Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophical Theology

Analytical Analyses of Christian Systematic Theology

Bibliology

The Doctrine of Scripture

Theology Proper

The Divine Nature and Properties of God

The Trinity

Analysis of God in Three Persons

Anti-Social Trinitarianism

(●) The one God is not a single self: the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are three someones. + Trinitarians agree that God is one and that he is Father, Son, and Spirit. Where they part company is on the count of selves. One party says three, three who each say "I" and mean it. The other says one, a single divine mind and a single divine will, with the persons being something thinner than three selves: subsisting relations on the older account, one self living three overlapping lives on the newest. The one-self answer is the one refused. Nothing in the case touches the count of Gods, which every side puts at one. What is at stake is whether the praying, the sending, and the forsaking in the New Testament are dealings between two parties or something a single self can carry out alone. Who holds what, on the one-self view: - Support: Thomas Aquinas gave it its most careful form, and Brian Leftow is its leading defender now. - Oppose: Tertullian and the Cappadocian fathers argued for three selves, and William Hasker and William Lane Craig press that case today. The argument that follows refutes it.

(P1) A person is a center of self-consciousness, intentionality, and will. + Christians who confess the Trinity divide over one question: how many someones there are in God. Social Trinitarianism answers three, and Anti-Social Trinitarianism answers one, meaning a single divine mind and a single divine will, with the three persons being something other than three someones. (1) A person is whoever can say "I" and mean it. - Think of a toddler around her second birthday. Put a smudge of lipstick on her forehead, stand her in front of a mirror, and instead of reaching for the glass she reaches for her own face. She has worked out that the girl in the mirror is her. - That is what the word "person" is reaching for, and it comes in three parts, each of them belonging to a who rather than a what. - Self-consciousness is the first: not merely being awake and aware, but being aware of yourself as yourself. A cat asleep on a windowsill is conscious. It does not lie there wondering whether it has been a good cat. - Intentionality is the second, and philosophers use the word in an odd way that simply has to be learned, because it has nothing to do with doing something on purpose. It means the aboutness of a mind. You never merely believe; you believe that the milk has gone off. - Will is the third, and the plainest of the three: the power to settle on something and then do it. The toddler's hand coming up to her own forehead is will, small and early. (2) The God of Scripture is a person in exactly that sense. - He says "I," and he says it as a name. "I AM WHO I AM" (Exodus 3:14) is not a description of a force at work in the world. It is what someone says when someone else asks him who he is. - He knows his own mind and he carries it out. "My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my purpose," says the God who declares the end from the beginning (Isaiah 46:10). - This is why prayer is possible at all. You can ask a person for something and be told yes, or no, or not yet. Nobody petitions gravity. (3) The church refused the thinner meaning of the word. - The Latin persona began life as the mask an actor held up in front of his face, and behind three masks there is one actor. If that is all "person" means here, then God played Father, then Son, then Spirit, one part after another, and nobody ever met more than one of him. That view has a name, modalism, from "modes," and the church threw it out in the third century. - Writing against a modalist named Praxeas around AD 213, Tertullian shows what he thought was at stake. If you want me to believe the Father and the Son are the same someone, he says, then find me a passage that reads: the Lord said to himself, I am my own Son, today I have begotten myself (Against Praxeas 11). - That retort only bites if "person" means a someone. Aimed at a mask, it would have no force at all. (4) The Fathers' word was not thinner than ours. - You will often be told that the church Fathers, the Christian teachers of the first centuries, meant no more by "person" than a distinct individual, with nothing implied about anybody's inner life. The caution is greatly exaggerated, and the way to test it is to watch what those writers do with the word rather than what a dictionary does with it. - Tertullian argues the distinctness of Father and Son straight from the I and the Thou of the Psalms, and he points to his own silent conversation with himself as a faint picture of a second person within (Against Praxeas 5, 11). Holding a conversation in your own head takes self-consciousness. Bare awareness will not do it. - The Cappadocian fathers who fixed the church's trinitarian vocabulary in the fourth century, Basil of Caesarea and the two Gregories, credit the three with mutual knowledge, mutual love, and wills that act in concord. Masks do not know one another. Masks certainly do not love one another. Therefore, "person" in this doctrine names a someone: a center of self-consciousness, intentionality, and will.

(P2) The Father, the Son, and the Spirit address, send, and love one another. + The New Testament does not simply list three names and leave the reader to sort them out. It shows three parties dealing with one another, and it uses the plainest language it has. (1) Three are on the scene at once, each doing something different. - At the Jordan the Son comes up out of the water, the Spirit descends on him like a dove, and a voice out of heaven says, "You are my beloved Son; with you I am well pleased" (Mark 1:9-11). - Count the parts. One is baptized. One descends. One speaks about the one being baptized, and speaks to him as "you." - Notice what the scene does not contain: a costume change. Whatever is happening at the Jordan, it is not one figure stepping offstage and coming back in a different hat. (2) The Son prays aloud to his Father. - A prayer is speech aimed at someone. "Father, glorify me in your own presence with the glory that I had with you before the world existed" (John 17:5) is a request, made to someone, for something the speaker does not simply reach out and take. - In Gethsemane it is starker still. "Abba, Father, all things are possible for you. Remove this cup from me. Yet not what I will, but what you will" (Mark 14:36). That is a petition followed by a submission to the decision of the one petitioned, and the cup is not removed. - Somebody heard those prayers. In the days of his flesh Jesus "offered up prayers and supplications, with loud cries and tears, to him who was able to save him from death, and he was heard because of his reverence" (Hebrews 5:7). (3) One sends and the other goes. - "God sent forth his Son, born of woman" (Galatians 4:4). "The Father who sent me" (John 5:37). Sending is not the same act as going: it takes one party with the standing to commission and another who accepts the commission. - The Spirit is sent as well, by the Father in the Son's name (John 14:26) and by the Son from the Father (John 15:26). Three parties, and one pattern of traffic running between them. - He is not only on the receiving end of it, either. The Spirit intercedes for the saints, and "he who searches hearts knows what is the mind of the Spirit" (Romans 8:26-27). One pleads and another reads the plea, which takes two. - Then there is the direction of the obedience, which runs one way and only one way. The Son is "obedient to the point of death" (Philippians 2:8) and says "I always do the things that are pleasing to him" (John 8:29). The Father is nowhere said to obey the Son. (4) The Father loved the Son before the world existed. - "You loved me before the foundation of the world" (John 17:24). Before the world. Whatever that love is, it did not begin at Bethlehem, and it was not aimed at a creature. - Love wants somebody there to receive it, and here somebody is: "The Father loves the Son and has given all things into his hand" (John 3:35). - It runs back the other way too, and the Son says so on the last night of his life: "I do as the Father has commanded me, so that the world may know that I love the Father" (John 14:31). - A man can be pleased with himself. He cannot hand himself everything he owns and call it a gift. (5) The cry from the cross is addressed to someone. - "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" (Mark 15:34). It is the opening line of Psalm 22, said aloud in Aramaic by a dying man. - The word "you" in that sentence is carrying the weight of the whole scene. It is a question put to another, and it waits on an answer from another. Therefore, the three do to one another what only distinct someones can do: address, send, obey, love, and forsake.

(P3) No one prays to himself, sends himself, or forsakes himself. + Praying, sending, obeying, forsaking: these are two-party verbs. A single self can certainly think out loud and can certainly be pleased with itself, but the rest of them take a second party or they do not happen at all. (1) Asking takes someone with the standing to answer. - You might be thinking: people talk to themselves constantly. They do, and rehearsing an argument in the shower is a real thing that really happens. It is not a request, though, and a request is a different kind of act. It goes to someone who can grant it or refuse it, and it is settled by that someone. - Gethsemane is not deliberation. It is a petition, "remove this cup from me," followed by a submission to a will named as the other party's, "not what I will, but what you will." And the petition is not granted. - A man can weigh a decision in his own head all night long. He cannot file a petition with himself and be turned down. (2) Commissioning takes two. - You can send yourself an email. Notice that nothing whatever happens when you do: no authority is exercised, no assignment is accepted, and nobody could have declined. - Sending in the Gospels is the other kind of sending. "I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will but the will of him who sent me" (John 6:38). Authority on one side, obedience on the other, and the one obeying says in so many words that the will being done is not his own. (3) Loving and forsaking take someone who is there. - Self-regard is a real thing, and it is not what these texts describe. A man fond of himself is not thereby loving anybody else, and a God who knows everything would know exactly which of the two he was doing. - Forsaking is harder still for the one-self reading. To be forsaken is to be left by someone who was there and is not available to you any longer. A self cannot make itself unavailable to itself, however dark the hour gets. (4) Counting minds is not the same as counting beings. - Take the claim exactly as far as it goes and no further. A single center of self-consciousness cannot do these things to itself. Whether one being can hold more than one such center is a different question, and a harder one, and it stays open. The count is of whos, not of whats. - Christian teaching has already refused to run the two counts together. The church holds that Jesus Christ has a divine mind and a divine will, and a human mind and a human will, two of each, and it has never concluded from that arithmetic that he is two beings. - The parallel is imperfect and it should not be sold as anything better. The two in Christ belong to two natures, one divine and one human, which is not the situation inside God. What it establishes is smaller: a census of minds and a census of beings are two different operations, and you cannot read the one off the other. Therefore, if the Father, the Son, and the Spirit were one center of self-consciousness, the things Scripture reports of them could not have happened.

(C1) Therefore, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are three centers of self-consciousness, intentionality, and will. + (1) The step is modus tollens, the plainest move in logic. - The name is Latin for "the way that denies," and the pattern runs like this: if the first thing were so, the second would follow; the second is not so; therefore the first is not so. If it rained last night the driveway is wet. The driveway is dry. So it did not rain. - Now fill it in. If the three were one self, none of the praying, sending, obeying, loving, or forsaking could have happened (P3). It happened (P2). So they are not one self. - That much is a denial, and the count comes from the same evidence. Three parties are named, and each of them stands at one end or the other of an act that takes two: the Father sends and loves, the Son prays and obeys, the Spirit is sent and intercedes with a Father who reads his mind (P2). P1 supplies the last piece, which is that whatever can do those things is a someone rather than a something. - The bar each premise has to clear is modest and fair. A premise need only be more plausible than its denial, not certain past all doubt. So weigh the denials. Would you sooner believe that "person" here means something other than a someone? That the Gospels do not report what they plainly report? That a self can commission itself and forsake itself? (2) A single intellect and a single will leave nobody to petition. - Anti-Social Trinitarianism, a name about the head count rather than about anybody's temperament, holds that there is one God whose intellect and will are not divided up among the three persons. One self, in other words, with the three being something else: relations, modes, manners of subsisting, aspects. • Subsisting is the technical word for standing on one's own as an individual thing rather than existing as a feature of something else. A man subsists. His height does not. - Whatever the three turn out to be, they cannot be that. One intellect and one will leave nobody to make the petition and nobody to receive it, and the garden had both. (3) The count is of selves, not of Gods. - Three centers of self-consciousness is not the same claim as three divine beings, and the difference matters. What P2 showed is narrower: the three do to one another what only distinct someones can do. - Israel's confession stands untouched. "Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God, the LORD is one" (Deuteronomy 6:4). How three selves are one God is the next question, and getting the count of selves right is what makes it the next question. Therefore, a God who is a single self cannot be the God whose dealings the Gospels record.

(P4) The Father, the Son, and the Spirit are not relations. + The most careful one-self account in the tradition does not say that the three are things standing in relations to one another. It says they are the relations, subsisting. (1) A relation is how one thing stands to another, not a thing in its own right. - Being a father is not an extra object in the world. It is a way one man stands to a particular child, and take the child away and there is no fatherhood left lying about. - Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth-century Dominican friar whose work shaped Western theology ever after, holds that a divine person is a subsisting relation: a relation standing on its own as an individual (Summa Theologiae 1a.29.4). What tells the three apart are relations of origin (1a.40.2), namely fatherhood, sonship, and procession, which is the Spirit's coming forth from the Father. - The motive is divine simplicity, the doctrine that God has no parts of any kind. If God has no parts, the three cannot be three pieces of him, and a relation is the one thing left that could tell them apart without dividing him up. (2) A relation does not pray, know, or love. - A person is a someone, and relations are not someones. Fatherhood does not sit down to dinner. Sonship does not sweat in a garden. The relation between a father and his boy is not a third party at the table. - Yet these three send one another, know one another, and love one another (P2). - Here is a test anyone can run. You can love your father, and you can be grateful for your relationship with him. You cannot ask the relationship for anything, and it has never once answered you. (3) A mind knowing itself gives you an I and a me, not two persons. - The engine of the model is God's inner life: God understanding himself and God loving himself, with God-as-understood and God-as-loved said to stand on their own, and so to count as persons. - Think what that would come to in your own case. The difference between yourself as the one thinking and yourself as the one being thought about is not a difference between two people. You are not two when you embarrass yourself, and no census counts a man twice for having a "me." - If that distinction were enough to make persons in God, the Son turns out to be a name for the Father's "me," and modalism is back in the room wearing a much better suit. (4) On this account the count would not stop at three. - If understanding and loving oneself yields distinct persons, then the Son understands and loves himself too, which yields two more, and each of those two yields two more, and so on without end. Trinities inside Trinities. - Aquinas saw it coming and answered it. The Word, which is his term for the Son, is no more a second intellect than he is a second God, so there is no second act of understanding available to produce a second word (Summa Contra Gentiles 4.13). - The answer does stop the multiplying. Look at the price on the tag, though: one intellect in God and one act of understanding is exactly what has to be denied if the Son is to have a mind of his own to pray with. (5) A person inside another person has no plain sense. - On this account the Son remains in the Father (Summa Contra Gentiles 4.11). A relation existing in a thing is ordinary talk, since a man's fatherhood is in him. One person existing inside another person is not ordinary talk at all. - The church's word for the three being in one another is perichoresis, from a Greek word for going around. Read as complete harmony of will, mutual love, and full knowledge of one another, it is clear and worth keeping. - Pressed into one someone literally lodged inside another, it stops carrying a meaning anyone can state. Therefore, whatever the three are, they are not relations, because relations do not do what the Gospels show them doing.

(P5) The Father, the Son, and the Spirit are not one self living three lives. + The boldest attempt to keep one self and still honor the praying and the sending borrows its central image from time-travel stories. (1) This is the strongest model a one-self view has. - The proposal is that God lives his life in three separate, unending streams, as Father, as Son, and as Spirit, and that the streams overlap, so that God in one stream can address God in another. - Picture a time traveler who loops back and meets his younger self. Two men appear to be talking in the room, and there is one man, present twice over. Scale that up and the baptism at the Jordan is God speaking with himself three times over. - Give it its due before taking it apart. It is the only one-self model that tries to take the I-and-Thou language at face value, the scenes where one party says "you" to another, rather than explaining it away, and its author does not pretend the case is easy. (2) The analogy is carrying the whole weight. - Take the traveler away and nothing is left to make three overlapping streams credible, which is why the model's author accepts the burden that comes with leaning on an analogy. He states it himself: he has to show that travel into one's own past is metaphysically possible, meaning that it could really happen, and not merely that the idea has no contradiction hidden in it. - Einstein's General Relativity does permit closed time-like curves, which are paths through space and time that loop back around to their own starting point. They turn up in unusual solutions, such as the rotating universe the logician Kurt Gödel described in 1949. - Gödel's universe is not ours, and two ordinary observations settle that. His does not expand and ours does. And the sky we see looks the same in every direction, as far as measurement reaches, which leaves no room for the cosmic spin his model needs. - So what the model takes from physics, in the end, is an image rather than a mechanism. Nothing in it plays the part of space and time, nothing plays the part of the traveler's own elapsed hours, and nothing accounts for the overlap of the streams. (3) On this account there is still only one person. - That is not a hostile summary. It is what the model says: one self, living three lives, and what there are three of is streams rather than someones. - So when the Son prays, God is praying to God, which is to say that God is praying to himself, at another point in his own life. (4) That reading turns Gethsemane and the cross into a soliloquy. - A soliloquy is the speech an actor gives alone on a stage, with nobody there to answer him. On this reading, "not what I will, but what you will" becomes God informing himself that he will do the thing he has already decided to do. - "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" becomes God asking why he, as Father, has forsaken himself, as Son. Say that one out loud and you can hear that something has gone wrong. - There is a trick in film where a single actor plays both brothers and the conversation is spliced together in an editing room. It is a lovely effect, and everybody in the theater knows the terms. If the cross is that, the Gospel is a special effect and the grief in the garden is staged. - The Father's love thins out to nothing as well. A God who knows everything and loves the Son would know that he was loving himself, and being fond of oneself is not what "love" means anywhere else the word appears. Therefore, three life-streams of one self are still one self, and one self cannot be forsaken by itself on a Roman cross.

(C2) Therefore, the one God is three persons who stand to one another as I and Thou. + (1) Everyone in this dispute confesses one God. - Aquinas confesses one God. The modern one-self theologians confess one God. Nothing in P1 through P3 questions it for a moment. The whole quarrel is among trinitarians about how many someones there are, and not about how many Gods. - The two halves of the conclusion come from two different places, and it is worth being plain about which is which. The threeness is what P1 through P3 drew out of the texts. The oneness is Israel's confession, held in common with every position being argued against, and it enters the conclusion unproved because it was never in question. - That fixes what this argument carries and what it does not. Against a critic who denies that there is one God, or who denies that the Son and the Spirit are God at all, a count of selves is not the thing that answers him. What the count establishes, whichever way those questions go, is that the scenes are not one self talking to itself. (2) I and Thou names the shape of the relation. - Philosophers use "I-Thou" for a relation in which two parties address each other as "you." Its opposite is the I-It relation, where one party inspects the other the way you inspect a chair. - The Father and the Son say "you" to each other, and they mean it. That is the evidence on the table, and any account of God has to be built around it rather than trimmed to fit it. (3) How three selves are one God is the next question. - P1 through P3 never counted beings. They counted selves. Saying what makes three selves one God is the hardest work in the subject, and serious trinitarians disagree with one another about how to do it. - Three Gods would be no answer at all. An argument that ended there would have traded one failure for a worse one. (4) No model is part of the faith. - The doctrine is two sentences long: there is exactly one God, and there are exactly three distinct persons properly called God. A model is an attempt to show how both sentences can be true at once, and models are proposals rather than revelation. - So when a one-self model is set down, nothing has been subtracted from the creed. What has been set down is a family of explanations, and the thing being explained is still standing. - That cuts both ways, and it should. Any positive account of how three selves are one God is a model too, and it answers to exactly the same standard. (5) Two findings would sink the case. - If the I-Thou passages could be shown to be a convention of religious speech rather than a report of what happened, the case would collapse, and so it should. It rests on taking the Gospel narratives as narratives. - If someone gave a coherent sense to a single center of consciousness commissioning itself, obeying itself, and forsaking itself, P3 would fall, and everything resting on it would fall with it. No account on offer does, and the two most developed attempts (P4, P5) are the closest anyone has come. Therefore, the God who is one is three whos, and the conversations recorded in the Gospels are what they appear to be. See also: PT / The Trinity: One God in Three Persons

On the models and their assessment: Craig, William Lane. Systematic Philosophical Theology: On God: Excursus on Natural Theology, On the Trinity, vol. IIb. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2026. Earman, John. Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers, and Shrieks: Singularities and Acausalities in Relativistic Spacetimes. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Hasker, William. Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Hughes, Christopher. On a Complex Theory of a Simple God: An Investigation in Aquinas' Philosophical Theology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. Leftow, Brian. "Anti Social Trinitarianism." In The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, edited by Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O'Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. McCall, Thomas. Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? Philosophical and Systematic Theologians on the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010. Tuggy, Dale. "Trinity." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Proponents of the one-self view: Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 4. Translated by Charles J. O'Neil. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae 1a.27-43. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947. Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics I/1, The Doctrine of the Word of God. Translated by G. W. Bromiley. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975. Leftow, Brian. "A Latin Trinity." In Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity, edited by Thomas McCall and Michael C. Rea, 171-200. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Rahner, Karl. The Trinity. Translated by Joseph Donceel. New York: Herder & Herder, 1970. On the New Testament witness: Bauckham, Richard. Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies on the New Testament's Christology of Divine Identity. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008. McGrew, Lydia. Hidden in Plain View: Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels and Acts. Chillicothe, OH: DeWard, 2017. Williams, Peter J. Can We Trust the Gospels? Wheaton: Crossway, 2018. Ancient sources: Augustine, On the Trinity 5.9.10; 14.8.11; 15.7.12; 15.8.14; 15.24.45. Basil of Caesarea, On the Holy Spirit 9.22-23; 16.40. Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium 3. Gregory of Nazianzus, Orations 29.2; 33.16. Gregory of Nyssa, Epistle 38.2-3. Tertullian, Against Praxeas 5, 11. Third Council of Constantinople (681), Definition of Faith. Biblical citations: Exodus 3:14; Deuteronomy 4:15-16; 6:4; Psalm 22:1; Isaiah 46:10; Matthew 28:19; Mark 1:9-11; 13:32; 14:36-41; 15:34; Luke 22:41; John 3:35; 5:37; 6:38; 8:29; 14:26, 31; 15:26; 17:5, 24; 20:28; Acts 5:3-4; Romans 8:26-27; 1 Corinthians 8:6; 2 Corinthians 13:14; Galatians 4:4; Philippians 2:8; Hebrews 5:7.
+ This flattens Aquinas. On his account each person is the whole divine essence subsisting as a relation, really distinct from the other two, and calling that modalism ignores seven centuries of careful work.
1. A subsistent relation is not a bare relation. The refinement is real, and it deserves to be stated properly before anything is said against it. A subsistent relation is not a relation in the loose sense, the way "to the left of" is a relation. It is an individual, something that stands on its own feet. And on Aquinas's account each person possesses the whole divine essence, meaning everything God is, which includes the whole divine intellect and the whole divine will. The Son is not some thin item out on the edge of God. He is God, subsisting as begotten, that is, as the one who is from the Father. Then there is the second piece, and it is the one that does the real work. The relations are opposed, which is the technical way of saying that fatherhood is not sonship and that neither one can collapse into the other the way a mode collapses into the thing it modifies. Aquinas calls the difference between them a real distinction, meaning a distinction on God's side rather than one our minds impose from outside. Anyone who says his doctrine is simply modalism has not read it. 2. Telling fatherhood from sonship does not give you two who can speak. Opposed relations do distinguish, and that should be granted first. Modalism says the three are one and the same someone under three descriptions, and Aquinas denies that fatherhood and sonship are the same thing. The difference between the two positions is genuine. His defenders press further, and fairly. Nobody ever claimed that an abstract relation kneels down and prays. The Son possesses the whole divine intellect and the whole divine will as his own, received from the Father, and it is he, a subsisting individual, who prays. That is a fair reading of Aquinas and it should not be caricatured. It also does not reach the difficulty, and Aquinas is the one who says why. The Word is no more a second intellect than he is a second God, so there is no second act of understanding in God (Summa Contra Gentiles 4.13). Possessing the one intellect in a filial manner describes how a single knower knows. It does not add a knower. Opposed relations tell fatherhood from sonship; they do not give you one who asks and another who answers. 3. One will cannot submit to itself in a garden. Here the account and the texts pull apart. If the divine intellect and will are numerically one, that is, one item rather than two items that happen to match, then "not what I will, but what you will" (Mark 14:36) cannot be one divine willer submitting to another. There is only one to go around. The standard reading takes that sentence as the human will of Christ submitting to the divine will, and it is a serious answer with a church council behind it. What it cannot reach is the traffic that runs before there is any human nature in the story at all: a Father who loved the Son before the world existed (John 17:24), and a Father who sent him (Galatians 4:4). 4. Granted in full, a "me" is still not a second someone. Suppose the subsistent relations are exactly as described, with nothing shaved off. There is still a question waiting. Why should God-as-known and God-as-loved count as two distinct someones at all? That is the difference between "I" and "me," and every self-conscious being has it already. Giving the "me" a firmer footing is not the same thing as turning it into a second who. See also: PT / The Trinity: Divine Simplicity and the Trinity
+ The Son's prayers come from his human nature. The church defined in 681 that Christ has a human mind and a human will alongside the divine, and those are what pray in Gethsemane, so the praying proves nothing about God.
1. Jesus really does pray as a man. Grant it, and grant it without hedging. Two wills in Christ is orthodoxy, settled at the Third Council of Constantinople in 681 against those who held that the incarnate Son, meaning the Son of God after he had taken on human flesh, had only one will. Jesus prays with a human mind and a human will that shrink from a Roman cross. Any account that reads the Gethsemane prayer as a transaction between two divine wills and stops there is being careless with the church's own teaching. 2. The I-Thou traffic is older than the incarnation. "Father, glorify me in your own presence with the glory that I had with you before the world existed" (John 17:5). "You loved me before the foundation of the world" (John 17:24). Before the world: there was no human nature yet to carry that love or to share that glory. And sending comes before arriving. "God sent forth his Son, born of woman" (Galatians 4:4) puts the commissioning first and the birth second, which is simply the grammar of the sentence. A human nature cannot be the thing that accepted a commission it did not yet have. 3. The Spirit never took flesh at all. The same pattern runs through him anyway. He is sent by the Father in the Son's name (John 14:26) and by the Son from the Father (John 15:26). He intercedes for the saints, and "he who searches hearts knows what is the mind of the Spirit" (Romans 8:26-27). A knower and a known, one who pleads and one who is pleaded with, and no human nature anywhere in the sentence to absorb the strain. 4. The objection grants two minds in one being. Look at what it has to grant in order to work at all: one being, Jesus Christ, carrying two minds and two wills, and nobody in the history of the church has counted him as two beings. Anyone who then wants to say that counting minds is the same as counting beings has just lost the use of this objection, because the objection runs on the opposite. See also: PT / The Trinity: One God in Three Persons PT / The Trinity: The Two Errors Nicaea Refused
+ Three centers of self-consciousness and will is tritheism with better vocabulary. Call them persons if you like; three minds that each know, choose, and love are three Gods.
1. A count of selves is not a count of Gods. Nothing in P1 through P3 says that the divine substance, the one thing God is, comes in threes. What the texts show is narrower: the three do to one another what only distinct someones can do (P2, P3). Whether those three are one being or three beings has not been touched, and the objection assumes the answer rather than arguing for it. 2. The step from three minds to three beings is not self-evident. Say the step out loud and it stops looking obvious. Every mind anyone has ever met came packaged one to a being, which is perfectly true, and which is a census of creatures. The objection turns that census into a law binding on the Creator. That is a generalization from the things that were made to the one who made them, and a generalization of that kind needs an argument behind it. Christian teaching already breaks the tally in a second place. In the incarnation the church holds two minds and two wills in one Christ, and has never drawn the conclusion that he is two beings. The gap in that parallel is real, and it is better stated than hidden. Christ's two minds belong to two natures, one divine and one human, while the three centers in God are all divine, so the incarnation does not show that three divine minds can be one being. What it does show is narrower, and it is enough for the question in hand: counting minds and counting beings are two different operations. The objection's central move is therefore not a truth anyone can read off the meanings of the words. It is a claim that needs an argument, and the objection does not offer one. 3. Israel's confession is about who made and rules everything. The Shema, the confession Israel recites daily, opens "Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God, the LORD is one" (Deuteronomy 6:4). It is not a claim about the internal furniture of God. It is a claim about who made everything, who rules everything, and who alone is to be worshipped. Three cooperating deities would fail that test no matter how unanimous they were, and so would any account that made God's oneness a matter of how well three parties get along. 4. The positive account of the oneness is disputed, not missing. Saying what makes three selves one being is the hardest work in this subject, and no single answer commands agreement. That cost should be admitted plainly rather than smoothed over. What is on offer, though, is a good deal more than a promise to work something out later. - One route says the Trinity itself is the one thing that has the divine nature: exactly one God, because there is exactly one being of that kind, with the three persons inside it. - Another treats God as a single spiritual being, not made of matter, equipped with three complete sets of the powers a mind needs in order to know, love, and choose. On that account there are three centers of consciousness in one soul, rather than three souls in agreement. Serious trinitarians disagree about which of those works, and the count of selves does not wait on the answer. Unfinished construction is not a demolition, and the one-self alternative breaks against the narratives. See also: PT / The Trinity: One God in Three Persons PT / The Trinity: There Is Exactly One God PT / The Trinity: Functional and Group Mind Monotheism PT / The Trinity: Tripersonal Monotheism
+ Karl Barth and Karl Rahner both denied three consciousnesses in God, and both are among the greatest theologians of the last century. Calling their view unitarianism is name-calling dressed as analysis.
1. Both men feared that "person" would suggest three separate personalities. Barth preferred to speak of three "modes of being" rather than three persons, judging that the modern word would put three separate personalities with three separate biographies into the reader's head (Church Dogmatics I/1, §9). Rahner made the same move with the phrase "distinct manners of subsisting," and he stated the consequence plainly: in God there are not three consciousnesses, but one consciousness subsisting in a threefold way (The Trinity, 106-107). Neither man was a modalist by intention. Both were confessing the creed, and both were reacting to a real danger in the modern word, a danger that has not gone away since. 2. The charge is against the account, not the men. The charge is that one-self theories of this kind are, for all their trinitarian language, thinly disguised versions of unitarianism, which is the view that God is a single person and nothing more. It is not an outsider's jibe. It is pressed from squarely inside orthodox theology, by philosophers and theologians who confess the creed Barth and Rahner confessed, and what it says is that the account cannot deliver what the texts require. It says nothing whatever about anybody's faith. 3. Modes of being multiply the ways, not the someone. One consciousness subsisting in a threefold way is still one knower and one willer. That one cannot be sent by another, cannot obey another, and cannot be forsaken by another (P3). Three manners of subsisting give you three ways for a single someone to be there. They do not give you a second someone to be addressed. 4. "Person" here does not mean a separate personality. It does not mean a separate life story, a separate body, and separate interests, which is what the modern ear hears and what Barth was right to fear. It means a center of self-consciousness, intentionality, and will (P1). Three such centers in one being is a strange claim and nobody should pretend otherwise. It is not, however, the claim that God is a committee of three individuals who happen to agree. See also: PT / The Trinity: There Are Exactly Three Persons
+ Augustine's picture is one mind with memory, understanding, and will, and the Western tradition has read the Trinity that way for sixteen centuries. This argument sets itself against the mainstream of Christian theology.
1. Augustine never identified the persons with those three. He calls memory, understanding, and will an image of the Trinity in man, and he says so in as many words and more than once (On the Trinity 14.8.11; 15.8.14). An image of a thing is not the thing. A photograph of a house keeps nobody dry. 2. Augustine saw the absurdity and refused it. If the persons simply were divine memory, understanding, and love, then the Father would know himself only by the Son and love himself only by the Spirit. Augustine states that result and turns it down, insisting instead that knowing and loving belong to each of the three (On the Trinity 15.7.12). Late in the same work he concedes outright that three things belonging to one person will not suit the three divine persons (15.24.45). 3. Augustine distinguishes the persons by relations, not as relations. The Arians, the fourth-century party who denied that the Son is God by nature, pressed him with a puzzle. Being unbegotten and being begotten look like opposite properties, since the Father is from no one and the Son is from the Father, and one essence cannot carry both at once. Augustine's answer is that the persons are distinguished by the relations in which they stand to one another. That is not the claim that the persons are relations, and the whole subject sits in the gap between the two. He worried about the word "person" as well, since human speech runs short at exactly this point, and he used it anyway. Not because it was adequate, but so that the three would not go unnamed (5.9.10). 4. The Eastern camp and the Western camp is the wrong map. Sorting this debate into a Greek side and a Latin side misdescribes who held what. Tertullian and Hilary of Poitiers wrote in Latin. Athanasius, a Greek, is one of the founts of Latin theology. All of them come down on the social side. Whatever the tradition owes Augustine, it does not owe him a doctrine he declined to teach. See also: PT / The Trinity: Divine Simplicity and the Trinity
+ Scripture gives God arms, nostrils, and regret. The praying and sending are the same kind of language, and building a doctrine of God's inner life on them is wooden literalism.
1. Scripture flags its own anthropomorphisms. Anthropomorphism is describing God in human terms he does not literally have: the outstretched arm, the listening ear. The books that use those figures are the same books that deny God has a body and forbid making an image of him, since Israel "saw no form" on the day the LORD spoke out of the fire (Deuteronomy 4:15-16). The figure arrives with its own correction attached. 2. Nothing in Scripture corrects the I-Thou language. No passage anywhere tells the reader that the Father and the Son are not really two. What happens instead is that converts are baptized into the one name of three (Matthew 28:19), and congregations are blessed by three (2 Corinthians 13:14). Those are things people do on a Sunday morning, not turns of phrase. 3. Figures of speech do not carry plots. God's arm never gets a scene. It has no beginning, no middle, and no death. The Father's sending of the Son runs from before the foundation of the world to a garden, a trial, and an execution, with the same two parties throughout and never once a swap. You can call a fast runner a rocket. You cannot then write his biography as a rocket's biography, with a launch pad and a fuel budget, and expect it to track anything real. 4. A staged agony would be a deception, not a figure of speech. Both sides of a metaphor know the terms, which is exactly why nobody is misled by an outstretched arm. A cry of abandonment addressed to nobody is a different thing altogether. It is a performance with an audience that has not been let in on it, and that is not the character of the God the Gospels are about. 5. Analogy is not a code that hides the plot. The serious form of this objection has nothing to do with arms and nostrils. It is the classical doctrine of analogy, worked out by Aquinas among others: every word said of God is stretched from its creaturely use rather than used in exactly the sense it bears of us, so that "sends" and "loves" tell us how God stands toward us rather than what he is in himself. Taken at full strength, it still does not deliver what the objection needs. For one thing, analogy on its own terms asserts something true. When a classical theologian says God's goodness is known analogically, he is not saying we know nothing about it. He is saying that what we truly say applies in a manner fitted to God. An analogical "the Father sent the Son" still has a sender in it and a sent one. For another, the Gospels are not handing us a word to apply to God. They are reporting a sequence with parties in it, in which one commissions, another accepts, and a third is poured out. Analogy governs how a word stretches when it is said of God. It does not change how many parties an event had. There is also a price the objector has to pay. If the language is so thoroughly analogical that no count can be read off it, then "God is a single self" cannot be read off it either, and the objection has dissolved the view it was defending along with the one it was attacking.
+ Divine simplicity requires the relations model. If God has no parts, he cannot carry three minds and three wills, and the classical doctrine of God leaves the persons no option but to be relations.
1. Rejecting the model does put pressure on divine simplicity. Aquinas's model is built on simplicity, and honesty requires saying so out loud. If God is absolutely without parts, the persons cannot be distinguished by anything positive in God, and relations are then the only distinguishing device left on the table. Reject the model and the doctrine of simplicity is going to feel the pull. 2. The strong form of simplicity is disputed inside orthodoxy. Divine simplicity is the claim that God has no parts. In its strong form it goes considerably further: God's attributes are identical with each other and with God himself, so that his justice is his mercy is his existence. Scripture plainly teaches that God depends on nothing and is not assembled out of anything prior to him. Whether it teaches the strong form is precisely what is argued about, by people who confess the same creed. 3. Pressed all the way, strong simplicity erases the three. Identity is transitive: if the morning star is Venus and the evening star is Venus, then the morning star is the evening star. So if each person just is the divine essence, the Father is the Son. That is not an outsider's complaint. It is the very difficulty that made an account of the persons as relations necessary in the first place, and philosophers who have worked through Aquinas closely have concluded that saving the Trinity here costs him the ordinary logic of identity. 4. What simplicity was protecting is not in danger. The doctrine was framed to defend three claims, and nothing in three centers of self-consciousness touches any of them: - God is not built out of prior parts. - He does not depend on anything else for what he is. - He is not one being among others in a class. See also: PT / Theology Proper: Divine Simplicity (Classical / Strong) PT / Theology Proper: Divine Simplicity (Weak) PT / The Trinity: Divine Simplicity and the Trinity
+ "Person" in the creeds is not the modern word. Hypostasis and persona meant a distinct individual, with nothing implied about consciousness, so this reads modern psychology back into the fourth century.
1. The dictionaries are on the objector's side. The charge is anachronism, the mistake of putting a later idea into an earlier writer's mouth, and the lexical half of it is correct. Persona did begin as an actor's mask, and hypostasis did mean an individual subsistence, something standing on its own. Neither word carries "center of consciousness" in its dictionary entry, and anyone who claims otherwise is overreaching. Where a word came from does not settle how a writer is using it, though. A candidate was once simply a man in a white toga, and nobody thinks a modern election is about laundry. 2. The tradition's own definition of person is built on reason and will. The definition the medievals worked from is Boethius's, from the early sixth century: a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Aquinas takes it up, tests it article by article, and then asks whether the word belongs to God at all (Summa Theologiae 1a.29.1, 1a.29.3). This is the tradition's own vocabulary, in other words, and not something imported from outside to embarrass it. Look at what the definition asks for. A rational nature is a nature with intellect and will, which is a great deal more than a bare distinct item on a list. The distance from there to "a center of self-consciousness, intentionality, and will" is a good deal shorter than the objection needs it to be. The distance is not nothing, and the honest reading keeps it open. On Aquinas's account the three share one intellect and one will, so a divine person can satisfy Boethius without being a distinct knower, and that is exactly what is in dispute. What cannot be said is that "person" in this tradition was ever a thin, psychology-free label for an individual thing. 3. The Fathers' arguments are thicker than their vocabulary. Watch what they actually do with the word. Tertullian argues for the distinctness of Father and Son from the I and the Thou of the Psalms, and points his reader to his own silent self-conversation as a faint picture of a second person within (Against Praxeas 5, 11). The Cappadocians credit the three with mutual knowledge, mutual love, and will of their own. Those are not the properties of a bare individual thing. They are things only someones do. 4. The Gospel narratives, not the creeds, carry the weight. The evidence is a man praying in a garden, a voice from heaven, a Spirit descending, a cry from a cross. If every fourth-century writer had meant something thinner by "person," those scenes would still say what they say, and a theory of God would still have to fit them. 5. The anachronism worth worrying about is a different one. The modern tool most often pressed onto these ancient texts is not the concept of a person. It is strict numerical identity: the rule that two names pick out the same thing only if absolutely every fact about the one is a fact about the other. Logicians sharpened that rule long after the New Testament was written, and it is then read back into sentences whose authors were not using it. If anachronism is the worry, that is where the worry belongs. See also: PT / The Trinity: The Logical Problem of the Trinity PT / The Trinity: Relative Identity and Constitution PT / The Trinity: The Two Errors Nicaea Refused
+ Refuting a theological model with cosmology is out of any theologian's depth. Closed time-like curves, paths that loop back to their own past, are a live topic in physics, and philosophers of time have defended the coherence of time travel for decades.
1. Even granting the physics, the soliloquy remains. The objection that carries the weight is the reading of Gethsemane and the cross (P5). Suppose travel into one's own past were shown tomorrow to be perfectly possible. The model would still make the cry from the cross a speech with nobody on the other end of it, and that is the objection it cannot survive. 2. The burden the model carries is not the one the objection describes. Nobody disputes that solutions to Einstein's equations permitting these curves exist on paper. Gödel published one in 1949, and no theologian is in any position to overturn it. What the model needs is different, and harder: that travel into one's own past is metaphysically possible, meaning that it could really happen, not merely that some equations tolerate the shape. A curve in a universe that neither expands nor looks anything like ours is a long way short of that, and the model's author says as much himself, so this is his own accounting of the bill rather than a hostile summary of it. Two gaps stay open even for a reader who wants the model to work: - The consistency rules physicists propose for keeping such worlds free of contradiction may themselves rule out loops tight enough to fit inside a single life, or rule out the passage of anything as large as a person along one. - The paradoxes are not disposed of by pointing out that a traveler could not in fact kill his own grandfather. That is a flat contradiction, and contradictions do not happen. What wants explaining is why every attempt would have to fail, every time, forever, with nothing to account for the world's endless conspiring to trip him. John Earman, who has worked through these spacetimes as carefully as anyone, calls that unbroken run of coincidences wildly improbable, and suggests that the most plausible way to be rid of the improbability is that such travel is impossible. The dispute here is not theology against physics. 3. The model borrows a motif rather than a mechanism. A physical theory that allows these curves supplies a geometry and a set of laws, and those are what do the explanatory work. The theological model has no counterpart to space and time, none to the traveler's own elapsed hours, and no account of what makes the three streams overlap. Being unlike a physical model is not a small defect when the physical model was the reason to believe the story in the first place. That last verdict belongs to the model's critics rather than to its author, who ties his own case instead to a live debate in the philosophy of physics: whether a world containing travel into one's own past is metaphysically possible at all.
+ Three wills can conflict. If each person has his own will, God's unity is a matter of how well three parties get along, and God turns out to be a very well-run committee.
1. Unity by cooperation would not be monotheism. The objection is exactly right about that, and it has to be granted before anything else is said. Three perfectly cooperating deities would be three deities, and any account that rests God's oneness on how well the three agree has already lost. That is the trap this whole subject is trying to avoid. 2. Wills that cannot conflict are not wills that happen not to. Each of the three is good and loving by nature rather than by effort or choice, and each knows everything there is to know. Two such wills cannot come to blows, and not because the negotiations go well. There is nothing for either to be mistaken about and no defect in either to pull them apart. Two flawless mathematicians working the same problem do not need a meeting to reach the same answer, and their agreement is not a lucky break. 3. Gethsemane is not a counterexample. "Not what I will, but what you will" is a real submission, and the church's reading of it is that the human will of Christ, which genuinely recoils from death, yields to the purpose he shares with the Father. A creature's nature shrinking from crucifixion is not two divine purposes at odds. 4. Counting wills by person is a real departure from the councils. The rule behind the definition of two wills in Christ is that a will belongs to a nature, meaning what a thing is rather than who it is. Two natures therefore give two wills, and one divine nature gives one divine will. An account with three centers of will sits loose to that way of counting, and pretending otherwise would be dishonest. Two things are worth saying about the departure. The rule was framed to settle a question about Christ, and it was framed three centuries after the fathers who fixed the trinitarian vocabulary had already credited each of the three with knowing, loving, and willing, always in concord and never divided. And what the council was protecting is kept here in full: Christ has a real human will, and a Savior with no human will would have left human willing unredeemed. How many willers there are inside God is not the question the council was asked. Extending its rule that far is a further step, and it is a step the texts resist. A Son who comes down from heaven "not to do my own will but the will of him who sent me" (John 6:38) is not describing a single will with a single owner. 5. The oneness was never built out of agreement. It rests on there being one divine being rather than three, and saying what that oneness amounts to is the constructive work. Counting selves does not do that work. Getting the count right is the first job in this subject; it is not the last one. See also: PT / The Trinity: One God in Three Persons PT / The Trinity: Functional and Group Mind Monotheism PT / The Trinity: Tripersonal Monotheism
+ A man who prays to God, is sent by God, and is forsaken by God is not God. The I-Thou evidence shows two distinct persons, which is what unitarians have said all along, and only one of them is God.
1. The objection is right about what the count does not show. Concede the whole of it. Everything drawn out of the Jordan and the garden establishes distinctness, and distinctness is all it establishes (C1). A unitarian, meaning someone who holds that God is one person and that Jesus is not that person, can accept the whole of P1 through P3 without flinching. Nothing there shows that the Son is God, and nothing there was framed to. That is why the conclusion says out loud where each half comes from (C2). The oneness is Israel's confession, and the deity of the Son and the Spirit is a separate case made from separate evidence. Take those away and what is left is a demonstration that God and somebody else were talking, which is a long way from a Trinity. 2. The deity of the Son and the Spirit rests on different texts than the count does. - Thomas falls at the feet of the risen Jesus and says "My Lord and my God!" and is not corrected (John 20:28). - Converts are baptized into a single name shared by three (Matthew 28:19). - Lying to the Holy Spirit is called lying to God in the space of two verses (Acts 5:3-4). The hardest one for a unitarian is the verse he reaches for first. Writing to Corinth about idols, Paul takes Israel's daily confession that the LORD our God is one LORD and opens it up to hold two: "one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist" (1 Corinthians 8:6). A Jewish monotheist does not put a creature inside the Shema. Those are not I-Thou texts, and they are not doing the same job. They answer the question the I-Thou texts leave open. 3. The unitarian reading has its own bill to pay. The Son's glory is spoken of as held before the world existed, and the Father's love for him is dated the same way (John 17:5, 24). A unitarian has to read all of that as ideal pre-existence, meaning a purpose formed in God's mind rather than a person who was there. That is a real reading held by serious people, and it is also a cost. The plainest sense of the sentences has to be set aside in every case, and the sending in Galatians 4:4 has to become the commissioning of someone who did not yet exist. 4. The two questions come apart cleanly. Whoever wins the argument about the Son's deity, a God who is a single self still cannot be the God the narratives describe. If the Son and the Spirit are God, three centers of self-consciousness follow, and the doctrine of the Trinity with them. If they are not, then the Gospels are recording conversations between God and creatures, and the dispute has moved to ground where the evidence is the divine titles, the worship, and the resurrection. See also: PT / The Trinity: One God in Three Persons PT / The Trinity: The Holy Spirit Is a Person, and God PT / The Trinity: There Is Exactly One God
+ John 17 is the evangelist's theology rather than a transcript, and nobody was awake to hear the Gethsemane prayer. Building a doctrine of God's inner life on scenes like these is naive about how the Gospels were written.
1. The sleeping disciples are a fair point and a narrow one. Mark says plainly that the three fell asleep, and he says it three times over (Mark 14:37-41). Whatever the source of the words was, the evangelist is not claiming three alert stenographers, and anyone who pretends otherwise is not reading the chapter. What follows from that is smaller than the objection needs. Mark reports the substance of a prayer along with the fact that the disciples slept through it, which is not how an author covers his tracks, and Luke puts the distance at a stone's throw (Luke 22:41), near enough to hear a man in anguish before sleep takes you. Then look at what the scene costs the men who preserved it. The inner circle cannot stay awake for one hour, and the teacher asks to be let off. Stories invented to serve a movement do not usually humiliate its leaders. This one does, in front of everybody. 2. Take John out entirely and the pattern is still there. The evidence does not live in one scene, which is what saves it here. Mark alone gives the voice from heaven addressing the Son as "you" (Mark 1:11), the petition in the garden (Mark 14:36), and the cry from the cross (Mark 15:34). Paul gives the sending of the Son (Galatians 4:4) and a Spirit who intercedes with a Father who reads his mind (Romans 8:26-27). Hebrews gives a Son whose prayers were "heard" by another (Hebrews 5:7). Those are separate authors writing to separate churches, and they were not coordinating. The I-Thou traffic is not a Johannine specialty that the rest of the New Testament merely inherits. 3. The objection cuts every model on the table, including the one it defends. Every account of the Trinity is read off these documents. Aquinas built his from them, the life-streams model was built specifically to accommodate them, and the modern one-self theologians take them as revelation. An objection that removes the Gospels as evidence does not hand the argument to a rival model. It removes the subject. 4. Two different questions are being run together. How a text came to be written is one question. What the text teaches is another, and it is the one at issue here. A theory of God offered as Christian doctrine has to fit what the New Testament documents say about God, and it has to do that whether the words of John 17 were taken down on the night they were spoken or composed at length in Ephesus. Whether those documents are also good history is a real question with a real answer, and it is argued from names, places, undesigned agreements, and the conduct of the witnesses rather than from anything here. See also: CE / New Testament Criticism: The Gospels: Real History CE / New Testament Criticism: Internal Marks of Eyewitness Testimony and Verisimilitude
+ Two models are examined and a whole family is pronounced dead. Other one-self accounts exist, and a better one could be built tomorrow, so this elimination proves nothing.
1. The count comes from the texts, not from the elimination. P1 through P3 do the work, and the count would stand if no model had ever been written down. P3 is not aimed at a model, either. It is aimed at any single center of self-consciousness whatever, so a new account that supplies one inherits the difficulty however it is dressed. What P4 and P5 do is close the two best-developed routes by which a one-self reading might have reclaimed the same texts. They are a response to the strongest replies, not a survey of everything anyone has ever said. 2. The specification a new model would have to meet can be written out in advance. It needs a single center of self-consciousness that is: - addressed as "you" by itself, - commissioned by itself, and refused by itself when it petitions, - and left alone by itself on a Roman cross. What is wanted is not a description of how that would look from the outside, but an account of how it could happen. The two failures are instructive precisely because they fail in opposite directions. Relations distinguish but do not speak. Life-streams speak but are not someones. Anything new has to find room between those two, and the room is narrow. 3. These are the two the literature itself treats as the strongest. One is the most careful account the tradition has produced, worked out over a lifetime and refined for seven centuries afterward. The other was built in the last few decades for the express purpose of taking the I-Thou language at face value rather than explaining it away. Refuting weak versions would prove nothing at all, and these are not weak versions. 4. The terms of surrender are on the table. Produce that coherent account and P3 falls, and everything resting on it falls too (C1, C2). That is what it means for a premise to be more plausible than its negation rather than certain past all doubt. It can be beaten, and what would beat it has been named rather than hidden. See also: PT / The Trinity: Tripersonal Monotheism
+ If the Son knows eternally what the Father has decreed, his petition in the garden is no more a real request between three selves than between one. The objection to the one-self model applies just as well to three.
1. Knowing the answer does not empty a request. A daughter who knows exactly what her father will say still has to ask him, and the asking is a real transaction because there are two of them in the room. Foreknowledge changes what the asker expects. It does not change who is being asked. 2. What empties a request is having nobody to ask. That is the whole difference, and it is a flat one. A petition needs someone to receive it who is not the speaker. On three selves there is such a someone; on one self there is not. The objection has found a feature the two accounts share and has left the feature that separates them untouched. 3. The human mind of the incarnate Son does not know everything God knows. He says so himself about one thing at least: "concerning that day or that hour, no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father" (Mark 13:32). Whatever else that verse settles, it rules out the assumption the objection needs, which is that the man praying in the garden had every fact of the divine decree in front of him as he prayed. 4. Run the objection out and it takes every prayer with it. God knew the answer before anyone asked, on every account of God anyone holds. If a request between parties who both know the outcome is not a real request, then no prayer ever prayed by anyone was a real request, and Christians have never believed that. An argument that proves that much has proved too much.

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Theological Analyses of Societal Issues

Theology of the Family

Where Faith and Family Intersect

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