(●)Externalism holds that justification can depend on facts outside the believer's mind.
+Every evening Dave checks the thermometer stuck in the roast, sees 165 degrees, and takes the meat out of the oven. He has never tested the thermometer. He bought it at the hardware store years ago and has trusted it ever since, and as it happens, it is an excellent thermometer, accurate to within a degree.
Is Dave justified in believing the roast is at 165? One answer says yes, and gives the thermometer as the reason. The instrument is reliable, so beliefs formed by reading it are good beliefs, whatever Dave does or does not know about it. That answer is the heart of externalism.
- Justification is the good standing a belief needs, besides being true, to count as knowledge. A justified belief is one it is reasonable to hold.
- Internalism says justification depends only on what lies within the believer's mind: experiences, memories, other beliefs, and the reasoning that connects them.
- Externalism says some of what makes a belief justified can lie outside the believer's mind, in facts the believer may have no way of seeing. The most important such fact is reliability, whether the way a belief was formed usually gets things right.
- In its main forms, externalism says this of every way of forming beliefs, reasoning included. On these views even a careful chain of logic gives justification only because of an outside fact about human reasoning, such as its being reliable.
The philosopher D. M. Armstrong gave the view its picture in 1973. A person who knows something directly, without inferring it from anything else, is like a good thermometer, he said. The thermometer does not reflect on its readings. It simply registers the temperature, and it does so reliably. Knowledge, on this picture, is a matter of being hooked up to the world in the right way, not of having reasons one could state.
Externalism has real attractions, and its defenders have pressed four of them.
- Animals and children. A dog knows its owner is at the door, and a toddler knows her mother is in the room, though neither could give you a reason. Externalism explains how they can know.
- Ordinary people. Most people could not defend their trust in their own eyes against a philosopher, and externalism says they need not.
- The skeptic. The skeptic doubts that we can know the world outside our minds at all. Externalism replies that if our faculties are in fact reliable, then we know, whether or not we can prove it.
- Science. Whether a way of forming beliefs is reliable is something psychology and biology can study. So externalism fits epistemology (the part of philosophy that studies knowledge and justification, named from the Greek word for knowledge) into the natural world.
(●)Every form of externalism ties a belief's standing to its link with the world.
+Externalists agree that a belief's standing depends on how it is linked to the world, but each form names a different link.
- Reliabilism. Alvin Goldman (1979) held that a belief is justified when it comes from a reliable process, one that produces mostly true beliefs. Vision in good light is a reliable process. Wishful thinking is not. The believer does not have to know the process is reliable, or have any reason to think so.
• Reliabilism faces a known difficulty, the generality problem. Any one belief comes from a process that can be described in many ways (vision, vision in dim light, vision through a dirty window), each with a different track record, and nothing in the theory says which description counts. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman pressed the problem in 1998, and reliabilists are still working on it.
- Tracking. Robert Nozick (1981) held that you know something when your belief tracks the truth: if it were false, you would not believe it, and if it were true, you would. A smoke alarm tracks smoke when it sounds whenever there is smoke and stays quiet when there is none.
- Proper functionalism. Alvin Plantinga (1993, 2000) gave the name warrant to the standing that turns true belief into knowledge. A belief has warrant, he held, when it comes from faculties working as they were designed to work, in the environment they were designed for, aimed at truth. On the Christian version, the designer is God.
• Think of a compass. It points north when it is working properly and sits in the earth's magnetic field, the setting it was made for. Set it down beside a magnet, though, and even a perfect compass misleads.
- Virtue epistemology. Ernest Sosa (2007) and John Greco (2010) judge a belief the way we judge an archer's shot. The shot is good when it hits the target because of the archer's skill rather than by luck, and a belief is good when it is true because of the believer's reliable abilities.
- Knowledge first. Timothy Williamson (2000) turns the usual order around. Rather than building knowledge out of belief plus something else, he takes knowledge as the starting point, and he holds that a person's evidence is simply what they know, which depends on the world as well as on the mind.
• If you know the kettle is on, then the fact that the kettle is on is part of your evidence. Someone in a perfect hallucination of the same kettle seems to have just what you have, but on this view his evidence is different, because the world is different.
You may have noticed that some of these are theories of knowledge rather than of justification. That matters less than it seems. What internalists and externalists are really arguing about is the good standing a belief needs, besides truth, to be knowledge. A further outside condition that only screens out luck, added on top of reasons the believer already has, is no rival to internalism.
- Think of a woman who glances at a stopped clock that happens to show the right time. She has a reason for her belief, which is the reading on the clock, and her belief is true, but only by luck, so she does not know the time. Cases like hers are called Gettier cases, after Edmund Gettier, who showed in 1963 that a belief can be justified and true and still fall short of knowledge because it is true by luck. What she lacks is protection from luck, and a condition that rules out lucky hits like hers can sit on top of her reason without replacing it.
- The views listed are rivals because they do more than that. They make the good standing itself depend on something the believer may have no way of checking.
(●)On externalism, no one has a non-circular reason to trust their own mind.
+Christians stand on both sides of this question. Some of the finest Christian philosophers of the last century are externalists, Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and Michael Bergmann among them. Christians who hold the view are brothers and sisters, and the disagreement is over the theory of knowledge, not over the faith.
Timothy and Lydia McGrew defended internalism in a 2007 book, and they argue that externalism fails at a point where it seems strongest. They start from an observation. On externalism, the rules that say which ways of believing give justification are contingent, meaning true, if at all, only because the world happens to be a certain way.
- A way of forming beliefs, or source, is anything that produces beliefs: perception, memory, testimony, reasoning.
- Take the rule "Beliefs from vision are justified." On reliabilism it is true only if vision happens to be reliable here. Had our eyes been badly made, it would be false.
- So the only way to find out whether a source gives justification is to find out whether it is reliable, and that has to be done by using some source. If you use the same source, the reasoning runs in a circle, as if you trusted your eyes to tell you whether to trust your eyes. Philosophers call this epistemic circularity ("epistemic" means having to do with knowledge and justification).
- If you use another source instead, the same question arises about that one. That starts a regress, a chain of questions in which each answer raises the next, and the McGrews call this one the metaregress.
Their conclusion goes further than skepticism, the doubt that we know the world. Externalism, they argue, ends in epistemic nihilism, the denial that justification is possible at all: no one could ever have a good reason to think any belief of theirs justified.
Their case can be set out as a deductive argument, one whose premises work like a locked chain: if each link holds, the conclusion cannot slip out. Each premise need only be more plausible than its denial, not certain beyond all doubt.
(P1)If externalism is true, no one has a non-circular reason to trust any way of forming beliefs.
+On externalism, whether a source gives justification is a contingent fact about that source. Call a reason to trust a source non-circular when no step of it leans on a source whose own trustworthiness is still in question, whether that is the source itself or another one further back.
(1) On externalism, a source justifies only if it is reliable in fact.
- That is what makes the view externalist. Dave's thermometer reading gives him justification because the thermometer works, not because he has any reason to think it does.
- The same holds for every source: vision justifies if vision is reliable, memory if memory is reliable, reasoning if reasoning is reliable. Proper functionalism and virtue epistemology swap in their own outside fact, faculties working as designed or a reliable skill, and apply it to every source, reasoning included. Knowledge-first views reach the same place by a different route (C). Only a view that exempts reasoning escapes, and it does so on the internalist's ground (D11).
(2) So which sources justify is a contingent fact about the world.
- The general rule, that reliable sources justify, may well be a necessary truth, one that could not have been false, the way two and two could not have made five. The trouble is that the rule by itself says nothing about memory, or vision, or any other particular source. For that, someone has to find out which sources are reliable, and that might have been otherwise.
- "Beliefs from memory are justified" is like "this fuel gauge is accurate." Either one might have been false, and finding out whether it is true means checking.
- That holds for reasoning too. On externalism, even a chain of careful logic gives justification only because human reasoning happens to be reliable.
(3) Every check on a source uses a source.
- Suppose you want to check your memory. You might compare it with written records, but reading the records uses vision, and trusting them uses testimony. Or suppose you want to check your vision. You look again, or you ask someone else, and she uses vision too.
- At each step there are two options. Trust the very source in question, and the check runs in a circle. Trust another source, and the same question has to be asked about that one.
- Our basic sources are few: the senses, memory, testimony, looking inward, and reasoning. Pass the question along, and before long it comes back to a source already in question, or it stops at one that is simply taken on trust.
- Think of a man who asks a stranger whether she is honest. "Yes," she says. Her answer is worthless as a test, because a dishonest stranger would say exactly the same thing. Asking her friend helps only if the friend is honest, and that is the original question moved one step back.
(4) Externalism's most careful defenders grant the circle.
- The most careful externalist studies of perception argue that every argument for its reliability relies on perception somewhere. They accept the circle as unavoidable for our basic sources, and some go further and defend it as harmless (D2, D4).
- Take the plainest such argument, a track record: sight has been right again and again. Every entry in that record was confirmed by someone looking, so the record has already trusted sight before it ever vouches for it.
- So the circle is not something internalists invented. On the externalist's own account, the only way to trust a source is by trusting a source.
Therefore, if externalism is true, every reason to trust a way of forming beliefs leans somewhere on a way of forming beliefs still in question.
(P2)Some people have a non-circular reason to trust some ways of forming beliefs.
+Non-circular means what it meant in (P1): no step of the reason leans on a source whose trustworthiness is still in question. Some reasons meet that standard.
(1) Present experience is not taken on a source's word.
- When you have a headache, you do not infer the pain from some report that might be mistaken. The pain itself is present to you. Philosophers call this direct awareness acquaintance.
- Nothing stands between you and what you are aware of, so there is nothing here to trust or distrust. That is why acquaintance with your own experience starts no circle.
(2) Some principles are seen to be true by understanding them.
- Suppose nine of the ten tickets in a hat are winners, and you know nothing else. Then the ticket you draw is probably a winner. Nobody needs a record of past raffles to see this.
- Principles like that are a priori, knowable by reflection alone, without going out to check the world (the Latin means "from what comes before").
• Some of the strictest internalists add that such principles are analytic, true because of what their words mean, the way "every bachelor is unmarried" is. Whether every principle of good reasoning is analytic is disputed (D2, D9). Either way, such a principle is not a contingent fact about how well some faculty performs.
- Seeing that the principle holds is itself a reason to trust reasoning that follows it, and that reason does not rest on reasoning's track record.
- The externalist's strongest reply is that the seeing is one more source that must be trusted. That reply is answered at (D2).
(3) From those, a person can reason to the reliability of a source.
- Experience has a pattern. Things stay where they were left, events follow one another in regular ways, and what you see agrees with what you touch and hear. The best explanation of that pattern is that the senses are giving a largely accurate picture of a real world.
- That inference uses experience and a priori principles of reasoning. It does not begin by assuming that perception is reliable. It ends by concluding that it is.
- Think of a man who, for months, receives letters from a correspondent he has never met. The letters agree with each other, answer his questions, and predict events that then happen. He comes to trust the writer, and not because the letters vouch for themselves. He trusts the writer because a real and well-informed writer is the best explanation of what is in front of him.
(4) The reason need only be available to some.
- It need not be that everyone has worked out such a reason, or that the inference is easy. It is enough that the reason is available and that some people have it.
- Think of a long proof in mathematics that most people will never read. It is a proof all the same, and the few who follow it have it.
- Whether the inference from experience to the world fully succeeds is still debated (D6). Whether it secretly leans on memory is taken up at (D12).
- Neither question touches reasoning that follows principles seen to be true, and one such reason is enough for (P2).
Therefore, some people have a reason to trust some ways of forming beliefs that leans on no source still in question.
(C)Therefore, externalism is false.
+If (P1) and (P2) hold, externalism is false. The reasoning takes three steps. If externalism were true, no one would have a non-circular reason to trust any way of forming beliefs (P1). But some people do have such a reason (P2). So externalism is not true.
That pattern of reasoning is called modus tollens, and it is valid, meaning that true premises guarantee a true conclusion. It runs: if A, then B; not B; therefore, not A. If it had rained, the street would be wet. The street is dry. So it did not rain.
(1) The conclusion reaches every view that makes all our sources answer to outside facts.
- Reliabilism, proper functionalism, and virtue epistemology all make even reasoning's standing depend on such a fact, and (P1) holds of each.
- Knowledge-first views reach the same place by a different route, since they start from knowledge rather than from reliable sources. On those views, whether a belief has its standing turns on whether it is knowledge, and their own defenders grant that a person cannot always tell that from the inside.
- A view that is externalist about the senses alone, and grants the internalist's account of reasoning, does escape (P1). It escapes only by standing on the internalist's ground (D11).
- Think of a chain of inspectors in which each inspector's license is vouched for only by another inspector. Now add one inspector whose work anyone can check just by reading it, and the chain finally hangs from something. But that inspector is the internalist's.
(2) Reliability still matters.
- A reliable source is a good thing to have. Knowledge also needs truth, and truth is a fact about the world.
- Dave is still better off with his excellent thermometer than with a broken one, because the beliefs it gives him are true.
- Externalism's being false does not mean that dogs, children, and ordinary believers know nothing. What it means is that what makes their beliefs justified is not a fact they have no access to (D8).
(3) The internalist's reasons remain.
- What remains are the internalist's reasons: experience present to the mind, principles seen to be true, and inference from them. On that view a person can ask "Should I trust my eyes?" and find an answer she can examine for herself.
- Think again of the man with the letters (P2). He can lay everything he has on the kitchen table and ask what best explains it, and the answer he reaches is one he can check again tomorrow.
See also:
Philosophy / Epistemology: InternalismPhilosophy / Epistemology: WarrantPhilosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism
On externalism:
Alston, William P. "Level-Confusions in Epistemology." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980): 135-150.
Alston, William P. "Epistemic Circularity." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1986): 1-30.
Alston, William P. The Reliability of Sense Perception. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.
Armstrong, D. M. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
Bergmann, Michael. "Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 709-727.
Bergmann, Michael. Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Dretske, Fred. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981.
Goldman, Alvin I. "What Is Justified Belief?" In Justification and Knowledge, edited by George S. Pappas, 1-23. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979.
Greco, John. Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Kornblith, Hilary. Knowledge and Its Place in Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.
Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Quine, W. V. "Epistemology Naturalized." In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 69-90. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.
Sosa, Ernest. "Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles." Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 410-430.
Sosa, Ernest. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.
Van Cleve, James. "Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle." Philosophical Review 88 (1979): 55-91.
Van Cleve, James. "Reliability, Justification, and the Problem of Induction." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1984): 555-567.
Williamson, Timothy. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
On internalism and the case against externalism:
BonJour, Laurence. "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980): 53-73.
Cohen, Stewart. "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 309-329.
Conee, Earl, and Richard Feldman. "The Generality Problem for Reliabilism." Philosophical Studies 89 (1998): 1-29.
Fumerton, Richard. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995.
McGrew, Timothy J. The Foundations of Knowledge. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995.
McGrew, Timothy, and Lydia McGrew. Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason. London: Routledge, 2007.
Vogel, Jonathan. "Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation." Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 658-666.
Vogel, Jonathan. "Reliabilism Leveled." Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 602-623.
On induction, analyticity, and naturalism:
BonJour, Laurence. In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Kim, Jaegwon. "What Is 'Naturalized Epistemology'?" Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 381-405.
Maher, Patrick. "The Hole in the Ground of Induction." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 423-432.
McGrew, Timothy. "Direct Inference and the Problem of Induction." The Monist 84 (2001): 153-178.
Quine, W. V. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." Philosophical Review 60 (1951): 20-43.
Salmon, Wesley C. The Foundations of Scientific Inference. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967.
Stove, D. C. The Rationality of Induction. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
Williams, Donald Cary. The Ground of Induction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1947.
Historical sources:
Descartes, René. Rules for the Direction of the Mind. Written c. 1628; published 1701.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 1748.
Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. 1785.
Reid, Thomas. An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. 1764.
+The argument confuses levels: externalism never said you need a reason to trust your sources, only reliable sources. Demanding a reason simply assumes internalism.
1. The distinction is real.
William Alston pressed this objection under the name level confusion. Being justified is one thing, and being able to show that you are justified is another, one level up. Externalists hold that a belief can be justified by a reliable source even when the believer has no reason to think the source reliable.
That should be granted, and (P1) does not deny it. (P1) does not say a belief needs a reason to trust its source in order to be justified. What it says is that on externalism no such reason exists anywhere.
- Think of health. A person can be healthy without being able to show that she is, and nobody thinks her health depends on her medical records.
2. (P2) assumes no theory of justification.
The strongest form of this objection says that asking for a non-circular reason quietly assumes internalism. But (P2) is not a demand. It is a claim that such reasons exist. An externalist who rejects it must hold that no one, ever, has a reason to trust their senses or their reasoning that does not lean somewhere on a source still in question (P1).
- That is a heavy thing to accept, and the externalists who have looked hardest at it have not hidden it. Alston examined the arguments for the reliability of sense perception one by one, found every one of them circular, and said so plainly.
- So the dispute is not over a definition. It is over whether the reasons (P2) describes are really there, and that is settled at (P2) and its defeaters (D2, D6, D12), not by a distinction between levels.
3. The question is not invented by internalists.
People really do ask it. "Should I trust my memory about this?" "Is this news source any good?" They ask it about their eyes after an eye exam, and about their own judgment after a mistake. The only question is whether externalism lets anyone answer with a reason, and on externalism every answer either runs in a circle or hands the question on to another source (P1).
- Think of a pilot whose instruments disagree. She has to decide which one to trust, and "whichever one is in fact working" is no help to her at all.
4. Justification is meant to answer the believer's question.
People call on justification to tell them what is reasonable to believe from where they stand. If justification were only a fact the believer could never use, it would stop doing that job. The externalist can define a standing that does not do it, but it is fair to ask why that standing should be called justification.
- Think of a bank balance you are never allowed to look up. It may be healthy, but it cannot tell you whether you can afford to sign for the house.
See also:
Philosophy / Epistemology: Warrant
+Every view is circular at its base. The internalist trusts reason and intuition with no non-circular reason either, so externalism is no worse off.
1. This is the strongest reply.
Michael Bergmann and William Alston argue that epistemic circularity is unavoidable for anyone's most basic sources. The internalist who appeals to a priori principles trusts the faculty that sees them, and he can check that faculty only by using it. If circularity is fatal, the reply goes, then it is fatal to everyone.
- Ask yourself how you know your arithmetic is sound. The only check on hand seems to be more arithmetic.
2. Seeing a truth is not trusting a source.
When a person understands that nine winners in ten tickets makes a win probable, she is not taking the word of a faculty, the way one takes the word of a witness. The truth itself is before her mind. Nothing stands between her and what she grasps, so there is no go-between whose reliability she has to assume.
- Think of the difference between being told a room is lit and walking into it. The first relies on the person telling you. The second relies on nothing between you and the light.
3. Mistakes about the a priori are corrected by more of the same.
People do sometimes think they see a truth of reason and turn out to be wrong. But the way they find out is by seeing more clearly, reasoning with principles they grasp better, and not by checking a faculty's track record. That is reflection correcting itself, and it never needs an outside fact the person cannot reach.
- Think of a student who adds 17 and 26 and gets 33. She finds the mistake by looking again and seeing where the carried one went missing, not by looking up how often her arithmetic has been right in the past.
4. The internalist's circle is not the externalist's circle.
On externalism, whether a way of reasoning gives justification is contingent. That makes "Is my reasoning reliable?" a question about the world, and a question about the world has to be checked. On the McGrews' internalism, the principles of reasoning are a priori, and analytic besides, and seeing them is not a check on anything.
- Think of a tape measure in a kitchen drawer. Whether it is accurate is a fact about that tape, and you find it out by checking it against another one. That a yard is three feet is not found out by checking tapes at all.
Whether every principle of good reasoning is of that kind is the most disputed part of the view. Its hardest test is induction, reasoning from what has been observed to what has not (D7).
See also:
Philosophy / Epistemology: WarrantPhilosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism
+Thomas Reid answered this long ago: reason and perception "came both out of the same shop." Distrust one and you have no grounds to trust the other, so all must be trusted alike.
1. Reid's point has real force.
Reid, the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher and minister, asked the skeptic why he should trust reason more than perception, since "they came both out of the same shop, and were made by the same artist." If a person trusts his reasoning without a non-circular check, Reid argued, he has no business demanding one for his senses. Many externalists look on Reid as their ancestor.
2. Even-handedness cuts both ways.
Reid's is a parity argument, one that tells us to treat like cases alike. What it shows is that trust should be even-handed. What it does not show is which way to even the scales. You can trust both reason and perception on credit, as Reid recommends, or you can ask of both a reason the believer can see, as the internalist does.
Nor does the internalist trust perception less than reason. He reaches perception's reliability by reasoning from experience (P2).
- Think of two cashiers trained at the same store. Fairness says to treat them alike, but that could mean taking both drawers on trust or counting both at the end of the shift.
3. The two sources are not alike in the way the argument needs.
Perception tells us about things outside the mind, and it can be fooled by conditions we cannot see: a mirage, a hallucination, a clever forgery. Grasping that two plus two is four is not like that, because what is grasped is present to the mind itself (D2). The shop is the same, but the products are different.
- Reid himself drew the line. In his later work he sorted the first principles of common sense into two lists, one of necessary truths, like the axioms of mathematics, and one of contingent truths. The principle that the faculties by which we tell truth from error are not misleading went on the second list.
- Reid held that the principles on both lists are self-evident. The internalist replies that a contingent truth about a faculty, however natural our trust in it, is exactly the kind of truth a deceived mind would find just as evident. A necessary truth of reason, by contrast, is seen in itself (P1, P2).
+Ernest Sosa's virtue epistemology escapes the circle. A believer can rise from animal knowledge to reflective knowledge by fitting her beliefs about her own reliability into a coherent picture, and that circle is virtuous, not vicious.
1. Sosa's distinction is illuminating.
Sosa distinguishes two grades of knowing. Animal knowledge is a reliably formed true belief, like a dog's. Reflective knowledge adds something: the believer also sees her belief as reliably formed, from a coherent perspective on herself and her world, one in which every part fits with every other. Sosa argues that this perspective can be built using the very faculties it vouches for, and that such a circle, far from being vicious, is the best a believer could hope for.
2. Coherence alone cannot tell a true story from a well-told one.
A perspective built from a source can be perfectly coherent whether or not the source is reliable. A man caught inside an elaborate deception can build an equally coherent picture of his own reliability, using the very faculties the deceiver controls.
- Think of an account book in which every column adds up. It might record a real business, or a perfectly consistent fraud, and adding up the columns again does not tell you which.
3. What Sosa adds is the externalist's fact again.
On Sosa's view, the reflective perspective gives knowledge when the faculties that build it are in fact reliable. That is the same contingent fact (P1), with another layer on top. The believer still has no reason that does not assume what is in question.
- Think of a second coat of paint on a wall nobody has checked for damp. The wall looks more finished, but the new coat tells you nothing the first one did not about what lies underneath.
+James Van Cleve: a believer can use a principle of good reasoning without first knowing that it is true. The demand for a non-circular reason confuses having a reason with knowing that one has it.
1. Van Cleve's point is correct about ordinary reasoning.
Most people reason well without ever stating the rules they follow, just as most people speak grammatically without ever studying grammar. Van Cleve argued in 1979 that a person can come to know things by a reliable rule before knowing that the rule is reliable, and in 1984 that a rule may even be used to establish its own reliability.
- He and others separate two kinds of circle. A premise-circular argument lists its conclusion among its premises: "He is honest, because he says so, and he is honest." A rule-circular argument only uses the rule its conclusion vouches for: induction has worked so far, so, reasoning inductively, it will keep working. The second kind, they argue, assumes nothing and is no vice.
2. A rule-circular argument certifies bad rules just as well.
Imagine a fortune-teller who reasons by counter-induction: whatever has happened in the past, expect the opposite next time. Ask her why she trusts her method, and she has an answer ready. "Counter-induction has failed every time so far. So, by counter-induction, it will succeed from now on." Her argument is rule-circular in exactly the way the inductive one is.
- Externalists answer that only the reliable rule gives justification, so the inductive argument justifies and hers does not. But that difference is a fact neither reasoner can see in the argument itself, which is the very situation (P1) describes.
- Nobody is asked to know the rules of reasoning before reasoning. The question is whether anyone, ever, can have a reason to trust a source that does not lean on that source, and using a rule to certify itself is exactly the circle in question.
- Think of a scale that is used to weigh its own test weights. It may be accurate. But weighing the weights on it cannot tell you so, because a faulty scale would agree with itself just as well.
3. A test that cannot fail is no test.
A source certified by its own use would pass whether it were reliable or not. Philosophers call this bootstrapping, after the old joke about lifting yourself by your own bootstraps. Jonathan Vogel and Stewart Cohen argued that it lets a person "learn" that a source is reliable just by using it, as a driver might "learn" that a gauge is reliable just by reading the gauge. Many externalists themselves find that result troubling, though some accept it.
- Vogel's example is a driver who has never checked her fuel gauge but believes whatever it reads. Each time, she notes what the gauge reads, believes the tank holds that much, and so concludes that the gauge was right again. After enough trips she concludes, from the gauge alone, that the gauge is reliable.
- Cohen's point reaches further than externalism. The trouble afflicts any view, internalist ones included, that lets a source give knowledge before the believer has any reason to trust it. It does not reach a view on which beliefs about the world are reasoned to from experience (P2).
See also:
Philosophy / Epistemology: The Principle of Credulity
+The internalist's route to the world fails. A brain in a vat, or a dream, explains the patterns of experience as well as a real world does, so there is no non-circular reason to trust the senses either.
1. This is the deepest challenge to (P2).
The skeptic's alternatives are built to fit the evidence. A powerful computer feeding a brain in a vat the very experiences you have would produce the very same patterns. If the alternatives explain the evidence equally well, the inference to a real world fails, and the internalist has no reason either.
2. Explaining well is more than fitting the facts.
An explanation is better when it is simpler, when it explains the patterns rather than copying them, and when it does not need to be adjusted case by case. The real-world explanation predicts that the cup will still be on the table. The vat explanation has to say that the computer, for its own reasons, decided to feed you the experience of a cup still on the table.
- Think of a detective who finds a set of footprints, a dropped glove, and a matching witness description. "The suspect did it" explains all three. "Someone arranged all three to look exactly as if the suspect did it" fits them too, but only by copying them.
- Jonathan Vogel and others have argued along these lines that the real world is the better explanation.
3. An open question leaves (P2) standing.
Whether the inference to the world fully succeeds is still debated, and no honest internalist pretends otherwise. (P2) needs the inference to give real support, not proof, and it is an argument made from things the believer has, without assuming that perception is reliable.
- Think of a doctor who diagnoses the flu from a fever, aching joints, and an office full of patients with the same thing. Some rarer illness could produce every one of those signs, and still the diagnosis is well supported.
- If the inference gave no support at all, the internalist would have no non-circular reason to trust the senses, and on (P1) neither would anyone else. (P2) would still stand on reasoning that follows principles seen to be true, but its reach into the world would be gone.
See also:
Philosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism
+Induction cannot be justified a priori. David Hume showed that reasoning from past to future can only be defended by assuming that the future will resemble the past, which is circular.
1. Hume's problem is real.Induction is reasoning from cases observed to cases not yet observed: the sun has always risen, so it will rise tomorrow. Hume argued that any defense of induction either assumes induction or proves nothing. It is one of the oldest unsolved problems in philosophy, and it has to be taken seriously.
2. There are a priori answers to induction.
The McGrews devote the final chapter of their book to defending a ground for induction. One family of a priori answers, set out by Donald Williams in 1947, refined by David Stove in 1986, and defended by Timothy McGrew in a 2001 paper, turns on counting rather than on how the world happens to go. Of all the large samples that could be drawn from a population, the great majority closely match the whole in the proportion of whatever is being counted. So unless there is some reason to think a given sample unusual, it is probably one of the majority.
- Think of drawing a thousand marbles from a huge urn and finding that seven hundred are red. Mathematics alone says that most samples of that size come close to the true proportion. You do not need to know how urns behave on Tuesdays to see it.
- Critics answer that this assumes the sample is a fair one, when every sample we have comes from the past, and the past may be unusual in just the way that matters. Defenders, McGrew among them, reply that a bare possibility like that is a reason for doubt only if there is some evidence that the past is unusual. Patrick Maher pressed a more technical objection: the last step, from most samples to this sample, holds only given starting probabilities that the argument itself does not supply. Whether any answer of this kind succeeds is debated, and the arguments are technical.
3. The externalist has the same problem in a worse form.
On externalism, induction gives justification if it is reliable in fact, and the only way to check that is by induction. Hume's circle is exactly the externalist's circle. The externalist's best reply, that a rule-circular argument is no vice, is answered at (D5). The internalist at least has a candidate for a way out.
- Think of asking a forecaster why her method of predicting from past patterns can be trusted. On externalism, the only check on offer is "It has worked before, so it will keep working," which is the method vouching for itself.
- If no a priori answer succeeds, (P2) keeps its case from reasoning by principles seen to be true, but its reach into the future narrows sharply.
+Dogs, toddlers, and most adults know things without any reason to trust their senses. If knowing required such a reason, almost no one would know anything.
1. (P2) asks only that some people have the reason.
(P2) says some people have a non-circular reason. It does not say that knowledge or justification requires the believer to have worked one out. A toddler's experience of her mother is present to her mind, and that experience is her reason for believing her mother is in the room.
2. Reliable information is not yet justification.
The strongest form of this objection, pressed by Hilary Kornblith and in an earlier form by Fred Dretske, says knowledge is belief produced by reliable information. That is a natural thing, the kind animal science studies, and animals have plenty of it. Grant that animals gather reliable information, and grant that a dog has experiences. What the internalist denies is that the information is what makes the dog's belief justified. On the internalist's view, that work is done by what is present to the dog.
- A reason can be an experience with no argument attached: the scent, and the sound of a key in the lock, present to the dog at the door. Whatever justification the dog's belief has is fixed by that, not by a fact about its environment the dog cannot reach.
3. The question is what anyone can know about knowing.
Whether toddlers know is not the point at issue. What matters is what happens when anyone asks whether their sources are trustworthy (D1). The toddler does not ask. The adult who does ask deserves an answer, and on externalism there is none that is not circular.
- Think of a girl of five, who never wonders whether her eyes can be trusted, and the same girl at twenty, reading about optical illusions for a psychology class. The question is new to her, and it is a fair one.
See also:
Philosophy / Epistemology: Internalism
+Naturalized epistemology: W. V. Quine argued that no truth holds by meaning alone and that epistemology belongs to psychology. Science tells us which processes are reliable, and armchair "a priori principles" are a myth.
1. Science has much to teach about how belief works.
Quine (1969) proposed that epistemology become a chapter of psychology, and Hilary Kornblith has developed the program at length. Cognitive science has shown real patterns of human error, from optical illusions to the way memories shift over time. An internalist should welcome all of it.
2. Losing analyticity would not lose the a priori.
In 1951 Quine argued that there is no sharp line between truths of meaning and truths of fact, and that any belief may be revised if experience presses hard enough. Philosophers still divide over that argument. But (P2) needs only that some principles can be known by reflection, and the ticket principle can be, whatever one concludes about meaning.
- Quine's own picture leans on standards nobody tests in a laboratory. When experience clashes with our beliefs, he said, we revise where the change is simplest and disturbs the least. Those preferences decide what science concludes, and no experiment established them.
- Think of the image Quine borrowed from Otto Neurath: sailors rebuilding their ship at sea, plank by plank. They may replace any plank they like. But they still need a way to tell a sound plank from a rotten one, and that way is not another plank.
3. Science itself rests on the principles in question.
Every scientific study reasons from observations to conclusions using principles of evidence: that a large random sample tells us about a population, that a hypothesis is supported by results it predicted. If those principles were only contingent facts to be checked by science, science would be checking its own methods with its own methods (D5).
- Think of a thermometer factory that tests each new thermometer against another one from its own production line. Its results are only as good as an assumption it never tested.
- Deciding what an experiment shows is not itself an experiment. It is reasoning, and the standards it uses have to be grasped, not observed. That is the a priori knowledge the internalist points to (P2).
4. Describing belief is not evaluating it.
A well-known objection to Quine's program says it changes the subject. Psychology can say how beliefs are caused, but justification is about which beliefs are worth holding, and a description of causes is silent about that.
- Think of a restaurant guide that lists only what diners ordered. Every entry may be accurate, and still it cannot tell you which dishes are good.
- Naturalists answer that the standards survive as advice about which methods reliably reach the truth. But which methods are reliable is learned by using methods, and that brings the question back to (P1).
+Christians have a non-circular reason to trust their faculties: God made them. Proper function within a Christian worldview gives the very assurance the argument says externalism lacks.
1. The belief is true and it matters.
God made the human mind, and made it able to know his world. That is a Christian conviction worth holding, and it has long encouraged Christians to study nature with confidence.
- Think of a hiker handed a map drawn by someone who knows the country well. Knowing who drew it is a good reason to expect the map to be right.
2. On externalism, the assurance comes through the same channel.
On proper functionalism, the belief that God designed our faculties is warranted only if it comes from faculties working properly, and whether they are is the very question at issue. So the assurance arrives through a source whose trustworthiness it was supposed to establish.
- Think of a letter of reference written by the applicant. It may be true, but it cannot settle the question it was written to settle.
3. The assurance is strongest when it rests on reasons.
A Christian who believes God made her mind can also have reasons for believing that God exists and has spoken, reasons she can see and share. Then her trust in her faculties is grounded in something more than her faculties, and the conviction of the faith that the mind is made for truth becomes a conclusion as well as a confession.
- Go back to the hiker. If she has her own reasons to believe the mapmaker knows the country, reasons that do not come from reading the map, then her trust in the map rests on more than the map.
See also:
Philosophy / Epistemology: WarrantPhilosophy / Epistemology: Evidentialism
+A moderate externalist can be an internalist about reasoning and an externalist only about the senses. Then she has the internalist's non-circular reason too, and (P1) is false of her view.
1. This view escapes (P1).
That should be granted plainly. (P1) holds of views on which every source, reasoning included, gives justification only through an outside fact. Reliabilism, proper functionalism, and virtue epistemology are all of that kind, and knowledge-first views reach the same place by a different route (C). On each of the first three, even a careful calculation is in good standing because the reasoning behind it is reliable, or working as designed, or the product of a reliable skill. A view that exempts reasoning is not touched by (P1).
- Think of a ship's navigator with an accurate compass she has never tested. On this view the compass alone justifies her heading. But on a clear night she can also sight the stars and work out her position with arithmetic she can check, and that gives her a reason to trust the compass that does not lean on the compass.
2. It stands on the internalist's ground.
The only non-circular reason this view offers for trusting the senses is the internalist's reason: experience, principles seen to be true, and inference from them (P2). On the question the circularity argument asks, it has conceded the answer.
- Go back to the navigator. Everything she can actually show about her compass comes from the stars and the arithmetic, and none of it from the compass.
3. Its externalist half does work only where reasons are missing.
When the navigator has her sighting, the compass's hidden accuracy adds nothing to her reasons. The view's externalism decides only the cloudy nights, when she has no reason at all to trust the compass and it happens to be good.
- Is a belief formed on a cloudy night like that justified? That is the question twin cases are built to test. Picture a man whose reliable hunch comes with no reasons at all, beside a twin with exactly the same inner life whose hunches are not reliable. The quarrel turns on whether the two men differ in how reasonable they are, and it is a different argument from the circle.
See also:
Philosophy / Epistemology: Internalism
+The internalist's route runs in a circle too. The pattern in experience is spread across time, and only memory reports it, so reasoning from the pattern trusts memory before memory has been checked.
1. Memory is the hardest case.
This should be granted. Knowing that things stay where they were left depends on remembering where they were left, and any long chain of reasoning depends on remembering its earlier steps. Descartes saw the worry about long proofs, and every theory of knowledge has to say something about it.
2. A memory is a present experience.
What you have now is not the past event but the seeming to remember it, and that seeming is present to the mind as surely as a headache is. The belief that the event happened is a conclusion. It is the best explanation of the memory impression, checked against other things present now: records, traces, and what the senses report.
- Think of setting your keys on the hook, then finding them there a minute later, just where you seem to remember putting them. If memory were unreliable, the match between a present memory impression and a present sight would be a coincidence. Each match like that, noticed while both halves are present, is evidence about memory that does not take memory's word for anything.
3. Some order is present all at once.
Not every pattern has to be remembered. The agreement between what you see and what you touch, the last few notes of a melody, a ball rolling across the table: these are present in a single span of awareness. Reasoning from them does not wait on memory's credentials.
4. Memory's reliability is a conclusion.
On this route, that memory is generally trustworthy is something reasoned to, as probable rather than certain. It is not a hidden condition the believer must meet without knowing it. Whether the reasoning reaches the whole of the past is debated. Either way, it is not the externalist's circle, in which memory's standing can be vouched for only by sources whose own standing waits on the same kind of fact (P1).
- Think of a witness who is believed because her account keeps matching the security footage, not because she vouches for herself. Her reliability is something the jury reasons to.
See also:
Philosophy / Epistemology: Classical Foundationalism