Justified True Belief

Mapping the Landscape of Good Reasons for the Truth of Christianity

Christian Evidences

Evidence & Arguments for Christian Theism

Divinity of Christ

Biblical Evidence for High-Christology: Jesus is God

TBD

Old Testament Criticism

Evidence for the Reliability of the OT Bible

Common Objections

Objection Analyses to Christian Theism

World Religions

Critical Analyses of Non-Christian Religions

Philosophy

Phileō Sophia - to Love Wisdom.

Metaphysics: Free Will

Whether Our Choices Are Up to Us

What the Sovereignty Texts Say, and What They Do Not

(●) The sovereignty texts are best read as God's plan built around what people would freely do. + At her parents' fortieth anniversary dinner, Nora watched her father do something he had never done in his life. He stood up, tapped his glass, and talked for ten minutes about the day he met her mother. Afterward Nora told her brother, "I got Dad to give a speech." Her brother wanted to know how. For forty years their Uncle Ray had told the story of that first meeting, and for forty years he had told it wrong. Nora seated him at their father's elbow and asked him to tell it again, knowing her father would not let it pass. He didn't. He stood up to set the record straight, and once he was on his feet he said the rest. Two sentences are now true. "Nora got Dad to give a speech" tells you whose plan it was. "Dad gave a speech" tells you whose speech it was. Neither sentence tells you how the plan ran through the speech. Suppose Nora had instead hired a stage hypnotist, who with a snap of his fingers left her father wanting nothing so much as to make a speech. Her father would still have stood up and spoken because he wanted to, and "Nora got Dad to give a speech" would still be true. But this time the wanting would have been put there from outside, and the speech would have been decided by someone else before he ever reached for his glass. Nobody thinks God is a stage hypnotist, of course. The point is about sentences. A sentence that says one person got another to do something does not say which kind of getting it was. Scripture is full of sentences like that. Joseph tells the brothers who sold him into slavery, "As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good" (Genesis 50:20). Peter tells a crowd in Jerusalem that Jesus was "delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God," and killed "by the hands of lawless men" (Acts 2:23). Each of these sentences has two halves, one about what God did and one about what people did. Passages like these are called the sovereignty texts, because Christians cite them for God's sovereignty: his rule over everything that happens, including what people choose. Everything turns on one word, settle. To settle a choice is to be what makes it go the way it goes, which is more than making its outcome certain. Knowledge and guarantees settle nothing. Nora had both. She was sure her father would stand up, and her seating plan made sure of it, yet neither her being sure nor her making sure is what made his choice go the way it went. He did that, when he pushed back his chair. The hypnotist, had there been one, would have settled it. With that word in hand, freedom takes one sentence to define. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it, for reasons of his own. He is then its source, the one it comes from. The father's speech was free in just this sense: nothing settled it but him, and he had a reason of his own, forty years of a story told wrong. In the ordinary run of human choices, a free choice also carries an ordinary mark: the person could have chosen otherwise, with everything before the choice as it was. Nora's father could have let Uncle Ray's story pass one more time. It is the mark and not the definition. A signature is the usual sign that a man agreed to a contract, but a man who agreed with a handshake agreed all the same. Another way a choice could have gone, there for the taking, is called an open door. The difference between the mark and the definition matters in the hardest case these texts raise, Pontius Pilate's (C, D16). Philosophers also have a word for a choice settled before it is made. A choice is determined when it is settled beforehand by prior conditions (the past and the laws of nature, or a decree of God) that are enough by themselves to make it go the way it goes. The hypnotized father's speech would have been determined: the snap of the fingers, and what it did to him, would have been enough by themselves. God's decree is his eternal plan for all that happens, and his providence is his governing of the world, by which he carries that plan out. Theological determinism is the view that the decree settles every choice anyone makes, sins included. Most who hold it are compatibilists: they hold that a choice can be free even if it is determined, so long as it flows from the chooser's own desires. On their view God settles the choice through the desires, and the chooser does what he wants. Philosophers who hold that people make free choices of a kind determinism would rule out are called libertarians, a name that has nothing to do with politics. Middle knowledge is God's knowledge of what every person would freely do in any circumstance, including circumstances that never come about. The view built on it is called Molinism, after Luis de Molina, the sixteenth-century Jesuit who worked it out. On it God governs the world by choosing which free creatures to place in which circumstances, knowing what each would freely do there. Nora did something like that on a small scale. She knew what her father would do if Uncle Ray told the story wrong, and she arranged for Uncle Ray to tell it. Open theism holds that God does not know in advance what free creatures will do, because until they choose there is nothing yet to know. That gives three ways to read a sovereignty text: - The decree reading: God's decree settled what the human agent did, and he answers for it because he acted on his own desires. - The open reading: the human agent settled what he did. God, not knowing it in advance, planned around what he forecast from the man's character, or else around what he had resolved to do himself. - The middle-knowledge reading: God planned what was done by knowing what the human agent would freely do and placing him where he would do it. The plan was God's, and the choice was the agent's. Many Christians hold a fourth view, simple foreknowledge: God foresees everything his free creatures will do, but has no knowledge of what they would do in circumstances that never come about. As a reading of these texts it keeps a good deal: the human half, and God's foretelling of free acts as well. On God's plan, though, it ends up where the open reading stands. What God foresees on this view is everything that will actually happen, and that already includes God's own decisions: whom he creates, where he places them, what he sends. So the foresight comes too late to plan with. A man who reads tomorrow's paper tonight and finds his own photograph in the stands has learned how the game ends, but the paper cannot help him decide whether to go (D19). The argument is abductive, which means it reasons to the best explanation. A detective cannot prove who took the last slice of pie the way a mathematician proves a theorem. What he can do is ask which suspect best explains all the evidence at once: the crumbs on one sleeve, the empty plate, the alibi that does not hold. With the sovereignty texts, the evidence is the texts themselves and the suspects are the three readings. Of each text we ask two things: what it says God did, and what it says the human being did, including whether it treats him as someone who weighed, intended and answers for what he did. Of each reading we ask whether it lets both halves mean what they say. The best reading is the one that explains the most while bending the least. To bend a text is to read it as saying less than it plainly says. No reading has to be proved beyond all doubt, only shown to be better than its rivals. Who holds what, on the sovereignty texts: - The decree reading: John Calvin, the Reformer of Geneva, to whom the Protestant churches called Reformed trace their teaching, wrote in 1559 that it is "the merest trifling to substitute a bare permission for the providence of God." John Feinberg defends the decree reading today. - The middle-knowledge reading: Luis de Molina set out middle knowledge in 1588, and William Lane Craig defends the reading today. - The open reading: William Hasker defends open theism today. The argument that follows holds that the sovereignty texts are best read as God's plan built around what people would freely do, which is the middle-knowledge reading.

(P1) Scripture ascribes the same acts to God's plan and to human hands. + Again and again a single event is told twice in the same passage, once as God's doing and once as the doing of men. Sometimes both are in one sentence. (1) Joseph was sold by his brothers and sent by God. - When Joseph makes himself known to the brothers who sold him into Egypt, he says both things in one breath: "do not be distressed or angry with yourselves because you sold me here, for God sent me before you to preserve life" (Genesis 45:5). A few lines later he goes further: "So it was not you who sent me here, but God" (Genesis 45:8). - Years later, after their father's death, he puts it in a sentence that has become famous: "As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good, to bring it about that many people should be kept alive, as they are today" (Genesis 50:20). The same verb, "meant," carries both intentions. One act, the selling, has two meanings attached to it, theirs and God's. - Think of a phone call. A man rings his brother to gloat over a bet he has won. Their mother, who asked him to call, meant it to end a year of silence between them, and it did. One call carried two meanings, and the gloating was the son's own. (2) The cross was God's plan and the work of lawless men. - Peter's first sermon puts the two halves in a single sentence: "this Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men" (Acts 2:23). - When the church prays after Peter and John are released from custody, it says the same of everyone involved: "both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel," were gathered "to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place" (Acts 4:27-28). - Jesus said it himself at the Last Supper: "For the Son of Man goes as it has been determined, but woe to that man by whom he is betrayed!" (Luke 22:22). - Think of a chess player who offers her queen, knowing her opponent will take it, and wins the game three moves later. "I let him take my queen" and "I took her queen" are both true of one move. The plan was hers, and the greed was his. (3) Assyria was God's rod with intentions of its own. - Isaiah hears God call the Assyrian empire "the rod of my anger" (Isaiah 10:5): "Against a godless nation I send him, and against the people of my wrath I command him" (Isaiah 10:6). - In the next breath the prophet says that the Assyrian's own purpose was something else: "But he does not so intend, and his heart does not so think; but it is in his heart to destroy, and to cut off nations not a few" (Isaiah 10:7). The king claimed the whole achievement for himself: "By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom" (Isaiah 10:13). - The pattern returns when the Assyrian army stands at the walls of Jerusalem. In an oracle (a message from God, spoken through a prophet), God says to its king, "I planned from days of old what now I bring to pass" (Isaiah 37:26), and in the same oracle, "I know your sitting down and your going out and coming in, and your raging against me" (Isaiah 37:28). - The prophet supplies his own picture: "Shall the axe boast over him who hews with it, or the saw magnify itself against him who wields it?" (Isaiah 10:15). An axe cannot boast, of course, so the picture is a rebuke, aimed at a tool with a will of its own that has forgotten whose hand it is in (D14). (4) The census was God's incitement, Satan's incitement and David's order. - One account of King David's census says that "the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he incited David against them, saying, Go, number Israel and Judah" (2 Samuel 24:1). The other, telling the same event, says that "Satan stood against Israel and incited David to number Israel" (1 Chronicles 21:1). - Neither account takes the decision away from David. His general, Joab, argued against it. "But the king’s word prevailed against Joab and the commanders of the army" (2 Samuel 24:4). - Newspapers do this all the time. The same strike can be reported as the union's decision, the owner's doing and the workers' walkout, and all three reports can be true. (5) Absalom chose a ruin that God had ordained. - When Absalom rebelled against his father, King David, he took with him Ahithophel, the wisest counselor in the kingdom: "the counsel that Ahithophel gave was as if one consulted the word of God" (2 Samuel 16:23). Ahithophel urged Absalom to strike that very night, while David was "weary and discouraged" (2 Samuel 17:2). - Then Hushai, David's friend posing as a defector, gave the opposite advice, and Absalom weighed the two. "And Absalom and all the men of Israel said, The counsel of Hushai the Archite is better than the counsel of Ahithophel. For the Lord had ordained to defeat the good counsel of Ahithophel, so that the Lord might bring harm upon Absalom" (2 Samuel 17:14). To ordain a thing is to decree that it will happen. - A nineteenth-century commentator on Samuel took the verse at full strength. Absalom's success so plainly depended on speed, he wrote, "that nothing less than the direct interference of the Divine providence could account for the infatuation of Absalom and his counsellors." He meant infatuation in its older sense, a folly that takes hold of a person. - The story also shows one means the interference used. David had prayed, "O Lord, please turn the counsel of Ahithophel into foolishness" (2 Samuel 15:31), and had sent Hushai back to the city to "defeat for me the counsel of Ahithophel" (2 Samuel 15:34). Whether God also worked on Absalom's judgment directly, as the commentator thought, the story does not say (P5). - Augustine, bishop of Hippo in North Africa around AD 400, read the verse as strongly as anyone. He cited it among the texts that show God turning human wills wherever he pleases, and in the same breath he kept both halves: "Did not Absalom choose by his own will the counsel which was detrimental to him? And yet the reason of his doing so was that the Lord had heard his father's prayer that it might be so" (On Grace and Free Will 41). Therefore, Scripture ascribes the same acts to God's plan and to human hands.

(P2) The same passages hold the human agents answerable for those acts. + The human half of these texts is not a formality. The passages that name God's plan also weigh the human deed, blame it, and call the people who did it to repent. (1) Jesus pronounced a woe on his betrayer. - In the very sentence that calls his death "determined," Jesus says, "but woe to that man by whom he is betrayed!" (Luke 22:22). In Matthew's account he adds, "It would have been better for that man if he had not been born" (Matthew 26:24). - A woe is a lament and a sentence at once. Jesus grieves over what Judas is about to do, and condemns it. - Judas afterward passed the same verdict on himself: "I have sinned by betraying innocent blood" (Matthew 27:4). - A Victorian commentator on Luke, writing on this verse, said that "although God knows from all eternity that Judas is the betrayer of the Christ, yet this does not destroy the freedom or responsibility of Judas." - Nobody pronounces a woe on a hammer. (2) Peter called the crucifiers to repent. - Peter did not soften the human half. He told the crowd that they had killed Jesus "by the hands of lawless men" (Acts 2:23), and he closed the sermon with "this Jesus whom you crucified" (Acts 2:36). When the crowd was "cut to the heart" and asked what to do, he said, "Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins" (Acts 2:37-38). - His next sermon named each part of it: "you delivered over and denied in the presence of Pilate, when he had decided to release him," and "you killed the Author of life" (Acts 3:13, 15). He granted that they "acted in ignorance" (Acts 3:17), and still said, "Repent therefore, and turn back, that your sins may be blotted out" (Acts 3:19). - A nineteenth-century Scottish commentator on Acts put the point plainly. Herod, Pilate, the Gentiles and the people of Israel, "though acting as the instruments of God's will, were not freed from moral responsibility, nor was their guilt thereby in the least degree extenuated." - A call to repent is a call to someone who did something. Nobody asks a storm to repent. (3) Assyria was punished for its own boast. - The empire God sent as his rod was judged for what it meant by the errand: "he will punish the speech of the arrogant heart of the king of Assyria and the boastful look in his eyes" (Isaiah 10:12). At the walls of Jerusalem the charge is the same: "Because you have raged against me and your complacency has come to my ears, I will put my hook in your nose" (Isaiah 37:29). - Babylon was treated the same way. God calls Nebuchadnezzar "my servant" (Jeremiah 27:6), and then says, "I will punish the king of Babylon and that nation, the land of the Chaldeans, for their iniquity" (Jeremiah 25:12). Habakkuk hears God say, "For behold, I am raising up the Chaldeans" (Habakkuk 1:6), and a few lines later calls them "guilty men, whose own might is their god!" (Habakkuk 1:11). - A mercenary hired by a king to put down a rebellion is the king's instrument. If he loots the villages on his way, he hangs for the looting. (4) The men who did these things confessed them as sin. - After the census, "David's heart struck him," and he said, "I have sinned greatly in what I have done" (2 Samuel 24:10). The other account has him say, "Was it not I who gave command to number the people? It is I who have sinned and done great evil" (1 Chronicles 21:17). He did not plead that he had been incited. - Joseph's brothers asked forgiveness for "the transgression of your brothers and their sin, because they did evil to you" (Genesis 50:17). Joseph did not tell them there was nothing to forgive. He said, "Do not fear, for am I in the place of God?" (Genesis 50:19). - A confession names the one who did the thing. David names himself twice. (5) The deeds came out of real weighing. - Absalom did not drift into Hushai's plan. Ahithophel's advice "seemed right in the eyes of Absalom and all the elders of Israel" (2 Samuel 17:4) until Absalom called for a second opinion and judged it better. - David overrode the objection of his own general (2 Samuel 24:3-4). - Pilate reached a verdict, "he had decided to release him" (Acts 3:13), and then let the crowd reverse it. He knew his own power: "Do you not know that I have authority to release you and authority to crucify you?" (John 19:10). - Anyone who has sat on a jury, or chosen between two job offers, knows what weighing is from the inside. The texts describe that, not a machine running. (6) God's announced judgments respond to what people do. - When Ahab, the idolatrous king of Israel, heard Elijah announce the end of his dynasty, he "tore his clothes and put sackcloth on his flesh and fasted" (1 Kings 21:27). Sackcloth was the coarse cloth people wore in grief and repentance. - God said, "Because he has humbled himself before me, I will not bring the disaster in his days; but in his son’s days I will bring the disaster upon his house" (1 Kings 21:29). The disaster was postponed, not cancelled. - A nineteenth-century commentator on Kings saw no injustice to the son in that. God "knew well what the son would be," he wrote, and "if the son had departed from his father's sins he would have been spared." - When Nineveh repented at Jonah's preaching, "God relented of the disaster that he had said he would do to them, and he did not do it" (Jonah 3:10). - One scholar has surveyed the Hebrew verb behind "relented," nḥm, use by use. In a few places it means to feel pain, as when "the Lord regretted that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart" (Genesis 6:6). Elsewhere it means to withdraw a promised blessing or a threatened judgment because people's conduct has changed. - A sentence that sackcloth can postpone is addressed to someone whose response is his own. Therefore, the same passages hold the human agents answerable for those acts.

(P3) God's hardening, inciting and deceiving come as judgment on sin already committed. + The hardest texts are the ones in which God acts on a human heart: he hardens it, incites it, deceives it. Read in their own stories, each of these comes after the rebellion it punishes. (1) Pharaoh refused before God hardened him. - Before Moses ever reached Egypt, God told him what Pharaoh would do: "But I know that the king of Egypt will not let you go unless compelled by a mighty hand" (Exodus 3:19). Then he announced his own part: "But I will harden his heart, so that he will not let the people go" (Exodus 4:21). - Pharaoh's first answer came before any sign or plague: "Who is the Lord, that I should obey his voice and let Israel go? I do not know the Lord, and moreover, I will not let Israel go" (Exodus 5:2). - Then count the plagues: • In the first five, the text says that Pharaoh hardened his heart, or that his heart was hardened (Exodus 7:22; 8:15, 19, 32; 9:7). • At the sixth, for the first time, "the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh" (Exodus 9:12). • At the seventh it is told both ways: Pharaoh "sinned yet again and hardened his heart, he and his servants" (Exodus 9:34), and God says, "I have hardened his heart and the heart of his servants" (Exodus 10:1). • From the eighth on, the Lord hardens it (Exodus 10:20, 27; 11:10). - An article on hardening in an 1899 dictionary of the Bible drew the lesson from that count. The Lord's hardening comes after Pharaoh's, and so, it asks, "Is it not evident that the divine action described in 'the Lord hardened' was a punishment for the previous disobedience of the king? Is it not equally certain that each judgment, up to the last one, while a punishment, was also a merciful warning and call to repentance? At each stage Pharaoh might have yielded instead of refusing." - That last sentence names the ordinary mark of a refusal that was Pharaoh's own: he might have yielded. What made each refusal his, though, was that nothing settled it but Pharaoh. - Scholars who read Exodus as woven together from earlier written sources assign the two ways of telling to different writers. The count reads the book as it stands, which is the book both sides of this debate read as Scripture. (2) Where the text shows God's part, it was a mercy Pharaoh refused. - The text says what Pharaoh made of each relief: "But when Pharaoh saw that there was a respite, he hardened his heart and would not listen to them, as the Lord had said" (Exodus 8:15). When the hail stopped, the same thing happened again (Exodus 9:34). - God told him he could have ended it long before: "For by now I could have put out my hand and struck you and your people with pestilence, and you would have been cut off from the earth" (Exodus 9:15). "But for this purpose I have raised you up, to show you my power" (Exodus 9:16). God kept him standing, and Pharaoh went on, in God's words to him, "exalting yourself against my people" (Exodus 9:17). - At the sixth, eighth and ninth plagues the text says only that the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart, and does not say how (P5). The decree reading takes those verses as God settling the refusals, and the words do not rule that out. Where the text does show God's part, it shows a respite. - The same warning of hail reached all of Pharaoh's servants, and they did not all answer it alike. "Then whoever feared the word of the Lord among the servants of Pharaoh hurried his slaves and his livestock into the houses, but whoever did not pay attention to the word of the Lord left his slaves and his livestock in the field" (Exodus 9:20-21). - Origen, the third-century teacher of Alexandria, gave the church a picture that has lasted: "the sun, by one and the same power of its heat, melts wax indeed, but dries up and hardens mud." In the same way, he wrote, one and the same working of God in the signs and wonders "made manifest the hardness of Pharaoh, which he had conceived in the intensity of his wickedness" (On First Principles 3.1.11). - Augustine drew the conclusion: "Thus it was that both God hardened him by His just judgment, and Pharaoh by his own free will" (On Grace and Free Will 45). (3) Eli's sons were sentenced for sins they had long practiced. - The priest Eli's two sons "were worthless men. They did not know the Lord" (1 Samuel 2:12). They took the sacrificial meat by force, for "the men treated the offering of the Lord with contempt" (1 Samuel 2:17), and they slept with the women who served at the entrance to the tent of meeting, Israel's sanctuary (1 Samuel 2:22). - Their father warned them. "But they would not listen to the voice of their father, for it was the will of the Lord to put them to death" (1 Samuel 2:25). - Read at full strength, the little word "for" gives the reason they would not listen: the Lord had willed their death, and so they did not hear. The determinist reads it that way, and so does the middle-knowledge reading. Where they part is over how that will of the Lord's did its work. - The oracle that follows gives the grounds, and they are the family's own conduct: "Why then do you scorn my sacrifices and my offerings that I commanded for my dwelling" (1 Samuel 2:29), and "those who despise me shall be lightly esteemed" (1 Samuel 2:30). Later God says he will punish Eli's house "because his sons were blaspheming God, and he did not restrain them" (1 Samuel 3:13). - So "the will of the Lord to put them to death" was a sentence already passed on long rebellion. The decree reading takes that will to have settled the refusing itself. - The middle-knowledge reading takes it another way. Having resolved on judgment, the Lord sent them no warning of the kind he knew they would heed, and left them to their own way. A resolve like that settles where a man stands, not what he does there. The refusing was still theirs. - A parent who has watched a grown son waste every loan may decide to stop lending. The son's ruin follows, and the parent's decision is part of why, but the waste was the son's. (4) The deceived prophets spoke to men who had already chosen their idols. - The hardest single verse is Ezekiel's: "And if the prophet is deceived and speaks a word, I, the Lord, have deceived that prophet" (Ezekiel 14:9). - A nineteenth-century commentator on Ezekiel refused to soften it: "The teaching of modern thought is to soften language like this into 'I have permitted him to be deceived.'" He was right to refuse. Ezekiel's God does not say "I permitted." He says, "I, the Lord, have deceived that prophet." - The same commentator said what kind of act it was: "the delusion is a righteous punishment." The oracle bears him out. It is addressed to men who "have taken their idols into their hearts" and yet come to consult a prophet, and in the same breath God calls them to "Repent and turn away from your idols" (Ezekiel 14:3, 6). - The oracle does not name an earlier sin of the prophet's own. It does count him guilty alongside the man who consulted him, for their punishment is to be alike (Ezekiel 14:10), and it has already said that the Lord will answer such a man himself (Ezekiel 14:7). The likeliest reading is that the prophet's sin was agreeing to give a word to a man who came with idols in his heart. - In the parallel case of King Ahab, "the Lord has put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these your prophets" (1 Kings 22:23). Ahab had already, in Elijah's words to him, "sold yourself to do what is evil in the sight of the Lord" (1 Kings 21:20). - Ahab was also told the truth. The one prophet he hated, Micaiah, stood before him, described the lying spirit, and said, "If you return in peace, the Lord has not spoken by me" (1 Kings 22:28). Ahab went up to battle anyway, in disguise (1 Kings 22:30). - Paul describes the same order in one sentence: "because they refused to love the truth and so be saved. Therefore God sends them a strong delusion, so that they may believe what is false" (2 Thessalonians 2:10-11). The refusal comes first, and the delusion is its sentence. (5) The census came out of anger already kindled. - "Again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel" (2 Samuel 24:1): the anger was there before David was incited, and the census became the occasion of Israel's judgment. - The census differs from the other cases in one way. The sin being judged was Israel's, and the text names no earlier sin of David's. This is not a man hardened for his own past. It is a judgment on a people, carried out through a king's choice. - The Chronicler (the writer of Chronicles) names another who incited David: "Satan stood against Israel" (1 Chronicles 21:1). Read together, the two accounts give the inciting to both, the Lord whose anger was behind it and the tempter who pressed it. James rules out reading the Lord's part as tempting: "Let no one say when he is tempted, I am being tempted by God, for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one" (James 1:13). - The dictionary article on hardening says the same of the census and texts like it: "if we look into the context we shall find that, as in Pharaoh's case, the divine action is a punishment of sin." - The two accounts are like two witnesses to one event. One names the judge whose sentence the order carried out, and the other names the tempter who pressed for it. Both leave the order itself in David's mouth. (6) Nations hardened for destruction had filled up their sin. - Of the kings of Canaan, Joshua says, "For it was the Lord’s doing to harden their hearts that they should come against Israel in battle, in order that they should be devoted to destruction and should receive no mercy but be destroyed" (Joshua 11:20). Sihon, king of Heshbon, was hardened the same way (Deuteronomy 2:30). - The purpose clause, the words that say what the hardening was for, is stark, and the determinist is right to press it: the hardening was so that they would receive no mercy. Mercy was not closed to Canaan as such. Rahab and her household sought it and were spared, and one city, Gibeon, made peace (Joshua 6:25; 11:19). For the kings who fought, the hardening sealed a sentence. - Centuries earlier God had told Abraham that his descendants would wait for the land, "for the iniquity of the Amorites is not yet complete" (Genesis 15:16). The Amorites were among the peoples of Canaan. Moses told Israel that "it is because of the wickedness of these nations that the Lord is driving them out before you" (Deuteronomy 9:4). - Paul traces the same pattern among the nations: "And since they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a debased mind to do what ought not to be done" (Romans 1:28). - Augustine, no soft reader of these texts, laid down a rule for all of them: "whenever you read in the Scriptures of Truth, that men are led aside, or that their hearts are blunted and hardened by God, never doubt that some ill deserts of their own have first occurred, so that they justly suffer these things" (On Grace and Free Will 43). By "ill deserts" he meant what a person has earned by doing wrong. (7) A judgment presupposes a sin it did not produce. - A judge's sentence answers a crime committed before the trial began. A hardening is the same. Whatever it does, it is laid on someone already refusing, for a refusal that came before it, and that first refusal was not itself a judgment. - Calvin, who pressed these texts harder than anyone and held that the decree reaches the first refusal as well, agreed that they describe judgment: "the Holy Spirit distinctly says, that the blindness and infatuation are inflicted by the just Judgment of God" (Institutes 1.18.2). - What theological determinism needs from these texts is more than a hardening laid on someone already refusing. It needs a decree that settled the first refusal too, and none of these texts says so. - One text in which God turns hearts toward a sin names no earlier sin at all: "He turned their hearts to hate his people" (Psalm 105:25). The judgment pattern does not cover it. It belongs with the texts that state God's rule without stating its means (P5). - Think of a drunk driver. He answers for the crash at eleven through the drink he chose at eight, even if by eleven he was in no state to steer. That is derivative responsibility: responsibility for what follows from a choice a person made himself. The hardened sinner answers for what follows a judgment in the same way, through the refusal that brought the judgment on him. Therefore, God's hardening, inciting and deceiving come as judgment on sin already committed.

(P4) The evil God is said to create is calamity, not sin. + A second group of texts has God creating darkness and sending disaster. Every one of them is about disaster or judgment, and none of them says who settles a sinful choice. (1) The texts plainly tie God's rule over disaster to his deity. - "I form light and create darkness, I make well-being and create calamity, I am the Lord, who does all these things" (Isaiah 45:7). - "Does disaster come to a city, unless the Lord has done it?" (Amos 3:6). "Who has spoken and it came to pass, unless the Lord has commanded it?" (Lamentations 3:37). "Is it not from the mouth of the Most High that good and bad come?" (Lamentations 3:38). "I kill and I make alive; I wound and I heal" (Deuteronomy 32:39). "The Lord kills and brings to life" (1 Samuel 2:6). Job's family comforted him "for all the evil that the Lord had brought upon him" (Job 42:11). - The most thorough modern defense of Reformed determinism presses one detail hard. Christians readily say that every good gift comes from God (James 1:17), and are slower to say that he creates calamity. Yet Isaiah puts these words straight after "I am the Lord, and there is no other, besides me there is no God" (Isaiah 45:5), as though God's rule over disaster were part of what makes him God. - Grant it. God's rule over disaster belongs to his deity, and nothing in the middle-knowledge reading takes it away. (2) The Hebrew word covers disaster as well as wickedness. - The word behind "calamity" in Isaiah 45:7 is ra', the ordinary Hebrew word for "bad." Like the English word, it can describe a bad man or a bad harvest, and only the sentence tells you which. - In Isaiah 45:7 the pairs tell you: light and darkness, well-being and calamity. The opposite of shalom, well-being or peace, is not sin but disaster. Older English translations render the line "I make peace, and create evil," which a modern reader easily mishears. - "Bad news" and "a bad man" use the same adjective. Nobody thinks the bad news was wicked. (3) Each text sits inside a judgment. - Amos's question about disaster follows the sentence that frames his whole book: "You only have I known of all the families of the earth; therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities" (Amos 3:2). A chapter later God lists the famine and the pestilence he sent, each time with the refrain, "yet you did not return to me" (Amos 4:6, 10). - Lamentations asks its question in a poem about the fall of Jerusalem, a few lines after insisting that God "does not afflict from his heart or grieve the children of men" (Lamentations 3:33), and it answers at once: "Why should a living man complain, a man, about the punishment of his sins?" (Lamentations 3:39). - Moses' "I kill and I make alive" closes a song about Israel's idolatry and God's vengeance: "Vengeance is mine, and recompense" (Deuteronomy 32:35). Isaiah's words come in his oracle to Cyrus, whom God raised up to subdue nations "For the sake of my servant Jacob, and Israel my chosen" (Isaiah 45:4). - Even the proverb most often quoted for the decree, "The Lord has made everything for its purpose, even the wicked for the day of trouble" (Proverbs 16:4), names the purpose the wicked serve: the day of trouble, their judgment. - The Reformed scholar who collected the Old Testament's hardest texts of this kind grants that most of them concern God's judgment on sin. Of the rest, such as Joseph's and Job's, one defender of middle knowledge observes that God plausibly permits some evil to bring about a greater good. - A court sentence and the crime it punishes are both bad news for the man in the dock. Only one of them was a wrong. (4) God is praised for the good and not blamed for the evil. - The Reformed scholar who collected those hard texts states the difference himself: "The manner in which God stands behind evil and the manner in which he stands behind good are not precisely identical; for he is to be praised for the good, but not blamed for the evil." - James says it from both sides: God "himself tempts no one" (James 1:13), and "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above" (James 1:17). - The decree reading has an account of the difference too. God brings about good by acting, and evil by withholding the grace that would restrain the sinner, the way a bobsled pilot must act to brake but need only let go for the sled to slide. That account is coherent, and it marks a real difference in how God brings good and evil about. It leaves the sin settled by the decree all the same. - On middle knowledge the difference reaches further. God gives the good, and permits a sin that nothing settles but the one who commits it. The good is God's gift, and the sin is the sinner's own. - A father who pays his daughter's tuition is thanked at her graduation. If she cheats on an exam, nobody blames him for the cheating, because he gave the tuition and she chose the cheating. (5) Sending calamity is not settling a sin. - On every Christian reading, God sends disaster. The God of middle knowledge sent the plagues on Egypt himself, and struck Israel after the census (1 Chronicles 21:7). - The harder cases are calamities that come through human sin. Job's came partly through raiders who killed his servants (Job 1:15, 17), and Israel's through Assyria's armies. There the texts say that God brought the calamity and that the raiders or the empire did the deed. How God stood to their choices they do not say (P5). - So these texts divide nobody on the question that divides the readings, which is who settles a sinful choice. They show that God rules the storm. They do not show that he settles the sin. - A captain who says "the storm is mine to command" has claimed the weather. He has said nothing about who started the mutiny below deck. Therefore, the evil God is said to create is calamity, not sin.

(P5) No sovereignty text says whether God's plan settles the choices it works through. + Some texts state God's rule over human plans in general terms: how far it reaches, and how sure it is. None of them says whether the plan settles the choices it works through, or works through them by placing, prompting and judging while the choosing stays with the chooser. (1) The king's heart is in God's hand. - "The king’s heart is a stream of water in the hand of the Lord; he turns it wherever he will" (Proverbs 21:1). Its neighbors say the same: "The heart of man plans his way, but the Lord establishes his steps" (Proverbs 16:9), and "Many are the plans in the mind of a man, but it is the purpose of the Lord that will stand" (Proverbs 19:21). - Calvin read the first proverb as giving the mechanism, the means by which God turns the heart. It "has the same force as if he had said, that whatever we conceive in our minds is directed to its end by the secret inspiration of God" (Institutes 1.18.2). - The determinist has the stronger half of the image: it is the heart itself, not the king's surroundings, that lies in God's hand. - But the proverb gives an image, not a means. A farmer turns water by the channels he cuts in the ground. He does not change what water is, and the proverb does not say whether God's channels run through the king's circumstances or through his desires. - One text sets such a turning inside a story, and it is among the hardest of them. A psalm says of the Egyptians, "He turned their hearts to hate his people, to deal craftily with his servants" (Psalm 105:25). Hating God's people is a sin, and no earlier sin of Egypt's is named. The line before gives the occasion: "the Lord made his people very fruitful and made them stronger than their foes" (Psalm 105:24). Exodus tells the same event from the Egyptian side: "Behold, the people of Israel are too many and too mighty for us. Come, let us deal shrewdly with them" (Exodus 1:9-10). - The decree reading takes the turning to be God's work on the Egyptians' hearts themselves, and the verb allows it. The middle-knowledge reading takes the blessing to be the turning, given by a God who knew what Egypt would make of it. The psalm says that God turned their hearts, and what the occasion was. It does not say which. (2) God works all things according to the counsel of his will. - Paul calls God the one "who works all things according to the counsel of his will" (Ephesians 1:11). A Victorian commentator on Ephesians took "counsel of His will" to express "emphatically the absolute self-determination of God": God's purpose is formed by nothing outside himself. - Many readers take "all things" in the widest sense, every event there is, and the words can bear it. Two verses earlier, though, the same words name what God's plan will gather up: "to unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth" (Ephesians 1:10). Some take the "all things" of verse 11 to be those same things, the ones the plan will unite in him. - Either way, the verse says a good deal. It says what God's purpose covers, and that nothing outside him forms it. It says that he is at work to bring it about, for Paul's verb is active. What it does not say is how that working runs through a human will. - Paul uses the same verb for God's working in a sentence that keeps both halves: "work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who works in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure" (Philippians 2:12-13). - A general contractor can truly say he built the house, though the electrician wired it and the roofer roofed it. The sentence says whose project it was, and nothing about how he got the roofer to climb the ladder. (3) God declares the end from the beginning. - God speaks through Isaiah as the one "declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my purpose, calling a bird of prey from the east, the man of my counsel from a far country" (Isaiah 46:10-11). The man from the east is Cyrus, the Persian king named two chapters earlier: "who says of Cyrus, He is my shepherd, and he shall fulfill all my purpose" (Isaiah 44:28). - Calvin drew from this that prophecy requires power over events: "Even the prophecies would have no certainty or solidity, if the same God who declares that this or that thing shall happen had not the events themselves in his power." - Grant it. God has the events in his power: he can prevent any of them, and nothing he declares fails. - What the text does not say is whether he brings Cyrus to Babylon by settling Cyrus's choices, or by knowing what Cyrus would freely do and raising him up to do it. God says to Cyrus, "I call you by your name, I name you, though you do not know me" (Isaiah 45:4). Cyrus served God's purpose for reasons of his own. - A coach who sends in the one player he knows will take the last penalty kick calmly can say afterward, "I won that match." The calm was the player's. (4) The potter has a right over the clay. - Romans 9 is the chapter most often cited for the decree reading. Paul writes that God "has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills" (Romans 9:18), anticipates the objection, "Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?" (Romans 9:19), and answers with the potter: "Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use?" (Romans 9:21). - Two Victorian commentators on Romans read the chapter as proving "the absolute character of the Divine sovereignty," so that whether a man "be destined for eternal glory or eternal destruction, he has no ground for speaking of injustice." In the next breath they added that Paul "never says, he carefully avoids saying, that God has created men for reprobation," meaning for final condemnation, and that the doctrine is to be drawn from chapters 9 through 11 together. - Paul's rebuke of the objector is "But who are you, O man, to answer back to God?" (Romans 9:20). One defender of free will turns the rebuke against the decree reading. If God had settled even the objector's talking back, he argues, scolding him for it would be like a puppeteer scolding the sock puppet on his own hand. The determinist answers that a man who talks back for reasons of his own is no puppet, whatever settled his reasons, and that answer stands or falls with compatibilism (C). - What the passage asserts is God's right. A right answers the question "may he?", never the question "is the creature the source?" A king's right to pardon a thief decides whether the thief goes free. It does not decide who took the jewels. - The objection Paul anticipates would be raised against the middle-knowledge reading too, and Reformed critics raise it against middle knowledge today. A God who kept Pharaoh standing, knowing what he would do (Exodus 9:16), invites the same question: "who can resist his will?" So the fact that Paul meets the objection cannot tell us which reading he held (D10). - The question of whom God has mercy on, whom he hardens, and on what basis is the doctrine of election, God's choosing of people for salvation. It belongs to the doctrine of salvation, and how the sovereignty texts are read does not wait on how it is decided. (5) Careful readers on both sides say the mechanism is not given. - The 1899 dictionary article on hardening ends where the texts end: "The two regions meet at some point invisible to human eye and undefinable in human speech and thought." - The commentator on Acts who held Herod and Pilate guilty (P2) first quoted a German commentator, who read the prayer at full strength: "The death of the Lord," he wrote, "was not the accidental work of hostile wilfulness; but, on the contrary, the necessary result of the divine determination, which must use the free action of man as its instruments." Then the commentator on Acts added a rider of his own: this determination "must be explained in such a manner as to make it consistent with the free agency of men." That is a demand for an explanation the text itself does not give. - The Westminster Confession, the classic statement of Presbyterian belief, says that God ordains "whatsoever comes to pass," and in the same sentence that by it "nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established." Second causes are the creatures God works through. The confession affirms both halves and names no mechanism for how the liberty is established. - It does rule one account out, and that account is the middle-knowledge reading's. The Confession's next section grants that God knows whatever may or can come to pass on any supposed conditions. Then it denies that he decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or as what would come to pass on such conditions. That second denial rules out the middle-knowledge reading's account of the decree. - Calvin himself, who read these texts as a decree, would not name the manner either. God does not drag men against their will, he wrote on Isaiah 10, "but in a wonderful and inconceivable manner he regulates all the movements of men, so that they still have the exercise of their will." - A treaty signed by two governments tells you that both agreed to it. It does not tell you who drafted it. Therefore, no sovereignty text says whether God's plan settles the choices it works through.

(P6) A faithful reading keeps both halves of every text meaning what they say. + If the texts do not give the mechanism, every reader brings one, and the first test of any reading is whether it lets both halves stand. (1) Every tradition confesses both halves. - The Reformed scholar who collected the Old Testament's hardest texts (P4) sorted the texts on each side under headings: • On God's side, four: God as Creator, Ruler and Possessor of all things; as the ultimate personal cause of all that happens; as the one who elects his people; as the unacknowledged source of good fortune. • On the human side, nine: people face commands and exhortations; they are said to obey, believe and choose; they sin and rebel; their sins are judged; they are tested; they are rewarded; the elect must respond to God's initiative; their prayers are not showpieces; and God pleads with sinners to repent. - His book is called Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension, and he kept both perspectives. - Calvin himself held that God hardening Pharaoh and Pharaoh hardening himself fit together, since "man, though acted upon by God, at the same time also acts" (Institutes 1.18.2). - One defender of free will states the rule for his own side: "A solution cannot occur by denying free will (by some flavor of divine determinism), nor by denying God's sovereignty. Whatever solution is proposed, it cannot be affirmed by diminishing the role of one or the other." Of the two camps he adds, "The motives behind these two groups of Christians are both righteous." - A contract carries two signatures. A lawyer who reads out only one has misread the contract, however loudly he reads it. (2) A reading that bends a clause pays for it. - To bend a clause is to read it as saying less than it plainly says. Reading "determined" as "foreseen only" bends it, and so does reading "woe" as a verdict on a choice that was never the chooser's own. - The price of a reading is what it has to bend. Philosophers of explanation call the virtue in question explanatory power: how much of the evidence an explanation accounts for without strain. A reading that explains one half by explaining away the other has less of it. - A key that turns the knob lock but has to be forced in the deadbolt is the wrong key, however well it fits the knob. (3) The test is not rigged. - It is the test both sides already use on each other. Reformed readers charge that libertarians bend "determined" and "predestined." Libertarians charge that the decree reading bends "woe" and "lawless." Both charges assume that a clause should mean what it says. - The test does not decide by itself which readings bend. Take the woe on Judas. Whether a woe fits a choice God's decree settled is the question compatibilism answers yes and its critics answer no. The test cannot answer that alone, and takes the answer from the argument about freedom (C). - So the test cuts both ways, and the question is which reading bends least. - A referee who calls fouls on both teams by one rulebook has not rigged the game. Therefore, a faithful reading keeps both halves of every text meaning what they say.

(C) Therefore, the texts are best read as God's plan built around what people would freely do. + The best reading of the sovereignty texts is that God plans every event they describe by knowing what each person would freely do and placing him where he will do it, so that the plan is God's and each choice is its chooser's. It is the one reading of the three that keeps both halves of every text at full strength whatever freedom turns out to be. The open reading loses part of the first half, and the texts themselves show it. The decree reading keeps the second half only if a choice God's decree settled can still be its chooser's own. The texts do not decide that question. Nor do they decide the question the middle-knowledge reading carries, whether God knows what free creatures would do. Both are answered on other ground, against compatibilism and for middle knowledge (point 5). (1) Measured by the principle behind blame, the decree reading bends "woe." - Theological determinism takes "determined" (Luke 22:22) and "predestined" (Acts 4:28) at full strength. On it the decree settled Judas's betrayal and Pilate's verdict, as it settles every choice. Calvin put it without hedging: "That men do nothing save at the secret instigation of God, and do not discuss and deliberate on any thing but what he has previously decreed with himself and brings to pass by his secret direction, is proved by numberless clear passages of Scripture" (Institutes 1.18.1). - The trouble lies in the other half of Luke 22:22, and it comes from the principle behind blame. That principle is non-prevention, which one defender of free will states this way: "An agent is morally responsible for an action only if nothing prevented the agent from doing otherwise." To be prevented is for something to do the stopping, there and then. - The same defender applies the principle to Hitler. On middle knowledge, he writes, "there is nothing that actually exists that prevented Hitler from doing otherwise." On exhaustive divine determinism, which is theological determinism by another name, "God himself prevented Hitler from doing otherwise." The decree reading puts Judas where it puts Hitler. - Then "woe to that man" is spoken over a choice God's decree itself settled. A woe says that Judas ought not to have done what he did. But nobody ought to have done otherwise, the same defender adds, when God determined what he did. So on this principle the decree reading keeps the word "woe" and loses its verdict. - Unlike the open reading's cost (point 2), this one is not read off the wording of any verse. It rests on non-prevention, which is argued on its own ground and which the determinist denies (point 5). - The determinist's answer is that the woe keeps its full sense, because Judas acted on his own desires, and on compatibilism that is all a woe requires. An older form of the answer says that the decree works from above, as the first cause behind every other cause, and takes nothing from the man (D18). If either answer holds, the decree reading bends nothing. - Both answers hold only if a person whose choice another settled beforehand can still be its source. The manipulation argument gives strong reason to think he cannot. Picture a man designed before he was born, by someone else, so that he would one day kill, and who then kills on his own desires. He did not settle his killing, and a choice the decree settled was settled beforehand by another in just the same way. - Think of a playwright who writes a villain's betrayal line by line and then, at the curtain, weeps over the villain's choice. The tears may be sincere. The choice was the playwright's. (2) The open reading bends "determined." - Open theism keeps the human half at full strength. It must then read "determined" as God's resolve that the Son of Man would die, with the betrayer's part forecast from what Judas was already like. - But the Gospels foretell free acts in a detail no forecast could reach. Jesus told Peter, "Truly, I tell you, this very night, before the rooster crows twice, you will deny me three times" (Mark 14:30). Of the reading that makes this a forecast from character, one defender of middle knowledge asks, "But three times before the cock crows twice?" - Open theists have an answer. God knew Peter through and through, and could bring about the questions around the fire and the rooster's timing himself. But that leaves the open reading a dilemma. Either Peter's character settled the three denials before he made them, and then they were not free on the open reading's own terms. Or it did not, and then "Truly, I tell you" was a wager on the odds. - John says that "Jesus knew from the beginning who those were who did not believe, and who it was who would betray him" (John 6:64). God named Cyrus as his shepherd (Isaiah 44:28), and knew Pharaoh's refusal before Moses left Midian for Egypt (Exodus 3:19). - Many scholars date these chapters of Isaiah to the Babylonian exile, when Cyrus was already on the march; others hold them to be Isaiah's own, from a century and a half before. On the later dating the naming is the weaker example. Even so, the oracle announces something Cyrus had not yet decided: that Jerusalem and its temple would be rebuilt (Isaiah 44:28). - A forecaster can say "rain tomorrow" from the clouds over the hills. Nobody forecasts from the clouds how many times one man will say one sentence before a rooster crows twice. (3) The middle-knowledge reading keeps both "determined" and "woe." - On middle knowledge God knew what each person would freely do in every circumstance he might create. One defender of middle knowledge describes the cross in exactly these terms. God knew: • which men, if members of the council, would freely vote to condemn Jesus; • which people, if in Jerusalem that week, would freely call for Barabbas; • what Herod, if king, would freely do; • and what Pilate, if governor of Judea in AD 30, would freely do under pressure from the crowd. - God chose to create those circumstances and those people. So the whole event unfolded "according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God," and every deed in it was done "by the hands of lawless men" (Acts 2:23). - Scripture shows God knowing what people would do in circumstances that never came about: • God told David what Saul would do and what the men of Keilah would do if David stayed; David left, so neither thing happened (1 Samuel 23:11-13). • Paul wrote that if the rulers of this age had understood, "they would not have crucified the Lord of glory" (1 Corinthians 2:8). - Those texts tell what people would have done in circumstances that never came about. They do not say whether he knows it before his decree, which is what would make it middle knowledge. The decree reading takes them as God's knowledge of what he would decree (D17). - Scripture also shows God placing people with a purpose. Paul told the Athenians that God set each nation's times and places "that they should seek God, and perhaps feel their way toward him and find him" (Acts 17:27). - The commentator on Kings reasoned the same way about Ahab's son (P2): God "knew well what the son would be," and knew what would have happened had the son turned. - On this reading, to predestine is to ensure, and to determine, in the philosopher's sense of settling beforehand, is to necessitate: to make a thing go the way it goes by conditions that are enough by themselves. Luke's "determined" belongs with the first of these, not the second, for it says that God decided in advance (D3). Nora made sure of her father's speech without writing a word of it. (4) Even Pilate, the hardest case, fits. - Pilate's part fell within "whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place" (Acts 4:28). He is the hardest case because, on one way of fitting him into the plan, he had no other door. - One defender of middle knowledge argues that God may have resolved to place Pilate only where he would freely hand Jesus over. Had God known that Pilate would let Jesus go, "He would not have placed Pilate in such circumstances. In that case, Pilate did not under the circumstances have the ability to let Jesus go. Yet he freely sent Jesus to the cross, since nothing determined him to do so." - If God so resolved, the resolve shut Pilate's door. It was the resolve that shut it and not God's knowledge, since knowing leaves a door as it finds it. But the resolve settled where Pilate stood, not what he did there. - Nothing prevented him, and nothing but Pilate settled what he did. Jesus counts the sin his own: "Therefore he who delivered me over to you has the greater sin" (John 19:11), which leaves Pilate a lesser sin of his own. In the same verse Jesus tells him, "You would have no authority over me at all unless it had been given you from above" (John 19:11). A sovereignty text and a verdict of sin come in one breath. - Picture Nora making herself a rule: she would seat her father beside Uncle Ray only if she knew he would stand. Then there was never going to be an evening on which he sat beside Ray and stayed in his chair. Yet nothing held him in the chair, and nothing lifted him out of it. Standing was his own doing. - God need not arrange things this way, and in the ordinary run of choices the door stands open. (5) The reading is the best one, not the only one. - The texts alone do not prove it. On their own they tell against the open reading. But they teach no mechanism (P5), so no reading of them can overrule the argument about how God's plan and a human choice fit together. - That leaves two readings. One keeps every clause whatever freedom turns out to be, and the other keeps every clause only if compatibilism is true. A determinist can keep "woe" by holding that a choice another settled can still be the chooser's own, and nothing in the wording of Luke 22:22 rules that out. The middle-knowledge reading, for its part, needs God to know what free creatures would do, and nothing in the wording of Acts 2:23 proves that he does. - So what finally decides between those two is not one of the sovereignty texts. It is two questions, each argued on its own ground and answered there: • The first is whether a person whose choice another settled beforehand can be its source. Three arguments answer that he cannot: the argument that if determinism is true nothing is up to us, the manipulation argument (point 1), and the positive case for free will. The last of these is not philosophy alone, for part of it is Scripture's other witness: the texts in which God sets real alternatives before people and calls them to choose (Deuteronomy 30:19; 1 Corinthians 10:13). • The second is whether a statement about what a free creature would do can be true. The grounding objection says it cannot, since nothing seems to be there to make such a statement true, and the answer to that objection is that it can (D17). - Nor is this a verdict on a communion, a family of churches. One defender of free will argues that the five classic points of Calvinism (the Reformed teaching on how God saves) and middle knowledge are not mutually exclusive. On his view a Reformed Christian could read the sovereignty texts this way while keeping his doctrine of election. The Westminster Confession would not follow him there, since it denies that God's decree rests on knowledge of what would happen on given conditions (P5). - A jury convicts on the whole case, not on one fingerprint. These prints rule out one suspect and fit the other two. But they fit one of those two only if his own account of the evening is believed, and whether to believe it is weighed with the rest of the case, not read off the prints. Therefore, the texts are best read as God's plan built around what people would freely do. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One Philosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to Us Philosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free Philosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding Objection

On the sovereignty texts and their readers: Carson, D. A. Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension. New Foundations Theological Library. Atlanta: John Knox, 1981. Pages 18-35 and 212, as summarized and quoted in Craig, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, section 6.1.3.3.2, notes 2-6. Craig, William Lane. "Free Will." Reasonable Faith, Question of the Week #320, June 3, 2013. Craig, William Lane. Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. IIa, On God: Attributes of God. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2025. Sections 6.1.3.3.1, 6.1.3.3.2 and 6.4.2.2. Parunak, H. Van Dyke. "A Semantic Survey of NHM." Biblica 56, no. 4 (1975): 512-532. Stratton, Timothy A. Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism: A Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis. 2nd ed. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2026. Pages 64-103, 414-426, 580-581, 589-590, 594-596 and 603. On the decree reading: Beale, G. K. "An Exegetical and Theological Consideration of the Hardening of Pharaoh's Heart in Exodus 4-14 and Romans 9." Trinity Journal 5 (1984): 129-154. Bignon, Guillaume. "A Critical Review and Fairly Comprehensive Refutation of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism." December 2020. Page 41. Bignon, Guillaume. Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018. Pages 1-3, 7-8, 15-17 and 176-183. Calvin, John. Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Isaiah. Translated by William Pringle. Vols. 1 and 3. Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1850 and 1852. On Isaiah 10:5-15, vol. 1, pages 341-352; on Isaiah 46:10, vol. 3, page 442. Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion (1559), 1.18.1-2. Translated by Henry Beveridge. Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1845. Feinberg, John S. No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001. Helm, Paul. The Providence of God. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993. Westminster Assembly. The Westminster Confession of Faith. 1646. Chapter III, sections 1-2, "Of God's Eternal Decree." Text as printed in Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3. New York: Harper, 1877. On the open reading: Boyd, Gregory A. God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000. Hasker, William. God, Time, and Knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989. Pinnock, Clark, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger. The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994. On middle knowledge and simple foreknowledge: Adams, Robert Merrihew. "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil." American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977): 109-117. Beilby, James K., and Paul R. Eddy, eds. Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001. On the composition of the texts: Childs, Brevard S. The Book of Exodus: A Critical, Theological Commentary. Old Testament Library. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974. Japhet, Sara. I & II Chronicles: A Commentary. Old Testament Library. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1993. Pages 374-375. Motyer, J. Alec. The Prophecy of Isaiah: An Introduction and Commentary. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993. Nineteenth-century commentaries: Abbott, T. K. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians. International Critical Commentary. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1897. Pages 20-21. Banks, J. S. "Hardening." In A Dictionary of the Bible, edited by James Hastings, vol. 2, 302-303. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1899. Gloag, Paton J. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles. Vol. 1. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1870. Page 160. Hammond, Joseph. I. Kings. Exposition in The Pulpit Commentary, edited by H. D. M. Spence and Joseph S. Exell. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, n.d. Page 512. Plummer, Alfred. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to S. Luke. International Critical Commentary. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1896. Page 500. Plumptre, E. H. Ezekiel. Exposition in The Pulpit Commentary, edited by H. D. M. Spence and Joseph S. Exell. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, n.d. Page 248. Sanday, William, and Arthur C. Headlam. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. International Critical Commentary. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1895. Pages 266-267. Smith, R. Payne. II. Samuel. Exposition in The Pulpit Commentary, edited by H. D. M. Spence and Joseph S. Exell. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, n.d. Page 418. Historical sources: Augustine. On Grace and Free Will 41, 43 and 45. In Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series, vol. 5. New York: Christian Literature, 1887. Molina, Luis de. Concordia (1588), part IV, on divine foreknowledge. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso as On Divine Foreknowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988. Origen. De Principiis (On First Principles) 3.1.11. Translated by Frederick Crombie. In Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 4. Buffalo: Christian Literature, 1885. Biblical citations: Genesis 6:6; Genesis 15:16; Genesis 45:5, 8; Genesis 50:17, 19-20; Exodus 1:9-10; Exodus 3:19; Exodus 4:21; Exodus 5:2; Exodus 7:13, 22; Exodus 8:15, 19, 32; Exodus 9:7, 12, 15-17, 20-21, 34-35; Exodus 10:1, 20, 27; Exodus 11:10; Deuteronomy 2:30; Deuteronomy 9:4; Deuteronomy 30:19; Deuteronomy 32:35, 39; Joshua 6:25; Joshua 11:19-20; 1 Samuel 2:6, 12, 17, 22, 25, 29-30; 1 Samuel 3:13; 1 Samuel 15:11, 29, 35; 1 Samuel 23:11-13; 2 Samuel 15:31, 34; 2 Samuel 16:23; 2 Samuel 17:2, 4, 14; 2 Samuel 24:1, 3-4, 10; 1 Kings 21:20, 27, 29; 1 Kings 22:23, 28, 30; 1 Chronicles 21:1, 7, 17; Ezra 1:1; Ezra 7:27; Job 1:15, 17; Job 42:2, 11; Psalm 105:24-25; Proverbs 16:4, 9; Proverbs 19:21; Proverbs 21:1; Isaiah 10:5-7, 12-13, 15; Isaiah 37:26, 28-29; Isaiah 44:28; Isaiah 45:4-5, 7; Isaiah 46:10-11; Jeremiah 3:7; Jeremiah 18:7-8; Jeremiah 25:12; Jeremiah 26:3; Jeremiah 27:6; Lamentations 3:33, 37-39; Ezekiel 3:7; Ezekiel 12:3; Ezekiel 14:3, 6-7, 9-10; Amos 3:2, 6; Amos 4:6, 10; Jonah 3:9-10; Habakkuk 1:6, 11; Matthew 26:15, 24; Matthew 27:4; Mark 2:5; Mark 14:30; Luke 22:3, 6, 22; John 6:64; John 12:6; John 13:2, 27; John 17:12; John 19:10-11; Acts 1:16, 25; Acts 2:23, 36-38; Acts 3:13, 15, 17, 19; Acts 4:27-28; Acts 17:27; Acts 26:5; Romans 1:28; Romans 9:14, 18-21; 1 Corinthians 2:8; 1 Corinthians 10:13; Ephesians 1:10-11; Philippians 2:12-13; 2 Thessalonians 2:10-11; James 1:13-14, 17; 1 Peter 1:20; 2 Peter 3:17.
+ The exegesis (the close reading of Scripture) is selective. Each side reads the texts through its own philosophy, so the texts decide nothing, and each side has shown only that it survives them.
1. Much of this is true. Both sides bring a model to the texts, because the texts do not supply one (P5). Reformed readers hear "woe" as fitting the decree because their account of freedom allows it. Libertarians hear "determined" as a decision made in advance on full knowledge, because theirs requires it. If the question were which reading the texts force, the answer would be neither. 2. A reading can be the best without being forced. The conclusion is abductive (C): it names the best reading, not a forced one. The question is which reading keeps the most of what the texts say, at the least cost (P6). - On the middle-knowledge reading, "determined" as appointed in God's plan and "woe" as the man's own both keep their sense. - The decree reading keeps the first and pays with the second. - The open reading keeps the second and pays with the first. Two maps can both show the river. The better one is the one you can follow without walking into it. 3. The symmetry is not complete. - The texts tell against one reading on their own. Peter's three denials before the rooster crowed twice (Mark 14:30) are beyond the reach of a forecast from character, whatever one's account of freedom (C). - They also take away a claim often made for the decree reading, that Scripture teaches its mechanism. No text does (P5), so the case against determinism made on other ground is not a case against Scripture. - The decree reading's cost falls on many clauses: the woe on Judas, the "lawless men" of Acts 2, the punishment of Assyria's boast, David's confession. It would be easy to count each of them against it separately. But every one of them stands or falls with a single question, whether a choice the decree settled can still be the chooser's own, so they count once and not many times. The middle-knowledge reading carries one question of its own in the same way (D17). - The asymmetry is a reason, not a proof, and the proof is argued on other ground (C). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One Philosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding Objection
+ Determinism best explains the texts in which God brings about events through human acts. If God does not settle those acts, the libertarian owes a model of how God does it all.
1. The demand is fair. Reformed philosophers press it hard, and the list of texts is long: - Ephesians 1:11 - the calamity texts of Isaiah, Amos and Lamentations - Joseph's story - the Assyrians - the cross, twice over in Acts - the inspiration of Scripture, where the writers wrote freely and every word was God's If God does not determine these events, the objection says, the libertarian needs a model of how God does all of that, whether open theism, simple foreknowledge (D19) or Molinism. The claim is that determinism explains all of them best. 2. The model exists. Middle knowledge is the model (C). God knows what every creature would freely do in any circumstance, chooses the circumstances, and so brings about every event on the list through free acts that he does not settle. - One defender of middle knowledge works the cross out in detail: the council, the crowd, Herod and Pilate, each placed where God knew he would freely act (C). - The inspiration of Scripture is worked out the same way: God knew what each writer would freely write, and chose the writers and their circumstances. - The model carries a cost of its own, the claim that God can know what free creatures would do, and that claim is defended against its strongest objection (D17). A theater director who knows her actors can cast a play so that it ends the way she intends, without writing a line of their improvising. 3. The question is which model explains better. Both models explain the half of each text that says God brought it about. The question is the other half. A model that fits the first half as well as determinism does, and fits the woe, the "lawless men" and the confession better, is the better explanation (P6). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It Philosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding Objection
+ "Determined" and "predestined" mean fixed beforehand by God. A plan that rests on what God foresaw men would do is not a predestination at all.
1. The words mean what the objection says. - Luke's word in "as it has been determined" (Luke 22:22) is horizō, from which English gets "horizon": to mark out a boundary, to appoint. Peter's "definite plan" (Acts 2:23) uses the same verb. - Luke's word in "had predestined to take place" (Acts 4:28) is proorizō, the same word with "beforehand" added: to decide in advance. And the church's prayer pairs God's plan with God's "hand," his power at work. - Neither word needs weakening. The events were decided in God's plan before they happened, and his power carried the plan out. 2. The texts do not say what the deciding rested on. - One defender of middle knowledge grants that in these passages Luke speaks of foreordination, God's ordaining of events beforehand, and asks what it rests on. It could rest on God's knowledge of what Herod, Pilate and the others would do, should he send his Son. - Reformed readers answer that "foreknowledge" in Acts 2:23 is itself a knowing that chooses, as when Christ is called foreknown before the foundation of the world (1 Peter 1:20). They point out, too, that Peter names the plan first. Both points are fair, and neither decides the order. The order of words in a sentence is not the order of God's reasons, and the same Greek word is used of plain knowing in advance (Acts 26:5; 2 Peter 3:17). - So nothing in these passages says whether God's foreordaining rests on his foreknowledge or the reverse. A plan formed on knowledge is decided before the event and certain to come to pass, which is everything the two words say. 3. Ensuring an event is not the same as necessitating it. - To predestine is to ensure, and to determine, in the philosopher's sense, is to necessitate: to settle beforehand by conditions that are enough by themselves. Luke's two words say that God decided in advance, which is what predestine means. - The same distinction is put in one sentence by a defender of free will: "Certainty is an epistemic property, not a causal force." Epistemic means having to do with knowledge. - A decision made in advance, on full knowledge, makes sure of what will happen without being what makes each choice go the way it goes. - God's hand is in the event on this reading too. His power chose the people, the place and the hour, and nothing in the event happened apart from him. What it did not do was settle Herod's choice or Pilate's. - Nora made sure of her father's speech in advance, the day she made the seating plan. She did not settle it. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+ "As the Lord had said": the verses that say Pharaoh's heart "was hardened" describe God's work in the passive, fulfilling his word "I will harden his heart." The hardening was God's from the start.
1. The reading is a careful one. Several of the verses that say "Pharaoh's heart was hardened" end with "as the Lord had said" or words like it (Exodus 7:13, 22; 8:19; 9:35), which point back to the announcement of Exodus 4:21. A divine passive is a passive verb whose unnamed agent is God, as in "your sins are forgiven" (Mark 2:5), and in English these verses read like one. - In Hebrew they are not passives. They say that Pharaoh's heart grew hard, or grew heavy, and they name no one as doing it. - So the strongest form of the objection does not rest on grammar. It rests on the announcements. Before Pharaoh had refused anything, God said, "I will harden his heart" (Exodus 4:21), and every later hardening is told as that word coming true. Reformed readers take God's hardening to be the reality behind every stage, and the reading is not a stretch. 2. The same formula is attached to Pharaoh's own act. "But when Pharaoh saw that there was a respite, he hardened his heart and would not listen to them, as the Lord had said" (Exodus 8:15). There the verb is active and its subject is Pharaoh, and the formula still follows. So "as the Lord had said" marks a prediction coming true. It does not tell you who did the hardening. 3. The prediction rested on knowledge. - God's first word about Pharaoh was about what he knew: "But I know that the king of Egypt will not let you go unless compelled by a mighty hand" (Exodus 3:19). - A God who knows what Pharaoh will make of every mercy can announce the hardening before the first meeting, and plan around it (P3). - A mother may say at breakfast, "He'll sulk when I tell him no." When her son sulks at dinner, it happened as she had said, and the sulk is still his.
+ Calling the hardening "judgment" changes nothing. God still hardens, incites and deceives, which is more than permitting, so on this reading God settles the sins that follow.
1. Judgment is more than permission. - Calvin was right that "it would be ridiculous for a judge only to permit, and not also to decree, what he wishes to be done at the very time that he commits the execution of it to his ministers" (Institutes 1.18.1). - Ezekiel's God says, "I, the Lord, have deceived that prophet," and the middle-knowledge reading takes him at his word (P3). Where a text says that God acted, the reading says he acted. - Where the two accounts of the census name both the Lord and a tempter as inciting David, the reading keeps both: the anger and the judgment were the Lord's, the tempting was the tempter's, and the order was David's. 2. Even if a judgment settled what follows, the sinner answers for it. - Suppose a judicial hardening did settle some later act. The sinner would still answer for that act through the refusal that brought the judgment on him, as a drunk driver answers for the crash at eleven through the drink he chose at eight. - That is how Ezekiel reasons about the deceived prophet and those who consulted him: "And they shall bear their punishment" (Ezekiel 14:10). It is the punishment of men who took their idols into their hearts before any deception came (Ezekiel 14:3). 3. No judgment text says the decree settled the first refusal. Theological determinism says that the decree settles every choice. Judgment texts describe God's response to a choice already made. The refusal the judgment answers was not itself a judgment, and none of these texts says that the decree settled it. Pharaoh's first "I will not let Israel go" (Exodus 5:2) came before any hardening at all. 4. In the one hardening told both ways, the text gives God's part as the respite. When the hail stopped, "he sinned yet again and hardened his heart" (Exodus 9:34), and God says, "I have hardened his heart" (Exodus 10:1). The text does not say that God's hardening took the place of Pharaoh's. It says both, and gives God's part as the respite (P3). At the sixth, eighth and ninth plagues it says only that the Lord hardened, and does not say how (P5). The same sun melts wax and hardens mud. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin
+ "The king’s heart is a stream of water in the hand of the Lord; he turns it wherever he will" (Proverbs 21:1). As Augustine taught, God works in human hearts to incline their wills wherever he wills, and that is the mechanism.
1. Augustine did teach it. He wrote that "God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills whithersoever He wills, whether to good deeds according to His mercy, or to evil after their own deserts; His own judgment being sometimes manifest, sometimes secret, but always righteous" (On Grace and Free Will 43). This is the classic statement, and it deserves to be read whole. 2. In Augustine's own sentence, the inclining to evil is a judgment. It comes "after their own deserts," that is, after what they deserved. Augustine was describing judgment on sin already committed (P3). A few lines later he gives the rule that follows from it: when you read that men's hearts are hardened by God, "never doubt that some ill deserts of their own have first occurred." He did not say that God inclines a will to its first sin. 3. The proverb says that God turns the heart, not how. - A farmer turns water by the channels he cuts (P5). - Where Scripture's stories show the means, the turning runs through what people meet and weigh: a friend's persuasion, which Absalom judged better (2 Samuel 17:14). Where the psalm tells of Egypt's hearts turned to hate, it gives Israel's growth as the occasion and says no more (Psalm 105:24-25; Exodus 1:9-10). - Sometimes God is said to put a thing into a heart directly. When a Persian king favored the temple, Ezra blessed the God "who put such a thing as this into the heart of the king" (Ezra 7:27). That is God acting on a heart (point 4). 4. God can move a heart without settling a sin. - Prompting a king to generosity, stirring up the spirit of Cyrus to send the exiles home (Ezra 1:1), sending a warning that is heeded: none of these makes God the one who settles a sinful choice. - Where the moving is toward evil, Augustine himself says it comes after the sinner's own deserts (point 2). The one text that names no deserts gives only the occasion (Psalm 105:25; P5). - The dispute was never whether God acts on hearts. It is whether the decree settles every choice, sins included. - A teacher who tells a shy student "you should try out for the play" has moved her. If the student then cheats on an exam, nobody traces the cheating to the teacher.
+ Ephesians 1:11 says God "works all things according to the counsel of his will." All things means all things, every choice included, and a God who works every choice settles every choice.
1. The verse can bear the widest reading. Grant that "all things" means every event there is (P5). Nothing happens outside God's purpose, and nothing in his purpose fails. 2. Working all things is not settling all things. Paul's verb is active, and the middle-knowledge reading keeps it active. On it every event comes about by God's working, in one of two ways: - What God does himself, he does: the plagues, the resurrection, the sending of his Son. - What his creatures freely do, he ensures by creating them and placing them where he knows what they will do. Their sins he permits, judges and turns to his purposes. So nothing happens apart from his working, nothing falls outside his counsel, and the free choices among all things are still their choosers'. A conductor works the whole concert according to his score, even the cadenza, the stretch the score leaves open for the soloist, who improvises every note of it. 3. Paul uses the same verb where both halves are kept. He writes, "work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who works in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure" (Philippians 2:12-13). God works in their willing, and they are told to work it out. The verse gives both halves and does not explain how they fit, and neither does Ephesians 1:11.
+ God creates evil. Isaiah puts "I make well-being and create calamity" straight after "I am the Lord, and there is no other," so God's rule over evil is part of his deity, and a God who merely permits sin has been stripped of it.
1. The placement is real. The detail is well observed, and it is granted in full (P4). God's rule over disaster belongs to what makes him God. 2. The evil in these verses is calamity. - The Hebrew ra' covers disaster as well as wickedness, and Isaiah's pairs (light and darkness, well-being and calamity) say which is meant (P4). - Every one of the calamity texts sits inside a judgment or a trial: Amos's punishment of Israel's iniquities, Lamentations' "punishment of his sins," Moses' "Vengeance is mine," Job's testing. - None of them says that God settles a sinful choice. 3. God's rule over sin is not a mere permission. - On middle knowledge God does not wait on events. He chose the world with every sin in it foreseen, permits each sin he could prevent, judges it, and turns it to his purposes, as he did with Joseph's brothers (Genesis 50:20). - That is providence over sin in the fullest sense a holy God could exercise. What he does not do is settle the sin, and James says why: God "himself tempts no one" (James 1:13). - A judge who sentences a thief, confiscates the loot and uses it to repay the victims rules over the crime from start to finish. He did not commit it.
+ Pointing out that there is choice everywhere in the Bible does not move the needle. Both sides affirm free choice and responsibility; the question is whether they require indeterminism (the denial of determinism), and the texts do not say.
1. The point cuts both ways. It comes from the most thorough modern defender of Reformed determinism, and it is right. Choice everywhere in the Bible does not decide the question. Neither does sovereignty everywhere in the Bible, since both sides affirm God's governance of everything. What divides the readings is the mechanism (P5), and neither list of texts states it. 2. Where the texts show a means, none is a decree settling a sin. Where Scripture tells how God brought an event about through a human choice, it tells of: - persuasion, as when Hushai's counsel answered David's prayer (P1); - judgment after rebellion, as with Eli's sons, Pharaoh and the deceived prophets (P3); - knowledge joined to placing, as with Judas, Peter and Cyrus (C). Where it shows no means, as when God turned Egypt's hearts (Psalm 105:25) or hardened the kings of Canaan (Joshua 11:20), it does not say. None of these texts tells of a sinful choice settled beforehand by the decree. 3. The needle moves on other ground. What moves it is whether a choice settled beforehand can be the chooser's own (C). The texts, read one at a time, add two things. The middle-knowledge reading needs no special handling of any of them, on any account of freedom. And neither list of texts can overrule the argument about freedom, since neither states the mechanism that argument is about. A scale that reads the same whichever side you load does not tell you which side is heavier. You weigh the two sides one item at a time. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: If Determinism Is True, Nothing Is Up to Us Philosophy / Free Will: We Have Good Reason to Believe We Are Free
+ Paul anticipated the libertarian's objections: "Is there injustice on God's part?" and "Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?" (Romans 9:14, 19). The best explanation of those objections is that Paul taught determinism.
1. The inference is a fair one. The most thorough modern defense of Reformed determinism opens with it, and offers it as the best explanation rather than a proof. Its strongest form runs like this: - On determinism the two objections have bite, so Paul had reason to meet them. - On libertarian freedom the answer to "who can resist his will?" would be trivial: everybody. A creature able to choose otherwise than God would have him choose could hardly complain that God's will is irresistible. - So Paul's answer, a rebuke rather than a correction ("of course he can resist"), fits determinism. The same defense adds that critics of determinism raise the same two objections today. 2. On the middle-knowledge reading nobody resists his will either. - The word Paul uses for "will" in Romans 9:19 is boulēma, which means a purpose or intention: what someone has resolved to bring about, rather than what he commands. Pharaoh defied God's commands at every plague and never once thwarted his purpose. - On middle knowledge God forms his purpose knowing what every creature would freely do, and places each where the purpose will be served. So the answer to "who can resist his will?" is not "everybody." It is "nobody," for no purpose of his can be thwarted (Job 42:2). - So the objection bites on both readings: if nobody thwarts his purpose, why does he still find fault? The other objection bites on both as well. Reformed critics press "Is there injustice on God's part?" against middle knowledge today. A God who knowingly places every sinner where the sin will follow, they say, is as implicated in it as a God who decrees it. An objection that fits both readings cannot tell us which one Paul held. A cry of "That's not fair!" from the next room tells you that someone lost. It does not tell you how the game was played. 3. Paul's answer fits both readings. Paul does not correct the objector's premise, because on either reading it is true: nobody thwarts God's purpose. What he rejects is what the objector draws from it, the right to put God on trial, and the potter answers exactly that (P5). A right answers "may he?", never "is the creature the source?" 4. Election belongs to the doctrine of salvation. Whom God has mercy on, whom he hardens, and on what basis is a question for that doctrine (P5). A Reformed Christian could keep his reading of Romans 9 on it and still read the sovereignty texts the middle-knowledge way, though his confession may not follow him there (C). See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin Philosophy / Free Will: Ought Implies Can: What a Command Presupposes
+ God takes no risks. Only a God who has foreordained every event can guarantee his purposes, and a God who governs free choices he does not settle might see them fail.
1. The worry is right about God. Calvin warned against a God who "sat in a watch-tower waiting for fortuitous events, his Judgments meanwhile depending on the will of man" (Institutes 1.18.1). A leading Reformed philosopher of providence argues that God takes no risks because he has foreordained all the events of nature and history. They are right that a God who waited on the world to see what it would do would not be the God of Isaiah 46. 2. The God of middle knowledge takes no risks. - He knew, before he created anything, what every free creature would do in every circumstance, and he chose the world in which his purposes are accomplished through their free choices. - Nothing surprises him, and Job's confession holds without remainder: "I know that you can do all things, and that no purpose of yours can be thwarted" (Job 42:2). - Nora took no risk with the speech. She knew what her father would do if Uncle Ray told the story wrong, and she arranged for Ray to tell it. The standing up was still her father's own. 3. The events are in his power. He can prevent any of them, by not creating a person or by changing the circumstances. What he cannot do is make a free creature freely do what it would not freely do. That is no more a limit on his power than his inability to draw a square circle. It is a sentence that names no feat. 4. Depending on what creatures would freely do takes nothing from the God of Isaiah 46. The sharper form of the worry grants all that and says that even this God depends on truths he did not choose, what each creature would freely do. That is so, in the way that Peter's denial was settled by Peter and not by God. A God who governs through such truths, and never once fails, has lost nothing that Isaiah 46 claims for him. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+ God regrets and relents (Genesis 6:6; Jonah 3:10), and says, "It may be they will listen" (Jeremiah 26:3). So the plan texts should be read as God's resolve and forecasts, as open theists such as William Hasker hold, not as knowledge of what free creatures will do.
1. The texts are real. - "I regret that I have made Saul king" (1 Samuel 15:11). - "It may be they will listen, and every one turn from his evil way, that I may relent of the disaster that I intend to do to them because of their evil deeds" (Jeremiah 26:3). - The strongest has God expecting what did not happen: he says that he thought Israel would return to him after all she had done, and she did not (Jeremiah 3:7). Open theists read these as God learning what free creatures do, and they deserve credit for refusing to let the human half of Scripture fade. 2. The chapter that says God regretted also says he does not. - "And also the Glory of Israel will not lie or have regret, for he is not a man, that he should have regret" (1 Samuel 15:29) stands between "I regret that I have made Saul king" (1 Samuel 15:11) and "the Lord regretted that he had made Saul king over Israel" (1 Samuel 15:35). - The survey of nḥm (P2) found that in 1 Samuel 15:11 and 35, as in Genesis 6:6, the verb means to suffer emotional pain, and that elsewhere it means to retract a blessing or a judgment because conduct has changed. Read that way, the verse between them says that God will not take back his sentence on Saul. God grieved over Saul. He did not discover him. - A father can grieve over a son's choices without having been surprised by them. 3. Threats carry conditions, as Jeremiah says. "If at any time I declare concerning a nation or a kingdom, that I will pluck up and break down and destroy it, and if that nation, concerning which I have spoken, turns from its evil, I will relent of the disaster that I intended to do to it" (Jeremiah 18:7-8). A warning with a condition in it is not a failed prediction. The king of Nineveh understood that: "Who knows? God may turn and relent" (Jonah 3:9). 4. "Perhaps" is spoken to people whose answer is their own. - At his call Ezekiel was told that Israel would not be willing to listen to him (Ezekiel 3:7). Later God told him to act out the exile before their eyes, adding, "Perhaps they will understand, though they are a rebellious house" (Ezekiel 12:3). The God who said both was not confessing that he did not know. His "perhaps" addresses people whose answer is theirs to give. - Jeremiah 3:7 need not mean that God believed something false. It can speak of what was to be expected after all Israel had been given, the way a wronged husband says "I thought she would come back" of a hope he had every right to, without having been mistaken about his wife. - A mother who says to her teenage son, "Maybe this time you'll clean your room," knows perfectly well how the afternoon will go. She is speaking to him, not reporting what she knows. 5. Some prophecies of free acts cannot be forecasts. Peter's three denials before the rooster crowed twice (Mark 14:30), the betrayer known "from the beginning" (John 6:64), Cyrus called by name (Isaiah 45:4): the open reading has to make each of these a forecast from character. One defender of middle knowledge answers that reading prophecies as inferences "denudes them of any theological significance." Open theists answer that God can bring about what he announces himself, as he stirred up the spirit of Cyrus (Ezra 1:1). But an announcement that depends on a man being born at the right time, rising to power and being willing presupposes knowledge of free acts. The only way around that is for God to bring about every one of those details himself, and that is the determinism the open view was built to avoid. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+ The texts set God's plan and human responsibility side by side without explaining them. Any model goes beyond Scripture, and the faithful course is to confess both and stop.
1. The texts state no model. That is granted (P5). Many careful Christians rest here, and the dictionary article of 1899 said it well: the two regions "meet at some point invisible to human eye." 2. Confessing both halves already rules some models out. To confess both is to take "determined" as God's and "woe" as the man's own. A model on which one of those is false has stopped confessing both. That is why the test of a reading is whether it keeps both halves (P6), and why the test is not a step beyond Scripture but a way of keeping to it. 3. A mystery is not a contradiction. - A mystery is something true whose workings we cannot see, like the union of God and man in Christ. A contradiction is a pair of claims that cancel each other, like a square circle. - A mystery can be believed. A contradiction cannot. If a decree that settles every choice and a sinner who is the source of his sin cancel each other, an appeal to mystery cannot keep both. 4. Every reader brings a model anyway. The reader who simply confesses both halves still hears "woe" in one of the three ways, usually without saying which. Saying which is not going beyond Scripture. It is showing one's work. A student who writes down the right answer without showing his work may be right, but the teacher cannot tell, and neither, sometimes, can the student. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin
+ Assyria is God's axe, and an axe does not choose. Isaiah's own picture makes the creature a tool whose every motion is the wielder's.
1. Calvin read the picture at full strength. - He cites the text among those in which God "calls the Assyrian the rod of his anger, and the axe which he wields in his hand" (Institutes 1.18.1). - God does not teach the wicked to obey willingly, he wrote, but "bends them to execute his Judgments, just as if they carried their orders engraven on their minds" (Institutes 1.18.2). - In his commentary on the chapter he says that Isaiah shows God presiding over individual acts, "so as to move men, like rods, in whatever way he pleases, to guide their plans, to direct their efforts; and, in a word, to regulate their determinations." 2. The picture is a rebuke to an axe that boasts. "Shall the axe boast over him who hews with it, or the saw magnify itself against him who wields it?" (Isaiah 10:15). A real axe cannot boast, and the verse does not say that Assyria cannot. It says that Assyria did, and should not have. Only a tool with a will of its own can forget whose hand it is in. 3. The text gives the tool its own intention and punishes it. - "But he does not so intend, and his heart does not so think" (Isaiah 10:7). The intention Isaiah describes is not God's. It is "in his heart to destroy." - Calvin grants this much himself: "God does indeed make use of the agency of a wicked man, but the man has no such intention." And when others objected that the image made men "stocks and stones," he answered, "Though God compares men to stones, it does not follow that they resemble them in all respects." - Isaiah says that the Lord "will punish the speech of the arrogant heart of the king of Assyria" (Isaiah 10:12). Nobody punishes an axe. - So the picture makes Assyria God's instrument in the purpose it served, and the text makes Assyria the source of the pride it was punished for (P2).
+ Judas was a pawn. Satan entered him (Luke 22:3; John 13:27), and the Scripture about him "had to be fulfilled" (Acts 1:16), so his betrayal had to happen.
1. The texts say all of that. - "Then Satan entered into Judas called Iscariot" (Luke 22:3). - "Brothers, the Scripture had to be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit spoke beforehand by the mouth of David concerning Judas" (Acts 1:16). - Jesus himself, praying on the night of the betrayal, calls Judas the son of destruction, the one of his own who was lost so that the Scripture would be fulfilled (John 17:12). None of these should be softened. 2. Judas's own greed runs through every account. - John says that Judas "was a thief, and having charge of the moneybag he used to help himself to what was put into it" (John 12:6). - Matthew has him open the bargaining himself: "What will you give me if I deliver him over to you?" (Matthew 26:15). - Luke, in the verses right after Satan enters him, says that "he consented and sought an opportunity to betray him" (Luke 22:6). - John says the devil "had already put it into the heart of Judas" (John 13:2), which is what a tempter does: he puts a thing into a heart, and the heart consents. As James puts it, "each person is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own desire" (James 1:14). 3. The fulfilling was certain because God's word cannot fail. - Scripture had foretold it, and God's word cannot fail. The words about fulfillment say what the betrayal fulfilled, not what produced it, and none of them says that the foretelling made Judas betray. What God foretells, he knows, and knowing settles nothing. - Peter's own summary puts the choice where it belongs: the apostleship "from which Judas turned aside to go to his own place" (Acts 1:25). - A forecast of rain is certain to be right when it comes from someone who has already seen tomorrow. The rain is not falling because of the forecast. 4. The question is not whether Judas had another door. Whether Judas could have done otherwise, in the ordinary sense, bears on the ordinary mark of a free choice, not on its definition. The question is whether anything but Judas settled the betrayal, and nothing in these texts says anything did.
+ Acts 4:28 says that Pilate did what God's plan had predestined, so Pilate could not have released Jesus. Then he was not free on the libertarian's own terms, and middle knowledge collapses into the decree.
1. Pilate may indeed have had no other door. Grant the hardest version (C). If God resolved to place Pilate only where he would freely hand Jesus over, then, given the resolve, there was no way for Pilate to release him. That is the reading one defender of middle knowledge himself gives: "Pilate did not under the circumstances have the ability to let Jesus go." 2. Freedom was never defined by the other door. A choice is free when nothing settles it but the one who makes it. The open door is the ordinary mark of such a choice. If God so resolved, Pilate's case is the exception the mark allows. The same defender finishes his sentence: "Yet he freely sent Jesus to the cross, since nothing determined him to do so." God's resolve decided where Pilate stood. What he did there it left to Pilate. 3. Nothing prevented him, and he settled it himself. To be prevented is for something to do the stopping, there and then, and nothing did. Nothing but Pilate settled what he did in the judgment seat, so the sin was his, and Jesus counts it his own: "he who delivered me over to you has the greater sin" (John 19:11), which leaves Pilate a lesser sin of his own. 4. Middle knowledge does not collapse into the decree. - On determinism God's decree is enough by itself to bring about Pilate's verdict. It is a sufficient condition, one that is enough by itself, the way striking a dry match is enough to light it. - On middle knowledge God's placing of Pilate is a necessary condition, one without which the verdict would not happen, the way a courtroom is needed for a verdict and decides none. - The difference is between placing a man and making him choose. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Black the Neurosurgeon: Freedom Never Depended on the Open Door Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+ Middle knowledge is impossible. Nothing could make it true what a free creature would do in circumstances that never arise, so there is nothing for God to know, and the middle-knowledge reading rests on knowledge no one could have.
1. This is the strongest objection to middle knowledge. It is called the grounding objection, and the philosopher Robert Adams gave it its modern form in 1977. A true statement, it says, needs something to make it true. A would-statement (philosophers say counterfactual of freedom) is a statement about what a creature would freely do in circumstances that never come, and it seems to have nothing: - not God's will, or the choice would not be free; - not the creature's choice, which is never made; - not his character, which cannot settle a free choice. If the objection is sound, the middle-knowledge reading is not available, and (C) falls with it. This is the reading's own cost, as compatibilism is the decree reading's. 2. Scripture treats some such statements as true. - God told David that Saul would come down to Keilah and that its men would hand David over if he stayed (1 Samuel 23:11-13). David left, and neither thing happened. - Paul says that the rulers of this age "would not have crucified the Lord of glory" had they understood (1 Corinthians 2:8). - The decree reading takes these as true because God decreed what would happen, and the open reading takes them as statements of what was likely. On the middle-knowledge reading they are true because of what the people themselves would freely have done. Which is right is the grounding question itself, and the wording of the verses does not decide it. 3. A statement is true when things are as it says. - Think of a neighbor who has never asked to borrow your ladder. It can still be true today that if he asked, you would lend it, and true because of how you would freely answer. Nothing stands behind that truth but the fact it states. - That is the heart of the answer: the fact a would-statement reports is enough to make it true, as the facts about the past make statements about the past true though the past is gone. 4. Critics of middle knowledge are divided on the objection. The most thorough modern defense of Reformed determinism does not rest on it: its author has written that he does not know whether the objection is sound, and that it is "not a significant reason" he rejects Molinism, the view built on middle knowledge. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Counterfactuals of Freedom Can Be True: The Grounding Objection Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It
+ God is not a rival cause. His decree works through the creature's will from above, as the first cause behind every second cause, so the decree reading keeps both halves at full strength and bends nothing.
1. This is the church's weightiest answer. - Double agency is the classical teaching that God and the creature each cause the whole act, at different levels: God as the first cause, on whom every other cause depends, and the creature as a second cause (P5), acting by its own power. It is a serious position held by serious people, and a great deal of the church's thinking stands behind it. - A hand and a pen both write the whole letter, and nobody asks which of them wrote which half. - The Westminster Confession applies it to the decree, which by its account establishes the liberty of second causes rather than taking it away (P5), though it does not say how. - On this answer the decree reading pays nothing for "woe," since God's settling and Judas's settling were never rivals for one place. 2. A settling from a higher level is still a settling. - The question is what makes the choice go this way rather than that. If the decree does, then something other than the chooser settles it, from whatever level the settling comes. - Think of the engineers who design a self-driving car. They are not in the car, and the car really does weigh the traffic at every corner. Every turn it makes was still settled by their design, and their distance from the road is what lets them settle all of them. 3. The first cause can leave the settling to the chooser. - There is another reading of the same doctrine. God holds the chooser and his power in being and acts with him in everything he does, while the chooser settles which way the choice goes. On it the liberty of second causes really is established rather than taken away. - The middle-knowledge reading takes it, and so can any view on which the chooser settles his own choice. So the doctrine of the first cause does not favor the decree reading. Both can hold it, and what divides them is still who settles the choice. - Catholic theologians argued over exactly these two readings around 1600, and in 1607 Pope Paul V ended the dispute without deciding it. The Westminster Confession rejected the ground the middle-knowledge reading gives for the decree (P5), but its sentence about the liberty of second causes fits that reading at least as well as its rival. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: Theological Determinism and the Authorship of Sin Philosophy / Free Will: A Manipulated Agent Is Not Free, and a Determined Agent Is a Manipulated One
+ Many Arminians, Protestants who follow the Dutch theologian Jacob Arminius, hold a view the three readings leave out: God simply foresees what everyone will freely do and plans accordingly. That keeps both halves with no need for middle knowledge.
1. The view keeps a great deal. Many Christians hold simple foreknowledge without ever naming it, and it keeps much: - the human half, at full strength; - the "foreknowledge" of Acts 2:23, at its word; - the texts in which God foretells free acts, such as Peter's three denials, which tell against the open reading (C) and not against this one; - freedom from the grounding objection (D17), since on it God has no knowledge of what anyone would do in circumstances that never come, and so no such would-statements to ground. 2. Foresight of what will happen comes too late to plan with. - What God foresees is the whole of what will actually happen, and that already includes his own decisions: whom he creates, where he places them, what he sends. So he cannot use the foresight to make those decisions, since the foresight already contains them. - On simple foreknowledge, then, God could not have placed Pilate in Jerusalem because he foresaw what Pilate would do there. The foreseeing presupposes the placing. - Think of a man who reads tomorrow's paper tonight and finds a photograph of himself in the stands at the game. The paper tells him how the game ends. It cannot help him decide whether to go. - The charge did not begin with defenders of middle knowledge. It was pressed hardest by an open theist, who concluded that foreknowledge of this kind is useless for providence whoever holds it. 3. On the plan it reads the texts as the open reading does. The prayer's "had predestined to take place" (Acts 4:28) says that what Herod and Pilate did was decided in advance. On simple foreknowledge God decided his own part in advance and foresaw theirs, so it has to read the predestining of their deeds as a foreseeing of them. Its defenders answer that providence never needed more than a God whom nothing surprises. That is a serious answer, given by serious people, and it grants the point in dispute: God lays no plan through the choices he foresees. 4. It is a short step from where its holders already stand. Arminius himself owned Molina's book and quoted it, and historians still debate how far he took middle knowledge for his own. A Christian who holds simple foreknowledge already holds that God knows every free choice and that the choices are free. The middle-knowledge reading adds one thing: that God also knows what his creatures would do in circumstances he might create, and knew it before he decided which to create. See also: Philosophy / Free Will: God Knows What You Would Freely Do, and Plans Around It Philosophy / Free Will: God's Knowing What You Will Do Does Not Make You Do It
+ These texts come from many writers over many centuries, and they disagree. Samuel says the Lord incited David and Chronicles says Satan did, so they teach no single doctrine, and harmonizing them is special pleading (exempting your own case from the rules).
1. The differences are real. - Chronicles was written long after Samuel, and it retells the census with a different name at its start. Its Hebrew word has no article (no "the" in front of it), and some scholars translate it "an adversary." Scholars disagree about why the Chronicler named him: some think he would not say that God incited a sin, others that he names the agent God used, as in the opening chapters of Job. - Scholars who read Exodus as woven together from earlier written sources assign the two ways of telling Pharaoh's hardening to different writers (P3). Grant all of it. The question is what follows from it. 2. Each writer holds both halves by himself. - Joseph's "you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good" (Genesis 50:20), Peter's "definite plan" and "lawless men" (Acts 2:23), Jesus's own "determined" and "woe" (Luke 22:22), Isaiah's rod whose heart "does not so think" (Isaiah 10:7): in each, one speaker puts both halves in one breath. No editor joined them. - So the pattern is not an accident of combining sources, and it does not depend on reading the texts as one book. It is what these writers believed, one at a time. - Three friends who each kept a diary of the same road trip disagree about which day it rained, and all three wrote that the car broke down outside Tulsa. The disagreements are part of why you believe the breakdown. 3. The later writer kept the shape. The Chronicler changed who is named as inciting David and kept everything else that bears on the question: God's displeasure and his striking of Israel (1 Chronicles 21:7), and David's own confession, "It is I who have sinned" (1 Chronicles 21:17). A writer revising an older account still told it with both halves.

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