the third-century AD collector of philosophers’ lives on whom we chiefly depend, says he died at seventy-three in the 143rd Olympiad. The Greeks often counted years by the Olympic Games, which came round every fourth summer, so an Olympiad is a four-year span, rather as we might date something only to a presidential term. The 143rd ran from 208 to 204 BC. The years in his title, about 279 to about 206 BC, are the conventional ones worked out from that, and every date below rests on the same calculation. The fact most readers remember is a number. He wrote more than 705 books, and not one of them survives whole.
(●) c. 279 BC: Born at Soli in Cilicia, he trained as a long-distance runner before he ever studied philosophy. Chrysippus was the son of a man named Apollonius, and he came "either from Soli or from Tarsus," as one ancient source hedges. Both are towns of Cilicia, the strip of coast in the southeast corner of Asia Minor (modern Turkey) facing Cyprus, and they lie less than thirty miles apart. Tarsus is the city Paul would one day call "no obscure city" (Acts 21:39). The first thing we hear about the young man is that he was a long-distance runner. Greek footraces were run in a stadium, and the long race, the dolichos, went back and forth along the track for two or three miles. It rewarded stamina more than flash, which is not a bad description of the philosopher he became. What turned him to philosophy, according to the Stoic writer Hecato, was a loss: the property he had inherited from his father was confiscated to the king’s treasury. We are not told which king or why. A young man with his inheritance gone and a long road ahead of him went to Athens.
(●) Before c. 240 BC: In Athens he studied under Cleanthes, then learned the skeptics’ methods in the Academy. In Athens he became a pupil of Cleanthes, Zeno’s successor at the head of the Stoa (a few sources say he heard Zeno himself). Cleanthes was a slow, devout former boxer; Chrysippus was quick and impatient, and the two made an odd pair. He used to tell his teacher that "all he wanted was to be told what the doctrines were; he would find out the proofs for himself." He did not hide his disagreements. Yet every time he had argued against the old man, Diogenes says, he felt remorse, and kept quoting a line of poetry: "Blest in all else am I, save only where I touch Cleanthes: there I am ill-fortuned." He also did something unusual for a Stoic. According to the historian Sotion, he studied in Plato’s Academy under Arcesilaus and his successor Lacydes. By then the Academy had turned skeptical: it taught that we should suspend judgment, because nothing can be known for certain. Arcesilaus died around 241 BC, so these studies began before that date. Picture a chess player who goes to train with the club that keeps beating his own: Chrysippus learned the skeptics’ weapons from the inside. It shows in his books. He wrote six books arguing against ordinary experience and seven defending it, and ancient critics complained that his case against the senses came out stronger than his defense of them.
(●) c. 230 BC: When Cleanthes died, Chrysippus became head of the Stoa and rebuilt its teaching from the ground up. Cleanthes died around 230 BC, and Chrysippus succeeded him. The school he inherited was under real pressure. The skeptics of the Academy were picking apart Stoic claims to knowledge, and the Stoics’ own founding doctrines had been stated more in slogans than in proofs. Chrysippus answered by doing what he had told Cleanthes he would do: he supplied the proofs. He defined the school’s terms, built out its logic, and worked through its physics and ethics until there was an answer, or at least an argument, for nearly every objection. He had a high opinion of his own abilities, and he did not hide that either. When someone asked him to whom he should entrust his son, he answered, "To me: for, if I had dreamt of there being anyone better than myself, I should myself be studying with him." He dedicated none of his books to a king, and when Ptolemy of Egypt wrote to Cleanthes asking him to come, or to send someone, to his court, it was Sphaerus, another of Cleanthes’ pupils, who went; Chrysippus would not. But he sent for his sister’s sons, Aristocreon and Philocrates, and educated them himself, and several of his logic books are addressed to Aristocreon by name. He was also, one source says, the first to teach a class in the open air at the Lyceum, the gymnasium where Aristotle had once lectured.
(●) c. 230–206 BC: He wrote more than 705 books, so famous for logic that people said the gods would use his system. The old woman who sat beside him while he worked said he wrote five hundred lines a day. The number of his books, more than 705, made him one of the most prolific authors of the ancient world, and his reputation in logic was so great that "most people thought, if the gods took to dialectic, they would adopt no other system than that of Chrysippus." Dialectic here means the art of reasoning by question and answer, the ancient name for logic. His critics were less kind about his style. He repeated himself, piled up quotations, and corrected as he went; one treatise quoted so much of Euripides’ play Medea that a reader, asked what he was reading, answered, "The Medea of Chrysippus." Apollodorus of Athens, in his Collection of Doctrines, arguing that Epicurus was the more original writer, complained that if you stripped his books of other men’s words, the pages would be left bare. He was a thinker before he was a writer, and much of what he wrote was argument in its working clothes. Some of it also drew complaint of a sharper kind. In a work on the early natural philosophers he read the myth of Zeus and Hera as an allegory of nature in terms so coarse that, Diogenes says, no one would soil his lips by repeating them, and his critics charged that his books on politics and justice treated incest and the eating of the dead as permissible in principle. Those charges belong to his own teaching, and they return in the final row.
(●) c. 206 BC: He died at seventy-three, by one story after a cup of unmixed wine and by another in a fit of laughter. Diogenes Laertius gives two accounts of the end. In the first, his students invited him to a sacrificial feast while he was teaching in the Odeum, a concert hall in Athens. He drank a cup of sweet wine without the water Greeks normally mixed in, was seized with dizziness, and died five days later. In the second, a donkey ate his figs, and he called out to the old woman of the house, "Now give the ass a drink of pure wine to wash down the figs," and laughed so hard at his own joke that he died. Diogenes does not choose between them, and neither can we. The date comes from the Chronology of an Apollodorus (Diogenes does not say whether he is the same man who complained about the quotations): the 143rd Olympiad, 208 to 204 BC, at the age of seventy-three. His pupil Zeno of Tarsus took over the school. Athens remembered him with a statue in the Ceramicus, the potters’ quarter by the city gate. He was a small man, and the statue was so nearly hidden by the statue of a horseman beside it that Carneades, the sharpest of the later skeptics, nicknamed him Crypsippus, "Horse-hidden." Carneades owed him more than a joke. The skeptic built his career on refuting Chrysippus, and he would often say, with a twist on the old saying: "Without Chrysippus where should I have been?"
What He Taught
(T1) Good reasoning has a shape that can be written down and tested. Suppose you are walking a dog and come to a fork in the road. The dog sniffs the left path, then the middle one, finds no scent on either, and dashes down the third without sniffing at all. Sextus Empiricus, the great ancient collector of skeptical arguments, reports that Chrysippus used exactly this picture: the dog, he said, is reasoning. In effect it says to itself: the quarry went this way, or that way, or the other; not this way; not that way; so the other. Even an animal follows the shape of an argument. Chrysippus spent much of his life writing those shapes down. Aristotle had built a logic of terms ("all men are mortal; Socrates is a man"). Chrysippus built a logic of whole statements joined by little words like "if," "and," and "or," which is what modern logicians call propositional logic. He reduced it to five basic patterns he called indemonstrables, forms so plain that they need no proof and every other argument can be checked against them. The first runs: "If it is day, it is light; it is day; therefore it is light." He also wrote book after book on the puzzles that test any logic, among them the Liar (a man says "I am lying": is he telling the truth?). Most of this work was lost, and logicians had to rediscover propositional logic for themselves in modern times before scholars recognized how much of it Chrysippus had already done. For Christian readers the point is simpler. The fathers who argued with pagans, and the medieval teachers who trained clergy in logic, worked in a world where careful, checkable reasoning was taken to be a reflection of the reason built into the world, and Chrysippus did as much as anyone to make it so.
(Q) "If anyone is in Megara, he is not in Athens: now there is a man in Megara, therefore there is not a man in Athens." Source: Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers VII.187 (Hicks translation). One of the trick arguments Chrysippus "used to propound," set like a puzzle for students. Megara was a neighboring city, some twenty-five miles west of Athens. Read the argument once and it seems to march along: the first line sounds true, so does the second, and yet the conclusion is plainly false, since Athens was full of men. When true-sounding steps lead somewhere false, the fault must be in the shape. Here it hides in the slide from "anyone" to "a man": the first line is about whichever person happens to be in Megara, and the conclusion quietly turns that one person into every man there is. Learning to find that kind of fault is what his logic was for (T1).
(T2) The heavens are made by something greater than man, and that greater thing is God. Imagine stepping into a large and beautiful house. The rooms are in order and the roof is sound, though you never meet the owner. Nobody could persuade you, says the Stoic speaker in Cicero’s dialogue On the Nature of the Gods, that it was built for mice and weasels. Cicero, the Roman statesman and philosopher, wrote that dialogue as a debate among the schools, and the Stoic spokesman, a man named Balbus, leans on Chrysippus for his strongest case. The argument he credits to Chrysippus runs in steps. Some things in the world, the stars in their courses above all, are beyond any human power to make. Whatever made them must be greater than man. And it would be sheer arrogance to suppose that nothing in the universe is better than ourselves. So something greater exists, and that is what we mean by God. It is an early ancestor of the arguments Christian thinkers would later build from degrees of greatness up to a highest being. But notice where Chrysippus took it. For him the greater being was not outside the world. The world itself, he argued, is complete and perfect, and so it must have reason, virtue, and wisdom; therefore the world is God. In the same dialogue Cicero gives the Epicureans a voice too. They were the followers of Epicurus, who held that the gods exist but live in untroubled bliss and take no interest in the world at all, and their spokesman summed up Chrysippus’ teaching bluntly: "that the world, with a universal effusion of its spirit, is God." The argument points upward; the conclusion folds back into the cosmos (see the final row).
(Q) "If there be no such thing as a Deity, what is there better than man, since he only is possessed of reason, the most excellent of all things? But it is a foolish piece of vanity in man to think there is nothing preferable to him. There is, therefore, something preferable; consequently, there is certainly a God." Source: Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods II.16 (Yonge translation, where it stands as Book II, chapter 6). Balbus is quoting Chrysippus directly, having just given the first step: whatever no human reason or power can make must have been made by a being "preferable to man," and the heavens are such a thing (T2).
(T3) Everything happens by fate, and yet what we do still comes from us. Push a stone cylinder, a garden roller, at the top of a slope. You start it moving, and in that sense you are the cause of its rolling. But once it is going it rolls because it is round. Push a cube in the same way and it simply tips over and stops. Your shove supplies the beginning; the shape of the thing supplies the rest. Chrysippus used that picture to answer the hardest objection to his doctrine of fate. He taught that fate (in Greek, heimarmenē) is an unbroken chain of causes running through all of time, so that nothing happens without a cause and everything that happens was always going to happen. His critics drew the obvious conclusion: then no one is to blame for anything, and punishing criminals is unjust. You can hear the thief in the dock making the case for himself: if my theft was settled before I was born, how can you punish me for it? Chrysippus answered with a distinction between causes. The outside world supplies what he called an antecedent cause, the push: an impression comes to us, a sight or an offer or a threat. But whether we give assent to it, saying yes inwardly and acting, depends on our own character, the shape of the stone. A well-formed mind meets the same push and does not roll into sin. So the act is fated, and it is still ours. Philosophers today call a position like this compatibilism: the view that a world in which everything is determined beforehand can still leave room for genuine responsibility. Chrysippus was its first great defender. Christian thinkers would agree with him that God’s providence governs all things, and they would argue among themselves for centuries about whether his answer gives a human being enough freedom to make the blame and the praise real.
(Q) "If you roll a cylindrical stone over a sloping, steep piece of ground, you do indeed furnish the beginning and cause of its rapid descent, yet soon it speeds onward, not because you make it do so, but because of its peculiar form and natural tendency to roll; just so the order, the law, and the inevitable quality of fate set in motion the various classes of things and the beginnings of causes, but the carrying out of our designs and thoughts, and even our actions, are regulated by each individual’s own will and the characteristics of his mind." Source: Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights VII.2.11 (Rolfe translation). Gellius, a Roman essayist of the second century AD, has just summed up what he calls the purport of a long and subtle argument, and then gives Chrysippus’ own illustration in a Latin rendering, introduced with "he says." Cicero tells the same story of the cylinder in his treatise On Fate (sections 42 to 43).
(T4) Providence made the world for good, and evils come as side effects of good things. Anyone who has bought a car knows the trade. A lighter body saves fuel and handles better, and it also crumples more easily in a crash. The engineer did not set out to make the car fragile; the fragility came along with something good. Chrysippus answered the problem of evil in much the same way, in the fourth book of his treatise On Providence. Critics said that if providence ruled the world, there would be no evils. He gave two replies. The first was that good and evil are opposites, and opposites come in pairs: there could be no idea of justice without injustice, nor of courage without cowardice. "There is absolutely nothing more foolish," he wrote, "than those men who think that good could exist, if there were at the same time no evil." The second reply is the one that has lasted. Nature did not aim at disease, he said; diseases arise from "certain inevitable consequences," as a byproduct of things made for a good purpose, the way a thin skull comes with a well-made head. Christian thinkers recognized the question at once, because they faced it themselves, and some of them used versions of his second answer. They did not accept the first. Scripture does not make evil necessary to the existence of good: God is good with no evil beside him, and the world he made was "very good" (Genesis 1:31) before anything went wrong.
(Q) "When nature fashioned men’s bodies, a higher reason and the actual usefulness of what she was creating demanded that the head be made of very delicate and small bones. But this greater usefulness of one part was attended with an external disadvantage; namely, that the head was but slightly protected and could be damaged by slight blows and shocks." Source: Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights VII.1.10–11 (Rolfe translation), quoting the fourth book of Chrysippus’ On Providence. Chrysippus goes on to say that diseases were created "at the same time with health," and that vices arise alongside the virtue nature intended (T4).
(T5) The passions are false judgments, and the soul can be treated for them as the body is treated for disease. A person walking downhill can stop whenever they choose. A person running downhill cannot; the legs carry them past the point where they meant to stop. Galen, the great physician of the second century AD, preserves the comparison Chrysippus drew from that: a passion is an impulse that has run past the measure reason sets for it. For Chrysippus, a passion (in Greek pathos: grief, fear, craving, or reckless delight) is not a separate animal living in the soul that reason has to cage. It is reason itself gone wrong, a mistaken judgment that something is good or bad when it is not. The grieving man has judged that a great evil has happened to him and that it is right to be crushed by it. If that is so, passions can be treated, the way a doctor treats a fever, by correcting the judgment. He wrote a book of Therapeutics, a manual for curing the soul, as the fourth part of his work On Passions. The goal was apatheia, freedom from passion, which some Christians would later question: Jesus wept at the grave of his friend (John 11:35), and Scripture does not treat all grief as error. But Christian pastors found much to admire in the physician of souls, and Origen, the great Christian teacher of the third century, praised his patience in treating people where they were.
(Q) "We must not too curiously inquire into the opinions held by a person at the time that he is under the influence of passion, lest, if we delay too long for the purpose of overthrowing the opinions by which the mind is possessed, the opportunity for curing the passion may pass away." Source: Origen, Against Celsus VIII.51 (Crombie translation, Ante-Nicene Fathers), reporting Chrysippus’ treatise on the cure of the passions. Origen gives the substance of the passage in his own sentence. Chrysippus’ point is a physician’s: treat the patient you have, even with arguments drawn from a philosophy you think mistaken, rather than lose the moment debating doctrine (T5).
(Q) "But since this is so, it is evident that nothing is impossible, and that we, after our death, when certain periods of time have again come round, are restored to this state in which we now are." Source: Lactantius, Divine Institutes VII.23 (Fletcher translation, Ante-Nicene Fathers), quoting Chrysippus’ books On Providence. The Stoics taught that the cosmos is periodically consumed in fire and then reborn, running through the same history again, the way a play is performed again on the same stage with the same lines. Lactantius, a Christian teacher of the early fourth century, quoted these words and judged that Chrysippus "says better" than Pythagoras on what lies beyond death, while still missing the resurrection the gospel announces.
What Christian Thinkers Made of Him
(†) The fathers knew him as the master of the Stoa, and borrowed from his logic and his care of souls. By the time the gospel reached the Greek cities, Stoicism was the philosophy of educated people in much of the Roman world, and its textbook form was the form Chrysippus had given it. Paul met it in the marketplace of Athens: "Some of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers also conversed with him" (Acts 17:18). The early Christian writers spoke of him as the school’s great authority. Origen, the brilliant third-century teacher of Alexandria and Caesarea, cited him with approval in his reply to the pagan critic Celsus, and he praised two things in particular. One was Chrysippus’ intellectual modesty, for he pointed his readers to abler speakers than himself (Against Celsus I.40). The other was his treatise on curing the passions, which tried to heal the troubled even on the terms of rival philosophies (I.64; VIII.51). Origen had a sharp purpose in saying so. Chrysippus, he argued, showed more care for his fellow men than Celsus did (VIII.51), and the gospel had done in fact what the philosopher could only prescribe, checking wickedness and softening savage manners in great numbers of ordinary people (I.64). Lactantius, the Latin teacher whom Constantine later hired to tutor his son, called Chrysippus the man who held up the portico of the Stoics, borrowing Cicero’s phrase. It is the old saying about the Porch in another form: take him away and the roof comes down. The tools Chrysippus had sharpened (definitions, the logic of statements, the analysis of the passions) passed into the common equipment of educated Christians along with the rest of Greek learning.
(†) His doctrine of fate forced the church to say how God’s providence and human choice belong together. Christians agreed with Chrysippus that nothing in the world happens by chance and that a wise providence governs all things. Where they could not follow him was the word "fate," because his fate was an impersonal chain of causes running through a material world, with no Father at the end of it. Justin Martyr, the second-century philosopher who became a Christian, drew the line early: "neither do we affirm that it is by fate that men do what they do, or suffer what they suffer, but that each man by free choice acts rightly or sins." The Stoics, he wrote, "maintained that all things take place according to the necessity of fate" (Second Apology 7). Augustine, two centuries later, took a more careful line in The City of God (V.8–10). If people mean by fate the order of causes that depends on the will of the most high God, he said, he would not fight over a word, though he would rather not use it. But he insisted that God’s foreknowledge does not abolish the human will, because our wills are themselves among the causes God foreknows. Boethius, writing in prison in the sixth century, set the two terms in order in his Consolation of Philosophy (IV.6): providence is the plan in the mind of God, and fate is that plan unfolding in time. Christians have gone on debating where exactly the line between God’s ordering and human freedom runs. That they had to debate it with such precision is partly Chrysippus’ doing: he framed the question so sharply that no one after him could leave it vague.
(†) His questions about evil and about a law written into nature stayed in Christian thought long after his books were lost. His On Providence survived in fragments quoted by others, and the fragments did their work. The thought that some evils come as by-products of goods, the way a delicate skull comes with a well-made head (T4), became a standard move in Christian reflection on why God permits suffering, and Leibniz, the philosopher who coined the word "theodicy" for the justification of God’s goodness in the face of evil, still engaged Chrysippus by name in 1710. The Stoic idea of a law built into nature and binding on every rational being, which Chrysippus did much to shape, reached the church through Cicero and through Roman law. The Digest, the great sixth-century collection of Roman jurists’ writings made under the Christian emperor Justinian, quotes the opening of Chrysippus’ book On Law, which calls law the king of all things divine and human. Christian readers recognized in that idea what Paul had said of the Gentiles, who "show that the work of the law is written on their hearts" (Romans 2:15), and the natural-law tradition of the medieval church, Thomas Aquinas above all, drew on that Stoic inheritance while grounding the law in a personal Lawgiver.
(†) Where the gospel parts company with him: a bodily god inside the world, endless return instead of resurrection, and a morality that made room for incest. The other column of the ledger has four entries, all of them things Chrysippus himself taught. - God and the world. For Chrysippus, God was the reason in the world and in the end the world itself, a fiery breath pervading all matter; like all Stoics he held that only bodies are real, so God too was body. Scripture begins with a God who stands before and outside what he makes: "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth" (Genesis 1:1). Jesus says "God is spirit" (John 4:24). Origen put the line plainly against the Stoics: God is not corporeal (not a body, not made of any kind of matter), "unless we fall into the absurd errors of the followers of Zeno and Chrysippus" (Against Celsus VIII.49). - Fate without a Father. His providence is real, but it is a chain, not a person who knows and loves. The God of Scripture governs all things too, yet he speaks, hears, forgives, and acts in history, and the fathers refused to let his rule collapse into impersonal necessity (Justin, Second Apology 7). - Return, not resurrection. Chrysippus taught that the cosmos burns and is reborn, and that each of us will live this same life again when the cycle comes round. Scripture announces one life, one death, and one judgment: "it is appointed for man to die once, and after that comes judgment" (Hebrews 9:27). The hope is not repetition but a resurrection into a new creation. - Things "indifferent" that are not. Because the Stoics held virtue to be the only good and everything else indifferent (neither good nor bad in itself, the way they counted health, wealth, and even life), Chrysippus followed the logic to places his own contemporaries found shocking. By the report of Diogenes Laertius, his Republic permitted marriage with mothers and daughters, and the third book of his On Justice permitted eating the bodies of the dead. The law of Israel puts the first beyond discussion: "None of you shall approach any one of his close relatives to uncover nakedness. I am the Lord" (Leviticus 18:6). He was a man of immense honesty in argument, willing to follow reasoning wherever it led. The trouble is that reasoning from a wrong starting point leads honestly to wrong places, and his starting point was a world with no Creator above it.